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**SOCIAL DEFENCE POLICIES IN RELATION  
TO DEVELOPMENT PLANNING**

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## INTRODUCTION

1. Measures taken to prevent or control crime are investments: they attract scarce resources from alternative uses. Development which does not lead eventually to a more equitable distribution (and the secure enjoyment) of benefits is a questionable endeavour. Therefore any dichotomy between a country's policies for social defence and its planning for national development is unreal by definition.

2. The criminal justice system of a state and its penal structure are as much a part of its development complex as its public administration, its communications infrastructure or its sanitation. That they may not rank for priority in development expenditure should not obscure their significance in motivating national growth and in sustaining development effort at all levels. The recent preoccupation in industrialized countries with the problems of the human environment and the quality of life lends force to the argument that increased productivity and even the wide spread of education and general improvement of health, which are associated with affluence, can be seriously affected by the deleterious by-products of a national growth too narrowly conceived.

3. The relationship between development and crime has been considered within the United Nations framework for some time. The prevention of delinquency in the context of national development was the subject of study by the United Nations Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which met in Geneva from 6 to 16 August 1968. And the guidance for the exploration of the subject may be traced to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, especially the report of its meeting in December 1966 (E/CN.5/408).

4. The ideas for the subject of this paper have therefore evolved gradually and in several parts of the world since the Third United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Stockholm in 1965. The purpose of presenting them now is to bring out the issues arising from the subject of crime prevention and national development for consideration by the Fourth Congress.

## I. CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT

5. It appears that as any country begins to open up, outgrow its traditionalism and respond to outside influences or new ideas by modernizing, industrializing and concentrating people in urban areas, its people and particularly its younger generation seize the many new opportunities. And in doing so, a small but progressively increasing number of them succumb to temptations and seek illegal satisfactions through crime.

6. This relationship between the changes in a country's economic and social structure and people's attitudes and modes of behaviour is one not yet adequately traced or understood; but the younger generation is the most affected. Young people are the life-blood of new development and the most vulnerable to delinquency. It is on record that the younger age groups take a more prominent part in crime as development proceeds and as a nation grows. Their relative share of total numbers arrested, brought before courts, placed on probation, committed to institutions or placed on parole begins to increase. The fact, reported by several countries, that there is a tendency for this increase in youthful offenders and their crimes to penetrate to the younger age groups is also significant. Where at one time the core of the problem was to be found amongst young adults, it has now moved down, in many places, to the junior adolescent.

7. Some of this can be explained by increases in population, by cultural changes, by increased lawmaking and, of course, by the natural high spirits, adventurousness, even violence of youth in most open societies. With the growth of modern towns, however, the evidence has been accumulating for a long time that the problem of crime now facing society is no occasional over-spill of high spirits, no understandable excess of juvenile exuberance and no mere statistical phenomenon technically explainable by legal or demographic changes in age groups, by improved systems for data collection or by over-zealous legislation or law enforcement. The impression that juvenile delinquency is a real and not simply an apparent problem which is growing in gravity and extent has been reinforced by the five Trends Studies of Juvenile Delinquency commissioned by the United Nations in Belgium, India, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia (SOA/SD/CS.1-5, 1966). These have examined some of the usual explanations and compared them with events in the five countries. Nevertheless, the question of the seriousness of juvenile crime in developing countries still varies and depends to no small extent upon the scope of the law and the concepts of delinquency applied.

8. There are certain basic issues which arise from the apparent increase of crime with development and the related prospect of preventing crime by more effective planning and programming. Such questions might be posed in the following ways:

- (a) To what extent is crime a necessary part of economic and social change?
- (b) To what extent is it incidental to change? Is change or development possible without more delinquency?
- (c) If changes in the economic and social structure must be expected to lead to more crime, then:
  - (i) What are the forms and aspects of change and development most associated with these rising delinquency rates?
  - (ii) What types of crime increase (and what types decline) with the changes in the socio-economic structure?

(d) How can planning and programming be modified (without prejudice to the main goals):

(i) To reduce the crime-generating potential of the forms and aspects of development most associated with increased delinquency?

(ii) To strengthen the crime preventive elements in national development and bring these into more direct relationship with planning so as to increase their contribution to national growth?

These are all broad problems, a discussion of which could be unrewardingly academic. Yet there is nothing academic about the dispositions of valuable productive resources which planners are already obliged to make to deal with crime, and their decisions on such allocations will be affected by their position on the issues outlined here. The concepts may seem unmanageable, but the vast sums lost, transferred or converted each year by expanding crime intrude into the economy, distorting investments and raising costs of living.<sup>1/</sup> Manageable or not, decisions are being made; thus, some practical policy has to be adopted to rationalize the expenditures, control the flows of resources and promote more effective development with less crime.

9. The answers to the first two questions in paragraph 8 are unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future. They have been the subject of many studies of social change, as well as studies of crime.<sup>2/</sup> And in some respects it is a question of semantics, dependent upon the way in which terms like "change", "crime" and "delinquency" are used. Nevertheless, the relationship between structural changes in the socio-economic system and the incidence of illegal behaviour is fundamental to any discussion of crime prevention. The precise links or connexions may still be in doubt, but the correlation which is apparent needs to be considered. And if planning is envisaged then the issue, though unresolved, is one upon which a position must be taken.

10. The two questions concerning the relationship between change and rising delinquency rates, and the types of crime, are treated in sections III and IV.

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<sup>1/</sup> In the United States of America, for example, it is reported that one firm engaged in the general retail trade maintains a police force larger than that of the Chicago Police Department (14,000 men) and builds 1.5 per cent (about \$120 million) of its \$8,000 million in sales into the price structure to offset the value of stolen merchandise. It was also reported that, in 1968, one chain of supermarkets lost more in value of goods stolen than it made in profits. This is apart from organized crime and the corruption or official venality which affects many countries. (It should be added that the first firm referred to here later issued a correction reducing the figures. The general situation remains unchallenged, however. Crime does add to prices.)

<sup>2/</sup> See papers of previous Congresses.

Different levels and aspects of economic and social development are discussed for their effects on crime, and the types of offences are briefly surveyed. The possible ways of planning to anticipate and prevent crime, form the real crux of this paper, however; and this is the subject of section V.

11. Throughout the discussion which follows, an attempt has been made to avoid over-simplifying what are indeed complex issues, to introduce each topic, touch on its difficulties and leave open the subject for fuller consideration by the Congress. Nevertheless, brevity entails selectivity and it is acknowledged that the subjects treated here lend themselves equally well to alternative treatment or other approaches.

## II. FORMS AND RATES OF CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

12. Change in a society obviously varies from the insignificant to the profound. This range of possibilities can be plotted on a continuum with total revolution or complete transformation at one extremity, and changes at the other end of the chart so slow and imperceptible that a small and simple community remains apparently the same for centuries. Neither of these extremities is easy for the socio-economic planner or the criminologist to handle. Total revolution shifts power, reverses status groups, reforms court and police systems and transforms laws, values and attitudes. In so doing, it eradicates some types of crime and creates others, but makes comparison of "before" and "after" extremely difficult. On the other hand, where there is very little change (say, in a small tribe that has lived in much the same way for centuries) any such "planning" as there might be is reduced to seasonal preparations or annual cycles of production; and since nearly all types of deviation are "antisocial" it is not always easy to distinguish crime from what might equally be called immorality or civil wrong.

13. The study of delinquency and socio-economic change belongs therefore to that range of the spectrum lying between the extremes where the rate of change may vary from steady to rapid; but change of this kind is evolution, not revolution; society may still be transformed but it will take more time, the process will tend to be more orderly and there will always be standards of comparison with earlier conditions. Frequently the change is deliberate and developmental, involving motivation for growth (and possibly gain), a mobilization of resources, a determination of priorities and objectives and a selection of the programmes designed to bring about the change required. Sometimes the changes will occur fortuitously and be unintended, perhaps stimulated by forces or factors outside the control of the particular community. Whether planned or not, economic and social progress usually means a growth of and change in the structure of output, industrialization, the rise of new institutions, a shift of people to towns and, in general, more social mobility and family disruption.

14. Moreover, the public is now increasingly being forced to realize that changes have by-products which are not always anticipated or necessarily desired, such as high rates of population growth, excessive internal migration, the proliferation of shanty towns and urban slums, or water and air pollution.

15. Crime occurs and seems to increase with the acceleration of change or development. It can be regarded as an unintended outgrowth or side-effect of such development. On the other hand, a measure of crime could be essential to development itself. Many penal reformers have had to act illegally at the outset to draw attention to needed changes. Civil disobedience has been used as an illegal means to secure legal reform; for instance trade unions were once illegal. The first accumulations of capital may be contrary to established custom in a traditional society.<sup>3/</sup> There are "frontier" situations where the line

<sup>3/</sup> "...Schumpeter was fond of suggesting that banking originated in crime - in making available to borrowers what in fact did not belong to the lender". Talcott Parsons, Theories of Society, introduction to part two, vol. I, (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 255. Also certain business leaders were convicted of crime - if only white-collar crime - in the process of building up their conglomerates which later promoted affluence.

between lawmaker and lawbreaker is not always clearly drawn and where earlier lawbreakers became the pillars of a new society.<sup>4/</sup>

16. In any country, crime is related more particularly to the legislation which development may inspire and to the rise in levels of education. The former determines the area of conduct to be regarded as criminal; the latter probably affects deeply the concepts of acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour.

17. In fact, then, crime as a social phenomenon could be to some extent:

(a) One result of the projection of outmoded standards into an age which has no place for them but has not changed the law;

(b) An undesirable side-effect of development partially negating its benefits and to some extent hampering its progress;

(c) A necessary means of ensuring cultural adaptation and a new phase of the development spiral. For instance, the same qualities that produce criminals (such as risk-taking, aggressiveness and the desire for gain) also produce entrepreneurs and business leaders.

#### Anticipation of Behaviour and Change

18. The relationship between human behaviour and social change is the crucial factor in understanding not only crime, but development itself. Motivation lies at the heart of the problem of mobilizing human resources and it needs to be kept constantly in mind in development planning. While some of the poorer Governments may be resisting the temptation to offer much needed social benefits which might be difficult to maintain and which would divert resources from the more forward-looking investments in agriculture, industry, tourism or commerce on which the levels of living depend, they know full well that their policies must stand the test of immediate human impact. People have to be persuaded to make the sacrifices and efforts necessary for growth. Often, in developing countries, efforts are being made to change not only attitudes and behaviour patterns but basic institutions and structures in order to promote economic and social growth.<sup>5/</sup> These same changes will be relevant in legislation and the amount of illegal conduct.

19. Sociologists and psychologists have shown that as the pace of change quickens, human nature is being forced to adapt and readapt, to adjust and accommodate itself ever more quickly to a "kaleidoscopic" existence. Urban concentrations, the progressive reduction of living space and the spread of community indifference as masses of people are brought to live and work in close proximity are all said to be related to the increased aggression, nervous tension and disorientation of our times. It would be surprising if this did not lead to more inadequacy and illegal compensation, more short cuts to possession, more outbursts of impatience and selfishness and therefore more crime.

<sup>4/</sup> See Mabel Elliott, "Our frontier heritage", Social Disorganization, (New York, Harper and Bros., 1961), pp. 543 ff.

<sup>5/</sup> For the significance of the structural changes of development, see report of the Committee for Development Planning on its sixth session (Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 7).



20. If not actually an integral or necessary part of the modern experience of accelerated change, increased delinquency is a thoroughly predictable event. We may not know exactly where, amongst whom or when it will happen, but we do usually know that it will happen and we are beginning to be able to predict the risk. It is closely related to the move from a closed to an open society and to the changes of scale as the society develops. There can be no question of a move back to simple forms of living. Our numbers and our commitment to higher living conditions preclude this. It seems, therefore, that some level of crime is to be expected. It may even be acceptable as a cost of growth, but like any other cost it needs to be kept as low as possible. Simply because an increased measure of crime is foreseeable, it should be possible to anticipate it by crime prevention policies and programmes. These cannot be static or based upon what has happened in the past.<sup>6/</sup> They must be forward-looking, dynamic, flexible and indeed an integral part of development process itself. This is an ideal easier to state than to realize in practice. It implies close collaboration between general planners and criminologists, with an understanding of each other's problems. It involves their joint endeavour to formulate policies, plans and programmes serving to prevent crime. This might mean:

- (a) Making crime more difficult to commit without detection;
- (b) Being more permissive about behaviour which cannot be controlled by law;
- (c) Involving young people more effectively in the development of the country;
- (d) Providing better guidance and creative opportunities for the more vulnerable juveniles (that is, those in age groups most prone to delinquency);
- (e) Better planning and evaluation of specific investments in social defence projects and programmes;
- (f) Making special provisions for high-risk groups - for example, the unemployed, the school drop-outs or the hard-core offenders (that is, the aggressive, psychopathic or compulsive criminals).

Naturally, the strategy, approach and formula will vary from country to country and according to local conditions.

21. It must be recognized, however, that all such measures could be criticized as being only supposedly preventive since we cannot specify the causes of crime and there is still no unequivocal measure of crime prevention. Thus any action or inaction in this field is subject to question. Even involving young people or ensuring the development of their individual capacities cannot guarantee a reduction of lawbreaking.

22. Yet something obviously needs to be done long before such questions can be satisfactorily answered by the results of protracted research. And careful moves along lines already shown to be promising, supported by regular evaluations and reviews, are intended to give both general planners and criminologists a more effective understanding and control of crime.

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<sup>6/</sup> See report of the United Nations Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 6 to 16 August 1968, p. 13, para. 46 (ST/SOA/91).

### III. POTENTIAL CRIMINOGENIC ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT

23. All kinds of social changes have been associated with delinquency or crime and it is necessary to make clear that nothing in the discussion which follows is intended to imply that there are universal phenomena called "crime" or "juvenile delinquency" which are in every country the same things expressed in the same ways; nor is it assumed that development is always the same regardless of the conditions within which it evolves. However, there is a kind of recurring pattern, though it may be differently expressed and experienced, to the various aspects of development which are thought to be associated with delinquency.

24. In different areas of the world, crime has been attributed respectively to:

(a) "Population increases, urban migration, poverty, materialism, inadequate services for education, employment and leisure activities, opportunities for property offences in cities."<sup>7/</sup>

(b) "Family disintegration, mass migration, poverty."<sup>8/</sup>

(c) "Transformation of family systems, working mothers, housing conditions, education, urban migration, mass communications."<sup>9/</sup>

25. It is clear that most of these terms or factors are closely related, umbrella expressions for a host of subfactors, subprocesses and adjustments. Moreover, none can be said to be more than potentially crime generating. It has to be borne in mind, therefore, that firstly far more non-offenders than offenders have been subjected to these so-called criminogenic factors in development - that is, they are only criminogenic in special circumstances for a minority of the total subjected to them - and secondly, these factors refer to conditions or influences which are almost invariably combined in any given development situation or in any delinquent personality case study.

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<sup>7/</sup> Sanga Linasmita, "Report on the Results of the Research on Causes of Certain Types of Offences Committed by Children and Juveniles, Bangkok, 1965", reviewed in W. H. Nagel, "Juvenile Delinquency in Thailand", report of the United Nations Technical Assistance Expert in Juvenile Delinquency, Bangkok, 1967. pp. 116-126. Quoted in A. A. G. Peters, Comparative Survey of Juvenile Delinquency in Asia and the Far East, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute, Fuchu, Tokyo, 1968.

<sup>8/</sup> "Third United Nations Seminar for the Arab States on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Damascus, Syria, 26 September to 5 October 1964", pp. 6-9 (ST/TAO/SER.C/81).

<sup>9/</sup> Ministry of Justice, "Present state of juvenile delinquency and counter-measures in Japan" (Tokyo, 1965).

#### A. Main aspects

26. The main aspects of development which have been thought potentially criminogenic are briefly reviewed below.<sup>10/</sup>

##### 1. Urbanization

27. Urbanization is the form of structural change, usually a result of economic growth, which is everywhere and most obviously considered to be associated with the growth of all kinds of crime, especially juvenile crime. Uncontrolled children on the streets of a town are a problem; children in a village are everyone's responsibility. Stealing is made easier, more attractive, more tempting in the towns. Gangs, cliques, organized groups or deviant subcultures form more readily and appropriately in a complex urban society. The literature on crime and urban living is replete with elaborations of this theme. Statistics indicate more crime as a town develops and there is some evidence that beyond a certain size the crime rise is more than proportionate. It is unwise to generalize, however, since so much depends upon the structure of the population, the layout of industrial and residential areas and the cultures of people concerned, not to mention methods of data compilation.<sup>11/</sup>

28. Urbanization, of course, stands for a psychological as well as a sociological and economic process. It connotes all kinds of change, in patterns of population distribution, in work habits, housing, leisure pursuits, transactions with widening circles of people and myriad opportunities for crime; it also means a greater complexity of life, impersonality of relationships, subcultures and less immediate controls of behaviour. It implies more opportunities for crime with less risk of detection and a disturbing juxtaposition of affluence and poverty. In fact, the other potentially criminogenic aspects of development listed below are very closely linked with urbanization and often promoted by it.

29. Urbanization is a necessary part of economic and social growth and not all urbanization has negative effects upon behaviour. There are smaller urban areas relatively free of crime while other areas have concentrations of either offences or offenders - or both. Furthermore, some towns are served by workers who come in from traditional villages, thus straddling both stages of development, and others have seasonal migration. Urbanization can mean very different types of urban concentration. Once one begins to analyse the concept of urbanization, the problem ramifies. Is it, for example, the most urbanized people who become the most delinquent? By "most urbanized" does one mean those most adapted to

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<sup>10/</sup> Poverty is not treated separately below, and neither is affluence, not because they are not important but because they are too obviously important - and too obviously relative. In so far as all planning for development aims at raising standards of living, poverty is likely to be dealt with.

<sup>11/</sup> There is some evidence of declining rates of serious crime in certain towns of Japan where the surge of rapid urbanization is levelling off and better living conditions prevail. These, however, are indicators which need more careful study before they can be properly interpreted.

town life or those who have had longer periods of residence in the towns? Or is it the unsettled newcomer unable to cope with his new urban problems? Obviously these varied conditions can lead to crime in different people in diverse ways. Often the most serious behaviour problems occur amongst those born in or of long residence in towns who have not found yet the status positions and careers associated with success in urban areas. This raises again the obscure issue of whether such young people are really urbanized and what one means by the word. The importance of subcultures and subgroups in the process of socialization and the possible inverse relationship between the number of legitimate channels to success and illegitimate behaviour have received a great deal of attention.

30. The extent of urbanization and its irreversible character <sup>12/</sup> in many parts of the world needs to be taken into account. The world's urban population, that is people living in towns of 20,000 or more, has been tentatively estimated to have increased threefold between 1920 and 1960.<sup>13/</sup> African and Latin American towns grew in population by nearly 70 per cent in the ten years up to 1960 and at present rates of growth African towns will have to be able to accommodate six times the present number of people by the end of the century.<sup>14/</sup> Presumably, unless there is a great movement to prevent juvenile crime in Africa, delinquency can also be projected to increase sixfold in that period, since most of it is to be found in towns. For the period 1950 to 1960 East and South Asia showed a 50 per cent rise in urban populations. These rates were 2.5 to 3.5 times higher for all regions than corresponding rates for total population growth. Moreover the figures for developing areas are even more significant when compared with the 18 per cent growth in European towns between 1950 and 1960.<sup>15/</sup>

31. Urbanization is usually closely associated with industrialization (dealt with separately below) and leads to a growing interdependent system drawing more and more people into its vortex and affecting developments in other parts of the country. It is reasonable to suppose that industrialization compounds, at least indirectly, the criminogenic aspects of urbanization in many developing countries. On the other hand, it may be noted that those same factors associated with crime in towns and now referred to as criminogenic have proved stimulating challenges for probably far more people than those who become delinquent.<sup>16/</sup>

32. Finally, it has been suggested that it is urban growth, especially when rapid and unplanned, and the element of mobility or instability in urban life which is what really produces crime. It has been noted that smaller towns and particularly

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<sup>12/</sup> "Urbanization: development policies and planning" International Social Development Review, No. 1 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.1).

<sup>13/</sup> Ibid., p. 10. See also Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population, 1920-2000 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.XIII.3), 1969, p. 49.

<sup>14/</sup> "Urbanization: development policies and planning", pp. 39-47, 55-62.

<sup>15/</sup> Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population, p. 24.

<sup>16/</sup> Nor should it be overlooked that rural areas may become affected by the return of some delinquents from towns or by the outward spread of urban influences.

those not conspicuously growing are often rather less troubled with juvenile delinquency than those that are developing apace.<sup>17/</sup> For the prevention of crime it may therefore be the rate and type of urbanization combined with the mobility on which most planning attention should be focused. On the other hand the question of a community's toleration of deviance is clearly relevant to such data and the extent to which crime is reported will have a marked effect on it. Other suggestions are that urbanization should be divided into stages, of which some are more criminogenic than others; that it is not urbanization per se which produces crime but what it brings in its trail; or that urbanization unaccompanied by industrialization is the real source of trouble.<sup>18/</sup> It probably all depends upon what one means by urbanization. Certainly the last suggestion, that urbanization needs industry, may only apply to situations in which the urbanization and industrial ways of life are geared. There are examples of large cities which preceded industry and which depend more on commerce and trade.

33. This is obviously an area for closer study, but its importance for developing countries is already very clear. The rapidity of their growth and the great stages of modernization which they span in a short period make it probable that they are heading for more delinquency proportionately than some developed countries. Everything goes to show, however, that this can be prevented if handled in time. Much will depend upon how effective community controls and planned countermeasures are.

## 2. Industrialization

34. Practically everywhere this is associated with urban growth. There are of course towns which developed commercially or grew as administrative centres and are not so much industrialized, but there is no significant industrialization without a form of township development. Just how far this can be called urban depends on the circumstances. The effect of industrialization on crime is said to be through other factors: creating mobility; reducing extended family life by work-tied housing and the individual nature of wage earnings; offering work to women who then may not be able to give proper care to their children; creating need if not providing adequate social security for sickness or incapacity.

35. In developing countries the combination of industrialization and urban growth has frequently led to young people being attracted to town when there is still not sufficient work to go around, whereas their labour could have been used in the rural areas they left. The result has been structural unemployment, another indirect factor in juvenile crime. Thus, between 1955 and 1964, the manufacturing output in the developing countries rose by 7 per cent annually but employment by only about 4 per cent.<sup>19/</sup> This can be expected to continue as a

<sup>17/</sup> See "Juvenile delinquency in Zambia" (SOA/SD/CS.3, 1967). Also, recent evidence from Poland and Japan (see "report of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts on Social Defence Policies in Relation to Development Planning, Rome 17 to 23 June 1969" (United Nations document E/CN.5/C.3/R.4/Rev.1)).

<sup>18/</sup> Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, "Criminalité et changements sociaux en Tunisie, Tunis, 1965", pp. 79-101.

<sup>19/</sup> United Nations Statistical Yearbook and Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.

problem wherever modernization of production involves a shift to automation to permit competition on a world scale. More industry could mean fewer and fewer jobs. Some of the early studies of "delinquency areas" showed problems in the inner city where slums were grouped around industrial plants, railway sheds or warehouses. A number of the later problems of crime have centred on suburban estates where industries have been re-located.

36. Considered separately, each aspect of industrialization has beneficial elements and each is a part of the growth of a nation. Indeed, it is only when such individually innocuous influences are combined that there is increasing pressure of a kind which might produce delinquent reactions in a minority. It is therefore industrialization combined with all the other criminogenic aspects of development which appears to generate juvenile crime.

### 3. Population Growth

37. The obvious way in which population growth increases crime is by the addition of members to the vulnerable age groups. More young people should, all other things being equal, mean proportionately more juvenile crime.<sup>20/</sup> In developing countries there has often been a structural shift in population in favour of the younger age groups - another relevant factor in increased juvenile crime. Less directly, but no less significantly, excessive population growth leads to crime by adding weight to the burden on the wage earner, overcrowding small houses, outgrowing school facilities and generally, of course, by the extent to which it holds a country back from developing economically. Let it be noted again, however, that most of these influences have provoked endeavour and greatness as well as delinquency. It depends on the person.

### 4. Internal Migration

38. Development requires eventually a movement of people from subsistence or peasant farming to industrial and commercial activities. The cultivation of land has to be mechanized for large-scale production with less people; industry has to absorb the larger numbers seeking work. Thus geographical, occupational and other types of mobility are involved. Such a migration has proved disturbing enough in countries now industrialized, and has been a distinct factor in crime. Amongst the more obvious things that result are the travelling offender, smuggling, drug trafficking and escapes; more subtly but effectively it contributes both to the environmental and personality factors in crime and so becomes an element in all kinds of illegal behaviour. It should be noted, however, that migration is not an indivisible concept. It often has a ratchet-like growth, so that the different stages or periods of migration may be related to different forms and types of crime.

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<sup>20/</sup> It was suggested at the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts that the group of children born in the high birth-rate years in Japan after World War II was proportionately more delinquent; also that larger populations had an effect on behaviour, through school problems.

39. In developing countries, the internal migration with its fragmentation of family life and its corrosive effect on social controls has often taken place before the work or adequate housing has become available in towns and whilst the land has still held the only promise of a regular (albeit subsistence) income. Thus, pressure for a delinquent reaction to frustration is built up by family disruption, bad housing and unemployment, usually unrelieved by public assistance or other forms of welfare. Here it may not only be the moves consequent upon urbanization but also the effects of the shift from a subsistence to a cash economy and different forms of agricultural production which need to be taken into account. Legal changes in land tenure systems and great increases in the number of social contacts may all be directly associated with the amounts of crime to be expected. The same roads and communications which open up a developing country tend to accelerate the movement of people towards the centres, both denuding the land of its most productive labour and increasing social and economic problems in the towns. The drift to towns may be expected to continue, as has been acknowledged above; but the concomitant migration has negative and positive results which may need to be balanced carefully for the full benefits of development to be obtained.

#### 5. Social Mobility

40. Social mobility is both good and necessary for economic and social growth, whether one is thinking of the vertical mobility to the higher levels of society through increased educational opportunities or the horizontal mobility of which internal migration is a part. But when migration, as shown above, can generate unemployment and other conditions associated with delinquency; and when the limitations of education and employment opportunity and development reduce the prospects for legitimate advancement, then the frustration and urge to succeed may increase the search for illegal short cuts to advancement. The pace and restlessness of social mobility - or the frustration due to the lack of movement when it is expected - all add to the delinquency risk with "weaker" personalities.

#### 6. Technological Change

41. The introduction of science and technology either requires or leads to production on a larger scale, promoting labour migration, urban concentrations and new prestige skills. It also requires new laws and controls, increasing the possibilities of committing crime. Automation, as shown above, can mean industrialization without sufficient jobs for the many who have flocked from rural areas expecting them. Better means of transport aid production and marketing but quicken the rate of migration and often disrupt thereby both social controls and family life. The vast increase in the number of automobiles, aeroplanes, computers and in the use of telephones and electricity has created a whole new series of offences and new ways of committing conventional crime. Sometimes when a single industry is a concentration of modern plant in a developing country, there emerges an enclave of modernization surrounded by both land and people still at subsistence or peasant stages. These contrasting ways of life have their own influence on behaviour. Temptation to commit crime is increased. Technology means improved education and audio-visual communication, both of which are likely to bring in ideas irreconcilable with tradition, changing established concepts of deviance and some of them questioning older patterns of behaviour. The strength of local demand for modern machines and gadgets,

the prestige articles for conspicuous spending in developing countries, may also be of significance. Young people are often tempted to steal to obtain money for such desirable acquisitions. For instance, for both practical and prestige reasons, bicycle stealing has been an outstanding feature of developing towns.

#### 7. Combinations of Factors in Crime and Development

42. As shown, it is difficult to describe these aspects of development as criminogenic except in their very indirect effect upon the behaviour of some people. This should not lead to the conclusion that it is therefore the type of personality which is the key to delinquency, because the psychological approach leads to an equally indefinite field of inquiry. Usually, it is combinations of all these social, economic, cultural, legal, personal and psychological factors and a number of special circumstances surrounding the event, which make up a crime and "produce" a criminal. From the social and economic planner's point of view, however, it is interesting that some of the combinations of vital factors for economic or social growth are also the most readily associated with increased delinquency. Towns, industrial growth, migration, technical advances and a willingness to take risks are all indicators or reflectors of a country's level of economic and social growth. They seem to serve equally well as indicators or reflectors of crime. The question is how to get the advantages and the development without the disadvantages, or at least with as few of them as possible.

#### B. Some Changes specially associated with juvenile Delinquency

43. Juvenile crime is closely related to the process of family disruption and disintegration, however this may occur. Indeed, what is often referred to as delinquency (because legal processes are involved) has been shown in many developing countries to be little more than a problem of child neglect brought about by the movements of people and the separating of family members as industrial and urban complexes develop. Juvenile delinquency in this sense becomes a much wider concept than adult crime.<sup>21/</sup> Juvenile delinquency often seems as serious a problem as it does because the law exists to deal with illegal behaviour, but the resources are not available for the basic welfare services (to replace family types of social security and welfare) made necessary by rapid social change. Problems with non-legal or discretionary solutions elsewhere may be brought before the courts simply because there are no other facilities. Juvenile delinquency in developing areas is equally a problem of inadequate or inappropriate schooling, or else it is associated with the growing amount of unemployment amongst young people coming to towns. These factors operate in the developed areas too; but whereas the industrial countries have to concentrate more on drop-outs or people not trained for jobs available, the developing countries are struggling with school systems inadequate to provide even primary education for all children eligible and which narrow in prospects at secondary and higher levels. These countries are struggling, too, with the

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<sup>21/</sup> A. A. G. Peters, op. cit., p. 11. See also "Juvenile Delinquency Trends Studies" (SOA/SD/CS.1-5) - for instance, the study on the United Arab Republic showed that 50 per cent of all minors before the courts between 1958 and 1962 were charged with vagrancy (SOA/SD/CS.1), p. 14.



problem of providing sufficient work for all those who might be trained but are unemployed in town, and they are frequently engaged in trying to slow the drift from the rural areas which need a supply of youthful labour to augment and modernize production.

44. Not infrequently an anomaly occurs where circumstances force the erection and staffing of reformatory schools when ordinary schools cannot be afforded for some areas with little or no delinquency. This underlines the need to reform through ordinary schools as far as possible. It may mean, too, that young offenders are reformed by adequate trade training at a time when such specialized training cannot yet be offered to all non-delinquents requiring it. These issues of "less eligibility" are not new in criminology but they emerge in stark definition in the poorer areas of the world. Again, the quality and type of education is important. When schooling is partly dysfunctional in the total society or not related to local employment prospects, it may serve to increase the frustration in towns of young people ill prepared for an age of automation, and to accelerate their flow from the agricultural areas where limited earnings are possible to urban centres where there are no jobs and where obtaining the means to live may involve illegal ventures. It seems, therefore, that the inadequacy of educational investments on the one hand and an inappropriate placing of them within the educational sector on the other hand, could well serve to increase the flow of juvenile offenders.

45. Juvenile crime is no less a reflection of the multiplication of opportunities for crime and the increasing temptations for young people as society grows more complex, more materially attractive and more liberal. As shown above, the increases of population alone increase the numbers in vulnerable age groups. Simply to concentrate populations is an obvious way of increasing the number of transactions and of raising the risk of crime; but add to this the decline in social controls and the pull of city attractions difficult to afford, and it is clear that a situation is created by development itself which makes for more juvenile crime.

This brief discussion of some factors and situations in juvenile crime can only raise more problems, mainly of interpretation and construction. It is intended to underline for discussion some of the salient features in the relationship between change and juvenile crime. It should be observed, however, that these may not be separate concepts at all but merely aspects of some common process or movement as yet not properly understood.

#### IV. SOME TYPES OF CRIME WHICH TEND TO GROW WITH DEVELOPMENT

46. Property offences are the ones which greatly increase with the process of economic growth and structural change in any country.<sup>22/</sup> As society becomes more open, complex, urban and industrial, the property available and the opportunities for stealing it abound. Moreover, the incentives for acquisition multiply. Thus, a very high proportion of juvenile crime in all countries is economic, that is, stealing, embezzlement, housebreaking, robbery etc.<sup>23/</sup> There are some indications that, at first, crimes against the person may tend to decline proportionately with urban growth and industrialization,<sup>24/</sup> but they eventually increase in amount and seem in some countries to reach a new gravity and significance as they become the forms of violence associated with robbery, extortion and other offences. Thus, it is violence - and often meaningless psychopathic violence - which preoccupies the more developed and affluent countries of the world.

47. It is occasionally possible to see that young offenders become more adapted to the possibilities and conditions of town life as they become more sophisticated in burglaries or more devious in frauds, whereas before they may have acted crudely or mainly on impulse or opportunity. The series of carefully organized housebreakings by gangs belong typically to towns; but then so do the houses and property which make such offences worthwhile. Not only would the gain be less but the risk would be greater in rural areas. Other forms of adaptation - or lack of it - may be found in the increase of drug offences in some developed countries, greater freedom of sexual expression and the increasing interest in confrontations with the law where it is regarded as outmoded.

48. On the other hand, as already shown, some of these apparent changes in behaviour may be really due to changes in law; for example, privacy is increasingly invaded as legislation increases which requires registration, licenses, returns, reports etc. and reduces the area immune from inspection and possible prosecution. It is known for instance that the legal definition of a crime may be a ponderous description of something fairly innocuous, of something which might be quite properly prosecuted in a town, but which might be ignored or dealt with differently in rural areas or conditions of less development. For instance, the offence of "being on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose" might be merely a group of boys exploring an old house or a vagrant looking for somewhere to sleep.

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<sup>22/</sup> Traffic offences grow most conspicuously with urban development in any country, and are even directly associated with agricultural improvements since these increase the amount of vehicular transportation and the use of mechanized techniques. But traffic offences raise other issues and are touched upon only obliquely here. Nevertheless, it is clear that traffic crimes are amongst the most serious in a number of countries.

<sup>23/</sup> Theft was the offence for which two thirds of the minors brought before the courts of the Cameroon were proceeded against. International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 20, (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.3) p. 40. It accounted for four fifths of minors before the courts in Morocco. Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>24/</sup> See tables in A. A. G. Peters, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

49. Indeed, it must never be forgotten that law defines crime and the way in which the developing countries are following developed nations in their rates of juvenile crime may be partially because they import foreign legislation determining patterns of illegal behaviour and influencing the direction of official policy. In developing countries, therefore, the amount of discretion which the police may be allowed to exercise in dealing with young people and their families could well affect the types and rates of crime which grow with development. Specialists in law and crime are beginning to explore this relationship between formal and informal controls and to recommend social or administrative, rather than legal, procedures for the control or encouragement of certain types of behaviour.

50. One of the most important offences associated with juveniles as a society grows is that of taking and driving away motor vehicles. This, as well as car stealing and stealing from cars, increases with the number of cars coming onto the roads and the carelessness of many people in looking after them. It comes, too, from young people drifting into situations of temptation and the stress imposed upon them to conform to adolescent values in town. Drunken driving, manslaughter and the organized stealing and reselling of motor vehicles are all outgrowths of the development of the motor industry and of greatly expanded systems of communication and transport.

51. It is interesting that although there are increases in the total amounts, the proportionate difference between male and female delinquency usually remains unchanged until the later phases of development and urban complexity, when female delinquency increases. Generally speaking, therefore, the social and economic planner in most developing countries will need to be only marginally concerned for some time about female delinquency. On the other hand, the level of female deviation, including immorality, may be a guide to family cohesion and controls, and the contribution that women can make to behavioural problems (or their prevention) through their family roles is considerable.

52. As a society becomes larger and develops into advanced industrial structures with large business and commercial interests, it can expect to confront more organized crime. Crime will have learnt to permeate business at all levels, to find legality for many antisocial practices and to influence not only the administration, but perhaps even the lawmakers themselves. Organized crime is not the monopoly of the higher levels of development, however, and there are some interesting examples of extortion for "protection" and "commercial" crime in the less developed areas, often involving juveniles. It is well known that in Asia, begging was once a widely organized business linked with less desirable practices. Protection money is taken by gangs in certain of the larger cities in Africa (though not yet on any large scale). Gambling is sometimes organized in a way which borders on the illegal and leads to many other types of crime. The tremendous increase in drug trafficking and drug taking and the effect of this on the rise of other crimes (because of the addicts' need to obtain funds for drugs) is a widespread phenomenon in many developed countries which is of special concern to developing countries, where the plants are often locally grown and the controls may not be highly developed. Mass communications and the development of a "youth culture" in the world make it likely that this is a fashion which could cross frontiers easily. On the other hand, at least one developing country (Iran) has been relatively successful in banning the growth of opium and dealing with widespread addiction. There may be lessons here for developed countries.

53. Lastly the great spread of education and the world-wide empathy amongst students are relevant for developing countries because in this way new waves of offences can derive from student protests and the emergence of the university population as a political force. This is not delinquency as it is usually understood, but confrontation does increase the number of offenders, if only technically. In developing countries, the participation of youth in politics has usually been achieved in the struggle for independence, but they are still not benefiting sufficiently and may have their own version of confrontation.

## V. PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

54. It has been suggested that urbanization, industrialization, population growth, social mobility and technological change are the elements of social change and economic growth from which increases in crime can most be expected. These are part of the development process, however, and all are likely to be intensified by further <sup>25/</sup>investments in industry, agriculture, infrastructure, health and education.

55. The question for the planner <sup>26/</sup> is how to deal effectively with these aspects of development so as to achieve economic growth and higher levels of living, whilst at the same time preventing delinquency or containing it within limits acceptable to the society. This is not a question which has been overlooked by planners so far. They are not oblivious to crime as a social problem and they have often been obliged to shift resources quickly when a single outrageous felony has led to a public demand for police reinforcements or appropriations of funds to improve prison conditions. They are only too well aware that any planning must consist of a basic minimum of investment to ensure human rights and equality of treatment before the law, and to protect property. If the conscious or explicit association between crime and national planning (or between crime and the general development process) in a country has been none too close so far it is because:

(a) There has been widespread confidence that crime, particularly juvenile crime, would tend to evaporate as over-all social conditions improved. In terms of realistic investment, it has always seemed much wiser to spend upon improved health and education, housing and social security for the majority, rather than to focus attention upon the minority problem groups like delinquents, mental patients or neglected children. In other words, development has always been interpreted as broad improvement, expecting the special problem groups to be progressively swept into the rising tide of more stable and capable children and young people in the next generation.

(b) There has been an underlying hope that in some way more development automatically means a more wholesome society with less and less need for expenditure on law and order, that is, that the "policeman" is more and more effectively internalized psychologically as a society grows and people mature.

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<sup>25/</sup> See "Social policy and planning in national development" (E/CN.5/445, 11 December 1969) for the view that economic phenomena are social in nature, socially conditioned and have social consequences, so that development planning which neglects this is bound to be misleading.

<sup>26/</sup> "Planner" as used here and throughout this section means the general economic and social planner, on the planning team concerned with national development planning, unless otherwise specified. There are also sectoral planners and when these are referred to, the term is qualified accordingly, for example "health planner", "education planner", "social defence planner".

56. Whilst (a) reflected a belief that a better environment would reduce crime and many other social problems which were once mainly associated in the public mind with poverty and miserable conditions, (b) indicated a conviction that human nature would mature psychologically.

57. Such confidence and hope have scarcely been justified by events. In fact, so little have these preconceptions been borne out that a more developed society spends more than ever on law and order, and it is appreciated that investments in directly productive sectors or human resources can, when unbalanced or unco-ordinated, encourage, permit or facilitate as much crime as they solve.

58. Another reason for the lack of true coincidence between crime prevention and national development planning and programming is that health, education and labour are much more widely relevant for a country's growth than for crime prevention. In so far as crime prevention is served by a nation's normal health, education, labour, social security provisions etc., it usually receives quite adequate attention without ever being mentioned. However crime preventive these services may be, this incidental function does not need special note or emphasis. It is when one begins to regard delinquency as a special problem requiring more attention than the basic health and educational services for the majority that one ordinarily begins to move out of the sights and range of the national planner. The social welfare, community, cultural, psychological or normative aspects of delinquency are not always so readily encompassed in a planning exercise on a higher plane. Getting measures for the prevention of delinquency into a developmental focus often means including these related subjects in the same sphere of activity.

59. In a developing country, this incorporation of community and social aspects is often enjoined by a planner's need to make the best use of all available resources and especially the "community will" and voluntary labour of the population to achieve national objectives. The importance of motivation for national growth has been touched upon in paragraph 17 above. This role of the community will and group effort is widely understood by administrators and planners, but there is still an understandable reluctance to commit resources which might be needed for more directly productive sectors until the value of such approaches can be more convincingly demonstrated. Unlike health, education and labour, they are not regarded as ends in themselves.

60. There is one exception to the argument in the last two paragraphs. Ministries of justice, systems of courts and police services tend to expand with the growth of a country, and it is clear that these have a substantial preventive significance. Moreover, in countries where lawlessness or terrorism or political instability require the maintenance of substantial police forces, numerous courts and court personnel etc. to provide a framework for normal commercial life and production, then crime prevention of a special kind receives planning attention a fortiori.

61. Yet, even here, where crime absorbs significant amounts of national resources, the expenditure or investment is rarely well planned. Opportunity costs, the relative merits of alternative ways of achieving an objective and regular evaluation of projects and programmes are concepts and approaches only seldom applied to social defence, whilst the positive aspects of crime prevention, planning in advance to anticipate crime increases or possibly diverting potential offenders or prison labour into nationally constructive services, do not receive

the national attention they deserve. In developing countries, expenditure on courts and police may increase, but usually their ancillary services do not seem to grow at the same pace (for instance prison facilities, reformatories, mental health services, probation systems, social welfare and perhaps even the national spread of juvenile courts and their related services). These lag behind, often because the resources are just too limited. Thus, funds are available to make the law and enforce it, but not to provide adequately for the reduction of the lawbreaking by earlier prevention and later reformatory systems.

62. From all this it would appear that there are two ways of approaching the planning for social defence. One can begin from the current expenditure on social defence and seek the planning methods and guidance to make the investments more meaningful and to obtain optimum results. Alternatively, one can adopt the wider perspectives of an economic and social planner with a view to providing for social defence on a broader scale. Here, social defence, besides its sectoral implications, is a planning issue permeating all sectors.

63. In this paper, the latter approach is adopted, first, because if crime is related to development then this wider range is necessary; and secondly, because it is believed that even beginning with current expenditures on social defence, more than one sector is involved and investment decisions have to be taken in a wider context.

#### A. From causation to control and back

64. National planning needs to know the costs of crime so as to calculate the benefits of its reduction. It needs all kinds of other information, too, in order to make forward provisions for expected criminal trends, types and patterns related to projected structural changes in the society. For national planning it is necessary to forecast, for instance, the amount of additional stealing likely to be associated with the introduction of a money economy or the increase in house-breaking to be expected from the increase in urban populations. Planners should then be clear about the most effective measures they can take to prevent crime, -for instance, whether they should do more to support housing, family welfare vocational education or youth clubs. Or should they concentrate on more relevant, better-quality education, better probation services or sophisticated equipment for the police?

#### 1. Limitations of data

65. All this implies that the precise policies and programmes which a Government might best support to prevent crime most effectively are known and can be specified with some estimate of the result to be expected. Unfortunately, this is not the position, and providing this kind of data for the planner is one of the most difficult tasks for the criminologist or administrator of crime prevention or control services. The fact is that, despite the years of extensive and intensive study and research in many countries, the vital factors causing crime still escape unequivocal, positive identification. As already noted, from nearly every factor known to be associated with delinquency, from "broken homes" and mental deficiency to overcrowding, delinquent subcultures, child neglect and poverty, it is still possible to show at least as many young people subjected to such conditions who do not commit crime as those who do. This is often true of combinations of factors too. The ingredients are often known but not their proportions, interrelationships or respective influences on the criminal event.

66. Of course, criminology has made considerable progress over the years, if only in narrowing down the issues and avoiding investigations likely to increase, rather than reduce, speculation. But it is still difficult to provide advice on broad population-wide measures to prevent crime.

67. Thus, apart from the degrees of "success" which might be shown by follow-up studies of probation, reformatory, child guidance or prison work, and some interesting excursions into the detection of delinquent tendencies before they erupt, or predicting the rates of success or failure of specified treatments, there is little to adduce for the benefit of the planner who needs to know where and to what extent to place the main emphasis.

## 2. Planning and related data for development

68. This lack of data does not, however, separate the planner from the criminologist and the administrator; it should bring them closer together in action to bridge the gap. For there are some things which it would still be possible to do. It is for consideration whether it is not already possible to project, at least in broad terms, the amount and types of crime in a society five years hence, using certain assumptions about population growth, rate of urban growth, police strength etc. In fact, the developing countries have the experience of developed countries to draw upon so as to make such forecasts less speculative. An interesting example has been reported <sup>27/</sup> of this kind of projection to obtain a crime index based upon the ratio between the observed number of crimes each year and the number expected (assuming certain age-specific figures for the propensity to commit crimes and the actual age distribution for the year).

69. With certain special studies in chosen areas it might well prove possible to "guesstimate" the amount of "real" crime (that is, not only reported but also unreported offences) for the purpose of planning. This extension into unreported crime hadly seems possible or necessary, however, in the immediate future.<sup>28/</sup> There is still a great deal that can be done with crime projections on the records presently available.:

70. Planning authorities and experts in juvenile crime should also be able to evaluate various types of health, education, labour and welfare schemes with a view to assessing their effect upon crime in selected localities or over a given period of time. This might include their effect on the factors associated with crime - for example, truancy, family disharmony, migration, job instability. Such information would be of great value (even if not over-precise) for the planner trying to determine the possible effects of his allocations in preventing crime.

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<sup>27/</sup> Gösta Carlsson, "Response, inertia and cycles", Acta Sociologica (Copenhagen), vol. II, No. 3 (1968), p. 139. Note, too, that Quetelet, in a nineteenth century statistical approach to crime, was interested in the "proclivity to crime" and tried, on grossly inadequate data, to show that this propensity remained constant over different periods.

<sup>28/</sup> Though neither immediately possible or necessary for the planner, the problem of unreported or "dark" crime is already engaging the attention of a number of research institutes.



71. It seems possible that such trial and error attempts to control juvenile crime by bringing to bear the influence of general development in the country, plus some special measures designed by those with appropriate experience in this field, could serve to refine the public efficiency in containing and eventually reducing the extent of the problem. The general hopes of broad investments preventing and containing crime (see paragraph 55) may have proved disappointing; but this only makes it necessary to find some way of reconciling a form (or forms) of direct action on problem groups with these broader schemes for total development, e.g., rural development with special aspects entrusted to otherwise unemployed youth groups; maternal and child health schemes with special attention paid to the development of behaviour; housing projects designed, inter alia, to meet the special needs of the child with problems; different forms of banking practice to discourage robberies; decentralization of police control and the full participation of the community in peacekeeping in new areas of land settlement. Such measures would be intended to offset the criminal by-products of certain types of national development.

72. More important is the fact that trial and error in planning on the scale proposed here would mean, in effect, using national planning as a form of action-research and feeding back the experience of success or failure to further increase understanding of causation and improve yet further the planning procedure. What is not sufficiently known is how to formulate and execute national planning for crime prevention on this scale.

73. Certain prospects suggest themselves. It is known, for example, that there are developing countries which will need to explore the advantages of labour-intensive activities. A project of this kind might be carried out in an area where the rates of crime had been projected and the types of crime (with probable age-groups of offenders) forecast. The project could be launched in a way most likely to attract those vulnerable groups in the population. It would be closely followed up, not simply for its effect upon competitiveness in industry, but also for its apparent influence (if any) on local rates of crime. For instance, did it coincide with any change in the local crime rate, especially of juveniles? If so, what evidence is there of either a direct connexion or of some third factor influencing both the crime rates and the labour-intensive scheme with its offer of employment? What kinds of offences were seemingly the most affected? What kinds of offenders? Did the enhanced employment opportunities attract young people known to be in the groups most vulnerable to delinquency? Which areas and groups did it fail to reach? Again, criminologists with special training could be used to report on the crime implications of certain pre-investment studies in industry, agriculture, health, education etc., and to evaluate their judgement at five-year intervals; no doubt there are ways to computerize some of the data likely to emerge from such studies. If so, a rough crime prospectus could be developed for certain types of investment in given amounts.

74. There are, of course, innumerable research objections to such crude approaches and from the outset it would doubtless be impossible to prove any direct connexion between a development scheme and local crime changes. On the other hand, broad planning and its implementation in this way covers (albeit more superficially) larger populations and areas than are usually available for more careful research study. And if, by trial and error, such an approach can effect - or be correlated with - certain changes in contrasting areas, it will have uncovered material for further deeper study by criminologists. Moreover,

research specialists could guide planners in developing such schemes to make them produce more reliable and valuable information. It is an approach which at least merits further consideration.

75. Other examples of planning not merely for control but for information as to the factors involved in crime might be as follows:

(a) Industrial and housing projects might be planned differently in similar regions or similarly in different regions, with studies of the effects on juvenile offenders and offences. This could mean different types of sizes of projects, differences of location, age and sex structure of workers and differences of facilities for social services.<sup>29/</sup>

(b) One might use the fact that a developing country cannot always afford to provide for education in nutrition and better caloric intake in all parts of the country simultaneously. Here longitudinal studies of the planning of nutrition, intensively in some areas and less intensively in others, and its effects in contrasting areas on delinquency-prone children would yield valuable information.

(c) Certain programmes might be arranged to extend training in industrial or agricultural skills so as to answer the question whether increasing the opportunities to acquire such skills has an effect on local delinquency rates. Similarly, carefully linking extended technical or vocational education to crime-prone neighbourhoods (amongst others, of course) should provide interesting results for understanding crime and planning control.

(d) Following the suggestion that it is the pace of urban development which is most directly associated with crime, it might be possible on existing data to prepare rough and very tentative estimates of amounts and types of crime to be expected at different stages of urban growth, perhaps even to postulate incidences of crime growth with rates of population concentration and given age and sex structures. These would be highly speculative at first but could be checked by experience. Their interpretations would be disputed, but their value in planning for crime prevention might be justified.

76. It is true that planners operating in this way will need to avoid committing resources on data too slim to justify experiential spending; but there will usually be a double purpose to justify the trial and error, as is shown from (a) to (d) above. Planners working will therefore be operating in much the same fashion as when they are providing for manpower needs rapidly changing in unforeseeable ways over the years of planning. They have to assume that people will stay in jobs, follow up their training or return to the country from abroad; or else they will have to make broad and unconfirmed assumptions as to what people will do when educational facilities are increased or incomes grow. Sometimes these are wide of the mark, as the assumptions about crime will be. But in the case of crime, although there may still be doubt about its aetiology, there is a great deal of information routinely recorded, many statistical analyses and a vast amount of work which has already been done on the factors in crime. Most of this needs testing on a wider scale and there are

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<sup>29/</sup> There was deliberate planning to counteract the anomic conditions associated with industrial change in the setting-up of fifty-two towns as part of the Volta River Project in Ghana. The results are not yet known.

existent hypotheses which are awaiting trial on a national scale.<sup>30/</sup> There are some hypotheses which can be tested by judicious planning for national development, and the control and prevention of crime will become more effective and more reliably based as the planner and specialist alike incorporate their past experience in future work. Needless to say, this should also mean a deepening knowledge of crime causation.

#### B. Setting objectives or targets

77. The discussion here will be concerned with the specifics of planning for crime reduction; but it would be misleading not to make the point that the general objectives of planning for development will probably be related more, as time goes on, to the quality of life, to the social aims of growth and to the best use of human resources. This should make any consideration of crime prevention more relevant.

78. Ideally, the planner should know how much or how little crime he is planning for, if only to check the progress he is making from one planning period to another. But, as shown above, crime, being an integral part of the social structure, an outgrowth of its legal standards, value systems and sub-cultures, cannot be totally eradicated. The only amount of crime a planner can hope to eliminate, then, is that amount which is considered abnormal in the circumstances. To set such a figure is to set a level for a particular society's tolerance of crime, an esoteric judgement to which few scholars would wish to commit themselves. The alternative is to set some arbitrary level for the planner. Without something of this kind, evaluation becomes very difficult.

79. It may be that the objectives can be sectoral and proportionate, say a 5 per cent rise in the police detection rate with a 5 per cent decrease in delinquency amongst schoolchildren of certain specified ages. It might be put alongside an aim of a proportionate reduction in committals to prison for first offences or short sentences, thus shifting attention to more open forms of treatment. Clearly, the choice of objectives would depend upon what could reasonably be expected, given all the available data.

80. There will be difficulties. Obviously, without any change in the real situation it might be possible to adjust the procedures so as to provide figures to satisfy planners trying to evaluate their own efforts. For example, the police detection rate or the number of young people prosecuted could be increased or reduced, respectively, by slightly amending the methods of counting or adjusting the number of cases actually dealt with. But these are problems which planners have to accept in relation to other national statistics; and though such arbitrary targets would be crude, tentative, even partly speculative, they are needed as bench-marks against which to assess progress and eventually weigh the real cost of social defence investments in terms of their possible allocation to alternative uses.

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<sup>30/</sup> See "Report of the United Nations Consultative Group", pp. 10-13.

### C. The pattern of investment

81. Developing countries, like others, have the task of improving in amount and quality the nation's financial, natural, scientific and human resources so as to expand the country's development capacity with the ultimate aim of raising living standards for as many people as possible. Productivity would usually come first, so that investments in agriculture, industry and infrastructure (transport, communications) will have first call, together with investments in health, education and labour as necessary for the quality of human resources. These absorb the bulk of the resources available.

82. It is unlikely therefore that crime prevention can hope to (or should need to) attract priority sufficient to change this fundamental pattern of effort for growth capacity. It should certainly be allocated additional resources if this is possible; and there are countries where available resources have not been allocated in a way adequate to protect society from the risks of crime or to reduce its main effects on development. Nevertheless, it is generally true that if crime prevention is to be pursued at all in developing areas it will usually have to be according to a general development pattern which stresses the directly productive sectors. Even if the social objectives of planning receive more explicit attention, and human rights lead to a more predominant position for social defence, it will still need to accommodate itself to the efforts to raise living standards by increasing production. This might be possible in several ways. Following are examples.

#### 1. Across sectors

83. Crime prevention is a cross-sectoral activity likely to be most successful where there is a good level of co-ordination in total planning. Where such coordination can evolve inter-sectoral programmes to deal with hunger, lack of education, youth unemployment, the effects of migration, urbanization or the need for rural development, it will have crime preventive aspects and implications which can often be emphasized without the need for additional funds or any reallocation of investment resources.

84. Housing, nutrition, agricultural extension and a host of other programmes could be improved by linking the schemes and building into them the results of criminological research. Other examples of adjusting social defence to established planning for broader objectives have been provided above. It has also been noted above that the fact that "delinquency areas" are known to develop in certain stages of urban growth could help planners to avoid on the draft board certain combinations of physical circumstances with which crime is associated. <sup>31/</sup> The close association of family disruption and child neglect with delinquency implies a need for cross-sectoral programmes to strengthen family life, that is, to

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<sup>31/</sup> The experience in Poland cited at the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts, Rome 1969, suggested that urban concentrations of 60,000-100,000 people might be an ideal: it is beyond this size that problems seem to become unmanageable. However, this can only be an arbitrary guide; experience in planning for optimal results (using "optimal" of both economic and social benefits) is the only guide, and for most countries integrated planning of the type required lies in the future.

ensure employment for bread-winners, improve housing, provide better schooling and health facilities for family members of all ages. All this is being done to a greater or lesser extent. It is only its crime prevention aspects which need more direct attention. Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that regional planning schemes including the better distribution of social services and amenities have been relatively few, and these might well be devised to serve the aims of prevention along with their other objectives.

85. Manpower surveys, public administration systems, local government structures, child development programmes, public works services and others are cross-sectoral activities each of which have their own importance for the prevention of delinquency.

86. Manpower studies will be based upon the priorities of the national plan. Amongst other things, they will project the types and levels of personnel required for the direct crime or correctional services, that is for police, prisons, courts, special schools and other delinquency services in the different sectors. If the national plan is intended to promote development (and reduce crime) by concentrating inter alia on more effective education of a type relevant to the environment, this may affect manpower requirements and cause a shift of emphasis from other sectors to education, with consequences for the reduction of the frustrations which often lead to delinquency. We have already mentioned the possibility of projecting rates of expected crime with rates of population growth and the rate of urban migration for a period of years ahead. This involves manpower projections for the services to deal with the expected crime, or to prevent it.

87. Efficiency in public administration and local government is, ipso facto, crime-inhibiting. Indeed, mismanagement and incompetence in these services, without going so far as to mention corruption, do distinctly produce crime. It follows that eliminating them to any degree discourages crime. That this is a crucial area for crime prevention is attested by the way in which well-organized crime has begun to permeate certain levels of public service in the highly industrialized countries and by some developing countries' experience of venality in the awarding of contracts, granting of licences or the filling of posts.

88. Child development programmes have been directed towards healthy physical and mental growth. But child pathology has received considerable attention in the medical and health sector. In the same way, the positive socializing influences which inhibit delinquency need to be understood and should become part of the programmes for child development. It seems that these will be centred upon healthy emotional growth, on constructive play materials and opportunities for participation and involvement at each stage of growth. Moreover, the social pathology of juvenile crime needs to be better understood for the positive influences in growth to be applied.

89. Public works, as a means of providing employment, clearing difficult hinterland, augmenting capital formation and offering a technical assistance service for self-help schemes of many kinds can be used to prevent crime. Its effect on unemployment, its value in gearing youth to development tasks, and its capacity to provide the technical know-how for community self-help are all potentially significant combinations of development and crime prevention activities.

90. Another cross-sectoral concern is with structural obstacles to development and bottle-necks. Presumably the structural problems likely to arise which have a relevance for social defence are those posed by development investments themselves, or the lack of them. There are many examples in developing countries of investments in the modern sectors leaving traditional areas unprovided for and raising social and economic problems likely to be criminogenic. <sup>32/</sup> Malaria eradication has sometimes led to structural problems because of its effects on population. This has long-term educational and social implications and may lead to a series of bottle-necks creating the incentive for illegal short cuts at different levels. Unemployment may be a consequence of uneven investment. This makes preventive work on crime very difficult since alternative ways of earning a living are restricted; anyone who gets into trouble with the law is seriously hampered in re-establishing himself by the competition for jobs and, in developing countries, there may be little or no provision for unemployment relief payments or public assistance. It may be that crime is often committed by people unable to keep a regular job even when there is one, but the fact that a job is available makes all the difference. On the other hand, investments in industrial projects leading to more urbanization and accelerated social mobility provide favourable conditions for crime, if their side-effects are not provided for.

91. Here the emphasis could be on built-in measures to take care of the worst effects of industrial and urban growth. There is still doubt as to what these should be, but in the present state of knowledge a fair amount of social planning to balance economic planning would be helpful. Attention has been drawn already to the dearth of regional planning of a comprehensive and integrated nature. An improvement in this could anticipate some of the problems and structural difficulties. Industrial concentrations attracting workers should include adequate housing, schooling, recreational and vocational training facilities. Better facilities for migrants might increase the flow to towns, but could also cushion the disruption and allow more effective consideration of such alternatives as satellite towns or more ambitious schemes of rural improvement.

92. The redistribution of wealth and equality of opportunity are structural matters which have a wide effect on adaptation and human behaviour and are significant for social defence. These, like so many other social improvements, should become a part of planning for their own sake, but their importance for social defence should not be overlooked and there may be considerable value in following up crime in areas where such changes are most marked to see the effects of the changes on crime rates and types. It will no doubt be found inter alia that structural transformations tend to reduce some kinds of illegalities and promote others, with changes in the whole concept of crime due to legal adaptation.

93. Another aspect of cross-sectoral planning for social defence will be the effect on direct social defence services of changes in the educational system, government employment and even political situations. It is often stressed that crime problems are increased by the fact that the direct handling of them tends

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<sup>32/</sup> See E/CN.5/445, for a lack of "satisfactory or even positive feedback mechanisms between agriculture and industry, modern and traditional technology, town and country, advanced and retarded regions and upper and lower income groups".

to fall to less and less qualified and able people, as the better elements of the various social defence services are attracted to other professions of greater prestige and financial reward. Surveys of manpower problems in the field of social defence could throw light on the planning issue of where it would be best to apply the available resources for the best effect.

94. It cannot be overlooked that bottle-necks in social defence practice have a way of working themselves out by unplanned - even unintended - changes in the system, but which may have certain consequences for cross-sectoral planning. For example, a backlog of cases for court appearance caused by an upsurge of crime or by an extra diligence on the part of the police or maybe by a shortage of magistrates and court facilities, is not infrequently relieved by a reluctance to prosecute (if the extra court facilities cannot be provided) any but the more serious cases. Or it could lead to a change in the law to give power to the police to impose fines subject to legal review (for example, traffic cases). So, too, a shortage of prison space can lead, apart from overcrowding, to more fines, discharges or probation for unsuitable cases, an ingenuity in devising new developmental alternatives of a non-institutional type, or even recourse to corporal punishment where this is still allowed. As such actions have consequences in several sectors (for example, justice, labour, social welfare, education, interior), the planning to provide for them is cross-sectoral. When looking for structural bottle-necks in social defence, it is important to examine the system for such accommodations to need which have evolved in the past, and which may sometimes disguise structural obstacles to an efficient system which only cross-sectoral planning can remove.

95. Lastly, it should not be difficult sectorally and cross-sectorally to make the risks of crime more dangerous and conspicuous. To a large extent, this means involving the public more directly in the maintenance of law and order. It means bringing the school more directly into community life, making it easier to report crime quickly, encouraging firms to adopt modern alarms and protective systems, and educating people in the ways to foil criminal attempts by locking cars, securing doors, not advertising absence from the home, etc. Whether it is the doctor or nurse looking for behavioural syndromes as well as physical problems, the teacher paying special attention to those who need to excel outside class, the parents seeking to know where their children are after a certain hour of night, the farmer taking simple measures to protect his crop or the trader buying only from reputable sources, the effect is to make it more difficult to commit crime. When this happens, or the risks of detection are increased, it can certainly be said that crime is being prevented. And the means are nearly always available within the current allocations of national resources.

## 2. Within sectors

96. The ways in which existing investments can become more crime preventive in the different sectors of the economy can only be touched upon here, but the examples given are intended to suggest some of the possible approaches.

### (a) Agriculture

97. Agriculture is the most important sector for developing countries, many of which have 60 per cent of their people on the land and some of which have no hope of changing this (even on the most optimistic assumptions concerning gross national product) before the end of the century. In such countries, crime is concentrated

in the towns and the best hope of prevention lies in developing the rural areas and helping to slow the rapid rate of urban migration of young people. Some of the measures usually taken are: involving young people in farming; the establishment of young farmers clubs; co-operatives; land settlement schemes; and agricultural training at all levels. However, it is questionable whether the drift to towns is very much affected by making rural areas more attractive and follow-up studies are needed. But whether rural improvements are effective or not, in stemming the flow to towns, no adequate alternatives have emerged; and it is clear that rural improvements are needed for their own sake. Schemes that reform land titles, give a stake in the land to sons of farmers, provide training for mechanical farming and involve young people in new small industry ventures would all be developmental and crime preventive (if only in their effect on the urban drift) without changing the order of priorities in the national plan.

98. Furthermore, it should be noted that broad planning for agricultural or rural improvements lends itself to the concept of zonal planning to include all aspects of life in a zone or province. Here, crime prevention should be taken into account. It may need repeating that the rural areas have their own problems of increasing crime related to the changes taking place in production methods and styles of living. They are influenced by the trends in urban areas as well as being affected by people returning from city to rural life.<sup>33/</sup>

#### (b) Industry

99. Industry is a relatively small sector in most developing countries; but its effect in drawing people to towns and changing patterns of life, through wage systems and the industrialization of labour, or through competitive production, female employment and advancement by merit, is very great. Crime prevention is perhaps best achieved at the planning stage, for example, when a decision is made about the location of industrial plants and provisions are built in for workers' housing, family amenities and recreational and educational facilities for young people. In the case of small industry, there is an opportunity for wider experimentation with family-type co-operatives or direct systems of family production. In particular, the trend towards automation should be anticipated. Generally, the effects of establishing new industry in a town or rural area are now fairly well known and it should be possible to project the rates and types of crime to be expected. Measures may then be taken to anticipate them.

#### (c) Health

100. It is not difficult to make investments on health services more crime preventive. With all the emphasis that is now given to nutrition and maternal care and child health, it should be possible to strengthen resistance to the elements known to be important for developing delinquent traits. This means more attention being paid to children deprived of normal home care or from disrupted homes, teaching parents how to help children to deal with their own difficulties in the process of socialization, shifting public attention more definitely to mental health and its promotion by community care and self-help. This in turn reverts to a consideration of the structure of a society in the process of change, since so many health and crime prevention problems arise from the concentration of population, shanty towns, and also not infrequently

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<sup>33/</sup> See "Report of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts".



from the attempt to use borrowed or imported systems to deal with problems which have special meaning for the culture.<sup>34/</sup>

(d) Education

101. Much is now being done to make education more relevant to the child's environment; but teaching in the past, which did not fit young people for agriculture (the only sector in which the majority could hope to earn a living), doubtless generated unemployment and frustration of a kind likely to provoke delinquent reactions. Thus, education appropriate to circumstances can itself be regarded as developmental and crime-inhibiting amongst young people.

102. As an increasing number of young people spend more of their lives in school or college, the idea is growing of making these institutions a more positive and realistic element in community life and public affairs. Already the students at universities throughout the world have found ways of making their political views known without always having the right to vote. This is a movement towards involving young people which might well be constructive and developmental, quite apart from its incidental effect on crime prevention.

103. Functional literacy training and rural education for adults are also types of education which promote self-realization and adaptation to the pressures of the environment. It should be noted too that such education, if fully relevant and well chosen, could possibly help to slow down the drift into towns. Over and above this, technical and vocational training opening new vistas for youthful employment and filling the middle levels of skilled workers, serves to develop a country and probably to prevent crime at the same time. In wider perspective education is the means of gaining criminological knowledge and an awareness of the action which might be taken to prevent crime amongst people of all ages in all walks of life. Courses in juvenile delinquency in the teacher-training syllabus can do much to identify problems at an early stage. Other measures worthy of consideration would be using parent-teacher organizations to exert community pressure against misbehaviour and to provide better and healthier outlets for young people.

(e) Direct social defence services

104. This sector is not separate but is rather a collection of services, distributed between ministries of health, the interior, education, justice and social welfare, which have a common base in social defence. It comprises the police, courts, educational establishments for delinquents, child guidance and mental health services, probation, prison, parole etc.

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<sup>34/</sup> Recent studies of São Paulo show that extended families persist, even with migrant families or those settled in towns. This is a structural problem in the society which needs to be provided for by models of urban settlements not usually available from developed areas. Moreover, it implies that more attention may need to be paid to the services needed to help people adapt to the new physical and social restrictions of town life. The question of whether they integrate or become misfits is directly related to the possibility of crime.

105. Taken together, these form a substantial part of the budget and, as suggested above, need to be carefully considered when questions of training, manpower and the efficient allocation of a country's resources are taken into account. There is a great need for a careful evaluation of the present ways of dealing with offenders and an examination of the prospects of integrating these with more general programmes for the development of the country. The use of prison or extramural labour for development work has already been touched upon but a variety of other relatively inexpensive measures might prove extremely profitable.

106. Better training for the police, not merely in the routine prevention of crime and arrest of offenders, but in the possibilities of using existing community loyalties and resources as crime prevention techniques would be worth consideration. How might this be done? Would the various departments of the local university help? Should there be closer links with community development?

107. Co-ordination of the work of these services often require interministerial arrangements which could be intensified even to the extent of allowing for staff to be exchanged in order to merge their collective knowledge and skills. Integration of their efforts is a process calling for adaptability and exchanges at all levels. There have been improvements in the older exclusive attitudes to this kind of interleaving of the services, but no country has yet achieved the kind of organization and the kind of working institutions which ensure the measure of integration and co-ordination which is required.

108. It might be more economical and probably more effective to let the courts have greater discretion in sentencing; this could be provided by amended legislation, if necessary, and guidelines for the greater use of compensation and restitution in forms which are locally relevant (for instance in terms of man-hours of labour offered to the victim). Alternatively, encouragement could be held out to use new approaches to probation, village supervision and community controls rather than prisons for short sentence. In view of the trend towards open prisons, work hostels and other liberal ways of treating offenders so that they are not isolated from the community, one might ask how far the developing countries need to have prisons at all. If this issue is faced squarely it could lead to a small but efficient prison or a small number of prisons with concentrated treatment facilities for the more serious or disturbed offenders, and outside this, a greatly extended system of official and voluntary probation with the formation of community councils to take responsibility for their own offenders.

109. There are, too, a number of techniques in general economic planning which might profitably be applied to the planning for direct social defence services. Some, however, still need a great deal of work before they can be considered, far less actually applied. These include such concepts as cost/benefit analyses and input/output ratios. These depend upon effective quantification and criminology is still far from this. In any case such quantification would by definition, omit important non-economic dimensions of social defence. Nevertheless, this is a field of study which would make it easier to bring social defence considerations into the mainstream of national planning. It should also help specialists in social defence to develop measures of at least one aspect of their work.<sup>35/</sup>

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<sup>35/</sup> See L. T. Wilkins and T. Gitenoff, "Trends and projections in social defence systems", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 381, (Philadelphia, Penna., Jan. 1969), on the possibility of computer simulation and use of numerical taxonomy etc. in crime research. Also see Space-General Corporation, "A study of prevention and control of crime and delinquency", Final report FCCD-7 (prepared for the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, State of California, El Monte, Calif., 1965), 258 pp.

110. The opportunities for experiment and adaptation are immense. But it should be noted that for these services it should be efficiency rather than economy which is the keynote. For, apart from the police and the courts, these are often amongst the most inadequately financed services in a developing country. It is frequently the lack of resources which makes them inefficient, so that they are a greater cost to the economy and so also a greater drain on development than they should be.

#### D. Evaluation

111. The key to adequate social defence planning (or to national planning with a social defence perspective) without adequate data on crime and its prophylactics is effective evaluation. It matters little that early planning is according to arbitrary targets if their efforts can be carefully studied afterwards.

112. The criteria for evaluation in social defence will be specific but will share also the elements common to evaluation in other fields. It will be necessary to study the objectives, the priorities, the means chosen to achieve them, the progress made towards them, whether such progress could be ascribed to the means used and to what extent, the significance for the economy as well as for crime prevention, the unintended consequences (if any) and the possibilities of the same results being achievable by any other means. Within this context would come the more detailed social defence questions such as the relationship of the objectives to criminal realities, the limitations and advantages of the means chosen, the consequences for recidivism, police policy, court sentencing and institutional work.

113. Needless to say the evaluation procedure is more complex than can be conveyed in this paper and judgements may have to be systematically subjective where complete objectivity proves impossible. It is, however, essential especially at a time when planning needs to operate from data of such limited reliability with the intention of learning by doing.

## VI. ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

114. Social defence policies, plans or programmes may be conceived as applying to society in a series of ever-widening circles, radiating outwards from the criminal and the criminal event. At each circle removed, the scope of the policies, plans or programmes extends, the population covered increases, the connexion with the criminal and his act becomes less pronounced and the specifically social defence elements merge into something wider. It follows from this (and other observations above) that there is nothing restrictively sectoral about social defence. since even at the very nearest to the offence and offender, several services and sectors such as justice, health, police etc., are involved. This has administrative and planning consequences.

115. For the outer circles of planning and policy it is obvious that the whole society, or nearly the whole society, is encompassed and the central or national planning authorities will be fully involved and finally responsible. Here crime problems and their prevention should have attention, but they will have relatively little priority especially if, as in a developing country, crime is no great issue and the resources available have to be concentrated on agriculture, industry, health or education to deal with poverty, disease and the lack of education.

116. In so far as it is operative, social defence in the outer ranges will be a dimension of all planning in whatever sectors and the main issues for its effectiveness will probably be those of sectoral co-ordination and adequate resources. It is the contention of this paper that (to take only the amounts already spent on or lost in crime) social defence is so important to the economy that planning without taking it into consideration is unrealistic. This means that criminological advisers or committees of experts will probably be required to study and advise on the crime implications of national policies, plans and programmes. These will be required at whatever level the economic and social planning of the country is being done - that is, at the centre, in the provinces, or even more locally according to the country concerned.

117. It is for consideration whether a new professional category of social defence planners might not be required for the future.

118. The inner circles of policy-making, planning and programming are already in many countries the responsibility of officials with direct charge of control or correctional services. Their recommendations have to be approved and taken into account by national planners looking at allocations for all sectors and weighing the priorities; but often the main policies, planning outlines and programming are left to those with responsibility for the services. In the past, many of these officials have been responsible for improvements or extensions of preventive action; but in other cases they have resisted change and improvements have only been achieved by external pressure from social reformers, political or academic interests. In recent years a close working relationship has grown up in the developed countries between the administrators, professionals and university faculties in the field of social defence. Research has been extended and integrated with routine work and both have improved as a result; and there has been a valuable interchange of personnel.

119. It is clear then that at this level there is considerable competence already for future planning. Often the funds available are said to be insufficient but a working group of officials from countries in Asia has demonstrated (theoretically at least) that it is possible to improve the administration of justice and make it more efficient by making it cheaper. 36/

120. Unfortunately, developing countries are often deprived of this co-operation of officials, voluntary and university services by the lack of criminology as a subject in the colleges, and by the smallness of the services involved which inhibit promotion and make exchange of personnel difficult. They may need to link their activities regionally 37/ to obtain the professional and academic support they need. More seriously, and notwithstanding the possibility of doing more with less (as suggested above), these countries have greatly lacked the means to provide even basic services of the quality known to be required.

121. At this inner level there is often a lack of planning experience and techniques. There are programmes formulated for police work, probation and prison activities, even for special education, family support and community involvements; but planning, even of a local type, is relatively limited. It may be that a planner could be made available to guide and advise at this level of social defence. He could help to place such planning and programming in a wider context by demonstrating the need to consider not only the established services but the question of how much production and benefits a country might have had by spending the money in other ways, and whether such alternatives would prevent crime. He could also help evaluate work completed or in progress and promote co-ordination with wider planning activities.

122. Whether such an adviser should be part of a new breed of social defence planners mentioned above will depend upon: the availability of criminological and planning advice in the particular country; the opportunities for co-operation at all levels by the different sectors and the planning authority; 38/ and the facilities available for improved training for social defence planning.

123. It will be obvious that the prospective provinces of planners and social defence personnel will be more difficult to define and specify in the intermediate areas of policy, planning and programming, where the subject matter is far wider than social defence but not yet covering total populations, and yet too wide to come within the perspectives of those concerned with services for direct preventive work.

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36/ "Consultative Group of Fellows from Iran, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand", Thirteenth International Training Course, UNAFEI, Fuchu, Tokyo.

37/ As at the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Fuchu, Tokyo, or the United Nations Social Defence Research Institute, Rome.

38/ Some developing countries are so small that functional differentiation is unrealistic. Planners and administrators either combine functions or overlap in their work.

124. In many ways these are the most significant areas for planning and programming because they include measures to assist or serve the "populations at risk", that is, the potentially delinquent group, especially of young people. A variety of different interests enter into the picture at this level or stage :- youth service workers, mental health authorities, educational (or re-educational) specialists, local government services, as well as large numbers of voluntary groups. And the important task of linking the outer, more general, circles of policy, planning and programming with the inner circles more directly concerned with the crime and criminals, devolves on this intermediate range for planning and action.

125. In these ranges it may be more difficult to distinguish such roles as planners or advisers to planners. There could be committees of all interests with representatives from both the wider and narrower circles of planning. Another way is to assign responsibility for these important middle ranges to either selected sectoral authorities with over-all co-ordinating authority or regional councils.

126. The form of organization will depend upon the country and its circumstances. Here only very tentative proposals can be discussed and then only subject to local conditions. But it seems that every country would need to consider carefully the possibility of a national council of advisers, experts, officials and prominent citizens to study and recommend policies in social defence at national and provincial and perhaps city levels.

## VII. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

### A. Advantages

127. It is impossible to deal with the optimum use of available resources for crime prevention and development without referring to the special position of countries which are still amongst the less urbanized in the world and many of which still have the vast majority of their people in rural occupations. Usually, these are circumstances in which crime or delinquency does not flourish on a national scale, although there are always urban or semi-urban pockets of crime. Such countries are striving to develop economically, and are still able to exploit traditional inclinations for co-operative effort with a sharing of benefits, or to use the extended family contacts and loyalties which reach into the modern areas or the strong sense of community which enjoins a ready participation in public life. These are dwindling ties, controls and influences which have long disappeared in the highly industrialized nations. Their loss will certainly be to the detriment of these nations. It is a matter for concern that more direct attention is not being paid to the mobilization of these community resources in development schemes of all types. Despite substantial investments in agriculture, industry, commerce, health and education, the closer linking of these to existing community systems and structures has not always been worked out in advance and the relative size of community development services shows how limited their exploitation has been.

128. In this paper "social defence" has been construed as crime preventive; but laws and the behaviour they permit or proscribe lend themselves to more constructive application. It should not be overlooked that legal measures could be used as planning instruments in developing countries to promote development and to remove obstacles to growth; this might be regarded as "crime preventive" in a radical sense.

129. In developed countries; the law has already been used to promote development and social progress by providing security for commercial transactions, outlawing discrimination, protecting workers and their conditions of employment, sheltering new industries from the open market, controlling monopolies, cartels and conglomerates and redistributing income by taxation. In the process new crimes have been created but the reward was felt to be worth the price.

130. Developing countries have more flexibility for using the law in this way, and indeed they already protect industries, enforce land reform, control currencies and impose taxes on imports. The question is how far the law can be used to promote new attitudes, the adoption of new methods of work, the cultivation of initiative and self-reliance.

131. How far they can go in this direction will depend upon local circumstances, the extent to which the Government has the confidence of the people and the cost-effectiveness of the measures to be applied by law. Wrongly used, such measures

could create more crime than the effect on development would warrant. <sup>39/</sup> Properly used with existing community institutions they could greatly promote economic and social growth.

132. Crime prevention requires the fullest possible use of community resources of this kind where they remain to be used. These are crime preventive even when operating in agriculture, industry or public works; in addition they can be more directly used to promote prevention by absorbing young people in total community efforts to develop. It is still possible to mobilize young people for voluntary work in nation building (including crime prevention, though this might not be expressly mentioned) and the resources devoted to such imaginative and constructive schemes have been inadequate.

133. It is important to take into account the fact that the carry-over of traditional community ties and extended family obligations into the towns offers rare opportunities for urban community building, for example, developing community life of a neighbourhood type which could keep juvenile crime to a lower and more manageable level than more advanced societies have been able to attain. Experimental work on preserving and using social relationships in this way has been rare.

#### B. Disadvantages

134. This paper has been concerned with ways in which developing countries can develop a crime prevention scheme of national significance without necessarily having to obtain substantial new or additional resources. It should be recognized however that the very lack of resources can itself be criminogenic for a society.

135. When education can be only so thinly spread as to raise hopes and aspirations without real advancement towards their realization, when only a half or three quarters of those eligible for schooling can be accommodated and inequalities are created; when direct crime services are hampered for lack of funds, when social welfare cannot be afforded to offset the uprooting of people which itself is a direct consequence of development expenditure in other directions, when mental health services cannot deal with preventive work at all because they have hardly enough resources to handle the dangerous psychotics and when poverty is of a degree deadening to the dynamism needed to develop the economy, the society without resources is also developing criminogenic situations. Before anything was done there was little crime, but the measure of development achieved has set in force movements and changes which, if only partially accommodated by the rate of economic growth, can generate situations favourable to crime.

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<sup>39/</sup> (a) One country made self-help obligatory by making it an offence to hinder self-help services, and then defining non-participation as a hindrance.

(b) For use of penal system positively see P. Selwin, "Penal systems", paper prepared for Conference on Social Planning, University of Sussex, 16-18 April 1969 (mimeographed).



C. General

136. The question of prevention of crime cannot be left without the observation that, apart from the need for planning for better general conditions and control, it depends to a very large extent in modern times upon countries adopting an adequate and comprehensive policy for the youth of the nation. This is more true of countries with over 60 per cent of their population in the youth age range. The energies, the drive, the idealism and ingenuity of youth are human, and national resources for wholesale development and, specially where there is youthful unemployment, they cry out to be used creatively. The involvement and participation of youth can provide development planning and its implementation with the drive and dynamic quality which ensures the success of any plan and is the greatest promise for crime prevention. <sup>40/</sup> In fact, increasing rates of juvenile crime might well be regarded as a measure of a society's failure to do just that.

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<sup>40/</sup> "Participation is essential for plan implementation, the deficiencies in which have created something approaching a crisis in planning", para. 20 (E/CN.5/445), see also para. 34 on youth as a force in modernization.

## VIII. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

137. Planning is no longer a purely national concern. The countries of the world are becoming progressively more interrelated and the responsibility for achieving better standards of living for all is a burden shared by developed and developing nations alike. Equally, the problem of controlling and preventing crime has been recognizedly international since nations first began to associate for their mutual advantage. In the days of the League of Nations there were commissions for white slave traffic and narcotics; and if the concept of crime be extended to cover "white collar" offences such as the exploitation of labour, tax evasions and the like, then more agencies than the United Nations itself are involved in crime prevention. Should political crimes be included as well, no area of international activity is really excluded.

138. More specifically, international co-operation in crime prevention was recommended by the United Nations Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1968. There is a clear need for better facilities for collating and publishing world figures on crime, for evolving common concepts of offences and legal or social categorization for the uniform collection of data. There is an obvious need for an international exchange of research data and especially for the testing of hypotheses in a wide variety of different cultural circumstances. Then, if society should begin to investigate the possibility of using systems analysis, information and control processes in setting up the machinery for crime control, there will be great value in exchanging experiences derived from the application of concepts like mapping, entropy, or "feed-back" in different environments. It may be said that as planning develops and becomes more refined in relation to crime prevention it will be because of a world-wide feed-back serving to improve subsequent efforts to understand and control.

139. Apart, however, from the question of co-operation between nations, there is the corresponding need for various types and proportions of technical assistance. The insignificant part which technical assistance for crime prevention and control has played in the wide range of technical services supplied by multilateral and bilateral agencies to developing countries is partly a reflection of a planning approach not taking account of crime prevention, partly a result of viewing crime in conventional terms without regard to its influence on development (through corruption, "white collar crime", distortion of distribution etc.) and partly a reflection of the lack of a felt need for planning in this area in both developed and developing countries. Only technical aid of an ad hoc nature has been either sought or offered so far.

140. According to the approach adopted by this paper, it would seem appropriate for governments requiring technical aid to begin with a request for a comprehensive assessment of the position from a combined criminological and planning point of view. Aid should be given at the planning level to enable countries to plan in such a way that crime is anticipated and as far as possible prevented. This presupposes that a study has been made by experts of the situation as it exists and as it can be expected to develop in the next five or ten years. Both could be the subject of requests to enable a country to review its position and plan a programme for the future.

141. The Consultative Group, in a rather different connexion, suggested interdisciplinary teams composed of sociologists, psychologists, politicians, jurists and technical experts specialized in evaluation and planning methods, "whose duty would be to observe facts and correlations, identify and measure requirements, survey available means and propose a programme of action after specifying logistic requirements." 41/

142. This seems a good first approach to technical assistance. Teams of this kind could help develop plans and policies, besides suggesting programmes for health, education, agriculture, industry and economic growth generally. It would seem reasonable to apply the method to crime prevention.

143. In addition, planning experts are needed with special qualifications in - and an understanding of - crime prevention. Such experts could guide planning authorities in the most effective approaches to crime control. They might also be able to help build into the national planning the techniques of evaluation.

144. Finally, a great range of different kinds of technical assistance, from fellowships and equipment to experimental projects and specialists in corrections, research, probation, legislation, court work and many other branches of crime prevention work, are required to help countries make the best use of their resources. However, it should not be overlooked that developing countries need the kind of technical aid which will assist them to make the best of their advantages. They need people with ingenuity to guide them in exploiting their community participation, family ties and obligations and their still valid and relevant traditions. They need experts who will not so much bemoan the lack of resources but who will explore new approaches to crime prevention using existing and indigenous sources of resistance to crime. They need help in taking a new and original look at crime and development untrammelled by the stereotypes of legislation and thinking in countries with different histories and traditions.

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41/ "Report of Consultative Group", p. 11, para. 35.

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