




CONCEPT NOTE

Law Enforcement in Afghanistan

Time Frame: June 2010 – July 2012

Background



The threat of Afghan opiates for national and regional security is well established. Currently, over 90 per cent of the world's heroin is manufactured from opium produced in Afghanistan. Recent UNODC studies indicate that most production and processing occurs in the south and west of Afghanistan, with the end product being smuggled from Afghanistan into the Islamic Republic of Iran (105 tons), Pakistan (150 tons) and Central Asia (95 tons). While portions of the heroin trafficked into Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics is distributed domestically, the bulk travels onward to

Europe and the Middle East. More recent indicators now point out that also China, a huge market which traditionally sourced its heroin exclusively from Myanmar, is becoming a destination country for Afghan opiates.

An additional dimension to the drug trafficking situation in Afghanistan is the trafficking of chemicals needed for the chemical process to convert opium into heroin. Over 12,000 tonnes of various precursor chemicals, including approximately 1,500 tonnes of acetic anhydride, are required annually in Afghanistan for the illicit manufacture of heroin. As Afghanistan has no legal requirement for many of these substances they are not imported legally into the country. Traffickers are therefore forced to procure the chemicals in countries outside of the region and then smuggle them into Afghanistan. Such illicit consignments are usually concealed within legal consignments of chemicals, or other commodities, and smuggled through legal border crossing points. Recent successes have been achieved in Iran, Pakistan and Uzbekistan in identifying and intercepting such illicit consignments but in general Border Police and Customs authorities currently in the entire region lack the specialized skills needed to conduct this work.

'Roll-out, Roll-in' approach

The Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) approach 'rolls-out' investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and conviction in one integrated process. This has led to a tangible increase of cases investigated (400 in the last 9 months of 2009). Beyond this the accelerated support given to the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) by international partners such as the UK/SOCA and the US/DEA has boosted operational successes to new heights (doubling seizures in 2009) yet still far below average international seizure rates. The second part of the approach, 'Rolling-in', implies connecting Afghan national capacity with the wider region. Regional cooperation through the Rainbow Strategy, has equally led to promising joint operations, especially across the Iran and Afghanistan borders, joint intelligence with special reference to the Central Asian Regional Information Coordination centre (CARICC) based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and significant seizures of precursor chemicals through Operation Tarcet.



Law Enforcement 'at work'

UNODC has a comparative advantage in stimulating cross-border cooperation on law enforcement to contain transnational problems emanating from Afghanistan. The consultative Paris Pact Initiative and the operational Rainbow Strategy were devised with this intent. The latter consists of the following operational plans (i) 'Closing the Opiate Trading Highway – The Triangular Initiative'; (ii) 'Interdicting of Routes to/from Turkmenistan up to the Caspian Sea'; (iii) 'The Northern Route: An Issue of Stability – Cooperation with Central Asia'; (iv) 'Preventing Heroin Production through Precursor Control – Operation Tarcet'; (v) 'Avoiding Unwelcome Complications: Demand Reduction and HIV/AIDS'; (vi) 'Hitting the Pressure Points - Controlling Illicit Financial Flows to/from Afghanistan'. Cross-cutting issues are the 'Dismantling Regional Networks: Platforms for Intelligence-Sharing' and 'Facilitating Trade – Profiling of Containers'. UNODC is equally the implementing partner on counter-narcotics within the Dubai Process (Afghanistan/Pakistan) facilitated by Canada.

UNODC does support national and international partners also domestically, in specific niche areas such as assisting the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) not only within Kabul but, importantly, supporting an effective CNPA presence within the provinces. UNODC facilitates training through the Counter Narcotics Training Academy (CNTA) in Kabul and the concept of Computer Based training (CBT) which furthers the extent of provincial outreach. Strengthening the Afghan Border Police (ABP) at the Western borders with Turkmenistan, Iran and Pakistan, is a key part of UNODC's strategy to link national capacity with regional operations. UNODC actively promotes the concept of Border Liaison Offices (BLO) and the establishment of the unique Precursor Control Unit (PCU).

By utilizing the lessons learned through CN activities, it is now proposed UNODC provide additional support to the Ministry of Interior's newly established Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). In consultation with other international bodies engaged in strengthening this organization, including Combined Security Transitional Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A to become the NATO Training Mission) and EUPOL, areas have been identified where support is currently not being provided. UNODC has both the mandate in terms of the international conventions and capacity to provide support.

The proposed law enforcement portfolio contained in this paper firmly places the focus on the "operationalisation" of service delivery in Afghanistan. With the envisaged mentorship programmes in place it will be possible to place a focus on obtaining measurable results in terms of police actions that lead to seizures, arrests and prosecutions. In this respect, the proposal is unique as it focuses on quantifiable results as opposed to the provision of infrastructure, equipment and training with little follow-up as to the results achieved through the provided services. Furthermore, a major component of each segment focuses on the *Afghanisation* of the activities to ensure ownership by the Government and thereby guaranteeing sustainability in the long-term.

Proposed Areas of Intervention

Output 1: The core aim of UNODC will be to build the capacity of the Afghan CN Police (CNPA) by enhancing law enforcement capacities in areas of intelligence, precursor control, rule of law and enhancing capacity for law enforcement cooperation against crime, organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking, diversion of precursors and terrorism. The long-term development of a professional training mechanism was also identified with an aim to develop and deliver a wide-ranging drug law enforcement curriculum and implement regular training to CNPA officers.

- ***Mentors guarantee hands-on training and local transfer of skills:***
 - 1) Intelligence – The CN Intelligence Directorate is currently supported by an Executive Mentor. This mentorship does not, however, extend to technical matters for his staff. The purpose of this mentor would be to provide guidance and oversight to officers working in this directorate in order to enhance both their knowledge in the utilization of hardware and software packages as well as their skills in the analysis of complex trafficking networks;
 - 2) Precursor Control – The Precursor Control Unit requires the guidance of an experienced mentor in order to effectively identify and intercept consignments of precursors being smuggled into the country and in dismantling illicit laboratories. The mentor would also provide further support in developing intelligence related to these events;
 - 3) Mobile Detection Teams – The capacity to indict consignments of drugs and precursors moving along major transportation arteries in the country falls within the jurisdiction of CNPA's Mobile Detection Teams. Providing the teams with mentors will greatly enhance their capacities to conduct targeted intelligence-led interventions resulting in a significant increase in seizures and prosecutions; and
 - 4) Train-the-trainer/Training – Activities in Afghanistan must be sustainable and this can only be achieved if the national capacity to train trainees is developed under Afghan nationals. Currently this expertise does not exist, but a mentor will be able to enhance national capacity and assist Afghan trainers develop training programmes.

- ***Tailor-made training and train-the-trainers:***
 - 1) Specialized training courses, such as precursor control, drug identification, informant handling, interviewing and interrogation, human rights etc. will have to be developed in the fields the mentors are providing services. In addition, new and relevant curricula will need to be developed for various training institutions, again to ensure sustainability of efforts in the country;
 - 2) Train Afghan trainers to deliver above specialized training courses – As mentioned above, the overall sustainability of CN efforts in Afghanistan requires Afghan trainers to take over the assignments currently being provided by the international community. Identifying and training suitable candidates is a prerequisite in order to ensure the best possible service is delivered.
 - 3) To select and deliver training for (a) teaching staff in charge of training programmes as well as (b) administrative staff to run the Training Unit (CNTA);
 - 4) Training material in support of counter narcotics training, together with the development of a national CN curriculum will be developed. Also a national resource centre and the establishing of a database of training courses, materials, and students trained and resources available will be developed (CNTA);
 - 5) Training courses (including CBT) and study tours, in support of improving capacity of all staff involved in counter narcotics, especially those in the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) will be developed and arranged (CNTA).
 - 6) Provide technical equipment (as necessary) – CNPA remains under equipped and under trained if they are to meet the expectations of the international community. Equipment required ranges from vehicles to safety equipment, field test kits and rummage gear.

Output 2: Focus CNPA interventions through intelligence, in particular by utilizing forensic intelligence for strategic drug control purposes, improving knowledge of heroin production, trafficking routes and distribution networks from Afghanistan and linking this to similar initiatives across the border.

- ***Exploit the information available through the analysis of seized narcotic drugs and precursors:***
 - 1) Develop a standardized approach to heroin data generation, collection and exchange;
 - 2) Develop a database of analytical heroin sample characteristics (ensuring future links with existing databases);
 - 3) Identify and make available field tests for heroin processing chemicals, intermediates and commonly encountered cutting agents;
 - 4) Establish, for collaborative research purposes, a collection of authentic heroin samples with relevant background information including not only heroin samples, but also samples of opium, processing chemicals and cutting agents found at clandestine laboratory sites.;
 - 5) Establish a geographical information system (GIS) based on forensic information on heroin seizures (and possibly seizures of heroin processing chemicals);
 - 6) Mentor and train forensic analysts in the CNPA Laboratory in efficient analytical techniques applicable to Afghanistan in order to fully exploit the information available through the analysis of seized narcotic drugs and precursors;
 - 7) Increase the use of forensic information for strategic drug control and crime prevention purposes, and improved inter-regional cooperation of forensic laboratories through a.o. the EC/ECO regional program.

Output 3: Focus the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) on Intelligence-led Policing (ILP), by introducing a strategic, future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control focusing on the identification, analysis and management of crime problems, in an effort to guide police operations through a pre-emptive and proactive approach to crime.

- ***Exploit the information available through analysis for Border Intelligence and Financial Crime Intelligence:***
 - 1) Assessment with Afghan, CSTC-A and EUPOL partners of each cell with regard to training and equipment needs;
 - 2) Provide technical equipment (as necessary) in particular specialized hardware and software packages required for mapping and analysis;
 - 3) Place a mentor within MOI to guide both cells to collect information and analyze to direct policy decisions by the Government of Afghanistan;
 - 4) Establish an information collection plan and produce intelligence packages for interventions against criminal groups both in the country and abroad;
 - 5) Develop and disseminate intelligence for tasking by Afghan law enforcement resulting in increased seizures, arrests and prosecutions of high-value targets.

Output 4: To decentralize anti-corruption initiatives from Kabul to provincial centres where UNODC has out reach capacity and develop front-line law enforcement capacity in these locations in order to complement ongoing activities by the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) of the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).

- ***As requested by the Government, support the UN's interventions against corruption:***
 - 1) Assessment of current public perception and counterpart capacity in each of the five provinces with UNODC presence, and establish anti-corruption units;
 - 2) Identify and develop a training programme and deliver training in conjunction with MCTF;
 - 3) Provide technical equipment such as vehicles, hardware and software packages;
 - 4) Place mentor to guide operational units to assist with the collection of Information, analyze to direct policy decisions by the Government of Afghanistan;

- 5) Provide support for anti-corruption interventions at the provincial level increasing seizures, arrests and prosecutions of corrupt officials.

Output 5: Provide platforms for operational activities both in Afghanistan and in the region – Governments in the region are currently achieving successes through UNODC sponsored operational platforms within the Rainbow Strategy such as Operation Tarcet, focusing on precursors, or the Triangular Initiative focusing on joint cross border operations. These, as well as further initiatives, currently require build up within the country and financial support if they are to be continued in the region.

- ***The ‘forgotten’ but strategic Western Border with Iran:***
 - 1) Front-line police are trained, equipped in order to perform effective policing and drug interdiction operations in the most prolific narcotics trafficking area in Afghanistan.
 - 2) ‘New leaders’ identified, trained and empowered to take over day-to-day management in an operational setting Mobile Interdiction Teams are established, equipped and trained, and effectively conduct drug interdiction operations.
 - 3) Trainer-the-Trainer programme with the Afghan Border police introduced to ensure sustainability of activities;
 - 4) Platforms established to facilitate regional Cooperation/Cross Border Operations;
 - 5) Mentors deployed with units to provide expert services and guidance;
 - 6) Increased seizures, arrests and prosecutions of high-value targets;
 - 7) Utilize Herat as a centre of excellence and, in the event of security issues in other provinces, will use the existing facilities as a regional training centre. While mentoring is envisaged for the initial two-year period, the training and empowerment of the NCO cadre to take over day-to-day management in an operational setting will ensure the overall sustainability of activities.
- ***Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) between Afghanistan and its neighbours:***
 - 1) Creating effective cross border communication and cooperation mechanisms at 15 border crossing points. These crossing points are Chaman, Gulam Khan, Nawa Pass and Torkham (Pakistan); Islam Quala, Mile 78 and Zaranj (Islamic Republic of Iran); Aquina and Toraghundi (Turkmenistan); Hayraton (Uzbekistan); and Al Shanem, Eshkeshem, Nusay, Shegnan and Shir Khan (Tajikistan).
 - 2) Seminars will be organized for all four countries to gather senior officers and key representatives of drug law enforcement agencies situated in selected high risk border areas, and personnel involved in border liaison work;
 - 3) An initial needs analysis will be conducted. All drug law enforcement agencies at the selected border crossings will be visited by a team of experts. The analysis will be based on extensive fact finding before, during and following the visits;
 - 4) Onsite workshops will bring together officers that are directly involved with operations at the border promoting cooperation and coordination between officers along the border.
 - 5) Renovating premises, and will provide basic equipment for the BLO premises, including office equipment (computers, faxes, furniture etc), and communication technologies.

Activities proposed for funding under this concept paper

Activities	Timeframe	Estimated Cost (\$)
Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan (CNPA) - CN capacity		\$ 6,961,000
CNPA and Forensic Intelligence: Improving knowledge of heroin production, trafficking routes and distribution networks from Afghanistan.		\$ 1,629,000
Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) – Development of Intelligence-led Policing (ILP)		\$ 1,946,000
Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) – Major Crime Task Force - Anti-corruption		\$ 2,225,000
Afghan Border Police – Western Borders		\$ 4,490,000
Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) between Afghanistan and its neighbours		\$ 4,170,000
TOTAL		\$21,421,000

