Independent project evaluation of the

**Strengthening drug and related crime control measures in selected checkpoints in Kazakhstan**

KAZ/I76

Independent Evaluation Unit
February 2013
This inception report was prepared by Peter Allan, Director, Allan Consultancy Ltd. in cooperation with the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The Independent Evaluation Unit of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime can be contacted at:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Vienna International Centre
P.O. Box 500
1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: (+43-1) 26060-0
Email: ieu@unodc.org
Website: www.unodc.org

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BOMCA    Border Management Programme in Central Asia
BGS      Border Guard Services
CA       Central Asia
CARICC   Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre
CNC      Counter Narcotics Committee
FANC     Foreign Anti-Narcotic Community in Central Asia
HDI      Human Development Index
INL      International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office
IOM      International Organisation for Migration
ISAF     International Security Assistance Force
MF       Ministry of Finance
MOI      Ministry of Interior
NATO     North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC      National Security Committee
OC       organised crime
PNA      Participatory Needs Assessment
RK       Republic of Kazakhstan
SPF      Strategic Programme Framework
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme
UNEG     United Nations Evaluation Group
UNODC    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In January 2007 UNODC offered assistance to the government of Kazakhstan through KAZI76 (the project) with the objective:

- To strengthen the capacities of the law enforcement bodies involved in drug and related crime control in selected checkpoints on major transportation routes.

Due to the length of the country’s external borders and the size of its territory, the project adopted a selective approach based on identifying crucial transportation routes and establishing internal checkpoints along them. It was also aligned with the Kazakhstani Strategic Programme Framework and the “Rubezh-drugs” initiative, which emphasise selective controls on the most intensely used transit routes and improving technical capacity of the Kazakhstani law enforcement.

The project was subject to four revisions adjusting its scope to the changing country needs, incorporating additional funding into the project’s design and extending its duration. Revision 1 in October 2009 extended the project’s budget and duration (until the end of 2010) and also introduced two new immediate objectives:

(a) To strengthen the counter narcotics capacity through provision of assistance to the law enforcement training institutes and specialized counter narcotics divisions.

(b) To strengthen canine capacity of the Military Institute and contribute with assessment of implementation of improved border management practices on the land border of Kazakhstan with Russian Federation.

Revision 2 extended the project’s duration until the end of 2011 and adjusted the project to the change of the recipient’s country policy, namely the reorganization of “Rubezh-Drugs” checkpoints into two special divisions, namely “South” and “Center”. Revision 3 extended the project’s duration until the 30th of June 2012 and adjusted the project to the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which made the Kazakhstan’s Southern border the key priority for the country’s law enforcement agencies. Revision 4 extended the project’s duration until the end of 2012, due to delays in implementation of the remaining project activities, namely the Kazakhstani state border assessment and capital repair of Quarantine Unit of Canine Centre of the Ministry of Interior. All of the revisions were made with the purpose of adjusting the project to the changing environment.

This evaluation finds that the Project – operating in a difficult environment and with changing priorities forced upon it – managed to deliver some positive outputs. These outputs have included 6 fixed, 18 mobile and 24 portable digital radio stations, 6 diesel generators were procured to CNC MOI RK’s oblast level divisions, and a satellite system was installed at “Rubezh-Drugs” checkpoints; 3 trainers from the Counternarcotics Interagency Training Centre participated at the training on analysis of operational information (ANACAPA); 5 canine instructors from KZ LEAs participated at the 2.5 months training at the Counternarcotics Canine Training Centre in Bad
Kreuzen, Austria; 5 sniffer dogs were procured for training deployment upon completion of the training; a dormitory of the Counternarcotics Interagency Training Centre was renovated; veterinary equipment was procured to the Canine Department of the Borderguard Academy of NSC RK; specialized vehicle for transportation of sniffer dogs was procured and handed over to Canine Centre of MOI RK and a Border Assessment was completed.

The extent to which these outputs have translated into positive impact is more difficult to assess. In some cases the outputs have not necessarily delivered the expected level of positive impact, for example the supply of technical equipment which cannot be used due to lack of personnel trained in its use. However the partnership and cooperation established by UNODC and its various stakeholders is one overt and clear example of a positive impact. Only with the passage of time (and a more rigorous Project monitoring regime) will the impact be more clearly observed.

The recruitment policy and the identification and deployment of the most appropriate staff / experts / consultants is another area of success for the Project. In particular the National Project Officer was singled out by all stakeholders as a major reason for the success of the Project by building effective working relationships with the most appropriate partners. This has had a direct impact of the success of the Project in another area, specifically in partnership and cooperation. The Project has liaised well with other, relevant partners in the country and region.

Where the Project has been let down is in the constantly changing country priorities. This – to a large extent – is not within the Projects ability to influence. However this evaluation believes that if a more robust feasibility study / needs assessment had been completed prior to the commencement of the Project - which should have included a risk assessment - some of the obstacles generated by these changing priorities would have been identified and the appropriate response mechanism could have been implemented. This would have made the Project more proactive than reactive.

Another challenge outside the direct control of UNODC but within the scope of the UN was the cumbersome and time consuming procurement process. On occasion these delays had a direct impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Project. These delays have led to the recommendation that any future project should concentrate on delivering technical assistance rather than fixed assets. Either that or UNODC finds another vehicle through which it can conduct its procurement thereby circumventing the UNDP.

Given the above information the main recommendations coming from this evaluation are:

\( a \) Align the project with the long-term priorities of its beneficiaries.
\( b \) Move any similar Projects away from a procurement focus to supplying technical expertise in the area(s) of UNODC comparative advantage.
\( c \) Implement a robust Project progress monitoring mechanism
\( d \) Continue with stringent staff selection procedures.
\( e \) A proper balance should be maintained between human and technical capacity.

Overall the Project – with its rather limited resources of just over USD $ 1 million – has managed to provide deliverables that have been appreciated by both beneficiaries and stakeholders. It has involved internal and external partners in inclusive, meaningful dialogue which has led to a coordinated approach in attempting to meet the (changing) objectives set by the Project.
### SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td>The Project suffered from the changing internal priorities of the country. Greater time and effort has to be invested in close cooperation with the recipient country administration with the aim of aligning the projects objectives with longer term priorities.</td>
<td>The move from internal checkpoints, to refurbishment of canine centres to Border Assessments serves to illustrate the constantly changing nature of the Project.</td>
<td>Align the project with the long-term priorities of its beneficiaries.</td>
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<td>There is no doubt that the length of time taken to procure various resources for the Project led to critical delays that had an impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Project.</td>
<td>Delays in recruitment of experts and in the awarding contracts for the refurbishment of the canine centres led directly to the need to extend the Project with all the related additional expense that entailed.</td>
<td>Move any similar Projects away from a procurement focus to supplying technical expertise in the area(s) of UNODC comparative advantage.</td>
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<td>The lack of a risk assessment within the feasibility study / needs assessment prior to the launch of the Project had a detrimental effect on the Project and its ability to deal with changing country priorities. Coupled to this was a lack of appropriate indicators within the feasibility / needs assessment or the initiating Project document. This meant determining if objectives had been met was difficult.</td>
<td>Without the tool to assess risks to the Project or monitor its progress it was difficult to evaluate whether the desired objectives have been achieved.</td>
<td>Implement a robust Project progress monitoring mechanism which should include:</td>
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<td>− A risk assessment forming part of the baseline survey / needs assessment which identifies possible risks to the Project and outlines strategies to cope with those risks.</td>
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<td>− clear and unambiguous, quantitative and qualitative markers of achievement of specified results.</td>
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<td>The quality of staff / experts / consultants employed and deployed by the Project was found to be of a very high level.</td>
<td>Responses from the interviews coupled with the desk review data demonstrated a high degree of professionalism in the recruitment of appropriate staff and that this was a key contributory factor in the relative success of the Project.</td>
<td>Continue with stringent staff selection procedures.</td>
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<td>Where technical equipment is delivered as part of the Project the proper training and retention of trained staff did not always occur.</td>
<td>The report notes instances where half of the equipment delivered remained unused due to a lack of personnel appropriately trained in its use.</td>
<td>A proper balance should be maintained between human and technical capacity.</td>
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* Primary responsibility for this would lie with the Project manager / coordinator.
I. INTRODUCTION

Background and Context

Kazakhstan lies on the trafficking route of Afghan opiates destined for Russian and European markets. Large domestic production of cannabis, substantive proportion of which is intended for export, additionally strains Kazakh law enforcement agencies. The county of 2,717,300 km² has to police 12,000 km of land borders and 1,900 km of Caspian Sea coastline. Effective execution of border and internal controls is extremely resource-intensive.

For decades Afghanistan has been the world’s largest producer of opium and Kazakhstan lies on one of the main opium trafficking routes. Three countries neighbouring Kazakhstan, themselves border Afghanistan. Afghan drugs destined for Russian and European markets are also smuggled in aircrafts, ships through the Caspian sea and through the territories of Turkmenistan and Iran, however according to the project document, Kazakhstan’s relatively well developed infrastructure has been the reason of its increasing importance as a drug trafficking route.

Since the early 80’s following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent loss of central control over the provinces, opium poppy cultivation has begun to establish itself as a sector of the country’s economy, profiting a substantial part of the Afghan society. Drug production and trade have gradually been organised and turned into a source of income for the forces resisting the Soviet intervention. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the cultivation was on the increase until the Taliban took over power and introduced a religiously justified country-wide ban.

The prohibition was however far from absolute and it soon became apparent that without the revenues generated by the opium production Taliban’s power could not be retained. In effect: “Both the Taliban and various groups fighting against them (...) benefited from opium poppy cultivation and trade. However, as most of the opium producing areas were under Taliban control, the largest profits out of opium were also reaped by the Taliban”\(^1\).

After the 2001 military intervention, drug trade has once again become a source of funds for the anti-government forces and the production has reached high levels with a major peak in 2006 and 2007. According to a discussion paper published by UNODC “poverty does not appear to have been the main driving factor in the expansion of opium poppy cultivation in recent years. (...) it has increased most in areas notable for their exposure to the insurgency, not the depth of their poverty.”\(^2\).

\(^1\) The opium economy in Afghanistan. An International Problem, UNODC 2003, p. 92
Drug trade has become a stable source of revenue for various anti-government, militant groups active especially in the Southern and Western provinces of Afghanistan. Over 90% of fields are located in that region, mainly in: Helmand (more than a half of all production is concentrated in this province), Kandahar, Nimruz and Farah. Opium poppy (Papaver somniferum) is relatively easy to cultivate and transport, so even the most unfavourable natural conditions cannot threaten the continuity of production.

Since 2009 due to controversy over the scope of NATO mandate in Afghanistan and the change of counter-narcotics policy of some member states, the NATO-led ISAF troops no longer engage in direct eradication of poppy fields. There has also never been political consensus for large-scale aerial eradication. In effect Afghanistan has remained the world's largest opium producer and the biggest heroin supplier to both European and Asian markets. Opium poppy cultivation has gradually increased since 2001 and the planned for 2014 withdrawal of NATO forces may lead to greater instability in the region and further increase of drug production.

Smuggling of opiates is a serious destabilizing factor for all Central Asian states. The three countries directly neighbouring Afghanistan: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all hold medium rank in the UNDP 2011 Human Development Index (HDI), which indicates their populations could be vulnerable to becoming involved in both trafficking and consumption of drugs.

Of all Central Asian states Kazakhstan holds the highest, 68th position on the HDI ranking, however its size poses a major challenge to the institutions responsible for countering drug related criminality. UNODC offered assistance to the government of Kazakhstan in the area of “strengthening drug and related crime control measures in selected checkpoints” and in January 2007 the project KAZ/I76 was started. Due to the length of the country’s external borders and the size of its territory, the project adopted a selective approach based on identifying crucial transportation routes and establishing internal checkpoints along them.

KAZ/I76 (now referred to in this document as ‘the project’) is aligned with the Kazakhstani Strategic Programme Framework and the “Rubezh-drugs” initiative, which emphasise selective controls on the most intensely used transit routes and improving technical capacity of the Kazakhstani law enforcement. Situation of narco-criminality described in the project document has not significantly improved to date, therefore maintaining high operational capacity of the Kazakhstani border guard and other law enforcement agencies tackling drug related crime seems crucial to effective counter-narcotics policy in the region.

Evaluation Methodology

Evaluation Questions

Given the timeframe within which this evaluation is operating there has not been the time to construct and distribute any surveys. The evaluation was conducted using desk review of appropriate documentation and the interviewing of relevant stakeholders. These interviews were semi-structured and consisted of some standard questions (see Annex III).

Data Collection Instruments
The elements that combined to create the initial logic model for UNODC KAZ/I76 “Strengthening drug and related crime control measures in selected checkpoints in Kazakhstan” were identified and broken down into their component parts. From this the appropriate indicators that existed at the time of the conception and implementation of the programme were identified. These indicators formed the basis of the data collection and analysis for the evaluation and acted as a basis for the structured interviews during field visits and picking out relevant benchmarks from programme documentation during the desk review.

This desk review took the form of a contents and results analysis from all the project documentation provided including all project revision documents, semi-annual and annual project progress reports. This contents and results analysis formed part of the overall methodology and assisted when evaluating the questions on the relevance of the project and the effectiveness of the project (as measured against the project objectives / outcomes).

Naturally the entire data collection and analysis should not be skewed by a reliance on indicator analysis from project documentation and structured interviews alone. A suitable technique to bring balance and perspective to the process, namely the most significant change (MSC) narration analysis was employed. This also has the advantage of being better suited to measuring impact than ‘simple’ indicator analysis. The theory and use of MSC narration is well documented as an effective approach to evaluating and monitoring change programmes. It is particularly useful in the evaluation of outcomes and impact and does not rely on the identification and monitoring of indicators. It is a systematic collection and then analysis of significant changes over a defined period of time.

There also has to be objectivity built into the overall methodology. By triangulating the analysis from different sets of stakeholders the effect that inherent biases have on the analysis and evaluation process was reduced. Thus the evaluation attempted to interview a broad a cross section of stakeholders and core learning partners as possible and approached them with a pre-defined set of questions. Some of these questions were closed to facilitate quantitative analysis and others were open (including the MSC narration) to facilitate qualitative analysis.

The data collection instruments and the stages of their deployment were as follows:

(a) **Analysis of the project documentation**

At this stage the formal structure of the project along with its objectives, outcomes and outputs (as derived from the Project Document and subsequent Project Reviews) was assessed against the criteria stated in the Terms of Reference for the evaluation.

(b) **Semi-structured interviews**

The goal of this phase was to;

(i) Answer any questions still outstanding from the desk review phase as regards the evaluation of the Project against the ToR evaluation criteria.

(ii) Confirm or refute assertions made within the project documentation thus forming part of the triangulation of data to help ensure an objective evaluation occurs.

(iii) Provide data to allow for both a quantitative and qualitative evaluation process. This included standard questions of all interviewees (see Annex III).
The application of these techniques provided for a proper diversification of data sources. One of the critical aspects of deploying this approach was to ensure that the synthesis and balance between different data is well judged. By triangulating the analysis from different data sets and from different stakeholders the effect that inherent biases have on the analysis and evaluation process was reduced.

**Sampling Strategy**

As noted in UNODC Evaluation Guidelines, UNODC evaluations are not developed on the basis of rigorous scientific research; rather they are “selective investigations aimed at collecting and analyzing data, formulating conclusions and making recommendations of practical relevance to the operations of UNODC and its partners.” Bearing the latter in mind for the purpose of this evaluation, and in order to keep it as manageable as possible, a simple categorization of interviewees has been developed: UNODC staff, implementing partner, beneficiary and donor. This categorization, developed on the basis of the roles each category plays in relation to the implementation of KAZ/I76 rather than on the basis of random selection, helped ensure proper representation in the overall research sample.

![Figure 1 – Stakeholder Categories](image)

**Limitations to the Evaluation**

The major limitations were:

(a) The narrow field of data collection instruments. Given the tight time frame it has not been possible to commit to anything other than a desk review of pertinent documentation and interviews with key stakeholders using some standard questions within those interviews to extract some basic quantitative data for analysis.

(b) Lack of time. It should be noted that the total number of working days allocated to this end of project evaluation is 11.5 which covers the production of the Inception Report, travel to the region for interviews, drafting of the report and finalisation of the report after receipt of
comments. This does not allow time for an in-depth examination of all 26 questions asked within the ToR.

(c) Lack of knowledge of the project from certain individuals during the stakeholder interviews. Some of those interviewed – in particular from the beneficiary stakeholder group – had little or no direct knowledge of the project as they were either new in post or were interview substitutes for other individuals. They had not been briefed to allow them to properly answer the standard questions asked within the data collection tools.
II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Design

Setting up a project should always be preceded by an extensive participatory needs assessment (PNA) and context analysis. The aim of this initial phase is to determine the particular needs of assistance, projects already being implemented (by central or local administration, international organisations or NGOs) and circumstances potentially impacting the development of the project. The end of this stage should result with a baseline study, being a prerequisite of progress monitoring throughout the whole project cycle. While this Project did produce a ‘Needs Assessment and Feasibility Report’ and a ‘Project Idea KAZI76 24-8-05’ document it did not cover the majority of aspects that would ordinarily be expected in a PNA. In particular it did not contain a risk assessment highlighting possible difficulties Project implementation might encounter and coping strategies for these difficulties. And those aspects it did cover did not have the required depth to make it useful. A full and proper PNA may have helped avoid some of the difficulties – or at least reduce the negative impact of the difficulties – the project encountered during its life cycle.

The project under evaluation: “Strengthening drug and related crime control measures in selected checkpoints in Kazakhstan” aimed to assist the recipient country in effective execution of controls on both external borders and internal checkpoints. The Project Document provides the following justification for the adopted approach: “Effective countering activities require a focused and selective approach to ensure the optimal use of resources. In this respect, establishing internal checkpoints along the most important transportation routes will increase the effectiveness of law enforcement responses to the growing drug trafficking problem.”

The prima facie structure of the project appears to be concise and logically designed. The overall project objective is to enhance drug control capacities of the Government of Kazakhstan, which should manifest itself in the immediate objective of strengthening the capacities of the law enforcement bodies involved in drug and related crime control in selected checkpoints on major transportation routes.

The project then formulates two outputs, the first one referring to the recruitment of the project staff, performing assessment missions and agreeing on a comprehensive work plan and the second output concerning proper equipment of the selected checkpoints and units of the law enforcement bodies and training of the personnel of these units. The Logical Framework also lists possible risks and proposes risk management actions.

The project was subject to four revisions adjusting its scope to the changing country needs, incorporating additional funding into the project’s design and extending its duration:

Revision 1 - extended the project’s budget and duration (until the end of 2010) and also introduced two new immediate objectives:
Immediate objective 1: To strengthen the capacities of the law enforcement bodies at selected checkpoints on major transportation routes.

Immediate objective 2: To strengthen the counter narcotics capacity through provision of assistance to the law enforcement training institutes and specialized counter narcotics divisions.

Immediate objective 3: To strengthen canine capacity of the Military Institute and contribute with assessment of implementation of improved border management practices on the land border of Kazakhstan with Russian Federation.

Revision 2 - extended the project’s duration until the end of 2011 and adjusted the project to the change of the recipient’s country policy, namely the reorganization of “Rubezh-Drugs” checkpoints into two special divisions, namely “South” and “Center”.

Revision 3 - extended the project’s duration until the 30th of June 2012 and adjusted the project to the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which made the Kazakhstan’s Southern border the key priority for the country’s law enforcement agencies.

Revision 4 - extended the project’s duration until the end of 2012, due to delays in implementation of the remaining project activities, namely the Kazakhstani state border assessment and capital repair of Quarantine Unit of Canine Centre of MOI RK.

All of the revisions were made with the purpose of adjusting the project to the changing environment, none of them has substantially changed the project’s overall structure.

The overall project’s objective remains in accordance with the UNODC project management principles and is impact-oriented, specific, practical, time limited and measurable. Enhancing internal and external drug control capacities of any country requires sufficient human resources (Output 1), properly trained and equipped to perform their duties (Output 2). The drug trafficking situation in Central Asia and the size of the recipient state, make the aforementioned outputs correctly identified priorities. Both the envisaged changes and the operationalisation of the methods leading to them were the appropriate approach at the time of the project’s inception and have not lost its relevance throughout the whole project’s cycle. The duration of the project has been systematically extended over the years, reflecting the changing internal and international circumstances. Since the main project outputs are recruiting, training and equipping staff, direct measuring of the undertaken activities form the immediate progress monitoring strategy presented in the logical framework.

The present evaluation concludes that the project was designed and revised in accordance with the UN results based management principles. The project’s structure is clear and represents an adequate response to the specific, identified need within the country’s law enforcement architecture. However the lack of a comprehensive participatory needs assessment conducted prior to commencement of the project meant that some of the difficulties the project subsequently faced remained undetected.

The project’s implementation will be examined in the following sections of the report.
Relevance

Project’s relevance is the extent to which its objectives are continuously consistent with recipients’ needs, UNODC mandate and overarching strategies and policies.

The UNODC 2003 report “The opium economy in Afghanistan. An International Problem” in the chapter “Devastation in neighbouring countries” describes the impact of Afghan drug trade on i.a. Central Asian states. The consolidation of organised crime networks and growing internal consumption of opiates are among the most severe consequences of the Afghan drug based economy. The report further defines the role of Kazakhstan as a drug trafficking route: “Railways linking Kazakhstan with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation are considered to be the most important trafficking channels via Kazakhstan. Important entry points into Kazakhstan are the rail crossing points of Rays (on the border with Uzbekistan) and Biney (on the border with Turkmenistan). Drug traffic via motor vehicles enters Kazakhstan mostly by crossing the border in Chimkent, Jambil or Almaty provinces. Most of the drugs going to Russia by rail or by vehicles cross the Russian border in the direction of Astrakhan, Orenburg, Chelyabinsk, Omsk and Novosibirsk”[^3].

The project document suggests that the increasing professionalism of drug trafficking groups may account for the small size and low frequency of seizures. To increase the capacity of the Kazakhstani law enforcement personnel in the fight against those OC groups the present project was instigated. The rationale behind KAZ/I76 did appear to be relevant and continues to be relevant at the time of this evaluation. It also appeared relevant to Kazakhstani priorities at the inception of the Project within the framework of the Kazakhstani law enforcement initiative called “Rubezh-drugs” which undertook the creation of checkpoints located inside the country, so as to strengthen drug control in major trafficking regions.

UNODC mandate encompasses regional capacity building in preventing and effective tackling of narco-criminality through provision of technical assistance, know-how, expertise and financial support. It also includes fostering cooperation of various law enforcement institutions. These two areas form two strands of the KAZ/I76 project aimed at enhancing the drug control capacity of the Kazakhstani border guard and fostering cooperation among various internal organs responsible for tackling drug criminality.

The project under evaluation is in line with the acts of UN organs, namely the Political Declaration adopted at the United Nations General Assembly 20th Special Session held in June 1998[^4] and recommendations of the UN Security Council regarding countering the drug situation in and around Afghanistan. It also remains in accordance with the policy line adopted by the countries of the region, which i.a. resulted in creation of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC). Kazakhstan has actively participated in the establishment of this international coordinating body.

The project contributes to two UNODC Strategic Programme Frameworks (SPF) binding at the time of its implementation, namely the SPF for 2008-2011 and SPF for 2012-2015. The project provides an operationalisation of the Result area 1.2.: International cooperation in criminal justice matters.

KAZ/I76 fits in the architecture of other UNODC projects being implemented in the region for the past decade, namely:

(a) AD/RER/F43 “Assistance in Developing Controlled Delivery Techniques”,

(b) AD/RER/E29 “Precursors Control in Central Asia”,

(c) AD/RER/F60 “Computer based drug law enforcement training in the member countries of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Sub-Regional Cooperation in Drug Control”,

(d) AD/RER/F23 “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence, information and data collection, analysis and exchange”.

The present project can be therefore seen as an element of a comprehensive counter drug strategy for Central Asia. This evaluation confirms the continuing relevance of KAZ/I76 to the needs of the recipient country.

**Efficiency**

According to UNODC Guidelines for Evaluation Reports one of the aims of a project evaluation is to assess the extent to which the planned outputs have been delivered and how they contributed to the attainment of the objectives. The proper design and appropriate participatory needs assessment, supported with a comprehensive context analysis in the project document form a foundation for the project’s efficiency. As we have noted no comprehensive PNA was completed thus one key element in creating project efficiency was missing.

The project’s documentation provides evidence of efforts to allocate available resources to generate maximum return measured in increased operational capacity of the Kazakh law enforcement personnel. As noted above the planned outputs of KAZ/I76 have been increased in number over the life of the project as the environment within which the project existed changed. However it is also well recorded within the project documents and project revisions that some of these planned outputs have been negatively affected by the efficiency of Kazakhstani administration. “The initial request to provide a list of alternative activities was sent to the Counternarcotics Committee of MOI RK in April 2011, and the Nota Verbale suggesting UNODC to undertake the reconstruction of the quarantine building of Canine Centre of MOI RK was received in mid-December. Also, the Border Guard Service of NSC RK has been delaying the provision of the name of the candidate to participate at the Working Group meetings for four months. The official request was sent in August.”

Most of the outputs created have been achieved and have contributed to the overall objective. These have included 6 fixed, 18 mobile and 24 portable digital radio stations, 6 diesel generators were procured to CNC MOI RK’s oblast level divisions, and a satellite system was installed at “Rubezh-Drugs” checkpoints; 3 trainers from the Counternarcotics Interagency Training Centre participated at the training on analysis of operational information (ANACAPA); 5 canine instructors from KZ LEAs participated at the 2.5 months training at the Counternarcotics Canine

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5 Annual Progress Report December 2011
Training Centre in Bad Kreuzen, Austria; 5 sniffer dogs were procured for training deployment upon completion of the training; a dormitory of the Counternarcotics Interagency Training Centre was renovated; veterinary equipment was procured to the Canine Department of the Borderguard Academy of NSC RK; specialized vehicle for transportation of sniffer dogs was procured and handed over to Canine Centre of MOI RK and a Border Assessment was completed.

Where outputs have not been met, it has mostly been as a result of the changing environment or recipient state’s administrative procedures, which are aspects that sit outside the control or influence of the Project Team, the Project or – indeed – UNODC itself.

However one of the main areas where the efficiency of the project was reduced does fall squarely within the remit of the UN. This concerns delays in the procurement process. These delays were directly responsible for the final project revision of June 2012 having to be implemented extending the project to December 2012. “The tender on selecting a construction company for capital repair of quarantine unit of Canine Centre of MOI RK is being conducted on turnkey terms via the Procurement Unit of UNDP Kazakhstan. The tender was announced on January 27 and is still in progress (June) – lots of time has been spent on adjusting the tender documentation submitted by the bidders in accordance with the rules of regulations of UNDP.”

The delays caused by the administratively burdensome UNDP procurement rules and regulations have a negative impact not only on the efficiency of the project but on project partners’ perception of UNODC and UNDP. This evaluation recognizes that UNDP procurement process and procedures are unlikely to alter sufficiently in the short term to speed up procurement. Thus any project of which procurement is a large component part must build in far greater lead times and accept that a procurement which – in theory – should only take 1 to 2 months could take 6 to 9 months. It may also be circumspect that prior to the commencement of any new project the possible negative impact of long procurement delays should be closely examined.

The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) defines efficiency of a project as “a measure of how well inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) are converted into outputs”. It follows – therefore – that an unexplained loss of funds from the project could have an impact upon output. This evaluation notes that the sum of USD $6,047 was charged to the project on or around 26th April 2012 and “is due to the costs associated with running the investment pool by HQ”. The National Project Officer (NPO) asked for clarification on what this means and why it has been charged to the project. It took 9 months to receive the answer that it is in connection with the change in “the operational rates of exchange between the United States dollar and other currencies”. The evaluator has not had the time to investigate this further but the initial explanation (investment pool costs) and the second explanation (exchange rate costs) seem different.

The results from the interviews suggest that the various partners and stakeholders in the project are satisfied with the efficiency of the project with one exception where the delays caused by the procurement process were highlighted. This evaluation concludes that the project operated as efficiently as the working practices of the Kazakhstan authorities and the procurement processes allowed.

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6 Project revision 4 June 2012
7 Email NPO 24/05/2012
8 Rule 106.5
Partnerships and Cooperation

The original project document states that “This project [...] will be implemented in close coordination and harmonization with other UNODC projects in the field of law enforcement [...] and in close collaboration and consultation with the Committee on Drug Control and Countering Drug Business under the Ministry of Interior and direct coordination with major donor(s). The official and non-official groups and entities such as FANC – Foreign Anti-Narcotic Community in Central Asia – will be consulted and used for the best possible coordination of activities, with a view to avoiding duplication.” There is no further mention of FANC and any consultation with them during the life of the project. It is unrealistic to expect UNODC and the project to be able to ‘coerce’ potential partners into working together however it would be reasonable to expect some written explanation of the reasons why a potential partner highlighted in the project document did not form part of the project.

Having noted this it is clear through the desk review material “Cooperation with the donor country and national authorities has been maintained at high level through regular coordination meetings or joint monitoring missions” that partnership building and cooperation has been successfully achieved by the project. This was furthered confirmed by the interviews where every interviewee respondent gave the highest rating of “excellent” on the question of partnership and coordination. This is in no small part due to the high regard in which the NPO is held by those with whom she has worked. Interviewees from all stakeholder groups asked the evaluator to explicitly record their appreciation of her skills in this particular area. It should be noted that fostering and building partnerships and cooperation does not necessarily correlate to the execution of partners’ responsibilities and delivery of inputs. For example one of the key partners of the project BS NSC RK delayed the provision of the name of the candidate to participate at the Working Group meetings for four months.

One of the key elements in building these partnerships and fostering good cooperation was the implementation of the Working Group (WG) to assist in the delivery of output 4.2 which related to border assessment. To create a platform for cooperation among the project beneficiaries and stakeholders, the WG on assisting UNODC in conducting border assessment within the frame of KAZ/I76 project was created. The WG consisted of the representatives of the BGS, the Customs Control Committee of the Ministry of Finance of RK, US Embassy’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office (INL), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) and UNODC. The WG members participated in the selection of the expert. Again – without exception – all stakeholder groups gave the highest feedback on this approach. The border assessment itself is further discussed under the section on ‘impact’.

The project also ensured that regular bi-lateral meetings were held with appropriate stakeholders and all written reports were provided on a semi-annual basis. Toward the conclusion of the project this reporting was on a quarterly basis.

Effectiveness

Data gathered in the evaluation process allow for only a rough assessment of the overall effectiveness of KAZ/I76. The extent to which the project achieved its objective and outcomes

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*Semi-Annual Progress Report July 2009*
may vary between different regions, which benefited from the project’s funding. Due to very limited time devoted to the present evaluation and a consequent scarcity of data, no in-depth analysis of the project’s effectiveness can be provided. The present evaluation regards the results of the MSC survey as the main indicator of project’s effectiveness.

The project document does not describe an in-depth project progress monitoring mechanism. There is also no comprehensive baseline study in the project’s documentation. The logical framework proposes direct measuring of the effects of all undertaken activities as the immediate progress monitoring strategy. This however should be collated with an external measure of the overall project’s objective, which is to “enhance drug control capacities of the Government of Kazakhstan”. Such an external measure could be the level of drug seizures, trafficking operations intercepted or criminal networks broken. The volume of seized drugs may of course indicate the increased production or the increased activity of the OC groups, however only an external criterion can provide an answer to the question whether the newly hired, trained and equipped staff in fact contributes to the enhancement of the country’s drug control capacity. The data is collected by the recipient state and the KAZ/I76 management should refer to it in the process of steering the project’s activities.

The effectiveness of the project was undoubtedly hampered by the ever-changing requirements and demands of the Kazakhstani state as it changed personnel and priorities. “Signing of the revised project document by the Ministry of Interior of the RK has been postponed. The reshuffling within the ministry’s top personnel was one of the main reasons for this postponement”. Moreover KAZ/I76 was aimed to assist the Kazakhstani administration, and consequently fell victim to the shortcomings of the government’s policies and the implementation thereof. Minutes of the Counter Narcotics Donor Coordination Meeting held in January 2008 provide an adequate example: “Unfortunately during implementation [of Rubezh checkpoints initiative] there were mistakes, as was correctly mentioned in the Assessment Mission Report which was prepared by an Independent Consultant for UNODC KAZ/I76 project. Two checkpoints were not located appropriately; others do not have proper working and living conditions for personnel and no infrastructure. ”.

The project was subject to four revisions adjusting its scope to the changing country needs, incorporating additional funding into the project’s design and extending its duration.

The first revision extended the project’s budget and duration and also introduced two new immediate objectives, most notably, strengthening the canine capacity of the Military Institute and assessment of implementation of improved border management practices on the land border of Kazakhstan with Russian Federation. The second revision extended the project’s duration and adjusted the project to the reorganization of “Rubezh-Drugs” checkpoints into two special divisions, namely “South” and “Center”. The third revision along with extending the project’s duration adopted it to the changed international situation, namely the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The last revision extended the project’s duration, due to delays in implementation of the remaining project activities, namely the Kazakhstan state border assessment and capital repair of Quarantine Unit of Canine Centre of MOI RK.

Numerous adjustments and extensions have certainly had an impact on the project’s effectiveness, they were however a necessary response to the recipient country’s policies, the functioning of its administration and also changing international circumstances. The Annual Progress Report

(S/APR) from December 2011 concludes: “If similar projects are to be implemented in the future, they need to show a stronger alignment with the long-term priorities of project’s beneficiaries and the implementing agency.” The project team needs to show great flexibility while managing a project so closely linked with the recipient countries internal policies. There is evidence in the project documentation that such efforts have been made by KAZ/176 management.

Although the effectiveness of the Project has been hampered by having to react to the changing priorities and the (lack of) speed in Kazakh administration in certain areas it does appear that the various outputs relating to the objectives have been delivered. The extent to which those outputs have strengthened the aspects referred to in the immediate objectives noted cannot be established.

Impact

Impact, as defined by the UNEG, is “the positive or negative, primary and secondary long-term effect(s) produced by a project or programme, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended”.

The project document states “The project has been designed in close cooperation with project management, implementation and monitoring structures, involving international project staff, national working groups, UNODC ROCA, donor officials, and UNODC Vienna technical experts, so as to review project progress and impact on a constant basis.” However the desk review has found little evidence this constant review of impact.

The only explicit mention of impact was in July 2007 when the impact was assessed thus; “Although the overall impact of the project is still limited, the National Project Officer was able to prepare the way for effective project implementation…”11 However the interviews shed some light in the area of impact and it was generally accepted by the majority of stakeholders that one of the products from the project that had the greatest impact was the Border Assessment. This involved a Working Group being formed, input from many stakeholders and the (ultimate) recruitment of an expert who supplied the Border Assessment report. The quality of the report is well documented by the various partners and the report in its entirety – including its recommendations – has been adopted by the BGS. This must be viewed as a positive impact. Another positive impact has been the use made of the refurbished canine training centres and the throughput of dogs and officers within these centres. Unfortunately a negative impact of the project has been in beneficiary relations due to the slow procurement process already highlighted within this report.

Overall the impact of the Project has been difficult to quantify due – in no small part – to changing priorities that has seen the Project move from the aim of establishing internal checkpoints, through the refurbishment of dog training centres to the commission of a Border Assessment. However, the qualitative feedback on impact from the majority of stakeholders (including donors) is assessed positively.

Sustainability

The overall project’s objective was to enhance drug control capacities of the Government of Kazakhstan, which attempted to manifest itself in the immediate objective of strengthening the capacities of the law enforcement bodies involved in drug and related crime control in selected checkpoints on major transportation routes. It appears that many of the Project outputs have strengthened these capacities.

The Project document attempts to encourage sustainability by stating that “The Government of Kazakhstan will assist in the assessment of the situation on the ground by providing relevant information and documents in preparation for the establishment of an efficient workplan. Further, it will contribute inputs as to ensuring the sustainability of the project’s objectives beyond the project’s duration”.

However the extent to which the objectives are sustainable after withdrawal of funding and support with the ending of the Project on 31st December 2012 is unclear. It should be noted that during the life of the Project this strengthening was only possible because the Project existed and was able to react to the changing Kazakh environment and law enforcement priorities and practices.
III. CONCLUSION

This five year Project with an approved total budget of just over USD $ 1 million managed to deliver a number of outputs despite constantly changing priorities. It did this through the recruitment and deployment of skilled staff, most notably the National Programme Officer who fostered excellent working relationships with all appropriate internal and external UNODC partners and stakeholders.

The Project worked better when it focussed on the delivery of technical assistance – for example the Border assessment – as opposed to the delivery of fixed assets. This was in large part due to the slow delivery of these assets through a cumbersome and time consuming UNDP procurement process. This slowness of response did not put display the UN in general and UNODC in particularly positive fashion to their beneficiaries and donors alike.

It does appear, however, that the funds disbursed through the Project have been used in the manner in which they were intended. There has been a positive impact from the use of these funds however the true value from the funding will only be realised over a period of time.

Should a similar Project be initiated in the future this evaluation concludes that it should focus on the delivery of technical assistance and that time should be taken prior to the beginning of the Project to undertake a proper feasibility study and needs assessment. Should these prove positive, an appropriate project monitoring process should be developed and deployed.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

As this is an end of Project evaluation there are no Project specific recommendations. However the Project has highlighted a number of areas where action would be required should a similar type of project emerge from KAZI76.

Investment in human resources

Ensuring good service conditions i.e. adequate remuneration, stable long-term contracts, housing allowances etc. is essential in maintaining a team of professional staff and providing the basis of staff integrity. Once these fundamental requirements have been fulfilled a motivation system composed not only of financial gratifications but also training opportunities and career paths should be developed.

Implement Project progress monitoring mechanism

Without the tool to monitor progress of an undertaking it is difficult to evaluate whether the desired objectives have been achieved. Progress monitoring mechanism should include:

(a) Detailed baseline survey together with needs assessment that incorporates a risk assessment,

(b) clear and unambiguous, both quantitative and qualitative markers of achievement of specified results,

Stringent staff selection procedure

Stringent recruitment process, including written exams, interviews, health checks and final assessment by a panel composed of the project stakeholders for all staff positions is a foundation for building highly professional human resources. Strict entry procedures have well proven positive effect on subsequent identification with and commitment to organisation.

Professional human resources

There should be appropriate service conditions along with a motivation system to assist in retaining professional staff and create the foundation for sustainability and integrity. This is especially important in the context of operational work.
Balancing the human and technical capacity

Only professionally trained staff can successfully use sophisticated equipment required in the modern law enforcement activities. Project documentation provides examples of situations where only half of the available equipment was used due to high turnover of staff and the lack of sufficient training among the remaining personnel.

Support of the recipient country’s authorities

Alliance with country’s authorities fosters institutional capacity building and the ownership of goals, both of which increase the sustainability of the project’s outcomes. Although the respect for the state’s sovereignty does not allow the project’s management to interfere with the internal decision making processes, sufficient effort needs to be invested in presenting the projects activities and achievements and maintaining active working relationships with the key stakeholders within the recipient country’s administration.

Aligning the project with the long-term priorities of its beneficiaries

The project team needs to show great flexibility while managing a project so closely linked with the recipient countries internal policies. Time and effort need to be invested in close cooperation with the recipient country administration with the aim of aligning the projects objectives with sometimes rapidly changing country’s policies.

Move similar Projects away from a procurement focus to supplying technical expertise in the area(s) of UNODC comparative advantage

There is no doubt that the length of time taken to procure various resources for the Project led to critical delays that had an impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Project. Future Projects should recognize that these delays could have a negative impact and allow for that in their planning. Ideally the amount of procurement should be kept to a minimum or procurement is made outside the UNDP architecture using, for example, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

1. Background and context
   (a) Overview:

   **Project number:** KAZ/I76
   **Project title:** UNODC KAZ/I76 “Strengthening drug and related crime control measures in selected checkpoints in Kazakhstan”
   **Duration:** 17 January 2007-31 December 2012
   **Location:** Kazakhstan
   **Executing Agency:** UNODC
   **Partner Organizations**
   - The Counternarcotics Committee of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Kazakhstan (CNC MOI RK);
   - Canine Centre of MOI RK;
   - the Interagency Counternarcotics Training Centre of the Academy of MOI RK;
   - Canine and Cavalry Department, the Borderguard Academy of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan (BA NSC RK);
   - the Borderguard Services of NSC RK (BGS NSC RK)
   
   **Total Approved Budget:** US$ 1,124,005
   **Donors:** US Government
   **Project Manager/Coordinator:** Gulnur Bolyspayeva/Tofik Murshudlu
   **Type of evaluation:** Final
   **Time period covered by the evaluation:** January 2007-December 2012
   **Geographical coverage of the evaluation:** Kazakhstan
   **Core Learning Partners (entities):**
   - International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office (INL), US Embassy; CNC MOI RK; Canine Centre of MOI RK; the Interagency Counternarcotics Training Centre of the Academy of MOI RK; Canine and Cavalry Department, the BA NSC RK; the BGS NSC RK

   (b) Project background and historical context:

   This project was designed to support the Kazakhstani Government’s efforts towards strengthening drug and crime control on the routes most vulnerable to drug trafficking. It was expected that in line with UNODC ROCA’s Strategic Programme Framework for Central Asia for 2004-2007, the project would improve the capacity of the law enforcement officials posted along major transportation routes for identifying and intercepting drug traffickers through the provision of communications and other equipment, vehicles, training and expertise.
Kazakhstan has become an increasingly important transit country for Afghan opiate trafficking by virtue of its size, regional geography and relatively developed infrastructure. Three of the countries it borders themselves border Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan has a monopoly on Central Asia’s borders with Russia. The numerous major road and railway links across this border as well as its length (6,800 km) and topography make anti-trafficking efforts difficult. All drugs smuggled from Central Asia to the West must transit Kazakhstani territory unless they are shipped by air, across the Caspian Sea, or across the Turkmen-Iranian border.

This geographical setting has coincided with a number of difficult political and social circumstances in the 1990s. Difficulties during the transition period placed a strain on resources otherwise available for intelligence-gathering and law enforcement. Simultaneously, smuggling feasibility has increased in line with the multiplication of transport links and the escalation of international trade.

Because of the country’s size, the border control in Kazakhstan is challenging. Except for the Chinese border, Kazakhstan’s current international borders had previously been internal USSR boundaries with little practical importance. Now, Kazakhstan must police some 12,000 km of land borders and 1,900 km of Caspian Sea coastline. In these circumstances, the additional measures have been needed to ensure a coordinated law enforcement response to the increasing threat of drug trafficking and related crime.

**Legal and institutional framework**

Kazakhstan’s Drug Control Law (“On Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Precursors and Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse”) is quite comprehensive and refers to the UN conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988. In May 2002, the national schedule of controlled substances was appended to this law to make drug and precursor classifications legally binding. At the same time, the Parliament has passed the law “On Amendments and Addenda to Several Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan Related to Control of Circulation of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors”.

The various procedural issues related to the investigation and prosecution of drug related offences, including the issues of seizure, confiscation and disposal of illicit drugs are governed by the Code on Criminal Procedure of 13 December 1997, the Decree of the President of 21 December 1995 “On the Office of Procurator”, the Decree of the President of 31 August 1995 “On Banks and Banking Activity”, and the Law “On Operational Activity” of 15 September 1994.

The Committee on Drug Control and Countering Drug Business under the Ministry of Interior of the RK is the most specialized counter-narcotics institution. The Committee has also been given drug law enforcement coordination authority and is staffed by 600 counter-narcotics police officers spread between the headquarters and integrated into police units at oblast and rayon levels. Most officers work in the south, where the scale of drug trafficking is the largest. This unit investigates majority of all drug-related cases initiated by the law enforcement agencies of the country.

Also significant is the Customs Control Committee that used to be a part of the Ministry of State Revenues and now is a part of the Ministry of Finances of RK. The Committee is responsible for the suppression of illicit drug trafficking over Kazakhstan’s borders. The interdiction of illicit drugs and precursors is the responsibility of the Division against Smuggling and Violation of Customs Regulations.

The National Security Committee (NSC) is responsible for investigating the most serious crimes, including the biggest drug trafficking cases. The Committee has specialized Anti-Smuggling and Drug Trafficking Department. Three other departments dealing with corruption, terrorism and intelligence are also involved in interdicting drug trafficking. The NSC’s major focus is international trafficking but it also handles domestic trafficking cases.
where large criminal organisations are involved. The NSC is the major agency of the Kazakhstani Government interacting with the foreign agencies on drug trafficking issues. In this capacity, it conducts joint controlled delivery operations with the foreign law enforcement agencies.

**Government policies, strategies and plans**

On 16 May 2000, Kazakhstan adopted the “Strategy on Combating Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2000-2005”. The Strategy stressed the urgent need to elaborate legislative mechanisms for tightening control over the drugs and chemicals and for significantly reducing their diversion into illicit trafficking (the relevant legislative innovations have been discussed above). Kazakhstan has now developed a new strategy for 2006-2014, consisting of 3 stages: 2006-2008, 2009-2011 and 2012-2014. The main aims of the strategy are the further strengthening of the special powers of the Committee; the introduction of the new methods of treatment and rehabilitation for drug addicts; creation of a social rehabilitation system and the development of anti-drug immunity among the population. In 2005, the Government of Kazakhstan within the framework of the “Rubezh-drugs” law enforcement initiative created internal checkpoints to strengthen drug control in major bottlenecks.

**Prior and ongoing cooperation in the field**

UNODC has been providing assistance to the Central Asian countries in combating illicit drug trafficking for the past decade. Cooperation with Kazakhstan in the field of countering illicit drug trafficking is basically covered by a number of regional projects including AD/RER/F43 “Assistance in Developing Controlled Delivery Techniques”, AD/RER/E29 “Precursors Control in Central Asia”, AD/RER/F60 “Computer based drug law enforcement training in the member countries of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Sub-Regional Cooperation in Drug Control”, AD/RER/F23 “Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence, information and data collection, analysis and exchange”. Similarly, Kazakhstan has actively been participating in the establishment of a regional coordination body under AD/RER/H22 “Establishment of a Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)”.

(c) Justification of the project and main experiences/challenges during implementation:

Several law enforcement operations in 2004 highlighted the trend of increasing opiate traffic, especially heroin, through Kazakhstan. The circulation of cannabis group drugs has also remained endemic, fuelled by a large domestic production. While a large proportion of narcotics were destined for export, some remained for consumption in the country. In recent years, decreasing prices have prompted a new wave of drug abuse, especially of heroin. This trend was reflected in the increasing number of drug users officially registered in the relevant health care institutions.

Since independence, Kazakhstan has also experienced a rapid growth in reported crime. Distinct organized crime structures have developed, some of which were focused on drug smuggling. The increasing professionalism of drug trafficking groups may have accounted for the small size and low frequency of seizures. National authorities predicted that the presence and use of Afghan narcotics will continue to rise, and external assessments suggested that trafficking professionalism will also do so. The first half of 2005 supported

12 In February 2004, the Kazakh National Security Committee concluded a months-long operation dubbed Operation “Nayza” (Spear) aimed at the international drug ring with resulted in several arrests and more than 200 kilograms of narcotics seized. In addition, as a result of three operations carried out in August and September 2004, 100 kilograms of heroin were seized by special sub-units of the Kazakhstan’s drug control committee. Drug seizures continued to rise, with a 12% overall increase in 2004 to 22.690 tons. Kazakhstan’s largest seizure of heroin (200 kg) occurred in 2003 following a joint Kazakhstani-Russian operation against an international group that lasted several months.
these projections, with seizures of heroin increasing by 93% and opium by 421% over the same period in 2004.

The complexity of the drug trafficking situation in Kazakhstan and the country’s limited manpower, training, and equipment to match the scope of the problem has required a well-targeted international intervention. To assist the government of Kazakhstan in addressing these gaps, UNODC developed the project (later on coded as KAZ/I 76), and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office of US Embassy supported it financially.

The main challenges faced by the project can be grouped as follows:

External changes:
The introduction of the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus was the primary political level transformation that affected implementation of the project. With the introduction of this Union, Kazakhstan’s Southern border became a key priority for the country’s law enforcement agencies.

Intra-agency changes:
Originally, the KAZ/I 76 project has aimed at supporting the implementation of strategy of the Government of Kazakhstan within the framework of the “Rubezh-drugs” law enforcement initiative, which envisaged creation of in-country checkpoints at major road links that lacked detour routes to strengthen drug control in major trafficking regions. Later on, the Counter Narcotics Committee of the Ministry of Interior (CNC MOI RK) has decided to reorganize the “Rubezh-Drugs” checkpoints into two special divisions – “South” and “Center”. This reorganization has led to the delay of some of the project activities.

The reshuffling within the top personnel of the Ministry of Interior of RK, particularly within the CNC – the project’s primary beneficiary – has eventually led to the change of the Committee’s priorities. Some of the planned activities had been cancelled.

One of the biggest drawbacks in project implementation has been the prolonged official correspondence with the national law enforcement agencies. Most of the times, the time spent on getting the official approval of changes in project implementation was measured in months. Correspondence with the BGS NSC RK deserves a special mention. Every official letter sent to the latter had to go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Committee, and there were cases when the letters were lost.

(d) Project documents and revisions:
The project idea was developed in 2005 and approved in October 2005 with preliminary $800,000 budget. The project document was approved in January 2006 and got the initial funding from the US Government amounting to $869,000. The project duration was planned for two years, from 2006 until 2008. The project was officially launched in January 2007.

The project has undergone four project revisions – in October 2009, November 2010, December 2011 and June 2012. The first project revision introduced new immediate objectives aimed at strengthening the counternarcotics capacity through provision of assistance to the law enforcement training institutes and specialized counternarcotics divisions. Subsequently, the project budget and duration were increased to enable UNODC to achieve these objectives. The budget increase was covered by a new pledge from the project’s donor. The project duration was extended until the end of 2010, and the budget totalled $1,133,000.

Similarly, the consequent project revisions have also focused on supporting the Government of Kazakhstan in narcotics control and border security through strengthening the capacity of law enforcement training institutes and specialized counternarcotics divisions. The main reason behind the second project revision was related to the external changes, i.e. the aforementioned reorganization of the “Rubezh-Drugs” checkpoints. Some
of the objectives for 2010 in the frame of the additional funding ($264,000) were not achieved mainly due to the prolonged procedure of official correspondence with the BGS NSC RK. To complete the planned activities, the project duration had to be extended until the end of 2011.

The main reasons for the third project revision were external and intra-agency changes, due to which each of the project activities planned to be implemented in 2011, had to be reconsidered. The introduction of the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus was the primary political level transformation that affected implementation of the project. With the introduction of the Customs Union, Kazakhstan’s Southern border became a key priority for the country’s law enforcement agencies. The planned border assessment activity had to be revised following the suggestion of the BGS NSC RK to assess the southern border instead of the initially planned North-western segment that became the internal frontier of the Union. The reshuffling within the top personnel of the Ministry of Interior of RK, particularly within the CNC MOI RK has eventually led to the change of the Committee's priorities. Some of the planned activities had been cancelled.

For implementation of updated and newly introduced activities, the project was revised and extended until June 30, 2012.

In June 2012, the project was revised for the fourth time and extended until December 31, 2012. The main reason for this project revision was delays in implementation of the remaining project activities, namely the Kazakhstani state border assessment and capital repair of Quarantine Unit of Canine Centre of MOI RK.

(e) UNODC strategy context:

The project contributes to UNODC Strategic Programme Framework (SPF) for 2008-2011 and 2012-2015, namely to Result area 1.2: International cooperation in criminal justice matters,” and fits well with the SPF’s immediate operational priority of providing assistance to improve national and regional law enforcement capacities.

2. Disbursement history:

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3. Purpose of the evaluation:

The final Independent Project Evaluation is initiated by KAZ/I76 project and was foreseen in the project document. It is managed by the National Project Officer (NPO) and is supervised by the head of the Programme Office in Almaty who coordinates all law-enforcement projects implemented in Kazakhstan.

The purpose of the present evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of the project and its impact on the counternarcotics capacity of the relevant Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies and training institutes, and to provide accountability to the donor agency by determining whether project objectives were met and resources were wisely utilised. It is envisaged that the evaluation results will suggest new strategic directions.
The main evaluation users are project beneficiaries, namely the CNC MOI RK, Canine Centre of MOI RK, the Interagency Counternarcotics Training Centre of the Academy of MOI RK, Canine and Cavalry Department of the BA NSC RK, and BGS NSC RK, and the project donor (INL, US Embassy).

4. **Scope of works:**

The time period to be covered is January 2007-December 2012. The geographical scope is national. The thematic coverage is the KAZ/I76 project.

5. **Evaluation criteria and key evaluation questions:**

The DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance (OECD, 1991) – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, partnership and cooperation, impact and sustainability – are the general basis for the evaluation.

The present evaluation will use the following criteria:

- **Relevance:**
  1. How relevant was the project to the needs and priorities of the relevant Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies and training institutes?
  2. To what extent are the objectives of the project still valid?
  3. Were the project activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
  4. Were the project activities and outputs consistent with the intended impacts and effects?
  5. Have complementarities and synergies of the project with other relevant projects implemented by UNODC in the region been created?
  6. Have the relevant risks been considered sufficiently?

- **Effectiveness:**
  1. To what extent the project objectives were achieved?
  2. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the project objectives?
  3. Was there an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor and assess the overall project progress?
  4. Has the project manager adapted to change by adjusting the project design and direction when deemed necessary?
  5. How have the project achievement and lessons learned been disseminated to the stakeholders?

- **Efficiency:**
  1. Were project activities cost-efficient?
  2. Were project objectives achieved on time?
  3. Were the resources and inputs converted into outputs in a cost-effective manner?
  4. Was the project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?

- **Partnerships and cooperation:**
  1. To what extent have partnerships been sought and established and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?
  2. How effectively were the partnership and cooperation aspects addressed?
  3. To what extent partnerships’ responsibilities were fully and effectively discharged?
  4. To what extent partnerships’ inputs were of quality and provided in a timely manner?
• **Impact:**
  1. What has happened as a result of the project?
  2. What real difference has the project made to the project beneficiaries?
  3. Has the project contributed to strengthening the counternarcotics capacity of the Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies and training institutes?

• **Sustainability:**
  1. To what extent did the benefits of the project continue after donor funding ceased?
  2. What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the project?
  3. To what extent are the project impact (if any) and outcomes likely to continue after the project is over?
  4. Is stakeholders’ engagement likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after the external funding ceases?

6. **Evaluation methodology:**

The project evaluation will utilize the following methodology:

• desk study of the relevant strategic and project documents (project document and its revisions, project semi-annual, annual and progress reports, and reports produced by the outside experts);
• structured interviews with the project beneficiaries and partners, UNODC relevant personnel, consultants of the projects and the donor agency;
• field visits.
## ANNEX II. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED DURING THE EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulnur BOLYSPAYEVA</td>
<td>UNODC Astana</td>
<td>National Project Officer KAZ/I76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tofik MURSHUDLU</td>
<td>UNODC Almaty</td>
<td>Ex Head, UNODC Programme Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nina KERIMI</td>
<td>UNODC Almaty</td>
<td>Head, UNODC Programme Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir YELCHIBEKOV</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
<td>Country Manager, BOMCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murat OSPANOV</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Head, Interagency Counternarcotics Training Centre, Academy of MOI RK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrey ZADOROZHNYI</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Head, Canine Centre MOI RK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raushan KASSYMBEKOVA</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Senior Programme Manager, INL, US Embassy RK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svetlana BEKMAMBETOVA</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
<td>Programme Office, IOM, Astana RK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir ABDYKALYKOV</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Head, Counternarcotics Department, Customs Control Committee, MF RK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokbergenov IDRIS</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Border Guard Service, NSC RK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhytzhan BESEVEV</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Deputy Head, Counternarcotics Committee, MOI RK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EVALUATION QUESTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In your opinion how well did the KAZ/I76 reflect your countries policies and objectives?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. How well did the KAZ/I76 integrate its work with other UNODC projects?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. How well did the KAZ/I76 implement its strategic planning?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. How well did the KAZ/I76 reacted to changes in its operating environment?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. How well did the KAZ/I76 use the resources that it had available?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. How well did the KAZ/I76 managed the issues of partnership and cooperation?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MSC QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What, in your opinion, was the most significant success that the KAZ/I76 project has achieved?

2. Apart from a lack of resources what, in your opinion, was the most significant barrier to the success of the KAZ/I76 project?

3. Apart from increasing resources what, in your opinion, was the most significant change that could be made to the KAZ/I76 project to improve its effectiveness?
ANNEX IV. DESK REVIEW LIST

1. Project Idea KAZI76-24-8-05
2. Project Document_KAZI76
3. Project Revision_1 Oct 2009
4. Project Revision_2 Nov 2010
5. Project Revision_3 Dec 2011
6. Project revision_4 Jun 2012
7. Annual progress report-Dec2007
8. Annual progress report-Dec2008
9. Annual progress report-Dec2009
10. Annual progress report-Dec2010
11. Annual progress report-Dec2011
15. Semi-annual progress report-July2010
17. Semi-annual progress report-July2012
18. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2010_4Q
19. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2011_1Q
20. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2011_2Q
21. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2011_3Q
22. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2011_4Q
23. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2012_1Q
24. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2012_2Q
25. Q-rep_KAZ_I_76_2012_3Q
27. UNODC Strategy for 2012-2015
28. TOR_Expert_KAZ_I76 – final
29. 5-AnnexII-SoW-eng
30. 6-AnnexII-Sow-eng
31. Note to file-26.12.11
32. 3-AnnexI-ToR