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This publication has not been formally edited.

**Comments**

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I. Executive Summary

In 2017, the supply of illicit drug crops (particularly coca bush for cocaine manufacture and opium poppy for opiates production) reached the highest level recorded since UNODC started its monitoring1. Multiple interlinked factors including poverty (income and non-income-related), security and geographic isolation played a role in explaining these increases, which cannot be reversed unless communities in cultivating areas are provided with means to develop alternative licit livelihoods.

Alternative development (AD) is a “process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotics and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-economic characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs” . In general, alternative development is regarded as a sustainable strategy because it does not uniquely focus on reducing illicit drug crop cultivation (which is the case for eradication strategies), but aims to improve the socio-economic situation and overall well-being of affected communities to provide households with an incentive to voluntarily cease cultivating illicit drug crops.

One of the problems limiting the wider implementation and financial support for alternative development is the lack of systematic evidence for decision-making on this topic. Donors and implementing partners of alternative development projects tend to work in (local) silos without functional knowledge sharing. Therefore, basic information, such as budgets and key characteristics of current alternative development projects and their geographical locations, has remained scattered.

This report constitutes one of the first efforts to collect and systematize information on the status of alternative development projects2 worldwide and provides an overview of the projects implemented at any time during the 2013-2017 period and their characteristics. It focuses on the main opium poppy supply countries (Afghanistan, Myanmar and Mexico) and the main coca supply countries (Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), which together account for 96 per cent of the cultivation of these illicit crops3 worldwide.

This research identified a total of 53 alternative development projects which were implemented at any time between 2013 and 2017 and had total annual budgets between US$190 and 275 million. In 2017, the active AD projects intended to target 550,000 households.

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1 The UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme was established in 1999, as mandated by E/RES/1999/30 and CND Res 42/3, Monitoring and verification of illicit cultivation
2 For the purposes of this report, project and program are used interchangeably.
3 As this report only focuses on alternative development in opium poppy and coca supply countries, subsequent references to “illicit crop(s)” are related to both or either of them (i.e., excluding cannabis and other illicit-drug crops).
Some increase in the total annual budget of alternative development projects worldwide, driven by Colombia

The aggregated annual budget for all the identified alternative development projects experienced a small but gradual increase between 2013-2017. This was mainly due to projects in Colombia, which more than doubled their total annual budget from US$75 million in 2013 to 154 million in 2017. This growth was related to the increased interest in funding alternative development projects following the 2016 Peace Agreement, which included commitments towards voluntary cessation of illicit crop cultivation and the implementation of social inclusion and development projects. One of the largest (new) alternative development projects, National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (‘Plan Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito’, PNIS), is funded by the Colombian Government. Projects in the Plurinational State of Bolivia also increased their total annual budget due to funds provided by the European Union for two “development with coca” projects; one of which started in 2014 and the other in 2016. In Afghanistan and Myanmar, the total annual budget of the active alternative development projects remained in the same range during 2013-2017 (i.e., between US$77-100 million in Afghanistan and 3.4-5.6 million in Myanmar). In contrast, there was less interest by donors in funding alternative development efforts in Peru, where the total annual budget decreased from US$34 million in 2013 to 26 million in 2017 as a result of fewer projects.

Most of the money went to long-term projects...

Alternative development projects promote intricate processes of behavioural change (i.e., farmers’ voluntary decisions to cease illicit crop cultivation), which require long-term and continuous investment. A budget analysis of the projects that ended in 2017 or before showed that most of the money was spent on long-term projects. Out of a total budget of US$469 million, 382 million went to projects that lasted longer than 6 years, 81.3 million to projects that lasted 4-6 years and 5.7 million to projects of less than 4 years.

...but in terms of numbers of completed projects, more than half lasted less than six years, too short for maintaining sustainable results

While the largest share of the total budget went to long-term projects, in terms of numbers of projects, more than half of the completed alternative development projects lasted less than six years and an additional 10 per cent lasted less than 4 years, which is likely to be too short to maintain sustainable results. The remaining 40 per cent of projects lasted from 6 to 10 years. For both short- and long-term AD projects, there is little sound evidence on their sustainability, primarily due to the absence of methodologically robust impact assessments.

Two thirds of the alternative development projects were funded by the United States, followed by Germany and the European Union

A total of 15 countries contributed financially to alternative development between 2013 and 2017, and almost two thirds of the projects were funded by the United States of America,
following by Germany (one quarter of the projects) and the European Union (one in ten). Most of the other countries funded fewer projects and focused on particular project types or geographic locations. For example, Thailand only funded alternative development projects in Myanmar (during 2013-2017). While the information on individual contributions by international donors to cost-shared or joint projects is incomplete, the general pattern is that the United States tended to provide funds to relatively large-scale projects with budgets of US$20-100 million or more, the EU to medium-scale projects of around 10 million, and Germany to smaller projects of 150,000 - 3 million.

Alternative development projects were usually implemented by multiple partners, each responsible for specific parts of the interventions, for example, building infrastructure or providing training. In half of the alternative development projects, local NGOs or private organizations participated as implementing partners, mostly in projects with budgets between US$20 and 100 million; while in a quarter, UNODC was included as one of the implementing partners (mostly in projects with individual budgets of less than 5 million). There was no detailed information on the amounts provided to individual implementing partners.

Key objectives of alternative development efforts vary greatly between countries

The main stated purposes of the different alternative development projects varied by country. Projects in Afghanistan focused heavily on the introduction of high value crops (90 per cent of the projects), in Myanmar on food security (80 per cent), in the Plurinational State of Bolivia on social integration of native communities (70 per cent), in Colombia on supporting Government capacity (40 per cent), and in Peru on consolidation of farmers’ associations or extending previous interventions (40 per cent).

The introduction of high value crops was one of the most commonly included main objectives of AD projects, with the exception of projects with small budgets of less than US$150,000. The main objectives of large projects with budgets above 100 million included support to government capacity (for example, related to the peace process in the case of Colombia), and to a minor extent food security, improved competitiveness of AD projects (e.g., marketing assistance and similar), increased farmer participation in AD projects, and off-farm activities. Smaller projects with budgets of less than US$150,000 had counteracting deforestation, education and farmer association competitiveness as main objectives.

Gradual shift from focusing mainly on high value crops to other issues, including deforestation and the environment

Although the introduction of high value crops was one of the most common main objectives included in AD projects regardless of their budget size, the main focus of such projects has shifted over time. While several projects that started in 2013-2014 focused on the introduction of high value crops, this was less common in 2016-2017. Moreover, some of the most recent AD projects are aimed at addressing environmental issues (for example, deforestation and

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4 Implementing partners can conduct the interventions themselves or hire or sub-contract other entities or organizations.
forest degradation) in order to access funding linked to climate change and natural resource conservation, particularly in Colombia.

**Areas with low but sharply increasing levels of illicit crop cultivation are currently being overlooked**

Alternative development projects in Afghanistan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Myanmar usually took place in areas (provinces, departments or states) with traditionally high levels of illicit crop cultivation. However, recently cultivation has started to emerge, and in some cases at a steady pace, in non-traditional locations, such as Jawzjan in Afghanistan, Santa Cruz in Bolivia and Chin State in Myanmar. These locations have not yet been covered by alternative development interventions, although investing in these emerging locations could potentially pay off in preventing the expansion of illicit crop cultivation.

**Continued need for sound evidence on the coverage of alternative development projects, including on the number of targeted households**

Reliable evidence on the number of households actually targeted by alternative development initiatives remains scarce. Very few projects conducted baseline and end line surveys or maintained sound continuous tracking of project activities and results. In contrast, there was generally information about the total number of households intended to be targeted by the different projects, but aggregating this information was complicated. Some projects were not clear on the intended target group; in other cases, the scope of the project was broad and also included households that would indirectly benefit. Some of the projects did not specify the number of target households because they did not target communities but wider areas or other types of aggregated units such as schools, local community boards or cooperatives. Taking into account these limitations, the best possible estimate for the number of households intended to be targeted by alternative development interventions in 2017 was 550,000.

**A way forward in alternative development knowledge creation and sharing**

To enable systematic learning from previous experiences in alternative development, there is a need for creating a knowledge management system that locates information sources, mines existing repositories, evaluates and stores relevant data, creates new insights based on the analysis of existing data and improves collaboration and sharing among stakeholders and interested parties. In addition, it is important to consistently monitor the impact of AD interventions. UNODC has developed a combined methodology for AD impact assessment using remote sensing and socio-economic surveys, which could be introduced in all new projects.
II. Scope of the report

This report covers the alternative development projects which took place in the main opium poppy (Afghanistan, Myanmar and Mexico) and coca bush (Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) cultivating countries in any of the five years within the period 2013-2017\(^5\).

The United Nations General Assembly, in its twentieth special session on September 1998\(^6\), recognized alternative development as:

“A process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotics and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-economic characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.”

In the UNGASS Outcome Document 2016\(^7\) Member States reiterated their “commitment to addressing drug-related socioeconomic issues associated to the illicit cultivation of narcotic plants and the illicit manufacture and production of and trafficking in drugs through the implementation of long-term, comprehensive and sustainable development-oriented and balanced drug control policies and programmes, including alternative development and, as appropriate, preventive alternative development programmes, which are part of sustainable crop control strategies”.

Its recommendations include “promote(d) research … to better understand factors contributing to illicit crop cultivation, taking into account local and regional specificities, and to improve impact assessment of alternative development programmes, including preventive alternative development, as appropriate, with a view to increasing the effectiveness of these programmes, including through the use of relevant human development indicators, criteria related to environmental sustainability and other measurements in line with the Sustainable Development Goals”.

Therefore, this report considered as an “alternative development”\(^8\) project those which aimed, in a sustainable manner, to:

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\(^5\) Most of the data were collected in those six countries before the end of 2018


\(^8\) The concept of alternative development is currently under discussion and undergoing revision, as some Member States have expressed their interest to extend it to urban settings to facilitate providing legal income-generating alternatives to non-rural communities affected by illicit drug trafficking. This discussion is still in progress given the inherent difficulties on transferring agriculture-based knowledge to urban settings (for more information see, Commission on Narcotics Drugs -Sixty-Second Session. Conference Room Paper on the Future of Alternative Development, 2019).
-improve the quality of life of (illicit crop) farmers, and
-reduce or prevent the cultivation of illicit crops

Other (development) projects that did not include both criteria at the same time among their objectives were not included in this analysis.

III. Information Sources

The sources of information on the different alternative development projects were the main international donors, such as:

- United States of America (Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs - INL and US Agency for International Development - USAID)
- Germany (German Development Agency – GIZ)
- European Union (EU)
- Japan (Japan International Cooperation Agency – JICA)
- Thailand (Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage – MFLF)
- United Kingdom (Department for International Development – DFID)

Information was also sourced from the Governments of the six illicit crop cultivating countries and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

In general, the reports describing the AD projects and other relevant information were gathered from the web pages of the organizations indicated above, supported by email communications and visits to each of the illicit crop supply countries. In total more than 5,000 files and reports were collected and reviewed for this study.

IV. Results of the global overview of alternative development projects implemented over the 2013-2017 period

There were 53 different active alternative development projects at some point during the period 2013-2017. Broken down by country, Colombia had the most (17), followed by Peru (14), Afghanistan (13), Myanmar (6) and the Plurinational State of Bolivia (3). Mexico had no active projects. A summary of each of the projects that were active during 2013-2017 is included in Appendix I of this report.

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9 It does not include China, as information on Chinese investments in for example Myanmar was not publicly available.

10 It does not include Chinese investments in Myanmar, as information was not publicly available.

11 In the case of Mexico, projects conducted in regions affected by opium poppy cultivation did not explicitly include the double objective of improving the quality of life of farmers and reducing or preventing illicit crop cultivation. One exception was the alternative development project “Rural Development to discourage opium poppy cultivation in Oaxaca, Guerrero and Michoacan” conducted by FAO in Mexico, but it is not covered in this report, as it took place in 1990-1993.
Most of the alternative development projects were implemented in Colombia. They included a couple of climate change-related projects (REDD+) with a coca cultivation reduction component and a group of smaller projects funded by the German Development Agency-GIZ (with budgets of less than US$150,000). National and international interest in promoting AD interventions in Colombia increased due to the Peace Agreement of 2016, which included commitments to the substitution of illicit crops and development interventions.

The total aggregated budget of the AD projects implemented during the period 2013-2017 was US$1,110 million, mainly allocated to Colombia (458 million), Afghanistan (438 million) and Peru (163 million). However, the numbers of projects by budget size differed by country. For example, in Afghanistan, Colombia and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, most of the projects were in the range of US$20-100 million, while in Peru and Myanmar they ranged between 5-20 million. Only Afghanistan, Colombia and Peru had at least one large AD project with a budget of more than US$100 million, whereas all the low budget projects of less than 150,000 were implemented in Colombia.
Two projects in Colombia were excluded, as budgets were not publicly available (2013-2043 and 2014-2044, see appendices c.5 and c.8 for their details, respectively).

**Trends**

Overall the number of active AD projects increased by around one quarter in 2017 compared to 2013. This was mostly driven by Colombia, where the number of projects more than doubled. However, 5 of those projects had (very) small budgets of less than US$150,000 each, which was unusual, as most of the AD projects in this country had budgets between 5 and 100 million.

The number of projects in Afghanistan fluctuated between 7 and 10 during the years considered, while the number increased - but remained low – in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (from 1 to 3). In contrast, in Peru and Myanmar, after experiencing a peak in the number of on-going projects in 2015 (13 in Peru and 6 in Myanmar), those numbers decreased and reached a minimum in 2017 (8 in Peru and 3 in Myanmar).
The number of AD projects with budgets between US$20 and 100 million increased from 9 in 2013 to 16 in 2017. Also, there were several new projects (5 in 2017) with budgets of less than 150,000. Such small projects were non-existent in the available reports for 2013. These increases were broadly mirrored by a decline in larger projects with budgets between 150,000 and 5 million as well as budgets between 5 and 20 million. The number of very large projects with budgets above 100 million remained the same.

* Two projects in Colombia were excluded, as budgets were not publicly available (2013-2043 and 2014-2044, see appendices c.5 and c.8 for their details, respectively).
Number of active AD projects by individual project budget size per year and country

* Two projects in Colombia were excluded, as budgets were not publicly available (2013-2043 and 2014-2044, see appendices c.5 and c.8 for their details, respectively).

Individual project budget size categories:

- ≥ USD 100 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- < USD 150 thousand
Total annual budgets of AD projects

In 2017, the total annual budget of the active AD projects was larger than in the previous years. This was driven by projects in Colombia, which more than doubled their total annual budget from US$75 million in 2013 to 154 million in 2017. In contrast, the total annual budgets for the other countries remained relatively unchanged, although with some differences between countries. For example, the total annual budget of AD projects in Afghanistan ranged from US$77 to 100 million; while in Peru, the total annual budgets were mid-range (between 25 and 35 million); and in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Myanmar, the budgets were smaller (between 0.5 and 10 million).

* Two projects in Colombia were excluded, as budgets were not publicly available (2013-2043 and 2014-2044, see appendices c.5 and c.8 for their details, respectively). The (approximated) total annual budget was estimated as the sum per year of the budgets of the alternative development projects after being divided by their indicated duration in number of years.

Individual Project Budget Size Categories:

* Two projects in Colombia were excluded, as budgets were not publicly available (2013-2043 and 2014-2044, see appendices c.5 and c.8 for their details, respectively).

The (approximated) total annual budget was estimated as the sum per year of the budgets of the alternative development projects after being divided by their indicated duration in number of years.
**Total annual budget of AD projects by individual project budget size category per country**

**Individual project budget size categories:**

- ≥ USD 100 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- < USD 150 thousand

* The (approximated) total annual budget was estimated as the sum per year of the budgets of the alternative development projects after being divided by their indicated duration in number of years.
Duration of AD projects

Around half of the completed\(^{12}\) AD projects lasted from 4 to 6 years, while four projects out of ten had a duration of 6 to 10 years and 2 lasted 2-4 years. None of the closed projects had a duration of less than 2 or more than 10 years. AD projects with larger individual total project budgets were of longer duration. Also, most of the resources for completed projects were assigned to projects of longer duration (a total budget of US$115 million or total annual budgets of 16.3 million for the 10 projects of less than 6 years and a total budget of 382 million or total annual budget of 56.3 million for the 7 projects of more than 6 years).

Individual project budget size categories:

- **Projects which ended in 2017 or before**
- **Excluding AD projects that were not completed but terminated for different reasons**

\(^{12}\) Completed in 2017 or earlier.
In the case of the active projects (with expected duration beyond 2017), similarly to the AD projects completed by 2017, most stated a total intended duration of 4-6 years, followed by 6-10 years. However, their final duration is still unknown, as they may be extended. For example, documentation for one project with a budget between US$20-100 million stated an intended duration of (only) 2-4 years. However, this project was expected to be extended and the project revision was under way at the time of writing (UNODC-AFGZ89 in Afghanistan, see Appendix a.10 for details).

In Peru, one project was planned with an initial intended long life-span of more than ten years and a flexible budget. This project (“Proyecto Especial de Desarrollo del Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro”, PROVRAEM, funded by the Government of Peru, 2014-2024, see Appendix e.13 for details) had a total budget between US$5-20 million for a total duration of more than 10 years. It is expected that more funds will be transferred in the future. Also, there was only one active project in Peru with a duration longer than 10 years and a total budget of more than US$100 million (“Programa Presupuestal de Desarrollo Alternativo Integral y Sostenible”, PIRDAIS, which started in 2007, see appendix e.2 for details).
Individual project budget size categories:

- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

Appendix II includes information on completed and active AD projects by duration in years and individual project budget size per country.

**Targeted number of households** as intended by the AD projects

The total number of households targeted as intended by the projects was significantly affected by one single large project in Afghanistan (see appendix a.3 for details of this project) with more than one million intended targeted households. This project ended in 2015, and as a result, the total number of targeted households dropped from almost 1.7 million in 2015 to slightly above 0.5 million in 2017. Most of the targeted households were located in Afghanistan and Colombia, where a relatively large number of AD projects and large budgets per project are concentrated.

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13 The number of targeted households as intended by the AD Projects refer to the direct recipients of the interventions (without counting, whenever possible, indirect recipients of interventions such as households located along the road which was built to primarily benefit a specific beneficiary community). In addition, given the information available, it was not possible to rule out double counting (i.e., different AD projects could have targeted the same households at the same time or at different periods of time).
The estimation of the total number of targeted households was complicated by the fact that several project documents were not clear on who they considered as the reported “beneficiaries” (that is, farmers, individuals, families or households). And when this information was specified, it was not straightforward to convert the reported numbers into a common metric (number of households). The major element that affected the comparability of the number of targeted households was the scope of the projects. Some projects had broad objectives intended to target large numbers of households as “indirect beneficiaries”, whereas others had more focused objectives, targeting only “direct beneficiaries”.

Some of the AD projects (8 out of 53) did not specify the number of targeted households because the projects:

- did not target particular communities but wider areas for which it was difficult to determine how many inhabitants actually benefitted, and also areas affected by migration due to conflict and other external conditions such as droughts or deforestation.

- did not target farmers or households but other types of aggregated units such as schools, local community boards, which in turn were expected to promote health practices among

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14 For the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru) and Myanmar, families were considered equivalent to households (as they are usually used indistinctively), while in the case of Afghanistan none of the projects reported families as “beneficiaries”.

15 One project in Afghanistan (2006-2014), which focused on infrastructure improvements, see appendix a.1 for details; and two projects in Colombia (2013-2043 and 2014-2044, both REDD+ projects focusing on climate change and avoiding deforestation, see appendices c.5 and c.8 for details, respectively)

16 One project in Peru (2014-2016, see appendix e.12 for details)
community members\textsuperscript{17}, or cooperatives\textsuperscript{18} for which they did not report the total number of members.

- were relatively new or used new approaches such as private-public investments for which there is no prior information about the final number of households to be reached\textsuperscript{19}.

- were cancelled at an early stage, before households received any intervention\textsuperscript{20}.

Most of the alternative development projects without information on the number of targeted households (for the reasons indicated above) were implemented in Colombia and Peru. For the remaining countries there was practically complete information about the number of targeted households (with the exception of the GPI project in Afghanistan which ended in 2014). Nevertheless, in the case of Peru and the GPI project in Afghanistan, all projects without information ended in 2016 or earlier. Therefore, the number of targeted households of alternative development interventions reported for 2017 (slightly above 0.5 million) is as complete as possible for all countries but Colombia.

In 2017, 60 per cent of the targeted households were assisted by AD projects with total budgets between US$20-100 million, as most of the projects that year fell within this category (16 projects). A sizable number of targeted households (27 per cent) were also assisted by projects with total budgets above 100 million (5 projects). Only 16 per cent of the targeted households were reached by projects with total budgets of less than 20 million (14 projects).

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Total Number of Targeted Households per Individual Project Budget Size (2013-2017), N=45*}
\end{figure}

Individual project budget size categories:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textless USD 5 thousand
\item USD 5 thousand to \textless 5 million
\item USD 5 million to \textless 20 million
\item USD 20 million to \textless 100 million
\item \textgreater USD 100 million
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{17} One project in Peru (2010-2015), see appendix e.6 for details
\textsuperscript{18} One project in Peru (2010-2016), see appendix e.9 for details
\textsuperscript{19} One project in Colombia (2017-2022), see appendix c.16 for details
\textsuperscript{20} One project in Peru (2015-2016), see appendix e.14 for details
* Excluding 8 out of 53 projects due to the lack of data (see this section for the omitted projects and reasons). Note that the graph refers to number of households in a particular year. It does not refer to unique households per year.

There were sharp differences in the total numbers of targeted households between the countries. In 2017, the total number of targeted households in Afghanistan, Colombia and Peru ranged between 117,000 and 229,000 per country, while the total number of targeted households in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Myanmar ranged between 6,000 and 13,000. This was not only related to the fewer projects implemented in Bolivia and Myanmar, but also to the lower average number of targeted households per project, which was between 17,000 and 20,000 per project in Afghanistan, Colombia and Peru, and only between 2,000 and 4,000 per project in Bolivia and Myanmar.
**Total number of targeted households of alternative development projects and individual project total budget size**

*Excluding GPI project (2006-2014, see appendix a.1 for details)*

*Excluding three projects (2013-2043 see appendix c.5; 2014-2044 see appendix c.8; and 2017-2022 see appendix c.16 for details)*

*Excluding four projects (2010-2015 see appendix e.6; 2010-2016 see appendix e.9; 2014-2016 see appendix e.12; and 2015-2016, see appendix e.14 for details)*

**Individual project budget size categories:**
- ≥ USD 100 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- < USD 150 thousand
**Main international donors for alternative development projects**

A total of 14 individual countries and the European Union provided funds to alternative development projects during the period 2013-2017. The largest donors were the United States of America (contributed to six out of ten alternative development projects conducted worldwide), Germany (almost a quarter) and the European Union (one in ten projects). In terms of budgets, the United States contributed at least US$615 million\(^{21}\) (of the total aggregated budget of US$1,100 for all active AD projects during the 2013-2017 period).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contribution to AD Projects</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Lichtenstein</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Projects received funds from one or more international donors.

The main international donors tended to focus on specific countries. For example, the United States funded almost nine out of ten alternative development projects in Afghanistan (85 per cent), seven out of ten in Peru (71 per cent) and six out of ten in Colombia (59 per cent). The United States was, however, a contributor to AD in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, funding one project which started in 2005 and concluded in 2018 with funds from other countries.

Only Germany funded alternative development projects in all five countries during the period 2013-2017, whereas the European Union contributed to all the projects in Bolivia. Thailand funded alternative development projects in Myanmar, but not in the other illicit-crop supply countries.

\(^{21}\) Corresponding only to projects that United States funded alone (without other international donors). For Germany and the European Union, these amounts were not calculated, as they had shared projects in many cases. Generally, no information was available on the amounts of individual contributions of international donors per project.
*Alternative development projects stated that they received funds from one or more international donors. No information available on individual contributions of international donors per alternative development project or the specific year of their contribution to the projects.
Main objectives of the alternative development projects

Overall, half of the AD projects focused on the introduction of high value crops and all five recipient countries had at least one project with this main objective. One quarter of the AD projects indicated the consolidation of previous interventions (e.g., marketing component of formerly funded farmer associations/cooperatives) among their key purposes, and all countries but Afghanistan had at least one project with this main objective. One in five projects mentioned support to governmental capacity as a main objective. Those projects were located in Afghanistan and Colombia. Also, one in five projects focused on counteracting deforestation in Colombia, Peru or the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Another common main objective was food security with almost one in five AD projects including this in Afghanistan, Bolivia or Myanmar.

Introduction of high value crops was one of the most common main objectives regardless of the project budget size with the exception of projects with very small budgets of less than US$150,000. The main objectives of very large AD projects (with budgets above 100 million) included support to government capacity, and to a minor extent food security, competitiveness and off-farm activities.
Conversely, small projects with budgets of less than 150,000 had as their main objectives to counteract deforestation, provide training or education and increase farmer associations’ competitiveness. Projects with budget ranging from 150,000 up to 100 million had diverse main objectives.

The main objectives of the alternative development projects varied significantly by country. Considering the number of AD projects per country, in Afghanistan, almost all the projects (92 per cent) concentrated on the introduction of high value crops, while in Myanmar, the primary aim of most of the projects was to reduce food insecurity (83 per cent).

Alternative development projects in the Andean countries had more diverse objectives. For example, the majority of projects in the Plurinational State of Bolivia focused on social integration (of
indigenous communities); in Colombia, in addition to the introduction of high value crops, the emphasis was on counteracting deforestation and supporting the government capacity associated with the peace agreement. In Peru, projects primarily aimed to consolidate farmer cooperatives or previous drug control interventions.

There was no comprehensive information available on the specific amount or proportion of the budget assigned to each of the main objectives of individual projects.

**Main objectives of alternative development projects by individual project budget size and country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% AD projects by main objective and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Afghanistan, N=13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction of high value crops</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support to government capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food security</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Agri-) business services</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reward counternarcotics achievements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competitiveness, incl. certifications</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Rural) employment, incl. off-farm act.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual project budget size categories:**
- < USD 150 thousand
- USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- 5 million to < 20 million
- 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

**% AD projects by main objective and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Bolivia, N=3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% AD projects by main objective and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Bolivia, N=3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social integration (of native communities)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction of high value crops</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reduce migration to coca departments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food security</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counteract deforestation / nat. res. Conservation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consolidate farmer associations / previous interventions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual project budget size categories:**
- < USD 150 thousand
- USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- 5 million to < 20 million
- 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

% AD projects by main objective and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Colombia, N=15*

- Support to government capacity: 47%
- Introduction of high value crops: 40%
- Counteract deforestation / nat. res. Conservation: 33%
- Consolidate farmer associations / previous interventions: 33%
- Increase private sector investment: 27%
- Education, incl. research: 27%
- Support peace process / reduce violence: 13%
- Land titling: 7%
- Competitiveness, incl. certifications: 13%

Individual project budget size categories:
- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

% AD projects by main objective and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Myanmar, N=6

- Food security: 83%
- Introduction of high value crops: 67%
- Consolidate farmer associations / previous interventions: 17%
- Support previous eradication/ avoid re-cultivation: 17%

Individual project budget size categories:
- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million
In relation to the trends over time, several of the AD projects that started in 2013-2014 focused on the introduction of high value crops, which became less common as a main objective in 2016-2017. In addition, more recent projects often include objectives such as counteracting deforestation and REDD++ to be able to access sources of funding related to climate change and natural resources conservation, especially in Colombia (see Appendix III for numbers of AD projects by main objectives and starting year per country).
Main implementing partners

Half of the alternative development projects included NGOs or private organizations as implementing partners, partly because the United States - a major donor - often includes such partners. Therefore, this was particularly prevalent in Afghanistan, Colombia and Peru, the largest recipients of funds from the United States. In contrast, the most common implementing partner for projects in the Plurinational State of Bolivia was the Government (National Fund for Integral Development, or “Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Integral”, FONADIN), as it received direct funds from the European Union for projects; and in Myanmar, UNODC was among the most frequent implementing partners.
NGOs and private organizations, as well as UNODC, were implementing partners of AD projects of all different budget categories. The German Cooperation (GIZ) in association with UNODC, the local Government and NGOs implemented projects with small budgets of less than US$150,000. The engagement of NGOs and private organizations was a preferred option for projects with medium budgets, while (development-related) Government entities were often implementing partners of bigger projects in Colombia.

As in the case of the main donors and main objectives of AD projects, there was incomplete information available on the specific funds provided to individual implementing partners, the type of implementing activities per partner, or the specific year of the partner implementation.

Appendix III includes the number of AD projects by main implementing partners and starting year per country.
% AD projects by main implementing partner and individual project budget size (2013-2017), N=51*

Individual project budget size categories:
- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

Percentage of AD projects by main implementing partners per country

% AD projects by main implementing partners and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Afghanistan, N=13

Individual project budget size categories:
- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

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% AD projects by main implementing partners and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Bolivia, N=3

- Ministry of Development or similar: 66%
- UNODC: 33%
- Counter Narcotic Agency or similar: 33%

Individual project budget size categories:

- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

% AD projects by main implementing partners and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Colombia, N=15*

- NGO/Private Org.: 60%
- UNODC: 33%
- Local/Regional Government: 27%
- Ministry of Development or similar: 20%
- GIZ: 20%
- Universities & Research Centers: 7%
- Farmers’ national federations: 7%

Individual project budget size categories:

- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

% AD projects by main implementing partners and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Myanmar, N=6

Individual project budget size categories:

- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million

% AD projects by main implementing partners and individual project budget size (2013-2017), Peru, N=14

Individual project budget size categories:

- < USD 150 thousand
- ≥ USD 150 thousand to < 5 million
- ≥ USD 5 million to < 20 million
- ≥ USD 20 million to < 100 million
- ≥ USD 100 million
Locations of AD projects per country

Most of the AD projects targeted multiple provinces or states and there was no information available on how much budget was assigned to each of those locations per individual project.

Afghanistan

The alternative development projects implemented during 2013-2017 in Afghanistan included at least one province with large areas under opium poppy cultivation (10,000 hectares or more in 2017). The projects were implemented in more than one province and had a total aggregated annual budget of US$123 million. However, half of the projects also targeted at least one province without opium poppy cultivation (“poppy-free” provinces with fewer than 100 hectares under cultivation in 2017). Those projects had a total annual budget of US$73 million; more than half of the total annual budget of all the AD projects in Afghanistan.

In particular, most of the alternative development projects (8 during 2013-2017) included Nangarhar as a targeted location, which was one of the top ten opium poppy producing provinces during that period of time, but with a smaller area under cultivation in 2013 than four other provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Farah and Nimroz), and in 2017, smaller than five provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Badghis, Faryab and Uruzgan). The AD projects that included Nangarhar as a targeted location had a total annual budget of US$70 million. Helmand and Kandahar - the top two opium poppy producing provinces - were targeted in fewer projects (6 projects with a total annual budget of US$ 54 million during 2013-2017) in comparison to Nangarhar.

During 2013-2017, Nangarhar’s opium poppy areas increased by 21 per cent, which was well below the overall increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan of 57 per cent. In addition, the largest increases in opium poppy areas were observed in previously low opium poppy producing provinces, such as Faryab and Ghor, with growth between 1,500 and 14,000 per cent with respect to their total opium poppy areas. These two provinces were also targeted by the lowest number of alternative development projects (2-3 projects, with a total annual budget of US$37 million) in comparison to other provinces in Afghanistan.

The Plurinational State of Bolivia

The alternative development projects in the Plurinational State of Bolivia were concentrated in La Paz and Cochabamba, which for the purposes of this report were categorized as high (more than 10,000 hectares) and medium (between 5,000 and 10,000 hectares) coca producing departments in 2017, respectively. These two departments experienced stable situations or slight increases in coca cultivation areas in 2017 compared to 2013 (1 per cent for La Paz and 16 per cent for Cochabamba). In addition, the Government implemented a project in non-coca growing departments to prevent migration to coca producing departments. There were no alternative development projects located in

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22 Location at department, province or state level, as disaggregated information at district or community level is not available for many AD projects
23 The categorization of high (>10,000 hectares), medium (5,000-10,000 hectares) and low (<5,000 hectares) coca producing provinces was established to enable a comparison of the production of illicit crops (coca or opium poppy) in provinces/departments located in different countries
the two low-level coca growing departments of Bolivia (Santa Cruz and El Beni, with fewer than 5,000 hectares).

**Colombia**

Three quarters of the alternative development projects implemented at any time between 2013 and 2017 included as targets the medium and large coca producing departments in Colombia (above 5,000 hectares per department). Those projects had a total annual budget of US$153 million. Four in ten involved low (less than 5,000 hectares) or non-coca cultivating departments, with a total annual budget of US$151 million. Meta, a middle level coca producing department neighbouring Cundinamarca (the department where the capital Bogota is located), hosted the largest number of alternative development projects (7 projects with a total annual budget of 145 million). In contrast, Narino and Putumayo, the two top coca producing departments in Colombia, hosted 5 AD projects each (with a total annual budget of US$121 million and 104 million respectively).

**Myanmar**

Five of the six alternative development projects implemented in Myanmar at any time during 2013-2017 were located in Shan State, the geographical area with the largest opium poppy area in that country. These projects had a total annual budget of US$5 million. Conversely, Kachin, Chin and Kayah States, geographical areas with relatively low poppy cultivation, did not host any AD projects. The remaining project was implemented in Magway, a poppy-free geographical area, which mainly served as training area for staff working on alternative development. This project had a total annual budget of US$0.5 million.

**Peru**

Fewer than one quarter of the projects implemented in Peru during 2013-2017 included Cusco and Ayacucho, two high coca cultivation departments with more 10,000 hectares each in 2017. Those projects had a total annual budget of US$17 million. Most of the alternative development projects implemented during that period covered Huanuco (12 projects with a total annual budget of US$33.4 million), followed by San Martin and Ucayali (10 projects each with total annual budgets of 32.5 million and 31.3 million, respectively).

Huanuco was the department with the largest decrease in illicit crop cultivation from 2013 to 2017 (-74 per cent), followed by San Martin (-40 per cent) and Ucayali (-24 per cent). Coca cultivation in Cusco remained stable (a 2 per cent increase) and in Ayacucho it increased by 25 per cent. In Peru, country donors like the United States tended to invest in alternative development in departments with a reduction in coca cultivation to consolidate previous gains (see the section: “Main objectives of alternative development projects”).

Some departments with large increases in coca cultivation (2013-2017) have not been covered by alternative development projects so far. Those departments include Cajamarca (with a 78 per cent increase), Madre de Dios (38 per cent) and Amazonas (27 per cent).