



## ENDNOTES



## Executive Summary

- 1 A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, p. 2.
- 2 Presidential Statement S/PRST/2010/4.
- 3 Including Taiwan, Province of China.

## Introduction

- 1 Statement at UN Security council, SC/9867, February 2010.
- 2 *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, p. 2.
- 3 Presidential Statement S/PRST/2010/4.

## Chapter 1 - The threat of transnational organized crime

- 1 Von Lampe, K., 'Not a process of enlightenment: the conceptual history of organized crime in Germany and the United States of America'. *Forum on Crime and Society* Vol. 1 No. 2, December 2001, pp. 99-116.
- 2 As well as the substantive offences of money laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice.
- 3 In accordance with the provisions of article 18.1 (c) of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and article 16.3 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971.
- 4 For opium, cannabis herb, cannabis resin and cannabis plants: 1 kilogram and above; for heroin, morphine, cocaine, and psychotropic substances: 100 grams and above.
- 5 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons. Vienna: UNODC, 2009.
- 6 Article 12 deals with the exchange of information, and was included in the Firearms Protocol despite discussion of information sharing in the main Convention. A number of forms of bilateral information exchange are suggested, while the pooling of seizure data pointedly was not.
- 7 Commission of the European Communities, *Towards a European strategy for preventing organised crime: Joint report from Commission Services and Europol*. Brussels: European Commission, 2001. p. 8.
- 8 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, Attached to Note by the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, para. 170.
- 9 Europol, *Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2006*. The Hague, Europol, 2006, p. 7.
- 10 US Department of Justice, *Overview of the law enforcement strategy to combat international organized crime*, April 2008. See: <http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2008/ioc-strategy-public-overview.pdf>, p. 10. Published the same year, van Dijk concurs, "The fragmentation of organized crime seems to be a worldwide trend...Organized crime groups today resemble networks of entrepreneurs... This new generation of "Mafias" does not conform to the hierarchical, static, and semi-bureaucratic structures, the cartels, cupolas, and the like. In many cases, territorially-oriented groups have been replaced by criminal organizations that are smaller, less stable, and lighter on their feet." van Dijk, J, *The world of crime*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2008, p. 148. Roberto Saviano, in his "personal journey into the ...Naples' organized crime system", argues, "The flexibility of today's economy has permitted small groups of manager bosses operating in hundreds of enterprises in well-defined sectors to control the social and financial arenas. There is now a horizontal structure – much more flexible than the Cosa Nostra, and much more permeable to new alliances than the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta – that ... adopts new strategies in entering cutting-edge markets... Camorra groups no longer need to maintain widespread military-type control ... because their principal business activities now take place outside Naples... The clans no longer need to organize in large bodies." Saviano, R. *Gomorra*. New York: Farrar,

Straus and Giroux, 2007, pp. 44-45.

- 11 von Lampe, K., "Organized Crime in Europe". In: Philip Reichel (ed.), *Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005, pp. 403-424.
- 12 Sterling, C., *Crime Without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion of Organized Crime and the Pax Mafiosa*. New York: Time Warner Paperbacks, 1995.
- 13 For example, the United States Department of Justice strategy to combat international organized crime identifies four priority areas of action:
  - Marshall information and intelligence
  - Prioritize and target the most significant international organized crime threats
  - Attack from all angles
  - [Apply] Enterprise theory
 But in explaining the concept of threat assessment, it suggests:
 

*Select and target for high-impact law enforcement action the international organized crime figures and organizations that pose the greatest threat to the United States ... (emphasis added)*

 And in discussing enterprise theory, it recommends,
 

*Develop aggressive strategies for dismantling entire criminal organizations, especially their leadership ... (emphasis added)*

 In short, while the document emphasises a non-traditional approach, it remains focused on the pursuit of individuals and organizations, rather than the dismantling of markets. See: United States Department of Justice, Overview of the law enforcement strategy to combat international organized crime, Washington, D.C.: DOJ, April 2008.
- 14 See Langewiesche, W. *The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime*. New York: North Point Press, 2004.
- 15 Peter P. Belobaba and Amedeo Odoni, "Introduction and Overview," in *The Global Airline Industry*, P. Belobaba, C. Barnhart and A. Odoni (eds.), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2009.
- 16 International Air Transport Association (IATA), Fact Sheet: World Industry Statistics, July 2009.
- 17 Government Accountability Office, *Airline Deregulation: Reregulating the Airline Industry Would Likely Reverse Consumer Benefits and Not Save Airline Pensions*, June 2006.
- 18 United Kingdom Department for Transport, *International sea container freight: The container freight end-to-end journey*, December 2008.
- 19 TEUs through Shanghai, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Tianjin and Xiamen ports increased from 27,844 in 2002 to 86,990 in 2007, according to the AAPA's World Port Rankings.
- 20 *July 2009 Web Server Survey*, Netcraft.
- 21 International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children, *Child Pornography: Model Legislation & Global Review*, 2008.
- 22 Serious Organized Crime Agency, *The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organised Crime 2009/10*.
- 23 Kattoulas, V., 'The Yakuza Recession'. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 January 2002
- 24 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision*, New York, 2006.
- 25 UN-HABITAT, *Global report on human settlements 2007*, pp. 45-47.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2008*, Geneva, Switzerland, December 2008.
- 28 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision*, Population Division, New York, 2006.
- 29 IOM, op cit.
- 30 UNODC, *What is migrant smuggling?* See: [www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org).
- 31 US Office of National Drug Control Policy, *ADAM II - 2008 Annual Report*, April 2009. See: <http://www.whitehousedrug-policy.gov/publications/pdf/adam2008.pdf>.

## Chapter 2 - Trafficking in persons

- 1 Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines Trafficking in Persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
- 2 UNODC, *Trafficking in Persons; Global Patterns*, Vienna, 2006.
- 3 The figure refers to 111 countries providing such information for the year 2006; See UNODC/UN.GIFT, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, Vienna, 2009.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 ILO, *A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour*, Geneva, 2005.
- 6 The definition used was that of the Forced Labour Convention of 1930: "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily". The ILO argues that "trafficking in persons for the purpose of exploitation is encompassed by the definition of forced or compulsory labour provided under the [Forced Labour] Convention." This estimate focuses on the costs to the laborers, including lost wages, rather than the profits accruing to the traffickers or exploiters. See ILO, *The Cost of Coercion; Global Report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work*, International Labour Conference, 98th Session 2009, Geneva, 2009.
- 7 ILO, 2005, op cit.
- 8 The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25. It entered into force on 25 December 2003. It is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons.
- 9 IOM, *Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children*, Dushanbe, 2001; Tatiana A. Denisova, *Trafficking in Women and Children for Purposes of Sexual Exploitation*, Zaporizhie State University, 2004; UNODC, *An Assessment of Referral Practices to Assist and Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons in Moldova*, Chisinau, Moldova, 2007.
- 10 UNODC *Trafficking in Persons; Global Patterns*, Vienna, 2006.
- 11 The West and Central European countries considered in this chapter as destination of trafficking are the following: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Kosovo (Serbia), Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, the United Kingdom.
- 12 TAMPEP, *TAMPEP 8, 1st General Meeting*, Vienna 2008; International Human Rights Law Institute, *In Modern Bondage; Sex Trafficking in the Americas; Central America, The Caribbean, and Brazil*, Chicago, 2005.
- 13 Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings; *Trafficking in Human Beings; First Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur*, The Hague 2002; TAMPEP, *TAMPEP 8, 1st General Meeting*, Vienna 2008.
- 14 UNODC, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, Vienna, 2009.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Rebecca Surtees, "Traffickers and trafficking in southern and eastern Europe," *European Journal of Criminology*, Volume 5/ Number 1/January 2008.
- 17 Tatiana A. Denisova, *Trafficking in Women and Children for Purposes of Sexual Exploitation*, Zaporizhie State University, 2004.
- 18 Ivana Trávníčková, *Trafficking in Women: The Czech Republic Perspective*, Institute for Criminology and Social Prevention and UNICRI, Prague, 2005.
- 19 Z.Izdebski, J.Dec *Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings in Poland*, Institute of Social Pedagogy Counselling and Sexual Education Unit University of Zielona Góra and UNICRI.
- 20 UNICRI, *Trafficking in Women from Romania into Germany Comprehensive Report*, March 2005.
- 21 According to a country profile of Azerbaijan compiled by The Protection Project, most Azeri women and girls are trafficked by friends, acquaintances, neighbours, or relatives. See IOM, *Shattered Dreams: A Report on Trafficking in Persons in Azerbaijan*, Geneva, 2002.
- 22 Tatiana A. Denisova, *Trafficking in Women and Children for Purposes of Sexual Exploitation*, Zaporizhie State University, 2004.
- 23 Ivana Trávníčková, *Trafficking in Women: The Czech Republic Perspective*, Institute for Criminology and Social Prevention and UNICRI, Prague, 2005.
- 24 Z.Izdebski, J.Dec *Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings in Poland*- Institute of Social Pedagogy Counselling and Sexual Education Unit University of Zielona Góra and UNICRI.
- 25 E.Ciconte; *The Trafficking flows and routes of Eastern Europe*, WEST-Women East Smuggling Trafficking, Ravenna, 2005; F. Carchedi, V. Tola, *All' aperto e al chiuso; Prostituzione e tratta: I nuovi dati del fenomeno, I servizi sociali, le normative di riferimento*, Materiali Eddiesse, Roma, 2008.
- 26 Tatiana A. Denisova, *Trafficking in Women and Children for Purposes of Sexual Exploitation*, Zaporizhie State University, 2004.
- 27 Izdebski, J.Dec *Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings in Poland*- Institute of Social Pedagogy Counselling and Sexual Education Unit University of Zielona Góra and UNICRI; Ivana Trávníčková, *Trafficking in Women: The Czech Republic Perspective*, Institute for Criminology and Social Prevention and UNICRI, Prague, 2005; UNICRI *Trafficking in Women from Romania into Germany Comprehensive Report* March 2005.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 International Human Rights Law Institute, *In Modern Bondage; Sex Trafficking in the Americas; Central America, The Caribbean, and Brazil*, Chicago, 2005.
- 30 CECRIA, *Save the Children Sweden Study on Trafficking in Women, Children and Adolescents for Commercial Sexual Exploitation*; PASTRAF, 2003.
- 31 F.Carchedi, I.Orfano, *La Tratta di Persone in Italia; Evoluzione del Fenomeno ed Ambiti di Sfruttamento*, Osservatoriotratta, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2007.
- 32 International Human Rights Law Institute, *In Modern Bondage; Sex Trafficking in the Americas; Central America, The Caribbean, and Brazil*; Chicago, 2005.
- 33 UNICRI, *Trafficking of Nigerian Girls to Italy; Report of Field Survey in Edo State, Nigeria*. Turin 2004.
- 34 F.Carchedi, A.Piccioli, G. Mottura, G. Campani, *I Colori della Notte. Migrazioni, Sfruttamento Sessuale, Esperienze d'Intervento Sociale*, FrancoAngeli, Milan, 2000; C. Magnabosco, M.Visentin, A.Giaconia, G.Martano, G.Parodi, G.Celestini, A.Delcanale, *Da uomo a uomo...da cliente a cliente; Storie italiane si clienti anonimi e clienti anomali*, Progetto La Ragazza di Benin City, associazione WHO, Aosta.
- 35 Carling, J. *Migration, Human Smuggling ad Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe*, IOM, 2005; Carchedi-Orfano *La tratta di persone in Italia, Osservatorio tratta*, 2007; UNICRI *Trafficking of Nigerian Girls to Italy*, 2005.
- 36 More than one mean of coercion can be used for the same victim.
- 37 Carchedi, F. and Tola, V., *All' aperto e al chiuso; Prostituzione e tratta: I nuovi dati del fenomeno, I servizi sociali, le normative di riferimento*, Materiali Eddiesse, Roma, 2008.
- 38 According to IOM, "The so-called second wave refers to

- women who were trafficked and who have been offered, or somehow taken, the option of recruitment rather than continued sexual exploitation". Also other studies confirm this pattern. In Ukraine "these criminal groups are both big and small, organized and unorganized, and nationally and internationally based. Within these organizations, 60% of the leaders are women, usually 30 to 35 years old; many of them are former prostitutes." See Tatiana A. Denisova, *Trafficking in Women and Children for Purposes of Sexual Exploitation*, Zaporizhie State University, 2004.
- 39 IOM, *Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children*, Dushanbe, 2001; Tatiana A. Denisova, *Trafficking in Women and Children for Purposes of Sexual Exploitation*, Zaporizhie State University, 2004; UNODC, *An Assessment of Referral Practices to Assist and Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons in Moldova*, Chisinau, Moldova, 2007.
  - 40 L.Kelly, *Fertile Fields: Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia*, IOM Vienna, 2005.
  - 41 UNICRI, *Trafficking in Women from Romania into Germany Comprehensive Report*, March 2005.
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  - 43 Ibid.
  - 44 Ibid.
  - 45 Ibid.
  - 46 G. Vermeulen, T.van der Beken, Belgium, 'A study for monitoring the trafficking of human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation in the EU member states', Unpublished, HEUNI, Helsinki, 2004.
  - 47 E. Turiakova, "Human Trafficking in the Russian Federation: Inventory and Analysis of the Current Situation and Responses", Institute for Urban Economics for the UN/IOM Working Group on Trafficking in Human Beings, Moscow, 2006.
  - 48 Azad Azarbaycan TV, Baku, 9 February 2006.
  - 49 UNICRI, *Trafficking in Women from Romania into Germany Comprehensive Report*, March 2005.
  - 50 International Human Rights Law Institute, *In Modern Bondage; Sex Trafficking in the Americas; Central America, The Caribbean, and Brazil*, Chicago, 2005.
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  - 52 International Human Rights Law Institute, *In Modern Bondage; Sex Trafficking in the Americas; Central America, The Caribbean, and Brazil*, Chicago, 2005.
  - 53 Carchedi, F. and Tola, V., *All'aperto e al chiuso; Prostitutione e Tratta: I nuovi dati del fenomeno, I servizi sociali, le normative di riferimento*, Materiali Eddiesse, Roma, 2008; Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, *Report to the Italian Parliament*, Rome, 2008.
  - 54 ILO, *A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour*, Geneva, 2005. ILO's methodology is based on reported cases of trafficking, not on cases detected.
  - 55 The year 2006 was used in this case because more countries reported data in 2006 than in the other years covered in the UN.GIFT research.
  - 56 Transcrime suggests a multiplier of 20 for every victim detected. See *A Pilot Study on Three European Union Key Immigration Points for Monitoring the Trafficking of Human Beings for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation across the European Union*.
  - 57 A.C.Kinsey, W.Pomeroy, C.Martins *Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 1948.
  - 58 E.O. Laumann, G. Kolata J.H Gagnon, R.T, Michael, *Sex in America: A Definitive Survey*, Warner Books Edition, New York 1994.
  - 59 B. Lewin, *Sex in Sweden. On the Swedish Sexual Life*, The National Institute of Public Health, Stockholm, 1998
  - 60 Leridon, Zesson and Hubert, *The Europeans and their sexual partners*, UCL, London, 1998
  - 61 Rissel, Richter, Grulich, et al, 'Sex in Australia: Experiences of commercial sex in a representative sample of adults', *Australia and New Zealand journal of public health*, vol. 27, no. 2, (pp. 191-197), Canberra, 2003.
  - 62 Leridon, Zesson and Hubert, *The Europeans and their sexual partners*, London, UCL, 1998.
  - 63 Ibid.
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  - 65 B. Anderson, J O'Connell Davidson, *Is trafficking in human beings demand driven? A multi-country pilot study*, IOM, 2003.
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  - 68 Groom, T. and R. Nandwani, 'Characteristics of men who pay for sex: a UK sexual health clinic survey', *Sexually Transmitted Infections*, Vol 82, 2006, pp 364-367.
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  - 70 Vandepitte1, J, R. Lyerla, G. Dallabetta, F. Crabbé, M. Alary, A. Buvé, 'Estimates of the number of female sex workers in different regions of the world', *Sexually Transmitted Infections*, Vol 82, (Supplement 3 ), 2006, pp. iii18-iii25.
  - 71 If one out of seven sex workers is a trafficking victim, then the detection ratio suggested above (one in 20) seems on the low side.
  - 72 ILO, *Minimum Estimate of Forced Labour in the World*, Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005.
  - 73 One US study found a client load of 694 male partners in the last 12 months per sex worker. This estimate was adjusted to account for higher client rates among drug addicted sex workers. Brewer, D., J. Potterat, S. Garrett, S. Muth, J. Roberts, D. Kasprzyk, D. Montano, and W. Darrowi, 'Prostitution and the sex discrepancy in reported number of sexual partners'. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, Vol 97, No 22, 2000, pp. 12385-12388.
  - Trafficking victims are likely to have higher client loads, perhaps comparable to drug addicts, but more research is needed on client loads for sex workers and trafficking victims.
  - 74 See Carchedi, F. and Tola, V., *All'aperto e al chiuso, prostituzione e tratta: i nuovi dati del fenomeno, i servizi sociali, le normative di riferimento*, Eddiesse: Rome, 2008. More research is also required on prices for services.
  - 75 When trends in convictions were not available, trends concerning prosecutions or investigations were considered.
  - 76 Elaboration from UN.GIFT-UNODC data.
  - 77 In Spain, the share of Romanian victims increased during the entire period considered.
  - 78 UNODC/UN.GIFT, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, Vienna, 2009; Carchedi, F., and Tola, V., *All'aperto e al chiuso; Prostitutione e Tratta: I nuovi dati del fenomeno, I servizi sociali, le normative di riferimento*, Materiali Eddiesse, Roma, 2008; Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, *Report to the Italian Parliament*, Rome, 2008; Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, *Trafficking in Human Beings; Fourth Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur*, The Hague, 2007; Comensha, *JAARVERSLAG 2008 Augustus 2009* (see: <http://www.menshandel.nl/cms/docs/jaarverslag2008.pdf>).

### Chapter 3 - Smuggling of migrants

- 1 According to Article 3 (1) of the Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land sea and air - commonly referred as the Migrant Smuggling Protocol - supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. UN



- General Assembly Resolution 55/25, 8 January 2001. In addition, Article 6 of the Protocol criminalizes the facilitation of illegal residence.
- 2 United Nations Development Programme; *Human Development Report 2009; Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*, New York 2009
  - 3 Webb, S., Burrows, J., *Organised immigration crime: a post-conviction study*, Home Office, 2009.
  - 4 There are many examples of opportunism in studies of migrant smuggling. For instance, in a study conducted by UNODC on migrant smuggling from Tamil Nadu (India) many of the smugglers were from the district of Chennai, the area of the local international airport. See UNODC, *Smuggling of migrants from India to Europe and in particular to the UK - a study on Tamil Nadu*, New Delhi, 2009, p. 31-32.
  - 5 Neske, M., 'Human Smuggling to and through Germany,' *International Migration* Vol. 44 (4) 2006.
  - 6 In a study on East Africa, the author explains that the large majority of migrants leaving Somalia and Ethiopia would choose to travel overland or by sea in extremely precarious situations because of their poor economic conditions. Only 3-5% of the them could afford flying directly to South Africa, usually with forged documents. See Horwood, C., *In pursuit of the Southern dream: victims of necessity. Assessment of irregular movement of men from East Africa and the Horn to South Africa*, International Organization for Migration, 2009, p. 42.
  - 7 For example, migrants travelling from South or East Asia to the Russian Federation and points beyond often fly from their origin countries to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan, and from there continue by land across Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation. Taxis waiting on the other side of the border take them to Moscow for US\$1,000 See Gembicka, K., *Baseline research on smuggling of migrants in from, through Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan)*, International Organization for Migration, September 2006, p. 19.
  - 8 Pew Hispanic Center estimates derived principally from the March 2004 Current Population Survey and Census 2000.
  - 9 See list at <http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY07.pdf>.
  - 10 Passel, J. S., *Unauthorized migrants: Number and Characteristics* Background Briefing Prepared for Task Force on Immigration and America's Future, Pew Hispanic Center 2005.
  - 11 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 7 October 2009.
  - 12 Presentation by R. Medina, World Bank, *CPSS-WB General Principles for International Remittances Services; The Point of View of Authorities: Banco de México*, May 2006.
  - 13 Hanson, G., *The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, CSR No 26, April 2007.
  - 14 Bloomberg news, *Greenspan says illegal immigration aids U.S. economy*, 30 April 2009.
  - 15 Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy directorate, *Immigration enforcement action: 2008, Annual Report*, July 2009.
  - 16 Rytina, N., Simanski, J., *Apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol: 2005-2008*, Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy directorate, June 2009.
  - 17 Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy directorate, *Immigration enforcement action: 2008, Annual Report*, July 2009.
  - 18 Nuñez-Neto, B, Siskin, A., Viña, S., *Border Security: Apprehensions of "Other Than Mexican" Aliens*; Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. CRS Report for Congress, 2005. September 2005.
  - 19 Rytina, N., Simanski, J., *Apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol: 2005-2008*, Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy directorate, June 2009.
  - 20 Nuñez-Neto, B, Siskin, A., Viña, S., *Border Security: Apprehensions of "Other Than Mexican" Aliens*; Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. CRS Report for Congress, 2005. September 2005.
  - 21 United States Government Accountability Office, *Illegal Migration; Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated*, 2006.
  - 22 Ibid.
  - 23 Ibid.
  - 24 Ibid.; and McCaul, M., *Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border*, Majority Staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations.
  - 25 United States Government Accountability Office, *Illegal Migration; Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated*, 2006.
  - 26 Nuñez-Neto, B., Siskin, A., Viña, S., *Border Security: Apprehensions of "Other Than Mexican" Aliens*; Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. CRS Report for Congress, 2005. September 2005.
  - 27 Ibid.
  - 28 Ibid.
  - 29 Ibid.
  - 30 McCaul, M., *Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border*. Majority Staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations.
  - 31 Spener, D., 'Mexican-migrants smugglers: a cross border cottage industry,' *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, Volume 5, Number 3/June, 2004.
  - 32 National Gang Intelligence Centre, *US National Gang Assessment 2009*, January 2009.
  - 33 Stratfor, *Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progresses and Growing Violence*, December 2008.
  - 34 US Customs and Border Protection, *Arrest of notorious Tijuana Alien Smuggler Successful through Bi-National Enforcement Efforts*, 23 June 2008.
  - 35 United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio Eastern Division, *Indictment for Manuel Valdez-Gomez and others*.
  - 36 Ibid.
  - 37 Ibid.
  - 38 Each year, during the winter months (when seasonal migrants are home), the Mexican Migration Project randomly samples households in communities located throughout Mexico. After gathering social, demographic and economic information on the household and its members, interviewers collect basic information on each person's first and last trip to the USA. From household heads, they compile a year-by-year history of US migration and administer a detailed series of questions about the last trip northward, focusing on employment, earnings and use of US social services. (See <http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/research/design-en.aspx>).
  - 39 The Mexican Migration Project Surveys are conducted among Mexican migrants who are back in Mexico to celebrate Christmas with their families. It is likely that these migrants cross the border more than once in a year.
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  - 41 Rytina, N., Simanski, J., *Apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol: 2005-2008*, Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy directorate, June 2009.
  - 42 Muenz, R., *Europe: Population and Migration in 2005*, Hamburg Institute of International Economics and Erste Bank; in Migration Information Source, June 2006.
  - 43 Collyer, M., *Undocumented Sub-saharan African Migrants in Morocco 2004*, Working Paper. Falmer: Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex.
  - 44 Carling, J., 'Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain,' *International Migration*, Volume 45, Number 4, October 2007, pp. 3-37(35).
  - 45 Ibid.
  - 46 Ibid.
  - 47 Moroccans resident in the provinces surrounding the two cities can travel freely to Ceuta and Melilla. According to the Schengen agreements, however, onward travel to the mainland has to be controlled by the customs authorities.
  - 48 Valsecchi, R., *Ceuta, the border-fence of Europe*, New York:

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- 49 Carling, J., 'Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain,' *International Migration*, Volume 45, Number 4, October 2007, pp. 3-37(35).
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- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Valsecchi, R., *Ceuta, the border-fence of Europe*, New York: WorldPress, 25 June 2009.
- 53 Carling, J., 'Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain,' *International Migration*, Volume 45, Number 4, October 2007, pp. 3-37(35).
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Monzini, P., *Il traffico di migranti per mare verso l'Italia; Sviluppi Recenti (2004-2008)*, CeSPI – Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Working Papers, 43/2008.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 See <http://elharraga.wordpress.com/page/1/>.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Monzini, P., *Il traffico di migranti per mare verso l'Italia; Sviluppi Recenti (2004-2008)*, CeSPI – Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Working Papers, 43/2008.
- 61 See <http://elharraga.wordpress.com/page/1/>
- 62 Monzini, P., *Il traffico di migranti per mare verso l'Italia; Sviluppi Recenti (2004-2008)*, CeSPI – Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Working Papers, 43/2008; and <http://elharraga.wordpress.com/page/1/>.
- 63 International Centre for Migration Policy Development, *The East Africa Migration Route Report*, Vienna 2007.
- 64 See <http://elharraga.wordpress.com/page/1/>.
- 65 Collyer, M., *Undocumented Sub-saharan African Migrants in Morocco 2004*, Working Paper. Falmer: Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex.
- 66 El Pais, *La guardian de los 'negros' del Sahara*, El Pais, 2004.
- 67 Carling, J., 'Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain,' *International Migration*, Volume 45, Number 4, October 2007, pp. 3-37(35).
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Monzini, P., *Il traffico di migranti per mare verso l'Italia; Sviluppi Recenti (2004-2008)*, CeSPI – Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Working Papers, 43/2008.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 International Centre for Migration Policy Development, *The East Africa Migration Route Report*, Vienna 2007.
- 73 Ibid.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Maroukis, T., *Undocumented Migration, Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe – Country reports Greece, Clandestino*, December 2008 (revised July 2009).
- 77 Icduygu, A., Toktas, S., 'How do smuggling and smuggling operate via irregular border crossings in the Middle East?' *International Migration*, 40/6, 2002, pp. 25-54.
- 78 Most of the sea apprehensions registered in the *Rest of Italy* in the nineties and early 2000s referred to South-East Europeans (Albanians and Kosovars) along the south-east coast of Italy. This flow has disappeared today.
- 79 This figure does not include the 1,600 people apprehended in Sardinia who do not appear to have been smuggled.
- 80 The NGO 'Fortress Europe' has systematically registered what they deem to be reliable accounts of the number of migrants believed dead and missing since 1988. According to this database, in 2008 about 1,000 migrants died or disappeared trying to reach Europe by sea.

## Chapter 4 - Cocaine

- 1 US data for the year 2008 show that the lifetime prevalence rate of those using crack-cocaine among the rich, i.e. those earning US\$ 75,000 or more a year, is 76% lower than among the very poor, i.e. those earning less than US\$10,000 a year. In contrast, the lifetime prevalence of overall cocaine use, which includes cocaine HCL and crack-cocaine use, is still 28% higher in the USA among the rich, compared to the very poor. (US Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), *2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health*, Rockville MD 2009).
- The popularity of cocaine HCL among wealthier sections of society is also reflected in Canadian data. The household survey among adults in the province of Ontario (which accounts for more than a third of Canada's total population) found a life-time prevalence of cocaine use among the 'poor', i.e. those earning less than Can\$ 30,000 a year of 4.5% in 2007, gradually rising to 9.1% among the 'rich', i.e. those earning more than Can\$ 80,000 a year. ('Cocaine use' mainly reflects 'cocaine HCL' use in Ontario). In contrast, cannabis and other drugs follow an inverted J curve in Canada, as in most other countries. Thus, annual prevalence of cannabis use amounted to 21.1% of those earning less than Can\$ 30,000 a year in Ontario in 2007 and fell to 10.3% among the 'middle class', i.e. those earning between Can\$50,000 and Can\$80,000 a year, before rising again slightly among the 'rich' (i.e. those earning more than Can\$80,000 a year) to 13%. (Canadian Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), 2007 CAMH Monitor eReport, *Addiction and Mental Health Indicators Among Ontario Adults, 1977-2007*, Toronto 2009).
- 2 The Library of Congress Country Studies: Colombia and CIA World Factbook, quoted in *Colombia Drugs and Society, 1988*. [http://www.photius.com/countries/colombiasociety/colombia\\_society\\_drugs\\_and\\_society.html](http://www.photius.com/countries/colombiasociety/colombia_society_drugs_and_society.html)
- 3 UNODC, *2009 World Drug Report*, Vienna 2009.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 The average amount of heroin seized per seizure case in 2007 amounted to 0.26 kg, while the corresponding figure for cocaine was 3.1 kg, based on information from the 67 countries reporting both pieces of information in the UNODC Annual Reports Questionnaire. A year earlier, the average cocaine seizure even amounted to 4.7 kg (information from 82 countries) and was 26 times larger than the average heroin seizure (0.18 kg).
- 6 US Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), *1995 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, Report #18*, Rockville, MD, 1996.
- 7 SAMHSA, *Results from the 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health*. If the data are re-adjusted to the internationally comparable age group 15-64, the decline in the annual prevalence of cocaine use was from 3% in 2006 to 2.6% in 2008.
- 8 National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2009*, Dec. 2008.
- 9 Health Canada, *Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey 2008*, Ottawa 2009. The decline from 1.9% of the population age 15 and above in 2004 to 1.6% in 2008 is equivalent to a decline from 2.3% to 2.0% if the numbers are re-adjusted to the internationally comparable age group of those aged 15-64.
- 10 Institute for Defense Analyses (Barry Crane, Art Fries, A. Rex Rivolo, Amy Alrich, Tara Mc. Govern), "History of the US Cocaine Market (Supply and Consumption)", presentation given to the UNODC expert group meeting: "The evidence base for drug control in Colombia: lessons learned", Bogota, 9-10 November 2009.
- 11 National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2009*, December 2008.
- 12 US State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Strategy Report*, Vol. I, March 2009.
- 13 The issue of extraditing narco-traffickers played a key role in Colombian politics in the 1990s. Following ongoing terror by the narco-cartels, the Colombian authorities gave in and

- changed the constitution in 1991, forbidding extraditions. As violence did not stop, the Colombian Congress amended again in 1997 its constitution in a way that permitted the extradition of Colombian nationals. (See Article 35, amended in the Colombian Constitution, A.L. No. 01, 1997).
- 14 Mexico signed with the USA a bilateral Extradition Treaty in 1978. However, a revision of January 10, 1994, stated that “extradition of Mexican nationals is prohibited except in ‘exceptional’ circumstances”. A subsequent decision (October 2, 2001) by the Supreme Court of Mexico introduced an additional barrier to extradition. It ruled that no extradition should be granted unless the requesting state gives assurances that the suspect would be eligible for parole as it saw the purpose of punishment in the subsequent rehabilitation of the convicted person. But this cannot – ex-ante – be expected from a US court. In 2002, a Mexican court even went a step further and ruled that assurances by an US prosecutor had “no value because US judges are autonomous... So they would apply the punishments established by the U.S. Penal codes”. (See *Escaping Justice – Extradition / Foreign Prosecution, Mexico*, <http://www.escapingjustice.com/extrafpo.htm>).
  - 15 National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2009*, December 2008.
  - 16 UNODC and Government of Colombia, *Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey*, Bogota, June 2009.
  - 17 R. Anthony and A. Fries, “Empirical modelling of narcotics trafficking from farm gate to street”, in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Bulletin on Narcotics*, Vol. LVI. Nos. 1 and 2, 2004, Illicit Drug Markets, pp. 1-48.
  - 18 Article 35, amended in the Colombian Constitution, A.L. No. 01, 1997.
  - 19 National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2009*, December 2008.
  - 20 For example, new data are available on the number of cocaine-dependent people and heavy cocaine users (using cocaine more than 100 days a year) identified in the National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health (NHSDU). There are also new data on cocaine-positive tests among arrestees, provided in the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program (ADAM II). See ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program, *ADAM II 2008 Annual Report*, Washington D.C., April 2009. This allows an updated definition and estimate of “chronic use”.
  - 21 The calculation of the new data series of ‘chronic users’ was based on the following model: data on heavy cocaine users (consuming cocaine on more than 100 days a year), plus ½ the number of ‘dependent cocaine users’, plus 1/3 of the arrested cocaine users. The occasional cocaine users were defined as the total number of users having consumed cocaine at least once over the last 12 months, less the chronic users. The logic for the definition of the ‘chronic cocaine users’ is as follows: ‘heavy cocaine’ users and ‘dependent cocaine’ users (which are of similar magnitudes in the USA) can be considered to form part of ‘chronic’ cocaine users. Simply adding the two variables will, however, lead to an over-estimate. Each data series, taken by itself, represents, in contrast, an under-estimate of the problem. The 2008 data from the ADAM II project, e.g. found that just 45% of the persons whose urine analysis had indicated cocaine use within the last 2 to 3 days, actually admitted to having used cocaine recently. Against this background, half of the ‘dependent cocaine use’ variable was added to the ‘heavy use’ variable. This combination is assumed to provide a more accurate reflection of the total number of heavy cocaine users who are still living in a household and are thus captured in household surveys. In addition, a certain proportion of those arrested, who consumed cocaine within the last two to three days, can be assumed to be chronic users of cocaine; a certain proportion of these people will no longer live in a ‘normal household’. Based on the analysis of the ADAM II data, it was established that this proportion could be close to 30%, which includes people who are homeless, living in shelters or have been ‘institutionalized’ over the last few months, i.e. having lived in treatment facilities, in jails or in prison. (See ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program, *ADAM II 2008 Annual Report*, Washington D.C., April 2009). Such cocaine users would not be ‘captured’ in a household survey.
  - 22 The 31 grams of pure cocaine figure is the result of a multiplication of the number of chronic users (2.3 million) with a per capita use of 55 grams per year and a multiplication of the number of occasional users (3 million) with 14 grams per year. This yields a total at 165 tons for 5.3 million users, which gives 31 grams per user in 2008, down from 44 grams per user in 1998 and 66 grams per user in 1988. The per capita use figures were derived from the results of the ONDCP study on *What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs*, published in 2001. They found average per capita consumption for chronic users to have fallen from 141 grams in 1988 to 106 grams in 1990 and 78 grams in 1998. The model used assumed that the downward trend continued as availability of treatment facilities continued to improve (67 grams in 2007). The downward trend was assumed to have accelerated in 2008, as a result of falling purity levels (55 grams). The decline in per capita consumption for occasional users was less pronounced, from 16 grams in 1988 to 15 grams in 1998, and was thus assumed to have fallen only slightly, to 14 grams in 2008.
  - 23 The ONDCP model assumed that 20% of the monthly cocaine users consumed 0.5 grams of cocaine per day while the remaining 80% of the monthly cocaine users consume 0.5 grams per week. This gives an average consumption of 57.3 grams of cocaine per month. The non-monthly annual users are assumed in this model to consume just 4 grams per year. In the case of crack cocaine it is assumed that 30% of the monthly users consumed 0.75 grams per day and the remaining 70% of the monthly users consume 0.75 grams per week. This gives, on average, 109.4 grams of crack cocaine per year for monthly users. The annual excluding monthly users are assumed to consume 6 grams per year. (See ONDCP, “Cocaine Consumption Estimates Methodology”, September 2008 (internal paper)).
  - 24 The problem here is that the US household survey provides estimates on overall cocaine use (i.e. cocaine HCl and crack-cocaine) and then gives an estimate on the number of crack cocaine users. Assuming that no crack user in the US consumes cocaine HCl, the cocaine HCl users can be ‘calculated’ by subtracting crack cocaine users from all cocaine users; assuming that all crack-cocaine users also consume cocaine HCl, the cocaine HCl figure would be identical to the overall cocaine figure. Applying the first interpretation, cocaine use would have amounted to 140 tons in 2008; applying the second interpretation, cocaine use would have amounted to 164 tons in 2008.
  - 25 For data 1988-2000: ONDCP, *What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 2001*; for 2001 data: Drug Availability Steering Committee, *Availability Estimates in the United States*, December 2002; for 2002-2008: UNODC estimates based on SAMHSA, *2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health*, Rockville MD 2009, and previous years; FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports (2002-2008)* and ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program - *ADAM II 2008 Annual Report*, Washington D.C., April 2009 and ONDCP, “Cocaine Consumption Estimates Methodology”, September 2008 (internal paper).
  - 26 Institute for Defense Analyses (Barry Crane, Art Fries, A. Rex Rivolo, Amy Alrich, Tara Mc. Govern), “History of the US Cocaine Market (Supply and Consumption)”, presentation given to the UNODC expert group meeting: “The evidence base for drug control in Colombia: lessons learned”, Bogota, 9-10 November 2009.
  - 27 ONDCP, *What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs*, December 2001; Drug Availability Steering Committee, *Availability Estimates in the United States*, December 2002; SAMHSA, *National Survey on Drug Use and Health*, Rockville MD 2009, and previous years; FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports (2002-2008)* and ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program - *ADAM II 2008 Annual Report*, Washington D.C., April 2009 and ONDCP, “Cocaine Consumption Estimates Methodology”, September 2008 (internal paper); Health Canada, *Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey 2008* and previous years; CINADIC, *Encuesta Nacional de Adicciones 2002*, Ciudad Mexico, Secretaria de Desarrollo, *Encuesta de Hogares, 2006*; CONADIC and Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública, *Encuesta Nacional de*



- Adicciones*, 2008, UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data / DELTA.
- 28 UNODC, *2009 World Drug Report*, Vienna 2009; UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data / DELTA; ONDCP, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 2001*; Drug Availability Steering Committee, *Availability Estimates in the United States*, December 2002; SAMHSA, *National Survey on Drug Use and Health*, Rockville MD 2009, and previous years; FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports (2002-2008)* and ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program - *ADAM II 2008 Annual Report*, Washington D.C, April 2009 and ONDCP, "Cocaine Consumption Estimates Methodology", September 2008 (internal paper), Health Canada, *Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey 2008* and previous years, CINADIC, *Encuesta Nacional de Adicciones 2002*, Ciudad Mexico, Secretaria de Desarrollo, *Encuesta de Hogares, 2006*, CONADIC and Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública, *Encuesta Nacional de Adicciones, 2008*.
- 29 For data 1988-2000: ONDCP, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 2001*; for 2001 data: Drug Availability Steering Committee, *Availability Estimates in the United States*, December 2002; SAMHSA, *National Survey on Drug Use and Health*, Rockville MD 2009, and previous years; FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports (2002-2008)* and ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program - *ADAM II 2008 Annual Report*, Washington D.C, April 2009; ONDCP, *The Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs: 1981-2007*, Report prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for ONDCP, Washington, July 2008; US Drug Enforcement Agency, based on STRIDE data.
- 30 For data before 2000: ONDCP, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs*, December 2001; for 2001 data: Drug Availability Steering Committee, *Availability Estimates in the United States*, December 2002; SAMHSA, *National Survey on Drug Use and Health*, Rockville MD 2009, and previous years; FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports (2002-2008)* and ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program - *ADAM II 2008 Annual Report*, Washington D.C, April 2009; ONDCP, *The Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs: 1981-2007*, Report prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for ONDCP, Washington, July 2008; US Drug Enforcement Agency, based on STRIDE data, quoted in DEA Intelligence Division, "Cocaine Shortages in U.S. Markets, November 2009" and US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index (CPI); UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data.
- 31 The calculations were based on the available price data series, provided by ONDCP, ending for the year 2007. For 2008, the purity adjusted cocaine prices per gram, as reported by the DEA, were used. However, a comparison shows that the two price data series – though both based on STRIDE data – do not correspond, neither in absolute values nor in trends. While the ONDCP price data are supposed to reflect exclusively the retail level, based on the analysis of purity adjusted prices for purchases of 2 grams or less, the DEA price data series is based on the average price for all effected cocaine purchases, purity-adjusted and recalculated to represent the average price of cocaine per gram. Though differences in the methodology used can explain differences in the level, they do not really explain differences in trends. In fact, the bulk of the DEA prices concerns the retail level and the DEA prices should thus – primarily - reflect changes in these prices as well. The differences in the two data sources is not only of academic interest. If the growth rates in prices, as revealed in the DEA data, were applied to the ONDCP price data set, starting as of 2007, the calculations suggest that the overall cocaine market would have slightly increased, from US\$33.5 bn in 2006 to US\$35 bn in 2008, as the strong increases in prices would have more than compensated the declines in consumption. Given the large number of reports suggesting that strong price increases took place over the 2006-08 period, the latter estimates appear to have a higher level of credibility.
- 32 Gross profits are defined here as the difference between the sales price of the drugs and the original purchase price.
- 33 Institute for Defense Analyses (Barry Crane, Art Fries, A. Rex Rivolo, Amy Alrich, Tara Mc. Govern), "History of the US Cocaine Market (Supply and Consumption)", presentation given to the UNODC expert group meeting: "The evidence base for drug control in Colombia: lessons learned", Bogota, 9-10 November 2009.
- 34 The 27 EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
- 35 The 4 EFTA countries are: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
- 36 UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data; Government reports; UNODC, *2009 World Drug Report*; EMCDDA, *Statistical Bulletin 2009*; and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, 2009.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 World Customs Organization, *Customs and Drugs Report 2008*, Brussels, June 2009.
- 39 Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), *The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organised Crime, 2009/10*, London, 2009.
- 40 World Customs Organization, *Customs and Drugs Report 2008*, Brussels, June 2009
- 41 Maritime Analysis Operation Centre (MAOC(N)), *Statistical Analysis Report*, Lisbon 2009.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 MAOC-N, *Semi-Submersible Briefing Paper*, Lisbon 2008.
- 44 Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, *2008 National Report to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point, "Spain" New Development, Trends and in-depth information on selected issues*, Madrid, 2008.
- 45 Ministerio del Interior, Secretaria de Estado de Seguridad, Centro de Inteligencia contra el Crimen Organizado, "Hashish and Cocaine in Europe", presentation given to UNODC, Vienna July 2008.
- 46 No data for 2008 received for Poland, Scotland, Ukraine and Belarus – assumed unchanged levels of seizures
- 47 Direction Générale de la Police Nationale, Direction Générale de la Police Judiciaire, Office Central pour la Répression du Trafic Illicite des Stupéfiants (O.C.R.T.I.S.), *Usage et Trafic des Produits Stupéfiants en France en 2008*, Paris, 2009.
- 48 UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data.
- 49 US Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 2009.
- 50 Damian Zaitch, *Trafficking Cocaine – Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, Studies of Organized Crime*, The Hague 2002.
- 51 US Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 2009.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), *The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organised Crime, 2009/10*, London, 2009.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 US Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 2009.
- 57 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Dipartimento Politiche Antidroga, *Relazione Annuale Al Parlamento Sullo Stato Delle Tossicodipendenze in Italia 2008*, Rome 2009.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Sample of arrested cocaine traffickers (n = 442) for which nationality was identified; number of all arrested cocaine traffickers in France in 2006: N = 2,561.
- 60 UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data, 2002-2006.
- 61 Bundeskriminalamt, *Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2008*, Wiesbaden 2009.
- 62 Bundeskriminalamt, *Organisierte Kriminalität, Bundeslagebild 2008*, Wiesbaden 2009.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 These techniques are detailed in the following documents: United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, "Cocaine Consumption Estimates Methodology", September

- 2008 (internal paper); Home Office, *Sizing the UK market for illicit drugs*, London 2001; Home Office, *Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodological developments*, Home Office Online Report 16/06, London 2006; UNODC, *2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1: Analysis*, Vienna 2005; and European Centre for Social Welfare Policy, *Two Worlds of Drug Consumption in Late Modern Societies*, Vienna 2009. While the first model, developed by ONDCP, seems reasonable, it is based on assumptions, not on actual empirical data from European countries. The second model is based on empirical data, but they refer to the situation in one country (UK) which is not necessarily representative for the rest of Europe. The third model refers to cocaine use in West and Central Europe, but it is again derived from a number of underlying assumptions (such as effectiveness of law enforcement interventions and importance of regional proximity). The fourth model is based on empirical data from six cities in Europe, but applying the use rate found among marginalized users to all past month users is likely to result in an over-estimate. At the same time, a basic problem of household surveys, based on self-reports, is that they are – most likely – showing a substantial under-estimate of the extent of drug use. It remains difficult to judge to what extent these errors offset each other in the final calculation of the amounts consumed.
- 65 UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data; Government reports; UNODC, *2009 World Drug Report*, Vienna 2009; EMCDDA, *Statistical Bulletin 2009*, Lisbon 2009; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, 2009; European Centre for Social Welfare Policy, *Two Worlds of Drug Consumption in Late Modern Societies*, Vienna 2009; ONDCP, “Cocaine Consumption Estimates Methodology”, September 2008 (internal paper); Home Office, *Sizing the UK market for illicit drugs*, London 2001; Home Office, *Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodological developments*, Home Office Online Report 16/06, London 2006; UNODC, *2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1: Analysis*, Vienna 2005.
- 66 Current Euro values were transformed into constant Euros by applying the consumer price index for the Euro zone.
- 67 Current US dollar values were transformed into constant US dollar values by applying the US consumer price index.
- 68 The unweighted averages of reported purities for countries in West and Central Europe show a decline at the retail level from 59% in 1998 (range: 25% - 75%) to 47% in 2005 and 36% in 2008 (range: 16% - 52%). At the wholesale level the decline was from 78% (range: 55% - 90%) in 1998 to 55% in 2008 (range: 26% - 80%).
- As some of the decline could have been simply the result of specific countries reporting in one year, and not in another year, a modified calculation model was introduced. This model assumes that the results of non-reporting countries remained basically unchanged from the previous year (or a later year) for which data are available. This was done to avoid changes in the overall average due to the reporting or non-reporting of countries in specific years. Using this approach for missing data, changes in the overall average only reflect actual changes in country-specific purity data. Based on this model, the average cocaine purities at the retail level in West and Central Europe declined from 55% in 1998 to 43% in 2005 and 37% in 2008. The wholesale purities declined according to this model from 72% in 1998 to 60% in 2005 and 56% in 2008.
- 69 This masks, however, two conflicting trends. Retail prices in constant euros showed a downward trend over the 1998-2005 period (-7%) which was followed by an increase of 9% over the 2005-08 period, reflecting first signs of supply shortage. Expressed in constant US\$ terms, prices increased from US\$218 per pure gram in 1998 to US\$273 per pure gram in 2008 (+25%). Most of the increase took place over the 2005-08 period (+24%).
- 70 Expressed in constant US dollars, purity-adjusted wholesale prices rose from US\$79,400 per kg in 1998 to US\$87,300 in 2005 and US\$111,600 per kg in 2008, equivalent to an increase of 28% over the 2005-08 period.
- 71 Based on the Annual Reports Questionnaire Data, about 55% of the seizures made in the Caribbean and 61% of the seizures made in South America excluding the Andean countries were linked to shipments towards Europe in 2008, up from 47% and 46% respectively in 2002. For seizures made in Africa it was assumed that the bulk of them was linked to shipments towards Europe.
- 72 Range: 97-122 tons.
- 73 Range: 189-232 tons.
- 74 UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data; Government reports; UNODC, *World Drug Report 2009*, Vienna 2009; EMCDDA, *Statistical Bulletin 2009*, Lisbon 2009; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, 2009; European Centre for Social Welfare Policy, *Two Worlds of Drug Consumption in Late Modern Societies*, Vienna 2009.
- 75 UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data; Government reports; UNODC, *2009 World Drug Report*, Vienna 2009; EMCDDA, *Statistical Bulletin 2009*, Lisbon 2009; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, 2009; Home Office, *Sizing the UK market for illicit drugs*, London 2001; Home Office, *Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodological developments*, Home Office Online Report 16/06, London 2006; European Centre for Social Welfare Policy, *Two Worlds of Drug Consumption in Late Modern Societies*, Vienna 2009; UNODC, *2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1: Analysis*, Vienna 2005.
- 76 “Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem”, in United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, *Report on the fifty-second session* (14 March 2008 and 11-20 March 2009), E/2009/28; E/n.7/2009/12, pp. 37-77.

## Chapter 5 - Heroin

- 1 This newfound role was the result of political shifts both within the country and beyond its borders. Over the years, opium cultivation has been dramatically reduced in other South-West Asian countries due to domestic enforcement, starting with Turkey in the early 1970s and culminating with the crackdown on production in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan in 1979-80. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, occurring at roughly the same time as the enforcement efforts in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan and drought in South-East Asia, initiated a long period of instability from which the state is still attempting to recover. More recently, enforcement efforts in South-East Asia and South America have increased the relative importance of Afghan illicit production.
- 2 A recent UNODC study revealed that Afghans end up paying upwards of US\$2.5 billion in corruption payments annually.
- 3 There has never been a national drug use survey in the country, but household surveys often fail to capture heroin users in any case, since their addiction leads to marginalization. The government registers known drug users, and while it is difficult to distinguish trends in the real number of drug users from trends in the efforts of the government to locate them, these numbers have been growing.
- 4 A rise in seizures in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2008 reversed this five-year slide.
- 5 An average of heroin wholesale kilogram prices in 17 European countries was about US\$33,000 in 2007. The price of a wholesale kilogram of cocaine the same year in the USA was US\$31,000.
- 6 CARICC Information Bulletin No 14, March 3, 2008.
- 7 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Nezakonnyi oborot narkotikov i ego svyazi s konfliktami i terrorizmom; Afganistan i Tsentral'naya Azia,” in *Razoruzhenie i bezopasnost'*, 2001-2002; *Mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'*, novye ugrozy novogo tysiacheletia (Moscow, 2003), pp. 67-68 in Sergey Golinov “Drug Trafficking through the Russia-Kazakhstan Border: Challenge and Responses\*.”
- 8 Interview.
- 9 According to the head of the Tajik Drug Control Agency, approximately 20 large “networks” control the drug trade in

- Tajikistan, with many smaller groups in the border areas.
- 10 Interview, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, October 16 2009.
  - 11 See M. Madi, "Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan: structure, implications and countermeasures", *Central Asian Survey* (December 2004) 23 (3-4), p. 253.
  - 12 "Pure" heroin refers to heroin purity in Afghanistan, which is about 70%. UNODC's Russian Federation country office and the National Research Center on Drug Addiction (NRC) of the Federal Agency on Health and Social Development implemented a survey on drug treatment centres to understand the average heroin consumption per day per user in 2009. According to the survey results, average heroin consumption per user per day is around 1.87 gram with 5% purity or 0.13 gram of pure heroin (70%) per day per user. The estimated number of heroin addicts in the Russian Federation is 1.5 million, so the consumption of heroin was estimated at 70 tons per annum.
  - 13 According to UNODC surveys, the average heroin consumption per user is 1-1.5 gram per day. The cost of one gram of high quality heroin (around 70% purity) is around US\$10-15 in Central Asia. But the typical cost for one gram of heroin ranges from US\$1.5 – 2 at street level. Hence, this would indicate that street level heroin purity is between 7-10%  $([1.5/15] * 70)$  in Central Asia. Based on daily consumption (1-1.5 grams per day), the total annual heroin consumption per user is estimated at 365-550 grams (at 7-10% purity) per year, the equivalent of 25-55 grams (midpoint 40 grams) of pure heroin.
  - 14 UNODC, *Drug Supply Reduction: An overview of drug supply and trafficking in Iran*, ([www.unodc.org/pdf/iran/drug\\_crime\\_situation/dsr/Supply\\_Reduction\\_trends\\_and\\_trafficking.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/iran/drug_crime_situation/dsr/Supply_Reduction_trends_and_trafficking.pdf)).
  - 15 Information provided by UNODC consultants, June 2008.
  - 16 UNODC, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency - The transnational threat of Afghan opium*, Vienna, 2009.
  - 17 Ibid.
  - 18 Ibid.
  - 19 This amount is equivalent to the estimated heroin consumption in Italy and Switzerland.
  - 20 Interview UNAMA, Hirat, Afghanistan, October 30th.
  - 21 Interview, Turkish law enforcement officials, October 12, 2009.
  - 22 EUROPOL Annual report, 2008.
  - 23 SOCA, "The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organized Crime", October 2009, p.26.
  - 24 While these estimates are the best currently available, one has to be aware that they are not based on direct research. This reflects the absence - for most countries - of any structured or organized data collection system to arrive at scientifically sound per capita consumption estimates. Heroin consumption estimates presented in this section should therefore be treated with caution.
  - 25 United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), Fifty-second session, Vienna, 11-20 March 2009 (UN Doc. E/CN.7/2009/L.2).
  - 26 United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the fifty-second session (14 March 2008 and 11-20 March 2009), Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2009, Supplement No. 8A (E/2009/28/Add.1).
  - 27 weapons", such as heavy machine guns and grenades.
  - 4 US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice Information Services Division, 2008 Crime in the United States, Expanded Homicide data, September 2009.
  - 5 US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, *Weapon Use and Violent Crime*, September 2003.
  - 6 Latin American News Security Update, [latinnews.com](http://latinnews.com), 18 November 2009.
  - 7 This does not take into account reserves, because the role of reserves varies so much between countries. In some countries, they gather and drill, while in others, they only exist on paper.
  - 8 South African Police Service, *The crime situation in South Africa: 2008/9 Annual Report*. Pretoria: SAPS, 2009, p 10.
  - 9 Ibid, p. 17.
  - 10 Dreyfus, P., N. Marsh, and M. de Sousa Nascimento, *Tracking the guns: International diversion of small arms to illicit markets in Rio de Janeiro*. Viva Rio, NISAT and ISER: Rio de Janeiro and Oslo, November 2006, pp. 24-25.
  - 11 Dreyfus, P., L. Guedes, B. Lessing,, A. Bandeira, M. de Sousa Nascimento, and P. Rivero, *Small Arms in Rio de Janeiro: The Guns, the Buyback, and the Victims*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 64.
  - 12 Statement available on the website of the Mexican presidency, <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx>.
  - 13 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (Mexico), mortality database. See: [www.inegi.org.mx](http://www.inegi.org.mx).
  - 14 Small Arms Survey, 2009, op cit.
  - 15 United States Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), *Firearms use by offenders*. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2002, p. 6.
  - 16 United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Guns used in crime*. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 1995, p. 3.
  - 17 BJS 2002, op cit., p. 6.
  - 18 US Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, *Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers*, June 2000.
  - 19 Klare, M. and Andersen, D., *A Scourge of Guns: Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America*, Federation of American Scientists, 1996. Cited in Marsh, N. 'Two side of the same coin? The legal and illegal trade in small arms'. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002, p. 225.
  - 20 PGR Traffico de armas.
  - 21 GAO 2009 op cit.
  - 22 See endnote 18.
  - 23 GAO 2009, op cit.
  - 24 GAO 2009, op cit., p. 34.
  - 25 Under surveillance, one prominent trafficker advised a police informant, "If you get pulled over, two is no biggie. Four is a question. Fifteen is, 'What are you doing?'" McKinley, J. 'U.S. is arms bazaar for Mexican cartels.' *New York Times*, 25 February 2009.
  - 26 RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration, US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, *Border Crossing Data US-Mexico 1994-2003*.
  - 27 GAO 2009 op cit.
  - 28 Project Gunrunner Fact Sheet, September 2008.
  - 29 Attorney General of Mexico, *Tráfico de Armas México-USA*, 30 April 2009.
  - 30 Violence Policy Center, *Indicted: Types of firearms and methods of gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico as revealed in US court documents*. Washington, D.C.: Violence Policy Center, April 2009, p 9.
  - 31 Small Arms Survey, 2007, *Guns and the city*, Geneva, Switzerland: August 2007.
  - 32 National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2009*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, December 2008.
  - 33 UNODC ARQ.
  - 34 Attorney General of Mexico, *Indicadores de Gestión en contra*

## Chapter 6 - Firearms

- 1 Ammunition is expended, and thus must be renewed, but controlling ammunition flows is much more challenging, because ammunition does not have unique identifying characteristics and ammunitions sales are not generally tracked. The number of ammunition manufacturers is also much greater than the number of firearm manufacturers. This makes ammunition acquisition relatively simple, and therefore less attractive for transnational organized crime groups.
- 2 Small Arms Survey, 2009, *Shadows of war*, Geneva, Switzerland: July 2009.
- 3 These estimates are only for firearms, not their parts, accessories, and ammunition. It also does not include "light



- de la Delincuencia Organizada*, April 2009.
- 35 Chu, V and Krouse, W., *Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 29 July 2009, pp 15-16.
  - 36 Norinco, the Chinese manufacturer, is one of the most commonly detected makes. See Federal Government of Mexico, *Tráfico de Armas México-USA*, 30 April 2009.
  - 37 A former deputy defence minister and member of parliament, Oleksandr Ihnatenko, has stated that some US\$32 billion worth of weapons were stolen between 1992 and 1998. See Kuzio, Tario, "Ukraine's decade-long illegal trade in arms", *Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 10 January 2002.
  - 38 Badrak, V., 'Ukraine on Arms Market: A view from Kiev', *Ekspert Voordzheniy*, May-June 2001, p.2.
  - 39 The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence states that the original figure upon independence was 7.1 million small arms and light weapons. The reduction of some 900,000 items between 1992 and 2007 is said to be due to commercial sale and destruction. The Ministry of Defence states that "between 20-25%" of the 900,000 were sold. The Ministry recently placed the number of small arms and light weapons under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces at some 6.2 million items.
  - 40 Reported cases falling into one of these two categories include transfers to Afghanistan (1996), Angola (1992, 2001), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), Burkina Faso (2001), Chad (2001, 2007, 2008), Cote d'Ivoire (2001), Croatia (1992, 1994), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2001, 2009), Ecuador (1999), Equatorial Guinea (2004, 2009), Eritrea (1999, 2001), Ethiopia (1999), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001), Guinea (2003, 2004), Iraq (2000), Islamic Republic of Iran (2000, 2001), Kenya (2007, 2008), Liberia (2001), Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1996, 2006, 2007), Sierra Leone (1993, 2001), South Sudan (2007, 2008, 2009), Sudan (2004), United Republic of Tanzania (1994, 2001) and Yemen (1999).
  - 41 According to the SIPRI 2009 Yearbook, there were 16 major armed conflicts active in 15 locations around the world in 2008 (two more than in 2007), involving the following areas: Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, Colombia, Peru, USA, Afghanistan, India (Kashmir), Myanmar (Karen State), Pakistan, Philippines, Philippines (Mindanao), Sri Lanka ("Tamil Eelam"), Iraq, Israel (Palestinian territories) and Turkey. Many of these conflicts stretch back decades. The conflict in Myanmar, for example, has been ongoing since 1948.
  - 42 The arms embargo concerning the DRC was enacted in Security Council resolution 1493 (S/RES/1493 (2003)) and has been modified several times since then, with the most current reaffirmation being in 2009 (S/RES/1896), which extends the mandate of resolution 1807 (S/RES/1807 (2008)). This resolution allowed transfers to the DRC government, but not to the non-state groups. The United Nations Group of Experts have reported several instances of suspected transfers involving Ukrainian aircraft, companies, or arms. See the *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2008/773)* and subsequent documents.
  - 43 Arms transfers to non-state groups in South Sudan are embargoed under Security Council Resolution 1591 (S/RES/1591 (2005)). The transfers in question were nominally destined for Kenya, but appear to have been diverted to South Sudan.
  - 44 One example is Imex Group of the Czech Republic. Imex acquired 4,000 Ukrainian Makarov pistols on the basis of an end user certificate stating that the destination of the weapons was Afghanistan. According to the United States Department of State, "Imex is run....[an]identified arms trafficker in the Czech Republic." See United States House of Representatives, *The AEY Investigation*, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Majority Staff Analysis, 24 June, 2008, p. 11. The director of Imex has been accused by the Czech Government of trafficking rocket propelled grenades to the Democratic Republic of Congo and of illegal shipments of firearms to Slovakia. See Chivers, C., E. Schmitt and N. Wood, 'Supplier Under Scrutiny on Arms for Afghans', *New York Times*, 27 March 2008, p.5.
  - 45 Wezeman, P., *Arms Flows to the Conflict in Chad*, SIPRI Background Paper, August 2009. The United Nations investigated the origins of 3,000 AK-47-type derivatives acquired by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), based in eastern Chad. See United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts*, United Nations S/2007/584, 10 September 2007, p.17. Many of the assault rifles detected were determined to be of Soviet manufacture, dating from between 1961 and 1980, but were otherwise untraceable. See S/2008/647. The UN panel has also recommended that the Chadian president's half-brother, Daoussa Deby, be subject to UN sanctions for violating the arms embargo on Darfur by supporting the transfer of arms to militias active there.
  - 46 While not under embargo, Equatorial Guinea is considered to be a country with a high risk of diversion. In 2009, a Ukrainian aircraft with a reportedly Ukrainian crew departing from Zagreb made an emergency landing in Kano, Nigeria and was found to be carrying 18 crates of mines and ammunition, reportedly bound for Equatorial Guinea. The aircraft used in the transfer (UR-CAK serial number 6343707) had recently been transferred to the Ukrainian air cargo company Meridian, formerly registered with Ukrainian and Moldovan-based air cargo companies Aerocom and Jet Line International, companies named in United Nations arms trafficking-related reports. See House of Commons Business and Enterprise, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees, *Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, Quarterly Reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of export control legislation First Joint Report of Session 2008-09*, London: The Stationery Office Limited, 19 August 2009.
  - 47 Small Arms Survey, 'Supply and demand: Arms flows and holdings in Sudan', *Sudan Issue Brief*, No 15, December 2009.
  - 48 See House of Commons 2009, op cit.
  - 49 See the United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms*, December 2000, S/2000/1195.
  - 50 Schroeder, M and G Lamb, 'The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise', *African Analyst*, Third Quarter 2006.
  - 51 Small Arms Survey 2009 op cit, p. 4.
  - 52 Jane's Defence Weekly, *IMINT tracks T-72 tanks toward South Sudan*. 7 July 2009.
  - 53 Lewis, M., *Skirting the Law: Sudan's Post-CPA Arms Flows*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, September 2009, p.40-41.
  - 54 Lewis 2009 op cit, p.39.
  - 55 NIS Export Control Observer, *Ukrainian Defense Ministry Newspaper Lauds Ukraine's Export Control Accomplishments*. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 2004, p. 13.
  - 56 International Export Control Observer, *Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission Exposes Past Illegal Arms Sales*. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 2006, p.2.
  - 57 Lewis 2009 op cit, p.39.

## Chapter 7 - Environmental resources

- 1 These issues are dealt with in the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Other Wastes and their Disposal, and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
- 2 For example, TRAFFIC estimates that wild foods (animals as well as edible plants and herbs) "contribute between 61-79% of non-rice food consumption by weight" for rural people in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. See "What's Driving the Wildlife Trade? A Review of Expert Opinion on Economic and Social Drivers of the Wildlife Trade and Trade Control Efforts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam", Traffic/the Wildlife Monitoring Network, October 2008, p. 4.
- 3 For example, a recent analysis of poaching data in the Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) database, "examined 29 factors that could potentially influence levels of illegal killing, and identified five factors that strongly correlated with levels of illegal killing in Africa. These included ecosystem type (forests experiencing higher levels of illegal killing than savannah), actual levels of protection, ease of human access (e.g. through logging and mining roads), and



- the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced annually by Transparency International. The analysis further suggested that levels of illegal killing, statistically adjusted for effort and influencing factors, were highest in central Africa (where 63 % of carcasses were found to be illegally killed), followed by eastern (57 %), west (33 %) and southern Africa (19 %). See: <http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-44-02.pdf>.
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  - 5 LAGA, *May report* (2006). Available at [www.laga-enforcement.org/.../LAGA-May%2006-Activity%20report.pdf](http://www.laga-enforcement.org/.../LAGA-May%2006-Activity%20report.pdf).
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  - 7 Interview – INTERPOL Environmental Crime Manager, October 2009.
  - 8 IUCN / TRAFFIC / WWF, *Status, conservation and trade in African and Asian rhinoceros*: An IUCN, TRAFFIC and WWF Briefing for the 58<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the CITES Standing Committee, Geneva, July 6-10 2009 (2009). Available at <http://www.cites.org/common/com/SC/58/E58i-10.pdf>.
  - 9 BIAZA, *Poaching for traditional Chinese medicine*. Available at <http://www.biaza.org.uk/public/images/campaigns/rhino-Docs/chinese.pdf>.
  - 10 BBC, *Kenya seizes coffin-stashed ivory*. (July 2009), available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8150890.stm>.
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  - 14 Shepherd, Chris R., *Overview of pangolin trade in South East Asia*, in Pantel, S. and Chin, SY (Eds), *Proceedings of the workshop on trade and conservation of pangolins native to south and southeast Asia*.
  - 15 WWF, *Seized pangolins might have returned to illegal market* (2009) [http://www.panda.org/wwf\\_news/news/?153842/Seized-pangolins](http://www.panda.org/wwf_news/news/?153842/Seized-pangolins).
  - 16 Bushmeat Crisis Task Force (2009). Available at <http://www.bushmeat.org/nodc/184>.
  - 17 Noted in National Geographic News, *Asian Pangolins Being Consumed to Extinction* (2009) available at <http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/blogs/news/chieffeditor/2009/07/asian-pangolins-being-wiped-out.html> and reported in *Overview of pangolin trade in South East Asia*... TRAFFIC South East Asia (2009), however actual data not available to EIA at the time of writing.
  - 18 Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, Haikou, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Changsha, Fuzhou, Xi'an, Chengdu, Nanjing, Nanning, Shenzhen, Dalian and Xiamen.
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  - 23 Pers. comm. traders in Kathmandu 2002 and seizure tables in EIA Reports -Tiger Skin Trail- and Skinning the Cat.
  - 24 Personal communication, Asian Big Cat traders - China 2009.
  - 25 EIA – The Tiger Skin Trail.
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  - 29 CITES Secretariat. SC53, Document 20.1. 'Control of Trade in African Elephant Ivory'. (2005).
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  - 32 Wyler, L and P Sheikh, *International illegal trade in wildlife: Threats and US policy*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2 February 2009, p 5. China is third, after Canada, in the document, but is second when combined with Hong Kong SAR.
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  - 34 Ibid.
  - 35 Milliken, T., R. Emslie and B. Talukdar, 'African and Asian Rhinoceroses – Status, Conservation and Trade: A report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN/SSC) African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat pursuant to Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP14) and Decision 14.89. November 2009. <http://www.cites.org/common/cop/15/doc/E15-45-01A.pdf>.
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  - 38 See discussion of the seizures recorded in the ETIS database, below.
  - 39 WWF. Available at <http://www.panda.org/?156422/Elphants-under-threat-as-illegal-ivory-price-soars-in-Viet-Nam>.
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  - 44 The Congressional Research Service in the United States gives a price range of US\$191 to US\$900 per kilogram, compiled from a variety of sources. See Wyler, L and P Sheikh 2009 op cit.
  - 45 Dependent upon size, ivory hankos were retailing for between US\$16 and US\$667 in Japan in 2002. Ivory hankos weigh between 20 and 100 grams. This suggests a per gram value of between one and seven dollars for worked ivory. See Sakamoto, M, Japan Wildlife and Conservation Society, Black and grey: Illegal ivory in Japanese markets (2002). Available at [http://www.jwcs.org/english/elephant/ivory\\_trade.html](http://www.jwcs.org/english/elephant/ivory_trade.html) from hyperlink at bottom.
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  - 58 *Indonesia-UK Tropical Forest Management Programme, Roundwood Supply and Illegal Logging, 1999*.
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  - 70 In particular, the provinces of Attapeu, Savannakhet and Khammouane.
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## Chapter 9 - Maritime Piracy

- According to Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, piracy is:
  - any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
    - on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
    - against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
  - any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
  - any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
- According to Articles 91 and 92 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, "Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly," and "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and... shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas."
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- 28 *Reported Incidents of Somali Pirate Attacks and Hijackings in the Gulf of Aden for 2008*, UISAT/UNITAR, 13 January 2009. Available at: [http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/freep-roduts/somalia/Piracy/UNOSAT\\_Piracy\\_Gulf\\_Aden\\_2008\\_Lowres\\_v7.pdf](http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/freep-roduts/somalia/Piracy/UNOSAT_Piracy_Gulf_Aden_2008_Lowres_v7.pdf)
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## Chapter 10 - Cybercrime

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- 4 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Transnational criminal activity: a global context*, 2000; Choo, *Trends in Organized Crime*, 2008, page 273.
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- 7 In order to limit the availability of such tools, some countries criminalize the production and offer of such tools. An example of such a provision can be found in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Cybercrime.
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- 11 Ealy op. cit. p. 9 et seq.
- 12 The Online-Community HackerWatch publishes regular reports on hacking attacks. Based on their sources, more than 250 million incidents were reported in only one month (August 2007). Source: <http://www.hackerwatch.org>.
- 13 See CC Cert, "Overview of Attack Trends", 2002, page 1.
- 14 The "Mariposa" botnet. See Arthur, op.cit.
- 15 Nearly 50% of all fraud complains reported to the United States Federal Trade Commission are related to a amount paid of less than US\$25. See Consumer Fraud and Identity Theft Complain Data – January – December 2006, Federal Trade Commission, available at: <http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud2006.pdf>.
- 16 This includes losses due to intellectual property theft, and involves losses to companies, rather than gains to cybercriminals. See: [http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/press/corporate/2009/20090129\\_063500\\_j.html](http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/press/corporate/2009/20090129_063500_j.html).
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- 18 Finklea, 'Identity Theft: Trends and Issues,' *CRS*, 2009,

- R40599, page 9.
- 19 Martin, *Phishing for Answers: Exploring the Factors that Influence a Participants Ability to Correctly Identify Email*, 2008, page 1.
  - 20 Consumer Fraud and Identity Theft Complaint Data, January – December 2005, Federal Trade Commission, 2006.
  - 21 Credit card information can be exploited electronically (by placing orders online, for example) or by imprinting this information on blank credit cards. In both cases, the problem remains of “cashing out” on goods so acquired, but there are groups who specialize in this process. Large networks are also required for extracting cash advances, which typically have a daily limit and may require secondary forms of identification.
  - 22 Symantec, *Report on the Underground Economy*, July 07 – June 08, 2008, page 18.
  - 23 See: Epstein/Brown, ‘Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry,’ *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 75, 2008, page 205.
  - 24 The following section describes email-based phishing attacks, compared to other phishing scams, which may, for example, be based on voice communications. See: Gonsalves, *Phishers Snare Victims with VoIP*, 2006.
  - 25 Regarding the different phases of phishing see: *OECD Scoping Paper on Online Identity Theft*, Ministerial Background Report, DSTI/CP(2007)3/FINAL, page 18.
  - 26 APWG Phishing Activity Trends Report, 1st Half 2009, Page 3.
  - 27 Ibid p. 7.
  - 28 “Phishing” shows a number of similarities to spam emails. It is thus likely that organised crime groups that are involved in spam are also involved in phishing scams, as they make use of the same spam databases. Regarding spam, see above: Offenders have developed advanced techniques to prevent users from realising that they are not on the genuine website. For an overview about what phishing mails and the related spoofing websites look like, see: [http://www.antiphishing.org/phishing\\_archive/phishing\\_archive.html](http://www.antiphishing.org/phishing_archive/phishing_archive.html).
  - 29 Martin, op. cit., page 2.
  - 30 See Dhamija/Tygar/Hearst, ‘Why Phishing Works’, page 1, available at: [http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~rachna/papers/why\\_phishing\\_works.pdf](http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~rachna/papers/why_phishing_works.pdf); that refers to *Lofstiness*, “Responding to “Phishing” Attacks”, Glenbrook Partners (2004).
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  - 32 APWG, *Phishing Activity Trends Report*, 1st Half 2009, Page 3.
  - 33 For more details see: *Techniques of Identity Theft*, CIPPIC Working Paper No. 2 (ID Theft Series), 2007, page 15.
  - 34 Regarding the use of malicious software in phishing cases see: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, *Putting and End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft*, 2004, page 10; Emigh, *Online Identity Theft: Phishing Technology, Chokeypoints and Countermeasures*, ITTC Report on Online Identity Theft Technology and Countermeasures, 2005, page 8 et seq, *Scoping Paper on Online Identity Theft*, OECD Ministerial Background Report, DSTI/CP(2007)3/FINAL, page 16 et seq.
  - 35 Paget, *Identity Theft, McAfee White Paper*, 2007, page 8.
  - 36 Regarding the various installation processes see *The Crimeware Landscape: Malware, Phishing, Identity Theft and Beyond*, page 21 et seq. - available at: [http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/APWG\\_CrimewareReport.pdf](http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/APWG_CrimewareReport.pdf).
  - 37 See: *The Crimeware Landscape: Malware, Phishing, Identity Theft and Beyond*, page 4 et seq. - available at: [http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/APWG\\_CrimewareReport.pdf](http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/APWG_CrimewareReport.pdf).
  - 38 In the early years of IT development, the term “hacking” was used to describe the attempt to get more out of a system (software or hardware) than it was designed for. Within this context, the term “hacking” was often used to describe a constructive activity.
  - 39 See Levy, *Hackers*, 1984; Hacking Offences, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2005 – available at: <http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/htcb/htcb005.pdf>; Taylor, Hactivism: In Search of lost ethics? in *Wall, Crime and the Internet*, 2001, page 61.
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## Chapter 11 - Regions under stress

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  - 65 UNODC, *Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East Asia*, December 2009.
  - 66 Ibid.
  - 67 Heroin prices in Ruili, a Chinese border town that serves as a major entry point for heroin from Myanmar, were reported by the Chinese Public Security Bureau to have amounted to some Yuan 36,000 per kg in 2004 (Maw Seng, China Alarmed at Heroin Influx from Burma, *The Irrawaddy*, March 2, US DEA reported slightly higher prices of around US\$5,000 per 0.7 kg of opium in 2003 in the Chinese border regions with Myanmar in 2003, equivalent to some US\$7,100 per kg). Opium farm-gate prices in Myanmar more than doubled between 2004 and 2009 (from US\$153 to US\$317 per kg) suggesting that heroin prices in the Chinese border regions with Myanmar may have doubled as well to some Yuan 72,000 or US\$10,500. Wholesale heroin prices for Thailand were officially reported to UNODC at between US\$12,000 and US\$15,000 per kg in 2008. Applying a 10:1 ratio for the transformation of opium into heroin and a tentative typical heroin export price of around US\$11,000 per kg - based on information that the majority of the heroin is sold to China and that Myanmar drug traffickers, exporting to the border regions of Thailand could only fetch prices at the lower end of the price scale – heroin sales could have generated around US\$360 million for traffickers in Myanmar in 2009 (range: US\$140 to US\$500 million).
  - 68 This estimate was provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Myanmar Country Report, January 2010). Neither IMF or World Bank have provided any GDP estimates for recent years.
  - 69 Statistics from the Office de Géologie et des Mines du Rwanda (Rwanda Geology and Mines Authority) indicate that, based on customs declaration nearly half the minerals exported (by weight) from Rwanda in 2008 were re-exports; not of Rwandan origin. See data supplied by Global Witness, in “*Faced with a gun, what can you do?*” *War and the militarisation of mining in eastern Congo*, July 2009, p. 71.
  - 70 World Gold Council, *Gold demand trends*, February 2009.
  - 71 More than half the world’s tin is used for solders in the electronics industry. In the mid-2000s, EU directives banned the use of lead in such solders, causing a spike in demand.
  - 72 Division des Mines, quoted in Global Witness, “*Faced with a gun, what can you do?*” *War and the militarization of mining in Eastern Congo*, July 2009, p. 89.
  - 73 Ibid.
  - 74 According to “official statistics” (exact source unknown), quoted in United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009, para. 299.
  - 75 Communities and Small-scale Mining (CASM), *Walikale: Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and Trade in North Kivu*, June 2008.
  - 76 United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009.
  - 77 The DRC Senate report is often referred to as the Rapport Mutamba Dibwe, after the president of the commission of inquiry. It was published on 24 September 2009 and is available online at <http://www.mediatorre.org/docactu,ZmJyZXVp bC9kb2NzL1JEY29uZ29fcmFwcG9ydC1taW5lcylzZW5hdHJkYw==,6.pdf>.
  - 78 United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009.
  - 79 Global Witness, “*Faced with a gun, what can you do?*” *War and the militarization of mining in Eastern Congo*, July 2009, p. 55.
  - 80 Ibid p. 61.
  - 81 Pole Institute, *Rules for Sale: Formal and informal cross-border trade in Eastern DRC*, May 2007.
  - 82 The Congolese government and the main armed groups signed a peace agreement, and a transitional constitution gave way to an interim government (pending elections), led by Joseph Kabila.
  - 83 For example, a discussion paper published by the Goma-based Pole Institute notes that “The economic dimension of conflict in Kivu is about rights of access to land and control of trade routes, not about minerals.(...) Conflict is linked to nationality and ethnicity and to political and administrative power.” Pole Institute, *Minerals and conflict in eastern DRC: A discussion paper*, July 2009.
  - 84 United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2008/773, 12 December 2008, para. 14.
  - 85 During the integration, only 2,542 weapons were handed in from the 6,006 CNDP ex-combatants identified in the integration process. Only 687 arms were handed over from the 2,872 PARECO elements identified. United Nations Security Council, *Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2009/253, 18 May 2009 (para 32).
  - 86 United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009.
  - 87 Moreover, according to the United Nations Group of Experts, most senior officials still consider General Nkunda their leader, in spite of his incarceration (United Nations Security Council, *Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2009/253, 18 May 2009).
  - 88 United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009.
  - 89 The most recent ones are S/2008/773, S/2009/253 and

- S/2009/603.
- 90 United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2008/773, 12 dn in Somalia, S/2009/684*, 8 January 2010.
- 119 Although Puntland has recently made efforts to speed up prosecutions of suspected pirates (S/2009/684).
- 120 Freedom C. Onuoha, 'Sea piracy and maritime security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali coast and Gulf of Aden in perspective', *African Security Review*, vol. 18, no. 3, p. 37.
- 121 Both these groups include foreign fighters and are supported by Al-Qaida.
- 122 International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, *Piracy off the Somali Coast: Final report (main document)*, p.21.
- 123 Ibid.
- 124 Ibid., p.20.
- 125 The estimated income of Puntland pirates was some US\$30 million in 2008, whereas the Government's budget was only US\$10 million.
- 126 International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, *Piracy off the Somali Coast: Final report (main document)*, p.17.