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Independent project evaluation of the

**Support to improved security by provision of
capacity building to the Jakarta Centre for
Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC)**

IDN T80

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This evaluation report was prepared by an independent evaluation team consisting of Mr. Angus Henderson. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>

The Independent Evaluation Unit of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime can be contacted at:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Vienna International Centre
P.O. Box 500
1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: (+43-1) 26060-0
Email: ieu@unodc.org
Website: www.unodc.org

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LIST OF COMMONLY USED ABBREVAIIONS

AGO Attorney General's Office
AKPOL Indonesian National Police Academy
AML Anti-Money Laundering
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
BNPT National Counter-Terrorism Agency
CBT Computer Based Training
CJS Criminal Justice Sector
CNTA/BNPT National Counter-Terrorism Agency
CWG Consortium Working Group
CT Counter-Terrorism
GB Governing Board
goLEARN Law Enforcement e-Learning (UNODC Software)
GOI Government of Indonesia
IEU Independent Evaluation Unit
INP Indonesian National Police
ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy, Bangkok, Thailand.
KERIS Collaborative, Educational, Responsive, Immersive, Simulation Training
KPK Corruption Eradication Commission
NF National Faculty
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PPATK Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
ROM Results Orientated Monitoring
SEARCCT South East Asian Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
TNA Training Needs Analysis
TDP Trainer Development Programme
TOC Transnational Organised Crime

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overall objective of the IDN T80 project was to improve the rule of law and security in Indonesia by strengthening the investigative and management capacities of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and other law enforcement agencies so that they were better able to detect, prevent and investigate serious transnational crime. The specific objective was to supplement the capacity of Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) to train other law enforcement personnel in the skills necessary to tackle transnational crime. The project sought to improve capacity by: delivering programmes that introduced and taught methods for countering transnational organised crime; introducing modern and imaginative teaching techniques; recruiting and training a cadre of national trainers, and introducing immersive training; and increasing JCLEC's connectivity with other international law enforcement institutions.

JCLEC is a bilateral Indonesian – Australian law enforcement cooperation centre that was established in 2004 in the aftermath of the Bali bombings. The JCLEC academy, in Semarang, is a fantastic training facility it is fully equipped with modern training suites and comfortable accommodation and is conducive to learning, The JCLEC Secretariat, in Jakarta, oversees training policy and forges regional links.

The project supported the Government of Indonesia's (GOIs) mid-term development objectives of increased security, to include combating transnational crime, and improved governance through institutional development. The project contributed towards UNODC regional and country objectives, in support of UN mandates, and accorded with the EU's Regional Strategy. The project, itself, was a European Union (EU) funded initiative (or action), for which the UNODC effectively became the lead implementer. The other implementing partners included the Indonesian Governance NGO Kemitraan, Charles Sturt University from Australia and the UK's College of Policing Bramshill (NPIA). While this funding arrangement and partnership provided the optimum mix of funds and expertise, it was complex and the design caused friction. Project staff effectively served two masters (UNODC and EU) and reported to numerous partners in addition to working alongside JCLEC. As a result the project encountered financial reporting difficulties due to differing (UNODC and EU) procedures. Administrative issues were further exacerbated by a lack of UNODC staff continuity; such as the project coordinator's post being filled by three different people over three years. Some of these problems could and should have been mitigated in the original project design.

Despite the implantation challenges and complex administrative arrangements the project was very successful. It delivered high quality outputs which markedly increased JCLEC's student throughput, and raised the investigative capacity of the Indonesian law enforcement agencies. Project governance was extremely good and project administration improved steadily over time. Project working groups and governing boards met on a regular basis and took note of training observations and evaluations, altering course content and project direction as required. Project staff forged strong relationships with their implementing partners and amongst the recipients. While JCLEC was appreciative of UNODC efforts, close proximity meant they witnessed faults first-hand. Only now, as the project staff depart is JCLEC able to appreciate the project's true

worth; they capacity and capability of the project staff will be hard to replace. Over a 3 year period the project delivered 62 courses and instructed over 2200 students. This equates to 33% of JCLEC's courses; and 25% of JCLEC's students. The project staff provided 33% of the Academies staff.

The JCLEC Executive Director and staff felt that they had ownership of the project's outcomes and it is heartening to see that the project's major achievements will not only be sustained by JCLEC but potentially exported into mainstream INP training. The project's overall objective envisaged improving rule of law and security across Indonesia and possibly more could have done to export project capabilities to other INP training establishments earlier. Increased impact might have been achieved through an influence campaign that engaged politicians and senior officials in a proactive manner, in an attempt to educate them, and elicit their support for project initiatives. Long term sustainability of the project's achievements and wider distribution of training required buy-in from senior INP and law enforcement personnel. Officials in positions of power must view new ideas as their own before they can implement their own programmes of change. UNODC may wish to explore this means of delivering effect as part of a wider Security Sector Reform programme, as and when funds become available.

Due to delays beyond the control of the project staff and the evaluator, the final evaluation occurred after all project activity had finished, it also had to take place before the end of 2013. The evaluator was, therefore, unable to witness any training and the field visit was truncated. However, neither of these facts adversely affected the evaluation as access to JCLEC staff, recipients, partners and historic data was more than sufficient to address the questions posed by the inception report. Prior to the commencement of the project no baseline study had been conducted. In addition it appears that the INP and other law enforcement agencies do not routinely collate or centralise security and rule of law data. This lack of data made it virtually impossible to quantify and/or verify project indicators which included increased security or rule of law.

The project did, however, deliver high quality outcomes which were clustered into four activity areas. Cluster one provided valuable and relevant programmes to mid /senior level officers from across Indonesia. It increased their understanding of transnational crime and provided skills that assisted in the investigation of these crimes. This analysis can be used with some certainty, thanks to the advanced evaluation methods used by the project staff which processed student feedback and conducted follow up interviews. The project also supported gender mainstreaming by increasing the number of female students and delivering the first ever female District Commander's Course. It was extremely efficient and managed to reduce the unit cost per student and provided 28% more capacity than originally conceived.

Cluster two recruited and trained national trainers and delivered immersive training. The project was successful in developing in-house trainers from amongst the various law enforcement agencies, but not as successful in sustaining a National Faculty within JCLEC. Although a valid concept, the National Faculty was not adequately supported by the Indonesian law enforcement agencies. It never really recruited sufficient numbers to make it viable in the long term. KERIS, the immersive training concept, is without doubt the flagship element of the project and virtually worth the entire project fund alone. Immersive training has been taken to heart by the national trainers, JCLEC and students. It will be interesting to see to what extent that KERIS is exported to other institutions. UNODC should maximize the deployment of this concept, possibly exporting it to other UNODC country programmes.

Cluster three provided computer suites, software and training aides for computer based training. All these items were well conceived and delivered on time and on budget. More importantly all these elements have been taken over by JCLEC. Sustainability of computers, equipment and

software was built into the project design from the start, which is not only commendable but worth exporting to other UNODC projects.

Cluster four, sought to network JCLEC with other international law enforcement institutions and provided mobile training team. While the mobile training teams have been established and will be taken on by JCLEC, networking JCLEC with other institutions is still a work in progress. Due to the participation of numerous other national partners, JCLEC already has links to other countries and is no better connected to these institutions than when the project commenced.

The overall impact of the project was difficult to analyze and ascertain. The objectives, as articulated in the project documentation, were too broad and measures of effect lacked clarity or quantifiable data from which to make judgments. The project was unlikely to ever directly contribute to improved rule of law and security. Despite this overall objective, the project did deliver something more realistic. It targeted mid/senior level officials and sought to improve their knowledge and skill sets. While there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest the project increased professionalism there is little tangible data, beyond the course evaluations to support these claims. The true benefit may have been joint training, which forced law enforcement agencies to work together and increased connectivity. The impact of networking and benefits of better educated officials are hard to measure retrospectively and the project would have benefited from more considered and realistic measures of effect.

In summary, IDN T80 was a well-executed and highly successful project, it delivered what it set out to achieve; regardless of the poorly articulated project documentation. It supported JCLEC and indirectly increased the institutional capacity of the INP and other law enforcement agencies. In many respects the project over achieved when measured against its outcomes. This all credit to the dedication of the project staff and their partners. The legacy elements of the project are KERIS, CBT, mobile training teams and the evaluation process. All these elements are sustainable and likely to survive well into the future. Although early days, there are INP plans to expand and export these elements to other law enforcement institutions. Many of the project's achievements represent best practice. UNODC should look to export them to other UNODC programmes. While the project was relevant to Indonesian needs, there may have been other means of delivering similar effect. In the future it is unlikely that UNODC will have the luxury to deploy a full project team in support of a single academy. UNODC will have a role in assisting Indonesia; however, this may be more at the policy level, than in the provision of training staff.

SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings¹: problems and issues identified	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations²
Key recommendations		
<p>Project objectives and outcomes were not realistic, attainable or measurable. While project documentation must accord with National and International priorities, objectives must be achievable and realistic.</p> <p>Project outcomes should indicate how they contribute to the overall objective and set appropriate measures of effect.</p>	<p>Regional and Country Programmes. Project documentation. Mid- Term evaluation. EU ROMs. Project Annual Reports. Interviews with partners.</p>	<p>UNODC general: future project / programme objectives and outcomes should be more realistic, attainable and measurable.</p> <p>UNODC general: UNDOC should consider providing additional support to country teams when they are drafting project documentation, as few core staff possess formal project management qualifications.</p>
<p>The actual risks to project success were not identified and/or articulated in the project documentation. This project involved multiple stakeholders, different reporting mechanisms and numerous currencies, all of which caused implementation issues. Most of these issues could and should have been mitigated during the design phase.</p>	<p>Project documentation. Mid- Term evaluation. Project Annual Reports. Interviews with partners.</p>	<p>UNODC general: future project / programme design must identify risk and seek to mitigate risk. This project there should have completed a stakeholder matrix which identified how and when reports were to be submitted. From this matrix it would have been apparent that there were financial reporting risks. Early identified would have allowed mitigation procedures to be put in place before the project commenced.</p>
Important recommendations		
<p>The use of the Kirkpatrick evaluation model and the manner in which it was adapted to meet JCLEC training needs is an example of best practice that should be adopted by UNODC projects elsewhere.</p>	<p>Mid- Term evaluation. EU ROMs. Project Annual Reports. Interviews with partners. Interviews with JCLEC staff.</p>	<p>UNODC general: UNODC should seek to export the Kirkpatrick evaluation model used for the internal evaluation of this project to other UNDOC training projects.</p>

¹ A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

² Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

<p>The fourth question which seeks to address the impact of activities requires careful consideration.</p>		<p>UNODC general: future projects / programmes should devise realistic and quantifiable measures of effect and procedures to measure impact.</p>
<p>The KERIS immersive training suites are state of the art and are highly regarded by both students and trainers.</p>	<p>Mid- Term evaluation. EU ROMs. Project Annual Reports. Interviews with partners. Interviews with JCLEC staff.</p>	<p>UNODC South East Asia Region should seek to export KERIS and the CBT it developed as part of this project to other training projects.</p>
<p>The National Faculty while a sound concept was not sufficiently resourced. An insufficient number of staff was recruited to ensure that it was a sustainable and viable concept.</p>	<p>Project documentation. Mid- Term evaluation. EU ROMs. Project Annual Reports. Interviews with partners. Interviews with JCLEC staff. Interview with National Faculty.</p>	<p>UNODC general: future project / programmes that aim to raise a cadre of national instructors should work on a ten to one ratio. For every required instructor's post there should be ten trainees. This provides depth and institutional resilience.</p>
<p>Given Indonesia's relative prosperity and donor reluctance to fund new programmes UNODC should consider what next? Indonesia still suffers from governance issues and lacks sufficient intuitional capacity to independently implement a programme of change.</p>	<p>Regional and Country Programmes.</p>	<p>Indonesia Country Office may wish to concentrate on reform. While it would be unable to deliver a comprehensive Security Sector Reform programme by itself, it is well placed to suggest and influence the design of one. It is also well placed to support at the policy level by advocating reform.</p>
<p>The end of a project requires a handover and disposal period. During the course of the evaluation it was evident that Project was shutting down and that there was no funding for this phase of the project.</p>	<p>Observations during evaluation. Interviews with Project Staff. Interviews with JCLEC staff.</p>	<p>UNODC general: future project / programme design should consider a disposal phase where a certain percentage of funds should be ring-fenced so as to allow a smooth handover of equipment, staff and material.</p>
<p>While partners and recipients were kept abreast of developments and the project never formally engaged those more senior officers who could have provided the impetus for full scale change and the funds that guarantee the sustainment of the projects achievements.</p>	<p>Project documentation. Project Annual Reports. Interviews with partners. Interviews with JCLEC staff. Interviews with Project staff.</p>	<p>Indonesia Country Office should consider allocating resources and time to developing a formalized campaign that seeks to influence key decision makers within the GOI and law enforcement agencies as a means of building sustainability into future programmes.</p>

I. INTRODUCTION


Background and context

Picture 1. People smuggling³

South East Asia is a global source, transit and destination region for human trafficking⁴. It is the world's second largest source of heroin⁵, and has become a key centre for the manufacture and movement of amphetamine type stimulants. The region suffers from illicit natural resource extraction and there is an omnipresent threat of terrorism. These transnational threats occur in a climate of instability, inadequate national legal frameworks and endemic corruption. Uneven institutional capacity, ineffective governance and limited cooperation amongst regional actors only acerbate the issue. As a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs, transnational organised crime, terrorism and corruption UNODC supports South East Asia and the Pacific Region with a regional programme.



Map 1. Migrant smuggling routes to Australia and Canada⁶



³ Picture 1: news.com.au – 8 April 2011. <http://www.news.com.au/world/indonesian-mps-pass-peoplesmuggling-bill/story-e6frfkyi-1226035698359>

⁴ UNODC Indonesia Country Programme 2012- 2015.

⁵ UNODC web site <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/>

⁶ <http://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2013/05/som-tocta/story.html>

Since 1998, Indonesia has undergone radical transformation⁷. Democratic elections, economic growth, rapid decentralization and substantial bureaucratic / governance reforms have all occurred. Despite progress serious challenges remain. Threats range from a need to improve maritime border security, to combating corruption, preventing terrorism, and increasing access to criminal justice mechanisms. In response to these needs, UNODC assistance to Indonesia has been guided by the South East Asia Regional Programme and from 2012 the Country Programme for Indonesia.

JCLEC is a formal training establishment that trains Indonesian law enforcement agencies in investigative techniques and procedures designed to tackle transnational threats. JCLEC was opened 3 July 2004⁸ and brought together the work of ad hoc working groups established at the Bali Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in February 2004, and related follow-up activities in response to the Bali Bombing of 2003⁹. It was also designed to maintain links with existing centres such as the South East Asian Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand.

Picture 2. JCLEC Academy¹⁰

The JCLEC Academy is located within the Indonesian National Police Academy (AKPOL) in Semarang. The Centre is intended as a resource for the South East Asia region in its fight against transnational crime, with a particular focus on counter-terrorism. It achieves effect by coordinating and facilitating a range of training programmes, seminars and workshops. The JCLEC Secretariat is based in Jakarta. It is this element that provides oversight, policy advice and forges international links. Although JCLEC is a bilateral Indonesian – Australian initiative, it actively seeks participation from other regional countries and international actors.



The project's objectives

The overall objective was to improve the rule of law and security in Indonesia by strengthening the investigative and management capacities of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and other law enforcement agencies so that they were better able to detect, prevent and investigate serious transnational crime.

The specific objective of the project was to supplement the capacity of JCLEC to train INP officers and other law enforcement personnel in the skills necessary for tackling transnational crime by establishing a comprehensive training and staff development programme.

⁷ UNODC Indonesia Country Programme 2012- 2015.

⁸ JCLEC website http://www.jclec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=28


⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Bali_bombings

¹⁰ Picture 2. JCLEC Academy, aerial photograph of the training buildings. Authors own photograph from JCLEC original.

The project had four outcomes which were delivered in four clusters of activities. The four outcomes were:

- a) Improving the managerial and operational capacity of the INP in general, and the CID in particular, both at Headquarters and at the regional (POLDA) level.
- b) Improving the quality of in-house training at INP, KPK, PPATK and AGO.
- c) Strengthening JCLEC’s effectiveness and relevance as a training institute for the INP and other law enforcement agencies.
- d) Cooperative exchanges between JCLEC and European and Asian training institutes.

Figure I. IDN T80 expenditure



^a Total project budget was 5,000,000 Euros, it was accounted in \$ USDs and received additional donations in \$ USDs (see table below).

^b Management costs include human resources, office equipment, meetings, evaluations and UN staff travel to site.

^c Travel costs include subcontractors, students travel and participation on overseas courses.

^d Training and equipment costs include computers, IT support, mobile training and the cost of courses at JCLEC.

Source: All data from project documentation and ProFi.

Table 1. IDN T80 donations

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Date of donation</i>	<i>Use of donation</i>
European Commission	\$6,619,637	2009 – 2012	UNODC CRIME
Turkey	\$50,000	2011	UNODC CRIME
Other	\$60,236	2011	UNODC CRIME
Total (not comprehensive)	\$6,729,873		

The three questions that this evaluation seeks to answer are: firstly, has the project contributed to increased capacity and capability of JCLEC to improve the skills required to tackle transnational crime; secondly, has this training support increased the investigative and managerial capacity of the INP (and others); and thirdly, can increased capacity be linked to any tangible improvements in the provision of rule of law and security in Indonesia?

Table 2. Evaluation questions

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Key questions</i>
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How relevant was the project to the defined needs and priorities of the Government of Indonesia, the International Community and the donors?
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What was the overall impact of the project?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the likely outcomes and how effective has the project been?
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How efficient has the implementation of the project been?
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How sustainable were the project's achievements?
Partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How effective have the partnerships with Government of Indonesia, Law Enforcement Agencies and donors been? How was the project governed and what more could be done to manage and improve stakeholder relations?
Lessons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What lessons have been indentured and should be learned?

Evaluation Methodology

Data was collected via a framework questionnaire through which semi-structured interviews were conducted. The framework questionnaire (at Annex II) was designed to guide discussion to cover all questions, though depending upon the meetings some questions were not relevant and others were asked instead. Ample opportunity was provided for the respondents to tell their own story and to initiate discussion on issues not considered in advance. These “leads” were pursued in discussions with other respondents in order to verify their veracity and to allow for further investigation of pertinent issues. The primary means of data collection were:

(a) A Desk level review. A review of all project documentation, financial data, other evaluations, and internet search of relevant open source and media information.

(b) Interviews. A series of interviews with recipients, core learning partners, UNODC staff and donors. These interviews sought to address the core questions and also requested additional information, such as donor perceptions which could then be researched at a later date.

(c) Observations. A visit to JCLEC as the highlight of the evaluation. It provided the opportunity to see first-hand some the project’s more tangible successes, to photograph them and to speak the trainers and students who use this facility.

(d) Case study. The evaluation did not have the ability to conduct first-hand case studies, but it did request both positive and negative feedback from staff, recipients and donors and used these vignettes to illustrate some of the more nebulous data.

II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Design

Indonesia is collection of over 17,000 islands¹¹ and has approximately 470,000¹² law enforcement officers. Of this total, 285,000 form the INP. When one considers the size of Indonesia and its law enforcement challenges, a project of \$6,700,000 USD was unlikely to deliver many tangible increases in security and rule of law or tackle transnational crime. It was always only going to contribute a small element. At the macro level, over 3 years the project trained less than 1% of the INP. Over 10 years JCLEC, as a whole, will have trained less than 2.5% of all the law enforcement officers in Indonesia and approximately 4.2% of the INP. When one considers the turnover of officers and natural wastage over time, these percentages are considerably less than the headline figures. The initial project documentation should have identified what the project's likely contribution was going to be and then set realistic objectives and measures of effect.

One could question if JCLEC was the correct mechanism for achieving the overall objective. However, given the limited budget and the scale of the problem, it was more beneficial to enable a single school than spread resources thinly between numerous institutions. Given the nature of the issues within Indonesia and the threat of transnational crime emanating from the region, a focus on senior to mid-level officers as a means of combating transnational crime appears to be as good a place to invest as any. The project certainly improved cooperation between a limited number of officers and any wider effect would have entailed the mainstreaming of course content to other schools and academies. Looking to the future, donors may wish to deliver wider coverage, or target courses and study periods that seek to influence Indonesian policy makers and then allow them to initiate internal reform. A Security Sector Reform programme that educates senior staff and seeks to influence policy, thereby allowing the seniors officers and staff to implement a programme of change themselves.

Despite the fact that the project's objectives were too grandiose, what the project delivered in an attempt to address them was commendable. Both objectives were correct, in that they sought to address Indonesian needs, UN mandates, UNODC programmes and EU priorities. However, for such a small project, in terms of resources and throughput of students, the objectives should have been defined in more realistic terms. This would have allowed the project documentation to provide some realistic and tenable measures of effect from which the project's impact could have been ascertained.

¹¹ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation/support-regional-integration/asean/documents/10.03.10_info_on_indonesia_finale_en.pdf

¹² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_National_Police

Relevance

Picture 3. An Indonesian police officer guards the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta¹³.



President Yudhoyono's Medium Term Development Strategy for Indonesia¹⁴ (MTDS 2005-2009) outlined three key priorities. The first was to "promote security and peace by solving separatist conflicts.... and fight trans-national crime, in particular terrorism". The second was to "improve justice and democracy by improving governance, and through improved public administration, law enforcement and decentralised public services". The third was to "increase prosperity.....through economic growth¹⁵".

In response to the MTDS, the EU's Country Strategy for Indonesia 2007 – 2013¹⁶, Area 3, focused on governance, in particular law enforcement and judicial reform. Against this background, the specific objectives of the EU-Indonesia Law Enforcement and Justice cooperation were:

- "tackling corruption.....
- addressing the specific needs of law enforcement and judicial authorities in support of ongoing reform including amongst others, the Judiciary, the Public Prosecution service and the National Police with the aim of supporting the emergence of publicly accountable institutions, committed to improved and effective governance and to combating more effectively transnational organized crime.
- Responding to the justice needs of the business and investor community.....
- Enhancing the legal protection of human rights¹⁷"

Learning lessons from previous assistance programmes a key feature of the EU Country Strategy 2007-2013 was to move away from a project-based approach toward a sector-based approach, supporting government sector policies, and concentrating assistance on a limited number of sectors. As such, in EU official documentation the IND T80 Project was referred to as the 'Action¹⁸', as the EU did not deliver the project, instead it subcontracted out an element of their rule of law sector funding.

UNODC¹⁹ states that the key issues that Indonesia needs to address, if it is to combat Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) and international terrorism, as well as to protect vulnerable groups are:

¹³ AU News. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2003-08-05/police-officer-guards-bombed-hotel/1460808>

¹⁴ MTDS – <ftp://ftp.fao.org/OSD/CPF/Country%20NMTPF/Indonesia/Status/NMTPF.pdf>

¹⁵ Indonesia's MTDS for 2005 -2006 key priorities.

¹⁶ EU's Country Strategy for Indonesia 2007 – 2013.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/documents/indonesia_csp_2007-2013_en.pdf

¹⁷ EU's Country Strategy for Indonesia 2007 – 2013.

¹⁸ For simplicity this report refers to IND T80 as the Project and makes no reference the Action.

¹⁹ Indonesia Country Programme 2012-2015.

- (a) None ratification of UN Conventions under the UNODC mandate.
- (b) Lack of supporting national legislation to implement the provisions of UN Conventions, such as with respect to MLA, and the complexity of the “legal tools” contained in the UN Conventions.
- (c) Judiciaries lacking sufficient independence and integrity, lack of effective cooperation between the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, and inadequate protection of vulnerable groups;
- (d) Lack of effective cooperation between Member States, particularly with respect to the investigation and prosecution of TOC, sharing data/information on TOC and expeditious Mutual Legal Assistance.

In response to the above, IDN T80 contributed to the Regional Thematic Programme by supporting the Rule of Law result areas 1.2.7, 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. It also supported the Regional Programme Outcomes 3.3 integrity-based and accountable criminal justice systems established and 3.4: more efficient and effective transnational cooperation on criminal justice matters. The project directly contributed to the Indonesia Country Sub-Programme area 1: Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking, Outcome 1.1. Improved border security through increased measures to counter illicit trade and trafficking.

The project itself supported or contributed to improving security and tackling transnational crime through capacity building at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC).

The EU conducted a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) in 2007 which saw JCLEC as a worthy investment; however, there was no indication that other modalities were considered. As the EU no longer implemented projects they produced a request for proposals in 2007, for award and distribution of funds in 2009. A consortium of partners led by the UNODC which included Charles Sturt University, Kemitraan and NPIA, bid for and was awarded the contract in early 2009. If effect these partners were subcontracted to deliver an EU project which was led by the UNODC. This funding and oversight structure differed from most other UNODC projects.

The project was highly relevant in that it supported Indonesian and International accords and priorities. There is little reference as to the why JCLEC was chosen at the expense of other institutions and why training was seen as the priority area for investment. However, given the limited funds (\$6,700,000 USD) and the three year²⁰ time frame, JCLEC as an already functioning academy would appear to be a suitable location for investment.

Efficiency

Due to the complexities of dealing with multiple currencies and differing financial accounting arrangements the project encountered a number of financial issues. The UNODC budgets in US Dollars, the EU in Euros and expenditure at JCLEC was in Indonesian Rupiah. Exchange rate fluctuations and differing UNODC / EU accounting periods/rules and styles complicated reporting and accounting during the course of the project. These issues, in addition to UNODC bureaucracy, resulted in UNODC being unable to transfer funds to JCLEC for a number of months until the matter was resolved. Future projects should be cognizant of the financial producers and processes of partners in advance and ensure that these issues are resolved during the design phase and not left until implementation. EU regulation's state that they will fund no

²⁰ With two extensions, the total duration of the project was extended from 36 to 50 months from Sep 2009 until Dec 2013.

more than 95% of any project. This left UNODC and its partners needing to find 5% of \$6,700,000 as the project was ending; luckily additional funds were made available by the Government of Turkey. Changes in project staff, particularly the project supervisor's post, adversely affected continuity and relationships. JCLEC viewed rapid staff turnover as a lack of commitment and felt that project staff should stay for longer. Despite these financial and human resource issues the project was efficiently delivered. Due to the efforts of the final project supervisor lessons were learnt, financial coherence achieved and the project closed out on time and on budget.

The development of KERIS (immersive training) is worthy of note. The system purchased was not top of the range. Instead it was based on a computer system that could be supported within Indonesia. This negated the requirement for expensive external system's support. The software purchased could be programmed by in-house staff which meant it could be altered at JCLEC, to meet the needs of the various courses as they evolved, rather than coming with pre-loaded standard programmes which required expensive systems upgrades.

The project was able to increase the number of students trained by reducing the unit cost per student per course. This led to a 28% increase in the number of students trained during the course of the project. The unit cost per student per course is approximately \$200, which includes travel and subsistence payments. If the total cost of the project is divided by the total number of students, then the cost per student is approximately \$2,000. While there were procurement and project support costs, future assistance would be far more cost effective if it just paid for a course to be run at JCLEC rather than retaining a full time project team in Semarang. Another consideration is the smaller cost of deploying mobile training teams vice the cost of running centralised courses. Future assistance to the INP and law enforcement agencies should consider funding distributed training, as this mechanism provides a more cost effective means of teaching and can reach a far larger target audience. That said, there would still be a need for a centralized school to act as a centre of excellence and to develop course content.

During the course of the evaluation it was evident that project was shutting down. Staff were being let go and offices closed. In reality there was still some vital project work that required UNODC attention, however, there was no funding for this work and the project was stopping abruptly due to lack of funds. In order to handover going concerns and aide sustainability it would be far better if future project design included a disposal phase where a certain percentage of funds would be ring-fenced so as to allow the handover of equipment, staff and material.

Partnerships and cooperation

Picture 4. IDN T80 project crest²¹.



The project was complex in its design and delivery. This was in effect an EU project which was subcontracted to the UNODC and its three partners for delivery. The major donation was in Euros, finances were in US Dollars and expenditure was in Indonesian Rupiah. In addition the project was delivered in and alongside JCLEC a joint Australian - Indonesian venture which included international trainers and national staff. The final recipients were the INP and other Indonesian law enforcement agencies.

²¹ <http://www.unodc.jclec.com?sarchedsite=unodc.jclec.com&pos=0>

All partners, recipients and donors are listed below.

Table 6. Donors, partners and recipients.

Organization	Relationship	Remarks
EU	Donor	Major donor
Turkey	Donor	
Partnership for Governance Reform (Kemitraan)	Implementing Partner	Governance and human rights
National Policing Improvement Agency (College of Policing Bramshill UK)	Implementing Partner	Investigation
Charles Sturt University (Australia)	Implementing Partner	Education
Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC).	Partner/ Recipient	Main support to Academy in Semarang
Australian Notational Police Force	Partner	Bilateral JCLEC partner
Canadian Police Force	Instructors at JCLEC	
Dutch Police Force	Instructors at JCLEC	
UK Police Force	Instructors at JCLEC	
Indonesian National Police (INP)	Recipient	1499 students
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)	Recipient	146 students
Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK)	Recipient	80 students
Attorney General's Office (AGO)	Recipient	152 students
State Attorneys	Recipient	133 students
The Courts	Recipient	82 students
BPKP	Recipient	24 students
Indonesian Ministries	Recipient	5 students
Tax and Customs	Recipient	71 students
Immigration Office	Recipient	6 students

Picture 4. JCLEC remembrance ceremony²²

The implanting partners represented the optimum mix, in that they came from a number of different countries, possessed variety of experience and had a wealth of knowledge that ensured course content was relevant and up to date. The mix of partners did, however, complicate implementation. The mid-term evaluation stated that shortcomings in project design involving insufficient analysis of key stakeholders, including JCLEC, led to some ambiguity in regards to the projects objectives and difficulties in defining impact and sustainability²³. Regardless of complexity, the implementing partners all felt that the project had been well executed and were content with UNODC communication mechanisms.



²² http://www.jclec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=327

JCLEC was generally content with the project, however, there were some financial difficulties relating to different reporting procedures between the UNODC and the EU which resulted in the late payment of invoices. As the major donor the EU was generally content. Apart from some minor issues relating to branding project achievements as EU and the requirement to report financial transactions in EU formats. In essence there was good communication both internally and externally amongst all the partners, donors and recipients. The UNODC project coordinator did an extremely good job in keeping all the relevant parties informed and managed to work through what were complex issues in a politically astute manner.

The project itself was extremely well governed. The Governing Board (GB) met on 7 occasions during the life of the project. The GB met in the April and October of every year. The GB was chaired by Executive Director of JCLEC and its members comprised of representatives from the INP, the EC and the project coordinator. A Consortium Working Group (CWG) met before each GB meeting. Its role was to advise the GB on all matters relating to the project. The CWG comprised of the project coordinator and members from College of Policing, Charles Sturt University, UNODC and Kemitraan. A formal record of all presentations and decisions was kept.

The project learnt from lessons identified. The majority of the mid-term evaluation's²⁴ recommendations and those in EU Results Orientated Monitoring Reports were acted on and implemented. These included improvements to: the NF; the TDP "expert trainers"; Divisional participation; the course evaluation system; the legal content of case studies; the quality of interpreters; and the content of CBT. Partial success was achieved in: improving alumni networks –there was proof that networking occurred and was encouraged, but it was never formalised; and despite efforts to increase JCLEC's connectivity accreditation with other Universities, activities under cluster 4 of the project failed to significantly increase JCLEC's network. The project failed to address the observation of poor project design, insufficient stakeholder analysis, ambiguous objectives and difficulties in defining impact and sustainability. It recommended that UNDOC played a leading role at the higher /policy level and also assisted JCLEC with strategic planning. While the project did assist JCLEC develop a strategic plan it did not successfully engage at the policy level.

Some of the recommendations and observations could not be acted on as they related to the performance of JCLEC and not the project. The desire and will of JCLEC, and the INP to change, while worthy of note, was outside the scope of the project.

The UNODC's and its partner's achievements are reasonably well publicised and easy to find on the internet. However, the media releases are low quality and rather amateurish. The one video that the UNODC did subcontract to a media firm was of a very low quality. Even the UNODC homemade version is better; as witnessed by the fact that it has attracted over 500 views on YouTube. UNODC may wish to consider the allocation of resources towards formal publicity and information packages for future projects. While many people know that the UNODC does good stuff, few are conversant with what they do and how they achieve success. It was disappointing to note that JCLEC believed that they got all the good press they required, based on the visits of senior politicians. JCLEC believed that it required no additional support. This view

²³ IDN T80 Mid-Term Evaluation – Recommendations.

²⁴ IDN T80 Mid-Term Evaluation on IEU-Website: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/IDN_T81_Anti_corruption_Project_Mid-term_Evaluation_Report_rev.pdf

is slightly short sighted, as JCLEC should invest in a long term influence campaign, whereby it reinforces messages toward targeted groups, be they donors, partners, students or senior officials.

Effectiveness

Due to a lack of tangible or clear project indicators from which to gauge the impact of the project, the evaluator independently assessed the achievements and outputs of each of the four clusters. The outputs and cluster activities were:

a) Enhanced effectiveness of senior law enforcement personnel through JCLEC delivery of specialised training courses. Cluster 1: Delivering high quality training courses for mid-level staff of law enforcement agencies.

b) Improved capacity of local /JCLEC trainers through targeted recruitment and trainer professional development. Cluster 2: Delivering a comprehensive trainer development programme for locally recruited trainers, national trainers of JCLEC and internal trainers of the target agencies.


c) Development of a sustainable and integrated training curriculum incorporating emerging transnational crime types and modern training methodologies. Cluster 3: Developing strategic training and education plan and establishment and enhanced use of KERIS and e-learning at JCLEC and across Indonesian law enforcement agencies.

d) JCLEC networked internationally and training outreach programme initiated. Cluster 4: Facilitating cooperative academic links enhancement between JCLEC and other ASEAN and European law enforcement training institutions and establishment and development of mobile training capacity.

Cluster One. Enhanced effectiveness of senior law enforcement personnel through JCLEC delivery of specialised training courses.

The project was designed to train 1800 students. The final result saw the project train 2193 students at JCLEC. This increase, at no additional cost, is commendable, and was achieved by project staff reducing the unit cost per student per course.

Figure 2. Student numbers trained at JCLEC: project progress²⁵.



²⁵ Table taken IDN T80 reports.


Not only did the project independently train a large number of students, it significantly increased the capacity of JCLEC over the three years that training took place. Using the data at table 3 , below, it can be seen that the project delivered one in four of the courses provided by JCLEC and trained one in three of all the students who attended JCLEC between 2010 and 2013.

Table 3. Student numbers trained at JCLEC calculated as a percentage of the overall number of students taught per year²⁶.

Year	Number of courses delivered	Number of students trained	As a percentage of JCLEC's capacity		
			Courses	Students	
1	2010	14	549	18%	27%
2	2011	31	1041	34%	45%
3	2012	17	608	20%	29%

The main target audience was the INP in particular the CID. Over all the INP made up 66% of the students who received training on UNODC run courses at JCLEC. In addition to involving a host of other law enforcement agencies certain elements of the programmes were opened up to members of the press and NGOs. This ability to discuss common issues amongst differing organisations proved to be highly effective. The ability to discuss issues with outside groups was often the first time that many law enforcement officials had actively engaged the press or NGOs and they discovered that both sides had many shared goals.

Figure 3. Student participation on project facilitated courses per law enforcement agency²⁷.




The project sought to deliver its training to mid/senior level law enforcement officers and officials. The table at figure 4 indicates that student selection and participation was correct in most cases.

²⁶ Data compiled from IDN T80 reports

²⁷ From IDN T80 reports.

Figure 4. Distribution of student's rank²⁸.



Map 2. Location and distribution of students by divisional area²⁹.



One of the projects aims was to increase capacity at the Divisional (POLDA) level. The map at figure 5 shows each of Indonesia's Divisional areas and the number of officers that attended UNODC funded courses at JCLEC. The map shows that there was good geographical spread and that all the divisions sent officers and received training via UNODC funded courses at JCLEC.

²⁸ From IDN T80 reports.

²⁹ From IDN T80 reports.

Note: West Sulawesi's officers are counted in the figures for South Sulawesi. Although a large number of the officers trained do come from Java and Jakarta this is only to be expected, as there is a larger number of more senior officers in these locations. The question is what next? How does JCLEC progress and expand the skill set of the wider INP and the other law enforcement agencies? Or how can it influence senior officials to take this programme on as their own?

UNODC support to JCLEC resulted in the delivery of a large number of high quality courses covering a wide range of transnational topics. The courses were well designed and well delivered. They met the needs of the students and content was delivered in an imaginative and compelling manner. The table below lists the type and number of courses that the project delivered.

Table 4. All courses run at JCLEC by the project.

Course Type	Number conducted	Course Name	Number conducted
Combating Transnational Organised Crime	6	Trainer Development Programme	7
Senior Management of Investigation	6	District Commanders Crime and Control Programme	10
Strategic Criminal Justice Improvement Programme	6	Integrated Management of Corruption workshop	7
Specialised Management of Financial Crime Programme	6	Cash Courier Programme	2
Professional Standards & Accountability	2	Immersive Training Facilitators Program	1
Executive Police Management	2	Mutual Legal Assistance Forum	1
Criminal Justice Management	6		

Evaluation pre and post programme, self-assessments and knowledge based objective tests indicate that the average increase in participants' knowledge overall was 50%. The average session evaluation score was 3.7 out of 5 and the average score of transfer of knowledge into the workplace was 3.6 out of 5. These figures can be used with some certainty as the project used a comprehensive evaluation process based on the Kirkpatrick Model of Training Evaluation. This model was devised by Professor Emeritus Donald L Kirkpatrick in 1959 and achieved broad acceptance in 1994 when he published '*Evaluating Training Programs*'.

The Kirkpatrick model has 4 levels of assessment these are³⁰:

- Reaction: The degree to which participants react favourably to the training - via feedback forms.
- Learning: The degree to which participants acquire knowledge and confidence based on training - via comparing learning before and after training.
- Behaviour: The degree to which participants apply what they learned – via observation, interview or survey approximately 6 months³¹.

³⁰ The Kirkpatrick Partners – the one and only Kirkpatrick.

<http://www.kirkpatrickpartners.com/OurPhilosophy/TheKirkpatrickModel/tabid/302/Default.aspx>

³¹ <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/3X3NCPF>

- **Impact:** The degree to which targeted outcomes occur as a result of training event – via survey. This element is the least measured component but arguably the most important. It is this element of the evaluation process that requires clearly defined criteria.

Picture 6. Commander Yuni Hariyati oversees events during a live exercise³².



In addition to ensuring that the rank, role and post of participants were suitable for training, the project also ensured that a creditable number of female students participated in the courses. Despite the fact that only 4% of INP is female the Project provided 276 female students course places, or 12% of the total number of places. The project also provided the first ever female only District Commanders Course. Although limited in impact, these facts are an important element of ensuring that there is gender main streaming within the INP and other law enforcement

agencies.

Cluster Two. Improved capacity of local /JCLEC trainers through targeted recruitment and trainer professional development.

Picture 7. Trainer Development Programme³³.

The initial plan was to develop the skills and knowledge of 40 internal trainers from various law enforcement agencies by means of a Train the Trainer programme held at JCLEC and foreign study programme at Charles Sturt University Australia. This initial concept was rebranded the trainer development programme (TDP) and it commenced training Indonesian students in 2011. The concept ensured that once students had completed the programme they would then be capable of teaching transnational threat subjects, either back at their own law enforcement agency school or institution, or return to JCLEC to augment the training staff. The project ran a total of seven TDPs modules³⁴ and trained 87 students. The overseas study tour for the first TDP was conducted between 25 November and 9 December 2011 with the participation of 28 selected trainers. During 2011 nine trainer development graduates were recalled to JCLEC to assist with a variety of project and non-project programmes. They all performed to a high standard and there were no issues with their release from their main employment. This was largely due to the fact that the request for their release was directed through the JCLEC / INP



³² <http://www.unodc.org/indonesia/2011/09/jclec/story.html>

³³ From UNDOC JCLEC website. <http://unodc.jclec.com/english/february2011.html>

³⁴ The first programme consisted of 4 modules and the second of 3 modules.

chains of command and was not via the UNODC. This highlights the point that project activity will only be sustainable if it has JCLEC /INP buy-in. In order to refresh and maintain the skills taught during this programme a workshop was conducted for the alumni of the TDP programs in last week of September 2013. This was a refresher with a specific focus on curriculum development. Outcomes of this training program shed light on the drafting of the strategic plan of JCLEC.

Picture 8. Training at JCLEC³⁵.



cluster 4. JCLEC has taken over this portion of the project.

The project also introduced goLEARN an e-learning model. Knowledge and skills of the focal points for Computer Based Training (CBT) were updated by provision of training on UNODC goLEARN system. 51 existing CBT modules in Bahasa were converted into SCORM compliant e-learning modules and are now available in the offline UNODC goLEARN platforms. Their lap tops with preloaded software are then used by the mobile training teams, which were developed under

Picture 9. National Faculty Members³⁶.

The National Faculty (NF) was a concept that saw the recruitment and training of dedicated national staff that could instruct project programmes and assist with other courses at JCLEC. The National Faculty would also attend overseas courses and import/export back best practice. Delivering a NF that could replicate some of the activities generated by the project was also a key element of long term sustainability. While there were some initial problems with sourcing suitable candidates, by June 2011 six positions had been filled. Although the concept was sound and the level of instruction the NF received was excellent it suffered from two problems. Firstly, there was no career or funding stream that provided support or paid for a NF when the project ended. Secondly, insufficient NF were recruited or trained so as to provide a sustainable base going forward. To be sustainable would the concept required NF to rotate between operational and academic postings. For this to occur it takes approximately 10 staff to deliver one full time. Only when this ratio is achieved are their sufficient personnel to account for promotions, resignations and rotations. Although the intention was to retain six NF, as the project closed their number reduced to two, which is an irreducible minimum from which the NF is unlikely to recover.



³⁵ From UNODC JCLEC website. <http://unodc.jclec.com/english/october%202011.htm>

³⁶ From UNODC website. <http://www.unodc.org/indonesia/2011/06/national-faculty/story.html>

Cluster Three. Development of a sustainable and integrated training curriculum incorporating emerging transnational crime types and modern training methodologies.

During 2013 the project staff's main focus was the conduct of a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) for JCLEC. This TNA was well received by the JCLEC management and the analysis conduct by the project underpins the 2013-2018 JCLEC Strategic Plan. In 2013 JCLEC rewrote its standard operating procedures (SOPs). These SOPs were rewritten with the assistance of two of the National Faculty. The additional capacity that the project staff brought to JCLEC will be sorely missed. The level of analysis and detail contained in the TNA will not be easy replicated by the remaining JCLEC staff, as they have to design training programmes and conduct lessons on an almost daily basis.

Picture 10. KERIS in action³⁷.



In July 2011 the Project introduced KERIS an immersive simulation learning system. KERIS uses various inputs, such as written documents, video and audio feeds to monitor real-time decision-making during critical incident exercises. It can also be utilized for operational and investigative training. KERIS was named after the traditional and mystical weapon of Indonesia. The word is also an acronym. Broadly translated from Indonesian Bahasa it means: Combined, Educational, Responsive, Immersive and Simulation. By recording everything that happens on CCTV, trainers and students alike gain a deep insight into decision-making, at both a team and individual level.

Picture 11. KERIS logo³⁸.

“We are happy to introduce KERIS as one of the best learning tools available worldwide to train our officers to serve and protect the public” Commissary General Dr Oegroseno, Chief of INP Education and Training Institution.

The project delivered a number of worthwhile and imaginative enhancements the JCLEC. The flagship event was the introduction KERIS. It is great to see that this system has been taken to heart by the national staff and that student feedback is so positive. These facts will greatly enhance its viability in the future. The computer based training is also a great addition to JCLEC and the INP as a whole. Its success through depends on how much this is pushed out to other training institutions and the operational force.



of

Cluster Four. JCLEC networked internationally and training outreach programme initiated.

JCLEC is networked thanks to a number of bilateral arrangements it has with other nations who already supply International instructors. During the life span of the project there have been a

³⁷ From UNODC website. <http://unodc.jclec.com/english/july2011.html>

³⁸ From UNODC website. <http://www.unodc.org/indonesia/2011/09/jclec/story.html>

number of international events, conferences and exchange trips. Table 5 is an indication as to the type of international event and when it occurred. Meetings were conducted with various Indonesian universities; however, progress towards joint accreditation was exceedingly slow³⁹. Based on this evidence and the chart below it would be safe to say that this cluster remains a work in progress. UNODC has assisted JCLEC in setting up events but it will now be left to JCLEC to take this activity forward. The project has done a considerable amount to enhance JCLEC's reputation. It has provided imaginative and cutting edge training programmes and technology to support course content. JCLEC has the potential to become a centre of excellence and the ability to become a regional heavy weight. However, the desire and drive to take a leading role may not be there. The net effect of closing the project office is a downsizing of the JCLEC staff. The end of the project also sees a loss in the number of partners that JCLEC will operate with. Both of these facts are detrimental to JCLEC's attempts to realise the outcome of this cluster.

Table 5. International conferences and study periods facilitated by the project⁴⁰.

Year	Event	Number	Remarks
March 2010	Regional Conference at JCLEC		
March 2011	the Project managed a Transnational Crime Trainers Forum at JCLEC	14 external schools and agencies attended	Numerous Indonesian agencies attended
2011	International Study Tour to the UK and the Netherlands. They also visited the Narcotics Bureau of Istanbul Police in Turkey.	2 x NF	
April 2011	International Transnational Crime Trainers' Forum		
2011	Training Development Programme - Australia Study Tour	28 x Trainees	
April 2012	Danish Institute for Human Rights	1 x NF	
October 2012	Regional Conference at JCLEC		
November 2013	Study tour to Thailand	2 x National Faculty and 2 x INP officers	

In tandem with the CBT cluster four set out to establish the mobile training team concept. Mobile training teams have to date trained 250 law enforcement officers in five remote locations. This element of the project has been taken on by JCLEC and the Executive Director stated that she was keen to deploy the mobile training teams and use CBT on a more regular basis. Ideally any future assistance to the INP/law enforcement officials or the JCLEC should be a balance between creating a centre of excellence and ensuring that educational impact is maximized amongst the operational force. CBT and mobile training represent an extremely cost effect mechanisms for reaching the operational force, particularly in a country such as Indonesia.

³⁹ IDN T80 Annual Report 2012.

⁴⁰ Data from IDN T80 Annual Reports.

Impact

It is almost impossible to ascertain to what extent the project contributed towards the achievement of the objectives of increased security, and improved law and order. There is no data from which a comparable study could be conducted. Prior to implementation no baseline study was conducted. Even now there is limited data from which to conduct a baseline study, as Indonesia collates little rule of law data. In reality the project's overall objective and even the specific objective were far too broad to be measured by quantitative means.

What is apparent from student feedback, evaluations⁴¹ and anecdotal evidence is that student knowledge of transnational threats and the skills required to tackle transnational crimes did improve due to the training they received at JCLEC. The UNODC and their partners delivered a large number of high quality courses. This imaginative and well-resourced training resonated with the target audience. The project targeted mid to senior officers and was about increasing capacity through quality. It was never about delivering whole scale change and training en-mass.

Within the project documentation there were few quantifiable metrics that could have been used to investigate what students did with the knowledge they gained once they left JCLEC, and if they were able to apply this knowledge, and to what end. Although the project used an advanced evaluation method to refine course content and training delivery, even this was incapable of measuring the project's long term impact. While the project aimed to contribute to the high level outcomes, it was not possible for the project itself to directly demonstrate any causal link.⁴²

Picture 12. Criminal justice management course at JCLEC⁴³.

Despite the lack of quantitative data there is qualitative data to suggest that the project did have an impact. There are numerous reports of inter-agency collaboration occurring during syndicate workshops; often for the first time, and much to the surprise of the students. This collaborative working has been extended into the field, the extent of which though is unknown. Anecdotally JCLEC students are more likely to involve other agencies having been on a course at JCLEC. At the end of joint training events students often exchanged phone numbers as a means of expanding their networks. Trainers recanted the fact that during one workshop vital intelligence was passed between students. The syndicate contained officers from 3 different agencies on one island (a deliberate tactic to enhance cooperation). During discussion the 3 officers realized each of their respective agencies believed the other was investigating a certain criminal. The facts were, no one agency was investigating the criminal for fear of upsetting the other and that this was first time all three agencies had discussed the case. The students resolved to commence a joint investigation upon their return and even nominated one agency to lead the investigation.



⁴¹ Average increase in transfer to knowledge from trainer to student at JCLEC over the period of the project was 50%. From JCLEC and UNODC Annual Reports /internal evaluations.

⁴² UNODC Annual Report for IND T80 2011.


⁴³ From UNODC website.

The College of Policing at Bramshill reported that UK law enforcement agencies have seen increased cooperation between UK and Indonesian law enforcement agencies as a result of the courses held at JCLEC, particularly in the passage of counter narcotic related intelligence⁴⁴. Australian Officers reported a similar dynamic in relation to people smuggling. It is a simple fact that by placing law enforcement officers together for joint training event then the connectivity between agencies will improve. Officers will have expanded their network and know who to call. Once officer make these links they are then more likely to involve other agencies. This will result in better intelligence sharing and better operational cooperation. The question of how much better remains opaque?

Charles Sturt University observed⁴⁵ an improvement in the quality of Indonesian officers attending career courses at overseas universities and institutions. Support to JCLEC had allowed trainers and academics to influence the selection of candidates, ensuring that patronage and language ability were not the sole selection criteria. Student competence was identified during a course and this ensured that a more rounded and capable student attended overseas courses. In addition, trainers were able to identify students suitable for attending internal career courses. Although there is no supporting empirical data the ability to select the most suitable candidates for promotion courses can only assist the INP and other law enforcement agencies in attaining greater professionalism. These two measures of effect would have been useful additions to the internal evaluation criteria. In addition, the ability to track the rank and position of students, post study, to identify if attendance increased their promotion potential, or even if they were still in a job that required transnational threat training would have been extremely useful.

Picture 13. Bali case study⁴⁶.

Finally the following case reported by Tempo Weekly Magazine 27 Oct – 02 Nov 2010 highlights the fact that skills taught at JCLEC were transferred to the field. The report shows how an Indonesian Police Officer applied the knowledge that he gained from a course sponsored by the project to an ongoing case. The report relates to the theft of some sacred artifacts from a temple on Bali⁴⁷ and how the investigating officer used an event flowchart link similar to one used during a murder case in the UK, which was used as a teaching aide on the Senior Management of Investigation Programme.



Although embryonic, the current Executive Director of JCLEC reported that she was keen to not only retain the successful elements of the project at JCLEC, but also to export them across the INP and to some other law enforcement agencies. In particular she was keen to expand the use of KERIS, computer based training (CBT) and mobile training teams throughout the INP and

⁴⁴ email from Bramshill expanding on evaluation meeting.

⁴⁵ In discussion with Tracy Green, Charles Sturt University.

⁴⁶ UNDOC information board at JCLEC – authors own photograph.

⁴⁷ <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/dozens-of-stolen-artifacts-recovered-in-bali/>

amongst other law enforcement agencies. While this expansion of the project's impact is commendable it is a little after the fact. It is a shame that there wasn't an element of the project that sought to export these elements whilst there was still some project staff available to assist.

Sustainability

The equipment that the project delivered such as the KERIS immersive training suites, the CBT aides and the mobile training team laptops were designed and procured with sustainability in-mind. All this equipment has already been taken over by and is supported by JCLEC. The project procured computers that could be maintained by JCLEC trainers and supported within Indonesia. The project staff deliberately did not purchase top of the range computers and software which would have required external contracted support. This element of the project had sustainability at the forefront of the design. The Executive Director of JCLEC, Police Brigadier General Soepartiwi⁴⁸ stated that she was seeking to export these elements of the project throughout the INP and to some other law enforcement agencies. The Executive Director also stated that JCLEC saw as the UNODC's evaluation methods as best practice and were now using the Kirkpatrick evaluation model for all their internal evaluations. There were certain programmes, such as the financial and anti-corruption that she was keen to export to other law enforcement agencies and she was in negotiations with her fellow institutional directors to discuss how course content and training aides could be used in a coherent manner across a number of agencies. Although early days, these are very encouraging signs and will ensure that elements of the project are not just sustainable but that they flourish and grow.

Conversely, despite the Project's documentation realizing the need to create a pool of national trainers and valiant attempts train and raise a cadre of national instructors, this element of the project has not progressed as planned. Lasting effect can only be achieved if senior decision makers and those with funding see the value of a project and have the ability to take it forward once international assistance is reduced. For this to occur the project must seek to influence decision makers early on so that they come to see project activities as integral to their training and more importantly take it on as their own.

Picture 14. The Indonesian president visits JCLEC⁴⁹.



Although outside the bounds of this evaluation it is worth noting that JCLEC remains a donor driven institution. Currently there are no plans for it to receive Indonesian funding. One activity that the project might have considered was the need to influence and lobby senior Indonesian officials to request that JCLEC received some form of state funding as a means of ensuring sustainability. While the INP does have a sense of ownership as witnessed by the exportation of best practice and the numerous visits by the president⁵⁰, it remains unclear how much they really support or will support JCLEC in the future.

⁴⁸ In discussion with the Executive Director of JCLEC, Police Brigadier General Soepartiwi 19 Dec 2013.

⁴⁹ JCLEC website. http://www.jclec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=256&Itemid=2

⁵⁰ The Indonesian President's visit to JCLEC 9-10 Dec 2011.

It is unclear if this lack of funding is deliberate, in that Transnational Crime is not a priority, that other institutions require funding ahead of JCLEC, or if JCLEC is seen as a shiny object that can be used to attract donors. Whatever the case the Project's and to some extent JCLEC's achievements risk being reduced through a lack of Indonesian funding. It will be interesting to see, if events involving alleged bugging,⁵¹ how during its tenth anniversary JCLEC fares?

Innovation

The project delivered a large number of high quality courses and, although hard to quantify, it has improved the capacity and capability of the INP and other law enforcement agencies to deal with the Transnational Crime. Of particular note are KERIS (simulated training), computer based training and the course evaluation process. These elements of the project were commended by all the interviewees. Each element has been taken on and over by JCLEC and become the project's legacy. The immersive training that KERIS provides is extremely popular with law enforcement officers and the trainers. The fact that it is low-tech solution that can be adapted by national trainers will ensure its sustainability. The JCLEC Executive Director reported that she was offering KERIS to other law enforcement agencies and was aiming to export computer based training modules to other law enforcement schools and institutions within Indonesia. This demonstrates real ownership. Finally the course evaluation design and data capture was extremely well executed. JCLEC has seen the benefits of this concept and has taken on the Kirkpatrick model as their baseline for all evaluations. The Director was very proud of the methodology and keen to expand this evaluation methodology across the INP.

http://www.jelec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=256&Itemid=2

⁵¹ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/11/19/ri-oz-police-cooperation-hangs-balance-diplomatic-spat-heats.html>

III. CONCLUSIONS

Given Indonesia's geographical location and the requirement to tackle transnational crime the project was relevant in relation to the nature of threat. The GOI, EU and UNODC all recognized the need to combat transnational threats and as such the issue was accorded a high priority in the GOI mid-term development strategy, and within various international assistance programmes. As a large organization with national reach, the INP as the primary law enforcement agency was the logical recipient. JCLEC as an already functioning academy with an international remit was probably the optimum location for investment. The EU sponsored training needs assessment identified the requirement to provide additional support to JCLEC in order to expand its reach and increase its throughput. Although it remains unclear if JCLEC was the only location suitable for investment and if other modalities were considered. In delivering this project the UNODC became a sub-contractor for the EU. The project did meet with UNODC objectives and the project suited its expertise; training is natural area where UNODC can add value. Whether UNODC considered alternative institutions for increasing intuitional capacity within Indonesia and alternative mechanism for combating transnational crime is also unclear. What is clear is the fact that the UNODC Indonesian project office was not well resourced and that the chance to conduct a readymade project, made eminent sense. With multiple partners and recipients, project implementation and co-ordination was more complex than normal. In essence much of this complexity was overlooked during the design phase and the risks were not explored, articulated or mitigated. The initial project staff had a strong desire to execute, which probably outweighed their need to consider all the risk implications of conducting the project overtime. Despite these issues the project was extremely well executed. The standard of the programmes taught, the course content, the imaginative manner in which teaching aides were developed, and the internal evaluation process were all first class. They should all be seen as best practice and used elsewhere. This project sets the standard, of how to deliver maximum effect on a tight budget. The project team and UNODC should be justifiably proud. While tactical implementation was excellent, the lofty and vague nature of project documentation meant that the project's progress measured against its stated objectives was impossible to calculate. While there are some qualitative examples of the project's impact there are virtually no means to quantify its worth. Had project documentation been more carefully drafted during the design phase, more consideration given to measures of effect, realistic objectives set and outcomes reduced in scope and scale, then it would have been far easier to demonstrate progress.

Measured against its activity outcomes, however, the project over delivered. It developed a large number of high quality programmes, which were delivered in an efficient and thoughtful manner. Instruction was well received by the students, the INP, other law enforcement agencies and JCLEC. There is evidence to suggest that JCLEC and the INP will take on many project's achievements. JCLEC is already using the evaluation method implemented by the project. KERIS, CBT and the mobile training teams will all survive and quite possibly flourish under JCLEC and the INP. Certain course elements are being exchanged with other law enforcement institutions and it will be interesting to see how much cross fertilization of ideas occurs in the future. The development of national trainers was the corner stone in developing institution capacity that will self-sustain. While the concept and execution were sound, the cadre of national

trainers may reduce in the future unless additional courses are run and numbers increased. The same is true of the National Faculty. The idea was brilliant. The training was first class. However, the buy-in from the INP and other law enforcement agencies was limited and the number of trained personnel too low to sustain the concept. This is a shame, as the long term institutional capacity of JCLEC can only be achieved when there is sufficient national faculty capable of implementing change. The project kept its partners abreast of the situation overtime; however, UNODC may wish to consider allocating resources and time to developing a formalized campaign which seeks to influence key decision makers within the GOI and law enforcement agencies as a means of building sustainability into future programmes.

Indonesia is a large, increasingly wealthy and institutional challenged country. While international assistance is reducing in line with its economic development, the institutional issues remain, and will need to be addressed for many years to come. Given its recent history UNODC may wish to assist the GOI by suggesting a programme of security sector reform rather than focusing solely on the issues of transnational crime and corruption. While UNODC would be unable to fund and deliver a complete SSR programme, it is well placed to suggest and influence reform and assist in niche areas of development; ones that match its expertise and mandates.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

In future project / programme objectives and outcomes should be more realistic, attainable and measurable. Future project design requires a more considered approach. While it is understood that project documents must address high level issues and accord with national and international priorities, outcomes must also be achievable and realistic. Projects are often limited in duration and resource constrained. If objectives are too grandiose then projects will not deliver when measured against these objectives. At best this project only ever supported or contributed a minor element toward the overall objective. Project / programmes outcomes should understand how the project supports/contributes toward the overall objectives and then set achievable outcomes with appropriate measures of effect. Project staff may require additional support when drafting project documentation as few possess formal project management qualifications which would be required to draft more considered project documentation.

Future project / programme design must de-risk project implementation. The design phase should consider all the risks and implications relating to the project, especially when a project involves multiple stakeholders, different reporting mechanisms and numerous currencies. Some of the issues that the project suffered from, could and should have been ironed out during the design phase, had they been identified as a risk. For example the differing requirement between EU reporting and UNDOC reporting and the fact that both required financial reports in different currencies should have been identified as a risk and procedures put in place to mitigate against any potential issues. Project staff should resist the temptation to rush into delivery vice taking care to understand the problem in the round and writing a comprehensive plan.

Future project / programme design should consider a disposal phase. During the course of the evaluation it was evident that project was shutting down. Staff were being let go and offices closed. In reality there was still some vital project work that required UNODC attention, however, there was no funding for this work and the project was stopping abruptly. In order to handover going concerns and aide sustainability it would be advisable that future project design includes a disposal phase where a certain percentage of funds could be ring-fenced so as to allow a smooth handover of equipment, staff and material.

UNODC should seek to export KERIS and the CBT it developed under this project. The KERIS immersive training suites are state of the art and were highly regarded by both students and trainers. UNODC should look to include the KERIS and the other CBT modules it develop at JCLEC in other training projects.

UNODC should seek to export the course evaluation methods to other projects. The use of the Kirkpatrick model of evaluation and the manner in which it was adapted to meet the needs of courses in JCLEC is an example of best practice that should be adopted by UNODC projects elsewhere. The forth question which seeks to address the impact of activities requires careful consideration. Future UNODC projects / programmes need to devise realistic and quantifiable measures of effect. The example of tracking the promotion and placement of course attendees is a simple example.

Future project / programmes that aim to raise a cadre of national instructors should work on a ten to one rule. For every instructor post required, the project should train ten trainees. This provides a training cadre with depth and institutional resilience. It allows a training stream to be generated and provides sufficient numbers to allow for rotation. The National Faculty while a great idea was never sufficiently resourced.

UNODC should consider allocating resources and time to developing a formalized campaign which seeks to influence key decision makers within the GOI and law enforcement agencies as a means of building sustainability into future programmes. While the project kept its partners and recipients abreast of developments and provided excellent instruction to targeted mid-level officers it never really formally engaged those more senior officers who could have provided the impetus for change and the funds that guaranteed the sustainment of the projects achievements.

UNODC should consider what next for Indonesia? UNODC may wish to concentrate on reform and not only training. While UNODC would be unable to deliver a comprehensive Security Sector Reform programme, it is well placed to suggest and influence the design of one. It is also well placed to support certain key elements that fit its mandates. Given Indonesia's relative prosperity and the reluctance of donors to fund new programmes, future assistance should focus at the policy level enabling Indonesian politicians and senior officials to deliver their own programmes from within their own resources. Using the best practices from this project UNODC could support a reform programme through simulation and via distributed training. UNODC could purchase course space at JCLEC, if required, as this would be considerably more cost effective than setting up a project office on a permanent basis.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

The mid-term evaluation identified three lessons and five best practices. This evaluation supports those observations in general, and has updated them to provide the following lessons identified.

Multi dimensional projects require strong country level leadership. This is to ensure that the vision is maintained and reinforced throughout the life of the project. To make sure that the vision is properly translated into tangible activity and that stakeholders are kept abreast of development.

Good project design is based on sound stakeholders analysis. Networks create possibilities for sustainability and should be part of the project's design. Strong country level engagement with stakeholders/beneficiaries and donors is a means of achieving sustainability. Project achievements are unlikely to be sustainable without involving high level policy and decision makers. The use of a sophisticated influence campaign which engages key decision makers and involves the media is a key element of sustainability. UNODC should ensure that this activity is identified early and incorporated into future project design.

Good evaluation methods are an important element for: identifying and implementing project alterations; refining training programmes; and if used correctly assisting to gauge the project's long term impact.

The trainer the trainer (TDP and NF) concept is a proven way to rapidly and efficiently transfer knowledge and skills to target agencies. However, without the backing of Indonesian institutions and the provision of Indonesian such as staff and financial resources, the initial impact on the training centres are likely to disappear overtime.

Inter-agency participation on JCLEC courses encouraged wider inter- agency cooperation. This was one of the strongest elements of the project. However, for this activity to become sustainable, more could have be done to encourage the alumni and key decision makers of the need formalise inter-agency communication and cooperation.

ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

I. Position Information

Title: Independent Evaluator

Department/Unit: UNODC

Reports to: Project Coordinator and Country Manager

Duty Station: Home Based (with expected travels)

Expected Places of Travel (if applicable): Jakarta and Semarang

Duration of Assignment: 11 October to 15 November 2013 (no cost extension is possible)

REQUIRED DOCUMENT FROM HIRING UNIT TERMS OF REFERENCE	
	<p>CONFIRMATION OF CATEGORY OF LOCAL CONSULTANT, please select :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(1) Junior Consultant(2) Support Consultant(3) Support Specialist(4) Senior Specialist(5) Expert/ Advisor <p>CATEGORY OF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT, please select :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(6) Junior Specialist(7) Specialist(8) Senior Specialist

II. Background Information

“Support to improved security by provision of capacity building to the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement (JCLEC)” IDN T80 (the Transnational Crime and Criminal Justice Project) is a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project aimed at improving the rule of law and security in Indonesia by strengthening the investigative and management capacities of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and other law enforcement agencies so that they are better able to detect, prevent and investigate serious transnational crime.

The project has the specific objective of supplementing the capacity of JCLEC to train INP officers and other law enforcement personnel in the skills necessary for tackling transnational crime by establishing a comprehensive training and staff development programme. In addition, the training component of the project is also designed to facilitate inter-agency networking and cross-fertilization of knowledge through integrated training programmes involving police, other investigators and analysts, judges and prosecutors.

In this project four clusters of activities are being implemented:

- 1) Activity Cluster 1: Delivering high quality training courses for senior staff of law-enforcement agencies,
- 2) Activity Cluster 2: Delivering a trainer development programme for locally recruited trainers, national JCLEC trainers and internal trainers of the target agencies
- 3) Activity Cluster 3: Developing long term training and education plan including training quality standards and establishment and enhanced use of KERIS and e-learning at JCLEC and across Indonesian law enforcement agencies
- 4) Activity Cluster 4: Facilitating cooperative academic links formation between JCLEC and other Asian and European law enforcement training institutions and establishment and deployment of mobile training capacity.

The project is located in Indonesia, specifically Semarang, Central Java. The project is using JCLEC facilities such as classrooms, hostel and other facility in JCLEC based on a signed MoU between the Project and JCLEC at the outset.

UNODC is the leading agency of the implementation of the project and its partners in the development and the delivery of the project are the Partnership for Governance Reform (Kemitraan) Indonesia, National Policing Improvement Agency (transformed into College of Policing in December 2012) UK, and the Associate partner is Charles Sturt University, Australia.

The stakeholder groups impacted by the project outcomes are Indonesian National Police (INP), Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Attorney-General’s Office (AGO), the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK), JCLEC, the courts, TAX office (DJP) and the Financial and Development Supervision Agency (BPKP) and the general public of Indonesia.

The Action Implementation Team (AIT) is headed by an International Coordinator. Technical staffs consist of four experienced national faculty two of which with law enforcement background. In addition to National Faculty staff, a Finance and Administration Associate, also works as UNODC staff in the project. An administrative staff and a driver are also attached to the project through the application of MOU with JCLEC.

The implementation period of the project was 36 months. The project was supposed to end on 30 September 2012 however following the request from the main beneficiary of the project,

JCLEC, the implementation of the project has been extended by the EC Delegation on two occasions resulting the duration of the project a total of 50 months with an end date of 30 November 2013.

The Action (the Project Document) stipulates that an external evaluation will be undertaken by an independent evaluator who will operate according to broad Terms of Reference developed by the Governing Board. The evaluator will conduct one final review of the Action, focusing on the effectiveness and impact of activities at the end of the Action. Mid-term evaluation was conducted in August 2011 and the recommendations were taken into consideration in making any necessary adjustments to activities in order to achieve planned outcomes and results. Background documents will be provided by the project team for the evaluators prior to the mission. The plan for this Final Evaluation has been communicated to the Governing Board in July 2013. implementation team in final form on a date to be agreed but in any case before 15th of November 2013.

III. Objectives of Assignment

International consultant will be tasked with conducting a final evaluation of the project that will address:

The overall implementation performance and achievements of the project outcomes,
 Issues that are related to the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability,
 The identification of any ‘good practice’ or ‘lessons learned’ from the implementation of the project, Recommendations for the UNODC for implementing similar projects in the future.

The consultant will be expected to report their findings and recommendations before 15th of November 2013.

IV. Scope of work

International consultant will conduct a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the project progress. The evaluation should be conducted in a number of phases. These phases will include:

A desk review of relevant reports and data,
 The submission of an evaluation methodology and work plan (in the form of an inception report),
 A field-research visit to Semarang, Indonesia where more qualitative issues can be addressed,
 The production and presentation of the report of evaluations team’s findings and recommendations.

International Consultant should submit a draft report to the project manager for review for factual errors or omissions and also to Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) for quality assurance and clearance. This should record the findings of the review, and any associated observations, recommendations, action plans, etc, which should be delivered to the UNODC and project implementation team in final form on a date to be agreed but in any case before 15th of November 2013.

TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

Timeframe for the evaluation process

Table - Matrix for calculating the number of days to be worked by consultants What tasks

What tasks	Where (location)	When (Tentative deadlines and/or dates)
Desk review (deadline)	Home	11 October 2013
Inception Report (deadline)	Home	18 October 2013
Briefing of evaluators	Indonesia / Jakarta	21 October 2013
Field mission/visit	Indonesia / Jakarta	22 October 2013
Field mission/visit	Indonesia / Semarang	23-24-25 October 2013
Preliminary Debrief	Indonesia / Semarang	25 October 2013
Preparation of the draft report	Home	1 November 2013
Round of comments among project management team and relevant stakeholders	Home	1- 15 November 2013
Submission of the report (deadline)	Home	15 November 2013

VI. Deliverables/Final Products Expected

Evaluator(s) will be issued consultancy contracts and paid in accordance with United Nations rules and procedures. A lump-sum (please see detailed budget below) will be paid in three instalments:

No.	Deliverables	% (Percentage)
1	The first payment will be made upon signature of the contract and submission of proposed methodology of the evaluation (in form of the inception report on 18th of October 2013) (25 per cent of the consultancy fee and travel expenses plus 75 per cent of the daily subsistence allowance)	25%
2	The second payment (25 per cent of the consultancy fee and 25 per cent of the daily subsistence allowance) will be made upon receipt of the draft report on 1st of November 2013 by the relevant units and sections at headquarters or field offices.	25%
3	The third and final payment (50 per cent of the consultancy fee, i.e. the remainder of the fee) will be made only after completion of the respective tasks and receipt of the final report and its clearance by the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit.	50%

VII. Requirements

Knowledge and Skills:

- Living/working experience in Southeast Asia and proven cross-cultural and gender sensitivity;
- Knowledge and understanding of Indonesian context of law enforcement and rule of law;
- A good knowledge and background on police/justice sector, human rights and gender issues;
- Familiarity with the use of adult learning principles;
- Ability to apply good judgment in the context of assignments given as well planning and managing work and priorities;
- Ability to communicate well (spoken and written) in English, including ability to draft/edit written reports, and to articulate ideas in a clear and concise style;
- Excellent computer skills;
- Good interpersonal skills and the ability to establish and maintain effective partnerships and working relations in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment with the sensitivity and respect of diversity including gender balance.

VIII. Qualifications (please refer to standard qualification in line with category of consultant)

- The Consultant must have excellent communication and facilitation skills as well as strong interpersonal skills. S/he must have good organizational and planning skills.
- The Consultant must be familiar with project management or have experience in similar capacity building projects.
- Members of the evaluation team must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the project under evaluation.
- The consultant must be independent and not have any past or expected future associations with the project.

The evaluators will not act as representative of any party and must remain independent and impartial.

Qualification for International Evaluator:

Education: Minimum of master's degree majoring in criminology, law, public administration, law enforcement, education or other social science.

Experience: At least 10 years of working experience in the work of development and in monitoring and evaluation of international projects, good at data collection and interviewing techniques. S/he must have a good understanding of the Indonesian context of law enforcement and rule of law. S/he must be familiar with **project management or have experience in similar capacity building projects**. An essential requirement will be a good knowledge and

background on justice sector, human rights and gender issues.
Language Requirements: Both the international and national evaluators must be fluent in English. National evaluator must be fluent in Bahasa Indonesia. Knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia for international evaluator is considered to be an asset.

IX. Annexes

- Annex 1. List of background documents for desk review
- Annex 2. UNODC standard format and guidelines for evaluation reports

Annex 1. List of background documents for desk review

1. UNODC Indonesia Country Program Framework
 2. Project document of IDN T80
 3. Semi Annual and Annual Project Progress Reports 2010-2013
 4. Project Progress Reports submitted to the EC
 5. Mid-Term Evaluation Report
 6. Results Oriented Monitoring Reports (EC administered monitoring activities)
 7. Minutes of Governing Board meetings
 8. Most up-to-date presentation of the project
- (This list is not exhaustive and will be supplemented with other relevant documents throughout the execution of the Final Independent Project Evaluation mission.)*

Annex 2. UNODC standard format and guidelines for evaluation reports

All tools, norms and templates to be used by the evaluators during the evaluation can be found on the IEU-Website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>

ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

The three main questions that this evaluation sought to answer were: firstly, had the project contributed to increased capacity and capability of JCLEC to improve the skills required to tackle transnational crime; secondly, had this training support increased the investigative and managerial capacity of the INP (and others); and thirdly, could increased capacity be linked to any tangible improvements in the provision of rule of law and security in Indonesia?

The following questions were asked in a series of semi structured interviews:

Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Are project objectives aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of Government of Indonesia, UNODC, UN mandates and those of the donors? If not what are tensions and how are these resolved?• Are the objectives of project aligned with regional initiatives and how is Indonesia's ability to increase the rule of law and security being enhanced?• Is the design of the project technically sound?• Are the projects objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to a clear strategy?
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• What has the project achieved? What quantifiable data is there to support these claims?• What qualitative data or case studies are there to support a notion of increased security and rule of law?• Has UNODC assistance improved the capacity of the INP and other agencies to tackle transnational threats and crime?• What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of the Project?• What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders about the overall impact of UNODC's assistance?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To what extent have project indicators and outputs been achieved?• How has institutional capacity been enhanced?• To what extent have specific skills (investigation, intelligence sharing, planning, management, and analysis) been enhanced?• Have leadership skills been enhanced at institutional and individual levels and has this led to increased security and rule and law?• What are the reasons for the enhancement and non-enhancement of objectives?
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• How efficient has the implementation of the Project been?• Were there less costly interventions modalities to those used in the projects?

- To what degree was gender balance a part of project planning?
 - Was the UNODC's human resource structure appropriate and efficient?
 - How are internal UNODC factors affecting effectiveness, including human resources, logistical support, flexibility in supply and budgetary controls and other resources?
- Sustainability
- Are UNODC efforts sustainable? How was sustainability built into the project?
 - How has UNODC ensured that benefits from its assistance continue after UNODC assistance stops?
 - Does/can the national government / the INP take responsibility for the JCLEC?
 - To what extent have the findings and recommendations from the past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified?
 - To what extent have women been involved in project formulation?
- Partnerships
- Did stakeholders feel that they were kept abreast of developments, delays and delivery?
 - What mechanisms did the project use to communicate with stakeholders?
 - To what extent have partnerships been sought with other relevant actors?
 - Is there effective coordination among government, UNODC and implementing partners?
 - What more could be done?
- Governance
- What formal governance structures did the project report to?
 - How was information feedback to these structures?
 - Did observations and feedback alter delivery, if so how?
-

ANNEX III. DESK REVIEW LIST

Contextual Documents:

Information on Indonesia –ASEM Development Conference II: Towards an Asia-Europe Partnership for Sustainable Development 26-27 May 2010, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation/support-regional-integration/asem/documents/10.03.10_info_on_indonesia_finale_en.pdf

Indonesia's National Development Plan 2004 – 2009 (Medium Term/RPJMN)
Indonesia's National Development Plan 2005 – 2025 (Long Term/RPJPN)

UNODC Regional Programme for Southeast Asia and Pacific 2009 – 2012

http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/rceap-response/UNODC_Regional_Programme_RCEAP_45_21_Oct_2009_.pdf

UNODC Country Programme for Indonesia 2012 – 2015

http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/indonesia/publication/Country_Programme_Indonesia.pdf

Indonesia - European Community: Strategy Paper: 2007-2013

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/documents/indonesia_csp_2007-2013_en.pdf

World Bank: Indonesia Country Overview

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview>

UNODC/JCLEC Project Presentation

http://prezi.com/x0chkacfta77/timeline/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy

JCLEC Website

http://www.jclec.com/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1

UNODC web page on JCLEC site

<http://unodc.jclec.com/english/index.html>

UNODC and INP Strengthening capacity at JCLEC

https://www.unodc.org/documents/indonesia//news/Press_Release_JCLEC_rev_EU_PI_and_JCLEC_EDs_291113.pdf

UNODC World Drug Report 2013

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf

Project Documentation:

Contribution Agreement EC and UNODC

Addendum No.1 to the Contribution Agreement 310812
Amended Action of T80 after Addendum No.2 270612
Amended Budget of T80 after Addendum No.2 270612
Amended Log Framework of T80 after Addendum No.2 270612
Amended Action of T80 after Addendum No.2 270612
Signed Addendum No.2 UNODC & EC 180612
Addendum No.3 Countersigned 291112
Annexes Action and Budget Addendum No.3
ProFi printouts

IND T80 Mid Term Evaluation Report Final

UNODC IDN T80 Project Annual Report (APR) 2013
UNODC IDN T80 Project Annual Report (APR) 2012
UNODC IDN T80 Project Annual Report (APR) 2011
UNODC IDN T80 Project Annual Report (APR) 2010
UNODC IDN T80 Project Semi-Annual Report (SPR) 2013
UNODC IDN T80 Project Semi-Annual Report (SPR) 2012
UNODC IDN T80 Project Semi-Annual Report (SPR) 2011
UNODC IDN T80 Project Semi-Annual Report (SPR) 2010

JCLEC Annual Report 2012
JCLEC Annual Report 2011
JCLEC Annual Report 2010
JCLEC Annual Report 2009

1st EU Progress Report 1 October 2009 to 31 March 2010
2nd EU Progress Report 1 April 2010 to 30 September 2010
3rd EU Progress Report 1 October 2010 to 31 March 2011
4th EU Progress Report 1 April 2011 to 31 December 2011
5th EU Progress Report 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012
6th EU Progress Report 1 January 2013 to 30 June 2013

EU Monitoring Report Monitoring reference MR-137622.01 dated 29/11/2010
UNODC Response to EU Monitoring Report
EU Monitoring Report Monitoring reference MR-137622.02 dated 27/05/2013
UNODC Response to EU Monitoring Report dated 01/07/2103

ANNEX IV. RECORD OF INTERVIEWS

Date	Time	Activity
16 December 2013 Monday	Afternoon	Arrive at JCLEC, Semarang
17 December 2013 Tuesday	08.00- 09.00	Meeting with the Project Coordinator (PC)
	09.00- 10.00	Skype meeting with partner from Charles Sturt University
	10.30- 12.00	Follow-up meeting with the Project Coordinator (PC)
	13.00- 14.00	Meeting with Executive Director Programs of JCLEC
	14.00- 15.30	Meeting with National Faculty (ex) Members at JCLEC
	16.00- 17.00	Skype meeting with partner from College of Policing
18 December 2013 Wednesday	ETA Jakarta Office 11.00	07.45 - Fly out to Jakarta with GA 233 at Jakarta ETA 08.50
	11.00- 12.00	Meeting with Project Coordinator of the IDN T81
	14.00- 15.00	Meeting with EU Delegation Project Manager and Finance Officer
19 December 2013 Thursday	10.00- 11.00	Meeting with Executive Director of JCLEC, at JCLEC Secretariat office in TNCC building (MABESPOLRI) 12 th floor
	13.00-14.00	Meeting with partner from KEMITRAAN
20 December 2013 Friday	09.00- 10.00	Meeting with UNODC Country Manager
		Departure for Abu Dhabi with Etihad Airways (475) ETD 18.00

ANNEX V. PROJECT TIMELINE

