CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: Recent patterns and integrity challenges in the public sector
Corruption in Afghanistan: recent patterns and integrity challenges in the public sector
Acknowledgments

The following organizations and individuals contributed to the implementation of the population survey, four sector-specific integrity surveys of public officials and to the preparation of this report:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna)
Sandeep Chawla (Director, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs), Angela Me (Chief, Statistics and Surveys Section-SASS), Enrico Bisogno (Team Leader Crime Statistics, SASS), Michael Jandl (Research Officer, SASS), Felix Reiterer (Consultant, SASS), Suzanne Kunnen (Public Information Assistant, Studies and Threat Analysis Section), Jonathan Gibbons (Editor)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Kabul)
Jean-Luc Lemahieu (Country Representative), Gary Collins (Programme Manager for Criminal Justice), Sohail Ghourwal (National Project Officer)

High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption
Dr. Azizullah Lodin (Chairman), Mohammad Amin Khuramji (Deputy Chairman), Mohammad Rafi Amini (Director for the Policy and Planning department)

The survey fieldwork would not have been possible without the dedicated work of the field managers and surveyors of Eureka Research (Kabul), who often faced difficult security conditions.

The implementation of the population survey and the four sector-specific integrity surveys was made possible by a financial contribution from the United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan.

Disclaimers

This report has not been formally edited. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNODC or contributory organizations and neither do they imply any endorsement.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of UNODC concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Photos: The pictures are used for illustration only and were not taken in the context of corruption.© Munir, A. Scotti
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 5

MAIN FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS .................................................................. 11

BRIBERY: THE CITIZENS’ PERSPECTIVE .................................................................................. 13

1. Prevalence of bribery as experienced by citizens .............................................................. 13
2. Mechanism and impact of bribery .................................................................................... 18
3. Citizens’ response to bribery ............................................................................................ 22

CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IN FOUR SECTORS OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ...... 29

4. Public officials and bribery: a general overview............................................................... 29
5. Bribery in the local government, education, police and judiciary sectors .................. 32
6. Recruitment and other integrity challenges in the local government, education, police and judiciary sectors .................................................................................................................. 39
7. Measures for strengthening integrity in the public sector .............................................. 51

METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX .................................................................................................. 73
INTRODUCTION

Corruption is widely understood to be the improper use of a public or official position for private gain. Quite apart from specific legal definitions, this includes offences such as bribery, embezzlement, abuse of power and nepotism. A further distinction can be made between political or “grand” corruption on the one hand and administrative or “petty” corruption on the other. While the former refers to acts of corruption perpetrated by high-ranking politicians and decision-makers, the latter concerns offences committed by mid- and lower-level public officials who are responsible for administrative procedures and services provided to the public.

Political corruption often receives the greatest attention due to its visible impact on political decision-making and good governance, but the pervasive and devastating impact of administrative corruption on the everyday lives of ordinary Afghan citizens receives far less publicity. Yet for the vast majority of the Afghan population, by limiting and distorting their right to access essential public services, hindering their chances of economic development and eroding their trust in government, justice and the rule of law, it is administrative corruption that is also keenly felt.

Taking all these different aspects into account, in 2012, as in 2009, the population of Afghanistan considered corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, to be one of the principal challenges facing their country, ahead even of poverty, external influence and the performance of the Government. If during the last three years there have been slight changes in the rating of these issues by the Afghan population, its perceptions of corruption have not improved significantly.
This report highlights the major findings of a programme of surveys in 2012 on the extent of bribery and other forms of corruption in Afghanistan and on integrity challenges in the public sector. The research on population experience of corruption follows up on a previous survey conducted in 2009 and, using a structurally similar research design, provides comparative results of the extent and patterns of bribery in Afghanistan. As in 2009, the survey focuses on the respondents’ personal experience of bribery, on the modalities, mechanisms and socio-economic patterns of corruption, as well as on perceptions of corruption. In addition to the general population survey, four sector-specific integrity surveys of civil servants were carried out from 2011 to 2012 in the judiciary, police, local government and education sectors, with the purpose of identifying particular integrity challenges in public service and shedding light on sector-specific patterns of corruption.

Findings of this report can be used to strengthen the fight against corruption and to support the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which Afghanistan ratified in 2008. The study analyses various types of corrupt acts – as defined in the Convention - committed by public officials or by individuals working for private-sector entities. Moreover, the report provides information that can be used to develop comprehensive strategies for preventing corruption in the public sector, which should have the promotion of integrity, both at the organizational and individual level, at their heart. Article 7 of UNCAC requires that States parties, in accordance with the fundamental principles of their legal system, take measures to enhance transparency in their public administration relative to its organization, functioning, decision-making processes and/or other aspects.

1 As in the 2009 survey, in 2012 more than 6,700 individuals were interviewed across the country in a sample representative of the whole population of Afghanistan. In the case of the civil servant surveys, in each sector, 2,000 to 3,000 interviews were conducted with randomly selected service providers and their beneficiaries.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Bribery as experienced by citizens

The large-scale population survey on the extent of bribery and four sector-specific integrity surveys of public officials undertaken by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan in 2011/2012 reveal that the delivery of public services remains severely affected by bribery in Afghanistan and that bribery has a major impact on the country’s economy. In 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and the total cost of bribes paid to public officials amounted to US$ 3.9 billion. This corresponds to an increase of 40 per cent in real terms between 2009 and 2012, while the ratio of bribery cost to GDP remained relatively constant (23 per cent in 2009; 20 per cent in 2012).

Afghanistan has made some tangible progress in reducing the level of corruption in the public sector since 2009. While 59 per cent of the adult population had to pay at least one bribe to a public official in 2009, 50 per cent had to do so in 2012, and whereas 52 per cent of the population paid a bribe to a police officer in 2009, 42 per cent did so in 2012.

However, worrying trends have also emerged in the past three years: the frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer and the average cost of a bribe has risen from US$ 158 to US$ 214, a 29 per cent increase in real terms. Education has emerged as one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption, with the percentage of those paying a bribe to a teacher jumping from 16 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2012. In general, there has been no major change in the level of corruption observed in the judiciary, customs service and local authorities, which remained high in 2012, as in 2009.

Although with a different intensity, bribery not only affects the public sector but also non-public sector entities in Afghanistan. Nearly 30 per cent of Afghan citizens paid a bribe when requesting a service from individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan in 2012, as opposed to the 50 per cent who paid bribes to public officials. The national economic impact of non-public sector bribery is also lower, with an estimated total cost of US$ 600 million, some 15 per cent of the estimated US$ 3.9 billion paid to the public sector.

Significant variations in the distribution of these two types of bribery also exist across Afghanistan. The public sector is most affected by bribery in the Western (where 71 per cent
of the population accessing public services experienced bribery) and North-Eastern Regions (60 per cent), while it is least affected in the Southern (40 per cent) and Central (39 per cent) Regions. On the other hand, local individuals and entities not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan, such as village elders, Mullahs and Taliban groups, are more involved in bribery in the Southern region (nearly 60 per cent of citizens paid a bribe when requesting a service from such individuals).

Citizens’ response to bribery

Although corruption is seen by Afghans as one of the most urgent challenges facing their country, it seems to be increasingly embedded in social practices, with patronage and bribery being an acceptable part of day-to-day life. For example, 68 per cent of citizens interviewed in 2012 consider it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users (as opposed to 42 per cent in 2009). Similarly, 67 per cent of citizens consider it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks (up from 42 per cent in 2009).

The data show that for every five Afghan citizens who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey, there was one who refused to do so, mainly due to a lack of financial resources. This means that the use of bribery in the public sector affects the capacity of the Afghan population to access necessary services, and that — as they are more likely to accept the payment of bribes — higher income households can ensure better accessibility to, and a higher quality of, public services than households with lower incomes. On the other hand, citizens with lower incomes are more likely to turn down requests for bribes, effectively pricing them out of the “market” for public services and making them less likely to receive fair service delivery.

When it comes to reporting bribery, 22 per cent of those who paid a bribe in 2012 reported the incident to authorities such as the police (one third), the public prosecutor’s office and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (one fifth each). While the bribery reporting rate in Afghanistan seems to be relatively high by international comparison, it is not clear if the reporting declared in the survey took place in a formal setting, since it rarely led to effective results. Indeed, less than a fifth of cases reported to the authorities resulted in a formal procedure and the majority of claims did not lead to any type of follow up.

The data clearly show that citizens’ major reason for not reporting bribery is their lack of faith in the authorities’ ability and resolve to call the perpetrators to account and to protect the interests of the complainant (57 per cent of those who experienced bribery but did not report it). However, some 13 per cent of respondents do not seem to regard bribery as an actual crime, given that they accept it as a “common practice” in their daily lives that does not require any remedial action, while 11 per cent of respondents simply do not know to whom they should report acts of bribery and 7 per cent fear reprisals when reporting bribery.

The focus on four sectors in the public administration

According to the direct experience of bribe-payers (those who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey), the four sectors of the public administration studied (police, local government, judiciary and education) are affected by bribery to different extents. Local government officials in provincial, district or municipal authorities are the public officials most involved in bribery in Afghanistan. Indeed, more than half (52 per cent) of bribe-payers paid a bribe to those particular authorities in 2012, which represents a significant increase on the 2009 level.

Although there has been a significant decrease in the share of bribe-payers who pay bribes to judges since 2009, prosecutors and judges both still receive bribes from roughly a quarter of bribe-payers. Likewise, while the percentage of those who pay bribes to police officers has halved since 2009, police officers still receive bribes from 22 per cent of bribe-payers, as do
teachers. In the case of the latter, however, this represents a three-fold increase on the 2009 figure.

Besides the four sectors considered here, the healthcare system also continues to play an important role in bribery, with doctors and nurses/paramedics accounting for between 15 and 20 per cent of officials paid bribes. Customs and tax/revenue officers are also often on the receiving end of kickbacks in Afghanistan, even more so in 2012 than in 2009.

**Purpose of bribes**

The analysis of specific forms of bribery in the four different sectors, by means of integrity surveys, indicates that bribery takes place for different reasons in different circumstances. In most cases bribes are paid in order to obtain better or faster services, while in others bribes are offered to influence deliberations and actions such as police activities and judicial decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in institutions. The administrative procedures for which most Afghan citizens pay bribes to local government authorities are also the procedures for which they most frequently access their services, such as land registration, to obtain identity cards (Tazkera), shop registration and public utilities. But the fact that bribes are paid for even the most fundamental of procedures, such as birth and marriage registration as well as access to justice, shows that administrative corruption has an impact basic civil rights in Afghanistan.

In addition to bribery in schools and universities paid by students or their families, teachers also indicate how corruption comes about through the work relationships of teachers with the staff of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. Indeed, among those admitting to the receipt of bribery offers, teachers in schools and in universities often report offers made for helping students to pass exams, whether by changing the grade (39 per cent of teachers who receive a bribery offer), or beforehand by providing information on the content of the exam (28 per cent of teachers who receive a bribery offer).

Among the list of reasons for bribery offers reported by police officers are standard motives such as facilitating the release of permits or documents, or avoiding the payment of fines, but other more alarming reasons are also reported by the same officials. Almost a quarter of Afghan National Police (ANP) officers (24 per cent) offered a bribe receive the offer in order to prevent imprisonment or speed up the release of a prisoner. Another 21 per cent are offered a bribe to not report drug trafficking or the smuggling of other items. Similar concerns are seen among the reasons reported by the Afghan Border Police (ABP) who, as well as offers for facilitating the release of travel documents (20 per cent), repeatedly receive offers for facilitating the trafficking of persons and weapons (24 per cent). Furthermore, actions such as tampering with criminal evidence and “turning a blind eye to” drug trafficking are not infrequent reasons for police to be offered bribes, acts that can have a shattering impact on overall integrity of law enforcement activities in the country.

In the justice sector, according to the experience reported by courts users, bribes are paid in relation to a variety of legal issues. They range from cases related to family and inheritance disputes, litigation relating to land/property, and road accidents, but they also include procedures related to criminal offences, including drug-related crimes, and commercial/debt issues. Court users involved in criminal cases are those most exposed to the payment of bribes, followed by those involved in commercial/debt issues and road accidents.

**Other integrity challenges**

Recruitment in the public sector has shown itself to be an area of concern in Afghanistan as it is largely based on bribes or patronage. About 80 per cent of citizens with a family member

---

2 This term refers to citizens who make use of court services. The survey was conducted by selecting a random sample of court users.
recruited into the civil service in the last three years state that the family member in question received some form of assistance or paid a bribe to be recruited. Civil servants in the four sectors covered in the integrity surveys also acknowledged that assistance with recruitment is widespread. For example, some 50 per cent of police, local government staff and school teachers indicated that they received assistance during their recruitment. However, the share of new recruits who received undue assistance is higher in those branches of the public sector where use of a thorough assessment (written test and oral interview) of candidates is less commonly used. These data suggest that the utilization of substantive procedures of assessment, though insufficient, constitutes a valid means of reducing nepotism, cronyism or clientelism in the public sector.

The majority of public officials indicate that they are not satisfied with their salary and only a minority say that their salary is sufficient for supporting their household. Thus it is not surprising that significant shares of civil servants report earnings, on occasion at least, from an economic activity additional to their usual employment. The percentage of local government officials who have a second job is particularly high, as is the percentage of university lecturers and school teachers. But undertaking an additional economic activity can be a delicate issue for civil servants and, though possible in certain sectors, engaging in a second job during working hours, for example, is considered a corrupt practice.

Corruption can be defined in different ways and it is not always clear whether certain types of behaviour are considered dishonest. For example, in the local government sector, levels of acceptance of practices such as recruitment on the basis of family ties, service users offering gifts to develop business and service users offering money to speed up a procedure, among others, indicate that there is a general lack of awareness of, or indeed a sense of resignation to, the integrity issues and challenges facing the local government sector in Afghanistan.

The influence of local power figures also inevitably leads to a sense of resignation in the police force, where it is greater than in other sectors of the public administration. The purposes of bribes paid to police officers, such as choosing to ignore drug trafficking or smuggling, underline the involvement of local power figures in corrupt practices. Indeed, drug traffickers are seen to be the biggest influence on police work at the local level and criminal group leaders the third biggest, after tribal leaders.

**Building a framework to foster integrity**

An organizational pre-requisite for fighting corruption is a public administration with clear and coordinated regulations and effective procedures and practices in place that help protect and foment integrity and reduce the possibility of corrupt conduct among civil servants, as long they are aware of the existence of such procedures and behave in accordance with them. For example, local government offices in Afghanistan do appear to have basic procedures in place, such as the use of codes of conduct outlining the integrity framework of civil servants. Indeed, almost three quarters (72 per cent) of local government officials state that a code of conduct exists in their place of work. Of those, 83 per cent have formally signed a code, while nearly half of all local government officials in the country (46 per cent) have signed and own a copy of a code.

Within the public administration itself, monitoring should be a fundamental factor in the assessment of staff procedures and detecting weaknesses and irregularities in the system. All surveyed institutions appear to have an established monitoring system in place, as indicated by more than 80 per cent of staff in each sector. However, impartiality — a crucial element in guaranteeing true transparency in this process — does appear to be an issue. For example, in 41 per cent of cases in the ANP and 32 per cent in the ABP, monitoring was conducted by designated inspectors from the Ministry of the Interior, whereas in most other cases it was carried out by the direct superiors of those monitored and/or done so in an unstructured manner. Questions about the impartiality of such a process need be asked.
The perspective of service users can also be an invaluable external means of evaluating the conduct of public officials, but formal channels need to be in place for citizens to do so. Staff of the ABP, in particular, (46.8 per cent) state that formal complaint mechanisms for citizens are often lacking, although where mechanisms are in place they are assessed to be performing better in recording and following up complaints than those available in the ANP where, in 35 per cent of cases, complaints are not recorded and 39 per cent of complaints are not followed up.

An important tool for promoting integrity among staff is training, yet it is an area that does not always receive adequate attention. For example, almost half of all police officers and judiciary staff have been given at least one training session on integrity/anti-corruption, but the corresponding percentages are much lower in the education sector and local government (respectively, 13 and 21 per cent). Although substantive/technical training is a well established process in all sectors, anti-corruption/integrity is a topic that warrants much more of a presence in staff development programmes.

All things considered, the vast majority of employees (between 80 and 90 per cent) of the four surveyed sectors report that they are satisfied with their job, but the picture becomes less clear when focusing on salary. Police officers, for example, are quite satisfied with what they earn, whereas salary satisfaction is significantly lower among education, local government and judiciary staff. Considering that the bribery prevalence rate is above 40 per cent in all four sectors, this indicates that no clear relationship can be established between the size of public officials’ salaries and their experience of bribery.
MAIN FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Corruption continues to exert a heavy burden on Afghan society and the country’s fragile economy. Murky practices cast their shadows over virtually all types of institutions, but they are particularly prevalent in dealings between the public sector and citizens who access its services. The modalities, frequency and intensity of corrupt behaviour can vary greatly and this report attempts to shed light on several of its manifestations.

This has been achieved by looking first at bribery and how it is experienced by citizens and public officials, with a focus on four sectors of the public administration of Afghanistan. The scope of the study is then broadened in order to examine other practices which, spanning the boundary between licit and illicit behaviour, often represent challenges to individual and organizational integrity. The field of analysis also includes certain aspects that have a direct impact on the working environment, job satisfaction and service delivery, as corruption should not be seen in isolation and it is necessary to consider the “bigger picture” when developing anti-corruption policies.

The findings of the study suggest some ways forward:

- Concrete measures for fighting bribery should concentrate on reducing unnecessarily lengthy and bureaucratic procedures that increase vulnerability to bribery. Preventive measures should also target civil service positions that are particularly exposed to bribery. For example, by means of sharing of duties, the introduction of staff rotation policies and the monitoring of service delivery.

- Bribes are often paid by the wealthy as a kind of additional fee for guaranteeing preferential treatment. In certain circumstances and with careful monitoring, the creation of a scale of fees relating to varying degrees of quality or speed of service could transform bribes into official payments. Particular attention should also be paid to the registration of their payment and, when implemented, fees for public services should benefit the entire system, not just corrupt officials.

- Citizens do not report bribes to authorities because they believe it to be pointless, which is confirmed by the fact that only a small minority of complaints are substantially and formally followed up. The existence of reporting channels should be
more widely publicized and the public administration should be more forthcoming about the follow up of reported cases. Some victims of bribery indicate the fear of reprisals to be the main reason for not reporting bribery to authorities. The confidentiality and protection of whistleblowers should thus be strengthened, particularly in local contexts and in the case of public officials who wish to report corruption themselves.

- Bribery not only affects the public sector but also the private sector. Existing legislative, procedural and operational tools need to be evaluated to see if they are adequately adapted for preventing and fighting corrupt practices by business entities and individuals active in the private sector.

- Recruitment in the public sector often occurs in a way that facilitates patronage and nepotism: the selection of new staff on merit through open and transparent procedures is not yet an established practice. Data show that when selection procedures are based on the substantive assessment of candidates, improper assistance and favouritism are hindered. The adoption of standardized and transparent selection procedures based on thorough substantive assessments of applicants should become the norm in all sectors of public administration.

- While the performance of additional economic activity may, in principle, be admissible in some public sector positions, it should be conducted within a clear regulatory framework in order to prevent corrupt behaviour and avoid conflicts of interest. This requires mechanisms of disclosure by public officials and proper monitoring by supervisors. This is particularly relevant in the education sector.

- The integrity framework in the civil service needs to be reinforced. According to the experiences observed in the four sectors examined, basic administrative procedures and regulations are in place, but management practices and oversight procedures are still weak and there is a general lack of professional training and, in particular, a lack of training on integrity. Anti-corruption/integrity training should be intensified and improved in quality and should be tailored to the context of each sector in order to provide practical guidance for understanding the difference between licit and illicit behaviour, as well as for developing integrity practices and supporting the development of positive role models.

- In a context where patronage is often a normative framework, superiors/managers should be the prime focus of anti-corruption efforts. Since lower ranks are significantly influenced by the behaviour and decisions of those of a higher professional and social standing, anti-corruption efforts should target the latter and raise awareness of the importance of fighting corruption and enforcing integrity standards.

- While low salary can undoubtedly be a key motivation for corrupt behaviour, data do not provide clear evidence of this. It is often unclear how to distinguish between bribery as a coping mechanism and as a means of personal enrichment. The line is blurred and it can shift in the perception of individual civil servants. Hence data do not provide definitive answers as to whether higher salaries should be a focus of anti-corruption efforts.

- Public awareness of the acceptability of certain practices and, more generally, of the importance of public service monitoring should be raised. In order to bridge the gap between communities and public administrations, public service oversight and participatory audit systems could be set up as a way of showing the public that citizens can monitor public service delivery themselves and that it is within their rights to do so.
Bribery in the form of public officials soliciting or being offered an undue incentive to influence the performance of their official duties constitutes one of the most recurrent forms of petty corruption. One of its most common manifestations, the payment of a bribe to a public official (or to a private sector employee) by a private citizen or entity, is the main focus of the first section of this report, in which the extent, cost, purposes and modalities of bribery are analysed from the perspective of citizens. Additional perspectives are provided by examining the way citizens react and respond to corruption, both in terms of how it affects their day-to-day business and their opinions and attitudes about corruption.

1. Prevalence of bribery as experienced by citizens

Of the many forms of corruption encountered in everyday life, administrative bribery can be singled out as placing the greatest burden on the economic well-being of Afghan citizens and their families. The extent of bribery as experienced by the Afghan population is thus of particular relevance in the overall assessment of corruption patterns and trends in Afghanistan.

In an act of bribery between a citizen and a public official, contact with the official who receives the bribe, either directly or through an intermediary, is crucial. The one-year prevalence of bribery in Afghanistan is therefore calculated as the number of Afghan citizens who gave money, a gift or counter favour to a public official on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey, as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period.3

On that basis, the prevalence of bribery in Afghanistan in 2012 was 50.1 per cent. While this represents a substantial decrease on the 2009 rate of 58.6 per cent, it also means that half of adult Afghans still resort to bribery when dealing with public officials (Figure 2).
Furthermore, although the total prevalence rate of bribery may have decreased since 2009, survey results indicate that the frequency of bribe paying has increased in the same period. In 2009, bribe-payers paid an average of 4.7 bribes to public officials during the preceding 12 months. In 2012, each adult Afghan who reported the payment of at least one bribe paid, on average, a total of 5.6 bribes in the preceding 12 months, or almost one bribe every two months.

In contrast to many other countries, where corruption often appears to be more widespread in urban areas, corruption in Afghanistan is just as prevalent in rural areas. Indeed, the prevalence of bribery was found to be slightly higher in rural areas (50.7 per cent) in 2012 than in urban areas (48.3 per cent). Conversely, the frequency of bribe paying was considerably higher in urban than in rural areas (7.2 bribes vs. 5.1 bribes).

While citizens in urban and rural areas of Afghanistan have roughly the same contact rate with public officials (88.0 per cent vs. 86.1 per cent), traditional gender roles may account for the differences in the contact rate between men (91.0 per cent) and women (81.1 per cent). The same gender roles are also likely to play a part when it comes to bribing public officials.
The bribery prevalence rate is substantially higher for men (53.7 per cent) than for women (45.1 per cent) in Afghanistan, whereas the reported frequency of bribe paying is higher for women than for men (6.3 vs. 5.3). The fact that female bribe-payers pay bribes more frequently than men may be related to the nature of the bribery involved, with women requesting services from public utilities and the health and education sectors, in particular, where they often engage directly with service providers and may be obliged to pay bribes repeatedly.

At the regional level, there are also significant variations in the prevalence and frequency of bribery in Afghanistan. The highest prevalence of bribery is observed in the Western Region (71.0 per cent), followed by the North-Eastern (59.7 per cent), Northern (53.6 per cent) and Eastern (47.4 per cent) Regions. The lowest prevalence is found in the Southern (40.3 per cent) and Central (39.0 per cent) Regions. However, the frequency of bribery (the average number of bribes paid by bribe-payers) is inversely related to its prevalence at the regional level: the lower the prevalence rate of bribery, the higher the frequency.

**Map 1: Prevalence of bribery and average number of bribes paid, by region, Afghanistan (2012)**

![Map showing regional prevalence and average number of bribes paid](image)

Source: General population survey 2012

**Bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector**

In any society, corruption and bribery are not exclusive to employees of the public sector and Afghanistan is no exception. For the first time, this study investigates dealings between citizens and numerous different individuals, groups and organizations external to the public administration of Afghanistan. Entities in the private business sector, foreign military or consulate personnel, religious authorities or insurgent groups may also demand illicit payments in return for certain favours, preferential treatment or the provision of services. For example, the employees of private banks may demand bribes for approving loans to farmers or shopkeepers, consulate personnel may do the same in return for processing visa requests
and the staff of military or international organizations may request bribes in return for preferential treatment.

Calculated using the same methodology as for bribery relating to public sector officials, the one-year prevalence rate of this type of bribery was 29 per cent in 2012. Meanwhile, the average number of bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan (the frequency of bribery) was 3.5 or, in other words, more than one bribe every four months.

As in the case of bribery concerning public officials, particular patterns can also be noted in bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan, which is somewhat higher in rural (29.4 per cent) than in urban areas (27.4 per cent) and is also higher among males (31.3 per cent) than among females (25.4 per cent).

**Figure 4:** Prevalence of bribery and average number of bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan (2012)

Non-public sector employees come from a diverse set of organizations and groups in Afghanistan. To gain more insight into how each different entity is affected by bribery, the analysis of the distribution of bribe-payers who paid an individual not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan at least once shows the relative importance of each entity (many bribe-payers also paid bribes to more than one such entity in the 12 months prior to the survey). As shown in Figure 5, the three largest shares of bribe-payers paid to embassy/consulate personnel (27.9 per cent), village elders (27.3 per cent) and non-governmental organizations (25.7 per cent). Other non-public sector entities received a smaller percentage of bribes.

---

4 Calculated as the number of Afghan citizens who gave money, a gift or counter favour to an individual not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey (as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with such an individual in the same period. Bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan is covered for the first time in the 2012 survey, thus no comparative data for 2009 are available.
While the prevalence rate of bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan is significantly lower than the prevalence rate of bribery to public officials, on average there are big variations in the prevalence rate of the former at the regional level. For example, it reaches 48 per cent in the Southern Region but only 19 per cent in the North-Eastern Region (Figure 6).

Regionally, patterns of bribery thus follow current patterns of state authority and the influence of non-public sector entities. Regions with lower prevalence rates of bribery for bribes paid to public officials tend to have higher prevalence rates of bribery for bribes paid to individuals not employed in the Afghan public sector. When the bribery prevalence rate is calculated for local entities only (village elders, Taliban and Mullahs), it is much higher in the Southern Region (59 per cent) than in the rest of the country and even higher than the prevalence rate

---

1 Officers of private banks, staff of international organizations, embassy/consulate personnel, staff of non-government organizations, ISAF officers.

2 Village elders, Mullahs and Taliban.
of bribes paid to public officials (40 per cent). This pattern is mainly due to the higher percentage of payments made to Taliban groups, as well as to village elders and Mullahs in the Southern Region.

2. Mechanism and impact of bribery

Modality of bribery

Survey data on the modality of bribe requests and offers reveal the nature of bribery in Afghanistan. In 85 per cent of cases the bribe is either directly or indirectly requested by a public official, while in only 13 per cent of cases the bribe is actually offered by a citizen (Figure 7:). The fact that in over 30 per cent of cases public officials explicitly request kickbacks for their services is remarkable in that a significant number of officials express little fear and shame in instigating acts of corruption. In other cases public officials adopt a more cautious approach, either by making implicit bribe requests (26 per cent) or making use of an intermediary (28 per cent).

Figure 7: Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by modality of bribe requests/offers, Afghanistan (2012)

The proportion of bribery requests made explicitly or implicitly by public officials or third parties does not show any notable geographical pattern by region or by urban/rural breakdown in Afghanistan. However, as illustrated in Figure 8:, it is remarkable that the percentage of bribe offers made by female citizens is more than three times greater than that made by male citizens (23.3 per cent vs. 6.8 per cent). This finding may be related to the particular purpose and nature of bribes paid by many women in Afghanistan: most notably to receive better services from public utility companies and from the health and education sector.

Figure 8: Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by modality of bribe requests/offers and by sex, Afghanistan (2012)
Purposes of bribes

Whether to finalize or speed up a procedure, to avoid paying a fine or to receive better treatment, citizens pay bribes for a variety of purposes. In Afghanistan as a whole, by far the most common of those purposes is “getting things done” or, in other words, to facilitate or speed up the delivery of a public service that would not otherwise be provided (59.4 per cent). Other purposes such as reducing the cost of a procedure (10.6 per cent), avoiding the payment of a fine (13.3 per cent), receiving better treatment (6.7 per cent), and other purposes (7.4 per cent) are less important. Interestingly, the finalization or speeding up of a procedure is a more common motive for bribery in rural than urban areas (61.1 per cent vs. 53.2 per cent), whereas reducing the cost of a procedure and receiving better treatment are more common motives in urban environments.

Types of payment

On average, 69 per cent of all bribes are paid in cash and a further 12.9 per cent are paid in the form of valuables. Only 11.2 per cent of all bribes are paid in the form of food items and 7.8 per cent as other goods or services. The dominance of cash bribes is even more pronounced in urban areas (79.1 per cent of all bribes) than in rural areas (66.2 per cent). As illustrated in Figure 9, bribe payment types have changed only slightly in the past three years and while valuables have assumed a more prominent role, more than two thirds of bribes are still paid in cash.

Figure 9: Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by type of payment, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

The cost of bribery

When focusing on bribes paid in cash, significant variations in the amounts paid become apparent between urban and rural areas, the different regions of Afghanistan and even between male and female bribe-payers, with the average amount paid in all these categories increasing to varying extents between 2009 and 2012. As shown in Figure 10, the average size of all bribes paid in Afghanistan increased from US$ 158 in 2009 to US$ 214 in 2012, an increase of 29 per cent in real US$ terms, which is entirely due to an increase in the average size of bribes paid in rural areas (from US$ 166 to US$ 240, a 38 per cent increase in real terms), whereas the average size of bribes decreased slightly in urban areas (– 6 per cent in real terms). Another feature of bribe payments in Afghanistan is the considerable difference in average bribe size paid by male and female citizens (US$ 265 vs. US$ 131).

The average bribe increased from 7,900 to 10,000 Afghani from 2009 to 2012, a nominal increase of 26 per cent. Taking into account inflation in Afghanistan of around 5.3 per cent over the three year period, the real increase in the average bribe in Afghanistan was 20 per cent.
When expressing bribe sizes in Afghani, the national currency of Afghanistan, cross-sectional relative values remain unchanged, while the calculation of changes between 2009 and 2012 is slightly modified with respect to amounts expressed in United States Dollars. For example, as shown in Figure 11, between 2009 and 2012 the average bribe in Afghani rose from 7,900 to 10,000 Afghani, an increase of 20 per cent in real terms. This was due to a moderate appreciation in the Afghani in relation to the United States Dollar in that three-year period.

The overall economic impact of bribery on the Afghan population can be estimated from information relating to the average size of bribes. In simple terms, in the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey a total of US$ 3.9 billion was paid in bribes to public officials, which represents an inflation-adjusted increase of 40 per cent on the overall economic cost of bribery in 2009, when the total amount paid in bribes by the Afghan population was estimated at US$ 2.5 billion. This means that bribery is placing a growing burden on individual Afghans as the per capita spend (including children and the elderly) on bribes in

---

See Methodological Annex.

In local currency, the total costs increased from 124 billion Afghani to 183 billion Afghani, a nominal increase of 47 per cent. Taking into account inflation of around 5.3 per cent over the three-year period in Afghanistan, this is a real term increase of 40 per cent in local currency.
2012 was US$ 156, while it was US$ 104 in 2009, an increase of 39 per cent in real terms. However, taking into account growth in the GDP of Afghanistan, the ratio of bribery cost to GDP remained relatively stable, decreasing slightly from 23 to 20 per cent between 2009 and 2012.

Socio-economic status and bribery

Certain socio-economic and demographic characteristics can help to clarify the nature and impact of bribery on the Afghan population. For example, while, as already identified, there is a higher prevalence rate of bribery among males than among females, household income has the greatest influence on the ability to pay bribes. As shown in Figure 12, there is a clear relationship between income and the prevalence of bribery. Citizens in higher income groups are more likely to be party to bribery, while those in lower income groups may simply not be able to afford a bribe requested. A comparison with 2009 data shows that the link between bribery and income levels is a recent evolution in corruption patterns in Afghanistan. In a context where bribery is widely used as a means of “getting things done”, this indicates that it is a further source of inequality in accessing public services.

Figure 12: Prevalence of bribery, by household income group, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

There is not a clear pattern in the relationship between educational level and bribery, although a lower percentage of bribes are paid by those who have no formal education, which could be associated with lower income level (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Prevalence of bribery, by educational level, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)
Form and cost of bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector

Bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan tend to be paid in cash even more so than bribes to public officials, although, at US$ 184, the average bribe paid in 2012 was less than the average bribe paid to public officials. Overall, 76 per cent of bribe-payers paid individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan in cash, while 12.5 per cent gave food and 9.5 per cent gave other valuables.

Just like the impact of bribes paid to public officials, the overall economic impact of bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector on the Afghan population can be estimated on the basis of the number and average size of bribes paid. In the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey, a total of US$ 573 million was paid in bribes to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan, which is equivalent to some 3 per cent of the GDP of Afghanistan over the same period. When added to bribes paid to public officials (20 per cent of GDP), this amounts to 23 per cent of the GDP of Afghanistan.

3. Citizens’ response to bribery

Understanding citizens’ attitudes to corruption is a key factor in the development of a successful strategy for fighting it. When confronted with bribe requests citizens can react in very different ways by either accepting such requests, turning them down or reporting them to the authorities. The analysis of these types of behaviour can provide valuable insight into how best to increase resistance to certain practices. Moreover, since attitudes and perceptions towards corruption can have an effect on certain types of behaviour, their analysis has a strategic value.

Refusal of bribery

Although most citizens confronted with a direct or indirect bribery request respond by paying the bribe, the fact that a significant portion of them later report the incident and others actually refuse outright to pay the bribe indicates that bribery is not always considered “business as usual” in Afghanistan.

Data show that, on average, for every five citizens who paid a bribe to a public official at least once in the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey there was one who refused to do so (9.1 per cent of total adult population). The refusal rate was somewhat higher in urban than in rural areas (11.1 per cent vs. 8.6 per cent) and also higher among females than males (10.5 vs. 8.0 per cent).

Reasons for refusing bribe requests can be diverse, being based on moral values or the simple fact that the request was deemed too expensive, though the analysis of bribery refusal data show that the latter is probably the predominant reason. Those who do not pay bribes tend to be concentrated in lower income groups and among those with a lower educational level (Figure 14). Thus in the bribery “market” those who cannot afford to pay bribes requested by corrupt public officials are more likely to turn them down, while education does not appear to be a powerful deterrent to participating in an act of bribery.
Reporting bribery

As mentioned above, half of Afghan citizens who had contact with public officials during the 12 months prior to the survey paid at least one bribe to a public official. Within that group, roughly three quarters of bribe-payers did not report the event to a relevant authority, while 22 per cent reported the incident. Reporting rates were significantly higher in rural areas than in urban areas (24 per cent vs. 16 per cent) and were also higher among males than females (26 per cent vs. 17 per cent). Comparative data from the 2009 survey show that reporting rates increased significantly, in urban areas at least, from 9 per cent in 2009 to 16 per cent in 2012.

When citizens report their experience of corruption in Afghanistan they do so mostly to official law enforcement institutions. Over a third directly report bribery cases to the police, while another fifth turn to the public prosecutor’s office. Almost the same number report to the specialized anti-corruption agency of Afghanistan, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, while 11 per cent address their complaints to the “Ombudsperson”. Less than one in ten approach the actual agency that employs the public official who requested the bribe, and in only a few cases are reports made to other institutions (Figure 15:).

Figure 15: Percentage distribution of bribe-payers who report their personal bribery experience to authorities, by institution, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: General population survey 2012

---

10 Literally: “The person who takes our complaints to the Government”.
Experience after reporting a bribe

In accordance with national and international legal standards, when an act of corruption is reported to a relevant authority, a formal procedure should be instigated so as to investigate the allegation of wrongdoing, return any illicit gains to their lawful owners and initiate disciplinary and criminal proceedings against public officials who have violated their duties. However, the accounts of those who have reported their personal experience of bribery suggest that this is often not the case and many reported acts of bribery do not result in the requisite follow-up procedures.

As illustrated in Figure 16:, only about 18 per cent of reported bribery cases in Afghanistan actually lead to the initiation of a formal procedure against the implicated public official. In another 24 per cent of reported cases the problem is solved informally and the citizen has his or her money or gift returned. In almost half of cases there was either no follow-up whatsoever (30 per cent) or the reporting citizen was advised not to take the report any further (18 per cent). This demonstrates a clear need for stronger and more transparent responses to acts of corruption that come to the attention of the authorities.

Figure 16: Distribution of the experiences of bribe-payers who report bribery to authorities, Afghanistan (2012)

- A formal procedure was started 17.6%
- The problem was solved informally 30.1%
- Citizen was advised not to go ahead with reporting 17.7%
- There was no follow-up to reporting 23.9%
- Don’t know 7.1%
- No response 3.7%

Source: General population survey 2012

Reasons for not reporting bribery

As noted above, roughly three quarters of citizens with personal experience of bribery in the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey did not report the incident to the authorities. The data clearly show that their major reason for not reporting bribery is their lack of faith in the authorities’ ability and resolve to call the perpetrators to account and to protect the interests of the complainant. More than half (57 per cent) of those who experienced but did not report a case of bribery expressed this conviction and this lack of faith in the authorities was even more pronounced in urban than in rural areas (Figure 17:).

About 13 per cent of respondents do not seem to regard bribery as an actual crime, since they accept bribery as a “common practice” in their daily lives that does not require any remedial action. Particular attention should also be paid to the 11 per cent of respondents who simply do not know to whom they should report acts of bribery and to the 7 per cent who openly admit their fear of reprisals when reporting bribery, a sentiment that is significantly more widespread in rural (8.1 per cent) than in urban areas (4.7 per cent).
Awareness of corruption

When developing effective anti-corruption policies it is important to understand whether certain corrupt practices are deemed acceptable or unacceptable by citizens. Both the 2009 and the 2012 surveys therefore asked Afghan citizens about their opinions regarding a series of dishonest practices and whether they considered those practices “always acceptable”, “usually acceptable”, “sometimes acceptable” or “not acceptable”. The 2009 survey results had already presented a controversial picture of integrity awareness in Afghanistan, with large shares of the population considering even severe malpractices to be either “always acceptable” or “usually acceptable”. However, the 2012 survey results indicate a growing tolerance of corruption in Afghanistan, which is quite alarming (Figure 18:).

According to the 2012 survey results, two thirds of the adult population of Afghanistan consider the receipt of minor gifts by civil servants from service users (administrative bribery) and the recruitment of civil servants on the basis of family and friendship ties to be acceptable. The latter is a form of nepotism that is considered more acceptable than certain forms of bribery, a finding associated with the high percentage of civil servants who admit to receiving assistance during their recruitment. The increased acceptability of kickbacks in schools is also consistent with increased levels of bribery in the education sector.

When perceptions of this nature are shared by the vast majority of the population, corruptive practices are more persistent and thus harder to eradicate.
Figure 18: Percentage distribution of adult population who consider selected practices “always acceptable” or “usually acceptable”, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

Perceptions of corruption trends

It is widely recognized that data on the perception of corruption do not measure corruption per se, but rather the psychological impact of corruption on the population. An individual’s perceptions of corruption are influenced by a number of factors, which include their own experience of corruption and also the public discourse on corruption in the media as well as among colleagues, friends and relatives. Due to the interplay between objective and subjective elements, corruption perception data cannot simply be used as proxy indicators of corruption trends and should be employed with caution. However, knowledge of general perceptions of corruption is nevertheless important, mainly because perceptions of high levels of corruption may foster further corruption. For example, if there is a widespread feeling that corruption is ubiquitous and growing, and that bribes are required to get anything done, it is more likely that bribes will be either requested or offered.

Asked whether they considered the level of corruption to be lower, stable or higher in 2009 than five years earlier, over two thirds (68 per cent) of Afghan citizens voiced the opinion that corruption had increased, while only a fifth (19 per cent) said it had decreased. When asked in 2012 whether they believed that the level of corruption had either increased, stabilized or decreased over the previous three years, only 39 per cent perceived corruption to have increased, 21 per cent thought it had decreased and 40 per cent believed that it had remained stable (Figure 19:). These data can be interpreted as meaning that there has been a certain stabilization — though at a high level — in the perception of corruption in Afghanistan. To completely reverse such perceptions significant and sustained long-term decreases in actual experiences of corruption are required.
**Figure 19:** Percentage distribution of perceptions of levels of corruption in Afghanistan in comparison to three years (2012) and five years (2009) earlier, (2009 and 2012)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012
CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IN FOUR SECTORS OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

This section takes a detailed look at forms of corruption as they are actually experienced within the public administration of Afghanistan, with a focus on four distinct sectors: Local Government, Education, Police and Justice. Selected due to the widespread number of services that they provide to the public, these four sectors have serious implications on citizens’ lives when corruption is involved.

Through the feedback of the public officials who work in them and the citizens who use their services, an attempt is made to identify where the most significant problems related to corruption reside in each sector. Since the criminal act of bribery, abuse of functions or embezzlement often take place in a context of lax organizational processes, unmotivated staff and opaque procedures and regulations, corruption should not just be evaluated in isolation. For this reason, after focusing on bribery, the analysis is broadened by considering the integrity challenges that exist in each of the four sectors and by exploring some of the organizational and managerial aspects that affect relevant institutions. The analysis of such factors can provide invaluable information for developing better policies that both prevent and fight corruption.

4. Public officials and bribery: a general overview

Just as different regions and elements of society in Afghanistan experience different levels of exposure to corruption, not all sectors of the public administration are affected by bribery to the same extent. According to the direct experience of bribe-payers (those who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey), local government officials in province, district or municipal authorities are those most involved in bribery in Afghanistan (Figure 20:). Indeed, more than half (52 per cent) of bribe-payers paid a bribe to those particular authorities in 2012, which represents a significant increase on the 2009 level.

Although there has been a significant decrease in the share of bribe-payers who pay bribes to judges since 2009, prosecutors and judges both still receive bribes from roughly a quarter of bribe-payers. Likewise, while the percentage of those who pay bribes to police officers has halved since 2009, police officers still receive bribes from 22 per cent of bribe-payers, as do
teachers. In the case of the latter, however, this represents a three-fold increase on the 2009 figure.

The healthcare sector also continues to play an important role in bribery, with doctors and nurses/paramedics accounting for between 15 and 20 per cent of officials paid bribes. Customs and tax/revenue officers are also often on the receiving end of kickbacks in Afghanistan, even more so in 2012 than in 2009.

**Figure 20:** Percentage of bribe-payers who paid a bribe to selected types of public official, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

![Chart showing percentage of bribe-payers by type of official]

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

Note: The sum is higher than 100 per cent since bribe-payers could have made payments to more than one public official in the 12 months prior to the survey.

The likelihood of bribes being paid to a particular type of public official depends on how frequently citizens interact with them. But since different types of official have different types of exposure to citizens, it is important to estimate the probability of a certain type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interaction. This is measured by means of the prevalence of bribery in relation to each type of public official. According to this indicator, four types of official (prosecutors, teachers, judges and customs officials) are the most likely to receive bribes when dealing with citizens. While there has been little change in prevalence rates since 2009 in relation to prosecutors, judges and customs officials, the vulnerability to bribery of teachers has increased dramatically in the past three years. Other officials particularly vulnerable to bribery in Afghanistan are tax/revenue officials and police officers, while there has also been a notable increase in the vulnerability of members of the Afghan National Army (Figure 21:).

---

11 This is calculated as the number of adult citizens who gave a selected type of public official money or gifts on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey, as a percentage of adult citizens who had at least one contact with that type of public official.
**Figure 21:** Prevalence of bribery, by public official receiving the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

**Bribe size by sector**

The average size of bribes paid in each different sector varies significantly. Bribes tend to be larger in the justice sector, where the average bribe paid to both prosecutors and judges is more than US$ 300. Somewhat smaller amounts are exchanged in dealings with local government officials and customs officials (approximately US$ 200), while bribes paid to other officials range between an average of US$ 100 and US$ 150 (0).

**Figure 22:** Average size of bribes paid, by type of public official who receives the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012) (current United States Dollars)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012
5. Bribery in the local government, education, police and judiciary sectors

For an act of administrative bribery to take place two parties need to be involved: a citizen and a public official. But since civil servants are more likely to be reluctant to admit their involvement in such practices, data collected from these two parties in the form of population-based surveys and civil servant surveys may not be directly comparable. Thus, the four sector surveys conducted in 2012 should not be compared to results from the population survey — particularly in relation to bribery prevalence — although they do provide a complementary perspective on bribery from within the civil service.

**Figure 23:** Percentage of public officials reporting the offer of at least one bribe in the preceding 12 months, by type of official, Afghanistan 2012

![Graph showing percentage of public officials reporting at least one bribe](source)

A significant share of officials in all four sectors reported being offered money or gifts in exchange for improved service in the 12 months prior to the survey, though percentages vary considerably between sectors. For example, approximately a quarter of local government officials reported a bribery experience, while only between 7 and 11 per cent of judiciary officials did so. Taking into account how reluctant many officials may be to declare such occurrences, data indicate that the offer of a bribe during the performance of their duties is not out of the ordinary for officials.

The experience of officials who receive offers of bribes also provides insightful information about the specific purposes for which bribes are offered. For example, the list of reasons provided by police officers include some standard motives such as facilitating the release of permits or documents, or avoiding the payment of fines, but other more alarming reasons are also reported by the same officials, as can be seen in the following sections.

Information collected from public officials offers a detailed view of the multiplicity of ways in which public officials can be confronted with situations of bribery. If bribes are generally offered and paid to circumvent rules and procedures, awareness of the specific reasons why they occur in the different sectors of the public administration is crucial for developing and implementing concrete measures for fighting corruption.

**Local government**

Local government in Afghanistan is composed of a great number of administrative divisions and offices. The Municipality, District Governor's office and Provincial Governor's office in each province form this extensive system of administration, which provides a multitude of

---

12 The analysis on the education sector is based on two separate surveys: one of 1,250 local government service users and the other of 1,148 local government officials (see Methodological Annex).
service — ranging from the issuing of Tazkera (identity cards), building permits and land registration to birth and marriage registrations and pension applications — and involves service users as individuals as well as private companies and organizations.

This huge variety of services necessitates a very extensive system of bureaucracy, the size and complexity of which means that the likelihood of administrative complications and service delays is high. The number and variety of services also implies extensive and frequent use of this sector by citizens who may consequently come to feel dependent on its employees who, due to the difficulties of monitoring such a complex system, may act individually and in their own interest, effectively transforming an area of public service into a private fiefdom. In this situation, the risks of clientelism and the abuse of power by officials are high and a number of preventive measures need to be put in place to raise both organizational integrity and the personal integrity of officials.

The general population survey data indicate that, according to the direct experience of bribe-payers (those who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey), local government officials are those most involved in bribery in the public sector of Afghanistan, with more than half (52 per cent) of bribe-payers having paid a bribe to those particular officials in 2012. A better understanding of the circumstances surrounding bribe-paying episodes can be obtained by examining the nature of bribery in terms of the specific purpose for which a bribe is paid by a citizen.

**Figure 24:** Percentage distribution of service users who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey, by type of administrative procedure for which they paid a bribe, Afghanistan (2012)

The procedures for which citizens most often pay bribes are those related to land registration, Tazkera, shop registration and public utilities. These are also the procedures for which they more frequently interact with local government officials, yet when considering prevalence of bribery (the amount of citizens who pay bribes to a particular type of public official, expressed as a percentage of those who actually have contact with that type of public official), other procedures, such as applications for social security benefits, building permits, and certificates and registration procedures, are actually those most exposed to bribery.
Bribery is a common practice for receiving financial benefits or for economic activities such as building permits or land registration. Given their business connotations this is not unexpected, but the fact that money or gifts in kind change hands even for the most fundamental of functions such as birth and marriage registration, as well as access to justice, shows that administrative corruption in Afghanistan has a direct impact on basic civil rights. Furthermore, with the average size of bribe paid to local government officials being US$ 200, the sums paid are far from trifling.

When asked about the most prevalent forms of corruption that exist in their sector, local government officials confirm the perception that corruption exists in their institutions and in a number of different manifestations. Two of the three most common forms of it are bribery by contracting companies (48 per cent) and bribery by service users (43 per cent), which suggests that money frequently changes hands for services rendered. Other forms of corruption cited by local government officials include embezzlement and nepotism in recruitments and promotions.
Education

Identifying and understanding patterns of corruption and integrity in the education sector of Afghanistan is a highly complex process. It involves both the huge number of civil servants and teachers who work in the different branches of the sector, as well as the service users who, due to the nature of the educational process, have a far more complex relationship with teachers and other civil servants than in other sectors of the public administration.

According to the general population survey, not only has the amount of bribes paid to teachers increased since 2009, the vulnerability to bribery of teachers has also increased dramatically, with the prevalence of bribery increasing from 15.6 per cent to 51.3 per cent in the same period. The average size of bribe paid to teachers and lecturers is still relatively low in comparison to those paid to other civil servants but it almost doubled from $64 in 2009 to an average $116 in 2012.

The survey on education sector staff provides complementary information on forms of bribery prevalent in this sector: in addition to bribery in schools and universities in relation to students or their families, teachers also indicated how corruption comes about through the work relationships of teachers with the staff of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. Indeed, among those admitting to the receipt of bribery offers, teachers in schools and in universities often report offers made for helping students to pass exams, whether by changing the grade (39 per cent of teachers who receive a bribery offer), or beforehand by providing information on the content of the exam (28 per cent of teachers who receive a bribery offer). The importance of bribes paid to teachers for facilitating the hiring of a colleague shows that bribery also exists in the administrative structure of the education sector as well as between parent/student and teacher.

Figure 27: Percentage distribution of teachers who receive a bribery offer, by reason for bribery offer, Afghanistan (2012)

Remarkably, a large share of school pupils’ parents (34 per cent) did not report the reason for bribing a teacher. However, 40 per cent of those who pay a bribe do so to help their children pass an exam. Improving grades and obtaining certificates are also reasons for bribing teachers (14 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively), but private tuition is another of the principal reasons (27 per cent). As discussed later, private tuition is an activity that raises a number of issues. It is a bona fide economic activity when conducted transparently but becomes a case of conflict of interest, for example, when private lessons are a requirement for passing exams or obtaining good grades.
Police

Few public bodies have such potentially serious implications on the lives of citizens as the police force. This, coupled with the fact that one in five Afghan citizens (19 per cent) had direct contact with the police in 2012, means that a study of public sector corruption in Afghanistan is not complete without a detailed look at the integrity of the police. The survey aimed at including police employees from all ranks and functions and focusing on the country’s principal police force, the Afghan National Police (ANP), including its administration, as well as on the Afghan Border Police (ABP), as representative of one of Afghanistan’s specialized police forces.

While the prevalence of bribery in relation to police officers decreased from 52 per cent to 42 per cent between 2009 and 2012, police officers in Afghanistan are second only to local government officials in terms of bribes received (22 per cent of bribes paid). Furthermore, on close examination of the purposes for which many of those bribes are paid, it emerges that in many cases they are aimed at concealing or mitigating very serious criminal offences. As a police officer from the North East of Afghanistan explains, the actions of certain police officers can have a cost on society far greater than the value of a bribe paid:

"In our police unit we are sometimes faced with moral corruption as well as bribes for releasing criminals, which is the most serious kind of corruption. Traffic police units also earn a lot of money from driving licence and vehicle registration numbers. In the criminal department, the most serious corruption happens and several cases of corruption occur there on a daily basis. Criminals arrested by the police are released without any punishment after offering money."

This is backed up by the data. Among the list of reasons for bribery offers reported by police officers themselves are standard motives such as facilitating the release of permits or documents, or avoiding the payment of fines, but other more alarming reasons are also reported by the same officials. Almost a quarter of ANP officers (24 per cent) who were offered a bribe received the offer in order to prevent imprisonment or speed up the release of a prisoner. Another 21 per cent were offered a bribe to not report drug trafficking or the smuggling of other items. Similar concerns are seen among the reasons reported by the ABP who, as well as offers for facilitating the release of travel documents (20 per cent), repeatedly receive offers for facilitating the trafficking of persons and weapons (24 per cent). Actions such as tampering with criminal evidence and “turning a blind eye to” drug trafficking are not
infrequent reasons for police to be offered bribes; acts that can have a shattering impact on overall integrity of law enforcement activities in the country.

**Figure 29:** Percentage distribution of Afghan National Police (ANP) officers who receive a bribery offer, by reason for bribery offer, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Afghan National Police

**Figure 30:** Percentage distribution of Afghan Border Police (ABP) officers who receive a bribery offer, by reason for bribery offer, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Afghan Border Police

**Judiciary**

As reported in the previous chapter, the prevalence of bribery for citizens who have dealings with judges and prosecutors is among the highest in the country: some 50 per cent of citizens who have contacts with judges and prosecutors have to pay bribes and the sums involved are typically very high (an average of over US$ 300 per bribe). The study conducted among public officials and service users of the judiciary provides additional information on corrupt practices that exist in this sector. In Afghanistan, an important share of cases is dealt with by means of a traditional system in which key elders acting in an individual capacity (standing *shuras* or *ad hoc jirgas*) arbitrate disputes. This study does not include these types of justice institutions but concentrates instead on formal institutions and procedures.
According to the experience reported by courts users, bribes are paid in relation to a variety of legal issues. They range from cases related to family and inheritance disputes, litigation relating to land/property, and road accidents, but they also include procedures related to criminal offences, including drug-related crimes, as well as commercial/debt issues. As Figure 32: indicates, court users involved in criminal cases are, as the prevalence of bribery indicates, more exposed to the payment of bribes, followed by those involved in commercial/debt issues and road accidents.

Courts and the officials operating in them are not the only judiciary officials affected by corruption. Data indicate that the Haqooq, which is generally understood to be the most accessible interface for citizens as it functions as an arbitrator between parties in disputes, is not immune to bribery either. Haqooq officers hear cases and work with the parties involved in order to reach an amicable solution, but when an out-of-court settlement cannot be reached, the case is usually referred to the courts. More than 23 per cent of users of Haqooq services had to pay at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey and, as Figure 33: indicates, bribes are often paid by parties involved in litigation relating to family issues (marriage and divorce), land/property disputes and road accidents.

---

14 This term indicates citizens who make use of court services. The survey is conducted by selecting a random sample of individuals who make use of court services.
The existence of bribery is also acknowledged, though to a lesser extent, by officials operating at different levels and stages of the judicial system. On average, prosecutors, Haqooq officers and other employees of the Ministry of Justice report that, in the majority of cases, bribes are offered by one of the parties in order to manipulate the process (more than 50 per cent of bribe offers) and in a smaller share of cases to speed up the finalization of the process.

6. Recruitment and other integrity challenges in the local government, education, police and judiciary sectors

The term “integrity” refers to the application of generally accepted values and norms in daily practice. At the individual level this refers to ethical conduct and relates to the qualities that enable a civil servant to fulfil an organization’s mandate by acting in accordance with standards, rules and procedures. At the organizational level, integrity relates to the rules, regulations, policies and procedures defined and implemented by public institutions.

Recruitment in the public sector: an overview

Job opportunities in the public sector can be attractive to job seekers, not only for the nature of the work itself but also for the advantages typical of employment in the civil service, such as job security, social status and stable remuneration. Though usually regulated in order to ensure transparency, the civil service recruitment process leaves varying degrees of discretion to the officials responsible and vulnerability to corrupt practices is high. As public sector jobs are often coveted, a lack of transparency and objectivity can make recruitment procedures vulnerable to nepotism and bribery.

The demand for public sector jobs in Afghanistan is confirmed by the 2012 survey findings, which show that 52 per cent of Afghan households have at least one member who applied for a job in the public sector in the three years prior to the survey and that, on average, more than half of those applications were successful.

In a large share of cases in which a household member was recruited into the public sector, citizens reported that recruitment was in some way facilitated by nepotism and/or the payment of bribes. As shown in Table 1, almost 45 per cent of all such households used both of those means, some 23 per cent only relied on the assistance of relatives/friends and almost 13 per cent paid a bribe but had no personal assistance during their recruitment. Less than one in five (19 per cent) secured a public sector job without assistance from a relative, friend or member of their own community and without paying a bribe.
The recruitment of civil servants is a crucial area for ensuring both the competence and integrity of a professional civil service. Transparency and objectivity in the recruitment process are meant to ensure that civil servants are qualified to carry out the duties with which they are entrusted in an efficient and impartial manner. If, however, the recruitment of civil servants is open to manipulation by unauthorized internal or external individuals, whether through undue influence by relatives or friends (nepotism), the intervention of members of one’s own ethnic or tribal community, or through the payment of bribes, the process will not result in selection of the most qualified and suitable candidates for the position in question.

**Features of the recruitment process in local government, education, the police and judiciary sectors**

Further evidence of the nature and quality of the recruitment process can be obtained through the sector-specific surveys of civil servants carried out in Afghanistan in 2012. In these surveys, a significant number of civil servants currently employed in various governmental institutions admitted to irregularities in their own recruitment procedures. Receiving undue help with recruitment from family members, friends or members of one’s own community is particularly common in numerous civil service positions in Afghanistan. Some 50 per cent of employees in both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Border Police (ABP) admitted to receiving such help in their recruitment, as did roughly half of all province, district and municipal officers. Additionally, a significant share of those officials acknowledged having paid bribes to facilitate their recruitment.

Also of particular concern is the recruitment of school teachers, during which over half received assistance and more than 21 per cent also conceded to the payment of bribes. Furthermore, while between 24 and 30 per cent of prosecutors, Haqooq and Ministry of Justice officers stated that they received assistance during recruitment, a smaller percentage of them admitted having paid a bribe in order to secure their job in the civil service.

---

Table 1: Percentage distribution of households with a household member who secured a job in the public sector in the last three years, by means of facilitation, Afghanistan (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paid a bribe</th>
<th>Did not pay a bribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received assistance</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not receive assistance</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General population survey 2012

---

15 Forms of assistance considered in this survey include: cases in which family or community members have direct responsibility for recruitment; when they intercede in the recruitment procedure on an applicant’s behalf and when they provide different levels of information on the selection exam.
The level of undue influence exerted by nepotism/informal links in recruiting civil servants is not homogeneous across the four sectors. This can be partly explained by the fact that in certain professions — for example the police and the judiciary — certain factors, such as the trustworthiness of new recruits, are of great importance. The type of selection procedures adopted by different sectors can also play a role in the proliferation of opaque recruitment practices. According to the experience reported by officials in the four sectors, there is great variation in terms of the procedures utilized for assessing candidates for available positions: from fully-fledged examinations in which applicants undergo both written and oral tests, to cases when there is no formal and substantive evaluation of applicants. The recruitment process is key to ensuring that the work force is hired in accordance with meritocratic criteria, yet roughly a third of the staff of the education ministries and schools did not undergo a substantive selection procedure, such as a written exam or an interview, and the same can be said of 22 per cent of university staff. Considerable amounts for a sector as sensitive and specialised as education, these figures set something of an apathetic precedent in terms of the recruiting of suitably qualified and competent personnel, and also indicate a lack transparency in the recruitment process. The share of public officials who were assessed through written and oral exams is also low in the police, while it is significantly higher in the judiciary.
Interestingly, results from the sector surveys clearly indicate that the share of new recruits who received undue help is higher in those branches of the civil service where use of a thorough assessment (written test and oral interview) of candidates is less commonly used. These data suggest that the utilization of substantive procedures of assessment, though insufficient, constitutes a valid means of reducing nepotism, cronyism or clientelism in the public sector.

In recent years, the recruitment of new staff in the four sectors under examination has been affected by opaque practices in different measures and with varying trends. As Figure 37: exemplifies, teachers in schools and universities recruited in recent years have increasingly received undue assistance. The same applies to new staff hired in the ABP, whereas some more encouraging trends can be observed in relation to the other public officials considered, though the share of new recruits who receive undue help remains substantial.
When focusing on the links between those who provide help and newly recruited staff, it appears that various networks, such as family, friends, members of community, tribe or religious group, are used to facilitate recruitment. In most cases, friends and family members are those most often used to help get a job in the public sector, though members of a job candidate’s tribe or local community are also frequently used, especially by new judiciary staff.

Figure 37: Percentage of public officials in selected sectors of public administration who received assistance during recruitment, by duration of service, Afghanistan (2012)

Figure 38: Percentage distribution of officials who received help during their recruitment, by sector and relationship to the person who provided help, Afghanistan (2012)
As Figure 39: shows, assistance during recruitment takes various forms, which range from directly or indirectly influencing the recruitment decision, or providing direct help during the exam, to supplying specific or general information about the content and modalities of the selection procedure. With the vast majority of the help given to recruits being of a direct nature — to the extent that the person helping actually influenced or was directly responsible for the recruitment decision — it appears that the existence of substantive procedures in the recruitment process are, at best, necessary but not sufficient for preventing undue assistance to candidates. Help provided during the exam itself and specific information provided for the recruitment exam are often used to circumvent practices established for ensuring the transparency of the process.

In some cases, helpers assisted candidates by forging documents (for example, ANP: 3 per cent; ABP: 8 per cent), which shows the degree to which patronage can permeate the recruitment process. If the forgery of documents and security clearance is a response to attempts to professionalize and standardize the recruitment process, this indicates that a corrupt environment will develop its own methods to mitigate measures designed to limit it. Instead of achieving a reduction in the influence of bribery and patronage, for example, anti-corruption measures sometimes merely create a new challenge to corruption. In the quotation below, an instructor at an ANP training facility in Kabul explains how this situation develops:
"Relations are the important factor; they create administrative problems inside the police organ. This prevents better education of the employees. People are recruited through relationships and joining this institution is the last choice for them. Ethnic, local, language and faith discriminations exist and the interior ministry does not pay attention to these problems. Mostly people are recruited through forgery carried out by senior authorities. Authorities take bribes and gifts during recruitment and the newest version of corruption is the production of fake documents for people without qualifications by senior authorities."

From its outset, the recruitment process should be shaped by the principle of openness and transparency, having as its main goal the recruitment of the best possible candidate for a given position. Instead, the methods involved in recruiting new staff often set a tone of patronage that shapes the recruitment process throughout. It also sets an unwholesome precedent for those entering the civil service and does little to reinforce a sense of impartiality and integrity that should, by definition, be inherent to any civil service environment.

For instance, more than a third of police in the ABP (35 per cent) heard about their job opening through friends or relatives already working for the ABP, while in the ANP the figure was a quarter. Add to this the fact that friends and relatives not employed by either force were responsible for informing applicants about a job opportunity, as well as the 30 and 25 per cent who were directly contacted by staff from the two forces, respectively, and it is clear that the police recruitment process has issues to address in terms of its openness. Indeed, only about a third of recruits heard about the recruitment opportunity through public means in the form of an advertisement in the media or a public or private recruitment centre.

Unfortunately, corruption does not stop with recruitment and numerous survey interviewees, such as the Mullah from Kabul quoted below, acknowledge that the corrupt nature of police recruitment is merely the starting point for subsequent corruption in the Afghan police force.

“Recruitment is not based on ability and excellence. In fact, it is based on ties, and those who have been recruited through corruption and are involved in corruption are obviously a source of corruption themselves."

Second job

As discussed later, the majority of public officials indicate that they are not satisfied with their salary and only a minority say that their salary is sufficient for supporting their household. Thus it is not surprising that significant shares of civil servants report earnings, on occasion at least, from an economic activity additional to their usual employment. The percentage of local government officials who have a second job is particularly high, as is the percentage of university and school teachers.

**Figure 40:** Percentage of public officials in selected sectors with an additional paid activity, by frequency, Afghanistan (2012)

![Percentage of public officials in selected sectors with an additional paid activity, by frequency, Afghanistan (2012)](image)

Source: Sector surveys 2012
Undertaking an additional economic activity can be a delicate issue for civil servants and, though possible in certain sectors, should be in accordance with national laws and prescribed procedures. Engaging in a second job during working hours, for example, is considered a corrupt practice, while conducting an economic activity in the same sector as one’s official position can raise issues concerning a conflict of interest.

Figure 41: Percentage of public officials with an additional paid activity in the same sector as their main job, by sector, Afghanistan (2012)

Among those who earn additional income, many do so in the same professional field as their main job, which constitutes an obvious scenario for potential conflict of interest between personal gain and public service. As Figure 41: indicates, this percentage is particularly high for university teachers, who often engage in paid research or teaching activities when conducting a secondary activity.

Amounts earned from an additional job can be very significant. For example, in the case of local government officials, though 20 per cent of those with a secondary activity report earning small amounts (less than 20 per cent of their salary), in other cases such earnings can be a substantial addition to a civil service salary: more than 50 per cent of the regular income of 28 per cent of local government officials with an extra income.

With only small percentages of education sector staff considering their salaries sufficient for supporting their household and more than two thirds of staff across all three branches of the education sector feeling that their salaries should be somewhat or significantly higher, it stands to reason that more than 10 per cent of staff across the whole sector have a regular second job and between 20 and 30 per cent have an occasional second job.

Ability to support their household is far more of a factor for civil servants who have a second job in education ministries and schools than in universities. In this question, receiving a low salary in schools seems to be a particularly important factor and one that raises issues both of competence and integrity, as shown in the following comment by a school teacher:
**Figure 42:** Percentage of education sector staff with a second job, by ability to support their household with their regular salary and by branch of education sector, Afghanistan (2012)

```plaintext

```

Source: Sector survey 2012, education sector staff

“I can say that problems have decreased compared to last year. The existence of problems affects the quality of work; for example, teachers are obliged to work in other organizations or NGOs apart from their job at school because their salary is not enough. That (extra work) creates fatigue at work and prevents those teachers from performing according to their responsibilities. It also creates a situation in which teachers ask students for gifts, and other corrupt actions.”

In the case of university teachers, on the other hand, ability to support the household appears to be less of a problem, which is probably due to the higher salaries paid for academic work.

**Integrity awareness**

While the vast majority (87 per cent) of public officials across all sectors of the public administration see corruption as a serious problem for Afghanistan, their perceptions regarding corruption in both the public sector as a whole and their own institution suggest that the situation has not changed for the worse. Some 70 per cent consider corruption in their own institution to be the same as, or lower than, three years prior to the survey, while 67 per cent think the same about corruption in the public sector in general.

The perspective of civil servants on the acceptability of bribery confirms the high tolerance of such behaviour observed among ordinary Afghan citizens and shows how there is a widespread lack of awareness among civil servants about what constitutes corruption in their daily work. The recognition that certain types of behaviour are illegitimate is the first step in improving the adherence to high standards of integrity in civil service.

Data collected from interviews with civil servants in Afghanistan show that a significant proportion of them consider practices such as “A civil servant asking for money to speed up the processing of files” or “Procurement of goods and services on the basis of family ties and friendship” to be acceptable.
The data above also demonstrate that a large share of civil servants across all sectors (between 38 and 69 per cent) consider some forms of administrative bribery (“A civil servant taking minor gifts from clients to top up a low salary”) acceptable. At the same time, an even higher percentage of civil servants (between 53 and 75 per cent) consider nepotism or patronage in recruitment (“A civil servant being recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks”) acceptable. While the data show that there are differences between sectors because different authorities are more or less aware of integrity practices, this widespread acceptance of patronage among civil servants — who may themselves have been recruited with its help — illustrates how the traditional system of relations between Afghan families, communities and tribes affects the various branches and sectors of government and undermines the development of a merit-based recruitment system characteristic of a modern public administration.

However, the concept of corruption can have very different meanings and it is not always clear whether certain types of behaviour are considered dishonest. For example, in the local government sector, levels of acceptance of practices such as recruitment on the basis of family ties (51 per cent), service users offering gifts to develop business (45 per cent) and service users offering money to speed up a procedure (36 per cent), among others, indicate that there is a general lack of awareness of, or indeed a sense of resignation to, the integrity issues and challenges facing the local government sector in Afghanistan.
When considering the root causes of widespread illicit behaviour it is interesting to note that two thirds of local government officials blame their colleagues for a lack of Islamic values or for being greedy. Another important reason is that certain practices have become types of “group behaviour” in which the individual can offer little resistance to act differently. Add to this the fact that almost two thirds of local government officials consider low salary the principal reason for resorting to corruption in the services they provide to the Afghan public, and the moral and material reasons for giving in to dishonesty are evidently compelling.

**Figure 45:** Percentage distribution of local government officials regarding the motives of staff in their sector for behaving dishonestly, Afghanistan (2012)

Similar motivations are provided by police officers: “Lack of Islamic values/greediness” is considered the most important motivation for corruption by police officers themselves. “Following the example of colleagues/superiors” is the second most important and, as to be expected considering levels of satisfaction with their salaries, “Low salary” comes in third place. Although it represents a considerably smaller share of police officers, “Coercion by local power figures” is also considered an important motivation for corruption by roughly a third of ANP officers (30 per cent).

**Figure 46:** Percentage distribution of police regarding the motives of police officers for behaving dishonestly, Afghanistan (2012)
The above shows that the influence of local power figures is greater among police than in other sectors of the public administration. As seen when examining the purposes of bribes paid to police officers, choosing to ignore drug trafficking or smuggling is a key factor, which is confirmed by police officers when asked about the involvement of local power figures in corrupt practices. Drug traffickers are seen to be the biggest influence on police work at the local level and criminal group leaders the third biggest, after tribal leaders.

**Figure 47:** Percentage distribution of police regarding the involvement of local power figures in corrupt practices with police officers in their community, Afghanistan (2012)

“Resignation” is a term that consistently crops up when analysing motives for corruption in the public sector of Afghanistan and this may be an explanation for the high level of acceptability of certain corrupt practices among police officers. As Figure 48: shows, only the bribing of teachers is deemed less acceptable than bribing a police officer.

**Figure 48:** Percentage of police officers who consider selected practices to be acceptable, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Police sector
Although, as in the other sectors of the public administration, police officers state that “Following the example of superiors and colleagues” is one of the main motivations for behaving in a corrupt manner, the vast majority of police officers do not believe that police corruption is a group act. On the contrary, to their credit, police officers in Afghanistan do not look for excuses and roughly eight out of ten officers from both forces (ANP: 81 per cent; ABP: 79 per cent) believe that corruption in the police is an individual act. Such honesty and awareness of the integrity challenges facing police officers in Afghanistan offers at least a glimmer of hope.

**Figure 49:** Percentage distribution of police regarding the belief that corruption in the police is an individual or a group act, Afghanistan (2012)

![Percentage distribution of police regarding the belief that corruption in the police is an individual or a group act, Afghanistan (2012)](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Police sector

### 7. Measures for strengthening integrity in the public sector

Constructing an integrity framework requires more than just preventing and/or criminalizing corruption. For individual civil servants, it means that personal conduct should be shaped by principles of impartiality, fairness, transparency, loyalty and dedication to work in all matters relating to their work and status. But the concept of integrity also applies at the organizational level, where it relates to rules, policies and procedures established by public institutions to regulate the way they are organized and how they work to fulfil the mandate entrusted to them. Ensuring integrity at organizational level requires that all institutional practices, such as in human resources, service provision or procurement, are fully compliant with certain standards and regulations.

With this in mind, this chapter analyses a number of factors that have a direct or indirect impact on integrity in the four surveyed sectors of the Afghan public administration, such as selected practices and administrative regulations, monitoring and training activities, job satisfaction and quality of service, as assessed by service users. The enforcement of high integrity standards is a key component in a comprehensive strategy to prevent and fight corruption in the public sector, and the analysis of existing strengths and weaknesses is strategically important for determining priority interventions.

As a way of introducing the topics addressed in this chapter, Figure 51 compares some of the results from the sectoral surveys. It shows that all of the institutions involved apparently have an established monitoring system in place, as indicated by more than 80 per cent of staff in each sector. On the other hand, training, another important tool for promoting integrity among staff, does not receive the same degree of attention: although almost 50 per cent of police and judiciary staff have received at least one training session on integrity/anti-corruption, the corresponding percentage is much lower in the education and local government sectors (respectively, 13 and 21 per cent). Overall, the vast majority of employees (between 80 and 90 per cent) in the four sectors report being satisfied with their job, but the picture is less clear when it comes to salary: while police officers are quite satisfied with their income, salary
satisfaction is significantly lower among education, local government and judiciary staff. Yet when taking into account the prevalence of bribery, which is higher than 40 per cent in all four sectors, such varying degrees of salary satisfaction indicate that no clear relationship can be established between the size of public officials’ salaries and their experience of bribery.

**Figure 50:** Percentage of public officials who have received integrity training, who are satisfied with their salary, who are satisfied with their job, and who have been monitored in the last 12 months, by sectors, Afghanistan (2012)

Local government

*Administrative regulations and procedures*

The existence of certain formal written procedures in the workplace can improve the bureaucratic system as long as civil servants are aware of the existence of such procedures and behave in accordance with them. Local government offices in Afghanistan do appear to have basic procedures in place, which, as long as they are enforced properly, should improve the functionality of those offices and reduce the possibility of corrupt conduct. For example, the use of codes of conduct, which outline the integrity framework of civil servants, appears to be an established practice, with almost three quarters (72 per cent) of local government officials stating that a code of conduct exists in their place of work. Of those, 83 per cent have formally signed a code, while nearly half of all (46 per cent) local government officials in the country have signed and own a copy of a code.
Not only does a large majority of those working in local government report the existence of formal procedures for keeping track of, for example, time-keeping, attendance and sick leave, but also management practices such as regular staff meetings, the agreement of work output and the formal assessment of work performance also appear to be largely in place. However, performance-related procedures such as premiums and the encouragement of skill development are scarcer, with just over a third of local government officials stating that they are in place.

Formal procedures should also have an external impact, and the idea of officials being public servants is underlined by transparency measures whose implementation can provide an indication of the accessibility of services to the public. In this respect, however, the public is not very well provided for in Afghanistan: although the vast majority of local government employees (84 per cent) state that opening hours are shown in their own office, less than half (48 per cent) state that staff wear official badges at work and only slightly more than a third state that information on procedures and rules are communicated to service users.
Considering that only 38 per cent of local government officials state that information about the rights and entitlements of service users is publicly disseminated there is also room for improvement in the level of communication between the public administration and citizens. Furthermore, while more than half (52 per cent) of local government officials state that there is a formal way for service users to file complaints about the quality of service, only about a third of service users actually know of a local government official or local government departments responsible for filing such complaints. In the case of the latter, slight differences exist between the three different administrative bodies (Municipality: 31 per cent; District Governor’s Office: 37 per cent; Provincial Governor’s Office: 38 per cent).

**Monitoring**

An essential means for assessing the transparency of staff procedures from within the public administration itself, and thus detecting weaknesses and irregularities in the system, is monitoring. With some 85 per cent of local government officials in Afghanistan monitored in the preceding 12 months, a monitoring system appears to be largely in place. Impartiality — a crucial element in guaranteeing true transparency in this process — does, however, appear to be an issue, with more than two thirds of local government officials (67.6 per cent) actually monitored by a colleague or inspector from within their institution, yet only 17.5 per cent monitored by an inspector from another institution.

**Figure 53:** Percentage distribution of local government officials, by type of monitoring in preceding 12-month period, Afghanistan (2012)

![Figure 53: Percentage distribution of local government officials, by type of monitoring in preceding 12-month period, Afghanistan (2012)](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Local government officials

Seen in this light, it is clear that the implementation of a monitoring system is not the only crucial factor; more vital is how well monitoring systems function once in place and if they actually enhance the way the institution functions, as well as contribute to its integrity. The fact that significant shares of local government officials in Afghanistan state that, notwithstanding the performance of unit staff and the expertise of the evaluation, factors such as the giving of gifts (19 per cent), community and religious group affiliation (17 per cent), political and party ties (16 per cent) and even the payment of money (16 per cent) are among the main influences on the results of internal monitoring and audits, shows that the latter is not necessarily the case.
Figure 54: Percentage of local government officials who consider the following factors the main influence on results of internal monitoring and audits, Afghanistan (2012)

Training

Training is a crucial means of improving professionalism and strengthening staff’s sense of identity and commitment, and while a considerable portion of local government officials in Afghanistan (72 per cent) have attended a training course during their career, more than a quarter (27 per cent) have never received any kind of training in their local government post.

Figure 55: Percentage distribution of local government officials who have received training, by timing of their most recent training session, Afghanistan (2012)

Training is also crucial for raising integrity awareness, but throughout their entire career in local government only a quarter of all local government officials have received anti-corruption training. With almost 60 per cent of them receiving management training as their most recent training topic and only 13 per cent receiving anti-corruption/integrity training (less than the amount receiving language or IT training), improving anti-corruption awareness is evidently not considered a priority in the local government of Afghanistan. Training for enhancing levels of integrity among local government officials is thus an area that needs greater attention.
**Job Satisfaction**

How civil servants evaluate their working conditions, work relationships, salary and other aspects of their workplace can have an impact on dishonest practices, with lack of job satisfaction or frustration representing particular risk factors for corruption. In this context, it is notable that the overwhelming majority (79 per cent) of local government officials in Afghanistan state that they are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with their current job, while slightly more than 8 per cent declare that they are “very” or “somewhat” dissatisfied.

The physical environment in which a public official works, and the tools with which to perform their duties in an efficient manner, are perhaps the most basic and palpable of elements that contribute to feelings of job satisfaction. Overall, almost half of local government officials are satisfied with the equipment provided by their employer. But with less than a quarter equipped with internet access and just over a third with access to a personal computer, there is a clear lack of digital technology available to them.

Civil service jobs are coveted around the globe for, amongst other reasons, the job security they provide. The local government of Afghanistan is no exception: 55 per cent of public officials state that they acknowledge job security as their most important reason for working in the public sector, and the vast majority of them are proud to be a civil servant (88 per cent). Only 2 per cent state that a good salary is the most important factor, which probably explains why when asked directly about salary satisfaction, the majority of local government officials indicate that they are not satisfied with their salary (78 per cent) and only 8 per cent state that their salary is enough for supporting their household. Taking into account the salary paid for similar positions in the private or public sector, 90 per cent think that a fair salary should be higher than it is now.

Against this background it is not surprising that 69 per cent of local government officials are actively looking for a new job (40 per cent within local government and 29 per cent elsewhere. A significant share of local government officials indicate better salary as the main reason for changing job or position, while about half consider better career prospects as another important reason for doing so.

In summary, the vast majority of local government officials are not completely satisfied with their salary and struggle to make a living from their civil service job. That may explain why 43 per cent of local government officials report earnings, at least on occasion, from an activity additional to their usual employment (see below). Rather worryingly, it also means that the integrity of local government officials is severely put to the test.
User satisfaction

While the vast majority of local government officials in Afghanistan are, on the whole, satisfied with their jobs, the picture that emerges when service users are asked about the services that those officials actually provide is not as clear and implies the existence of numerous integrity issues and challenges.

Figure 57: Percentage of local government service users who think that local government institutions have sufficient resources to respond to requests, and percentage of local government service users who are dissatisfied with the work of local government officials, by local government body, Afghanistan (2012)

Some 40 per cent of service users state that they are dissatisfied with the work of local government at municipality level, though satisfaction actually increases as geographical distance between service user and provider increases. Indeed, at the Municipality level 47 per cent are dissatisfied, while at the Provincial Governor level the figure falls to 31 per cent.

This dissatisfaction is nevertheless tempered by service users’ understanding of the lack of resources available to local government officials. Only a little over a quarter of service users (27 per cent) think that local government institutions have sufficient resources, while that figure rises to 43 per cent at the Provincial Governor level, where the degree of dissatisfaction is lower. The main reason for dissatisfaction with local government services is the lack of a timely response to service requests (57 per cent), something echoed in the following comments of a local government official from Kunduz about how favouritism in the provision of services develops.

“Another cause of problems in our office are the middlemen and the commanders who break the law. These people never stay in line to wait for services. For example, services for them are provided in one day and services for other local people are provided in ten days.”
The fourth most stated reason, “Unfair treatment of people requesting services” (30 per cent), further implies a lack of integrity among service providers in local government, as illustrated by the following comment made by a community elder from Nangarhar, Sheraz District.

“Our civil employees respect those who use mediators, like relatives and friends, and are rich and powerful, otherwise they do not help service beneficiaries to solve their problem.”

While the above comments and survey response suggest that fair and equal treatment of service users is lacking, it should be noted that bottom of the list of the main reasons for not being satisfied with local government come bribery requests by public officials (11 per cent). This is in stark contrast to the data, which show a high prevalence of bribery when citizens actually have dealings with local government officials (as discussed in the following section) and indicates that citizens tend to perceive bribery as a normal practice when interacting with local government officials.

**Education**

**Administrative regulations and procedures**

Basic formal administrative procedures for ensuring that employees report for duty and carry out those duties are largely in place across the whole education sector. More than 75 per cent of staff in Ministries, Schools and Universities have an official written time and attendance system and between 60 and 71 per cent record tasks completed on a daily basis. Leave is formally tracked and regular formal assessments of work performance undertaken in approximately the same percentage of staff. In the area of skills development and performance recognition, however, procedures do appear to be lacking.
In terms of the feedback of students and their families, more than half of all staff across the sector have a formal means for citizens to file complaints (Ministries: 54.9 per cent; Schools: 56.9 per cent; Universities: 60.2 per cent). Moreover, a high percentage of education sector employees state that reports are recorded and filed when those complaint mechanisms are actually in place (Ministries: 85 per cent; Schools: 91 per cent; Universities: 64 per cent).

Bearing in mind that only 13 per cent of education sector staff has not been monitored, monitoring systems can be said to be largely in place within the education sector. But the fact that no more than the same percentage of them has been monitored by inspectors from a ministry other than their own raises questions about the impartiality of the monitoring process. Indeed, more than half of the staff (55 per cent) of both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of higher Education has been monitored by inspectors from the same ministry and 22 per cent by other staff of the same ministry.

Furthermore, the performance of their duties by civil servants is only considered the main influence on the results of internal monitoring by just over half of civil servants (55 per cent). On the other hand, an assortment of corrupt factors, from community and religious ties to the payment of money, together account for the main influence on those results, according to more than 60 per cent of civil servants in the sector. This underlines the unsatisfactory nature of the monitoring process, while the fact that 69 per cent of ministry officials are satisfied with the process also suggests that their levels of integrity awareness need addressing.
Training

One way of addressing integrity awareness issues is through anti-corruption/integrity training. Across the education sector some two thirds of staff have received training of some sort at some point in their career (Ministries: 64 per cent; School teachers: 69 per cent; University lecturers: 65 per cent).

A similar percentage (66 to 76 per cent) of those who received such training actually received it during the 12 months prior to the survey, showing that training is obviously an on-going, relatively “fresh” process in the education sector. However, while substantive/technical matters are the most common topic of their most recent training (between 58 and 74 per cent), anti-corruption/integrity is bottom of the list. For 10 per cent of civil servants in the education ministries it was the most recent topic received in training, whereas hardly any employees of
schools and universities (3 and 1 per cent, respectively) received anti-corruption/integrity training in their most recent training course.

**Figure 62:** Percentage distribution of education sector staff who have received training, by topic of their most recent training session, Afghanistan (2012)

![Bar chart showing distribution of education sector staff training by topic.](chart)

- Substantive/technical matters
- Management/Administration
- Information and communication technology
- Language course
- Anti-corruption/integrity
- No response

Source: Sector survey 2012, education sector staff

Note: The sum is higher than 100 per cent since multiple answers were possible.

When looking at their career as a whole, the picture improves slightly but, even so, only between 15 per cent (Ministries and Universities) and 20 per cent (School teachers) of civil servants in the education sector have ever received some sort of integrity or anti-corruption training.

**Job Satisfaction**

As to be expected in a profession that is widely considered to be a vocation, job satisfaction in the education sector of Afghanistan is high. In all three branches of the sector, more than 80 per cent of staff are satisfied with their job and only between 3 and 7 per cent (the latter in the school system) are dissatisfied.

**Figure 63:** Percentage distribution of education sector staff, by level of job satisfaction, Afghanistan (2012)

![Bar chart showing distribution of education sector staff satisfaction levels.](chart)

- Satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Dissatisfied
- Don’t know/no response

Source: Sector survey 2012, education sector staff

Despite this, less than half of school and university staff are satisfied with the equipment and facilities available to them, although the situation is slightly better in universities than in
schools. As in the case of the local government sector, IT/digital technology seems to be out of reach for most staff, particularly in schools, where less than 15 per cent of teachers have access to desktop computers and a mere 6 per cent have internet access. But this is not the case in universities, where almost 60 per cent of teachers have a desktop computer and internet access, which is understandable considering the far greater presence of research-based disciplines in the academic world.

**Figure 64:** Percentage of education sector staff with access to selected types of work equipment, by branch of the education system and by type of equipment, Afghanistan (2012)

![Chart showing access to work equipment by education sector staff, by branch of the education system and by type of equipment.](chart)

Source: Sector survey 2012, education sector staff
Note: The sum is higher than 100 per cent since multiple answers were possible.

Though job satisfaction is very high in the education sector, poor facilities or equipment are actually the third most important reason (School teachers: 32 per cent; University teachers: 34 per cent) for job dissatisfaction among teachers. Lack of teaching staff is the second most important reason (School teachers: 23 per cent; University teachers: 43 per cent), but by far the most important reason for dissatisfaction is low salary (School teachers: 67 per cent; University teachers: 33 per cent).

**Figure 65:** Percentage of university teachers and school teachers dissatisfied with their current job, by main reasons for dissatisfaction, Afghanistan (2012)

![Chart showing reasons for job dissatisfaction among university teachers and school teachers.](chart)

Source: Sector survey 2012, education sector staff
Note: The sum is higher than 100 per cent since multiple answers were possible.

Any job dissatisfaction among teachers is to some extent manifested in the share of them actively looking for a job outside their branch of the education sector (Ministries: 28 per cent; Schools: 25 per cent; Universities: 15 per cent). The share of those looking for a job within
their branch of the education sector is somewhat higher (Ministries 46 per cent, Schools 35 per cent and Universities 26 per cent).

**Figure 66:** Percentage distribution of education sector staff, by reason for changing job or position, Afghanistan (2012)

![Chart showing percentage distribution of education sector staff, by reason for changing job or position](chart)

Source: Sector survey 2012, education sector staff

Note: The sum is higher than 100 per cent since multiple answers were possible.

Although “better career prospects” is a motive for changing job for about half of those, on average, better salary is the most common reason for wanting to do so. Up to 70 per cent of school employees feel that a better salary would be a motive for changing job, while 62 per cent of ministry employees and even 50 per cent of university employees feel the same. Indeed, almost three quarters (74 per cent) of school employees are dissatisfied with their salary, as are 61 per cent of those who work at ministries and 58 per cent at universities.

**Figure 67:** Percentage distribution of education sector staff, by opinion regarding the size of a fair salary for their job, Afghanistan (2012)

![Chart showing percentage distribution of education sector staff, by opinion regarding the size of a fair salary for their job](chart)

Source: Sector survey 2012, education sector staff

With only a small percentages of education sector staff considering their salaries sufficient for supporting their household (Schools 12 per cent; Ministries 14 per cent; Universities 22 per cent) and more than 70 per cent of staff across all three branches of the sector feeling their salaries should be somewhat or significantly higher, the temptation to seek alternative sources of income is evidently strong.
User satisfaction

Service users surveyed about schools were the parents of school pupils, whereas service users surveyed about universities were actual students themselves. This is a possible explanation for the large disparity in levels of satisfaction with teaching staff between schools and universities, since, as those who directly attend, students are likely to be more critical than parents who do not.

More than two thirds of parents (70 per cent) were satisfied with teaching staff in schools, whereas only just over a third (38 per cent) of university students were satisfied with their teachers. However, degrees of satisfaction about the quality of the basic physical infrastructure of schools and universities were very similar, with 82 per cent of both types of service user satisfied with the quality of the school/university buildings and 66 and 73 per cent, respectively, satisfied with the size of classrooms and the number of pupils or students actually in each class.

The main reasons for the dissatisfaction of university students with teaching staff are the lack of teaching skills and formal qualifications of the latter, which is reflected in the views of school pupils’ parents regarding school teachers. However, teachers being poorly equipped and the unfair treatment of students are bigger problems in universities than in schools, the lack of interest and commitment of teachers is roughly the same, but poor attendance of
teachers is a bigger problem in schools than in universities. Bribery requests from teachers, on the other hand, do not figure among the main reasons for dissatisfaction in either type of institution, which, considering that the general population survey indicated that 22 per cent of bribe payers in Afghanistan pay bribes to teachers (an almost three fold increase on the 2009 figure of 8 per cent), implies a certain acceptance of bribery.

**Figure 70:** Percentage distribution of university students who consider selected issues the main reason for dissatisfaction with teaching staff, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: Sector survey 2012, university students

**Police**

**Administrative regulations and procedures**

Due to the different nature of their field of operations, ANP officers have more direct contact with citizens as service users (75 per cent) than ABP officers (56 per cent), since the latter is principally tasked with patrolling the borders. Yet a similar majority of both forces consider the administrative procedures designed to guide the provision of services to citizens to be sufficiently formalized (ANP: 76 per cent, ABP: 78 per cent).

An official written time and attendance system is in place for almost two thirds of both forces (ANP: 64 per cent; ABP: 66 per cent). But while the majority of police officers participate in regular meetings with their superior, this is not true for 32 per cent of officers in the ANP and 40 per cent in the ABP. In effect, a significant proportion of the police force does therefore not obtain regular feedback on its performance (ANP: 40 per cent; ABP: 44 per cent).

**Figure 71:** Percentage of police officers whose current job has the following procedures in place, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Police sector

In terms of feedback by service users, staff of the ABP in particular (46.8 per cent), state that formal complaint mechanisms for citizens are often lacking, although where mechanisms are in place they are assessed as performing better in recording and following up complaints than those available in the ANP where, in 35 per cent of cases, complaints are not recorded and 39 per cent of complaints are not followed up.
On the other hand, the monitoring of police is conducted on a regular basis in Afghanistan. Only 6.4 per cent of ANP officers and 4.5 per cent of ABP officers state that they were not monitored at all in 2012. But whether or not that monitoring is effective is a different question. For example, in 41 per cent of cases in the ANP and 32 per cent in the ABP, monitoring was conducted by designated inspectors from the Ministry of the Interior, whereas in most other cases monitoring was undertaken by the direct superiors of those monitored and/or in an unstructured manner, questions about the impartiality of which need be asked.

Regarding the factors influencing the results of monitoring, the expertise of monitoring staff and the job performance of employees are considered by far the most important influences. Other influences, such as clientelism and nepotism, but also bribery in the form of giving gifts or paying money, prevail.

**Figure 72:** Percentage of police officers who consider the following factors the main influence on results of internal monitoring and audits, Afghanistan (2012)

When asked how often they report to a supervisor, 48 per cent of ANP officers do so on a daily basis, a third report at least once a week and 14 per cent at least once a month, while 5 per cent do not report to their supervisor at all. As for the ABP, 58 per cent of police officers report on a daily basis, 24 per cent at least once a week and 16 per cent at least once a month, whereas 2 per cent do not report to their supervisor.

**Figure 73:** Percentage distribution of police officers, by frequency of reporting to supervisor, Afghanistan (2012)

According to the vast majority of police officers, not only do they regularly report to superiors, monitoring by superiors during the course of policing also takes place on a regular basis (ANP: 84 per cent; ABP: 82 per cent). However, with 7.9 per cent of ANP officers monitored and 17.9 per cent ABP officers monitored stating that such inspections take place “very infrequently”, this suggests inconsistencies in either the way monitoring is carried out,
or that some police officers feel the need to give a better impression than the one that really exists.

**Figure 74:** Percentage distribution of police officers inspected during the course of their duties, by frequency of inspections, Afghanistan (2012)

![Figure 74](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Police sector

**Training**

The picture that emerges when looking at training and the police in Afghanistan resembles, to a large extent, the one seen in the previous section about monitoring. That is to say that while training is largely in place in both of the police forces surveyed, only a limited amount of it actually addresses anti-corruption.

In general, training appears to be a regular part of working life for the police force. More than three quarters of police officers (ANP: 78.6 per cent; ABP 76.5 per cent) state that they have attended training courses in the workplace at some point, while two thirds of ANP officers (66.4 per cent) and three quarters of ABP officers (75.4 per cent) did so in the 12 months prior to the survey.

**Figure 75:** Percentage distribution of police officers who have received training, by topic of their last training course, Afghanistan (2012)

![Figure 75](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Police sector

In both police forces, operational techniques (ANP: 47 per cent; ABP: 62 per cent), use of advanced weapons (ANP: 40 per cent; ABP: 54 per cent) and other substantive or technical matters (ANP: 37 per cent; ABP: 34 per cent) were the most common topics covered in police training. However, anti-corruption/integrity training or training relating to the ethical code accounted for roughly a fifth of the most recent training sessions attended (ANP: 20 per cent; ABP: 22 per cent), though more than half of officers from both forces (ANP: 52 per cent;
ANP: 59 per cent) state that they have participated in such a training course at some point during the course of their police career.

**Figure 76**: Percentage distribution of police officers who have received training, by quality assessment of training received, Afghanistan (2012)

![Percentage distribution of police officers who have received training, by quality assessment of training received, Afghanistan (2012)](source: Sector survey 2012, Police sector)

In terms of the quality of training received, opinions are divided. ANP officers appear rather sceptical, with 42 per cent considering training sessions to be “very bad” or “bad”, whereas ABP officers express a far more positive opinion, with more than three quarters of them (77 per cent) considering their training “good” or “very good” and only 5 per cent “very bad or “bad”.

**Judiciary**

*Administrative regulations and procedures*

As in the other three sectors surveyed, basic procedures for controlling staff attendance and work duties are in place in the vast majority of offices in the judiciary sector. More than 80 per cent of the three types of judiciary official considered have a formal system for checking attendance and the performance of duties in their workplace. On the other hand, the use of more innovative management schemes, such as the supervision of professional development of their staff or the granting of premiums for good performance are less frequent (typically less than 50 per cent of staff).

**Figure 77**: Percentage of judiciary sector staff whose current job has the following procedures in place, Afghanistan (2012)

![Percentage of judiciary sector staff whose current job has the following procedures in place, Afghanistan (2012)](source: Sector survey 2012, Judiciary sector staff)
Furthermore, there is room for improvement regarding practices that regulate the relationship judiciary sector service users. In particular, information about existing procedures/rules and the rights/entitlements of citizens are not always easily accessible, which is conducive to creating an unbalance between those who access judiciary services and the officers who operate in the judiciary.

**Figure 78:** Percentage of judiciary sector staff whose current workplace has the following elements in place, Afghanistan (2012)

![Graph showing percentage of judiciary sector staff](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Judiciary sector staff

**Monitoring**

The monitoring of staff and of their working procedures/results is quite common in judiciary sector institutions. Only a small percentage of officials were not monitored in the 12 months prior to the survey (Prosecutors: 14.4 per cent; Ministry of Justice officials: 6.4 per cent; Haqooq: 8.9 per cent) and, on the whole, most officials in the judiciary sector are satisfied with the internal monitoring and audit system in their respective institution (Prosecutors: 76.2 per cent; Ministry of Justice officials: 73.1 per cent; Haqooq: 67.5 per cent).

**Figure 79:** Percentage of judiciary sector staff who consider the following factors the main influence on the results of internal monitoring and audits, Afghanistan (2012)

![Graph showing percentage of factors considered influencing monitoring](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Judiciary sector staff
In addition to the skills and expertise of both employees and monitoring staff, when looking at the factors that influence the results of monitoring activities, other aspects can be noted, such as affiliation to community/religious groups, political parties, or the giving of gifts or bribes, which indicate that relations and undue payments have a say in determining the outcome of monitoring activities.

**Training**

The vast majority of officials in the judiciary sector have received training at some point in their career (Prosecutors: 78.8 per cent; Ministry of Justice officials: 78.6 per cent; Haqooq 68.6 per cent) and a large share of them attended a course in the 12 months before the survey. As shown in Figure 81, the share of judiciary staff who received training on integrity/anti-corruption issues in the previous 12 months is significant and it becomes even more so when considering the entire career of officials: for example, 60.3 per cent of Prosecutors declare having received at least one training on such topics.

**Figure 80:** Percentage distribution of judiciary sector staff who have received training, by topic of their most recent training, Afghanistan (2012)

![Chart showing percentage distribution of judiciary sector staff who have received training, by topic of their most recent training.]

Source: Sector survey 2012, Judiciary sector staff

**Job satisfaction**

Job satisfaction is also high for the majority of judiciary staff, even if they often have to operate in challenging and complex situations. The handling of poor performers is among the reasons about which officials express a low level of satisfaction, which denotes deficiencies in both the capacity of management and the regulatory framework.

**Figure 81:** Percentage distribution of judiciary staff, by level of job satisfaction, Afghanistan (2012)

![Chart showing percentage distribution of judiciary staff, by level of job satisfaction.]

Source: Sector survey 2012, Judiciary sector staff
However, as in the other sectors surveyed, the most important reason for dissatisfaction is remuneration, which is considered too low by most judiciary officials (Prosecutors: 73.1 per cent; Ministry of Justice officials: 68.6 per cent; Haqooq: 72.9 per cent). As Figure 83 indicates, improving one’s salary is the main motivation for looking for another job, whether within an official’s current institution or elsewhere.

**Figure 82:** Percentage distribution of judiciary sector staff, by reasons for changing job or position, Afghanistan (2012)

![Figure 82: Percentage distribution of judiciary sector staff, by reasons for changing job or position, Afghanistan (2012)](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Judiciary sector staff

**User satisfaction**

Judiciary sector service users express a moderate level of satisfaction with the courts and Haqooq, particularly in comparison to the services provided by community leaders/village elders, whom citizens often consult in the arbitration of disputes. Moreover, it is noteworthy that it is not bribery that leads to low levels of satisfaction but rather the insufficient quality of services received (in terms of the excessive length of trials) and the lack of commitment by judiciary officers.

**Figure 83:** Percentage of judiciary sector service users satisfied with services provided by different elements of the justice system, Afghanistan (2012)

![Figure 83: Percentage of judiciary sector service users satisfied with services provided by different elements of the justice system, Afghanistan (2012)](image)

Source: Sector survey 2012, Court users and Haqooq service users
Citizens also report that transparency and communication relating to the information required for managing the procedures relative to their cases are insufficient, which can cause problems as citizens without such information may find themselves in a weak position and thus be more vulnerable to possible bribe requests.

Although, as in the case of their counterparts in the other sectors surveyed, judiciary officials view their sector in a relatively positive light, citizens who use their services have a less optimistic view, their principal grievance being the distance that they perceive to exist between themselves and the civil servants who should be attending to their needs.
METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

This report is based on data from various surveys conducted from 2011 to 2012. The core of the analysis is based on a representative sample survey of the general population of Afghanistan.

General population survey

A total of 6,700 interviews with persons aged 18 and above were conducted for the survey. The allocation of the sample by regions is based on population estimates by the Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan (CSO) in the CSO Statistical Year Book 2009/10.

For the development of the actual sampling design, the 6,700 survey interviews were first distributed across urban and rural areas in all six regions of the country. In the sampling design, urban and rural areas by region were treated as a domain. An initial sample size \( n' \) calculation for each domain based on simple random sampling was made on the basis of achieving a desired margin of error of +/- e, with a confidence level of 90 per cent according to:

\[
n' = \frac{z^2 p(1 - p)}{e^2}
\]

where \( z \) is the standard score \( (z = 1.65 \) for a 90 per cent confidence level) and \( p \) is an estimate of key indicators to be calculated from the survey. The desired margin of error \( e \) was +/-3.5 per cent. The initial sample size was adjusted for the size of the population within each domain according to:

\[
n = \frac{n' * N'}{N}
\]

where \( N' \) is the population size in each domain and \( N \) is the population size of Afghanistan. Finally, a mixed approach was chosen between the equally distributed initial sample size \( (n') \) and the proportionally distributed adjusted sample size \( (n) \) according to:

\[
f' = 0.1n + 0.9n'
\]
All 34 Afghan provinces were included in the sample. Districts were randomly selected as *primary sampling units*. The number of districts randomly selected for each province is proportional to the overall number of districts in each province. The final sample size was calculated for urban and rural areas in each province according to:

\[
f = 0.5 \frac{f' * N_p}{N'} + 0.5 \frac{f'}{n_D}
\]

where \( N_p \) is the population size in each province, \( N' \) is the population size in each domain and \( n_D \) is the number of provinces in each region. The number of interviews calculated for each province was further allocated proportionally to the size of the individual districts.

Within districts, sampling points, i.e. communities, were selected as *secondary sampling units* using population stratified random sampling. Each district was separated into population clusters. Sampling points were then randomly selected from each cluster in proportion to the population density of the population clusters. Per sampling point, a maximum of 10 interviews was conducted.

During the fieldwork phase random walk selection was employed for the selection of individual households. Within the household, survey teams selected the actual respondent by using a simple Kish grid, on which household members were listed according to age and name. Calculated from the final sample size used in the survey, at a standard confidence level of 95 per cent, this sample size implies a margin of error of 1.008 per cent for the overall sample. For urban and rural areas at the regional level the margin of error is between 3.29 per cent and 3.67 per cent.

In the final database, weighting factors were included in order to align the findings to actual population figures.

Random sampling ensured adequate coverage of all socio-economic groups. However, in Nuristan and Paktika, as well as in a number of districts in different provinces, a 50:50 ratio of male and female respondents could not be maintained due to security considerations and limitations in access. For Parwan and Logar survey results had to be excluded from the analysis due to data quality issues.

**Sector surveys**

In addition to the general population, experience and perception of corruption is analysed in-depth in four public sectors; Local Government, Education, Police and Judiciary. The sectors were selected on the basis of previous results which indicated that these sectors are either more prone to corruption or provide a great number of services to the public.

The sector surveys took place in 25 out of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The provinces were selected per stratified random sampling. Public officials were selected in proportion to their number per sampled province. For the police surveys, interviews were distributed to provinces in proportion to their population size, as the number of police forces per province could not be obtained due to security reasons.

In order to increase trust and confidentiality, the interview mode of the sector surveys was self-completion. Questionnaires were anonymously completed and placed in a sealed ballot box by the respondents. Due to illiteracy issues, self-completion was not always possible. In such cases, a face-to-face interview was conducted.
Table 2: Sector surveys, Afghanistan (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School teachers</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University teachers</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University students</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haqooq</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ministry of Justice officials</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice system beneficiaries</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court users</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government beneficiaries</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government officials</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sector survey 2012

**Key indicators**

In this report three main indicators are used to assess the experience of bribery. Information used to compute indicators 1a, 1b and 2 is collected from the general population.

- **1.a Prevalence of bribery** \( (p) \) is calculated as the number of citizens who gave a public official money, a gift or counter favour on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey \( (b) \), as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period \( (c) \).

\[
p = \frac{b}{c}
\]

- **1.b Prevalence of bribery by type of public official** \( (p_o) \) is calculated as the number of citizens who gave money, a gift or counter favour to a particular type of public official, on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey \( (b_o) \), as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with that particular type of public official in the same period \( (c_o) \).

\[
p_o = \frac{b_o}{c_o}
\]

- **2. Frequency of bribes** \( (f) \) is calculated as the average number of times bribe-payers actually paid a bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey.

\[
f = \frac{1}{b} \sum_{i=1}^{b} x_i
\]

Table 3 presents 2009 and 2012 survey data on the population who personally paid a bribe, the rate of contacts with public officials, the prevalence rate of bribery and the average number of bribes paid.
Table 3: Exposure to bribery, contact with public officials, prevalence rate of bribery to public officials and average number of bribes paid, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population who personally paid a bribe/Total</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population who personally paid a bribe/Urban areas</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population who personally paid a bribe/Rural areas</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of contact/Total</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of contact/Urban areas</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of contact/Rural areas</td>
<td>87.2%</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence rate of bribery/Total</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence rate of bribery/Urban areas</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence rate of bribery/Rural areas</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of bribes paid/Total</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

Estimation of total annual amount paid in bribes

An estimate of the total amount of money paid in bribes during 2009 and 2012 is calculated by multiplying the number of people who paid a bribe in cash (part 1 below) by the average number of cash bribes paid per person over the year (part 2) and the average sum of money paid in each bribe (part 3). Estimates are determined separately for urban and rural areas then combined to provide a national estimate before being converted into United States Dollars.16

1. Total number of people estimated to have paid a bribe with cash17

The number of people who could potentially be involved in the payment of bribes corresponds to the adult (aged 20+) population, which was estimated to be 40 per cent of the total population in 2009 and 44 per cent of the total population in 2012. This gives the number of people potentially involved in the payment of bribes in urban and rural areas as 2,863,000 and 6,735,000 in 2009, and 2,587,000 and 8,599,000 in 2012.18

The urban survey in 2009 indicates that 46 per cent of people paid a bribe in one form or another. Of these, 65 per cent paid a bribe with money. The rural survey in 2009 only concerned male respondents: taking into account that very similar prevalence rates were recorded for men in the urban and the rural survey, the overall value of 46 per cent from the urban survey is used for the percentage of people who paid a bribe in one form or another in rural areas. However, the rural survey does indicate that 81 per cent of the respondents who paid a bribe did so with money. This suggests that the total number of people from urban and rural areas who paid bribes in cash was 849,000 and 2,499,000, respectively.

In 2012, the percentage of people who paid a bribe was 43 per cent in urban areas and 44 per cent in rural areas. Of those, 79 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively, paid bribes in cash,

---

16 World Bank, World Development Indicators, official exchange rate, average for 2011.
17 The calculations as shown here may not match exactly due to rounding.
amounting to a total number of people from urban and rural areas of 870,000 and 2,482,000, respectively.

2. Average number of bribes paid each year
The average number of cash bribes paid over the year was 5.2 for urban areas and 4.5 in rural areas in 2009. This implies that the total number of cash bribes paid by the population in urban and rural areas was 4,445,000 and 11,281,000 during 2009. In 2012, the numbers were 7.2 bribes and 5.1 bribes, respectively, amounting to 6,296,000 cash bribes in urban areas and 12,707,000 cash bribes in rural areas.

3. Average sum of money paid per cash bribe
The average amount paid per cash bribe was 6,926 Afghani (US$ 139) in urban areas and 8,291 Afghani (US$ 166) in rural areas in 2009 and 6,425 Afghani (US$ 137) in urban areas and 11,232 Afghani (US$ 240) in rural areas in 2012.

4. Annual amount paid nationally in cash bribes as per cent of GDP

Multiplying parts 1, 2 and 3 gives the total amount of money estimated to have been paid in bribes during 2009 as US$ 2,486 million (124,313 million Afghani), which is the equivalent of 23 per cent of GDP; and during 2012 as US$ 3,920 million (183,181 million Afghani), which is the equivalent of 20 per cent of GDP.

Table 4:  Summary computation procedure of annual amount of bribes paid, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people who</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>3,348</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>2,482</td>
<td>3,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paid money as a bribe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mean number of</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bribes paid per year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mean bribe amount</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total money paid as</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>2,486</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>3,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bribes (1 x 2 x 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(US$ million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012