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AD/RER/00/F23

Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan & Tajikistan

Independent Evaluation Unit

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BA	Beneficiary Agency
BC	Beneficiary Country
CADAP	Central Asia Drugs Assistance Project
CARICC	Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances & their Precursors
CJTF	Criminal Justice task Force (Afghanistan)
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
DCA	Drug Control Agency
DCS	Drug Control Service
DEA	US Drugs Enforcement Administration
EC	European Commission
ECO	The Programme Framework for International Cooperation on Drug Control in the Economic Cooperation Organization Countries
EU	European Union
FANC	Foreign Anti-narcotics Community
INAL	Bureau of International Narcotics & Law (US)
ISAF	International Stabilisation Assistance Force
IT	Information Technology
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
ODCCP	UN Office of Drug Control & Crime Prevention
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NADIN	National Drugs Intelligence Network in Central Asia
POLINT	Police Intelligence
ROCA	UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia
SOCA	Serious & Organised Crime Agency (UK)
TAIS	Telecommunications Analytical Intelligence System
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UNGASS	UN General Assembly
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WCO	World Customs Organisation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction & Background

This is the mid-term evaluation of a project aimed at strengthening drug law enforcement capacities in data and information collection; in essence the development of intelligence systems and intelligence-led law enforcement (including policing). The project (AD/RER/00/F23 – known as F23) covers the development of information management policies and strategies, the establishment of drug control agencies (DCA), the government designation of lead DCA, the identification of focal points for information exchange, the procurement and installation of IT hardware, software, intelligence databases and analytical software and the delivery of training in intelligence and analytical skills and techniques. In terms of delivery, the project started in January 2002.

The F23 project is a regional one, in so much as it seeks to create links, networks and communication channels between appropriate law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (although for this evaluation there was a focus only on Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan).

The overall objective of the F23 project is two-fold.

- To increase interdiction and the crime control effectiveness of drug law enforcement structures through the improvement of data collection and information management capacities.
- To establish mechanisms to enable the exchange, receipt and dissemination of information between DCA at national, regional and international levels.

To achieve this objective, three areas were selected and outputs formulated.

- A coherent and comprehensive system for data and information collection, analysis and exchange is established.
- Specialist law enforcement personnel are properly trained in the management of information gathering and exchange systems.
- A mechanism for information gathering and exchange is established at a regional level.

As the project was implemented, in line with drugs trafficking trends, law enforcement/intelligence developments and requests from the beneficiary agencies, the third output as shown above was removed and introduced as a separate UNODC project (CARICC) and two new outputs were included.

- Extension of the country scope with incorporation of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into the project.
- Expansion of the project scope with the enhancement of the project's positive results by introducing additional intelligence-led policing component.

Major Findings

- The F23 project can be regarded as having been successful thus far.
- The regional aspect of the project is of significant importance to the overall effort to reduce drug trafficking. The establishment of information networks and the acceptance of the need to tackle issues at the regional level, marks a great step forward.
- Despite regional focus and progress, the impact at this level is in places, limited and inconsistent. National priorities and programmes understandably take precedence in certain places and national development has been at different speeds and with different levels of adoption and success.
- High quality IT hardware is required to run sophisticated software, to securely store increasing amounts of data, to produce comprehensive intelligence analysis and to efficiently exchange information. This is costly and the project required time to draft comprehensive and thorough needs analysis and user requirement documents.
- Intelligence IT possibilities are continually developing and with the solid foundation put in place by the project some can be used by beneficiaries with the real possibility to develop the use of more.
- In many cases, operational law enforcement staff are often unaware of the importance of intelligence in modern strategies and of their roles within intelligence-led policing structures, whether it be in terms of information supply or the operational use of intelligence material. Standardised and widely used working methods are still not universal amongst the beneficiaries.
- Training and mentoring on live cases has been very productive allowing for the development of real, actionable intelligence and the establishing of close, professional working relationships between the project staff and those of the BAs.
- In the main, BAs are focusing on producing intelligence analysis related to telephone traffic. This is very important material in tackling organised crime and when seeking to attack the heart of international criminality. However, there is now a need to develop the techniques learned so far and to move into other analytical areas using what is currently done as a foundation.
- The sustainability of the project is put at risk by staff recruitment, rotation and retention issues. Those who have been beneficiaries of significant investment in terms of finance, training, and expert time are not encouraged or allowed to stay working within the intelligence environment. Much valuable experience and knowledge is being lost.
- The *Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances & their Precursors*, although taken out of the F23 project, is the ultimate client of the intelligence produced by the BAs and offers great potential as an information coordination centre.
- The involvement of Customs Administrations in the F23 project is inconsistent and greater integration and commitment is necessary as their role as national 'gatekeepers' is an important one in the combating of drug trafficking.

Main Conclusions

- Changes in long-held working practices, the introduction of new technologies, progress towards sustainability, regional and international recognition and a solid base for regional cooperation are now all in place to a greater or lesser degree. As a result of in-depth groundwork, a solid base for intelligence-led policing in the region has emerged. Modern techniques and processes have been adopted and learnt; much time and assistance has allowed for the acquiring of experience.
- The work of the project is far from finished. Indeed, one opinion might be that for a project effectively started in 2002 the results are less than would be hoped. However, it is important to restate the achievements and changes that have occurred from a starting point that was far from conducive to the implementation of intelligence-led policing and the use of intelligence analysis.
- The regional aspirations of the project are laudable and absolutely necessary if drug trafficking from Afghanistan through the region is to be effectively tackled. Projects with any regional components are often difficult to deliver successfully and it cannot yet be said that at a regional level development has been to an acceptable, effective or sustainable standard, despite the excellent work that has taken place. Continued efforts using the current model of assistance delivery must continue as there is no place for a relaxation of effort or commitment.
- The potential inclusion of Armenia and Georgia should be seen as indicators of solid progress and regional impact; if this development can come to pass, it is to be welcomed and many of the lessons learned in the project already will allow for the smooth integration of the law enforcement agencies (LEA) from these countries.
- The problems of high-level support and recruitment and retention of intelligence staff must be taken seriously, as finding solutions is key to providing the climate for sustainability.
- With the on-going project commitments and the possibilities of expansion, the current staffing resource is clearly overstretched from time to time. Steps need to be taken to secure additional funding to allow for the recruitment of extra staff. The current staffing levels are insufficient to effectively fulfil the ambitious but fully appropriate project objectives, both at national and regional level.
- Implementation of the project objectives has been somewhat inconsistent, with some BAs being more cooperative or committed than others. This poses a risk to the project's regional focus. It is natural for the project staff to focus more on the committed and progressive BAs, but for effective regional drugs interdiction, it is important that the other BAs are not excluded.
- Much positive comment was made in the interviews conducted for the evaluation regarding the training and assistance given concerning live and on-going cases. Future training and technical assistance needs to follow this model.
- The F23 project staff should be acknowledged for their insight and employment of local knowledge that has allowed excellent working relationships to be effected and tailor-made activities undertaken to best meet the needs and requests of the BAs. Their flexibility and even-handed approach has greatly enhanced the dialogue with the BAs which has, in turn, led to the achievements outlined in this report.

Main Recommendations

- Continued efforts must be made to secure high level and donor support by UNODC, partners and BAs; increased donor visibility will assist in this.
- Delivery of assistance at regional level must continue to the current model, using joint activities, *in house* training and expert meetings on a structure and inclusive basis.
- Further regional development, involving the existing members of the project, possible new members and CARICC can be undertaken by the use of bench-marking exercises that bring all beneficiaries together to compare national situations with agreed standards and to develop connections and working relationships.
- Necessary IT updates can be fulfilled by use of routinely replaced UNODC equipment and renewed donor funding. Enhanced efforts should be made by beneficiaries for self-funding or direct outreach to potential donors.
- Thorough and comprehensive needs analysis must be conducted into the provision of new analytical and intelligence IT software packages to allow for the extending and widening of intelligence case building.
- Comprehensive awareness programmes must be conducted amongst BA operational staff to ensure full understanding of intelligence-led law enforcement, its requirements and its benefits. Simplified but standardised information recording, evaluating and transmitting procedures and templates must be developed to make the process as user-friendly, secure and reliable as possible.
- An international expert 'team'/pairing must be established to mentor and provide skills transfer *in situ* with beneficiaries and on a rolling basis amongst them, allowing for the exchange of best practice and lessons learned amongst the BAs and the facilitating of communication between them.
- Training in the use of further intelligence analysis techniques and the use of open source intelligence must be delivered, as far as possible on a joint basis and with as much practical, live case content as possible.
- Staff recruitment, rotation and retention issues must be addressed, at senior and even governmental levels if necessary, to ensure greater stability and sustainability with BAs. Employment contracts, motivational schemes and other means must be explored to allow for greater retention of staff and the resultant building up of expertise
- Continued support of CARICC via the work of the F23 project must take place, with CARICC being the ultimate and main user of the intelligence material produced.

Lessons Learned

- A project of the nature of the F23, with its marked emphasis on fundamental changes in behaviours and procedures and its regional element, cannot be effectively implemented unless there is support at the highest levels.
- The changes in procedures and the adoption of unfamiliar techniques and methodologies that the F23 project proposed could only be achieved effectively with detailed and comprehensive planning.

- The nature of the F23 project raised issues regarding security of data and criminal information. It was vital to the success of the project that the experts employed were able to demonstrate clear commitment, professionalism and operational working experience.
- Flexibility, pragmatism and innovation in project delivery are often necessary, especially in projects of the length of the F23 where developments in trends, possibilities and risks will occur.

SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings ¹ : problems and issues identified	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations ²
The project can be regarded as having been successful thus far.	High level support was ensured, strategies put in place, equipment procured and installed, training delivered, intelligence material produced.	Continued efforts to secure high level and donor support by UNODC, partners and beneficiary agencies (BA)s. Increased donor visibility.
The regional aspect of the project is of significant importance to the overall effort to reduce drug trafficking.	The inclusion of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, the potential inclusion of Armenia and Georgia demonstrate the recognition that has been achieved for the efforts at regional coordination and cooperation.	Delivery of assistance at regional level continues in the current model, using joint activities, <i>in house</i> training and expert meetings.
Despite the regional focus, the progress at this level is in places limited and inconsistent. National priorities and programmes understandably take precedence.	The limited amount of tangible and operationally useful information that is currently being exchanged and the still limited amount of regional interaction despite good foundation work.	Further regional development, involving the existing members of the project, possible new members and CARICC is undertaken by the use of benchmarking exercises that brings all beneficiaries together to compare national situations with agreed standards.
High quality information technology (IT) and software is required to run sophisticated programmes, to securely store increasing amounts of data, to produce comprehensive intelligence analysis and to efficiently exchange information.	All BAs evaluated need more equipment to increase capacity or to update existing capability.	Necessary IT updates be fulfilled by use of replaced UNODC equipment and renewed donor funding. Efforts should be made by beneficiaries for self-funding or direct outreach to potential donors.
Intelligence IT possibilities are continually developing and can	Beneficiaries demonstrate sufficient skills to move	Needs analysis be conducted into the provision of new analytical

¹ A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

² Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

be used by beneficiaries thanks to the standards achieved so far.	forward into new analytical areas and request assistance with the use of new software and programmes.	and intelligence software packages
Operational law enforcement staff are often unaware of the importance of intelligence in modern strategies and of their role within intelligence-led policing.	Limited amounts of information is received from field officers, it is rarely evaluated to an agree standard and they are rarely receive intelligence as finished product with which to conduct duties and controls.	Comprehensive awareness programmes be conducted amongst BA operational staff to ensure full understanding of intelligence-led law enforcement, its requirements and its benefits.
Training and mentoring on live cases has been very productive allowing for the development of real intelligence and close working relationships between the project and BAs.	Positive feedback was received from every single BA staff member interviewed.	An international expert 'team'/pairing be established to mentor and provide skills transfer <i>in situ</i> with beneficiaries and on a rolling basis amongst them.
In the main, BAs are focusing on producing telephone traffic analysis. There is a need to develop and move into other analytical areas using what is currently done as a foundation.	Interviews with BAs and inspection of intelligence material produced, demonstrate a significant understanding and use of telephone traffic analysis techniques but limits in other areas.	Training in the use of further intelligence analysis techniques and the use of open source intelligence be provided.
The sustainability of the project is put at risk by staff rotation and retention issues.	The need for regular training and re-training shows that many of those who have been invested in by the project cannot be retained.	Staff recruitment, rotation and retention issues be addressed, at senior level if necessary to ensure greater stability and sustainability with BAs.
The Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances & their Precursors (CARICC), although taken out of the project, is the ultimate client of the beneficiaries and offers great potential as an information coordination centre.	Project reports and revisions continue to regard CARICC as the regional intelligence client. All beneficiaries are active members of CARICC.	Continued support of CARICC via the work of the F23 project.

<p>The involvement of Customs Administrations in F23 is inconsistent but necessary to the reduction of drug trafficking.</p>	<p>Customs Administration representatives interviewed requested technical assistance and support in approaching higher management for inclusion in F23.</p>	<p>The inclusion of Customs Administrations in the project in a more formalised and embedded way.</p>
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I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Overall project concept and design

The combating of drug trafficking requires well-organized systems of information and data collection, processing and analysis, as well as the exchange of the final product among the competent agencies at national, regional and international level. The absence or limited use of mechanisms for the collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information and data, can result in limited capacity in the conducting of effective and coordinated drug control activities.

The governments of the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have made individual efforts and in partnership with technical assistance projects to counter major drug trafficking through the region but it was recognised that there were still shortcomings in the field of information gathering, data collection and analysis. The main deficiencies identified were in the areas of:

- Understanding of the value of information in assisting effective law enforcement
- Planned, structured, systematic information gathering procedures within national LEA
- Analytical capacity and skills
- Inter-agency and regional cooperation and consequent sharing of law enforcement related information

The result was agency and government policy makers having difficulty designing strategies to counter drug trafficking because of the lack of accurate information about activities, the individuals and organizations concerned, trafficking *modus operandi*, and other essential data upon which to plan.

LEAs collect information and data in accordance with their own requirements and needs and often create individual databases on the basis of different software. These databases are structured in different formats for information retrieval with the overall situation progressively leading to incompatibility of existing databases and limits to the effective exchange of information, especially in electronic form.

Reducing the supply and demand for illicit drugs cannot be faced effectively without addressing the problem of information sharing and exchange. It is important that a standard approach for data and information collection/processing be adopted as well as to elaborate standard formats of basic information to be collected and exchanged.

In the Central Asian region it was seen as necessary to set up sustainable data and information collection and intelligence exchange systems initially at national and then regional level. As a result, in June 2001, the F23 project was established. The project aimed to identify priorities and sound strategies for information gathering for drug LEA in each country. National DCA were to be assisted in designing information sharing and exchange systems suitable to their objectives in combating illicit drug trafficking.

It was also intended that improving or establishing information gathering and exchange mechanisms within each BC would lead to a strengthening of the exchange of information at the regional level.

The F23 project sought to assist governments of the Central Asian countries in adopting and utilising standard formats, specialist software, rules of information gathering and data collection and their exchange thus strengthening the fundamentals of each BA information management abilities. At the same time the project planned to assist in the creation within each BA of a position or office as the focal point for inter-agency cooperation and information exchange

The F23 project was originally aimed at strengthening the capacities of the LEA of each Central Asian country. Due to the successful delivery of the early stages of the project and because of the increasing threat of drug trafficking, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan were later added as beneficiaries. Basic equipment, such as computers, specialist software for information gathering, processing, storage, exchange and analysis as well as training during implementation of the project was provided. Special attention had to be paid to the elaboration of national and regional mechanisms for the purposes of information gathering and exchange on a standardized basis. Also, as the F23 project developed, attention was placed on capacity building, allowing beneficiaries to sustain the progress made.

The project strategy was a sound one in that effective law enforcement, especially the countering of drug trafficking cannot succeed without effective and targeted intelligence or the proactive cooperation of the agencies concerned. A major problem with cooperation and sharing of intelligence is the lack of standardisation and compatibility, in systems and working methods; the F23 objective of establishing nationally and regionally agreed standards based on those employed internationally and advocated by such bodies as Europol, Interpol and the World Customs Organisation (WCO) was therefore, a sensible and necessary one if the efforts of the Central Asian countries were to be successful.

Effective use of intelligence in law enforcement is only possible when significant quantities of information can be collected and processed. In this, electronic means are often employed to great benefit. The F23 project objective of supplying, installing and training in the use of internationally recognised specialist software was an important one in increasing the operational capacity of the BAs. As the same software was supplied to all BAs the project further assisted the inter-agency, regional and international exchange of intelligence.

The original project document stated that a period of 2 years would be needed to successfully deliver the objectives. However, as the project developed and grew both in scope and recognition, it became clear that this time frame was unrealistic. Therefore, a number of subsequent project revisions were designed, proposed and agreed and the necessary funding obtained to take into account aspects such as software developments, interest of new beneficiaries and trends in drugs trafficking and its combating. The total approved budget for the project to date is \$5,087,315.

The regional nature of the project and the need for specialist IT and training has meant that the vast majority of financial resources have been devoted to procurement of equipment, salaries of experts and expenses related to holding national and regional activities. As a result, the permanent *in situ* project management staff allocation has been limited to 2 persons, who also have other project and managerial responsibilities. However, good use has been made of UNODC administration staff in all the BCs along with the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent.

The original project document of June 2001 and the subsequent revisions give clear and logical information regarding the background to the project, its rationale and the objectives that were expected to be achieved. The detail is concise yet gives comprehensive guidance as to what is to be achieved. Overall, the documents demonstrate a natural and necessary progression as the steps of the project take hold, intelligence analysis units are set up, equipment installed, training delivered, expertise acquired and

national and regional cooperation established. The sequences described and planned are in keeping with international standards for the development of intelligence within LEAs.

Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The F23 project duration is planned until mid-2014; so far no evaluation has taken place. The purpose of this evaluation is to measure the project achievements, capturing an innovative dimension and planning for future project phase. The results of the evaluation are intended for use by those managing the project and for the ROCA, to enable them to learn from what has been done thus far and to make effective adjustments to on-going implementation. It will also inform stakeholders (LEA of the project member countries, UNODC Headquarters, UNODC ROCA, UNODC project office in Tajikistan, head of office/project coordinator, project manager and current donor countries). The evaluation covers the F23 project from its physical inception in June 2001 to the present date; in order to capture important aspects of the projects origins, related activities from 1998 were also analysed.

F23 currently covers the original 5 Central Asian countries plus Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. Due to funding and time restrictions, the evaluation manager selected Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as the BCs to be studied as they represented a meaningful cross section of all the project beneficiaries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been involved from the project's inception and are regarded as being fully committed and demonstrating concrete examples of progress, whilst Afghanistan is a later and enthusiastic beneficiary and has the added importance of being where the majority of heroin and opium based drugs originate.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation methodology involved the following:

- A desk review of relevant documents including the project document, all project revision documents, semi-annual and annual project progress reports and appropriate sections of the UNODC *Rainbow Strategy*.
- A field mission to the ROCA consisting of briefing and individual interviews with the regional representative, senior law Enforcement advisor, logistics officer and financial officer.
- Field missions to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan to include the following activities:
 - Individual interviews with the F23 project coordinator/head of UNODC Tajikistan programme office and briefings by UNODC staff members.
 - Briefing by UNODC staff in the UNODC programme office in Kyrgyzstan and country office in Afghanistan.
 - Individual interviews with senior officials of project BAs and other national counterparts, including officials from LEA of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan.
 - Individual interviews with donor representatives.

- Site visits to the intelligence analytical units of LEA of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan
- Other sites for physical inspection and discussions with beneficiaries and other people directly or indirectly affected by the project

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Main Objectives, Responsibilities & Description of the Proposed Analytical Work paragraphs of the Terms of Reference (ToR) document and focused on the evaluation questions detailed in the ToR (see annex and below).

LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION

The support provided to the evaluator, principally by the UNODC programme office in Tajikistan was excellent. An agenda was compiled, interviews arranged, visa applications completed and travel and logistical issues addressed. Additionally, project documentation was supplied to allow for desk review and overall preparation.

However, there were a number of limitations to the evaluation most of which were foreseen in the inception report:

- Limited time for meetings in each BC and BA
- Availability of appropriate interviewees
- Rotation and resignation of BA staff
- Gaining access to LEA sites, viewing intelligence analysis material produced and seeing equipment donated
- The freedom for LEA staff to discuss high level or sensitive matters
- A tendency amongst BAs to overstate achievements
- The general security situation, especially in Afghanistan

With regard to the last bullet point, 2 major security incidents occurred in Afghanistan during the course of the evaluation. Firstly, on Sunday 15 April 2012, insurgent forces launched attacks on a number of prominent sites in Kabul and other cities within Afghanistan including foreign embassies, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters and the Afghan parliament. Secondly, it was reported on 21 April 2012 that the Afghan authorities had seized 10 tonnes of explosive destined for a further attack on Kabul along with evidence of an intended attack on the vice-president. As a result of understandable security concerns and travel difficulties, the time available for the field visit to Afghanistan was kept to a minimum. These incidents also illustrate some of the problems encountered by those attempting to implement F23.

Of the limitations listed above, only the security situation in Afghanistan posed any real problem and this was related to the amount of time available for interviews in Kabul of CNPA and CJTF staff. The amount of time available in Kabul was maximised through the excellent cooperation, especially of the CJTF and UNODC representatives who allowed interviewing and information collection to go on past what would normally be considered the end of the working day.

Rotation of staff is mentioned in the report on a number of occasions as a major limitation on the effectiveness and sustainability of the F23 project. To a much lesser degree, this was also the case for this evaluation as a number of key staff from earlier periods within the project had left their respective services. However, this situation was countered in two ways, firstly by the making use of the experience of the UNODC project staff to select the best candidates for interview and secondly, in one instance, interviewing informally, a former member of one of the beneficiary agencies.

Additionally, it has to be stated that the UNODC project staff and the wide range of documents that they made available were able to minimise any information gaps that might have been created by the above limitations.

II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Design

The origins of the F23 project and its design lie in the UN Office of Drug Control & Crime Prevention (ODCCP) strategy of the time which was itself governed by the Political Declaration adopted at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) 20th Special Session which was held in June 1998. The UNGASS resolution *Measures to Enhance International Cooperation to Counter the World Drug Problem* encouraged "...states in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies" to address the issues of data collection and information exchange.

At a meeting held in September 1999, at the initiative of the Uzbekistan government, the *Six plus Two Group* (the six countries bordering Afghanistan, namely China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan along with the USA and Russia) expressed their concern at the increased cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs in and from Afghanistan. In September 2000 at a high-level meeting of this group, a regional action plan on countering the Afghan drug trade was drawn up in consultation with ODCCP. This regional action plan approved by all the members encompassed a set of objectives to combat the Afghan drug trade in the fields of law enforcement, regional cooperation, criminal justice systems, eradication of illicit drug crops, alternative development, counter-narcotics efforts within Afghanistan, demand reduction and demand prevention.

From this it can be seen that a clear concern had already been identified globally and certain, concrete, high-level steps taken with the ODCCP involved from an early stage.

At around the same time, *The Programme Framework for International Cooperation on Drug Control in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Countries* (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan) was drawn up and this provided the framework for the F23 project which ODCCP was now preparing. The programme was divided into 2 strands:

- Strengthening (to the extent possible) the drug control capacities of individual countries
- Addressing the drug problem in the ECO region through jointly coordinated action by countries using as far as possible the regional cooperation mechanisms.

At the 5th ECO summit held in May 1998 the majority of the heads of state/government recognized the importance of concerted action within the ECO framework to pre-empt the rapidly escalating regional drug problem.

The *Programme Framework*, which was presented to major donors in October 1998 and aimed at providing response to the increasing appeals from all ECO countries for drug control assistance. The *Programme Framework* also aimed at addressing the drug problem in the world's largest opium producing, consuming and trafficking region through an effective use of the cooperation mechanisms.

The *Declaration and Priorities for co-operation to counter drugs, organised crime & terrorism in Central Asia* adopted during the *International Conference on Enhancing Security & Stability in Central Asia: An Integrated Approach to Counter Drugs, Organized Crime & Terrorism* held in October 2000 indicated a genuine willingness of the Central Asian countries to improve cooperation and coordination, a readiness to develop systems for the collection, analysis, sharing and evaluation of data on drug trafficking and drug abuse and the establishment of mechanisms for gathering, sharing and exchange of information between all relevant agencies and bodies.

The UNODC has formalised, laid-down and tried and tested project design standards and methodologies. These were followed from the earliest stages when the original project was designed and project document AD/RER/00/F23 written. A substantial amount of research and assessment was conducted with regard to drugs trafficking and use in each of the prospective BCs, in itself not always easy due to the clear lack of information available at the time. Assessments of the drugs interdiction and operational intelligence capabilities of each BC were also made.

As can be seen in the original project document, a number of key areas were identified as being necessary for the successful implementation of the project. In summary they covered strategy development, adoption of standardised intelligence methodologies, establishment of dedicated operational intelligence analysis capacity, the supply of equipment, training, mentoring and the development of means for cooperation and information exchange. Three clear and logical outputs were formalised and incorporated into the project document;

Output 1 - A coherent and comprehensive system for data and information collection, analysis and exchange is established.

Output 2 – Specialist law enforcement personnel are properly trained in the management of information gathering and exchange systems.

Output 3 – A mechanism for information gathering and exchange is established at a regional level.

For each output, a significant number of specific and detailed activities were formulated, breaking down the outputs into manageable elements, taking into account the scope of the project, the difficulties of implementing regional projects and the low starting point of many of the BAs. Indeed, the overall philosophy developed of parallel development of individual BAs under a regional framework was an eminently suitable one and has proved effective.

The project design identifies the pressing need to have full support and, crucially, the understanding of BC governments and BA senior management in the adoption of intelligence-led law enforcement and policing methods as operated in developed agencies and services around the world. The project proposed achieving this through the sensible step of a series of comprehensive and targeted workshops to be conducted at the commencement of the project. The workshops would also be the fora for the exchange

of views, agreement of requirements, identification of problems and beginnings of the establishment of national and international networks. This step at the outset of the project was vital to all the work that followed.

The project design also took into account the lessons learned from past experience in the delivery of assistance in the area of intelligence. The lessons identified included the needs for systematic delivery of assistance and genuine coordination between those delivering assistance. Projects such as the EU-funded *Central Asia Drugs Action Plan (CADAP)* and *National Drugs Information Networks in Central Asia (NADIN)* were identified as being potential partners and existing UN projects such as the *Immediate Technical Assistance on control and prevention of drug and related organized crime in the Russian Federation*, the *Precursors Control in Central Asia* and that concerning the establishment of a DCA in Tajikistan noted as foundations on which F23 could build. F23 also supported the *ROCA Strategic Programme Framework and the Regional Programme for Afghanistan & Neighbouring Countries*.

The project document details an ambitious end-of-project situation as “...the countries of the region will have national mechanisms for information collection, storage, analysis and exchange. These mechanisms will allow the drug law enforcement bodies in each country to collect and share police information with regard to illicit drug trafficking. The project will have provided both technical and organizational means for establishing procedures and networks for the collection and exchange of information...”.

Clear and unambiguous though this objective might have been, it can be seen through the various project revisions that it was a situation that would be difficult to achieve.

Relevance

The original project document of June 2001 states the problem, as such, in its *Background & Justification* section thus, “All available information indicates that the illicit drug trafficking is increasing in Central Asian countries but its real magnitude and nature are unknown...”. In a later paragraph of the same section the document demonstrates one element needed to effectively address this situation but also sounds a warning should the advice not be translated into action, “Combating illicit drug trafficking requires well-organized systems of information/data collection, processing and analysis, as well as the exchange of the final information product among agencies involved at national and regional levels. Unfortunately the absence of a proper mechanism for the collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information and data, results in a limited capacity in conducting effective and coordinated drug control activities”. The F23 project document details the over-arching activity needed in a very clear, unambiguous and easy-to-follow way, “It is necessary to set up a sustainable data and information collection and criminal intelligence exchange system initially at national and then at a regional level”.

There was clear recognition, from the outset of the project that a solution to the stated problem did not lie in one country or one LEA alone. It is a fundamental of intelligence doctrine that isolationist practices will not, in-the-main, succeed and that cooperation, coordination and even collaboration at all levels is vital to maximise resources and effectiveness. There are many international standards and benchmarks that support this including the *Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission (EC) External Cooperation* which state that “...the goal of exchanging data is to share relevant information with other agencies in order to contribute to a more effective and efficient border and cross border operations. A central level office should be tasked to manage/coordinate/supervise information exchange with the other law enforcement agencies.... on a need-to-know basis. A similar procedure for information exchange should be established with neighbouring countries and beyond.” Similarly, the *EU Customs Blueprints (Investigation & Enforcement)* state that “A comprehensive intelligence and information system

in support of investigation and enforcement staff and sharing of intelligence with other law enforcement agencies based on national legislation and memoranda of understanding is established, developed and regularly updated". Most importantly the UNODC Rainbow Strategy, subtitled A Regional Solution to A National Challenge seeks to translate the objectives of the Paris Pact Initiative (A Partnership to Counter Traffic in and Consumption of Afghan Opiates) into operational outlines. The Yellow Paper presents a strategy to "...bolster narcotic interdiction efforts along Central Asia's borders with Afghanistan". What is particularly appropriate for the F23 project is the ways it looks at "...developing and coordinating intelligence....and strengthening overall interdiction capacities through the development of cross-border liaison mechanisms between Central Asia and Afghanistan".

In support of the Central Asian countries in their efforts to tackle international drugs trafficking based on the UNODC *Rainbow Strategy* and other international bench marks, the F23 project formulated two straightforward and appropriate Immediate Objectives.

- To increase interdiction and the crime control effectiveness of drug law enforcement structures through the improvement of data collection and information management capacities.
- To establish mechanisms to enable the exchange, receipt and dissemination of information between drug control bodies at national, regional and international levels.

Through these, it can be clearly seen that twin 'pillars' of data management and data exchange are rightly identified and included in the project strategy as foundations to all that follows. As has already been mentioned above, 3 comprehensive outputs were then formulated to ensure the effective implementation of the project.

Output 1 tackles the need to establish coherent and comprehensive systems for data and information collection, analysis and exchange. Included within the output are necessary elements such as the formulation of national strategies for data collection and information management, the development of systems that emphasise and highlight the priorities of the activities and mandate of LEA, the identification of agencies that can act as sources of information and connected focal points, budgeting, the supply of equipment for gathering, storing, exchange and analysis of information, the designing, formalising and embedding of systems for information management, the installing of national databases on illicit drug trafficking and the identification of regional and international drug trafficking routes. This package of measures clearly demonstrates the intention to create permanent structures and working methodologies, adequately supported in terms of logistics and by national management at the highest levels. All are crucial pre-requisites of effective and long-lasting organisations, capable of the eventual goal of self-development.

Output 2 correctly addresses the need to train specialist law enforcement staff to work within the intelligence systems and structures put in place as part of output 1. Although training, especially in the use of new and sometimes sophisticated software was to be provided, output 2 was also mindful of the need to develop the overall national LEA capacity by providing training in wider information management and intelligence techniques. This is a very necessary part of the project strategy and of this output for it is here that the future work of the LEA staff was introduced, developed and embedded, allowing the concept of intelligence-led law enforcement and policing to become systematic and routine.

Thus far, the outputs focused on agency and national development. However, as has been demonstrated above and is clearly shown in the project document, regional and further international intelligence cooperation was an ultimate and vital objective, in line with national, regional, UNODC and international strategies and aims. As will be seen on many occasions in this report, output 3, which dealt with the

establishment of mechanisms for information gathering and exchange at a regional level was ambitious and more difficult to achieve to the levels envisaged and hoped for by those UNODC staff implementing the F23 project.

Output 3 introduces the concept of regional information sharing and exchange systems and the tried-and-tested method of appointing and establishing national focal points to handle information sharing and exchange. The output attempted to elaborate and systematise the operational practices in the form of agreements and standardised procedures. Output 3 was rightly, neither a complicated one nor deeply prescriptive in the way it attempted to achieve its objectives, demonstrating the clear knowledge and understanding of the UNODC project management team of the difficulties of implementing successful regional projects, especially when the project subject was one of such a potentially sensitive and secretive nature. They also showed sensitivity to the ethnic, geographical and political differences between the beneficiaries and developed an approach that showed their understanding and the efforts taken to work professionally and with due respect to all parties. As a result and as will be seen later in this report, the methods adopted to meet output 3 sometimes meant use of resource intensive means, in terms of UNODC staff, travel and funding. However, in the case of the F23 project, in terms of the regional nature of the objectives, what was done was, in general fitting and imaginative.

During the life of the F23 project, a number of revisions have been made, based on the assessment of the UNODC project implementation team and the requests of the beneficiaries. Two were of major significance and analysis can show that both were appropriate and in line with national and international aspirations and trends in addressing current drugs trafficking issues.

In Moscow in December 2004, the parties to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on sub-regional drug control cooperation agreed and endorsed the proposal to establish the *Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances & their Precursors*. This was considered a necessary response to the increasing drug threat and the limited results in the fight against drug trafficking. The permanent members included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The establishment of CARICC - an inter-state agency set up to coordinate the efforts of competent authorities of the member countries to counter drug trafficking from Afghanistan, was a project supported by the UNODC (project AD/RER/H22). The main goals of CARICC were set out as the coordination of multilateral international operations and the collection, storage, protection, analysis and exchange of information in the field of combating illicit drug trafficking. As a result, a project revision to F23 was made that removed much of the substance of output 3.

The project revision document III, clearly shows the resultant situation. *"...F23 plays a key role in coordinating with the CARICC initiative by developing and reinforcing the capacities of the respective national drug intelligence units of each member state to evolve and integrate into a full national multi-agency criminal intelligence resource. Extending the project will allow it to become a vital part of strengthening the foundation for forthcoming CARRIC activities. On account of F23 activities, the analytical centres at national levels will become a key institution within the law enforcement bodies and be a support function to operational law enforcement activities"*. The importance of F23 nationally and regionally is demonstrated and by the initiation of the H22 project. F23 was able to develop and modify its use of resources, again at the behest of the beneficiaries and in line with international trends towards the second major project revision.

Two new outputs were included in the project. The first, a replacement for output 3 concerned the extending of the country scope to incorporate Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. The project revision III document summarises the move thus, *"...the incorporation of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into project F23 activities will be of crucial strategic value. It is extremely important to guarantee a standard approach for data and*

information sharing, as well as to elaborate standard formats for the collection and exchange of basic information both between LEAs within each country, and in the region. Increasing the geographical scope will build upon the success already achieved, as it will enhance the objective by contributing to building the capacities for regional mechanisms of exchange and dissemination of information. Addressing the lack of capacity for information sharing and exchange is a vital prerequisite in combating the supply of and demand for illicit drugs. Having access to potential information sources in Afghanistan and Azerbaijan related to illicit drug trafficking will be of great benefit to both regional and international interests”.

Following the events of 11 September 2001 and the international mission in Afghanistan, heroin production and trafficking, did not notably decrease and Afghanistan maintained its position as the main global source country of opium cultivation. Illicit drug laboratories situated within the country, where opium is refined to morphine and heroin allowed criminal organizations to then export the drugs. At the same time the strategic geographical position of Azerbaijan (having a coastline with the Caspian Sea and bordering Iran), meant the country had a crucial role for surveying and analysing the trafficking routes through the Caucasus; Azerbaijan is also part of the CARICC initiative. On the initiative of the two countries, the new output 3 included a needs assessment of analytical and information/intelligence systems and IT equipment, the drafting of recommendations on how to enhance the capacity of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan to collect data related to illicit drug trafficking, the identification by the governments of the lead agencies and other national services that would participate in project, the procurement and installation of appropriate IT equipment, the provision of dedicated training and assistance in the design of information systems tailored to local needs and situations.

It was of great benefit to the continuation of the project that the lessons learned from its implementation thus far could be used by the UNODC project management staff and the beneficiaries from Afghanistan and Azerbaijan to assist in the detailing of effective strategies for their incorporation in the project.

The second new output, number 4, focused on expanding the existing project scope and building on the significant progress made up to that point. In particular the new output added some intelligence-led policing components. These included awareness raising and assistance concerning matters such as strategic intelligence analysis, telephone analysis, informant management, forensic intelligence and software encryption. Output 4 also covered needs analysis, procurement, installation and training of new equipment and software which became necessary due to advances in technology, criminal behaviour and LEA competence. Conducting of training needs analysis, regular monitoring of the established intelligence analysts and the holding of regular, semi-annual regional meetings involving participating countries to increase knowledge and strengthening cross border cooperation were also added as elements of output 4.

The project revision document III is correct when it states that F23 should *“...continue to serve its valuable function of building a foundation for the CARICC project...”* and also to *“...reinforce the implementation and development of criminal intelligence analysis functionality by incorporating intelligence led policing functionalities at drug law enforcement agencies in the region”.*

Efficiency

Output 1 deals with the establishment of coherent and comprehensive systems for data and information collection, analysis and exchange in each BC. As far as the three countries being studied in detail for this evaluation are concerned – Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - the first thing that can be clearly seen and stated is that national strategies on data collection and information management related to

combating illicit drug trafficking have been formulated and put in place. This has included the definition in each BC of the lead LEA and its partner organisations by the government, making clear the roles and responsibilities of each and giving support to the efforts being made by each.

In Afghanistan, the Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) have been established as the lead with close support from the Criminal Justice task Force (CJTF). The situation in Kyrgyzstan is that the lead is taken by the Drug Control Service (DCS), working in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior (MoI). In Tajikistan, the lead LEA is the DCA which is also supported by the MoI. In all three countries, the Customs Administrations also have a role in drugs interdiction, due to their positions at border control points and their responsibilities for control, selection and examination of cargo and passengers luggage. Despite persistent efforts by the F23 project management team, including the provision of training and equipment, no Customs Administration could be said to be actively involved or truly committed to F23. This is to be regretted given the need for borders to be strengthened and agencies to cooperate and work together.

In all three beneficiary countries, specialist units for intelligence analysis have been set up, with staff trained, equipment and software installed, chains-of-command defined and focal points for cooperation appointed. This putting in place of solid structures is a major step forward in attempting to ensure sustainability of the results of the project and of the whole concept and strategy of intelligence-led policing. The experience and knowledge that have been acquired during the life of the project are in themselves tools that can support development and sustainability of all intelligence analysis structures.

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, drugs intelligence databases have been installed and are now being used to store related information, as well as processed intelligence. However, the databases are not just places of storage but they also allow for controlled but user-friendly access to all the information, assisting in its manipulation, analysis and the dissemination of actionable, focused and effective intelligence material. In Afghanistan, which was a later member to the project, drugs intelligence databases have not been effectively set up, despite the fact that appropriate software has been supplied. There seemed to be a hesitation about moving to the use of this software, even though it was accepted as necessary. Currently, all information that has been processed by the CNPA is stored in *Microsoft Word* format, which seems a strange choice as makes it difficult to efficiently and confidently work with information and because it goes against the training and advice supplied by the project, not least in the area of standardisation of intelligence material.

A very positive step in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is that concrete and comprehensive intelligence is being produced and acted upon; a slight downside to this is that there is a major focus on telephone analysis. This is in itself a plus, however, as the grasping and effective use of this analytical technique is important to the success of intelligence-led policing and to the continued development of the use of intelligence analysis. What is needed now is advancement in all three countries, in the adoption of an intelligence database in Afghanistan and the greater employment of a wider range of analytical techniques in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Output 2 concentrates on the training and building of capacity of specialist LEA staff in the management of information gathering and exchange systems. Due to the clear and vital need to complete comprehensive and detailed preparation, to establish structures, rules and guidance at very high levels and to have equipment installed and tested, it was not until 2003 that any prolonged and serious training in the use of analytical techniques and the associated software took place. This might seem like an unnecessarily long gap from the start of the project but it is important to bear in mind a number of relevant points when looking at the delivery of this output. In many ways, the introduction of intelligence

analysis and intelligence-led policing marked a significant shift in the focus and working practices of the beneficiary LEAs, where total, indiscriminate and random controls had formed the basis of strategies. It was important that the F23 project management were able to clearly explain to LEA management and staff of the benefits of this change, of the way this form of policing was supposed to work and of their important roles within it. A so-called 'hearts and minds' initiative was needed to achieve these requirements and there was no quick and easy way to go about this. Indeed, it is very much to the credit of the project designers that the need to establish such a firm foundation was realised at the project outset and that unrealistic targets for operational activity were not set.

It was equally important that workable structures were put in place and that appropriate equipment was procured. In this last matter, which will be elaborated elsewhere in this report, it was seen that despite the generous amount of time devoted to equipment needs analysis and taking into account fully the user requirements and strictly adhering to UN procurement rules, the IT solutions initially purchased and installed were not ultimately the most appropriate, necessitating a change of direction later on in the project.

All of the above is clear justification for what appears to be a delayed start to the operational training. However, once structures of sufficient robustness had been put into place, significant training got underway, not just in the use of the software that had been installed but also in the use of intelligence analysis techniques such as *Anacapa*, the collection, collation, storing and dissemination/sharing of intelligence, the completion of an information log form and the adoption of intelligence evaluation techniques that allow for the standardised understanding of the worth of a piece of intelligence and its source. Large amounts of training were delivered on a joint and regional basis, an accepted and totally appropriate best practice in the development of national and international cooperation, even if it was often a more resource intensive option than some others.

In response to requests from many of the beneficiaries the F23 project also delivered significant amounts of *in situ* training and mentoring on use of intelligence analysis software, including training based on live cases, thereby directly assisting in the development of the capacity of the intelligence analysis units whilst at the same time actively tackling the immediate need to supply actionable intelligence to operational staff.

As has been already mentioned, the new output 3 dealt with extending the country scope of F23 to include Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. In pursuance of this output, needs analyses regarding analytical capability, intelligence-led policing, systems, IT and training were conducted to allow a plan of delivery to be devised that was both achievable and in line with the requests, aspirations and capacity of the BAs. This part of the project was able to make valuable use of lessons learned from what had gone on so far in the project. In particular, the steady and measured approach to scene-setting, ensuring senior management support, drafting and putting in place intelligence analysis strategies and ensuring comprehensive needs analyses had been conducted prior to the commencement of training, skills transfer and mentoring meant developmental progress could be made at a relatively faster speed than had been achieved in the early stages of the project. This is a wholly understandable situation and is to the credit of the UNODC project management team that they put the lessons learned to very good effect. Additionally, as will be mentioned later on in the report, it was possible for project staff to identify and employ the training and operational expertise acquired and built up by analytical staff from other BAs, allowing them to pass on their own lessons learned and to release the UNODC staff for other project areas.

Output 4 deals with project scope expansion, building on the positive results and lessons learned by implementing additional intelligence-led policing components. This, in fact, turned out to be somewhat

resource intensive in terms of the UNODC project staff because of the need to meet with a wide range of agencies and staff in target countries for the purpose of introducing, explaining and convincing of the benefits of the further developments in the adoption of intelligence-led policing tools. It could be said that so far, the success has been inconsistent. Subjects such as strategic intelligence analysis, (including risk assessment, profiling, etc.), informant management (including the installation of informant databases), forensic intelligence and use of encryption software have all been introduced as areas for the progression of the project but have only been taken up in certain places and to limited degrees in others. Training and awareness sessions has been delivered, in detail, and to a comprehensive programme by the UNODC project staff but what they are attempting covers a wide scope and range of intelligence activity and is a drain on their limited resources, especially in operational fields.

In certain places only the EU-funded encryption software programme *Intellect* has been installed and is being used. Additionally, it is a common theme for the F23 project that certain countries and LEAs are more cooperative and progressive than others. The UNODC project staff have made admirable and praiseworthy efforts to be as inclusive of all BAs at all times and as far as possible - the cornerstone of any successful regional project - but take up has been varied. (Although not a direct subject of this evaluation, it is worth noting that Turkmenistan, a project beneficiary has so far declined to sign the latest project extension and revision document, despite the best efforts of the project staff and at present, therefore, is effectively not cooperating with either the national or regional aims. This is an illustration of the problems the project staff encounter in an effort to maintain an even-handed regional approach.).

One aspect of this output that can be regarded as a major success is in the universal uptake of the use of telephone analysis, making use of both the high quality training and the state-of-the-art, international standard software. Some significant cases have been developed and brought to successful prosecution using this form of sophisticated analysis. This is a major step forward operationally and should also be used, now, as a basis for the introduction and development of other analytical techniques such as financial analysis, product analysis and crime pattern analysis. Also as part of output 4, IT hardware and software has been supplied to all direct BAs, with the necessary training delivered, often by staff from regional LEAs rather than international experts; this is a noteworthy and highly encouraging step.

Finally as part of this output, the regular, six-monthly expert meetings are being held - much needed and appreciated fora for all participants and selected expert guests and stakeholders for the exchange of information, situation updates, familiarisation, the building up of contacts and the introduction of outside specialists and matters of concern. Output 4 has been an ambitious addition to F23 and combined with the increase of BAs as a result of output 3, has meant a stretching of the project management resources. This and the uneven take up and development across the project has, naturally led to the project staff concentrating their assistance more on those BAs who are progressive and cooperative. Given limited resources, this is entirely reasonable, although there is a risk to the even-handed regional approach that has sought through the life of the project to ensure equal treatment for all. There is a difficult balance to be achieved and the efforts made by the project management staff are to be commended in this respect.

Reference has already made to the informal, 'twin-track' approach whereby national and regional assistance has been delivered in parallel and with direct links. Right from the commencement of the project, there was a necessary attempt to standardise and harmonise in the development of intelligence-led strategies, the setting up of national structures and systems, the supply of equipment and delivery of training and technical assistance, being as far as possible at the same pace and to the same template across the region. At the same time, the notion of regional cooperation, harmonisation and information sharing was a concept inherent in the project from the beginning with the regional aims and objectives being clearly and obviously stated and worked towards. Despite the difficulties of national priorities, degrees of

isolationism and general suspicion, the project staff have kept to the plan of concerted regional development and, in fact, have to be congratulated on the ambitious plan of including Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into the project. With Armenia and Georgia now expressing serious desire to be considered for inclusion, comes a piece of significant and positive feedback of the correctness of the approach adopted and of the efforts of the F23 UNODC project staff.

F23 is currently managed at the operational level from the UNODC country programme office in Dushanbe, where an international and a national member of staff are responsible. Both are highly competent and dedicated but it must also be pointed out that both have other project and management responsibilities which mean that they are not always able to devote as much time and effort to F23 as they would like or feel is necessary. Administrative support is provided also from the Dushanbe office for the whole of the project and in each UNODC country programme office and in ROCA local administrative support is provided. It could be argued that for a regional project of the scope and range of F23 a dedicated advisor should be placed in each BC. This would allow for more direct and channelled assistance. However, this would also be a highly resource intensive operation in a project where significant amounts of money need to be spent on the supply of specialist equipment and its equally costly training. Therefore, the management arrangements adopted for F23 and outlined above, are considered both sensible and appropriate, especially when taking into consideration the regional aspirations of the project.

Financial management and procurement is handled by ROCA, an arrangement as is standard for many projects in Central Asia and allowing for harmonisation, purchasing power and the use of and compliance with UNODC procedures and expertise, thus releasing the project staff for concentration on technical and operational requirements.

The evaluation detailed by this report is the first formalised evaluation of the F23 project. However, project monitoring has taken place on regular and *ad hoc* bases throughout its life. In keeping with the laid-down UNODC guidelines, a project report is submitted annually. The project finance activity is managed and tracked centrally in ROCA with the use of the UN *ProFi* IT system, although F23 does not fully use the system, due to limited training in its use thus far and the need to upload a large amount of documents. Project revisions are made when required and also provide a means of project monitoring. Regular meetings have been organized with representatives of participating project countries in order to discuss project implementation, intelligence-led policing activities focusing on crime analysis and the use of available analysis software. Regular meetings are also held with donors and partners to update on F23 achievements, to discuss future funding and to understand donor needs. The bi-annual expert meetings provide another regular and formal opportunity to monitor project activity. Finally, the excellent regular contact that takes place between the project staff and the BAs means that elements of the project are monitored on an almost daily basis. This is highly appreciated by the BAs as a way of making sure that the project is made regularly aware of progress, needs and problems. F23 project staff travel extensively in the region as a means of project support and monitoring and will invariably take the opportunity to visit every BA when in a particular country, irrespective of the reason for the visit.

The following table shows the budgeting to take the project up until 2012. It is taken from the F23 project revision document V – the most recent one available.

Description	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Total approved budget (modular)	Addition of funds needed	Overall budget

						budget)		
	2008 and before	2009	2010	2011	2012	(1)	(2)	(3) (1)+(2) =
Travel in projects	96,277	12,423	51,100	37,000	15,000	162,800	49,000	211,800
15-99 Total Travel	96,277	12,423	51,100	37,000	15,000	162,800	49,000	211,800
International Experts	557,127	177,082	232,000	185,000	92,500	966,209	277,500	1,243,709
Short-term Intern. Consultants	67,957	43,328	59,000	147,000	-	170,285	147,000	317,285
Admin. Support Personnel	13,419	-	-	-	-	13,419	-	13,419
UN Volunteers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Personnel Costs	40,842	27,983	48,400	70,000	30,000	117,225	100,000	217,225
National project. staff and cons.	8,721	-	-	-	-	8,721	-	8,721
19-99 Total Personnel	688,066	248,393	339,400	402,000	122,500	1,275,859	524,500	1,800,359
Sub-Contracts	35,300	-	-	-	-	35,300	-	35,300
Grants to institutions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29-99 Total Subcontracts	35,300	-	-	-	-	35,300	-	35,300
Individual fellowships/Training	28,375	75,574	100,000	125,000	45,000	220,649	153,300	373,949
Study Tours	1,032	-	-	-	-	1,032	-	1,032
In-service training	18,553	-	-	-	-	18,553	-	18,553
Group Training	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Meetings	141,274	41,331	58,400	50,000	20,000	241,005	70,000	311,005
39-99 Total Training	189,236	116,905	158,400	175,000	65,000	481,240	223,300	704,540
Expendable equipment	13,087	113	-	-	-	13,200	-	13,200
Non-expendable equipment	1,104,980	195,614	67,500	161,500	1,500	1,368,094	163,000	1,531,094
Premises	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Equipment - local procurement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
49-99 Total Equipment	1,118,067	195,727	67,500	161,500	1,500	1,381,294	163,000	1,544,294
Operation and maintenance of equipment	54,856	16,030	16,300	20,000	10,000	92,187	25,000	117,187
Reporting costs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Sundries	16,582	1,510	2,100	4,000	2,000	23,192	3,000	26,192
General Operating Expenses	10,150	14,343	14,500	21,000	10,600	39,592	31,000	70,592
59-99 Total Miscellaneous	81,588	31,884	32,900	45,000	22,600	154,973	59,000	213,973
90-99 Project Subtotal	2,208,534	605,332	649,300	820,500	226,600	3,491,466	1,018,800	4,510,266
PSC to Reporting Agency	15,755	-	-	-	-	15,755	-	15,755
PSC to UNODC - UNODC impl .project	262,127	78,666	84,400	106,700	29,400	428,893	132,400	561,293
PSC to UNODC on shared project	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
56-99 Project Support Costs	277,882	78,666	84,400	106,700	29,400	444,648	132,400	577,048
99-99 Project Total	2,486,417	683,998	733,700	927,200	256,000	3,936,116	1,151,200	5,087,316

The 2 most recent Annual Reports state that all planned activities have been implemented based on the annual plan and with implementation rates exceeding 90%. Few major problems have been reported although the documents reviewed make clear that activities can only be successfully implemented with full support of beneficiaries and this is often required to be at governmental level. Additionally the *Annual Report* for 2011 states that “...delays with the project extension approval in some countries has been an issue in this reporting period and has meant that some activities had to be postponed...”.

Partnerships & Cooperation

What can be stated at the commencement of this section is that in all the interviews conducted in the pursuance of this evaluation, there was universally positive feedback for the efforts of the F23 project staff. This included the project management staff and the individual country programme administrative support. Indeed, it was often mentioned that the continued success of the project was due very much to their dedication, attitude, professionalism and expertise.

In the case of the F23 project, the partners come in two main forms; those who are donors and those who provide support, advice and who have an interest in the work of the project and the wider objective of drugs interdiction. In the case of donors, it is of course, important to ensure proper engagement; otherwise quite simply, future funds will not be forthcoming. Therefore, it is a major responsibility of the F23 project staff to maintain regular contact with donors, to report on what has been done with the funding, to demonstrate funds have been used for purposes in line with the donors’ intentions and to lobby for further funding as and when necessary. Through the life of the project funds have been donated by Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Turkey, UK and US. Currently F23 is support only by the US through the US Bureau of International Narcotics & Law (INAL) and the Canadian government.

Formal mid-term and end of funding reports are provided for the donors, but it is also in the regular and on-going contact – formal and informal – that the project is able to create and maintain synergies. Feedback from interview questions demonstrated satisfaction and appreciation for the efforts of the

project staff. It was however, also mentioned that greater visibility of activity could further inform donors and that greater outreach, especially to Embassies - in country - could result in greater pledging of funds which would in turn allow for expansion of the assistance currently being provided.

Similarly, operational partners are kept abreast of the projects progress and achievements through regular and on-going contact. Due to the regional and international nature of the F23 project, physical, face-to-face meetings are not always possible or cost effective. However, the use of progress reports and the bi-annual expert meetings are means to keep operational partners informed and to ensure effective coordination. The project coordinator takes on the role and responsibility for coordination amongst partners and his efforts are universally accepted as being effective, given the major constraints on his time; the open and communicative attitude of the project staff means that partners are in the main satisfied with the service that they receive.

CARICC remains a major partner for the F23 project, with the cooperation based on the sound and fundamental principle that it is the main client for the efforts of the BAs of F23. This is clearly demonstrated in project revision documents, *"Supporting the CARICC project is an important part of this strategy. It will be crucial to have the process of crime analysis and intelligence led policing methodologies fully implemented, accepted and used by the drug law enforcement agencies at a field level in order to support the CARRIC project. The field offices in turn will need to understand the concept and aims of CARRIC."*

The range of groups, projects and bodies that F23 has cooperated and coordinated with is wide; the issues of drugs trafficking, border controls, intelligence and regional cooperation in Central Asia are many and in such circumstances there is always the risk of overlap or omission. F23 has made strenuous efforts to play a major role in coordination whilst at the same time maintaining a focus on its own objectives and responsibilities. Amongst the groups that F23 with were/are UNODC regional and national projects (including D65, E24, G28, G64, H03), Interpol, the Foreign Anti-Narcotics Community (FANC), Organisation for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), US Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA), UK Serious & Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), CADAP, NADIN, Police Intelligence (POLINT) and the INAL. On some occasions, the close relationships forged and the professional attitude of the F23 project staff resulted in funding or assistance being provided for the project by those not involved as formal donors.

In general, the donors and partners expressed satisfaction with the delivery of the project outputs, although some issue was made of the standard 13% fee taken from all funding as the service charge for UNODC operations. Although this was explained by project and finance staff on a number of occasions, some donors, especially the US were somewhat critical of the 'loss' of what they regarded a significant amount from the genuine work of the project.

Donor visibility is limited in places, although UNODC visibility was clearly seen on much of the equipment donated to the project. Amongst the BAs – management and staff – there was only limited knowledge as to who the partners and donors to the project were.

Effectiveness

As can already be seen, although the F23 project has been in operation for a considerable amount of time, it has also achieved much in terms of operational results and the structures that have resulted. In the early part of the project, much was done in terms of preparation of the BCs to adopt, understand, utilise and benefit from the employment of intelligence analysis, information exchange and ultimately,

intelligence-led policing. In order to reach this stage much painstaking behind-the-scenes work was conducted by the project staff, a process that not only required patience and foresight but also diplomacy, when having to confront the twin obstacles of inter-service/international suspicions and security of information. The importance of the tasks of the initial stages of the project should not be underestimated and their generally effective completion laid the foundation for the activities that followed. The tasks undertaken included:

- Recruitment of project experts (including IT experts)
- ‘Sign up’ of the BCs to the project
- Identification of lead LEA for drugs interdiction in each BC
- Drafting and agreement of inter-agency documents
- Agreement on types of data to be collected
- Common understanding of the activities to be conducted
- Provision of office space in each BA
- Drafting of BA instructions
- Donor outreach for funding pledges
- Drafting of blueprints for data collection and management
- Equipment needs analysis
- Drafting of IT and equipment specifications
- Training needs analysis

Whilst all these activities were taking place, the project staff were providing advice, support, encouragement and technical assistance to the BAs as well as coordinating with donors and partners as summarised in the previous section of the report.

The fulfilment of all the above tasks meant that in each BC, intelligence analysis units, focused on drugs interdiction were set up, intelligence systems were put in place at least ‘on paper’ and that there was sufficient ‘buy in’ to the project both from BC and BAs.

With this stage of the project completed, the foundation was in place to progress towards the operational use of what had been donated and the production of functioning and actionable intelligence under a strategy of intelligence-led policing. All of what had taken place and all of what was to come, was to be conducted with the regional focus and ultimate objective of proactive sharing of information, drugs interdiction cooperation and the support of international efforts such as CARICC.

Now the project activities turned to equipment, training and technical assistance, three staples of international development. The activities undertaken included

The equipment supplied included the following:

- Desk top and laptop computers, printers, scanners, servers, transformers, memory sticks.

- Local area network
- *TAIS* (Telecommunications Analytical Information System) – *ONTOS* software
- *i2* software including *Analyst Notebook* and *iBase*
- *i2* dongles (software security keys)
- Intelligence databases
- *Intellect* encryption software

To make full use of the hardware and software that was supplied, a comprehensive and high volume of training was delivered, following the training needs analysis conducted in the early stages of the project. The training delivered included the following:

- Intelligence analysis
- Management training
- *Anacapa* techniques
- Use of *TAIS-ONTOS*
- Use of *i2 Analyst Notebook*
- Use of *iBase*
- Intelligence awareness
- Informant management
- Intelligence evaluation
- Use of geographical information systems
- Use of *Microsoft Excel*

As far as was possible, training was delivered in joint situations (national and/or regional) and at the requests of the BAs with as much use of practical examples and work on live cases as was possible.

In addition, to the on-going support provided by the F23 project staff, certain other measures of technical assistance were delivered including the following:

- Study tours
- Operational mentoring
- Expert meetings and other fora

Comparison of these activities with the original project document and the subsequent project revisions demonstrate a close harmony and match, with the vast majority of programmed outcomes having been

delivered. As has already been discussed, the amounts of delivery and their effectiveness have varied on a country-to-country and agency-to-agency basis. The situations in the three countries studied for this evaluation can be summarised as follows.

Afghanistan – Not an original member of F23 but a natural candidate to join as the project developed. It has its own, specific issues when it comes to security, politics, donor coordination and over-load, corruption, conditions of service and recruitment. However, both the CNPA and CJTF have intelligence analysis units set up, with staff appointed, training delivered and are producing the beginnings of concrete and actionable intelligence and analysis.

Kyrgyzstan – The project in Kyrgyzstan suffered from instability amongst the LEAs, resulting directly from governmental and political pressures and considerations. Initially, the lead agency and therefore, the major beneficiary of the project was the DCA. However, once the project was under way and significant steps had been taken, the role was taken away and given to the MoI. Whilst this did not mean an entirely new start for the project as the MoI was also a BA, it was definitely an unfortunate and backward step. However, work with the MoI continued using the templates of establishing the project as described in earlier parts of the report. Progress was again made. Once again, though, politics and reorganisation intervened, a new lead LEA was set up, this time the DCS. Once again, the project had to accommodate this change. In Kyrgyzstan itself, the change was compounded by the transfer of some intelligence analysis staff and equipment from the MoI to the DCS. In some ways, this made sense as it preserved the established experience, allowing the DCS to start work from a base that had some foundation. However, the removal of such precious resources from MoI impeded their progress and created a tension between the two agencies which was not conducive to the spirit and intention of operational cooperation.

Tajikistan – Of the three BCs, it is clear that Tajikistan has made the most progress and of all the BAs concerned the Tajikistan DCA demonstrates the most professional and operationally competent intelligence analysis structure. There are a number of reasons for this, above and beyond just the positive developmental strategy adopted. Firstly, the F23 project is based in Tajikistan and so it is natural, easier and totally understandable that Tajik LEA have had more direct and more regular access to the project staff. Secondly, the Tajik DCA has been a direct beneficiary of another UNODC project – TD/TAJ/H03 – which has as its objectives the establishment of a competent counter narcotics agency within the country. Thirdly, the Director General of the DCA has been in place since its inception; this degree of stability right at the top of the organisation has contributed greatly to its development. This fact and the general progress of the DCA can be seen as models for other BAs and BCs providing encouragement and vision as to what can be achieved, as well as vital lessons learned.

Procurement of analytical software can be seen as a major component of the project, an element involving significant cost and training. It has already been shown that in the early stages of the project, an equipment needs analysis was conducted. This involved major consultation with the beneficiaries, who would become the users of the software. The consensus reached for the software to be supplied was for the *TAIS-ONTOS* system; one main reason being that it could operate in the Russian language. This was considered important at the time as few staff from the BAs could work in English, a more common language internationally in the field of intelligence analysis. *TAIS-ONTOS* was duly supplied, installed and trained. The analysts started to use it to develop cases using the intelligence analysis training they had received. However, as the project progressed and the BA staff became more familiar with the intelligence analysis process and with other types of software available, it became apparent that *TAIS-ONTOS* was no longer the best solution. Therefore, an important and brave decision was made to cease providing assistance for *TAIS-ONTOS* and to switch to the more commonly used *i2* system, which operated in English. This decision was not taken lightly and the BAs were involved at all stages, agreeing with the

change in direction. Detailed discussions were held with *Avicom*, the producers of *TAIS-ONTOS* to attempt to find a solution that would allow the system still to be used. Ultimately, however, these proved fruitless. The distinct advantage in the use of *i2* software is that it has become an international standard in analytical software and whilst expensive to purchase, it brings the benefit that it is widely used around the world, making its analytical products readily understood when shared with fellow users – an important element of the standardisation of intelligence cooperation. With the benefit of hindsight, the decision to initially purchase *TAIS-ONTOS* might now look unfortunate. However, the world of intelligence software is an ever developing, ever changing one and it would perhaps be more accurate to state that the original decision was a correct one based on the user requirements and general principles of logic, whilst the move to *i2* was made much easier thanks to the foundations laid in the use of intelligence analysis skills using *TAIS-ONTOS*. Indeed, when the F23 project commenced, *i2* software was far from the developed and sophisticated product currently available and had not achieved the degree of market share and international acceptance that it has subsequently. The *TAIS-ONTOS* systems donated and installed are still in place within the BAs and can be used; similarly, it is in use at CARICC.

The F23 project is still in operation, is still developing and its full potential has yet to be realised. However, as has already been seen, its achievements have been significant and the effects are noticeable. In summary, they can be stated as follows:

- Acceptance of the importance of intelligence-led policing
- Implementation of intelligence-led policing strategies
- Nomination of lead and support agencies in counter narcotics matters
- Creation of intelligence analysis units with agency and national focal points for information exchange
- Production of actionable intelligence
- Acceptance by prosecution bodies of the importance of analytical products; acceptance as admissible evidence in prosecution cases
- Creation of a regional network of intelligence analytical units
- Exchange of intelligence analysis national and regionally
- Successful incorporation of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into the project
- Ability to provide project training resources from within the project BA
- Recognition of the project on the international scene

The project has installed modern intelligence systems and *i2* analysis software in 17 LEAs throughout Central Asia, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. Approximately 180 staff has been trained in intelligence analysis techniques at various levels. All relevant agencies have analysts working with *i2* software who are able to create analytical reports and visualization charts in support of operational activity.

It has to be pointed out that many of these achievements are still in limited or embryonic stage. However, when the starting point of the project is considered along with the resourcing and management difficulties posed by the regional nature of the project, F23 can be considered a qualified success thus far and a

springboard for more intensive intelligence analysis development and the possible inclusion of other members such as Armenia and Georgia.

As far as obstacles and limitations to the project progress are concerned, the analytical software dilemma has already been described. A number of others must be highlighted, although it is important to also point out that the F23 project staff has taken active steps, at times both pragmatic and imaginative to minimise their effects, always in consultation with the BAs.

The anti-narcotics trafficking strategies that the project has helped to put into place, especially the creation of lead drug control bodies, are still young and have not yet had time to become embedded as part of the fabric of government and law enforcement. As a result, they remain vulnerable to change; in intelligence matters it is widely accepted that it is not a short term measure and that systems and staff should be given time to acquire experience and knowledge. The intelligence systems are also susceptible to political interference and the threat of such; the lack of a certain degree of independence hinders the development of confidence and limits the platform for taking ambitious and innovative steps.

Staff rotation is also a serious issue. The rotation process is a well-known and accepted motivational and anti-corruption measurement within government administrations. However, regular rotation impedes the development of skills and experience of the individual operators themselves. Low salaries and unfavourable conditions of employment exacerbate this situation.

Physical security issues, especially with regard to Afghanistan have also intruded into the project from time-to-time, making planned events not always possible or causing major travel and logistics problems. To travel the short distance from the F23 project office in Dushanbe to Kabul, often necessitates long flights via Istanbul or Dubai.

The differing levels of support in each BC and BA have also been highlighted, but it must be reiterated that inconsistent development means the need for more individual tailoring of assistance delivery. The F23 project team have gone to great lengths to accommodate this situation and their efforts should be praised and have been positively acknowledged by many BAs. However, the very fact that assistance has had to be provided in this less than uniform way has meant greater use of resource.

Finally, as has been detailed in other parts of the report, the laudable aims of creating a regional intelligence analysis network and capability have meant finding solutions that were not always the cheapest or lowest in terms of staffing or time resources, even when making use of UN purchasing power and established suppliers. The sheer fact that the project now seeks to take in 7 BCs and to spread resources evenly amongst them means that significant savings cannot always be made. The bringing together of BA staff for joint training and meetings is a vital part of the process of confidence building and exchange of information but it comes at a price, which could be lessened were the project to be implemented on merely national lines.

Impact

It is perhaps natural when evaluating an anti-narcotics project to look for evidence of impact in tangible results such as detections and confiscations of drugs and assets, arrests and successful prosecutions of offenders and the breaking up of criminal organisations. These are results to be desired by project staff and beneficiaries alike. However, it is too simplistic to regard them as indicators of impact in a project such as F23 as these results are dependent on many factors other than those attended to by the project

and which are out with its control. Additionally, amongst the BAs it was difficult to obtain specific details of results and of the part played by F23. Successful criminal cases are often the result of a synergy of a number of factors, of which the use of intelligence material is only one. It is also often difficult to be accurate about the exact amount of contribution to the overall result.

For evidence of impact, we need to look at more structural and operational indicators, demonstrating major changes in behaviour, attitudes, strategies and work practices.

It can be confidently stated that the F23 project is improving intelligence analysis and information management capacities (mechanisms for exchange, receipt and dissemination of information between DCA) in the Central Asian region, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.

Internationally accepted, tried and tested intelligence analysis methodologies, strategies and policies are now in place and embedded as routine aspects of law enforcement, especially in regard to drugs interdiction whilst modern and sophisticated software now allows for the efficient and accurate processing of information and intelligence. The regional networks that the project has fostered and supported allow for the exchange of actionable intelligence and analytical material.

However, criminal intelligence as a discipline and intelligence analysis as a tool are still relatively new concepts for the region and existing mechanisms for collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information, including access to information sources, have need and potential for improvement and so that greater impact can be seen. It is true to say that the objective of intelligence-led policing as a routine and accepted method of working, with its emphasis on areas such as risk analysis, tackling organised crime, prioritisation and effective resource allocation is still a long way from being fulfilled in all project locations, although in some such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, good foundations are clearly in place.

On a regional level, too, it has to be admitted that despite the best efforts of the project management staff, the progress has been less than they would have wished and the resultant impact perhaps even disappointing. The difficulties of managing and sustaining a regional project have already been defined as have the steps taken by the project staff to mitigate some of them, but the fact remains that the exchange of intelligence material is still patchy, *ad hoc* and inconsistent. A comment made by BA staff interviewed on a number of occasions was that the information exchanged, especially at a regional level, was rarely of a live and operational nature, being in the main of historical and high-level content. The project intention with regard to effective regional information exchange and cooperation was to make the process routine and embedded; normal working procedure and not an event to be remarked upon. Whilst information exchange can be demonstrated, the impact of F23 has been of a limited nature. One BA staff member interviewed went as far as to say that regional information exchange was not necessary, thus demonstrating the somewhat negative and out-dated attitudes that the project staff has to work with on occasion.

However, also in the regional context, the inclusion of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into the project at their own request clearly shows regional impact, and is a good indicator of its value. Additionally, the interest shown by Armenia and Georgia to be involved only goes to further emphasise that there has been regional impact. The creation of CARICC and the instigation of its related UNODC project is also a clear sign that information and intelligence is being produced and that it has value on a regional and even international level. The existence and operation of CARICC, as the foremost Central Asian and Caucasus anti-narcotics information and intelligence centre, is due in no small way to the effects of F23 project

Sustainability

The F23 project has been in existence since 2001 and during that period much has been delivered in the way of equipment, training and technical assistance and, as has already been demonstrated, much has been achieved on a short to mid-term level. Most importantly, given the resource that has been spent and the severity of the drugs trafficking situation through Central Asia, the benefits of the project can be sustained, developed and built upon.

Earlier sections of the report have detailed some of the obstacles to the project. A significant one has been the rotation, transfer and resignation of staff in whom significant resource has been invested and who have had the opportunity to build up much needed experience. As a result, there has been a need for regular repeat and refresher training, on many occasions having to start once more from the basics. This clearly is a far from optimum situation when discussing the issue of sustainability. The project staff are more than well aware of the unsatisfactory nature of the situation and have taken steps within their resource limitations to address the matter by proposing restrictions in staff rotation, improvements in terms and conditions, the introduction of a form of career structure within intelligence and employment contracts which could assist in members of staff retaining their positions within intelligence structures. However, the success of these efforts has been limited, sometimes by national employment law, sometimes by funding limitations and lack of political will. It is an area where further and intensive efforts are required (see recommendations below). At the same time, it is also important to point out that issues of recruitment and retention are in the main beyond the remit of the project and of UNODC.

In order to mitigate the effects of this issue, the project has taken significant and praiseworthy steps towards creating *in house* training capacity. This too is a problematic area, with regard to retention of those trained, and requires constant monitoring from the project staff. However, as can be clearly seen in the case of the Tajikistan DCA, the creation and development of *in house* intelligence analysis training capacity is possible. Selected staff from this service, now experienced in the use of intelligence analytical techniques, as a result of the F23 project has been further trained as trainers, training materials have been devised, training programmes written and important training delivery is taking place. Furthermore, these trainers have been used by the F23 project to provide basic training to other BAs, notably those of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan when they joined the project. As has been demonstrated on many occasions throughout this report, training has been a significant part of the project. Therefore, the ability to provide *in house* training will obviously prove to be of significant benefit as the project moves forward and attempts to successfully embed the new intelligence-led policing methodologies and strategies.

Equipment supply, whether hardware or software, has been another significant and costly element of the project. Its maintenance and update is obviously a major element of the sustainability issue. In the majority of BAs, *in house* IT support is available and dedicated to the effective operation of the intelligence analysis units. On occasions, understandably, some of the equipment donated towards the beginning of the project, is becoming or has become outdated and is in need of upgrade or replacement. Once again, this would be a costly matter, although with the expertise acquired thus far, installation should be more easily achieved.

In reality, the UNODC and its donors cannot be expected to continue to financially support the IT requirements for intelligence assistance into the long-term future. In some BCs, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, this kind of funding appears not to be a major problem. However, for the others, it can represent a major obstacle and concern. Once again, lessons can be learned from what has taken place in Tajikistan where the DCA has taken steps independent of the UNODC to approach donors with regard

to funding. With government and agency funds being limited, this is an approach which has obvious merit and should perhaps be considered by other BAs.

The regional information exchange and cooperation aspects of the F23 project are still some significant distance from being regarded as institutionalised and structurally solid. The immediate sustainability is perhaps limited at best. However, the presence of CARICC as the overarching Central Asian and Caucasus drugs intelligence centre provides a possible opportunity for solidifying and systematising of the regional counter-narcotics aspirations of the project. As CARICC is both the recipient of intelligence produced by the strategies that resulted from the project and the regional cooperation body, it can offer expectations of effective sustainability of regional and international efforts.

At the commencement of the F23 project it was clear that there was a need to secure governmental, ministerial and senior management support. Achieving this was a major objective; significant resource and effort was dedicated and sufficient high-level buy-in resulted. In order for the work of the F23 project to be sustainable into the long-term future, these levels of support must continue. It is, therefore, important that UNODC, donors, partners, stakeholders and, most importantly, the BAs themselves, maintain channels of communication, provide meaningful feedback and integrate their approaches with these decision makers. Visibility, transparency and proactive communication will, therefore, be necessary.

An excellent foundation has been laid for effective intelligence-led policing. However, as can be seen in the section above, the strenuous efforts and clear focus that the project has thus far adopted must be maintained if the objectives are to be fully sustainable into the long-term future.

III. CONCLUSIONS

It can be concluded that to a major degree the F23 project has been a success so far. Changes in long-held working practices, the introduction of new technologies, progress towards sustainability, regional and international recognition and a solid base for regional cooperation are now all in place to a greater or lesser degree. The efforts that have been made, both by the project staff and the BAs themselves, have been significant and are worthy of acknowledgment. The difficulties that the project faced have already been detailed, whilst the pragmatic and imaginative ways in which the whole project was tackled have demonstrated the commitment to the BCs of the project staff, in particular and of the UNODC in general. Indeed, much of what has been achieved so far can be attributed to the personal efforts of the project staff that were widely praised and complimented in the interviews undertaken for this evaluation. Their communication skills and accessibility, as well as their technical and practical knowledge, were particularly highlighted as being of vital importance to the project implementation; this applied to the national and the regional objectives. As a result of in-depth groundwork, a solid base for intelligence-led policing in the region has emerged. Modern techniques and processes have been adopted and learnt; much time and assistance has allowed for the acquiring of experience.

But this evaluation report has already pointed out and highlighted that the work of the project is far from finished. Indeed, one opinion might be that for a project effectively started in 2002 the results are less than would be hoped. However, it is important to restate the achievements and changes that have occurred from a starting point that was far from conducive to the implementation of intelligence-led policing and the use of intelligence analysis.

The regional aspirations of the project are laudable and absolutely necessary if drug trafficking from Afghanistan through the region is to be effectively tackled. However, projects with any regional components are often difficult to deliver successfully. Once again, through the professional and inclusive efforts of the project staff, regional cooperation and information exchange progress has been made, but in itself, it cannot be said yet to be at a level that is acceptable, effective or sustainable. Continued efforts using the current model of joint training courses, meetings and seminars and the utilisation wherever possible of *in house* training capacity need to continue; there is no place for a relaxation of effort or commitment.

The potential inclusion of Armenia and Georgia should be seen as an indicator of solid progress and regional impact; if this development can come to pass, it is to be welcomed and many of the lessons learned in the project already will allow for the smooth integration of the LEAs from these countries.

The problems of high-level support and recruitment and retention of intelligence staff must be taken seriously, as finding solutions is key to providing the climate for sustainability. The international standing and good reputation of the UNODC and of many of the donors and partners should be brought to bear on this situation where the changing of current practices can only be achieved through action at the highest level.

New forms of intelligence analysis, additional software and the use of other intelligence and research techniques must also be explored in order to comprehensively develop the achievements to date.

With the current project commitments and the possibilities of expansion, the current staffing resource is clearly overstretched from time to time. Steps need to be taken to secure additional funding to allow for the recruitment of staff to supplement and support those already in place. Any international experts recruited to deliver further assistance must be able to demonstrate working knowledge and practical experience of intelligence-led law enforcement, be advocates of information exchange and cooperation and show commitment to the development of each of the BAs and of the regional capacity. The current staffing levels are insufficient to effectively fulfil the ambitious but fully appropriate project objectives, both at national and regional level.

The project has quite rightly focused on drug control bodies and national MoI. However, other agencies also have an important role to play in drugs interdiction, especially Customs Administrations, and although efforts have been made by the F23 project to include this latter, little progress has been made and only inconsistent interest has been shown. If the anti-narcotics effort in the project region is to be fully effective and comprehensive, then other responsible bodies, such as Customs Administrations and Security Services, need to be more heavily involved, with their participation on a more systematic and formalised basis than is the case at present.

Implementation of the project objectives has been somewhat inconsistent, with some BAs being more cooperative or committed than others. This is, in a way, only to be expected, but at the same time poses a risk to the project's regional focus. It is natural for the project staff to focus more on the committed and progressive BAs, but for effective regional drugs interdiction, it is important that the other BAs are not excluded.

Much positive comment was made in the interviews conducted for the evaluation regarding the training and assistance given concerning live and on-going cases. Future training and technical assistance needs to follow this model, focusing on practical skills transfer and operational work, rather than that of a more theoretical nature.

The F23 project staff should be acknowledged for their insight and employment of local knowledge that has allowed excellent working relationships to be effected and tailor-made activities undertaken to best meet the needs and requests of the BAs. Their flexibility and even-handed approach has greatly enhanced the dialogue with the BAs which has, in turn, led to the achievements outlined in this report.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations made below, apply in the main to the F23 project staff themselves, as they concern actions and tasks that the project will need to plan, instigate and then deliver. All, naturally, will have to be in partnership with the appropriate beneficiaries. In a few cases, the recommendations are also focused on local beneficiaries or other groups but always through the medium of the F23 project and the UNODC in general.

UNODC F23

Open source is a form of information collection management that involves finding, selecting, and obtaining information from publicly available sources (generally via the internet) and analysing it to produce actionable intelligence. In the intelligence community, the term open refers to overt, publicly available sources (as opposed to covert or classified sources). In recent years, the use of open source information for the research and the building of intelligence and criminal cases has expanded and a number of LEA in Europe and worldwide employ highly skilled staff to perform in this area. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that training and mentoring, preferably provided by experts from law enforcement agencies be delivered to allow BA staff to further develop their analytical cases and to provide intelligence for clients that is as comprehensive and researched as possible. One aspect of the training could and should include instruction in the use of automatic translation programmes as this is a standard in open source work. **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that expert services be employed to explore with subscription website providers means to keep costs to a minimum or even zero.

Three elements of the F23 project that drew regular praise from those interviewed were the regional expert meetings held in different locations once every six months, joint training that was delivered and the *in house* training capacities that are beginning to emerge and be developed. All are crucial to the continued growth and sustainability of the intelligence analysis implemented as a result of the project and cannot be under estimated. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that support for the expert meetings continue, that they be increased to once every four months and that continuity of membership be assured so as to give those attending an indication of the importance of the role and allowing for the building up of a network that is able to communicate and provide support each other away from the physical meetings. **IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED** that as much future training delivery as possible is of a joint nature (national or international). **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that increased use of *in house* training delivery be made for future training, especially that of a basic level, with trainers of one BA and/or BC being enabled to travel to partners and neighbours to conduct events. The use of *in house* trainers has a number of benefits which include that of being able to train in a common language, understand local conditions and have experience of the development process. Additionally, **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that further

support be given to the development of *in house* training in the area of intelligence analysis through training courses, educational material and mentoring, with a view to establishing a regional capability, a trainer pool from which suitable staff can be selected when required (it is possible that the Tajikistan DCA, the most developed so far in terms of in house analytical training, could be used a model for regional replication and adoption).

Although a substantial amount of IT hardware and software has already been supplied as part of the F23 project, not all BAs have up-to-date equipment or sufficient for their developing needs. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that an equipment needs analysis is conducted for all beneficiary agencies with a view to establishing needs, especially in the areas of computers and *i2* software keys (*dongles*). **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that consideration is given to the donation of UNODC's own IT equipment when it is routinely replaced. Additionally, since the inception of the F23 project, there have been significant developments in associated software programmes. **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that a needs analysis be conducted to determine what additional programmes and features might be supplied to build upon the basis in place and progress being made. Areas of interest should include further programmes produced by *i2*, the comprehensive use of the EU funded *Intellect* data encryption programme (thus removing one objection – lack of security of information - to the exchange of data nationally and regionally) and open source websites and programmes.

Significant progress has been made amongst the beneficiary agencies in the use of some analytical techniques and the associated software. However, this does focus very much in the main on telephone analysis. This acquired expertise has provided a sound basis for the work of the intelligence analysis units and should now be used for the training, introduction and adoption of the use of other analytical techniques and software. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that a needs analysis be conducted to establish user requirements in standard and internationally accepted analytical techniques such as financial transactions, commodities, crime pattern and offender groups. Standard and off-the-shelf packages for the installation and training of these techniques are commercially available.

The work of all BA operational analysis units is very much dependent on the activities of operational law enforcement staff for it is they who provide information to the units to allow for processing, analysis and enhancement to take place. If information is not received, the work of the intelligence analysis unit is severely restricted. At the same time, operational law enforcement staff are themselves clients of the units and should be able to access information and request analysis to assist them in their day-to-day work. At present, despite the best efforts within some beneficiaries, there is a relatively low level of understanding and acceptance of the intelligence analytical unit by operational LEA staff and of their own obligations to the intelligence process. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that a comprehensive awareness training programme be designed and established, to be delivered to as many operational staff as possible, preferably in situ in their work places with as much participative learning as possible. **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that this awareness training should include the adoption of the internationally accepted 4x4 intelligence evaluation system and standardised/user-friendly reporting documents. **IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED** that training of trainers events take place to give those selected from amongst the operational intelligence analysts to deliver the awareness training, the material and confidence needed to fix in place the role of intelligence within modern law enforcement.

UNODC F23 and Beneficiary DCA, MoI and Police

Much complimentary comment was made by the vast majority of BAs regarding the training and mentoring provided by international experts. What was especially appreciated was the way that the experts, who were all experienced operational users of analytical techniques and software, had assisted through side-by-side skills transfer in the development of live and on-going cases, on an individual basis. More of this type of training was requested as was the need for continuation in this type of training delivery and of the experts employed. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that a training/mentoring sub-project be designed and delivered that would allow a small team or pairing of experts to be effectively embedded within BA operations (security permitting) to work at developing the skills of the BA staff through the development of active cases (the pairing should have a mixture of analytical and operational intelligence experience and skills). **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that these experts operate on a continual rotation basis spending possibly one/two week per BC before moving to another and repeating the exercise to a scheduled timetable. The rotation of the experts would mean that they could act as information channels between the BAs that they were supporting and would allow for the cross-fertilisation of ideas, lessons learned and updates from one BA to another. A small team or pairing would allow for communication and mutual support but by deploying the experts in separate locations for most of the time, a greater coverage of BAs could be achieved. The need for the experts to be embedded has to be emphasised and **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that senior management support is obtained for this prior to the commencement of the activity. Once one 'round' of training and mentoring had taken place, the same experts would repeat the visiting process thus building on the trust and familiarity already established and bringing the lessons learned from the visits made.

A serious obstacle to the conducting of the F23 project and the development of operational analysis capacity is the rotation, transfer and resignation of staff that have been trained, mentored, gained experience and been the subjects of significant investment. Within law enforcement, intelligence in particular, is a discipline that needs time for staff to gain experience, however suitable and of high quality any training and equipment might be. Rotation of staff is an established human resource management device for the gaining of a wide range of experience and the prevention of corruption. However, in intelligence terms, it is a distinct hindrance. Therefore, **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that significantly longer rotation or tenure periods be allowed for staff who have been appointed and trained as operational analysts, with justifiable opportunities for the prolonging of these periods should stringent criteria be met. **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that a review of employment conditions, selection, employment contracts, pay and grading, *in house* promotion and national employment law be undertaken in each BA with a view to producing employment contracts that ensure continuity of service by intelligence analytical staff but with adequate safeguards, status and incentives.

F23, Beneficiary Country Customs Administrations and external Customs assistance projects

Customs Administrations have a vital role to play in drugs interdiction as they act as the 'gate-keepers' of national borders, performing risk analysis, selection, controls and examinations of cargo and the private goods of passengers. Customs Administrations are also depositories of large amounts of information that can assist in intelligence analysis. At present, their participation in the F23 project has been inconsistent

and limited. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that renewed efforts are made to involve the Customs Administrations of the BCs in the project in a more structured and committed way, even if only as potential information sources that can feed into the national and CARICC efforts. In order to achieve this, **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that use be made of international bodies who are supporting and assisting the Custom Administrations of the project region such WCO, the EU and US Agency for International Development (USAID).

UNODC and CARICC

A major principle of intelligence work is that there should be no process and no product without an end user; the client. A major client of the BAs of the F23 project is CARICC. It is a project supported by UNODC. In fact CARICC would only perform at limited effectiveness without the feeding in of intelligence and information from the operational analytical units of the BAs. **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that as far as possible CARICC be consulted, involved in and used as a means of progressing the F23 project whether as a source of best practice, a site for events, a communication tool, a source of experts or a client for intelligence material. The closer that CARICC is bound together with the project BAs, the greater the likelihood of the sustainable development of both. Additionally, **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that F23 project management continue and enhance their current good practices of donor identification and coordination, proactively seeking out all possible opportunities to actively collaborate and to share resources such as with the upcoming *Heroin Route 2* technical assistance project which will be funded by the EU and in whose ToR are many activities that cross cut with F23.

One of the great strengths and opportunities of the F23 project is its regional aspect. And despite the work that has been done thus far, it is no surprise that each BC and BA has developed at a different pace. As a result, all beneficiaries find themselves at different levels of operational capacity. **IT IS RECOMMENDED**, that a region-wide bench marking exercise be conducted involving a selected member of staff from each beneficiary being seconded to a small team that would then travel to all the project beneficiaries in turn, using structured questions and indicators to gauge and assess progress made. The objectives of the exercise would include the comparison of working practices, the identification of weaknesses in systems currently under operation, the identification of best practices and approaches that have proved successful, the production of a comprehensive report detailing the activities and findings and the detailing of recommendations for the adoption of new and improved working practices. Experience shows that this process allows a great team spirit to develop that can be harnessed at later dates as well as the chance to see at the work of others at first hand. The information gathering process would take place through presentations by host beneficiaries, structured interviews and site visits on a progressive basis, visiting each beneficiary in turn and one after the other. As well as involving all the direct project beneficiaries, **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that a visit to learn about the analytical capacity and operation of CARICC also be included in this exercise.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

A project of the nature of the F23, with its marked emphasis on fundamental changes in behaviours and procedures and its regional element, cannot be effectively implemented unless there is support at the highest level in the BCs.

The changes in procedures and the adoption of unfamiliar techniques and methodologies that the F23 project proposed could only be achieved effectively with detailed and comprehensive planning. It was vital that this involved consultation and agreement with the BAs in order to obtain a sufficient degree of ownership to allow for project implementation.

The nature of the F23 project raised issues regarding security of data and criminal information. It was vital to the success of the project that the experts employed were able to demonstrate clear commitment, professionalism and operational working experience. It is very difficult to show that one can be trusted, but when an expert can clearly be seen as a dedicated fellow professional, acceptance followed by trust can be achieved.

Flexibility, pragmatism and innovation in project delivery are often necessary, especially in projects of the length of the F23 where developments in trends, possibilities and risks will occur and all need to be taken into consideration, within the project framework itself and in relation to the needs and requirements of the beneficiaries.

ANNEX I – Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR MID-TERM PROJECT EVALUATION

1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Project/Sub-programme Number	RERF23
Project Title	Strengthening drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange
Project Duration	June 2001 to June 2012
Location	Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Afghanistan and Azerbaijan
UNODC Regional / Country or Thematic Programme Outcome to which this programme/project directly contributes	1. Rule of law 1.2. International cooperation in criminal justice matters
Executing Agency	UNODC
Partner organization	n/a
Total Approved Budget	\$5,087,315
Donor(s)	Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, UNDP
Project Coordinator	Mr. Christer Brannerud
Type of evaluation (mid-term or final):	Mid-term
Time period covered by the evaluation:	10 years, 6 months
Geographical coverage	Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Afghanistan and Azerbaijan

of the evaluation:

Core Learning Partners1 (entities)	n/a
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Brief description: The project’s objectives are to provide “a coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, and information collection, analysis and exchange is established”.

The project area of responsibility includes the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.

Combating illicit drug trafficking requires well-organized systems of information/data collection, processing and analysis, as well as the exchange of the final information product among agencies involved at national and regional levels.

Project F23 has improved criminal intelligence analysis and information management capacities, and further developed mechanisms for collection, evaluation, exchange and dissemination of information between drug control agencies in the Central Asian region, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. However the need to further developing a more sophisticated and proper mechanism for the collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information and data results is obvious and has been set as one of the priorities for the continuation of F23 project’s activities fully supported by the attending countries.

At present, counter narcotic agencies, cooperating within the frame of project F23, collect information and data in accordance with local requirements and needs.

However, some of the agencies databases are structured in different formats for information retrieval. Such a situation is creating an incompatibility of existing databases and difficulties of effective exchange of computerized information.

The F23 “project philosophy” is to teach *similar* working methodologies and using *same* analysis software and database structures. Such approach will stimulate national and regional cooperation between agencies and encourage the sharing of information and analytical products between Intelligence analysts from participating countries.

The project has installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software in 17 counter narcotic agencies in the project area. Approximately 170 officers have been trained in crime analysis techniques at various levels. All relevant agencies have analysts working with i2 software who are able to create analytical reports and visualization charts in support of criminal investigations and operational activities.

It is necessary to continue developing a sustainable data and information collection capacity and root the Intelligence Led Policing implementation focusing on criminal intelligence analysis and information processing at counter narcotic Intel units. This exercise should also aim to identify priorities and a sound information gathering strategy for drug law enforcement bodies in each country. National drug agencies will be assisted in developing their information sharing and exchange system suitable to their objectives in combating illicit drug trafficking.

The RER/F23 project has been revised five times.

Revision 1. In line with the findings of the assessment mission (October 2002) the project was revised in terms of scope, duration and budget. The revised project envisages provision of more advanced training, organization of study tours and seminars on intelligence-led policing, procurement of software packages, as well as assistance in drafting interagency agreements on intelligence collection, analysis and exchange.

Revision 2. In 2004, UNODC and UNDP signed an agreement (POLINT) that coordinates the activities of this UNODC project with new and related action executed by UNDP under the EC-funded CADAP programme. Thus, the current project revision addressed the provisions of this 2004 UNDP-UNODC MoU, expanded project duration, and refocused remaining activities of RER/F23 on those components not covered under CADAP.

This revision did not change the conceptual approach, legal context and implementation arrangements of the approved project AD/RER/F23, unless specified in the document.

Revision 3. was intended to increase the initial life span and shape the project activities to address new developments in Central Asia and neighboring regions. The revision added two new outputs that were extending the country scope and fortify past results of the project. The first of the new outputs incorporated Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into the F23 project. The second enhanced the project's positive results by implementing additional intelligence-led policing components in countries that were involved in the previous phases of the project. This revision did not change the conceptual approach, legal context and implementation arrangements of the approved project TD/RER/F23, unless specified in this document.

Revision 4. It was expected that the project would continue activities once the project revision has been signed by recipient countries. Unfortunately, the national clearance procedures have taken longer time that was initially expected so that some project activities commenced with some delay.

In addition, in view of the increased scope of responsibilities it was suggested to upgrade project coordinator post to a more senior level, but this activity has not been materialized.

Revision 5. The fifth revision of the project has installed modern intelligence systems and analysis software providing operational analysis training at counter narcotic agencies in all five Central Asian countries. However existing mechanisms for collection, storage, exchange and analysis of information, including access to information sources, remain in need of further support in order to achieve their potential.

The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) are still in the process of developing its functionality after its inauguration and F23 continues to play an important supporting role in that development through its technical and operational assistance for national analytical capacity. The collection and dissemination of criminal intelligence at the national level is a prerequisite for successful regional intelligence cooperation.

The challenges associated with supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan are self evident. This project is contributing to international efforts by helping the Counter Narcotic Police Afghanistan (CNPA) to develop a criminal intelligence capacity. Existing activities are on-going and it is proposed to extend them to include the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF). Because of the security situation, such activities are inevitably protracted and progressed cautiously.

The project objective and output remain unchanged.

The latest revision was approved in December 2010 and it is extended through June 2012.

The latest revision contains the following objectives:

1. A coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, information and information collection, analysis and exchange is established
2. Specialized law enforcement personnel are properly trained in the management of information gathering and exchange systems
3. Extend the country scope: incorporate Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into the project
4. Expand the project scope: enhance the project's positive results by introducing additional intelligence-led policing component

Indicators of success are shown in the project document as:

- Each project country has at least operational analysis unit.
- Each project country has access to i2 software and is able to produce link charts.
- The knowledge of the analysts in dealing with information has been enhanced.
- The analytical capacity of LE agencies has improved operational support to the operational officers to become more efficient.
- Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) has an operational analysis unit.
- The operational analytical capacity is improved and good quality analytical reports are produced.

2. DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

Overall Budget (time period)	Total Approved Budget (time period)	Expenditure (time period)	Expenditure in % (time period)
\$ 5,087,315.00 (Nov 2001- Dec 2011)	\$ 5,087,315.00 (Nov 2001- Dec 2011)	\$ 4,434,315.00 (Nov 2001- Dec 2011)	% 87.16 (Nov 2001- Dec 2011)

3. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

This is a mid-term evaluation and is initiated by the Project Coordinator/Project Manager. No project specific evaluation has been conducted in the past 10 years. The purpose of the evaluation is to measure the project achievements, capturing an innovative dimension and planning for future project phase. The project duration is planned until mid year of 2014.

The results of the evaluation are intended for use by those managing the project and for the regional office in Tashkent to enable them to learn from and make desirable adjustments to ongoing implementation. It will also inform stakeholders (Law Enforcement Agencies of the project member states; UNODC Head Quarter; UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA); UNODC Project

office in Tajikistan, Head of Office/Project Coordinator and Project Manager; Donor Countries representatives: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office (INL) Embassy of the USA in Tajikistan; Canada) with an aim to learn more about project accomplishments.

The UNODC Office in Tajikistan will be closely involved since programming, financial management, auditing and logistical support as well as policy and strategic direction are provided to the project by that office.

The evaluation managers are Mr. Christer Brannerud, Project Coordinator and Mr. Rasoul Rakhimov, Project Manager of UNODC Tajikistan.

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

This mid-term evaluation covers the activities of the entire RER/F23 project implemented in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan from its inception in 2001 up to the date of the evaluation.

5. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Relevance

Are the project outputs and activities consistent with the expected outcomes and objectives?

How well did the project design meet the project document?

How well was the project planned in advance?

Were appropriate adjustments made where necessary?

How have project revisions developed the original project objectives?

Efficiency

Are activities cost-efficient?

Is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?

Is the structure and profile of the project management team appropriate?

Is the project managed effectively and with timely responses to changing circumstances?

Is project reporting accurate, timely and satisfactory?

Is procurement of equipment being conducted effectively and in a timely fashion?

How could project planning be improved?

Was there a training needs analysis conducted? If so, is the training delivery appropriate in the light of the end result?

Partnerships/cooperation

Are stakeholders properly engaged and informed?

Effectiveness

To what extent are project objectives, outcomes and outputs being achieved?

The effectiveness of the project will be evaluated according to the extend of achievement regarding the following project objectives/outcomes

Are training inputs delivered effectively and adjusted to the national context?

How could the procurement of equipment and the delivery of training be made more effective?

Project objectives /outcomes:

1. A coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, information and information collection, analysis and exchange is established
2. Specialized law enforcement personnel are properly trained in the management of information gathering and exchange systems
3. Extend the country scope: incorporate Afghanistan and Azerbaijan into the project
4. Expand the project scope: enhance the project's positive results by introducing additional intelligence-led policing component

By the end of the project it is expected that:

- Each project country has at least operational analysis unit.
- Each project country has access to i2 software and is able to produce link charts.
- The knowledge of the analysts in dealing with information has been enhanced.
- The analytical capacity of LE agencies has improved operational support to the operational officers to become more efficient.
- Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) has an operational analysis unit.
- The operational analytical capacity is improved and good quality analytical reports are produced.

6. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation methodology will involve:

1. A desk review of relevant documents. These documents will include *at least* the following: the project document, all project revision documents, semi-annual and annual project progress reports;
2. Field mission to ROCA office in Tashkent consisting of:

- Briefing and individual interviews with Regional Representative, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, Financial Officer.

3. Field mission to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan consisting of:

- Individual interview with F23 Project Coordinator/Head of UNODC Tajikistan Programme-Office and briefings by UNODC staff members.
- Briefing by UNODC staff in the UNODC Programme-Office in Kyrgyzstan and Country Office in Afghanistan;
- Individual interviews with senior officials of project beneficiary agencies and other national counterparts, including officials from the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan;
- Individual interviews with donor representatives;
- Site visits to Analytical Units of the LEA of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan and other sites for physical inspection and discussions both with beneficiaries and other people directly or indirectly affected by the project.

A meeting plan with stakeholders will be submitted by the evaluator at least 2 week in advance of the field missions. This plan will include interview questions and a detailed description of the full evaluation methodology to be reviewed by the Project Coordinator, Head of project office in Tajikistan, Project Manager, ROCA and reviewed/approved by IEU prior to undertaking the final adoption of the evaluation.

Following completion of the missions, a draft evaluation report (in English) will be prepared. The draft will be circulated to the Evaluation managers and to ROCA in sufficient time to allow for comments to be made and for any misunderstandings to be clarified. Final approval and clearance of the report will be done by IEU. The evaluator may choose to take the comments into account in producing the final report, for which they will be responsible.

The UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) will provide quality assurance and ensure compliance with the Norms and Standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and UNODC guidelines³ by providing comments on evaluation tools and methods, the draft report and clearance of the final report.

7. TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

The evaluator will submit a draft report to the Evaluation Managers, the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit, and to ROCA. The report will contain the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team. The report should be no longer than 20 pages, *excluding* annexes and the executive summary. The report will be distributed by UNODC as required to the governmental

³ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/about-projects-.html>

authorities and respective donors, and will be discussed at a Tripartite Meeting by the parties to the project.

POs will be responsible for the meeting schedule, arranging the interviews, providing translation and coordinating all administrative matters.

Logistical Support

The Project Office (PO) will provide office space, an internet connection and use of a desktop computer where appropriate as well as assistance with interpretation. The evaluator will need to provide his/her own laptop, cameras or other equipment. POs will assist with transport within the region and support international travel arrangements and the issuance of visa (where necessary). ROCA will assist with travel arrangements related to Uzbekistan.

Timeframe for the evaluation process

When (Tentative dates)	Consultant (Working Days)	What tasks?	Where ?
17-22 March 2012		Submission of methodology to IEU for review and approval	
23-24 March 2012	4	Desk review, completion of UNODC security training (on-line) and preparation of interview plan	Home
27 – 28 March 2012	2	Briefings and interviews with ROCA management, operations and logistical support. Preparation of Inception report	Tashkent. Uzbekistan
29 March - 14 April 2012	14	Site inspection and meetings with stakeholders	Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and Kabul, Afghanistan; Dushanbe, Tajikistan;
16 April 2012	1	Debrief with Evaluation Managers	Dushanbe
20 - 24 April 2012	3	Preparation of draft evaluation report	Home
25 April – 4 May 2012		Review of draft report by selected <u>stakeholders and IEU</u>	
7 – 8 May 2012	2	Finalization of report.	Home

9 – 16 May 2012		Submission and clearance of final report (IEU)	
Total working days	26		

The final report will be disseminated through IEU website.

8. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The mid-term evaluation of the project will be carried out by an independent International Programme Evaluation Expert identified by UNODC through a competitive selection process. The Programme Evaluation Expert will have at least 5 years experience in reviewing criminal justice and/or law enforcement structures, university degree or recognised certificate from a relevant academic institution and have experience of evaluating technical assistance projects. Costs associated with the evaluator will be borne by the project. The expert shall act independently in his individual capacity and not as representative of the government or organization which appointed them. S/he will have no previous experience of working with the project or of working in any capacity linked with it.

The evaluator will be responsible for drafting the evaluation report, ensuring the report meets the necessary standards and for submitting the drafts as described in a timely manner.

9. MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS

Management Arrangements

The independent evaluation will be carried out following UNODC’s evaluation policy and UNEG Norms and Standards. The evaluation team will work closely with UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit.

The Independent Evaluation Unit

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) guides the process of this evaluation; endorses the TOR, approves the selection of the proposed Evaluation Expert and liaises closely with evaluators throughout the entire evaluation process. IEU comments on and approves the selection of evaluation consultants and the evaluation methodology and provides methodological support throughout the evaluation; IEU will comment on the draft report, endorse the quality of the final report, supports the process of issuing a management response, if needed, and participates in disseminating the final report to stakeholders within

and outside of UNODC. IEU ensures a participatory evaluation process by involving Core Learning Partners during key stages of the evaluation.

Project Coordinator/Manager

Management is responsible for the provision of desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the evaluation methodology, liaising with the Core Learning Partners, as well as reviewing the draft report and developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations.

Management will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team. For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate.

Core Learning Partners

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers in consultation with IEU. Members of the CLP are selected from the key stakeholder groups, including UNODC management, mentors, beneficiaries, partner organizations and donor Member States. The CLPs are asked to comment on key steps of the evaluation and act as facilitators with respect to the dissemination and application of the results and other followup action.

Evaluation Team

Roles and Responsibilities of the Evaluator

- carry out the desk review;
- develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique;
- draft the inception report and finalize evaluation methodology incorporating relevant comments
- implement quantitative tools and analyse data

- triangulate data and test rival explanations
- ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled;
- draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy;
- finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received;
- include a management response in the final report

Roles and Responsibilities of the Evaluator

- assist the Lead Evaluator in all stages of the evaluation process, as per the respective TOR.
- participate in selected missions

More details will be provided in the respective job descriptions in Annex 1.

10. PAYMENT MODALITIES

1. The evaluator will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per common UN rules and procedures;
2. The fee for their services will be defined according to UN rules and procedures and depending on the qualifications of the candidate;
3. The project will cover all costs related to travel of the evaluator and provide his/her with the DSA for each location in accordance with UN published rates;
4. Payment will be in a lump-sum in two instalments:
 - a. The first payment will be made after the approval of the evaluation methodology and submission of the detailed evaluation plan (25 per cent of the lump sum);
 - b. The second payment will be made after submission of the draft project evaluation report (25%).
 - c. The third payment (50 per cent of the lump sum) will be made only after completion of the respective tasks and receipt of the final report and its clearance by the Independent Evaluation Unit.

EXPECTED DELIVERABLES

All deliverables will be the responsibility of the Evaluator:

- Meeting plan:

The plan should include: who should be interviewed and why, pre-prepared interview questions and a detailed description of proposed evaluation methods.

- Oral interim debriefing

This interim debrief will allow the clarification of any misunderstandings or misconceptions and to answer any points of confusion or ambiguity.

- Draft evaluation report

This report should be a complete draft document reflecting the evaluation and initial findings. It should be submitted electronically to Head of Project Office in Tajikistan, Evaluation Manager, ROCA and IEU for comment and suggested amendment.

- Final evaluation report.

This should include a review of the original project design, the way in which it was implemented, the impact on the drug situation and whether there are recommendations or lessons to be learned for the future.

ANNEX II – LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Name	Position	Organisation
Asif Majeed	Officer-in-Charge	ROCA
Lorena Lombardozi	Programme Associate	ROCA
Renat Menibaev	Head of Admin/Procurement	ROCA
Rasoul Rakhimov	Project Manager	UNODC Tajikistan
Olga Kogay	Finance Analyst	ROCA
Alexander Fedulov	Head of Programme Office	UNODC Kyrgyzstan
Ekaterina Stepanenko	Finance Assistant	UNODC Kyrgyzstan
Madina Sarieva	Project Officer	UNODC Kyrgyzstan
Daniyar Kalmatov	Head of Anti-narcotics	Kyrgyzstan Customs
Ernest Bikiev	Deputy Head of Anti-narcotics	Kyrgyzstan Customs
Damir Sagibaev	Deputy Head of Anti-narcotics	Kyrgyzstan Drug Control Service
Altenbeck Orozbaev	Senior Analyst	Kyrgyzstan Drug Control Service
Sangak Barzuev	Chief of Analysis unit	Tajikistan Ministry of Interior
Natalia Markina	Senior Software Engineer	Tajikistan Ministry of Interior
Shakribonu Kurbanova	Senior Operative	Tajikistan Ministry of Interior
William Lawrence	Project Manager	BOMNAF
Madina Rakhmikhudoeva	Project Assistant	UNODC Tajikistan
Christer Brannerud	Head of Office	UNODC Tajikistan
Bunafsha Odinaeva	Deputy Director	Tajikistan Drug Control Agency
Suhrob Safarov	Head of Information & Analytical Department	Tajikistan Drug Control Agency
Juri Chikalov	Analyst	Tajikistan Drug Control Agency
Eid Noori	Project Assistant	UNODC Afghanistan
Noor Zazai	Head	Criminal Justice Task Force
Aga Khudodod	Head	Counter Narcotics Police of

		Afghanisan
Mohamad Kabikhon	Head of Analytical Unit	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanisan
Abdulmalik Mamyrov	Deputy Chief of Analysis Unit	Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Interior
Ayna Kochkorbayeva	Senior Analyst	Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Interior
Baktygul Akieva	Senior Analyst	Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Interior
Tilek kasymov	Analyst	Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Interior
Mirlan Aydarov	Chief of Analysis unit	Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Interior
Tofik Murshudlu	Head of Project Office	UNODC Kazakhstan
James Callahan	State Department	United States

ANNEX III - EVALUATION TOOLS

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation methodology will involve:

- A desk review of relevant documents including the project document, all project revision documents, semi-annual and annual project progress reports.
- A field mission to the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent consisting of briefing and individual interviews with the Regional Representative, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor and Financial Officer.
- Field missions to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan to include the following activities:
 - Individual interview with the F23 Project Coordinator/Head of UNODC Tajikistan Programme Office and briefings by UNODC staff members.
 - Briefing by UNODC staff in the UNODC Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan and Country Office in Afghanistan.
 - Individual interviews with senior officials of project beneficiary agencies and other national counterparts, including officials from LEA of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan.
 - Individual interviews with donor representatives.
 - Site visits to the Analytical Units of LEA of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan
 - Other sites for physical inspection and discussions with beneficiaries and other people directly or indirectly affected by the project.

The evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the Main Objectives, Responsibilities & Description of the Proposed Analytical Work paragraph of the Terms of Reference (ToR) document.

The evaluation questions will focus on a number of main areas and be developed through deeper analysis:

Relevance

- Are the project outputs and activities consistent with the expected outcomes and objectives?
- How well did the project design meet the project document?
- How well was the project planned in advance?
- Were appropriate adjustments made where necessary?
- How have project revisions developed the original project objectives?

Efficiency

- Are activities cost-efficient?

- Is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?
- Is the structure and profile of the project management team appropriate?
- Is the project managed effectively and with timely responses to changing circumstances?
- Is project reporting accurate, timely and satisfactory?
- Is procurement of equipment being conducted effectively and in a timely fashion?
- How could project planning be improved?
- Where training needs analysis conducted? If so, is the training delivery appropriate in the light of the end result?

Partnerships & Cooperation

- Are stakeholders properly engaged and informed?

Effectiveness

- To what extent are project objectives, outcomes and outputs being achieved?
- The effectiveness of the project will be evaluated according to the extent of achievement regarding project objectives/outcomes
- Are training inputs delivered effectively and adjusted to the national context?
- How could the procurement of equipment and the delivery of training be made more effective?

Sampling Strategy and Data Collection Instruments

Data sources for evaluated subjects, issues and questions are identified in Data Collection Plan (annex II).

The main component of the proposed method of evaluation is semi structured interviews. Using such a method allows for a greater discussion on the main focus and detail of the evaluation (especially assessing outcomes and impacts), as well as providing flexibility, preserving confidentiality (when needed) and an opportunity to give personal re-assurance and answer any questions that interviewees might themselves have.

The categories of stakeholders in beneficiary countries (Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) that it is planned to meet for interviews as key actors are as follows:

- UNODC ROCA Managers and Programme Office staff in countries involved in the project management cycle.
- Officials from national LEA involved in countering illicit drug trafficking.
- Officials involved in the collection, processing, analysing and disseminating of information.

- IT specialists.
- Customers of intelligence and analysis produced by national LEA.
- Users of specialist intelligence analysis equipment and IT.
- Representatives of national LEA training establishments.
- Those responsible for delivery of technical assistance and training.
- International community (persons leading technical assistance projects in the field of drug supply reduction and well acquainted with the drug situation in the country).
- International donors.

Where the desk review has left knowledge gaps, additional questions will be elaborated. Additional and potential specific questions for each category of interviews are listed in annex III.

In addition to meeting arrangement, the ROCA and UNODC Programme Offices are expected to collect or ensure easy access to the other appropriate documentation not identified and supplied for the desk review. This documentation may be used, should the need arise, for additional clarification or in-depth analyses to support the findings of the interviews and physical inspections.

The use of questionnaires has been considered for this evaluation but not pursued. Some representatives of national LEA may be reluctant to complete and return a questionnaire without meeting the evaluator and there are often lengthy prearrangement processes including the obtaining of approval of contents by senior management.

The draft report will be circulated to the evaluation managers and to ROCA in sufficient time to allow for comments to be made and for any misunderstandings to be clarified.

Data Collection Plan

Evaluated subjects, issues, questions	ROCA	UNODC	Assistance	International	National
	Project Management	Programme and Country Offices	Providers	community donors	LEA
Relevance					

Evaluated subjects, issues, questions	ROC	UNO	Assist	Intern	Natio
	A Projec t Manag ement	DC Progra mme and Count ry Office s	ance Provid ers	ational comm unity donor s	nal LEA
Are the project outputs and activities consistent with the expected outcomes and objectives?	√	√	√		√
How well did the project design meet the project document?	√	√	√		
How well was the project planned in advance?	√	√		√	
Were appropriate adjustments made where necessary?	√	√		√	√
How have project revisions developed the original project objectives?	√	√	√		√
Efficiency					
Are activities cost-efficient?	√	√	√	√	
Is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?	√	√	√	√	
Is the structure and profile of the project management team appropriate?	√	√	√	√	√
Is the project managed effectively and with timely responses to changing circumstances?	√	√			√
Is project reporting accurate, timely and satisfactory?	√	√		√	√
Is procurement of equipment being conducted effectively and in a timely fashion?	√	√	√		√

Evaluated subjects, issues, questions	ROC A Project Management	UNO DC Programme and Country Offices	Assistance Providers	International community donors	National LEA
How could project planning be improved?	√	√	√	√	√
Were training needs analyses conducted? If so, is the training delivery appropriate in the light of the end result?	√	√	√		√
Partnerships & Cooperation					
Are stakeholders properly engaged and informed?	√	√	√	√	√
Effectiveness					
To what extent are project objectives, outcomes and outputs being achieved?	√	√	√		√
The effectiveness of the project will be evaluated according to the extent of achievement regarding the project objectives/outcomes.	√	√	√		√
Are training inputs delivered effectively and adjusted to the national context?	√	√	√		√
How could the procurement of equipment and the delivery of training be made more effective?	√	√		√	

Specific Questions for Interviews

Project Management

1.1. What tools/instruments are in place in order to receive indication of the impact that the project has had? What means are used for receiving feedback on the performance of trained analysts and other direct

beneficiaries, including level of comprehension of the intelligence-led policing concept? What kind of follow-up activities are envisaged and conducted in the scope of the project?

1.2. How were the training and equipment needs identified? Were any formal needs assessments conducted? Are the reported outcomes available?

1.3. Have the staff of beneficiaries' agencies been used as the trainers (instructors) in the framework of the Project?

1.4. To what extent are complementarities and synergies of the Project with other projects implemented by UNODC in the region created and managed?

1.4. To what extent are complementarities and synergies of the Project with other similar and linked projects nationally and regionally created and managed?

1.6. Describe the distribution of responsibilities for management of the project in ROCA, interaction with relevant regional UNODC offices, contribution to and support of the project from the respective UNODC Programme Offices in the beneficiary countries.

1.7. What barriers is the project management facing in communication and interaction with national authorities in beneficiary countries? What are the barriers to project delivery?

1.8. How is sustainability achieved within beneficiary agencies? What kinds of in house training are in place? What kinds of formal commitment are made to remaining in posts for which significant time and resource has been invested?

1.9. How has ROCA and the UNODC Programme Offices coordinated and supported the work of international experts?

1.10. Which specific requests were received from the beneficiary countries and to what extent have they been incorporated into the projects activities?

Beneficiaries (Intelligence Staff)

2.1. How have you benefited personally from your training? In what ways? To what extent was the training tailored and relevant to your operational environment? Can you apply practically the knowledge and skills?

2.2. To what extent has the project improved cooperation with other agencies and with other countries? How has this been achieved?

2.3. What legal issues with regard to data exchange still create problems?

2.4. How much of the total assistance supplied can be applied in the work place?

2.5. To what extent have those supplying assistance been aware of drug supply and demand situation in your country? Similarly with law enforcement?

2.6. How much have you been able to practically interact with the project? What kinds of support have you received from the UNODC?

2.7. Were you provided with adequate educational and awareness materials to supplement training and skills transfer?

2.8. Have you been able to establish a network of formal and informal contacts with colleagues from other agencies and countries that have enhanced your operational abilities?

2.9. Were the method of training and techniques of assistance helpful to you and your development? What aspects of the assistance did you have difficulties/problems with?

2.10. How well has the assistance enabled you to interact, educate and influence your 'customers', intelligence colleagues and managers?

2.11 What is required to sustain, develop and strengthen the work done by the project thus far?

2.12 To what extent is intelligence-led policing now used in the day to day operational environment?

2.13 How satisfied are you with the equipment and IT supplied? How satisfied are you with its installation, training and management?

Beneficiaries (Intelligence Customers)

3.1. To what extent do you now feel confident to use intelligence material? How much do you receive? In what form? How could this be improved?

3.2. How much management support has there been for the use of intelligence-led policing?

3.3. What awareness and other training did you receive regarding the use of intelligence? Was it sufficient?

3.4. How do you interact with intelligence staff? How often? What do you contribute and receive? How is your contribution acknowledged?

3.5. How satisfied are you with the quality and security of information and intelligence supplied?

3.6. What successes have been achieved as a result of the project?

3.7. How much do you feel part of the national and international effort aimed at tackling drug trafficking and related organised crime?

3.8. Do you have any recommendations for improving the delivery of intelligence product?

3.9 What guidelines, instruction and training did you receive for the handling and using of intelligence?

3.10 Are intelligence specialists aware of your needs as a customer? To what extent? What methods are employed?

Donors and Other Stakeholders

4.1. How are you kept aware of the progress of the project? What formal and informal methods are employed?

4.2. To what extent have you been encouraged to contribute ideas and support? How has this been done? What have been the results?

4.3. Do you feel that the project has progressed in the right direction?

4.4. To what extent do you think you are getting value for money?

4.5. To what extent has your contribution and support to the project been acknowledged? How much visibility does your contribution receive?

4.6. How else could you be involved in the project?

4.7. What is the make-up of the project team? How satisfied are you with this? What has been the quality of external experts?

Beneficiaries (Management)

5.1. What has the impact has the project had on operational result?

5.2. To what extent has the project attempted to tailor assistance to your requirements?

5.3. What mechanisms are in place to ensure regular and close contact with the project implementers? Formal and informal.

5.4. Are you satisfied with the training, equipment and technical assistance that has been delivered?

5.5. To what extent do you feel that the UNODC has supported your work in drugs interdiction?

5.6. How satisfied are you with the intelligence produced by your staff as a result of the project?

5.7. What support have you provided to UNODC during this project?

5.8. Who are the donors for this project? What contact have you had with them? Are they sympathetic you your operational aims?

5.9. Are you satisfied with the strategies developed through the project?

5.10. To what extent has the project improved standardisation of intelligence operations, handling and dissemination nationally and internationally?

5.11. What arrangements are in place to ensure sustainability of the results of the project? What in house training? How is equipment maintained and upgraded? How is continuity of staff ensured?

5.12. What improvements could be made to the project?

5.13. How would you like to see the project develop and progress? What new ideas and needs do you have?

5.14. How effective is the project planning process? How involved are you?

5.15. What is the make-up of the project team? How satisfied are you with this? What has been the quality of external experts?

All Interviewees

- 7.1. What modifications or revisions are needed for continuation and development of the project?
- 7.2. What measures must be taken to guarantee the most appropriate individuals are selected for intelligence posts?
- 7.3. How can data protection legislation be ensured?
- 7.4. How can standardisation internally and internationally be improved and ensured?
- 7.5. How can national and international cooperation and networking be improved?
- 7.6. How can the benefits of intelligence-led policing be further promoted?

ANNEX IV – DESK REVIEW LIST

Project Document: AD/RER/00/F23

Annual 2002 – Project Progress Report for F23

Annual 2003 – Project Progress Report for F23

Annual 2004 – Project Progress Report for F23

Semi-Annual (Jan to Jun 2005) – Project Progress Report for F23

Annual 2009 – Project Progress Report for F23

Annual 2010 – Project Progress Report for F23

Annual 2011 – Project Progress Report for F23

Project Document - Revision I

Project Document - Revision II

Project Document - Revision III

Project Document - Revision IV

Project Document - Revision V

Tajikistan Quarterly Field Office Report – Jul to Sep 2011

Tajikistan Quarterly Field Office Report – Oct to Dec 2011

Project Budget – Statement of Allotment vs. Expenditures 2012

UNODC Rainbow Strategy

UNODC Report - Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan & Central Asia: A Threat Assessment

Mid-term evaluation of project TD/RER/H22 - Establishment of the Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre - CARICC



PC Tajikistan - DCA



PC Kyrgyzstan - DCS



i2 Security Key (Dongle) - Kyrgyzstan MoI




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