TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Project; TCSCG/S 29

Project title: SUPPORT TO THE CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CAPACITIES OF SERBIA AND OF MONTENEGRO

Thematic area
ANTI TRAFFICKING

Country
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO (SERBIA, MONTENEGRO)

Report of

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UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>RPO</td>
<td>Regional Project Office (Sofia)</td>
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<td>RPC</td>
<td>Regional Project Co-ordinator</td>
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<td>CMIS</td>
<td>Case Management and Intelligence Software</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>ANACAPA</td>
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<td>NIM</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Summary table of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations

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<th>Findings: identified problems/issues</th>
<th>Supporting evidence/examples</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<td>1. Planning did not take into account the possible important change of circumstances in politics, economy etc.</td>
<td>Dissolution of SaM into two separate states</td>
<td>Project must be first introduced in detail to stakeholders</td>
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<td>2. No coordination with parallel projects of other international organizations</td>
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<td>Project was signed 6 months after beginning</td>
<td>Ensure cost sharing by MoI as well as ownership and accountability</td>
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2. A concise summary of:

a) Summary description of the project or programme evaluated including project objectives

1. Criminal intelligence is widely recognized as an essential tool for law enforcement in the fight against serious and organized crime. Intelligence-led techniques are widely practiced throughout the EU and elsewhere in the developed world, and there are clear and widespread strategic and operational benefits to be gained from assisting the countries of Southeastern Europe in the development of their criminal intelligence infrastructure.

2. Project SUPPORT TO THE CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CAPACITIES OF SERBIA AND OF MONTENEGRO (hereafter referred to as Project S 29) aimed of providing assistance in the development and upgrading of national capacities for analysis of criminal intelligence and strengthening the relevant institutions in Serbia and Montenegro.

3. Countries in Southeastern Europe identified for Project S 29 were at the start of the project Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) as one federal state consisting of two republics and later Serbia and Montenegro as two separate states.

4. This project was designed in late 2002 as a programme to strengthen the criminal intelligence capacities of Serbia and of Montenegro culminating in the development of formalized Criminal Intelligence Services in the Republic of Serbia. The approval for funding of such a project came from London in 2005. The project started on 10 July 2006 and finished on 30 June 2008.
5. The objective of this project was to provide a mixture of expert advice, training and technical equipment to enable the effective collection, evaluation and collation of information followed by the analysis and dissemination of meaningful intelligence product. The Criminal Intelligence Services created were intended to function at local, regional and republic levels and were to provide a valuable operational and strategic service in support of intelligence-led policing and the targeted disruption of organized criminal activities.

6. The five key objectives were identified to form the framework criteria for Project S 29. They were as follows:

   1. Establishment of project office and operating procedures.
   2. Development of criminal intelligence strategy and Criminal Intelligence Service implementation.
   3. Establishment of a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity.
   4. Strengthen the capacity to generate pro-active intelligence products impacting on the disruption of organized criminal groups.
   5. Establishment of a coordination, monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

**b. The major findings of the evaluation:**

1. Most of the objectives are not achieved.
2. The majority of the activities, especially planned training of regional criminal intelligence analysts was provided in Serbia.
3. Only strategic and financial analysis training was omitted.
4. Added value of the project S 29 consists in the fact that much larger (6 times) than planned target group was trained (92 students and 6 courses in basic criminal intelligence analysis based on ANACAPA).
5. The increase in number of persons trained made achieving of the objective *Establishment of a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity* more possible. But, the MoI lacking its own training capacities is a problem of sustainability.

6. Full achievement of all the five key objectives was hampered due to the reluctance of both the MoI of Serbia and Montenegro, internal Ministerial rivalries and competition between UNODC and SNPB at the start of the implementation of S 29 and the weak dollar rate which practically lowered the value of funding provided by the donor, and the lack of technical support with regard to CBT development.
7. The need to provide assistance of UNODC in the development and upgrading of national capacities for analysis of criminal intelligence and strengthening the relevant institutions in Serbia and Montenegro still persists.

c) Lessons learned and best practices

1. Project interventions have a potential for increasing in scale and complexity if the project design were more realistic from the outset.

2. The outstanding needs of Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies identified with regard to criminal intelligence development are: an applicable strategy of development of Criminal intelligence Systems and technical assistance (tools, software, hardware).

3. Good practices which have been identified through the implementation of the project are: cooperation and synergy with other agencies, effective delegation of responsibility, engagement of domestic trainer who delivered courses in the local language which participants were able to absorb much more than if courses were held in English.

4. An induction mission was extremely valuable and supported by subsequent formal and informal ProFi field officers portal training. The extent of this induction could have been improved, as the operating mechanisms of the UNODC, particularly with regard to budget issues are complex.

5. Despite the shortcomings listed above, the project, with only 2 principal UNODC staff members, was able to achieve more of its objectives than a nationally supported project (SNPB) with, on paper, ten times its funding.

6. UNODC overcame rivalry between UNODC and SNPB through the use the strategy of common engagement and developing partnerships and trust with SNPB but with other donors as well (notably the OSCE, CAFAO - now TACTA). The key to dislodging the logjam was to commence the criminal training intelligence programme according to the project plan and carry it out in combination with the SNPB project. It was thought that if the UNODC could be seen as effective contributors in this area then this would encourage the Ministry of Interior to engage in more complex areas such as strategic planning.

7. But, it was necessary to spend a lot of time and energy to provide synergy with SNPB and other agencies. Better research should be done with regard to the plans of other agencies to avoid overlapping and competition with similar projects in the future.

8. Only in this way of achieving synergy with other agencies it was possible to deliver training for which the UNODC on its own had insufficient funding. As an example in a training activity the UNODC would provide its planning, course preparation and delivery, the OSCE premises for it and support and the SNPB additional funding and support. It should be noted that this co-operation was not limited to specific activities and that by midway through the life of the project the work of the UNODC had led the redevelopment of donor co-ordination in general in both Montenegro and Serbia.
9. The very good practice of the project was the delivery of training to participants in local language. Unsurprisingly this greatly aided understanding, increased uptake and overall understanding of criminal intelligence. This consequently led to an increase in the credibility of services in this field given by the UNODC in both Montenegro and Serbia.

10. Amongst lessons learned is the adoption of a project planning process more inclusive of recipients and taking into account the activities of other donors. The aims and objectives of the project were extremely ambitious in any case; hence the delays experienced through the reluctance of the recipients to engage with it rendered the full service delivery of it impossible.

11. The planning must take into account the time of implementation as a more important factor because, for example, an extension of only six months was enough to finish project delivery in enabling training to also be given in Montenegro.

12. In addition to the project itself being simply underfunded, consideration could be made to funding projects in more appropriate currencies, such as Euros for example, when all costs will be encountered in this currency, to avoid the effects of major currency fluctuations.

13. Local ownership is obviously a vital ingredient to the success of any assistance project. However, it was found during the course of the project that this was sometimes far from straightforward. Support and ownership at a higher level appeared sometimes elusive. At a practitioner level interest was generally greater, although one important contact point appeared out of their depth in their role at the Serbian Ministry of Interior. In addition different representatives at the Serbian Ministry of Interior appeared sometimes reluctant to cooperate with each other with regard to project activities. Also, communications through the Ministry of Interior bureau for international cooperation were sometimes very slow and procedure very bureaucratic.

14. In contrast there appeared no such ownership problems in Montenegro where the UNODC contact person was also the chair of the National Intelligence Working Group there. However, this may just be due to the fact that the project has carried out far less activities in Montenegro.

15. Lessons learned from the project’s experience would be to be aware of such problems and if necessary raise them at the highest level in order to get them resolved. In addition should Ministries of Interior not exhibit interest in any activity then offer it to relevant persons from the Ministries of Justice and Finance instead as this still benefits law enforcement intelligence development in any case.

d. The recommendations, conclusions and including implications to UNODC of the evaluation

1. The project should be continued.
2. The planning must be better in the future and taking into account the possible change of circumstances in politics, economy etc in Serbia and in Montenegro.

3. To avoid overlapping and competition with similar projects in the future it is very important first to make research regarding the plans of other agencies present in Serbia and in Montenegro.

4. To be more effective in the future, the project must be first introduced to stakeholders, especially to the MoI with a lot of necessary explanation regarding the goals and methods, which should be used in the implementation of the project.

5. UNODC HQ should itself develop proper induction courses for international staff to be employed as project staff irrespective of their working locations.

6. To make the MoI in the future more interested in the progress of the project it is necessary both to ensure cost sharing with the MoI and make the MoI most responsible for the implementation of the project. UNODC should just assist the MoI. Ministries of Finance and Ministry of Customs should take a part in this process as well.

7. More financial participation should be by the MoI and Ministries of Finance and Ministry of Customs than by the donor.

8. In order to avoid loss of resources through exchange rate I recommend close financial monitoring and mobilization of extra resources to avert or partially address this situation along with the budgeting procedure.

9. The intelligence trainer should be domestic. The courses should be held in the local language. To establish a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity it is necessary in the future to use the assistance of the best participants of the courses of the project S 29.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Context

1.1.1. The emergence from ten years of political sanctions, armed conflicts and isolation under a regime that paid little attention to the enforcement of border controls and the democratic rule of law have precipitated fresh problems and challenges to law enforcement agencies in Serbia and in Montenegro.

1.1.2. It is a fact that with the commencement of infrastructure redevelopment in Serbia the traditional Balkan route is once again the most commercially viable route for heavy goods’ vehicles bound for Western Europe. Superior quality of roads, faster clearance at border crossings and a significant saving in road fuel costs dictate that as road hauliers become accustomed to the Balkan Route, open again at its shortest point, so too will traffickers exploit the camouflage of legitimate trade to transport illicit drugs, humans, cash and other controlled goods.

At crowded border crossings, ports and airports physical resources to examine vehicles, cargo and persons are still extremely poor. In the major cities organized crime groups have taken a strong hold and benefited from a dispersed populace to widen their criminal networks.

1.1.3. Prior to June 2002 no sufficient capacity existed in Serbia and Montenegro for an intelligence-led policing methodology. From this date the country became part of the UNODC Regional Project ‘Strengthening of capacities for the collection and analysis of criminal intelligence analysis in South Eastern Europe’ (F 35). This project assisted to create Criminal Intelligence Units located in the anti-organized crime groups of the Republic of Serbia and also within the Belgrade Police Secretariat. Criminal intelligence methodology was introduced and quickly utilized bringing structural changes and importantly operational results. At the same time the project provided similar assistance to neighboring countries of the region and assisted to network intelligence analysts allowing them the possibility to share experience and information.

1.1.4. For this and other reasons an approach, which was based on criminal intelligence methods already, existed in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. However, this project aimed to augment the work of the criminal intelligence service and operational analytical work of the Criminal Police Division of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic Serbia. This was to be carried out in the form of training of operational analysts, the proper provision of equipment and software and any other activities, which might prove necessary during the execution of the project. All activities were to be carried in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia and Swedish partners, the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB) to avoid the possibility of the overlap of these two projects through the joint coordination of both.
1.1.5. Serbia and Montenegro ably demonstrated that it was ready to move on with the creation of full Criminal Intelligence Services but did not fully drive the rationale for this project. It came at a useful time when Serbia and Montenegro began to become more professional partners and demonstrated a strong political will to interdict Class ‘A’ drugs and to break organized criminal organizations focusing notably on drug trafficking, human trafficking, commercial fraud, money laundering and more often a combination of all. Once the negative focal point in a region of conflict and political uncertainty, Serbia now has an important role to play in underpinning regional stability. The development and enhancement by Serbia and Montenegro of their criminal intelligence capacities should be viewed as an integral part of a process of an intelligence based law enforcement in countries of the European Union.

1.1.6. The total budget for the project provided to UNODC by the Government of United Kingdom was US$ 587,030.

1.1.7. It is within this general context that the impact of the S 29 project should be evaluated. The evaluation should examine the progress achieved in the light of the objectives listed in the S 29 project document, taking into account different prevailing conditions.

1.2. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

1.2.1. The overall purpose of this evaluation is to determine what the project S 29 has achieved and if it has attained its objectives successfully and efficiently, taking into account the prevailing conditions (political, financial, technical, levels of cooperation etc.) during its implementation.

1.2.2. The purpose of the evaluation of this project is to learn from the implementation experience so that performance, management and programme design may be improved.

1.2.3. The objective of this evaluation is to examine the mandate, strategies, objectives, relevance, effectiveness, results, impact, sustainability and added value of UNODC’s actions regarding the project S 29.

1.2.4. The intended use of evaluation results is to learn about the factors that led to either success or failure, the lessons, which can be applied in a wider context, practically to be in service to the programme and management.
1.3. *Executing Modality/Management Arrangements*

1.3.1. The implementation modalities were not totally appropriate and for this reason not always effective in the delivery of the project. The reasons were the reluctance of MoI of SaM to full cooperation, and the slow UNODCs reaction to parallel SNPB activities in SaM and to the newly changed political conditions (Serbia and Montenegro dissolved in two independent countries in the year 2006).

1.3.2. Management arrangement of engaging a domestic trainer in the local language was an excellent choice for implementation of the project and its training component. It is to be recommended in the future in a possible extension of S 29 project.

1.4 **SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

The scope of the evaluation covered the analysis of data/information and articulates the major findings regarding the project S 29. It addressed the major evaluation issues of appropriateness, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the project S 29 in meeting the needs or solving the problems. The scope of the evaluation show if and how the objectives have either been achieved or not, what progress has been made in achieving those objectives and how these contribute to the attainment of the overall goal of the project. In the scope of the evaluation was evaluated how institutional and management arrangements have impacted the implementation and delivery of project. The coordination and collaboration arrangements with partners and other stakeholders (MoI, OSCE, TACTA, SNPB were examined. Further, the scope of the evaluation included the analysis of different kind of backstopping the project had received from UNODC head quarters, field office or other relevant partners. In the scope of evaluation of the project S 29 there is evidence regarding the benefits, lessons learned as knowledge derived from experience despite the problems during the implementation of the project S 29 in S & M and best practices that have a broader applicability to other activities of UNODC. In the scope of evaluation the project S 29 were highlighted major constraints and problems that impacted the implementation and delivery of the project.

1.5. **METHODOLOGY**

1.5.1. The evaluation methods and the approach used to identify information sources and collect information during the evaluation, and to analyze the data obtained included: Document review including all major documents, other relevant documents connected to the Project S 29 were made available for the evaluation. Assessment (appropriateness, quality and use) of manuals developed by the project.
1.5.2. The evaluation is based on the study of the above-mentioned documents and interviews with key persons, agencies and stakeholders in the project (beneficiaries, donor, partners etc.).

1.5.3. The methods used in collecting primary data were semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion with representatives from the Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Interior, other organizations (TACTA, OSCE, SNPB) which have collaborated with the UNODC as informal partners in the project and with the project donor (UK). A list of persons consulted and the organizations/countries they represent, including the officers of UNODC, is attached at Annex B.

1.5.4 The methods used to analyze the data were quantitative and qualitative analysis.

1.5.5. I was briefed by the Regional Programme Co-ordinator (RPC).

1.5.6. Prior knowledge of the S 29 project stems from my attendance at the Regional Criminal Intelligence Conference in Belgrade on 12 - 13 December 2006.

2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS

2.1. Overall Performance Assessment

2.1.1. The project has not achieved all its objectives fully in Serbia (some of them not at all), and none in Montenegro. The main reasons are a reluctance of both MoI of Serbia and MoI of Montenegro, the creating of a separate state of Montenegro in 2006, as well as nonfunctional government in Serbia for a longer period of time, lack of financial resources to cover activity in two and not in one state as was planned, lack of synergy at the beginning of the realization of the project with other international agencies dealing with similar projects in Serbia and Montenegro - especially with SNPB, postponement of initial start of the project, the devaluation of financial resources because of the market differences between the Euro and Dollar - approximately 30%, and finally because of the slow implementation of some objectives as well. There has been some progress made towards their achievement but at different levels. The best results are achieved in Serbia, in achieving synergy with other agencies regarding the realisation of similar projects (OSCE, SNPB), and, especially, in establishing a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity as one of the main objectives. This objective was quantitatively six times more achieved in Serbia than planned.

Taking into account all these factors, the overall impact of the project should be assessed only as a partial success.
2.2. Attainment of the Objectives/ Achievement of Programme/Project Results

- IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 1: Establishment of project office and operating procedures (achieved in full, but with some delay).

- **Output 1.1.** The output *Engagement of appropriate project personnel* was realized through following activities: preparation of a detailed Terms of Reference and staff selection process and employment which proceeded slowly due to administrative procedures but with no overall difficulties.

- **Output 1.2.** The output *Provision of office accommodation.* Time and resources put into locating appropriate office in Belgrade (Serbia) were successful.

- IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 2: Development of criminal intelligence strategy and Criminal Intelligence Service implementation (not achieved or partially)

- Even in 2006 it was clear that both the development of a criminal intelligence strategy and Criminal Intelligence service was a slow and disjointed process.

- In general, the requirement in both Serbia and in Montenegro was the development of criminal intelligence services rather than an individual service in both.

- **Output 2.1.** The output *Intelligence strategy development* was attempted to be realized through the next activities:

  a) **Establishment of Criminal Intelligence Service Working Groups** (partially achieved)

  - Criminal Intelligence Service Working Group activated in Montenegro by the UNODC, OSCE and CAFAO (now TACTA). The UNODC was then able to advise and support criminal intelligence development in Montenegro until December 2007 when a severe crisis in funding levels (due to losses through exchange rate) made travel to Montenegro nearly impossible within the travel budget.

  - Similar attempts in Serbia were unsuccessful, as the Serbian Ministry of Interior could not be convinced of its benefit. In Serbia such working groups had existed in the past, but then had been discontinued. The reason for this is unknown but may be a reflection of the level of capability of the designated contact person for criminal intelligence within the Ministry of Interior. Extensive efforts were made to reactivate this but with no success.

  b) **Study tours of senior managers to leading overseas Criminal Intelligence Services** (not achieved)
- These study tours were suggested to Serbia only with regard to Croatia but the view of the Ministry of Interior was that this had already been done. No approach was made to Montenegro concerning this activity.

c) **External expert advisory mission** (not achieved - only in a small way)

- The presentation by the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency at the Regional Criminal Intelligence Conference in Belgrade contributed to this provision in a small way. Despite tentative plans to achieve further progress through the visit of perhaps experts from Croatia, no further interest was shown in this by either Ministries of Interior in Serbia or in Montenegro.

d) **Adoption of intelligence strategy** (not achieved)

- In Serbia a draft intelligence strategy had been compiled but it was as much a reflection of cooperation with the Swedish Police (SNPB) project as it was an intelligence strategy. To further extend assistance to include strategic issues, the draft of an intelligence strategy produced by the Ministry of Interior in Serbian was obtained and translated. Using this document together with experience of the situation regarding intelligence in Serbia, a draft for a Serbian National Intelligence Model was formulated for presentation to the Minister of Interior in early 2008. Much work is still needed in the development of an intelligence strategy and a national intelligence model for Serbia. An approach was made through UK SOCA at the end of 2007 to the Minister of Interior in order to start this work. However, the Minister was subsequently injured in a serious road accident and no further progress has been made to date with this.

- In Montenegro no interest has been shown to date in adopting a formal intelligence strategy or model, however, the basis for it exists in the workings of the National Criminal Intelligence Working Group. At the end of 2007 when a plan for the development of an information sharing centre, drawn up by CAFAO (TACTA) with the support of the OSCE, UNODC and other parties, was presented to the Montenegrin government.

- **Output 2.2.** The output *Implementation of the Criminal Intelligence Services* was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

  - In general, it was only possible to achieve very little of the activities planned in this section. In hindsight it was probably too optimistic to achieve such goals given the time frame and prevailing situation in which the project was delivered.

a) **Definition of staffing table and Terms of Reference for Criminal Intelligence Service members** (not achieved)

- Such assistance was only provided to Serbia in the form of general advice on the recruitment of new regional analysts. The project was never in a position for or requested to assist further in this area.
b) Advisory assistance in relation to the identified premises and technical requirements.

- This was provided only in Montenegro with regard to UNODC support, together with other assistance providers, to the planned development of a national law enforcement agency joint information sharing facility. The project was never in a position for or requested to assist further in this area in Serbia.

c) Advisory assistance in relation to the testing and selection of staff members

- The project was only ever in a position for this in Serbia with regard to general advice on the recruitment of new regional analysts. The project was never in a position for or requested to assist further in this area in Montenegro.

d) External expert advisory mission

- No interest was shown in this activity by either Serbia or by Montenegro.

e) Advisory assistance to the Management Boards of the Criminal Intelligence Services

- No interest was shown in this activity by either Serbia or by Montenegro

f) Official launch of the Criminal Intelligence Services

- It was not possible for the project to make sufficient headway in this field to make an official launch relevant in either country.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 3: Establishment of a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity (Basis for potential sustainability achieved)

Output 3.1. The output *Training strategy development* was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

a) Assessment of the existing training infrastructure.

This was achieved with the substantial input of the criminal intelligence trainer. Both Serbia and Montenegro possessed the basis on which to develop a training structure; namely Police training schools supported by the OSCE but neither had or have yet a technical capacity to train in the field of criminal intelligence.

In Serbia, one such trainer existed but their remit was limited only to the intelligence unit of the Belgrade City Police. This person was seconded to the UNODC as its Intelligence Trainer in this project in order to spread such training more widely.
b) Identification of graduated training needs and training calendar

In Serbia this was achieved through the preparation of three alternative course structures to the Ministry of Interior for their training programme for regional analysts. This was presented to the Ministry together with the OSCE and SNPB for them to choose their preferred option, which was implemented.

In Montenegro it was not possible to construct a training schedule since any future training in criminal intelligence had to wait until this was scheduled with the SNPB project in the second quarter of 2008. This would be an important activity to pursue in Montenegro in the event of the extension of S 29 activities.

c) Provision of training aids

This was achieved by the purchase of technical equipment to provide training, such as laptop, projector and screen etc. It should be noted that during the project, training equipment, in addition to premises, were often provided by the OSCE (For example workstations for i2 Analysts’ Notebook Version 7 students). In addition the SNPB provided smaller items such as pens, pencils, stencils and calculators for the students.

d) Formal adoption of training strategy and implementation of action plan

In Serbia and in Montenegro there is still as yet no formal training strategy or implementation plan for it. But, alternative training strategies were developed for use in both Montenegro and Serbia and presented to Ministries of Interior so that they could select what best fitted there needs.

Output 3.2. The output Trainer development and module preparation was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

a) Training of trainers (including trainer assessment)

This was attempted in Serbia when Ministry of Interior personnel were requested to release personnel to ‘shadow’ the UNODC Intelligence Trainer on training courses in order to develop their own training skills. This was never fully pursued by the Ministry, who in only one instance sent an analyst to attend the course, but after only two days he was asked by Ministry to return to his regular office job due to heavy workload.

In Montenegro circumstances have not yet allowed the development of this activity.

b) Production of national language training materials

National language training materials developed for both Montenegro and Serbia. This was achieved by the Intelligence Trainer in adaptation of both Basic Criminal Intelligence (based on ANACAPA principles) and i2 Analysts’ Notebook Version 7 manuals into Serbian. These manuals have been used in Serbia and are ready to be printed for Montenegro as soon as they are required. It should be noted that some
financial and technical support was given by the OSCE and SNPB to the UNODC in the production of the Basic Criminal Intelligence (based on ANACAPA principles).

c) Production of selected modules as Computer Based Training (CBT)
During the implementation of the project it was not possible to engage in any activities concerning Computer Based Training (CBT) in either Serbia or Montenegro. The funding allowed in the budget was insufficient to enable CBT modules to be recreated in the Serbian language. The support provided from UNODC experts in CBT was extremely poor.

No interest was shown in CBT development in Serbia.

Some interest was shown in Montenegro concerning the CBT element of the project, however, up to the present, the UNODC have not been able to deliver assistance in this area.

Output 3.3. The output Delivery of structured training
was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

a) Training for front line officers in criminal intelligence principles
This was achieved to a limited extent through the provision of basic criminal intelligence analysis to key personnel in addition to trainee analysts in Serbia. However, no such training was possible in Montenegro.

b) Training for middle and senior managers in criminal intelligence use and management
It has not been possible to provide this training so far in either country.

c) Training for new analysts / intelligence officers in basic criminal intelligence analysis.
The majority of the planned training of regional criminal intelligence analysts was provided in Serbia. Only strategic and financial analysis training was omitted. A larger than planned target group was trained 92 students (6 courses) in basic criminal intelligence analysis based on ANACAPA principles and 31 students (4 courses) in intelligence charting using i2 software. It is important to note that those students trained were from several law enforcement agencies the Police, Customs, Internal Control and Anti-Money Laundering and that these classes were multi-agency in form. Many more students were still in need of training at the end of the project. The training was delivered in Serbian and was very well received by the Ministry of Interior.

. Prior to these courses the UNODC requested that an intelligence analyst working for the Ministry of Interior “shadow” and assist the UNODC trainer in delivering these courses so that they could start the process of training as a trainer themselves. However, a designated person only attended two days of the 5th training course.
The planned i2 Analysts Notebook training planned for the second half of 2007 was postponed until 2008. This is because those persons to be trained were not provided with software licenses by the SNPB.
The increase in number of persons trained made this development more sustainable. Also, including representatives from other law enforcement agencies outside the Police supported efforts to promote a multi law enforcement agency approach in Serbia. No training activities were carried out in Montenegro. This is due to the requirement to coordinate activities with the Swedish Police project that will not be active in this field until mid 2008 it was not possible to commence this training in Montenegro.

d) Training for analysts in basic and advanced use of visualization tools.
This is approaching a successful conclusion of the programme for developing a regional network of analysts in Serbia where up to 90 analysts has undergone this training. The training was delivered in Serbian and was very well received by the Ministry of Interior. Due to the requirement to coordinate activities with the Swedish Police project it was not possible to commence this training in Montenegro.

e) Training for analysts in telephone toll analysis
During the implementation of the project it was decided that this was unnecessary as a separate activity as it is possible to deliver it during the training - Training for new analysts / intelligence officers in basic criminal intelligence analysis and Training for analysts in basic and advanced use of visualization tools. Therefore the same comments listed for these two sections also apply to Training for analysts in telephone toll analysis.

f) Training for specialized analysts in financial intelligence analysis
It was not possible to deliver this training, as criminal intelligence services in both Serbia and Montenegro had not evolved sufficiently by the end of the project to be able to benefit from such training.

g) Training for selected analysts in strategic analysis
It was not possible to deliver this training, as criminal intelligence services in both Serbia and Montenegro had not evolved sufficiently by the end of the project to be able to benefit from such training.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 4: Strengthen capacity to generate pro-active intelligence products impacting on the disruption of organized criminal groups.

Output 4.1. The output Product generation and monitoring was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

a) Ongoing mentoring assistance
Both Serbia and Montenegro showed little interest in ongoing mentoring assistance. Attempts were made to provide mentoring assistance to already trained criminal intelligence analysts in particular in Serbia. However, no interest was expressed in this.
b) Technical consultancy in the implementation of the Case Management and Intelligence Software (CMIS)

Extensive advice was provided to Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Interior with regard to the development of case management and intelligence software systems. One important factor in both Serbia and in Montenegro was that both Ministries of Interior had already taken steps to develop their own bespoke case management systems prior to the start of the project. In addition both were already in possession of some software licenses for i2 Analysts’ Notebook.

With this background in mind, the project was able to showcase in December 2006 the following four different relevant systems:

1) i2 Limited
2) Memex
3) Jade Corporation
4) GISDATA

Despite exposing these systems both Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Interior preferred to continue with developing their own systems whilst purchasing i2 product licenses to provide them with an intelligence charting capability.

Output 4.2. The output Regional networking of criminal intelligence analysts was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

a) Facilitation of regional operational case meetings / exchanges.

No interest was expressed with regard to such activities by the Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Interior and in hindsight both needed to develop their own intelligence capabilities first before such activities could be tackled.

b) Organization of an annual criminal intelligence conference including regional participation.

This conference was organized and held in Belgrade in December 2006. The conference marking the beginning of the S 29 project in Serbia and in Montenegro. It was a very successful one and enabled valuable regional networking to be achieved in this field.

- IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 5: Establishment of a coordination, monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

Output 5.1 The output National level project coordination and accountability was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

a) Six-monthly meetings of the Steering Committee
In Serbia the intelligence development process was not sufficiently developed to consider such an activity in the general sense. The only Steering Committee meetings held by the Serbian Ministry of Interior with the Swedish Police to which the UNODC was occasionally invited. These meetings appeared extremely laborious and with little or no progress. In Montenegro such Steering Committee meetings were reactivated but were carried out in combination with meetings of the criminal intelligence service working groups as described in activity b) below.

b) Monthly meetings of the Criminal Intelligence Service Working Groups
In Serbia the intelligence development process was not sufficiently developed to consider such an activity.
In Montenegro such meetings were successfully reactivated together with the significant assistance of the OSCE and the European Union – Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (EU-CAFAO existing from 2008 as TACTA) in Montenegro. A multi law enforcement agency forum was established which met every two to three months being a hybrid between the proposed Steering Committee and Criminal Intelligence Service Working Groups.

Output 5.2. The output Establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism was attempted to be realized through the following activities:

a) Oversight and progress reviews
Regular monitoring and evaluation of the project has been ongoing throughout. Contact has been regularly maintained with the donor both with the United Kingdom Embassy funding unit in Belgrade and SOCA liaison officers covering both Serbia and Montenegro. This was done in the form of quarterly reports in the format requested by the donor and in monthly UNODC reports available to the donor. Also, regular contact was maintained with SOCA in order that the project could be mutually supportive of other United Kingdom assistance in the criminal intelligence in the region. SOCA was regularly kept updated on the progress of the project, or of any difficulties, and was invited to participate in the project activities.

b) Terminal evaluation
The organizing and carrying out of a terminal evaluation was done properly. The terminal evaluation was carried out by an independent evaluator according to terms of reference developed by the UNODC. His report will also be made available to the project donor and its beneficiaries.

2.3. Implementation

2.3.1. The implementation process was partially successful, despite the ineffective project planning and the huge problems during the implementation of the project S 29 (the nonexistence of introduction of the project to the stakeholders before its start, the reluctance of both the MoI of Serbia and Montenegro, competition between UNODC and
SNPB at the start of the implementation of S 29, the weak dollar rate which practically lowered the value of funding provided by the donor, and the lack of technical support with regard to CBT development.

2.3.2. Especially in the first phase of implementation of project S 29 there was no effective coordination among the government and UNODC. In this phase the other implementing partners were competitive or expressed lack of desire to cooperate with UNODC.

2.3.3. Thanks to hard engagement of local UNODC staff in Belgrade the good relationship with the MoI, SNPB and other implementing partners were established and fruitful cooperation was provided. Some important key objectives were achieved, in full or partially especially in the field of training.

2.3.4. During the implementation process S 29 achieved added value in the project consisting in the much more training than was planned and in establishing the synergy with the partners in Serbia and Montenegro.

2.3.5. The perceptions of the various stakeholders regarding the quality of the implementation process are different. Their common assessment is that the implementation of project S 29 was not fully provided. (See more detailed under Scope of the Evaluation).

2.4. Institutional and Management Arrangements

2.4.1. The institutional implementation modalities were not totally appropriate and for this reason not always effective in the delivery of the project. The reasons were the reluctance of MoI of SaM to full cooperation, and the slow UNODCs reaction to parallel SNPB activities in SaM and to the newly changed political conditions (Serbia and Montenegro dissolved in two independent countries in the year 2006).

2.4.2. Management arrangement of engaging a domestic trainer in the local language was an excellent choice for implementation of the project and its training component. It is to be recommended in the future in a possible extension of project S 29.

3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

3.1. The project has not achieved all its objectives fully in Serbia (some of them not at all), and none in Montenegro. The main reasons are a reluctance of both MoI of Serbia and MoI of Montenegro, the creating of a separate state of Montenegro in 2006, as well as nonfunctional government in Serbia for a longer period of time, lack of financial resources to cover activity in two and not in one state as was planned, lack of synergy at the beginning of the realization of the project with other international agencies dealing
with similar projects in Serbia and Montenegro - especially with SNPB, postponement of initial start of the project, the devaluation of financial resources because of the market differences between the Euro and Dollar - approximately 30%, and finally because of the slow implementation of some objectives as well. There has been some progress made towards their achievement but at different levels. The best results are achieved in Serbia, in achieving synergy with other agencies regarding the realisation of similar projects (OSCE, SNPB), and, especially, in establishing a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity as one of the main objectives. This objective was quantitatively six times more achieved in Serbia than planned.

Taking into account all these factors, the overall impact of the project should be assessed only as a partial success - a partial failure in Serbia and an absolute failure in Montenegro.

3.2. The formal situation analysis of the baseline on ground was partially produced. The separation of Serbia and Montenegro into two separate states was not taken into account. The recommendations made to outline programs were to enhance the prevailing situation with regard to the use of intelligence by Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies.

3.3. The training material for Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement personnel was produced on specific criminal intelligence training courses. The training material produced under this project is technically appropriate. The training material produced under this project is available in the local language. The training material is available for further use by the Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement personnel for future training. It is an important benefit for MoI in Serbia and in future for Montenegro as well. These benefits will be self-sustainable.

3.4. Further training needs on criminal intelligence and its use was identified. The staff trained during courses would subsequently have the opportunity to utilize their skills in their future work environments if they received the tools and not just skills. The SNPB promised the tools (40 software licenses) as part of common activities with UNODC regarding establishment of a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity.

3.5. The training strategy and training programs were developed. The training programs were delivered in accordance with the needs of their recipients.

3.6. In an overall context, the training provided was effective.

3.7. The communication between governmental authorities, particularly with focal points of both Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Interior was just formally adequate (there were a lot of contacts and meetings without much result); in other words the communication and cooperation were not really adequate enough.

3.8. There are two positive, more unintended than intended effects / outcome of the project interventions / activities in general including those affecting Serbian and
Montenegrin law enforcement agencies and other donor organizations in Serbia and in Montenegro.

First, in achieving synergy with other nonofficial partner/agencies regarding the realisation of similar projects in Serbia, and, second, in achieving six times better results than planned regarding the objective: establishing of a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity as one of the main objectives. Since UNODC was not in position to carry out all objectives it focused on complying with the needs of MOI of Serbia to have six times more participants in the courses ANACAPPA and I2 than planned.

The most negative, unintended outcome of the project interventions / activities in general including those affecting Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies and other donor organizations in Serbia and in Montenegro is: lack of fruitful cooperation with the government of Serbia and especially in Montenegro, which resulted in one other unintended outcome in the form of the non-realization of the objectives: Development of criminal intelligence strategy and Criminal Intelligence Service implementation.

3.9. In order to avoid loss of resources through exchange rate I recommend close financial monitoring and mobilization of extra resources to avert or partially address this situation along with the budgeting procedure.

There are different perceptions of the various stakeholders about the overall impact of UNODC’s project activities. Some of them assessed the overall impact of UNODC’s project S29 activities as a partial success. Others assessed the overall impact of UNODC’s project S29 activities as a failure. Regarding the opinion of one of the stakeholders the realization of the project was too slow and in the future UNODC must perform "better, faster, stronger". In the opinion of the representatives of one of the stakeholders the project is not yet completed. All the stakeholders insisted that the project should be continued. But, some of them expressed the opinion that in the future the Ministry of Interior of Serbia should take the lead in the delivery of the project and UNODC should just assist the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia. Ministries of Finance and Ministry of Customs should take part in this process as well. In the future the Ministry of Interior must be responsible for the progress of the project. Some of them believe that the MoI should partially finance the project to become more active in the progress of the project. In the opinion of the representatives of one of the stakeholders the project should be continued with eventual assistance from Croatia. All stakeholders expressed the opinion that the project should be continued with a domestic Intelligence trainer who had been engaged until now. Regarding the opinion of one of the partners, the donor should continue the financing of the project as well, but with a smaller outlay. Some of them assessed that the planning must be better in the future and take into account possible changes of circumstances in politics, economy etc in Serbia and Montenegro ("It's better to spend one year of good planning than to spend three years on a project without success!").

3.10. Internal UNODC factors did sufficiently affect the effectiveness of the project implementation, including availability of human resources and logistical support. But regarding the level, predictability and regularity of resources and flexibility of the budget (UNODC constraints) this was less effective because the project S29 was funded in US dollars at the 2005 exchange rate whilst all its costs were payable in Euros. At the end of
the project in the May 2008 a rough estimate in decline in exchange rate was 30% in the region. (For example MoI of Montenegro was asking for separate training which did not happen ).

3.11. Factors like constraints and administrative processes regarding communications with project focal points, limits to access of personnel at their working locations (particularly trainees of project delivered courses), human resource constraints of the recipients etc. have an impact on the effectiveness of the project implementation (e.g. prevailing security situations) in the way of postponing the realization of the project. For example there were no summer activities at all because MoI of Serbia did not find any possible timeframes for the training etc.

3.12. The project did not contribute to the achievement of any formal or informal development strategies with regard to the use of intelligence by Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies because MoI of both states found the development of this kind of strategy a very internal matter, to be developed solely by MoI. But, the implementation of project S 29 was a factor pushing MoI to work more in the way of developing strategies with regard to the use of intelligence by Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies.

3.13. Overall, the main reason for the achievement of specific objectives is the strong engagement of the UNODC staff in Serbia in the way of establishing new ways of cooperation with informal partners and stakeholders and especially with SNPB and both MoI of Serbia and MoI of Montenegro.

Overall, the main reason for the non-achievement of specific objectives is the reluctance of both MoI of Serbia and MoI of Montenegro to engage with this project because they had accepted the SNPB parallel project as being a better funded option.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1. Lessons

4.1.1. Project interventions have a potential for increasing in scale and complexity if the project design were more realistic from the outset.

4.1.2. The outstanding needs of Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies identified with regard to criminal intelligence development are: an applicable strategy of development of Criminal intelligence Systems and technical assistance (tools, software, hardware).

4.1.3. It was necessary to spend a lot of time and energy to provide synergy with SNPB and other agencies. Better research should have been done in the planning phase regarding the plans of other agencies to avoid overlapping and competition with similar projects in the future.
4.1.4. Amongst lessons learned is the adoption of a project planning process more inclusive of recipients and taking into account the activities of other donors. The aims and objectives of the project were extremely ambitious in any case; hence the delays experienced through the reluctance of the recipients to engage with it rendered the full service delivery of it impossible.

4.1.5. The planning must take into account the time of implementation as a more important factor because, for example, an extension of only six months was enough to finish project delivery in enabling training to also be provided in Montenegro.

4.1.6. Local ownership is obviously a vital ingredient to the success of any assistance project. However, it was found during the course of the project that this was sometimes far from straightforward. Support and ownership at a higher level appeared sometimes elusive. At a practitioner level interest was generally greater, although one important contact point appeared out of their depth in their role at the Serbian Ministry of Interior. In addition different representatives at the Serbian Ministry of Interior appeared sometimes reluctant to cooperate with each other with regard to project activities. Also, communications through the Ministry of Interior bureau for international cooperation were sometimes very slow and procedure very bureaucratic.

4.1.7. In contrast there appeared no such ownership problems in Montenegro where the UNODC contact person was also the chair of the National Intelligence Working Group there. However, this may just be due to the fact that the project has carried out far less activities in Montenegro.

4.1.8. Lessons learned from the project’s experience would be to be aware of such problems and if necessary raise them at the highest level in order to get them resolved. In addition should Ministries of Interior not exhibit interest in any activity then offer it to relevant persons from the Ministries of Justice and Finance instead as this still benefits law enforcement intelligence development in any case.

4.2. Best Practices

4.2.1. The good practices which have been identified through the implementation of the project are: cooperation and synergy with other agencies, effective delegation of responsibility, engagement of domestic trainer who delivered courses in the local language which participants were able to absorb much more than if courses were held in English.

4.2.2. An induction mission was extremely valuable and supported by subsequent formal and informal ProFi field officers portal training. The extent of this induction could have been improved, as the operating mechanisms of the UNODC, particularly with regard to budget issues are complex.
4.2.3. Despite the shortcomings listed above, the project, with only 2 principal UNODC staff members, was able to achieve more of its objectives than a nationally supported project (SNPB) with, on paper, ten times its funding.

4.2.4. UNODC overcame rivalry between UNODC and SNPB through the use the strategy of common engagement and developing partnerships and trust with SNPB but with other donors as well (notably the OSCE, CAFAO - now TACTA). The key to dislodging the logjam was to commence the criminal training intelligence programme according to the project plan and carry it out in combination with the SNPB project. It was thought that if the UNODC could be seen as effective contributors in this area then this would encourage the Ministry of Interior to engage in more complex areas such as strategic planning.

4.2.5. Only in the way of achieving synergy with other agencies it was possible to deliver training for which the UNODC on its own had insufficient funding. As an example in a training activity the UNODC would provide its planning, course preparation and delivery, the OSCE premises for it and support and the SNPB additional funding and support. It should be noted that this co-operation was not limited to specific activities and that by midway through the life of the project the work of the UNODC had led the redevelopment of donor co-ordination in general in both Montenegro and Serbia.

4.2.6. The very good practice of the project was the delivery of training to participants in local language. Unsurprisingly this greatly aided understanding, increased uptake and overall understanding of criminal intelligence. This consequently led to an increase in the credibility of services in this field given by the UNODC in both Montenegro and Serbia.

4.3. Constrains

4.3.1. Constraints that impacted project delivery

4.3.1.1. The planning of the project S 29 did not take into account the possible important change of circumstances in politics, economy etc in Serbia and in Montenegro (for instance into dissolution of SaM in two separate states, Euro as main foreign currency in SaM etc).

4.3.1.2. No coordination with parallel SNPB project at the start of the implementation of the project S 29.

4.3.1.3. SNPB's project overlapped 100% with S 29, which caused rivalry between UNODC and SNPB.

4.3.1.4. It was necessary to spend a lot of time and energy to provide synergy with SNPB and other agencies.

4.3.1.5. Apparent lack of interest in project showed by MoI. The project plan was extremely difficult to implement initially due to reluctance of the recipients to engage with the project S 29 as they did not wish to risk losing the support of SPNB's better funded parallel project.
4.3.1.6. Different factions in the Ministry of Interior of Serbia appeared unwilling to work with each other and the Minister did nothing to address this. Factions concerned themselves only with their own power base and appeared to have no interest or even conception of parallel activities which impacted on their own and overall success. The basic criminal intelligence training had, to an extent forced the issue in some cases, but meetings between different factions remained rare.

4.3.1.7. The insufficient understanding of the MoI regarding the benefits that could be provided through the implementation of the project S 29

4.3.2. **Constraints that can impact delivery of the further project**

4.3.2.1. A possible complication over the Kosovo question and other possible destabilising factors could have a negative impact on future delivery of a project extension.

4.3.2.2. A lack of desire of the MoI to take part in financing the next project is very possible. But the reluctance in cooperation and in implementation of the project extension should not exist or will be much less than in the past.

4.3.2.3. Possible constraints in achieving better engagement with MoI in strategic planning is the reluctant position of the MoI that development of the strategies is a very internal matter, to be developed solely by the MoI.

4.3.2.4. Conflict between different factions within the MoI.

4.3.2.5. Working relations with the MoI still require further development.

4.3.2.6. For political reason the MoI of Serbia and the MoI of Montenegro would not be willing to have the training carried out jointly.

5. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

5.1. **Issues resolved during the evaluation**

5.1.1. There were no issues resolved during the evaluation.

5.2. **Actions/decisions recommended**

5.2.1. The project should be continued.
5.2.2. To avoid overlapping and competition with similar projects in the future it is very important first to do research regarding the plans of other agencies present in Serbia and in Montenegro.

5.2.3. To be more effective in the future, the project must be first introduced in detail to stakeholders, especially to MoI with a lot of necessary explanation regarding the goals and methods, which should be used in the implementation of the project.

5.2.4. UNODC HQ should itself develop proper induction courses for international staff to be employed as project staff irrespective of their working locations.

5.2.5. To make the MoI in the future more interested in the progress of the project it is necessary both to ensure cost sharing with the MoI and make the MoI most responsible for the implementation of the project. UNODC should just assist the MoI.

5.2.6. Ministries of Finance and Ministry of Customs should take a part in this process as well. More financial participation should be by the MoI and Ministries of Finance and Ministry of Customs than by the donor.

5.2.7. It is necessary to develop deeper working relations with the MoI.

5.2.8. It is necessary to provide basic training in other law enforcement agencies in Serbia and start with providing basic training in Montenegro.

5.2.9. In Serbia it is necessary to complete more advanced forms of training for existing analysts.

5.2.10. The intelligence trainer should continue to be domestic. The courses should be held in the local language. To establish a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity it is necessary in the future to use the assistance of the best participants of the courses of project S 29.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

6.1. The initial scope of the project S 29 was too ambitious.

6.2. The planning of the project S 29 did not take into account the possible important change of circumstances in politics, economy etc in Serbia and in Montenegro (for instance dissolution of SaM in two separate states, Euro as main foreign currency in SaM etc).

6.3. At the start of the implementation of the project S 29 there was no coordination with parallel SNPB project which overlapped 100% with S 29. That caused rivalry between UNODC and SNPB and spending a lot of the time and energy to establish fruitful cooperation and synergy.
6.4. The UNODC’s decision to co-ordinate project activities closely with the work being carried out by other international organizations was a wise one and led to activities subsequently being carried out by such organisations as the OSCE, TACTA and others being complimentary to rather than duplicating the work of the project.

6.5. Most of the key objectives of the project S 29 are not achieved. Significant steps had been made only towards the achieving a half way point with training support delivered in Serbia. Full achievement of all the five key objectives was hampered due to the reluctance of both the MoI of Serbia and Montenegro, internal Ministerial rivalries and competition between UNODC and SNPB at the start of the implementation of S 29 and the weak dollar rate which practically lowered the value of funding provided by the donor, and the lack of technical support with regard to CBT development.

6.6. Despite the difficulties encountered during the implementation of the project, the UNODC was able through cooperation with other agencies to deliver outputs using minimum resources. The majority of the activities, especially planned training of regional criminal intelligence analysts was provided in Serbia. Only strategic and financial analysis training was omitted. Added value of the project S 29 consists in the fact that much larger (6 times) than planned target group was trained (92 students and 6 courses in basic criminal intelligence analysis based on ANACAPA). The increase in number of persons trained made achieving of the objective Establishment of a sustainable criminal intelligence training capacity more possible. But, the fact that the MoI lacks its own training capacities is a problem of sustainability.

6.7. Montenegro showed interest just in developing Criminal Intelligence Working Group and it was prompted by the work of the UNODC. The planned training of regional criminal intelligence analysts was not provided at all in Montenegro.

6.8. Basic criminal intelligence training has strengthened the basis for the improving the capacity of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia to generate pro-active intelligence products. However, it is not possible yet to estimate the real extent of this impact.

6.9. In Montenegro the project has only been able to contribute in a very indirect way to the generation of pro-active intelligence products impacting on the disruption of organized criminal groups by the provision of written guidelines.

6.10. The project was implemented within budget.

6.11. The needs identified before the start of the project S 29 and during its inception to provide assistance in the development and upgrading of national capacities for analysis of criminal intelligence and strengthening the relevant institutions in Serbia and Montenegro still exist.

6.12. It is clear that achieving the original goals and key objectives of the project S 29 should be provided through implementation of a follow-up project with same or with similar goals, as it seems that achieving these goals is not possible through the implementation of just one project.
Terms of Reference for Final Evaluation

Project TCSCG/S29

Support to the criminal intelligence capacities of Serbia and of Montenegro
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Intelligence led law enforcement is recognised among law enforcement professionals as a most efficient methodology for the disruption of drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime. It involves the collection and analysis of information to produce intelligence products designed to progress operations at both tactical and strategic levels. This in turn is aimed at providing an efficient solution to the challenges faced by law enforcement.

Intelligence led law enforcement requires additional effort and commitment. Senior managers must be prepared to adopt more modern philosophies and methodologies: to believe that operations can and should be driven by intelligence, to act, rather than react. They must be prepared to recognise and accept the tremendous added value that intelligence analysis can bring to the task of law enforcement.

Intelligence led law enforcement challenges the traditional understanding of law enforcement. Often viewed before as a peripheral, analysis becomes a key component in the planning and decision-making process. As intelligence-led operations become the norm, an increasing number of law enforcement agencies have recognised the critical role of the intelligence function. The role of analysis is rapidly expanding and the demand for both professional intelligence analysts and for quality analytical training is increasing.

The removal of barriers between the Member States has not only given new horizons for law-abiding citizens, but also dramatically increased the operational freedom of organised criminal groups. As a consequence of this, transition to intelligence based law enforcement is a recognised strategic objective in countries of the European Union and its pre-accession partners. The development and enhancement by Serbia and Montenegro of their criminal intelligence capacities should be viewed as an integral part of this overall process.

It is within this general context that the impact of the S29 project supporting the criminal intelligence capacities should be evaluated. The evaluation should examine progress achieved in the light of the objectives listed in the S29 project document and the desired overall outcome listed therein. In addition, the evaluation will be required to view the progress achieved taking into account the conditions (political, financial, technical, levels of cooperation etc.) prevalent during its implementation.

2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The overall purpose of this evaluation is to determine what the project has achieved and if it has attained its objectives successfully and efficiently, taking into account the prevailing conditions (political, financial, technical, levels of cooperation etc.) during its implementation. In this regard, the extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met as well as what has been achieved in terms of impact and sustainability should also be assessed.
The evaluation will seek to draw lessons and good practices from the project implementation which will be used to improve future project planning, design and management. Furthermore, the evaluation must seek to measure the project’s achievements, outcomes and impacts, both positive and negative.

The main stakeholders of this project are:

1. **The Ministries of Interior of both Serbia and of Montenegro**

   Other stakeholders less central to the project include the Serbian Ministries of Justice and Finance and the Montenegrin Ministry of Finance.

2. **International organisations and donors collaborating with the project on an informal basis**

   **Serbia**
   - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
   - Swedish National Police Board (SNPB)

   To a lesser extent there was also cooperation with the US Department of Justice in Belgrade.

   **Montenegro**
   - OSCE
   - Technical Assistance to Customs and Taxation Administrations (TACTA)

3. **The Project Donor, United Kingdom**

   Project and SOCA offices of the British Embassy Belgrade, Serbia

4. **UNODC Offices**

   **Bulgaria**
   - Regional Project Office South East Europe (RPOSEE)

   **Serbia**
   - Project Office

3. **EVALUATION SCOPE**

   The evaluation shall focus mainly on the project’s concept, design, implementation, results, outputs and outcomes. The evaluation should appraise:

   (a) **Project concept and design:**

   The evaluation should analyse whether and how the project contributed to priority areas, thematic and result areas of the UNODC. It should review the problems identified by the project and the corresponding strategy chosen in order to address these. The evaluation
should also encompass an assessment of the relevance and attainability of the objectives and of planned outputs, activities and inputs, as compared to other cost-effective alternatives. An analysis of the clarity, logic and coherence of the project as a whole should also be conducted. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

- Were the objectives of the project aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of the Serbian and Montenegrin governments and UNODC mandates?
- Was the design of the project technically sound? Are the project objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to the further development of criminal intelligence capacities in Serbia and in Montenegro?
- In particular, was the timeframe allowed for in the project design feasible to enable its objectives to be achieved?
- Was the implementation strategy appropriate for meeting the stated objectives, with a focus on assessing project elements directly related to capacity building and coordination mechanisms between intelligence bodies in Serbia and in Montenegro?
- How well did the project objectives reflect the specific nature of the problem and needs of Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies and criminal justice development in general in both countries?
- To what extent were complementarities and synergies of the project with other projects implemented by UNODC and other organisations and donor bodies in both Serbia and in Montenegro created?

(b) Objectives, outputs, impact and sustainability:

The evaluation should seek to determine to what extent results have been achieved, and if not fully, whether there has been some progress made towards their achievement. Taking into account these factors, the overall impact of the project should be assessed. This should also encompass the likely sustainability of results and benefits as well as the project’s contribution to law enforcement agency capacity building and its capability to use intelligence effectively. In addition, the beneficiaries’ perception towards the achievements should be taken into consideration. A further fundamental aspect with respect to sustainability is beneficiary capacity building (have the beneficiaries gained the necessary tools and skills?). Furthermore, financial sustainability should also be assessed (for instance, once the project is terminated, will the benefits be self sustainable?). Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

- To what extent has the project achieved its objectives?
- Was a formal or informal situation analysis of baseline situation produced? Were recommendations made to outline programmes to enhance the prevailing situation with regard to the use of intelligence by Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies?
- Was training material for Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement personnel produced on specific criminal intelligence training courses? Is the training material produced under this project technically appropriate? Is the training material produced under this project available in local language? Is the training material available for further future use by the Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement personnel in training?
• Were further training needs on criminal intelligence and its use identified? Did the staff trained during courses given by the project subsequently have the opportunity to utilise their skills learned in their future work environments?
• Were a training strategy and/or training programmes developed? Were the training programmes delivered in accordance with needs of their recipients?
• In an overall context, was the training provided effective?
• Was the communication between governmental authorities, particularly with focal points of both Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Interior adequate?
• What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects/outcome of the project interventions/activities in general including those effecting Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies and other donor organisations in Serbia and in Montenegro?
• What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders, especially the Ministries of Interior of Serbia and of Montenegro, informal implementing partners (OSCE, SNPB etc.), other UN agencies, the project donor (UK) and other bilateral and multilateral donors in Serbia and in Montenegro about the overall impact of UNODC’s project activities?
• How did internal UNODC factors affect the effectiveness of project implementation, including availability of human resources, logistical support, the level, predictability and regularity of resources and flexibility of the budget (UNODC constraints)?
• How did factors like constraints and administrative processes regarding communications with project focal points, limits to access of personnel at their working locations (particularly trainees of project delivered courses), human resource constraints of the recipients etc. impact on effectiveness of project implementation (e.g. prevailing security situations)?
• To what extent did the project contribute to the achievement of any formal or informal development strategies with regard to the use of intelligence by Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies?
• Overall, what are the reasons for the achievement and non-achievement of specific objectives?

(c) Overall implementation process:

The evaluation should assess how effectively/efficiently project planning and implementation have been carried out. This includes assessing the extent to which organisational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms used by the UNODC effectively supported the project. Efficiency should be analysed namely as the project’s capacity to achieve the desired effects at an acceptable cost when compared to any alternative approaches which may have enabled reaching the same effects. The role played by the field office and regional field office in the development and implementation of the project or programme should also be assessed. The evaluation should analyse problems and constraints encountered during implementation as well as the quality and timeliness of inputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities carried out. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

• Did alternative less costly interventions/methods exist which could have been utilised in designing this project in achieving the same outcomes/impact at the beneficiary level?
• To what extent have partnership / partnerships been sought with other relevant actors (including UN-agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?
• Overall was there effective coordination among government, UNODC and other implementing partners?
• Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by field and HQ staff (administrative / managerial support and coordination)? Have informal partner institutions been fully supportive in the execution of joint activities?
• What is the anticipated positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of interventions on Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies and other donor organisations in Serbia and in Montenegro following implementation of the project?
• What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders, especially the Ministries of Interior of Serbia and of Montenegro, informal implementing partners (OSCE, SNPB etc.), other UN agencies, the project donor (UK) and other bilateral and multilateral donors in Serbia and in Montenegro about the overall impact of UNODC’s project activities?
• How did internal UNODC factors affect the effectiveness of project implementation, including availability of human resources, logistical support, the level, predictability and regularity of resources and flexibility of the budget (UNODC constraints)?
• How did factors like constraints and administrative processes regarding communications with project focal points, limits to access of personnel at their working locations (particularly trainees of project delivered courses), human resource constraints of the recipients etc. impact on effectiveness of project implementation (e.g. prevailing security situations)?
• Is there an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor and assess the overall progress of the project? How have project achievements and lessons learned been disseminated to the stakeholders?
• To what extent are the project interventions / activities sustainable?
• What concrete actions or measures have been taken, or are required, to ensure the sustainability of the practices and structures established / strengthened by the project (e.g. working practices, working structures and behaviour change)?

(d) Lessons learned from the concept, design and implementation of the project, as well as good practices:

Recommendations may also be made in respect of issues relating to the implementation and management of the project as well as follow up projects dealing with the same issues. The evaluation shall assess in what ways the project design and / or delivery can be improved to enhance its effectiveness. The evaluation should identify the key elements, assumptions and risks for the development of similar initiatives in this and other regions. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

• Do the project interventions have a potential for increasing in scale, complexity or replication?
• What are the outstanding needs of Serbian and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies with regard to criminal intelligence development?
• What are the good practices which have been identified through the implementation of the project?
4. EVALUATION METHODS

The evaluation consultant should present a detailed statement of evaluation methods and the approach to be used to identify information sources and collect information during the evaluation, and to analyse the data obtained. The evaluation methods will include:

(a) Document review: this will include all major documents, such as:
   - The project document (There is an overall final version and a final version for Serbia alone)
   - Project work plan
   - Project coordinator’s evaluation report
   - Monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual project progress reports held in the UNODC project management system (Reporting system was changed during the duration of the project)
   - Quarterly, semi-annual and annual project progress reports to the donor organisation (Reporting system was changed during the duration of the project)
   - Project Meeting Reports
   - Project Mission Reports
   - Documentation of Intelligence Working Group in Montenegro
   - Proposed plan for National Intelligence Model (NIM) development in Serbia

(b) Assessment (appropriateness, quality and use) of manuals developed by the project:
   - Basic criminal intelligence training, based on anacapa principles, manual (Serbian)
   - i2 Analyst’s Notebooks tips for beginners (Serbian)
   - Criminal Intelligence Training – Analysts (Amended on behalf of UNODC F35 project)
   - Criminal Intelligence Training – Front Line Officers (Amended on behalf of UNODC F35 project)
   - Criminal Intelligence Training – Managers (Amended on behalf of UNODC F35 project)
   - Presentations for Criminal intelligence with regard to trafficking in persons (Presented on behalf of UNODC S50 project)

(c) Structured / semi-structured interviews and / or focus group discussion with representatives from the Serbian and Montenegrin Ministries of Interior, other organisations which have collaborated with the UNODC as informal partners in the project and the project donor. Specific contact persons are noted below:

The Ministries of Interior of both Serbia and of Montenegro:

**Serbia**
Ivica Petrovic, Department of Operational Analytics (tel. +381 648920240, email ipetrovic@mup.sr.gov.yu)
Mladen Spasic, Head of Service for Combating Organised Crime (tel. +381 648922212, email mlaspa@mup.sr.gov.yu)
Informal partner organisations and donors:

Serbia
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Torstein Pihlmann, Organised Crime Programme Manager (tel. +381 63214479, email torstein.pihlmann@osce.org)
Swedish National Police Board (SNPB)
Vojkan Filipovic, Project Coordinator (tel. +381 62 1839603 or +46 767652320, email vojkan.filipovic@rps.police.se)
Maja Zivanovic (tel. +381 638525598, email maja1969yu@yahoo.com)

Montenegro
OSCE
Valeri Petrov (tel. +382 69312380, email Valeri.Petrov@osce.org)
TACTA (Technical Assistance to Customs and Taxation Administrations)
Alan Wilson ((tel. +382 69327150, email alan.wilson@eu-tacta.org)

The Project Donor, United Kingdom

British Embassy Belgrade, Serbia
Dino Pasalic, Head of Projects (tel. +381 11 3060921, email Dino.Pasalic@fco.gov.uk)
Tom Attwood, Liaison Officer (tel. +381 11 3060920, email tom.attwood@soca.x.gsi.gov.uk)
Vesna Knezevic, SOCA Office Manager (tel. +381 11 3060919, email Vesna.Knezevic@fco.gov.uk)

(d) Structured / semi-structured interview of relevant UNODC staff

Serbia - Project Office
Tom Robson, Project Coordinator (No longer in post – See Project Coordinator’s report section 4 a) document review of these Evaluation ToRs)
Miroslav Prljevic, Intelligence Trainer (tel. +381 641145169, email miroslav.prljevic@unodc.org)

Bulgaria - RPOSEE
Carla Ciavarella, RPOSEE Coordinator (tel. +359 886396427, email carla.ciavarella@unodc.org)

(e) Field assessment missions to Belgrade, Serbia and Podgorica, Montenegro

Before the field missions, the evaluator is to prepare an evaluation methodology, including data gathering tools (e.g. questionnaire, checklists etc.) and submit to the
UNODC for review and feedback. Following the completion of field missions, the evaluator is expected to present the initial findings and possible recommendations to the UNODC Regional Project Office for South Eastern Europe (RPOSEE) in Sofia, Bulgaria, for validation of findings and appropriateness of recommendations.

5. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The TCSCG/S29 project is to be evaluated by a National or International Expert (Evaluator) who has the relevant skills for the task. The evaluator should have respectively excellent knowledge in the theory and workings of the combat of organised crime and extensive knowledge in the field of the use of criminal intelligence in intelligence led policing.

The evaluator should hold an advanced degree in law, criminology, crime analysis or relevant field and have proven experience on the key issues highlighted above, preferably in the specific context of the Western Balkans. Familiarity with structured training programmes in the field of law enforcement would also be an asset. In addition, the evaluators should also meet the following criteria:

1) Be familiar with project implementation in international organisations.

2) Have experience in conducting independent evaluations and or assessments.

3) Have at least 10 years relevant professional experience in issues relating to organised crime gained either in working directly in law enforcement or in an academic context.

4) Have obtained a post-graduate degree in a relevant area.

5) Possess excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English. Knowledge of local languages (Serbian / Montenegrin) would be an asset.

The evaluators are selected by the UNODC Vienna, in consultation with the RPOSEE in Bulgaria. Coordination is to be sought also with the Europe, West and Central Asia Section, the Criminal Justice Reform Unit, HSB/DO, and the Independent Evaluation Unit, in UNODC Vienna, using the agreed criteria and drawing expertise from the roster of experts.

6. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

This evaluation will be a joint effort between the evaluation team and UNODC. As for substance, it is critical that the evaluation should be carried out independently by the Evaluator and that they conduct a thorough evaluation covering all aspects of the project objectives, achievements, implementation and management. The Evaluators will have access to all relevant documents and the UNODC RPOSEE regional project office in Bulgaria and the UNODC Project Office for Serbia will provide the required support for the Evaluator whilst the evaluation process is carried out. The UNODC officials responsible for the briefing of the Evaluators are:

UNODC RPOSEE (Bulgaria):
- Regional coordinator

UNODC Project Office for Serbia:
- Intelligence Trainer

UNODC HQ (Austria):
- Independent Evaluation Unit

Time Frame & Tentative programme for the Evaluators:

The evaluator will be recruited for 15 days (If international) or 13 days (If recruited national).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme &amp; Activity</th>
<th>Days Required</th>
<th>Tentative dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of methodology/questionnaires + Desk-review</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling to Belgrade, Serbia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>To be decided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk-review of documentation at UNODC project office in Belgrade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings/interviews with Ministries, Departments, UN Agencies and relevant stakeholders., visit to project intervention sites</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field mission (Podgorica, Montenegro)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>To be decided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of the draft report</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporating the UNODC comments in the report and preparing the final draft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Working &amp; Travel Days</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Detailed itinerary and programme will be prepared upon arrival and in consultation with the Evaluator.

**Deliverables of the evaluation:**
1) Evaluation plan and detailed terms of reference with methodology
2) Evaluation draft report with findings
3) Final evaluation report.

**Payment:**
The Evaluators will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures. The final payment will be made only after the acceptance of the final draft of the evaluation report by UNODC HQs and the RPOSEE Bulgaria.

**Evaluation report** (see also Annex Standard format and guidelines for project evaluation report):
The evaluation report should follow the standard UNODC report outline that is listed below:

1. Evaluation summary (maximum 4 pages)
2. Introduction
3. Background (Project description)
4. Evaluation purpose and objective
5. Evaluation methodology
6. Major findings
7. Lessons learned (from both positive and negative experiences)
8. Constraints that impacted project delivery
9. Recommendations and conclusions

Annexes to the evaluation report should be kept to an absolute minimum. Only those annexes that save to demonstrate or clarify an issue related to a major finding should be included. Existing documents should be referenced but not necessarily annexed. Maximum number of pages for annexes should not exceed 15. The format of the reporting is *attached*. The Terms of Reference of the Evaluators, including methodology and questionnaires and the UNODC Format and Guidelines for the Evaluation should be annexed to the report. Also the Evaluators should fill in an evaluation assessment questionnaire (*attached*).
ANNEX A: CHECKLIST - GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Background information
   - Information on why, when and how the programme was established
   - Programme budget
   - Main objectives and expected results
   - Legislative authority and mandate

2. Evaluation purpose
   - Information on who initiated the evaluation
   - Reason for undertaking the evaluation
   - What the evaluation intend to accomplish
   - Main stakeholders
   - Intended use of evaluation results

3. Evaluation scope
   - Timeframe
   - Geographical coverage
   - Thematic coverage
   - Analysis of efficiency of programme planning and implementation
   - Assessment of progress towards results
   - Assessment contribution to an area of comparative advantage
   - Assessment of whether the programme reflects result-based programming, management and monitoring (RBM)

4. Evaluation methods
   - Suggesting key elements of the methodology to be used

5. Evaluation team
   - Size of the evaluation team
   - Necessary qualifications for each team member

6. Planning and implementation arrangement
   - Management arrangements: consultation with the field and agreements with partners and / or beneficiaries
   - Timeframe for the whole evaluation process
   - Resources required and logistical support needed
   - Description of products to be delivered

ANNEX B: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATIONS AT UNODC

Attached as a separate document to be given to evaluators
ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONS CONSULTED

UNODC staff

Bulgaria - RPOSEE

Carla Ciavarella, RPOSEE Coordinator

Serbia - Project Office

Tom Robson, Project Coordinator
Miroslav Prijevic, Intelligence Trainer

The Ministries of Interior of both Serbia and of Montenegro:

Serbia

Ivica Petrovic, Department of Operational Analytics
Mladen Spasic, Head of Service for Combating Organized Crime
Slavica Jokanovic, Head of Operational Analysis Department
Drazen Maravic, Head of the Bureau for International Cooperation

Montenegro

Milan Djelevic, Head of Intelligence

Informal partner organizations and donors:

Serbia
OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe)
Torstein Pihlmann, Organized Crime and Border Policing Programme Manager, Law Enforcement Department
Anders Stolpe, Organized Crime Adviser, Law Enforcement Department
Marta Koso, Project Assistant, Law Enforcement Department

SNPB (Swedish National Police Board)
Vojkan Filipovic, Regional Project Coordinator for Western Balkan
Maja Zivanovic, Assistant to Regional Project Coordinator for Western Balkan

Montenegro

OSCE
Valeri Petrov, Programme Manager Police Reform

TACTA (Technical Assistance to Customs and Taxation Administrations)
Alan Wilson, Head of Mission

The Project Donor, United Kingdom

British Embassy Belgrade, Serbia
Dino Pasalic, Head of Projects
Tom Attwood, Liaison Officer
Vesna Knezevic, SOCA Office Manager
ANNEX D. List of documents and manuals

a) Document review include all major documents, such as:

- The project document (There is an overall final version and a final version for Serbia alone)
- Project work plan
- Project coordinator’s evaluation report
- Quarterly and annual project progress reports held in the UNODC project management system (Reporting system was changed during the duration of the project)
- Quarterly, semi-annual and annual project progress reports to the donor (Reporting system was changed during the duration of the project)
- Project Meeting Reports
- Project Mission Reports
- Documentation of Intelligence Working Group in Montenegro
- Proposed plan for National Intelligence Model (NIM) development in Serbia

b) Other relevant documents connected to the Project S 29:

- Evaluation Assessment Questionnaire
- Evaluation guidelines
- Evaluation Pack - Table of Contents
- Stand Format and Guidelines for Evaluation Report
- Activity Summaries
- Work Plans Training and Equipment Donation Summaries

  c) Assessment (appropriateness, quality and use) of manuals developed by the project:
  - Basic criminal intelligence training, based on ANACAPA principles, manual (Serbian)
  - i2 Analyst’s Notebooks tips for beginners (Serbian)
  - Criminal Intelligence Training – Analysts (Amended on behalf of UNODC F35 project)
  - Criminal Intelligence Training – Front Line Officers (Amended on behalf of UNODC F35 project)
  - Criminal Intelligence Training – Managers (Amended on behalf of UNODC F35 project)