The [Chellen] plaintiffs included 52 East Indian men that had been recruited in India and brought to the U.S. by JPC. JPC hired the [Chellen] plaintiffs after a prior experience of bringing a group of 20 Indian men to Tulsa in preparation for work in Kuwait for a joint venture between JPC and a Kuwaiti company, [AL Samit] International.
In India, [John Pickle] ([AL Samit] representatives who were agents of [JPC]) personally met with the [Chellen] plaintiffs for recruitment. Pickle knew the plaintiffs believed that they would be working for JPC but not [AL Samit]. In order to bring the [Chellen] plaintiffs to the U.S., [Pickle] obtained improper visas for them. JPC told U.S. officials that the [Chellen] plaintiffs would be part of a “training” program and JPC also routed wages to the [Chellen] plaintiffs through [AL Samit]. Upon plaintiffs’ arrival to the U.S., JPC took their visas, return-trip airline ticked and I-94 forms.
[JPC] restricted the plaintiffs' movement, communications, privacy, worship, and access to health care. [JPC] provided a hostile work environment characterized by abusive language, demeaning job assignments, threats, and intimidation based on the plaintiffs’ national origin. [JPC] forced the workers to live in sub-standard housing. [JPC] threatened that if the plaintiffs left the area, they may be harmed by Americans who were angry about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and that neighboring black residents around the area were dangerous and would shoot them.
The Plaintiffs, 52 employees from India and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), sued the defendants, an employer and the owner, for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq., 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981, for deceit, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
There were two phases of the proceedings. The 1st phase of the proceedings, in which the Court determined that the plaintiffs were employees, and the 2nd phase of the proceedings, in which the Court was to determine liability as well as damages for all claims.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants for violations of (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981, and (3) State Tort Law, deceit, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(1) Violation of the FLSA:
The Court referred to the definition of ‘employees’ under the FLSA as entitled to a minimum wage of $5.15 per hour. For overtime hours, employees are entitled to one hand half times the rate for regular hours. The Court found that ‘employee’ under the FLSA imposes no limitation based on nationality or immigration status, and that other federal laws have been held applicable to unfair labor practices committed against undocumented workers. Thus, the Court found that the plaintiffs were to be considered as ‘employees’ under the FLSA. In spite of their status as employee, John Pickle Co., Inc. (JPC) did not pay the plaintiffs at the statutory rates.
In addition, the Court examined offsets for the defendants. According to the FLAS, ‘wages’ paid to any employee includes the reasonable cost. Cost of furnishing facilities found by the Administrator to be primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer will not be recognized as reasonable. In determining if a facility is “primarily” for the benefit of the employer or an employee, the Court has focused on if a particular facility has substantial value to, and could be freely used by the employee independent of the job performed. After considering the factors above, the Court found that the defendants were not entitled to offsets for expenses related to housing, uniforms, tools, and travel, though entitled to offsets for food, medical expenses, and telephone expenses.
Lastly, the Court examined the liquidated damages. Under the FLSA, any employer who violates the provisions of Section 206 or Section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, and an additional amount as liquidated damages. From other cases, the Court found that the trial court is required to award liquidated damages unless the defendants acted in good faith and they had reasonable ground for believing their acts were not a violation of the FLSA. As the defendants did not show reasonable ground, the Court awarded liquidated damages to the plaintiffs. This award of liquidated damages shall be equal to the full amount of back pay.
The Court also found that John Pickle (defendant 1) was personally liable for JPC’s violation of the FLSA since he personally acted to recruit the plaintiffs, personally involved in many of decisions which resulted in payment of less than minimum wage, and played a leading role in causing JPC to under-compensate the plaintiffs.
(2) Violation of the Civil Rights (Title VII & § 1981):
Both § 1981 and Title VII afford federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race. Both of these causes of action may be prosecuted by the same plaintiff based on the same fact. However, John Pickle cannot be held liable in an individual or personal capacity under both statutes as the remedies available under Title VII and § 1981 are separate, distinct and independent, and compensatory and punitive damages available under Title VII are subject to a cap that is not applicable in § 1981. Thus, the Court stated that it would consider the alternative remedy under § 1981 if violation of that statute can be made out on grounds different from those available under Title VII.
Evidence, such as the circumstances of the plaintiffs’ recruitment, their work, and their living conditions, showed that the plaintiffs were subjected to racial discrimination, disparate treatment, and a hostile work environment. The Court also found that John Pickle was personally liable for violating § 1981 in his action towards the plaintiffs since he was personally involved in the discriminatory decisions and acts that led to the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.
The Court stated that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover full and fair compensation for work actually performed under Title VII or § 1981, but not both. The legal status and citizenship of the employees do not change the entitlement of the plaintiffs. Under Title VII & § 1981, the measure of damage is the rate of pay that each plaintiff should have earned, given his skills and qualifications, compared to that of similar-situated non-Indian JPC workers, less any applicable offsets. While the minimum wage measure under the FLSA is subsumed in the calculation of lost wages under Title VII & § 1981, the FLSA liquidated damage award serves a different purpose and is not subsumed in the lost earnings recoverable under Title VII & § 1981. Hence, the Court admitted compensatory damages for the plaintiffs’ mental and emotional distress. The Court also admitted punitive damages recoverable under Title VII & § 1981 as the defendants did the egregious conduct.
(3)State Law Tort Claims:
Pursuant to Oklahoma law, the Court found that John Pickle is personally liable on the plaintiffs for tort claims such as deceit, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as he directly participated in the creation and execution of the plan to bring the plaintiffs to Oklahoma, including the misrepresentations made to them and the intentional infliction of emotional distress they experienced. Under Oklahoma law, Okla. Stat. tit. 12 §727.1(E), damages awarded for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress were appropriate to warrant prejudgment interest. Also case law, Oakland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F. 3d 1308, 1317 (10th Cir. 1988), showed that prejudgment interests may be awarded on damage for fraud and deceit under Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §§ 6, 7.
The plaintiffs have established their claims against both defendants for violation of the FLSA, § 1981, and their tort claim.
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
