Independent project evaluation of the

Smuggling of Migrants:
Establishment and Operation of a
Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) for
East Asia & the Pacific

XSPT78
Regional Office for South East Asia and the Pacific

November 2014
This evaluation report was prepared by an Angus Henderson an independent consultant. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report represents the final evaluation of Project XSPT78, Smuggling of Migrants: Establishment and Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) for East Asia & the Pacific.

Smuggling of Migrants (SoM) is a crime involving the procurement for financial or other material benefit of the illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national or resident. Smugglers understand how to beat border controls, and while today their cargo may be migrants, tomorrow it might be terrorists or narcotics. Understanding SoM, and particularly the methods and routes used by smugglers are key elements in analysing transnational and interregional crime.

Within the South East Asia and the Pacific SoM is a highly relevant issue. The region has historically relied on large migrant workforces. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimate that as many as 1 in 4 migrant workers within the region have no legal status. As the association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) seeks to increase regional commerce, which includes freedom of movement for migrant workers and less restrictive immigration controls, many more migrants will seek work across the region. Despite these positive steps, economic disparity and increasingly sophisticated border controls will force many to cross borders illegally. Destination countries, such as Australia, have come under considerable physical and political pressure to act against irregular migration. This evaluation does not assess the impact of national policies. These issues are widely reported and the subject of active debate. The report does however make one statement: the debate now has a baseline understanding; thanks to this Project, the debate is based on a series of facts and not just assumptions.

The Project ran from Jan 2010 until Oct 2014, which included two no-cost extensions. Although this report is a final evaluation, the donor, the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Control, has agreed to fund some of the core activities carried out under the Project, until June 2015; with the possibility of more funding to follow. At the time of writing, the Project Coordinator is due to leave the Project. The principle intended user of this report is, therefore, the Regional Office for South East Asia and Pacific (ROSEAP) as it seeks to replace the Project Coordinator and move core Project activities into a new phase. This evaluation presents an opportunity, to assess both what has been delivered and what could be delivered in the future. As such the report has been designed as a series of project level recommendations.

Project XSPT78 aimed to improve evidence-based knowledge, sharing and access to knowledge relating to the SoM, and to assist countries to increase their capacities to generate and use information on migrant smuggling. SoM data is sensitive and was not routinely shared between Member States, especially within the region. Before the Project there was no collation of SoM data, and no central repository from which to conduct analysis and monitor trends.

Measuring the Project’s impact was extremely difficult. The Project document contained many poorly articulated outputs, which in reality represented a list of activities. There were no prescribed indicators from which to draw conclusions. Rather than assess effectiveness and
impact against these poorly articulated outputs, this report evaluated the Project against the four main areas where it actually delivered effect, these were:

a. Data gathering and information exchange.

b. Training of law enforcement and immigration officials.

c. Production and dissemination of research and analytical reports.

d. Advocacy and support to the Bali Process

Exchanging SoM information between regional Member States is sensitive. Only 2 of the 8 identified participatory nations\(^1\) signed the original project documentation. Despite this initial lack of buy-in, and due to the diligence of the Project Staff, data is now regularly collected from 19\(^2\) countries and territories. A network has been established and UNODC is linking data from one source to other global networks, increasing its effect. This network consists of an on-line secure database, the Voluntary Reporting System on Migrant Smuggling and Related Conduct (VRS-MSRC) which regularly collates data from 19 nations and holds data from over 40. Data is inputted by Member States, via national focal points, officials assigned to the Project by their respective nation’s immigration and/or border control agencies. Data is analysed centrally by UNODC Staff and merged with other research to produce SoM knowledge products\(^3\). Knowledge products are published on-line and distributed to the participating Member States. UNODC leveraged its position as a primary agent for data gathering and research to gain membership of the Bali Process. Through the Bali Process is it activity supporting policy makers within the region and beyond, by providing access to UNODC products and technical assistance which allows Member States to incorporate and uphold UN Conventions and Protocols relating to SoM. This level of cooperation and data sharing is a major achievement and is indicative of increasing regional cooperation. Although the initial Project documentation (PD) provided a sound justification for the Project, it did not provide a viable project plan. It lacked scoping and designing phases, which were detrimental to a technical Project that sought to introduce an IT system. The Project did not identify a primary indented user (PIU) and did not collect key user requirements from the PIU. The aim of the Project was confused and this was compounded by a failure to clearly identify a PIU. The Project was caught between providing data for operational users, a system for border agencies that required regular (quarterly / bi-annual) updates and data for strategic trend analysis that required less regular updates but more detailed analysis. Due to resources constraints, the system design, and for practical reasons Project Management addressed the later objective and in return delivered a highly effective Project. Within Europe, and amongst likeminded countries, organizations such as Frontex have been able to develop systems to analyses and react to irregular migration. That UNODC has managed to introduce a system between such diverse Member States in just few years is a massive achievement.

The Project provided law enforcement capacity building mainly analytical training in 7 countries. To date over 450 officials have been trained. Training was well delivered and warmly received. While UNODC sought to triangulate\(^4\) training with two other law enforcement projects,

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1 The Project Documentation was signed by Indonesia and Cambodia. China, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar Thailand and Viet Nam did not sign it.
2 Australia, Cambodia, France, Hong Kong (SAR), Indonesia, Lao PDR, Maldives, Marshall Islands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America.
3 The 8 knowledge products can be found at the following link: https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/resources/publications/2014/index.html
4 UNDOC sought to ensure that border officials, port intelligence units and data analysts received elements of
PATROL and Port Intelligence Unit (PIU), the impact of this training is difficult to assess. Without policy change and more importantly without educating the entire span of command, training a handful of analysts provides transitory and unsustainable effect. UNODC should focus on training the decision makers, so that they ask the right questions, in addition to training the analysts, so that they can provide the right answers.

UNODC staff produced seven high quality knowledge products and contributed to the Regional Transnational and Organised Crime Threat Assessments. While many interviewees were aware of the UNODC knowledge products, few had read them and none had actively used them. During the course of the evaluation the terms irregular migration, illegal migration, SoM and human trafficking were interchanged by most interviewees. SoM is often seen as peripheral to the law enforcement community and likewise to many policy makers. Law enforcement offices require near time data from which to mount operations. Policy makers require migration overviews and global analysis, of which SoM is but a subset. UNODC has recognised this and worked with partners such as IOM and UNHCR, as they possess the other data subsets that enable a more holistic view. There is probably more that can be achieved in partnership with IGOs and NGOs to provide the level of service that Member States require. There is also more than could be achieved with academia, where the Project should seek out and formalise viable partnerships with universities that study SoM. These types of partnerships would benefit both UNODC, in the production of knowledge products and Universities, and their PHD students, who could gain valuable research exposure. In the terms of future developments, UNODC can’t compete with many of the other actors in the arena. The fact that IOM has over 100 field offices across South East Asia and that the USA has unilaterally funded biometric collection at Cambodian airports dwarf the geographical spread and budget of UNODC. But UNODC has a role to play, it is the guardian of the protocols and while it can’t deliver near-time IT systems, it can ensure that the policy debate is supported with clear and meaningful facts, and that capability short falls are identified and solutions devised in a coherent manner.

Undoubtedly the Project’s major achievement has been the fact that it has enabled UNODC to gain a membership of the Bali Process and the Ad-Hoc Group. The later allows UNODC to actively support Member States through the Bali Process; by providing substantive assistance to member States. UNODC expertise is leveraged during formal sessions and the assistance that UNODC provides is highly regarded. UNODC’s ability to assist is based on a combination of expertise and credibility which is largely driven by the quality of its research and knowledge products. Policy makers can now discuss SoM using facts, and no longer debate using assumptions. While there may be little concrete proof to suggest that this level of support has directly changed Member States policies, many of those interviewed stated that bilateral relations had improved, as both sides now understood the problem thanks to UNODC’s assistance and impartial data analysis. The fact that Member States have endorsed VRS-MSRC through the Bali Process, and are beginning to input their own data into the system, should be viewed as a major trust building mechanism; out of all proportion to the actual level of data it captures.

As to the future, there are both opportunities and threats to the project. Not least a change in personnel and a break in continuity. As the continuation of activities under the Project enters a new phase, the evaluation concludes that ROSEAP should continue the Project’s core activities, but use its time wisely, to revise the scope of the Project’s activities around the following three areas:

each of the three law enforcement projects within their training so that the totality of the training was more effective.
a. **Support to the Bali Process.** Policy support via the Bali Process should be front and centre. This is UNODC’s niche, what it does best. It is via mechanisms such as the Bali Process that UNODC can best deliver against its mandates; which ultimately supports Member States.

b. **Data gathering and analysis.** To gain maximum impact from the data collection process and related products, the VRS-MSRC should become a global system. ROSEAP should consider offering this element of the Project to HQ UNODC, as the foundation of a new global research programme on SoM, similar to the research programme run by the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons Unit (GLOTIP). UNODC’s credibility is partially based on its world class research and analysis. Products bare the UN seal and are recognised as fair and accurate. But UNODC products are only the starting point. It is only once policy makers understand the issue, that they will then they will ask “what can we do about it?”

c. **Training support.** The law enforcement capacity building element of the Project should be continued in a more targeted way, to stretch along the entire span of command. The Project is linked to other law enforcement capacity building efforts under the regional programme for South East Asia and the Pacific, but more can be done. It should seek partnerships; understand where it can deliver change and where others should take the lead. Maximum impact is achieved at the Country Office level, as capacity building requires strong relationships. Here UNODC has an advantage it has long standing relationships and should look to use these to help other actors deliver assistance, ensuring that it based on need and that it is coherent.

Project XSPT78 should be viewed as a success. It was a ground breaking Project. It established a baseline where one did not exist. Did it achieve what it intended to achieve? The short answer is in-part. The longer answer is that the original design was flawed and that what the Project ended up delivering was the art of the possible. Measured against what should have been its areas of achievement, the project has succeeded. There is room for improvement, and there is now some additional time and resource to allow for this evolution. Support to Bali Process was the major achievement of the Project and this is where UNODC has the greatest impact. In order to provide this level of policy support, UNODC has to be seen to provide a service that others can’t. UNODC support must be backed up by data collection and impartial analysis, something that no other organisation or Member State was capable of delivering. While data collection and analysis in support of policy are mutually supporting activities, to be fully effective the Project requires two dedicated staff members; one to gather and analyse data and one to support the political process by traveling to Member States and engaging policy makers.

When one considers that it might cost a Member State in the region of $250-350,000 USD year to deploy a single immigration official offshore or attach one to an Embassy to liaise and collect data, then this Project with a budget of $5,000,000 USD over 4 years, collecting data from 19 countries represents extremely good value. Measuring political dialogue and policy support via the Bali Process is considerably more difficult to gauge. Ultimately the donor and co-chair of the Bali Process, Australia will be the judge of that. Recent correspondence suggests that they are content with, and will continue to fund, the Project.
## SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key recommendations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>There is a possibility of additional donor funding in the future. The design of the evaluated Project is not suitable to take its core activities forward.</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, ROSEAP and CLPs.</td>
<td>ROSEAP should review the Project documentation in early 2015, incorporating the recommendations contained within this report and re-design a delivery mechanism to carry forward the core activities of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Project Document of the evaluated project listed 12 outputs under one outcome. These are too many, and are incorrectly articulated. They are activities. In addition there are no realistic measures of effect.</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, ROSEAP and CLPs.</td>
<td>ROSEAP and Project Staff should articulate outputs under 3 outcomes. Each outcome should have a valid and applicable measure of effect.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Training.** Training on SoM and data analysis should be included as an element of all UNODC LE capacity building. Three areas where training is required are:

- General SoM training for border / immigration officials and Police officers via CBT.
- In areas where CBT is unsuitable course material should be delivered in the local language and if possible via a train the trainer package.
- Focal point/specialist VRS-MSRC training.

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5 A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

6 Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to Bali Process. Given the nature and scope of the problem supporting the political process is a full time activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data gathering and analysis. Given number of Member States participating in this activity and the degree of analysis that has to occur this is a full time activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRS-MSR has been only functioning for one year. Data input has been unequal and ensuring data input and quality has been a resource (staff) intensive process. A significant part of the data was collected by UNODC through an emailed questionnaire and then inputted by UNODC.</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, ROSEAP and CLPs.</td>
<td>ROSEAP in close consultation with the primary intended users should re-consider and simplify of the type of data to be collected through the VRS-MSRC. It should start by clearly defining the primary intended user and then capture key user requirements, keeping in mind that this database can and should only be for the purpose of strategic analysis on migrant smuggling trends, methods, routes and the profiles of migrant smuggler and irregular migrants.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRS-MSRC has collected data from 40 countries and has 19 regular contributing nations. It is already a semi-global database. The question is how far can this system go?</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, ROSEAP and HQ UNODC Staff.</td>
<td>ROSEAP and Project Staff should consider how, over time, VRS-MSRC could migrate to HQ Vienna to become a Global Programme.</td>
</tr>
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<td>The project design leapt from justification to implementation without programming an inception or detailed design phase.</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff and desk review of project documentation.</td>
<td>HQ UNODC should introduce a project design and management process that follows excepted norms and conventions in the private sector. This process should include inception and detailed design phases.</td>
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</table>

**Important recommendations**

The current Project Coordinator, and SME, is due to leave in Oct 2014. It will take time to replace the Project Coordinator and bring the new incumbent up to speed.

ROSEAP should apply for the current Project Coordinator to support the Project remotely, or until such time that a suitable replacement has been hired and is up to speed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For the last 3 years, the evaluated project was run by one International Staff with the support of National Assistants, National Project Officers and significant number of consultants.</th>
<th>Interviews with Project Staff and desk level review of Project documentation.</th>
<th>The continuation of the Project’s core activities should be adequately staffed. ROSEAP should hire a second International Staff member from June 2015. One of the International staff should focus on the maintenance and further improvement of the VRS-MSRC and the provision of training in support of data collection and analysis. The other on providing policy level support.</th>
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<tr>
<td>ROSEAP has triangulated its LE capacity building and training activities. While the plan is sound, it fails to engage the entire span of command. While a suitable mix of officers and officials have received training, their superiors may not understand how to employ new capabilities.</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, Country Office staff, ROSEAP and desk level review of Project documentation</td>
<td>ROSEAP and Project Staff should examine all LE capacity building training, ensuring that they engage the entire span of command.</td>
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<td>Country/Project Offices should: identify the chain of command in their own country and devise ways of engaging it. seek opportunities to engage the entire chain of command, such as study periods, seminars and one day training courses, or joint conferences in partnership with other IGOs/NGOs, all as a means of increasing advocacy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A majority of member states (event those that received training support under the project) are unable to utilise the database without assistance. There is a lack of capacity and capability in many of intelligence and analysis agencies. UNODC must ensure a coherent approach which includes educating the consumers of intelligence and not just the analysts.</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, Country Office staff, ROSEAP and desk level review of Project documentation.</td>
<td>ROSEAP and LE / Project Staff should review intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities across the region. Future training should aim to develop intelligent consumers in addition to better analysts.</td>
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<td>Migration and irregular migration are highly relevant topics within the region. These areas are congested with many other actors and agencies providing services which overlap with UNODC’s mandates.</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, ROSEAP and desk level review of Project documentation</td>
<td>ROSEAP should define the Project’s limitations and Project Staff must remain within lane.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
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<td>There is a high level of human data and quality assurance in gathering</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff and desk level review of Project documentation.</td>
<td>Project Staff should consider increasing the use of academia to support the data gathering and production. These relationship should be formalised in if such activities are to be continued under a new project.</td>
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<td>SoM information, analysing trends and producing knowledge products,</td>
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<td>which is beyond the capacity of the Project's current Human Resources.</td>
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<td>The Project has used links with academia to support research in the past.</td>
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<td>The UNODC Global Programme for Human Trafficking (GLOTIP) has used</td>
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<td>academics for research purposes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Although VRS-MSRC is an in-house UNODC database and nations input their</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, CLPs and Donor.</td>
<td>ROSEAP should consider a long term sustainment plan for VRS-MSRC.</td>
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<td>own data view a nominated focal point, there is a material cost in</td>
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<td>overseeing the system, and a human resource cost to chasing, correcting</td>
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<td>and analysing the data. Once donor funding stops the system will cease</td>
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<td>to exist.</td>
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<td>The Project did not convene a PSC. By gaining Bali Process endorsement,</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, ROSEAP and desk review</td>
<td>ROSEAP must ensure that the Bali Process understands its role as the formal project governance mechanism (PSC).</td>
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<td>this body has by default become the Project Steering Committee (PSC)</td>
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<td>through which Project governance is exercised.</td>
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<td>There was no external or internal mid-term evaluation of the Project</td>
<td>Interviews with Project Staff, ROSEAP and desk review</td>
<td>In the future all ROSEAP Projects/Programmes should include a formal mid-term evaluation.</td>
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<td>conducted</td>
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<td>There was a degree of triangulation between the Project and the other</td>
<td>Interviews with Project and ROSEAP Staff</td>
<td>Greater effort is required to ensure that the current project mentality is replaced by an integrated programming approach. UNODC staff must be educated, so that they understand what programming is and how to apply it. This education should also be extended to donors and recipients, who have been conditioned over the years to the project mentality.</td>
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<td>law enforcement capacity building projects, but there was not true</td>
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<td>integration. Latterly the Project Coordinator was responsible for the</td>
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<td>human trafficking portfolio, but this was driven more by human resource</td>
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<td>considerations than an integrated programming priority.</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Background and context

Smuggling of Migrants\(^7\) (SoM) is a crime involving the procurement for financial or other material benefit of illegal entry or stay of a person into or in a State of which that person is not a national or resident. Migrant smuggling affects almost every country in the world. It undermines the integrity of countries and communities, and costs thousands of people their lives every year. UNODC, as the guardian the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Organized Crime Convention) and the Protocols thereto, assists States in their efforts to implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Smuggling of Migrants Protocol)\(^8\).

Project XSPT78, Smuggling of Migrants: Establishment and Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) for East Asia & the Pacific was delivered from the Regional Office for South East Asia and Pacific (ROSEAP) in Bangkok between Jan 2010 and Oct 2014. The Project aimed to improve evidence-based knowledge, sharing and access to knowledge relating to SoM and to assist countries to increase their capacities to generate and use information on migrant smuggling. In essence the Project had three main areas of delivery. It supported the Bali Process at the policy level, it provided analytical training in 7 countries, and it developed VRS-MSRC, a secure online database that tracks SoM figures in 19 countries/territories\(^9\).

Regional context

As immigration policies in destination countries become more restrictive and border monitoring more sophisticated, illegal migrants are becoming more dependent on smugglers to facilitate their movements. Throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific criminal gangs profit from transporting and facilitating the illegal entry of migrants through transit countries and then on to destination countries.\(^10\) Migrant smugglers offer a range of services, dependent on price. Those paying the lowest fees are at greater risk while in transit. Their illegal status often results in harm and/or exploitation once they reach their final destination.

In East and Southeast Asia, it is estimated that as many as one out of every four migrant workers may be classed as having an irregular status.\(^11\) While information exists on regular migration, there is no specific data on smuggling of migrants and irregular migration. Official statistics regarding smuggled migrants is limited. While some nations did gather data, this information was not systematically collected or shared amongst member states. The collection of such information


\(^{9}\) Due to the nature of problem, understanding smuggling routes is detail is required. Therefore Territorial Islands report in the same manner as fully fledged nations.

\(^{10}\) For this purpose, destination country means the final country in which the irregular status migrant arrives.

\(^{11}\) IOM Situation report on International Migration in East and Southeast Asia, 2008.
itself was often hindered by a lack of awareness and capacity constraints of the relevant actors at the national level; officials often did not recognise or understand the nature of problem. Prior to the Project there was no common approach or mechanism for the collection of this information and policy debate within the regional was based on assumptions and not fact.

Map 1. Migrant Smuggling Routes in South East Asia and the Pacific  

Regional initiatives

As a primary destination country, Australia has taken a leading role within the region in trying to understand and act on the issue of smuggled migrants. Australian interest is based on two factors, firstly, there are internal political pressures within Australia to limit the flow of illegal migrants entering the country, and secondly, there was a realisation that Australia needed to support its regional partners. As such, a coordinated regional approach benefits both Australia and the region as a whole. Australia is also co-chair of the Bali Process, a forum dedicated to people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime. The Bali Process is the preeminent political structure that examines transnational crimes, promotes regional coordination and supports regional initiatives.

Within ASEAN there is a desire to narrow the development gap between the established members and the newer members of the group. ASEAN is, therefore, moving towards closer economic integration where greater intra-ASEAN economic cooperation and the free flow of people, goods and services are anticipated. The ASEAN members have set a target of free mobility of high skilled workers within the region by 2015. Further to this the ASEAN Vision 2020 envisages


13 In discussion with the donor.

ASEAN as a community of Southeast Asian Nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies. In the social field, the development of a cohesive and caring ASEAN society based on agreed rules of behaviour and cooperative measures to tackle regional problems such as trafficking in women and children and other transnational crime is emphasized. Under this vision there are a number of initiatives which include trade, customs and the free movement of migrant labour.

Donations

The sole donor was the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), subsequently renamed the Department of Immigration and Border Control, who pledged $4,254,088 USD toward the project between Jan 2010 until May 2014. Due to the appreciation of the Australasian Dollar (AUD was the pledged amount) against the US Dollar (USD was the expended currency) the budget increased to $5,226,443 USD. With the agreement of the donor, this provided a cost free extension until Oct 14. As of 24 Aug the Project had expended 98% of the allocated funds.

Project expenditure

Figure I below indicates how Project funds were expended. The largest element of expenditure were staff costs, which includes all the associated cost of hiring consultants.

Figure I. Project Expenditure


1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief22.pdf
Evaluation criteria

The evaluation used the standard IEU evaluation headings and criteria. During the desk review, and in coordination with the term of reference (TORs), the following series of key questions were developed. Additional sub questions were added and these can be found at Annex II. It became apparent during the desk review that while there was a wealth of activity reporting, but that outcomes had no real measures of effect and the evaluator was unable to reach an informed assessment of the Project’s impact. Therefore, the overarching question that the evaluator tried to answer during the course of evaluation was, “what has the project achieved, what was the outcome of this achievement and what impact, if any did the Project make?”

Table 2. Evaluation criteria and key questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
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| Relevance           | • How relevant was the Project to the defined needs and priorities of the Member States, the International Community and the donor?  
• How relevant was the Project in regards to the identified problem? |
| Design              | • Were the Projects objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to a clear strategy?  
• Were sufficient time and resources allocated to achieving the Project’s stated aims and objectives?  
• Was the design of the Project technically sound? |
| Effectiveness       | • What were the Project’s outcomes and how effective has the Project been in achieving them?  
• To what extent have the original Project objective/outcomes been achieved?  
• How effective has the project been at altering its delivery to meet new challenges?  
• To what extent has the project improved the capacity of member states to develop and share information on migrants smuggling? |
| Efficiency          | • How efficient has the implementation of the Project been?  
• How have UNODC internal procedures impacted the Project’s |
delivery?

- What formal governance structures did the Project report to? How was information feedback to these structures?

Sustainability
- Was sustainability considered in the Project’s design?
- How sustainable are the Project’s achievements?
- What more could UNODC do to make the Project sustainable?

Impact
- What has the Project achieved? Has there been a tangible outcome?
- To what extent has information sharing and cooperation among Members Improved in the fight member states capabilities to combat the smuggling of migrants?

Partnerships
- What cooperation and partnerships have UNODC sought to deliver the Project?
- Are partners satisfied with the level of information provided by the UNODC?
- What additional partnerships could be developed in the future?

Human Rights and Gender
- To what extent did human rights considerations impact Project design and delivery?
- To what degree are gender sensitive policies and gender balance promoted via the Project?

Evaluation methodology

The evaluation was designed and conducted in compliance with the UNODC Evaluation Policy, the Terms of Reference (TOR) and accepted international programme evaluation standards.

In order to comply with policy requirements, the evaluation design:

a. Identified the Regional Office of South East Asia and Pacific as the Primary Intended User (PIU) of the evaluation; and
b. Deployed utilization-focused techniques by actively engaging the PIU in the identification of significant changes attributable to the project products and in identifying solutions for overcoming the challenges they considered important.

The terms of reference (at Annex I) outlined the key aspects of the evaluation including the purpose, scope and indicative questions to be considered. A desk review was carried out by the evaluator as part of the inception report preparation process. The desk review resulted in an Evaluation Matrix (Annex III) which contained both general and specific questions. This matrix served as the basis for developing the various data collection instruments.

Data Collection Instruments

A variety of data collection instruments were designed in order to gather and triangulate evidence:

a. Desk Review. Preliminary desk review of all relevant project documentation, as provided by UNODC and also independently accessed by the evaluator. These documentation included:

1. Project document.
2. Project revisions.
3. Profi print outs.
4. Annual and Semi-annual Project progress reports.
5. Selection of relevant activity reports (regional conferences, training seminars, national workshops and baseline surveys).
6. Project sponsored literature.
7. Open source web based literature.

b. Semi-structured interview guides. The evaluator prepared interview guides based on the key questions. During the interviews, the evaluator probed topics not originally contained in the guides when considered relevant.

c. Surveys. The evaluation devised two surveys which contained a combination of closed and open ended questions. In addition the evaluation utilised the results of two surveys conducted by the Project staff. The four surveys were:

1. Emailed questionnaire sent to national focal points responsible for VRS-MSRC – details contained at Annex II
2. Emailed questionnaire sent to policy level points of contact involved in the Bali process – details contained at Annex II.
3. Emailed questionnaire sent to students who had undergone UNODC sponsored training. The details of which are contained in UNODC Survey Report – Training Impact Assessment 31 Aug 2014

4. Emailed questionnaire sent to recipient of Project sponsored knowledge products. The details of which are contained in UNODC CAU Migrant Smuggling Knowledge Product Impact and Awareness Assessment 19 Sept 2014.

d. Case Studies. The desk level review revealed that there was little data relating to Project’s impact. In fact the Project Coordinator had employed a consultant to retrospectively design a measure of effect tool\textsuperscript{18}, as those contained in the Project documentation were not deemed sufficient to indicate Project progress. The evaluator decided that qualitative data, in the form of a case study, might be a more suitable vehicle for assessing impact than purely quantitative metrics. The idea was to seek examples of how member states had used analysis to alter their policy, posture or response to the smuggling of migrants.

Sampling Strategy

A total of 65 individuals were identified as constituting the universe of the evaluation (see Annex IV). The selection of these individuals was based on them having a degree of involvement in the design, implementation, funding and/or oversight of the Project. Of this universe 49 were interviewed directly. The remainder either declined and/or were sent an email questionnaire.

Field Visits

It was not foreseen to visit all 19 countries participating in the project; based on guidance from programme staff, scope, scale, and limitations of the evaluation, the evaluator conducted the following field visits which used Bangkok and the Regional Office as the hub:

a. Bangkok, Thailand from 26 August to 1 September.

b. Jakarta, Indonesia from 1 - 4 September.

c. Bangkok, Thailand from 5 - 7 September.

d. Phnom Penh, Cambodia from 8 – 9 September.

e. Bangkok, Thailand from 9 - 11 September.

Interviews

The framework questions at Annex II guided discussions. Interviews were either in person, or via Skype. Interviewees were asked to consent to the interview and assured as to the confidentiality of the process. They were informed that quotes may be used in the report, but that identifiers will not be used. Any information requested by an interviewee to be handled as confidential was treated as such by the evaluator.

\textsuperscript{18} This included conducting surveys which resulted in the two impact assessments mentioned above.
During the course of the meetings it was obvious that some questions were not relevant and others were asked instead. Interviewees were accorded the opportunity to address any topic they feel was not covered (sufficiently or at all). Ample opportunity was provided to the respondents to tell their own story and to initiate discussion on issues not considered in advance. These “leads” were then pursued in discussions with other respondents in order to verify their veracity and to allow for further investigation of pertinent issues. Ongoing email and phone communications with stakeholders were used as required.

Limitations to the Evaluation

There were no major limitations to the conduct of this evaluation. Project staff engaged with the evaluator 3 months before the start of the field mission, which provided sufficient time to agree travel dates. Reading material was provided in advance, which allowed the substantive project documentation to be read, and an inception report was drafted approximately one month before the field mission.

Given the geographic scale of the region and the time available, for the evaluation, there was no way the evaluator could visit all the Participating States. The field mission was, therefore, limited to the signatory states and the Regional Office (see above). Sufficient time was built into the programme to allow the evaluator to interview as many people as possible and to call/Skype those that could not be interviewed in person. In addition, an emailed questionnaire was used, to ensure that all Participating States, regardless of geography, or time zone, were provided an opportunity to participate in the evaluation.
II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Relevance

The Smuggling of Migrants is defined as the "procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.19 It Migrant smuggling undermines the integrity of countries and communities, and costs thousands of people their lives every year. UNODC, as the guardian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Organized Crime Convention) and the Protocols thereto, assist States in their efforts to implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Smuggling of Migrants Protocol).20

SoM is at the edge of UNODC’s law enforcement remit. Often described as a victimless crime, more often than not, it is the transnational dimension of the SoM that interests states; the fact that a facilitator can smuggle humans, terrorists or prohibited goods. Historically, within the South East Asia and Pacific region there has been limited willingness to act against SoM, and there are even allegations of official collusion21/22. Although these reports are strenuously denied23 they do highlight the scale of the problem, the ease in which smugglers can move their human cargos and the nature of the issue that the Project sought to address.

ROSEAP’s Regional Transnational and Organised Crime Threat Assessment24 (TOCTA) used much of the SoM data gathered by the Project in addition to other research products. It tries to provide a more holistic view of transnational threats across the region. It describes an inter-linkage between SOM, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes but does not go into the detail that many recipients felt they required. TOCTA user opinion differed between: those that felt that the level of detail in the threat assessment was too general and did tell them anything that they did not already know25; and those that felt it was highly relevant, often due to the fact that they were unable to gather and process this type of data unilaterally. This highlights one of the Project’s main issues which relates to defining an end user for the data. Many of the Member States involved in the Project do not have the capacity or capability to process complex data and/or produce their own SoM trend analysis. They require significant assistance to either develop this capability or a finished product produced by UNODC. This presents an additional problem, as the level of detail each Member State requires differs markedly. During interviews most Member States expressed more concerned with human trafficking (HT) and SoM was seen as a more marginal issue. The UNODC global human trafficking reports were widely known and highly regarded. The SoM Project is highly relevant at the global level and if there is an

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25 In conversation with recipients of the TOCTA.
opportunity to expand the current Project toward becoming a global project in time, it should be grasped. IOM assess that the number of migrants who have died in transit is in excess of 40,000 since the year 2000\textsuperscript{26}. The UN and Members States have a duty of care toward people in transit and understanding the problem is the step in acting against it. Given the recent incident of criminal gangs taking advantage and even killing migrants\textsuperscript{27}, and this would be highly relevant area for UNODC research and assistance (Recommendation 10).

There is a growing awareness of the importance of migration in post 2015 development agendas, especially the need for reducing migration costs (such as recruitment costs) and improving migrant rights\textsuperscript{28}. IOM reports suggest that many as 1 in 4 migrant workers within the region have no official status\textsuperscript{29}. While figures such as this are used in many research and policy papers, until the Project commenced there was no baseline data or understanding relating to the number of smuggled migrants. There were only assumptions.

With increased security and more sophisticated border detection equipment, many illegal migrants rely on a third party (smugglers) to facilitate their movement\textsuperscript{30}. Increasing criminal involvement is seen as a threat to member states and to the safety of migrants\textsuperscript{31}. Smuggling of migrants presents a potentially destabilizing factor and major security and social challenge. In addition, the rise of IS and the use of foreign fighters, will force member states to collect data relating to illegal migration (including SoM) in an attempt to assess how Jihadists may attempt to gain entry or return to their countries of origin.

As ASEAN policy pushes for, amongst other things, increased trade, freedom of movement and the respect of universal human rights, it has developed a number of action plans which include the issues of SoM and illegal migration.\textsuperscript{32} One such measure was the establishment of an ASEAN Directory of Immigration Focal Points to facilitate networking among the immigration authorities, especially in the area of enforcement. The Ha Noi Declaration adopted at the 6th ASEAN Summit also reinforced ASEAN’s aim to intensify individual and collective efforts to address transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, piracy, arms smuggling and trafficking in persons. The Project is relevant to the region as it supports the Bali Process; a regional initiative\textsuperscript{33}. The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process\textsuperscript{34}) formed in 2002 has tried to raise regional awareness of the consequences of people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime. More than 45 member states and international agencies such as UNHCR and IOM participate in the forum. Under the guise of the Project UNODC received full membership of the Bali Process. The areas where the Project assists the Bali Process are highlighted in the table below.

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\textsuperscript{28} ExSum to the World Bank Migration and Development Brief (22) for 2014, \url{http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief22.pdf}

\textsuperscript{29} IOM Situation report on International Migration in East and Southeast Asia, 2008.

\textsuperscript{30} World Savvy Monitor – Human Migration 2009 \url{http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index.php?option=com_content&id=424&Itemid=818}

\textsuperscript{31} UNODC Transnational and Organised Crime Threat Assessment.

\textsuperscript{32} ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters. \url{http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/asean-plan-of-action-for-cooperation-on-immigration-matters}

\textsuperscript{33} Bali Process Website \url{http://www.baliprocess.net/}

\textsuperscript{34} Bali Process Website \url{http://www.baliprocess.net/}

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Table 3. Bali Process outcomes supported by the Project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bali Process Outcome</th>
<th>Project Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>more effective information and intelligence sharing</td>
<td>establishment of data collection via national VRS-MCRS focal points and the training of data analysts</td>
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<tr>
<td>improved cooperation among regional law enforcement agencies to combat people smuggling and trafficking networks</td>
<td>networking of officials through joint training events and via the VRS-MCRS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enhanced border cooperation</td>
<td>support to policy level discussions – joint training provided to border officials improves networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased public awareness to discourage smuggling activities</td>
<td>support to policy level discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verify the identity and nationality of illegal migrants and trafficking victims</td>
<td>establishment of data and VRS-MCRS data base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enact legislation to criminalise people smuggling and trafficking in persons</td>
<td>support to policy level discussions – technical legal assistance to nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the Project UNODC has also gained membership of the Bali Process Ad-Hoc Group. This group was established to develop and pursue practical measures on people smuggling, trafficking in persons and the irregular movement of people. The Ad-Hoc Group brings together the most-affected countries and relevant international organisations to address specific issues. The Ad-Hoc Group is primarily tasked with implementing the Regional Cooperation Framework (RCF), which is the practical tool aimed at enhancing a regional responses to irregular movement through a series of activities, to include the targeting of people smuggling enterprises.

The Regional Support Office was established in Bangkok in Sept 2012. It aims to facilitate implementation of the RCF. The Office provides a central point for information sharing (including an online secure server) between States on refugee protection and international migration; capacity building and exchange of best practices; pooling of common technical resources; and providing logistical, administrative, operational and coordination support for joint projects between Bali Process members. Visibility within the RSO is key to UNODC’s involvement, as this is where policy becomes implementation. (Recommendation 4b) The Project was highly relevant to the donor, as Australia is a major destination country within the region. The differing political parties in Australia had each tried to tackle the issue of illegal migration and smuggling in different ways. In 2009 the Australian government was increasingly concerned with the issue and the border and immigration services were put under pressure to act more effectively. In response they went through a period of re-structuring and capability enhancements. It was during this period that the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) raised the idea of a common SoM database and suggested that UNODC draft a proposal.
Design

When assessing the Project’s design there are two elements that require examination. The first element places the Project in context and examines if its outcomes matched the requirement; was the design driven by a clearly identified need and was the Project a suitable solution? The second element is the physical plan; was the design realistic in terms of achieving the desired outcome given the resources and time available, was it ever going to be on budget and on time? The simple answers to these questions are: against the first element, somewhat, the Project did seek to provide a solution to an identified shortfall, but it failed to specify who the intended recipient was, which confused delivery; and secondly, due to this failure, there was no clearly articulated plan from which the Project could have been delivered to, or measured against.

The Project supported the law enforcement pillar of the Regional Programme Framework (RPF)\textsuperscript{35}, in particular output 1.5.1: systems to generate, manage and report SoM information. The other elements of the outcome 1.5: BLO’s mandates broadened (...); informed and capable frontline LE officers and officials (...); and research on irregular migration used as part of the Bali Process, were not officially part of the Project’s remit. Although the Project was part of RPF, it was not really integrated into the programme, and was very much a standalone Project under a regional umbrella. The Project Management unilaterally expended a great deal of effort in assisting the Bali Process, as this was seen as the area where UNODC and the Project could attain maximum impact. There was a degree of triangulation between the Project and the other law enforcement capacity building projects; PATROL\textsuperscript{36} and Port Intelligence Unit\textsuperscript{37} (PIU) and with Computer Based Training (CBT). Latterly the Project Coordinator was responsible for the human trafficking portfolio, but this was driven more by human resource considerations than an integrated programming approach. Greater effort is required to ensure that the current project mentality is replaced by an integrated programming approach. UNODC staff must be educated, so that they understand what programming is and how to apply it. This education should also be extended to donors and recipients, who have been conditioned over the years to the project mentality. It will take time for all concerned to understand and be comfortable with programmed delivery. (Recommendation 15)

The Project document (PD) was well written. The why, what and how, used a logical framework to define the problem. It was a well thought out and well-argued justification that was used to secure funding. As an academic document, it correctly identified the requirement to do something. The solution it suggested, in theoretical terms matched the requirement. The issue, in the region, was a lack of understanding relating to SoM, from which politicians could devise

\textsuperscript{35} The Regional Programme Framework for Southeast Asia and the Pacific 2009 -2012. 

\textsuperscript{36} Partnership Against Transnational-crime through Regional Organized Law-enforcement (PATROL) 

\textsuperscript{37} Port Interdiction Unit (PIU) https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/cambodia/2013/06/migrant-smuggling/story.html
sound policies. A lack of policy and adoption of UN protocols on national laws meant that frontline officials did not report the crime or incorrectly dealt with smuggled migrants (either turning a blind eye or focusing on the migrant and not the smuggler). To solve these issues the Project used a sound mix of academics and contracted subject matter experts to assist with database design, delivery and the production of knowledge products. Risk and risk mitigation were articulated in the PD. These were simple and relevant. There was no baseline data available from which to gauge success, as prior to the Project, no systems were in place to capture this type of data. The PD, however, used this as an excuse to limit the measures of effect it articulated. Performance indicators that were included in the PD were used devised logically and were consistently used. Outputs did match the requirement, as specified in the PD; however, it can be question if this requirement correctly articulated?

Although the initial PD provided a sound justification, it failed to provide a suitable plan. While there was realisation, that UNODC could not affect change in all the identified shortfall areas\(^{38}\), the plan did not sufficiently articulate where UNDOC could affect change and how this could be achieved. Overall, there was no clear aim or strategy as to how change would be enacted and supported; with what resources and when. The PD failed to specify a primary identified user, and therefore, the Project could be perceived as trying to please too many people (users) while satisfying none. Had the Project’s design utilised the theory of change\(^{39}\), it might have identified a critical path from which the Project could have been resourced. For example, if member states possess a common understanding of the problem (SoM) then they can participate in meaningful political dialogue. This dialogue is, therefore, a prerequisite to agreeing a way ahead, advancing policy, and enhancing operational capability. As such, there were several design and structural deficiencies which led to a “rush to failure”. Where IT systems were designed and training delivered ahead of informing and supporting political dialogue. There was also a failure to understand that: IT supports decision makers - hence the requirement to articulate a PIU; and that a database is but one element of an IT system – which comprises of people, training, processes, equipment and software.

The Project was too ambitious, too diffuse and its outputs were not rooted in reality when one considered the available resources. The Project title suggests the formation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU), activities ranged from policy support to the Bali Process, through to the training of relatively junior immigration officials. With a budget $5,000,000 USD spread over 4 years and 8 recipient countries expenditure would have averaged no more than $100,000 per country per year. The main areas of weakness were:

a. An immediate start and implementation date that was unlikely to occur, before staff had been hired.

b. There were too many outputs. These were listed in an over-time manner, but there is no time scale provided, and no sense of the groundwork required to turn these activities into outputs.

\(^{38}\) The PD identified 6 areas of weakness in member states understanding of the problem and ability to deal with the issue of SoM. It realised it did not have the means to tackle all 6 areas and instead focused on: communication and cooperation mechanisms; timely and quality strategic information; and limited awareness, knowledge and skills among key officers and other stakeholders.

\(^{39}\) The theory of change is a tool that sets out a clear path from day-to-day activities to achieve outcomes to the change desired. It allows the practitioner to see exactly how inputs make a difference. Working through a theory of change helps a project manager understand what they do every day contributes to your overall mission. [http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-of-change/](http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-of-change/)
c. Outputs were phrased as activities. This failing hampered any measures of effect and Project reporting. All reporting became an activity log rather than a series of impact assessments.

d. PD did not articulate who the primary intended user. It tried to satisfy an operational requirement for information, via a CAU, and a strategic requirement for trend analysis.

e. The PD failed to articulate how effectiveness was to be measured.

The design was short on technical substance. Although it sought to deliver an IT system as one of its major elements, it failed to envisage scoping, detailed design and any form of pilot phases. These are common failings and occur in many UNODC projects.\[40\] The issue is easily remedied by UNODC adopting recognised project management technics when designing and writing future project documents, especially when it involves IT (Recommendation 13). Regardless of which formal process is used, most commercial project management processes have a number of defined phases; which roughly equates the following: inception; design; execute; monitor; and close. This differs from the UNODC process\[41\] which is: strategy setting; programme development; resource mobilisation; implementation; and monitoring and evaluation and then return to strategy setting. The problem with the PD was that it went from justification to execution without an inception or design phase. While certain elements can be truncated or other models used which will offer alternative phases commercial project management generally abides by these phases which allows time and resources to be allocated upfront. The PD failed to allocate resources and time in order to achieve these initial activities. The design of the outcomes did provide a handrail. In that it recognised the requirement to fact-find and produce baseline documents, but these activities were simultaneous with execution. Had a standard project management model been used in designing the project then a resource and outcome plan (over-time) would have emerged. This would have indicated a slower start to implementation, the requirement for a pilot phase and possibly the rollout of an IT system as it matured. In all reality it would have seen the need to increase the Project’s timeline.

Project design shortfalls, mentioned above can be assigned to a number of factors. Firstly, the project was required to fit the needs to a single donor, as such it was written to secure funding from a specific source rather than being a thoroughly thought through proposition that sought to affect change. Secondly, there was poor project management, in terms of design which led to confusion. Thirdly, there was a failure to understand that a database is just a tool, and that the tool supports change; the tool does not equal change.

Efficiency

The observations that follow are caveated with the following statement: when judging efficiency the evaluator had to refer delivery against the project’s design; actual verses planned. As already discussed there were issues with the design which in turn impacts how efficiency is gauged. The observations that follow are designed to assist those who will draft a new project, that will continue the core activities of the evaluated project rather than as a critic of the Project’s efficiencies per-se. The Project Management produced a detailed project plan and delivered effect in a highly efficient manner. Compared to the resources available and the scope of the Project, what was achieved should be considered as very good value for money.

\[40\] The evaluator has assessed 8 UNODC projects to date.

Expenditure

The Project was slow to start, as it took time to hire a suitable project coordinator. Although the major cost drive was staff, the Project never hired the full complement of staff outlined in the original project documentation.

Figure 2. Forecast expenditure

![Pie chart showing forecast expenditure]

Figure 3. Actual expenditure

![Pie chart showing actual expenditure]

The charts above represent the proposed budget from the initial Project Documentation and the final Project expenditure from Profi. Final expenditure is broadly the same as proposed expenditure. The main area of change was the reduction in equipment procurement from 10% to 1% and the addition of IT which accounted for 8%. It is this money that was used to build the database on which VRS-MCRS is based. There were slight increases to training costs, 14% to
18%, the majority of which was DSA and Travel for trainees; and to staff and travel costs of 1% and 2% respectively.

Staff

Due to the poor design of the Project, implementation initially stalled, as it took longer than anticipated to recruit a suitable subject matter expert to become the project Coordinator. This caused a delay of approximately 9 months. The Project never hired the full complement of staff envisaged in the PD; instead it hired a number of consultants. UNODC rules limit contractual duration and inefficient central hiring processes provided an erratic flow of consultants. This impacted continuity and required the project coordinator to continually bring on and in-brief new staff, which in turn reduced the effectiveness of the Project Coordinator as it took him away from his primary function which was to manage the Project (arrange training, collect data, write papers and travel to countries to assist in policy development and adherence to international conventions and norms). The numerous project revisions mainly related to staff changes and are proof of poor design; which had to be retrospectively altered.

Information technology

For very understandable reasons the Project sought to use an in-house, UNODC, IT solution. UNODC has an IT department which is capable of introducing new software and writing codes. Due to the potentially sensitive nature of the data, UNODC produced software and UNODC owned server where considered paramount. Unfortunately the in-house solution was fraught with problems. It took longer than expected to deliver. The difference in location and time zone meant that communications were difficult. There appeared to be little ownership of the software within the IT department, who had a number of other tasks not leaving them with sufficient resources to adequately prioritize the finalization of the VRS-MSRC. The software solution produced was an amalgam of others programmes that UNDOC had developed and was not bespoke to the task. This resulted in integration problems which further delayed development, and there are still bugs in the system today. A better solution may have been for the IT department to assist in the procurement process, articulate the KURs and down select a suitable commercial solution. UNODC in-house IT would have a role to play in placing the software on their server and providing maintenance, but the physical development of the database and the rolling out of the programme would have probably been speedier via a commercial firm. There may have been a cost differential, but the solution in all likelihood would have been more robust.

Governance

Despite stating that there would be a Project Steering Committee (PSC) the Project failed to set one up, inform it, or pass annual prioritise via it. While this appears to be a stark failing, there are mitigating circumstances. Only 2 of the 8 countries envisaged as part of the Project actually signed the Project documentation. There was never an opportunity to form a full PSC. The donor was kept fully informed throughout, and more importantly the donor nation was the co-chair of the Bali Process. This is important as the Project has received official recognition from the Bali Process\textsuperscript{42}. Since then it has been reporting to Bali Process meetings on a regular basis. All but one of the nations there were invited to sign the PD are members, and as such the Bali Process has become the de facto PSC. In many ways this type of governance structure is more effective than

\textsuperscript{42} UNODC became a full member of the Bali Process at the 5t Ministerial in April 2013. And then also part of the Bali Process Ad-Hoc Group at the Senior Officials Meeting of the AHG in Canberra (August 2014).
the prescribed mechanism. It utilises a pre-existing meeting which specifically deals with the issue of SoM. This governance model, a. reduces the requirement to hold a separate meeting and b. supports pre-existing structures without the need to invent new ones. The Bali Process must however, be aware that it is the formal Project Steering Committee (PSC) and provide guidance as required. (Recommendation 12)

Reporting

Outputs were poorly articulated and represented a series of activities. Measures of effectiveness were in fact measures of activity. Activity reporting was used consistently in annual and periodic reporting. Annual reporting was succinct and well written. Indicators of activity were largely met but there was no gauge to assess how inputs improved quality or led to desired outcomes. Project staff are currently wrestling with this issue as they close the Project out.

Training Support is not about the numbers trained, but the effect of the training. The evaluator has seen considerably better MoE used for law enforcement training within the region before, such as adaptation of the Kirkpatrick Model at JCLEC in Indonesia.

Support to the political process, is more than the number of meetings attended. MoE could have formulated a narrative approach to describe how UNODC had supported member states or the declining requirement for UNODC assistance as member states fully engage with the issues.

Although annual financial reporting accorded with UNODC standards, it did not meet the donor’s requirements. The donor stated that they required activity-based reporting, so that they can see what is being spent on each activity over time. An annual letter stating that expenditure was in-line with UN norms and standards was deemed insufficient.

There was no mid-term evaluation of Project, either in-house (internal) or independent (external). This was a failing which should be rectified in future projects. (Recommendation 14)

Working with Member States

The PD envisaged working with 8 member states, those at the heart of the South East Asia and closest to Australia. With only 2 signatures the project stalled. With endorsement from the Bali Process, VRS-MSRC now collects data from 19 Bali Process member states, and has received an input from over 45. This expansion is because SoM is a global phenomenon, it is not only transnational it is very much inter-regional. The Project’s research products cover states in other "UNODC regions" such as South and Southwest Asia, the Americas and Europe. Project Staff are currently preparing a report on migrant smuggling in Asia that describes major trends of migrant smuggling with regard to 28 countries in Southwest, South and Southeast and East Asia and also in relation to countries of origin or destination that are outside of Asia. In preparation of this report, 28 country profiles were compiled; each is based upon open-source data and primary data UNODC collected directly from state authorities. This approach is holistic and provides the global trend analysis that the Member States require. It supports UNODC’s interregional drug control approach (IRDC) which envisages a network of networks and is therefore a highly efficient and effect use of resource.

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43 Data from 45 nations has been achieved through collecting data via an email survey, which is in addition to VRS-MSRC.
Partnerships and cooperation

Smuggling of migrants is not a distinct issue in its own right. For UNODC it is part of the wider transnational protocols. The subject matter and source data is inexplicitly linked to wider border issues, migration, irregular migration, human trafficking and the rights of refugees. The criminal element, the act of smuggling, is not limited to migrants, and can include other transnational threats such as terrorism and money laundering. Therefore, the space in which the Project operates is congested. There are many other actors that work with similar data and in the same space, albeit each has a different perspective. For the Project there are three main actors, UNHCR which looks at the right of refugees, IOM which tracks legal and illegal migration and the Bali Process which has an interest in all migration issues and associated transnational crimes. The Project forged good working relationships with these partners. The fact that the Project’s main achievement supports the Bali Process, and the fact that it is working directly in partnership with the Regional Support Office (RSO) is proof of a good working relationship and cooperation.

As a means of demonstrating the complexities and congestion the table below lists those organisations that the Bali Process has identified and works with.

Table 4. Bali Process stakeholder matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International and Regional Forums relating to Migration, Smuggling of Migrants and Human Trafficking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC (Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Immigration Directors' Conference (PIDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI center)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to those organisations listed above, UNODC works with 19 member states on a bilateral basis, their MFAs, Immigration / Border Agencies and very often National Police Forces. Therefore, the list of interested parties and points of contract spirals into the hundreds and managing this is a full time job. For the continuation of the core activities of the evaluated project, ROSEAP should consider hiring two staff, one as the coordinator, focused on overall coordination and policy support and the second to focus on the reporting mechanism, data collection and knowledge products. (Recommendation 3)

The Project identified the RSO, IOM and UNHCR as its primary partners. Interviews indicate that there was a good working relationship between UNODC and these partners. RSO was particularly supportive of UNODC’s activities and support much of UNODC’s work as it is complimentary to what it is trying to achieve. But this is an area that requires additional attention. There is the potential for UNODC to compete for resources with other IGOs, namely IOM and INTERPOL. Instead UNODC should seek common ground and as in the case of IOM seek a formal partnership in support of the RSO. The following vignette highlights this point. A military coup in Thailand caused approximately 250,000 Cambodian workers living in Thailand to return to Cambodia over a matter of days.\(^4^4\) IOM via its large field network was able to monitor and count returnees and was able to estimate a total number. However, this piece of work was not linked to UNODC’s SoM data, despite the UN Country Team have a stated one UND approach. Press reports, a month later, then focused on the issue of Cambodian migrants

having to pay for Thai paperwork\textsuperscript{45} as a means of returning back to Thailand. Despite these inter-linkages there was no formal collaboration between IOM and UNODC to assess and understand the true nature of the problem. This was is missed opportunity and an area where greater cooperation could be achieved.

The RSO hosts an immigration borders information service website that allows immigration agencies from partner countries to share ‘open source’ information and immigration-related intelligence on current media items of interest, immigration alerts of potential irregular movements and modus operandi and more substantive reference materials or resource documents\textsuperscript{46}. This website does not host items bearing national security classifications or replace the ongoing liaison mechanisms that occur between embassies/high commissions and interlocutors in host countries. INTERPOL is delivering more secure means for law enforcement and border officials to share information that it classified. The United States of America provides bilateral support to many member states. For example Cambodia was recently provided biometric collection systems (BICES) which have been installed at major entry points. UNODC with VRS-MSRC provides a system that only looks at the issue of SoM. It is the only system that does this. While there is a requirement to work actively with partners UNODC needs to clearly define what its role is how it differentiates itself from these other initiatives. UNODC must also assist Member States in bringing some form of coherence to international assistance. (Recommendation 7)

The Project worked with academics, most notably from Queensland University Australia. The use of academics to assist with data collection, assurance and trend analysis is a suitable use of resources and should be expanded as the Project goes forward. It is recommended that future revisions and or re-design should seek develop formal links with a number of academic institutions. These partnerships should be articulated in the formal documentation. Leveraging academia adds credibility to UNODC research and is mutually beneficial to both sides. (Recommendation 8)

Effectiveness

Effectiveness can be viewed in two ways. Compared to the stated outputs and the indicators that exist, the Project has largely achieved what it intended to achieve. These achievements were on budget and on time (albeit with a one year extension). When compared to the overall objective, then the Project still has some way to go, in achieving its aim. The conclusion to this observation is that the Project requires more time to enact change and that UNODC should consider phase one a partial success, and prepare for phase two, while learning the lessons of phase one.

Of the 8 countries that the PD envisaged participating in the Project, only 2 (Cambodia and Indonesia) signed the PD. This could be seen as a failure. However, by gaining the endorsement of the Bali Process, the Project has been effective in engaging even more countries than originally envisaged. What could have been a negative in fact turned into a positive.

The Project’s overall objective was to identify and effectively act against smuggling of migrants activities in East Asia and the Pacific. The simple analysis is that smuggling of migrants has been identified, via voluntary reporting and publication of knowledge products, but that effective

\textsuperscript{45} \url{http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/07/cambodian-migrant-workers-pay-for-thai-labour-scramble/} \\
\textsuperscript{46} This system is relatively new and is not yet fully operational. There is a link from the Bali Process Website to the VRS-MSRC.
action against smuggling activities has not altered markedly. But the Project did not possess the resources, approval, reach or mandate to act. At best, the Project has supported political dialogue which may in time lead to policy change. If political will exists and sufficient resources become available and officials are trained then some action might be taken.

The Project supported the 2009 - 2013 Regional Programme Framework. The Project’s outcome was: systems to generate, manage, analyse, report and use migrant smuggling information established and operational. The project was largely successful at attaining its stated goals, at least at the headline level, see table 5. There is now a system in place that can generate, manage and to some degree analyse, report and use smuggling of migrant information. Using indicators from the original Project documentation the following can be seen.

Table 5. Project measures of effect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 states participate in first reporting cycle</td>
<td>Reports submitted by states to VRS-MSRC</td>
<td>19 Member States and Territories have input national data into the system</td>
<td>Exceeded planned achievements by more than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usage of VRS-MSRC</td>
<td>Only 2 nations reported viewing data beyond checking their national inputs, and no member state reported active use of VRS-MSRC database for intelligence and analysis purposes</td>
<td>Partial. The system is still new and many actors are either unaware of, or do not have access to, the data base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The VRS-MSRC</td>
<td>There is a live database that can be viewed by all Member States that submitted data</td>
<td>Partial. The IT supporting the system is fragile and is yet to provide full functionality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 6 CAU knowledge products published</td>
<td>Knowledge products</td>
<td>7 products have been published</td>
<td>Exceeded planned achievements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of products</td>
<td>Although most Member States are aware of products, this is not universal and there has been limited use of the products to data.</td>
<td>Partial. Most Member States had received but not activity used the products.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original project documentation then listed 12 subsequent outputs, which it grouped into three activity areas. As discussed, in the design paragraph, these outcomes were not articulated correctly and appropriate measures of effect were not devised. As such there is little point in this report evaluating each in turn; this level of reporting is already contained in UNODC annual or semi-annual reports.
In reality the project delivered effect in three areas and it is in these areas that the Project should articulate outcomes during any revision (Recommendations 4). These three areas are:

a. production of knowledge products based on the systematic gathering of smuggling of migrants data;

b. inform and support policy makers via the Bali Process;

c. capacity building to gather and analyse smuggling of migrants data, at the national level.

Using these three criteria, this evaluation has discovered the following.

Data collection and knowledge products

The Project has established the very first data collection and exchange mechanism that not only serves a group of like-minded states (such as Frontex in Europe) but for a group or widely dispersed and differing nations. This is a massive achievement. This is not a one off study. Data gathering is occurring on a regular basis, and the number of participating countries is greater than originally planned. The system is laborious and the database requires humans as part of the gathering process. Emailed reminders have to be sent to each participating nations. Phone calls and helpdesk activity is required to guide focal points through the uploading of data. National databases, if they exist, are not interoperable with VRS-MSRC, so there is requirement for the manual inputting of data. In many countries there is no single data source and the focal point becomes the data gatherer and inputter, often having to provide the first level of data assurance. The system is not automatic, it requires a human interface and there will be an ongoing requirement for UNODC to assist focal points, guiding them through the process and providing a second line of data assurance before data can analysed and used. While the system has a built in search engine and can search for information in a number of different ways it is currently incapable of providing any form of automatic comparative analysis, such as diagrams or charts. Staff are required to extract data and conduct comparative analysis via a secondary medium such as excel. Developed countries could make more use of VRS-MSRC, but generally don’t. Many countries in the region don’t use it and probably never will; instead they are waiting for UNODC products. This presents a problem, until a suitable product appears many member states won’t see a benefit of supporting the system.

The publications that have been developed from the research and data generated by the project are high quality. It was reported that “products were comprehensive, accurate and well written”. The extensive reference lists add authoritative weight to the documents. Overall they provide an excellent set of background documents that indicate how countries are dealing with the crime of migrant smuggling. While a few member states are using these documents as background material for their own analytical activities, most interviewees stated that they had not seen or read the publications; some were even unaware of the publications. Those that had seen the publications stated that hard copies often stayed on the bookshelves of senior officials, while those directly working on the issue would browse the online versions. Most of the member states that found it difficult to collate data in the first instance, possessed limited analysis capacity, and were therefore unable to process UNODC products and VRS-MSRC data.
A recent UNODC impact assessment report assessed the effectiveness of the Project’s knowledge products. From 1,386 targeted\(^{47}\) individuals only 7% (of the total or 30% of those that responded) stated that the products were useful, raised awareness and were relevant to those working on SoM issues. Between 11% and 15% were aware of the publications and between 7% and 10% had made use of these publications. This mixture of low response levels (less than 20%) and low approval rates is disappointing. These findings confirm what many interviewees stated. Very few had used the products and those that had felt they were too strategic and not focused on their information requirements (which were more operational and tactical). Although the majority of comments received during the evaluation were positive, there was criticism that UNODC reports were too academic, difficult to read and too time consuming to digest. There was an expectation, expressed by less developed Member States, that UNODC should produce national level analysis. Even Member States with more capacity were hoping for greater sub regional analysis and greater use of maps and graphics. Data collection and analysis either needs to become more regional and country specific, which is beyond the capacity of UNODC, or it should become a global study much like the human trafficking study.

Policy support

Before the Project, UNODC was not an acknowledged SoM expert within the Asian region, and only had observer status at the Bali Process. Through the project, UNODC has managed to become first a full member of the Bali Process (April 2013) and then part of the Bali Process Ad Hoc Group (August 2014). Now that UNODC is actively participating, it must ensure that it continues to provide the high quality support that has been delivered to date (Recommendation 2). In this area, CLPs view UNODC support as highly effective. The presence of a SME at meetings has assisted member states to understand the issue and their international obligations. When conducting technical working groups UNODC assistance provided insight into the protocols and the technical assistance required to understand their meaning and how to implement them. One interviewee stated that they “didn’t have time to read everything, and to have UNODC representation at meetings provided a ready source of detailed technical information that would have taken days to read and digest”.

Training support

Training was suitable to the requirement and targeted. Country offices identified those who required training and requested suitable candidates to attend training sessions. Those who indicated analytical aptitude during the basic courses were then invited back for follow on training. Training while targeted did not cover the entire span of command. More could be done to educate and support decision makers in addition to the analysts. (Recommendation 6)

Training was triangulated with two other UNODC capacity building projects, PIU and PATROL. This ensured that analysts, port official and border guards all received standard levels of training which included elements of the other two projects; this as a means of increasing the overall effect of UNODC projects. The sum of which, in theory, was to develop comprehensive trend analysis, liaison and interdiction capabilities within Law Enforcement structures of the Member States. Training was coordinated with CBT, which cost effective means of training, but is not suitable for all participating nations. (Recommendations 5). In certain Member States computers are not readily available and officials are not always computer literate. In other countries where English

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\(^{47}\) Individuals who had been sent one or more of the seven products being assessed.
is not readily spoken or understood there is also a need to translate course material and provide courses in local languages.

Under the project, three types of training courses were delivered to officials from Cambodia, Pakistan, Lao PDR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. In total 450 officials received training. However, the majority of those who completed the five day course participated in the follow on 10 day course which reduces the overall totals by almost 1/3. In real terms this means that no more than 45 officials from any one country received training. While train the trainer is an appropriate means of reaching a mass audience, this level of training will continue to require specialist consultants and those that are familiar with the database.

Table 4. Training courses delivered by the Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Targeted Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A two-day Workshop on Operational and Strategic Analysis on Migrant Smuggling</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A five-day Training Course on Strategic Analysis on Migrant Smuggling</td>
<td>Border Officials and Immigration Analysts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A ten-Day Training Course on Operational Analysis in support of Migrant Smuggling Investigations</td>
<td>Border Officials who have already conducted the five day course</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training materials were translated into each local language and the instructors were assisted by translators, with exception of Malaysia. The participants consisted of frontline law enforcement officers, border and immigration officials as well as more senior management officers. Training course materials and participant lists for all of the training sessions are on file with the Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit at UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok. A follow up on-line survey found that the training provided had been relevant to the majority of respondents and that they have used it directly in their work\(^{48}\). There was a clear expression of interest for additional training in both strategic and operational analysis. Those stressing that it was not relevant explained that the reason was due to transferring units and therefore not continuing to be involved in the subject matter.

Impact

Project impact is difficult to quantify. This is for three reasons. Firstly, there is no measure of effect in the PD from which to gauge success, secondly, the effect that the project achieved is political dialogue, which is hard to measure, and thirdly, the impact the Project hopes to achieve, will take longer than the PD envisaged.

According to all the Project reports, and even attempts to retrospectively assess impact, there is very little tangible impact. However, it is to be noted that the VRS-MSRC was only launched in July 2013. A limited number of immigration officials (compared to the total) have received training and while some migrant smuggling publications have been written, they are not widely

\(^{48}\) 29 officials responded to the survey. Excluding non-valid email addresses the response rate was 10%.
used. However, what UNODC has achieved is a membership of the Bali Process, through which it has increased its ability to engage policy makers and advocate change.

One member state commented that “through policy changes, your efforts and the efforts of the Bali Process the volume of smuggled migrants transiting through South East Asia continues to decline.” It was also suggested by a number of interviewees that UNODC support to the Bali Process had “increased bilateral dialogue, as regional actors are now on the same or similar page”. But was this what the Project stated it would achieve, and is it worth the money? The short answer is yes, because, if one follows a theory of change, if there is political agreement then capability enhancements can occur. To place UNODC support in context, it has taken the Bali Process 10 years to get to where it is now. One member state reported that in their opinion “one of the major confidence building achievements, of the Bali Process to date, has been the fact that VRS-MSRC exists, that members input their data and that others members can view it”. This is data that did not exist before the Project started to collect and collate it. It would have been impossible for any single country to gather this data; “it took the UN flag of neutrality to assist the process”. The data collection mechanism, while fragile, is very cost effective. The reported cost of a single overseas LE/immigration official is $250-350,000 per annum. Most countries could not afford to deploy their own network of staff to build a unilateral system. The Project’s true worth has been the data and analysis that has supported the policy makers. While this might be measured by intangible levels of increasing confidence and trust, the cost of this data analysis is a fraction of the price that it would cost a single nation. Although policy support was not the aim of the project, it is the reality. And it matters less that the systems that gather, report and inform are not widely used by member states, so long as the policy debate progresses; and at presently it does.

The Project has been beneficial to UNODC. By gaining membership of the Bali Process Ad Hoc Group, UNODC is now front and centre of the process that examines and acts against the SoM. This group is larger than just the region, it is an intra-regional organisation. The Project’s ability to link to these organisations is fully in line with the interregional drug control (IRDC) approach which envisages a network of networks. The Project has established its own network, and is now linking it to a wider interregional network.

Sustainability

In terms of sustainability the Project documentation stated that participating states would be encouraged to provide adequate numbers of trained staff who would be continuously assigned to work on SoM data collection and analysis. The Project would also encourage member states to institutionalise enhanced capacities, standard operating procedures, and training programmes. Maintenance of databases was foreseen as a national issue, enabled by working with government institutions and staff that had the capacity to maintain the system. Activities would be developed with the relevant training centres in each of the participating countries and the Project would see that its training modules were included in the national curriculum for professional training of the targeted officials.

Although this level of sustainability was envisaged developing these types of initiatives has been hard to achieve. Examining each of the three areas in which the Project sought to achieve an effect the following can be concluded.

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49 This figure was provided by the Immigration bureau of New Zealand and accords with other national estimates.
a. National level training is not sustainable in its present form. There will be a continuous requirement for UNODC to provide training support to many member states, to educate officials in the issue of SoM, data collection and data analysis. Levels of awareness differ between member states and there is a long way to go until sufficient numbers of immigration officials understand the issues and can replicate this training. There will a continuous requirement for training support and incentives such as DSA. Codifying SoM into national curriculum is aspirational at present.

b. Data collection, assurance and analysis is still very much the preserve of the Project team. Member states are yet to utilise the system. Providing sufficient numbers of VRS-MSRC operatives (and focal points) will also require UNODC support in the medium term. The production of knowledge products from the data is only likely to occur with UNODC assistance.

c. Support to the Bali Process and to policy makers will also be the preserve of UNODC staff. While IOM and UNHCR can provide data on their areas of expertise, it is the sum of these products to include SoM analysis that policy makers require. So long as the first two areas require UNODC (or external) assistance then so too will policy level support.

If and when donor funding expires the system (VRS-MSRC) will cease to exist. There are a number of options for keeping some elements of the Project running if this were to occur. One option is to migrate data collection and the database to HQ Vienna under its Research and Analysis Branch were the unit which is responsible for the Global Reporting on Trafficking in Persons is located. Although this option would still require some funding, it would be fraction of the current price it would also allow the current data to be used as either a standalone database or in conjunction with other UNODC knowledge products. The system could be offered to the Bali Process and funding sought from the collective. It could be offered to IOM who may be capable of utilising it alongside their other work. IOM certainly has the geographical laydown within the region to maintain contacts in each country, but it does not have the mandate to do this. The final option might see UNODC charge a small subscription fee for use of the database. 19 or more countries paying $10-20,000 a year would generate sufficient revenue to keep the system live (Recommendation 11). However, the system has to prove its worth first. Given the relative immaturity of the database and some of the issues it has encountered, there is probably a requirement for improving the data base and the sustainment plan before it could be offered at a price.

Certain elements of training can become more sustainable. Ensuring that SoM training is included within CBT provides training to many Member States, but not all. Some Member States don’t have ready access to commuters and here personal instruction will continue to be required. Translating training aides into native languages has a far greater impact than working through interpreters. Effect is amplified if a train the trainer package are provided. The ultimate goal should be to enshrine SoM training within national curriculums, but this will take a considerable amount of time and effort. For this to occur, UNODC has to not only train operatives, but also senior managers. Without management buy-in capability enhancements risk being overlooked, ignored or blocked by senior staff, as they either don’t understand it, care for it, or see it as a threat.
Human Rights and Gender Mainstreaming

The Project documentation stated that it was both gender and child sensitive. Gender issues were certainly recognised, up-front, during the design. Cultural issues, within the region, exposes many females to family pressure to work abroad; a sense of filial duty. The Project acknowledged these issues and sought to understand their impact. The Project sought to use female assistance to gather information and to conduct interviews. Trainees were vetted and elements of human rights and gender equality were included, where appropriate, in the training modules. UNODC made its material available to IOM and UNHCR and provided joint events, allowing these NGOs to update officials in areas where they possessed greater expertise. Female candidates were encouraged to attend training and courses were held in locations such as JCLEC, which has an active gender policy.

Within the region, many illegal migrants travel by boat. When these vessels are stopped, the status of those on board will be investigated. Depending on national policies, the education of the naval officers, border or immigration officials and their investigative capabilities, the status of these people may be determined as either passenger, migrant, illegal migrant, trafficked person, refugee, victim, criminal, smuggler, terrorist, drug dealer or mule. This assessment then effects how these people are treated. If ministers and policy makers don’t understand the differences between these different categories, and don’t have policies in place to deal with them, then there is little front line officers can do. Engaging in the policy debate and assisting countries to develop laws and policies that accord with UN mandates is the first step in upholding migrant’s rights.

Training officials is a step further down the process of change. In reality, it is what the Project is trying to achieve that does more for Human Rights and gender equality, than what the Project documentation listed it would seek to achieve.

Innovation

There are a number of areas where the Project has been innovative, which may be applicable other programmes/projects. These areas are:

a. Gaining political endorsement via a pre-existing political mechanism, the Bali Process, rather than trying (and failing as in the case of the Project) to gain individual member state signatures for a single project.

b. Using a pre-existing political mechanism, the Bali Process, as the PSC rather than creating a separate PSC. In effect mainstreaming UNODC activity within the existing political process.

c. Relationship building with Universities and use of academics to analysis data. This is an area where even more could be achieved, as it could provide mutually beneficial and cost effective means to support data collection, assurance and analysis,

d. Use of Law Enforcement/Border Control Officers attached to Embassies to assist in the delivery of instruction. This win - win solution is virtually cost free (less DSA) and allows LE Embassy Officials from nation X\(^{50}\) to build relationships and deliver training,

\(^{50}\) Nation X would preferably be a Bali Process Member State.
while at the same time UNDOC can claim credit for training, ensuring that it conforms to a standard template and that it is in accordance with the Project’s aims and objectives.
III. CONCLUSIONS

During the ROSEAP debrief, the evaluator used a SWOT\textsuperscript{51} diagram to indicate initial conclusions. This product was provided to the Project staff as one of the formal deliverables, as described in the TORs (Annex I). This section provides a summary of the evaluation findings using the SWOT analysis headings. This method is used as it provides a simple structure for identifying areas for improvement, which logically lead to recommendations. The complete SWOT analysis diagram is enclosed at Annex V.

Strengths

The issue of illegal migration and SoM is highly relevant within the region. UNODC is now a member of Bali Process (and Ad-Hoc Group) which enables it to exert maximum influence in an arena where it naturally and practically has the greatest impact. Membership of the Bali Process and support to political dialogue within the region has increased UNODC’s credibility, which in turn has increased its ability to uphold and implement UN protocols. There is now a baseline of understanding amongst member states, which did not exist before the commencement of the Project. While the Project’s effectiveness is mixed and its impact difficult to quantify, many interviewees stated that UNODC’s efforts, supported by this baseline, had enabled political dialogue. All actors now had a similar understanding of the problem. While they may not all agree and consensus via committee (the Bali Process) was slow, there was an increasing number of bilateral arrangements. The Project’s successes have also been made possible via the strong relationships that UNODC forged with partners. The Project has delivered many quality products (even if they are not universally used) which have increased knowledge on the issue of SoM. The sum of a baseline and the supporting publications is the emergence of the first ever evidence based analysis of SoM within the region. In producing these products UNODC has developed a network of interrelated actors from many different nations, which accords with UNODC’s IRDC approach\textsuperscript{52}. Exchanging SoM information is sensitive. The fact that member states have endorsed VRS-MSRC and are inputting data is a sign of increased regional cooperation and trust. While LE training element of the Project may not have been as effective as desired, it is greatly appreciated. And there may be some truth in the statement that some training is better than none. SoM is at the edge of the LE agenda, but understanding smuggling routes and techniques lies at the heart of understanding transnational threats. There is now a system in place that collates this data; it is what member states do with the data that requires a rethink.

Weaknesses

SoM is seen as peripheral issue by many states. Reporting and tracking SoM, let alone acting against it, in a coherent manner, is not seen as a priority by all. The Project was poorly conceived and designed. A primary intended user was never identified and, therefore, key user requirements were not captured upfront. VRS-MSRC did not seek to understand the entire smuggling of

\textsuperscript{51} SWOT is Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats.
\textsuperscript{52} UNODC’s Inter-regional drug control approach (IRDC) seeks to build a network of networks from the sub-regional to the global level.
migrants universe. It only knows what Law Enforcement Officials input into it. While tracking and analysing this information, as part of global migration studies to inform transnational risk assessments is of use, investigating such a narrow element of migration, for its own sake has limited utility; it is not apparent to what end this data is required. The system is neither an operational tool\(^{53}\), from which to glean intelligence, and in its current format, neither is it a truly strategic tool\(^{54}\); it only tracks SoM data and does not seek to estimate the scale of the problem or address wider issues. Understanding wider issues requires comparative analysis and coloration with other data sources; more than is currently collected and beyond the capability of the current IT. The Project was resource constrained compared to the outcomes it tried to achieve. Under staffed and over worked, in terms of level of detail required to analyse data and the travel required to support political dialogue. There is considerable congestion in the migration field and significant partner overlap, especially with IOM, UNHCR, and other LE agencies such as INTERPOL. The data feeds from which the system works are reliant on first world states who have the ability to capture data and input returns with relative ease. Many developing nations don’t collect this data centrally and there is a high human resource bill associated with inputting data which limits their participation. At present, and despite training, few member states process the data that is already captured or use the system as it was designed. The reporting format is complex and the IT that supports it is best described as fragile. There is a huge reliance on human analysis and on data assurance. The system is just a database and does not produce an output in its own right. This leads to delay in the production of knowledge products, which means that they are not timely enough to satisfy an operational requirement, despite the requirement to input data on a quarterly basis.

Opportunities

The initial Project is coming to an end and there is a natural period of reflection and the ability to enact change. The donor has indicated that funding is likely to continue into the future, possibly for 2 more years. Membership of Bali Ad-Hoc Group has increased UNODC’s ability to reach out to member states and advance the policy debate. The current project coordinator will shortly move on and this allows a new Subject Matter Expert (SME) to be hired and potentially for new ideas to surface. ROSEAP has recently issued a new regional programme and this provides an opportunity for UNODC to bring greater coherence to its LE portfolio by examining interdependencies between its various sub-programmes. The fact that over 40 countries have sent in data to what is a regional Project indicates that the system has a far wider utility and that it is possibly suitable to becoming a Global Programme. UNODC’s partners are very appreciative of its work to date, and there is a sense that future collaboration is possible; in fact required. ROSEAP needs to place SoM into context, both as an element of wider migration issues, and also as an element of the transnational/interregional threats. The threat of returning jihadists or terrorists who seek to circumnavigate border controls is a real time security issue. Any database that can provide trend analysis on smuggling routes and the means of defeating immigration and border officials has utility beyond the scope of its original design.

\(^{53}\) Many of the Law Enforcement Officials interviewed stated that they required live time operational inputs and felt that the current system was at too a high level for their immediate needs.

\(^{54}\) Many of the Policy Level Officials interviewed stated that the current UNODC analysis was too narrow in its remit and that they required charts and maps depicting total migration flows showing irregular migration, SoM and human trafficking etc as subsets of the total.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Threats

The change of the project coordinator is a threat, as the current incumbent is an SME, one of only a handful and a font of knowledge. Replacing the Project Coordinator will be hard and will take time; possibly months. There is bound to be a dip in the Project’s activity levels until a replacement is fully on board. The Project is under resourced compared to its expected outcomes. The span of the Project, in both geographical terms and the level of duties, is too large for one member of staff. There should be two Project Staff. With the Project Coordinator moving on there is the potential for a break of continuity within the staff and this presents a real risk that knowledge will not be retained and that new staff will have to revisit a well-trodden path; as if for the first time. There is a real risk that just as UNODC gains membership of the Ad-Hoc Group it finds itself without an SME and limited resources. There is a degree of expectation management required, so that member states and partners don’t perceive UNODC as a quick fix, which it is not, UNODC must be valued long term partner. There is a risk that without dedicated oversight, chasing up and assisting focal points member states don’t input national data in to the system. If this occurs then one would have to question the relevance of VRS-MSRC. Equally if member states log onto the system (which at present is a rare occurrence) they might realise that not all participating states have submitted the data in response to the last reporting cycles. IOM, UNHCR, INTERPOL and many other bilateral capacity building projects operate in the same space often with the same officials, reporting to the same donors and on occasion are competing for the same funds. There is a risk that UNODC cannot compete for the funds it requires to deliver the Project. Finally the biggest threat is that the fact that regional policies do not change, that local or international politics blocks progress; which is why the Project must continue advocate at the political level through the Bali Process.

Way ahead

The evaluation’s overall recommendation is that ROSEAP should continue to deliver the Project, and mitigate risks in the three following areas:

a. Regional co-operation should be supported by the Project Coordinator jointly from ROSEAP (and the RSO if possible). This role would oversee the Project in its entirety and also act as the subject matter expert on SoM and HT matters within ROSEAP and the RSO.

b. Data collection, support to VRS-MSRC, analysis and research should be run from the regional office via a dedicated Analytical Assistant, supported by Country Offices; who would be the first line of outreach and data assurance. There should be increased links to academia for the provision of data collection, assurance and analytical support. ROSEAP should continue to develop the system within the region and then offer it up as a working global solution once it is more mature.

c. Capacity building should be firmly linked with all other LE capacity building mechanisms and Country Office level work. It should look to engage the entire span of command and incorporate SoM and HT training into national curriculums. It should ensure that it woks more effectively with partners and avoid duplication of effort. It should establish synergies between the different programmes and consider utilising all resources such as LE officers attached to Embassies from Bali Process member states.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis that ROSEAP has received additional funding that allow the Project to continue the core activities until June 2015 this evaluation makes the following recommendations:

1. ROSEAP should review and revise current project documentation in early 2015, for implementation of a new phase to begin from June 2015. This revision would bridge the handover period between Project Coordinators and ensure the Project’s activities become firmly embedded in the new regional programme, and that they are aligned with future funding.

2. ROSEAP should apply for the current Project Coordinator to support the Project remotely (from Vienna) and in person at key events linked to the Bali Process, until such time that a suitable replacement has been hired and is up to speed with all the details relating to the project. (this recommendation is already being implemented, in that the Regional Representative has requested that the current Coordinator return for key events and conduct a handover at some later point, and is included for completeness)

3. The continuation of the Project’s core activities should be adequately staffed. ROSEAP should hire a second International Staff member from June 2015. One of the International staff should focus on the maintenance and further improvement of the VRS-MSRC and the provision of training in support of data collection and analysis. The other on providing policy level support.

4. ROSEAP and Project Staff should articulate outputs in three functional areas, assigning responsibility as follows. Each outcome should have a valid and applicable measure of effect.

a. Training. Training on SoM and data analysis should be included as an element of all UNODC law enforcement capacity building efforts. There are three areas where training is required, these are:

1. General SoM training to border officials, immigration officials and Police officers incorporated into the CBT global programme.

2. In areas where CBT is unsuitable then country offices/national associates should receive assistance so they can run bespoke training events. They should aim should have course material delivered in the local language; if possible via a train the trainer package.

3. Focal point or specialist VRS-MSRC training should continue to be arranged and possibly delivered via the data collection analyst staff member.

b. Support to Bali Process. Given the nature and scope of the problem supporting the political process is a full time activity. There is a strong link to human
trafficking and this needs exploring in greater depth, with reference to programme synergies, resource allocation and partnerships. Providing a split in functionality (policy and analysis) might also allow UNODC staff an opportunity to operate from RSO, which would be the optimum location to gain maximum influence. While this is aspirational it should be a long term goal as it represents the best way of optimising partnerships. Although this option would have to be carefully weighed against the requirement to manage the Project from ROSEAP.

c. Data gathering and analysis. This should be led by the Regional office. The database is already a partial global system and ROSEAP should devise a plan that would seek to migrate the research and analysis elements to Vienna so that they could become a global programme, as either a standalone programme, or in conjunction with Human Trafficking.

5. ROSEAP and Project Staff should examine all LE capacity building activities. Delivery must be more than political agreement and tactical training. It requires careful relationship building and education along the entire span of command. It is only once this has been achieved that UNODC training modules will become part of the national curriculums.

a. Country/Project Offices should identify the chain of command in their own country and devise ways of engaging it.

b. Country/Project Offices should seek opportunities to engage the entire chain of command, such as study periods, seminars and one day training courses, or joint conferences in partnership with other IGOs/NGOs, all as a means of increasing advocacy. There will be other ways and this will take time and energy.

6. ROSEAP and LE / Project Staff should review the support they provide to (developing) member states intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities. In order to develop intelligence or analytical capacity, there is also a requirement to generate a smart customer, one that can ask the right questions. This reinforces the notion of educating along the entire span of command; to include policy makers. Employing two staff members would provide the means to tackle this issue from the top down – via policy makers – and bottom up – via the data analysts.

7. ROSEAP should define Project limitations and Project Staff must remain within their lane. The SoM and HT arena are congested and UNODC must focus on activities that differentiate it from the other actors. It is the guardian of the protocols, it has a live database from which it can draw and provide accurate data to support the policy debate, and it can provide (limited) technical assistance to member states. Whole scale change is a national concern, and this requires national or bilateral resources; UNODC should support change but stay away from providing the means to change.

8. Project Staff should consider increasing the use of academia to support recommendation 5c. Consideration should be given to establishing formal partnerships with universities that provide PHD studies in SoM and HT. This as a means of leveraging assistance human resources to assist in with intensive activities such as data collection, assurance, analysis and report drafting. These relationships should be formal and articulated in the Project Documentation, so that funding is guaranteed and that the use of academia is visible and understood by member states. Only UNODC staff should deal with sensitive
information and approve the publication of UNODC knowledge products, but much of the data assurance and analysis could be joint activities.

9. ROSEAP in close consultation with the primary intended users should re-consider and simplify the type of data that is collected through the VRS-MSRC. It should start by clearly defining who the primary intended user is and then capture their key user requirements, keeping in mind that this database is and should only be for the purpose of strategic analysis on migrant smuggling trends, methods, routes and the profiles of migrant smugglers and irregular migrants.

   a. ROSEAP should seek to upgrade the software, using an external provider, overseen by UNODC IT Section who would provide specialist advice, contracting oversight and quality assurance.

10. ROSEAP and Project Staff should consider how, over time, VRS-MSRC could migrate to HQ Vienna to become a Global Programme. This should be a long term aspiration in the 5 -10 year time frame. Not all elements of the database would be required, but the major element could become a Global Programme which regional offices then support as and when required.

11. ROSEAP should consider a long term sustainment plan for VRS-MSRC. In addition, or as an alternative to seeking global funding. VRS-MSRC as a shared data collection system that may lend itself to a subscription service.

12. ROSEAP must ensure that the Bali Process understands it role as the Project’s formal project governance mechanism (PSC).

13. HQ UNODC should introduce a new Project design and management processes that follow the excepted norms and conventions in the private sector.

   a. There is a requirement for future projects to include inception and detailed design phases, especially when they seek to introduce IT systems.

   b. When introducing an IT system a pilot phase should be planed for.

14. Future ROSEAP Projects/Programmes should include a formal mid-term evaluation.

15. Greater effort is required to ensure that the current project mentality is replaced by an integrated programming approach. UNODC staff must be educated so that they understand what programming is and how to apply it. This education should also be extended to donors and recipients, who have been conditioned over the years to the project mentality. It will take time for all concerned to understand and be comfortable with programmed delivery.
V. LESSONS LEARNED

The following paragraph comprises lessons that were identified during the course of the evaluation. Whether they have been learnt or just identified is an internal UNODC issue, however, they are considered relevant to the evaluation and are inline/or support the recommendations:

a. *It takes time to deliver.* The Project’s timeline was aspirational. A project cannot and should not jump from justification to delivery. The fact that this Project has been extended and will probably gain an additional 2 years of funding is proof that it takes time to deliver. When dealing with multiple countries it takes far longer than when delivering with one. The Bali Process has been running for ten years and one could argue that little concrete has emerged; dialogue is only now starting to bear fruit. But through dialogue, issues are now understood, common ground has been identified. The policy debate has been engaged and technical working groups are drafting protocols or ratification in the near future.

b. *Projects should include a formal inception and design phases.* UNODC should either formulate its own Project management methodology or adopt common project management practice, especially when designing an IT system. The Project documentation lacked an inception phase where key users requirements would have been captured, and it lacked a proper design period where the database would have been built or a pilot phase where testing would have been conducted. The Project was designed to conduct all these elements simultaneously when the reality was it could not. The Project Coordinator had to reverse engineer the design.

c. *UNODC does not build IT systems.* UNODC’s strength is its technical expertise, not its ability to build new IT systems. In the future UNODC should look to outsource elements of projects that require building of IT systems. It should focus on assessing and stating the requirement for IT systems. The UNODC in-house IT Section could have been utilised assisting the Project Coordinator to draft a requirements paper, contracts and provide quality assurance to a commercial software solution rather than develop an in-house bespoke product.
ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna

Terms of Reference of the

Final Independent Project Evaluation
Smuggling of Migrants: Establishment and Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) for East Asia and the Pacific

XSPT78
Regional

June 2014

UNITED NATIONS
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I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project number:</th>
<th>XSPT78</th>
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<tr>
<td>Project title:</td>
<td>Smuggling of Migrants: Establishment and Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) for East Asia &amp; the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duration:</td>
<td>January 2010 – June 2014 (plus non-cost extension 30 October) (4 years and 9 months)</td>
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<td>Linkages to Regional Programme:</td>
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<td>Total Approved Budget:</td>
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<td>Donors:</td>
<td>Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Manager/Coordinator:</td>
<td>Sebastian Baumeister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of evaluation (mid-term or final):</td>
<td>Final Independent Project Evaluation</td>
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<td>Time period covered by the evaluation:</td>
<td>January 2010 – end of the Evaluation Field Mission (tentatively: September 2014)</td>
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<td>Thailand (Bangkok), Cambodia (Phnom Penh) and Indonesia (Jakarta)</td>
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<td>Core Learning Partners (entities):</td>
<td>See Annex 3</td>
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Project overview and historical context in which the project is implemented

The Smuggling of Migrants: Establishment and Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) for East Asia & the Pacific Project (XSPT78) was launched in 2010 with an initial budget of 4.3m USD to span over four years. The overall objective was to increase capacity for Member States in East Asia and the Pacific to effectively identify and act against Migrant Smuggling.

Throughout East and Southeast Asia criminal groups are generating profits from transporting and facilitating the illegal entry of migrants into destination countries. Immigration policies in destination countries are becoming more restrictive and border monitoring is becoming more sophisticated. In response, migrants are becoming more dependent on migrant smugglers to facilitate their movement. This has resulted in the diversification of the migrant smuggling industry, which now offers a range of services at various costs. Migrants who pay the lower spectrum of the scale bear greater risks of danger and harm. The irregular status of such smuggled migrants often results in further harm, violence or exploitation once they have arrived at their final destination.

In East and Southeast Asia, it is estimated that as many as one out of every four migrant workers may be classed as having an irregular status. Official statistics regarding the number of identified smuggled migrants, however, remain low. The continued deportation of possible smuggled migrants, without prosecuting any of the criminal networks, result in a larger demand for smuggling of migrant services.

A challenge for governments across the regions is determining the extent of the problem and the characteristics of the organised crime groups involved. While information exists on regular migration, there is a lack of specific data on smuggling of migrants and irregular migration. Little is known, for example, about the:

a. number of persons smuggled;

b. transportation conditions they endure;

c. their experiences upon arrival in their destination country;

d. smuggling routes;

e. methodologies used by criminal groups; or

f. deaths in transit

Prior to the initiation of the XSPT78 Project there was no common approach or mechanism for the collection of information on smuggling of migrants. While national data sets sometimes exist, the information was not systematically collected or shared. The collection of such information itself is often hindered by a lack of awareness and capacity constraints of relevant actors at the national level. For instance, statistics regarding migrant smugglers and their clients, where they exist, are unlikely to be disaggregated by nationality, gender or age. National differences regarding the quality of information are compounded by different national collection frameworks and differing definitions of offences and concepts without reference to international standards.

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55 For this purpose, destination country means the final country in which the irregular status migrant arrives.

56 IOM Situation report on International Migration in East and Southeast Asia, 2008.
This includes the definition of “smuggling of migrants” contained within the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (the Migrant Smuggling Protocol).

To overcome these challenges the project conducted a range of activities across four main areas. Namely, 1) data gathering and information exchange, 2) training of law enforcement and immigration officials 3) production and dissemination research and analysis reports and 4) advocacy and support of the Bali process. 57

Justification of the project and main experiences / challenges during implementation

Against this regional backdrop the project’s objective was to assist states in increasing their capacities to identify and effectively act against smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air – as defined in the articles 3 and 6 in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol - in East Asia and the Pacific by establishing systems to generate, manage, analyse, report and use migrant smuggling information.

Over the four year course of the Smuggling of Migrants Project, significant inroads towards creating a common approach and mechanism for the collection of information on the processes of smuggling of migrants, increasing awareness of smuggling of migrants and training of frontline law enforcement officers in the use of migrant smuggling data have been made.

A secure, internet based, data sharing tool for State authorities, the Voluntary Reporting System on Migrant Smuggling and Related Conduct (VRS-MSRC) was created and launched in July 2013. Currently, 19 states and territories 58 have confirmed their participation and uploaded data and information on smuggling of migrants including:

- Qualitative assessment of flows
- Major routes used
- Fees paid
- Means of transport used
- Profiles of irregular and smuggled migrants
- Profiles of migrant smugglers

At the 4th and 5th Bali Process Ministerial Conferences in 2011 and 2013 ministers welcomed UNODC’s assistance with the VRS-MSRC and encouraged member states to participate in the initiative.

Five substantial knowledge products on migrant smuggling in Asia have been produced, including a thematic review of available literature relating to smuggling of migrants with focus on 14 countries in Asia together with a comprehensive annotated bibliography. 59

57 The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process) was established in 2002 and includes 45 international organisations and states seeking to enhance cooperation across a range of areas to counter trafficking in persons and migrants smuggling, among other areas, data gathering and information exchange. For further information see http://www.baliprocess.net/.
58 Australia, Cambodia, France, Hong kong (SAR), Indonesia, Lao PDR, Maldives, Marshall Islands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
59 Articles and books published in English, German and French between January 2004 and March 2011. An updated bibliography extending the period to April 2014 is expected to be published in July 2014.
A research study on financial flows within Asia and Europe relating to migrant smuggling was also published in August 2013 and circulated to key law enforcement officials.

As of March 2014 a total of 375 frontline law enforcement officers, public security and immigration officials, across 7 countries\(^60\) have undergone a 2, 5 and/or 10 day migrant smuggling training course on either operational analysis (how to use information to support an on-going investigation), strategic analysis or attended a senior managers’ course.

A list of the reports related to the most relevant activities is included in Annex 2.

Challenges to the implementation process derived primarily from two sources. Firstly, the project was designed at the request of one donor, the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), and not at the request of target countries. Hence, there was initially a substantial lack of ownership by the target countries.

Secondly, migrant smuggling is a sensitive and often highly politicised topic in the region. Member States and government agencies have historically preferred to act unilaterally or bilaterally with little or no experience in information sharing in this area.

These two factors combined led to an inherent reluctance to the core aim of the project (to improve regional information on migrant smuggling) which led to a slow endorsement process by target countries.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document

The initial project document was produced in February 2010. The project has subsequently gone through six project revisions, two respectively in 2011, 2013 and 2014. They included primarily budget revisions. The donor funding was provided in Australian dollars which appreciated substantially against the US dollar over the project period from 4.3m USD to 5.2m USD (see Disbursement History below). The only substantive change was in 2014 which included a non-cost extension of the project to 30 October 2014.

UNODC strategy context, including the project’s main objectives and outcomes and project’s contribution to UNODC country, regional or thematic programme

The Project was launched in January 2010 and was aligned with the UNODC regional plans outlined in the 2009-12 Regional Programme Framework for East Asia and the Pacific.\(^61\) The objective trees below illustrate how the project falls under the planned objective, outcome and outputs within the regional programme framework’s Rule of Law pillar, Objective: 1.5 – Outcome 1.5.1 and 1.5.3

2009-12 Regional Programme Framework for East Asia and the Pacific – Rule of Law pillar

\(^{60}\) Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam

\(^{61}\) 2009-12 Regional Programme Framework was extended and only replaced in 2014. The SoM project now fall under the new UNODC strategic programme for the region, i.e. the 2014-17 Regional Programme for Southeast Asia – Sub-Programme 1: Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Trafficking : Outcome 3: Output 3
FINAL INDEPENDENT PROJECT EVALUATION: XSPT78 - SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS: ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF A COORDINATION AND ANALYSIS UNIT (CAU) FOR EAST ASIA & THE PACIFIC

1. Border Control
   1.1 BLO mechanism institutionalized and operational
   1.2 BLO's mandates broadened to cover crimes related to irregular migration
   1.3 Joint Port Control Units established and operational
   1.4 Airport specialist responses units established and operational

2. Trafficking in Persons
   1.2.1 Legislative frameworks meet international obligations and standards
   1.2.2 Information on trafficking trends and country responses used by stakeholders for evidence-based responses
   1.2.3 Informed and capable frontline law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
   1.2.4 Systems established for quickly identifying and assisting victims
   1.2.5 Mechanisms established to promote cooperation between criminal justice agencies within and across borders
   1.2.6 Corporate sector organizations adopt codes of conduct

3. Drugs & Precursors
   1.3.1 Domestic legislation harmonized with international instruments
   1.3.2 Information on ATS and other drug production and trafficking used by stakeholders for evidence-based responses
   1.3.3 Informed and capable frontline law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
   1.3.4 Mechanisms established to promote cooperation between responsible agencies within and across borders
   1.3.5 Guardianship lab investigation teams established and operational
   1.3.6 Chemical industry associations adopt codes of conduct on precursor diversion

4. Natural resources and hazardous substances
   1.4.1 A regional strategy in place to prevent and suppress trafficking in illicit natural resources and hazardous substances
   1.4.2 Effective environmental governance policies and regulatory frameworks established and implemented
   1.4.3 Informed and capable law enforcement and specialized officials
   1.4.4 Mechanisms established to promote cooperation between responsible agencies within and across borders
   1.4.5 Producers and consumers effectively engaged in reducing demand for illegal forest products

5. Smuggling Migrants
   1.5.1 Systems to generate, manage, analyze, report and use migrant smuggling information established and operational
   1.5.2 Informed and capable frontline law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
   1.5.3 Research on irregular migration used as part of the dual process

Impact
- Reduction in illicit trafficking and/or smuggling of people, drugs, illicit natural resources and hazardous substances

Rule of Law
1. Illicit Trafficking & Smuggling

UNODC
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
II. DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

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<td>4,811,014 USD</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
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*Initial total approved budget in 2010 was 4,254,088 USD. Appreciation of AUD against USD is reflected in the higher figure in Total Approved Budget.

** Project is subject to a non-cost extension to 30 October 2014. Additional expenditure will occur.

III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION
Reasons behind the evaluation taking place

The need to conduct a final independent project evaluation at the end of the project was encompassed in the original project document and it is part of the UNODC policy on this matter.

As the project will terminate on 30 October 2014 it is recommended to conduct the evaluation latest between July and October 2014.

Assumed accomplishment of the evaluation

Through this evaluation, UNODC should obtain a frank assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in this specific area and draw on recommendation and lessons learned to inform future programming. This evaluation will also offer an opportunity to increase accountability for all stakeholders involved and identify problems that may have to be addressed differently in the future.

Specific questions, among others, that are expected to be answered include: To what extent have the resources available converted to output in a timely and cost-effective manner for the knowledge products?; To what extent has the Project improved Member States capacity to develop and share information on migrants smuggling?; And To what extend are the project results (outcomes and impact, if any) likely to continue / be sustained after the project has finished?

UNODC is committed to support Member States in strengthening their capacity to address the threat of migrant smuggling even after the completion of the Project, as indicated in the new 2014-17 Regional Programme, to which project also helped contribute in the development of the Transitional Organized Crime Pillar of the Programme. The identification of best practices and/or mistakes during the evaluation process will help improving data and information sharing, and strengthen Members States capacity to effectively tackle migrant smuggling. As such the evaluation will support more informed policies among Member States and UNODC.

The main evaluation users

The main users and benefactors of this evaluation will be the UNODC Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific, in future programming towards outcomes outlined under the 2014-2017 Regional Programme, Core Learning Partners (see Annex 3) and the project donor the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Control.

IV. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION
The unit of analysis to be covered by the evaluation

The scope of the independent evaluation will be limited to the implementation, impact, use and sustainability of the Voluntary Reporting System (VRS) database; the quality, impact and use of core knowledge products; the impact of the project in support of the Bali process; as well as evaluating the training in operational and strategic analysis in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam. In particular the evaluation will assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of these activities (training, data collection, knowledge products and advocacy) conducted over the period 2010-2014 at national and regional levels.

The time period to be covered by the evaluation

Activities conducted over the period Jan 2010 until the end of the evaluation field mission (tentatively September 2014) at national and regional levels.

The geographical coverage of the evaluation

The scope for the geographical score of the training component of the project will be Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam, while the scope of evaluation of the Voluntary Reporting System (VRS) database will be the 19 participating member states. Evaluation of knowledge products and the project’s impact on promoting awareness of Migrant Smuggling and contributing the Bali Process has no specific geographic scope. Three field missions are planned, Namely, Thailand (Bangkok), Cambodia (Phnom Penh) and Indonesia (Jakarta)

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62 Australia, Cambodia, France, Hong Kong (SAR), Indonesia, Lao PDR, Maldives, Marshall Islands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
V. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be conducted based on the DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned and best practice, and, will respond to the following below questions. However, provided as indicative only, and required to be further refined by the Evaluation Team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent is data sharing through the VRS-MSRC relevant to fight migrant smuggling at national and regional level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How relevant was the project to needs/priorities of the target groups?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Were the resources available converted to output in a timely and cost-effective manner for the VRS-database?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Were the resources available converted to output in a timely and cost-effective manner for the delivered training and development of knowledge products?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent have the resources available converted to output in a timely and cost-effective manner for the knowledge products?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent have the training activities reached the planned goals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To what extent has the Project improved Member States capacity to develop and share information on migrants smuggling?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent have the original project objective/outcomes (or as adapted and approved during implementation) been achieved?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent has the cooperation and information sharing among Governments improved their capacity to counter the smuggling of migrants?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To what extent has the project’s training and capacity building improved in members states capacity to fact effectively smuggling of migrants?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent has the project influenced other situational changes, positive or negative, beyond the original objectives of the project?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Sustainability**

1. To what degree will Governments continue to support the data and information sharing on smuggling of migrants after the Project?

2. To what extend are the project results (outcomes and impact, if any) likely to continue / be sustained after the project has finished?

**Partnerships and cooperation**

1. To what extent has UNODC generated synergy with other potential partners including other UN agencies, NGOs/CSOs, etc?

2. To what extent has UNODC developed a strong and trustworthy relationship with Government partners?

3. How satisfied are the stakeholders with their involvement in this project, and what evidence is there of their ownership / commitment to supporting the outcomes?

**Human rights and gender**

1. To what extent has the project taken into consideration human rights concerns during the implementation of its activities and the design of the project?

2. To what extent has the project addressed the gender dimension of working with law enforcement officers at the border location and the design of the project?

**Lessons learned and best practices**

1. What, if anything, could the management team have done differently to implement the project more efficiently?

2. What, if anything, could the management team have done differently to ensure sustainability of the VRS-data base and information sharing between counterparts?

3. What, if anything, could the management team have done differently to have contributed better/more efficiently to the Bali Process?

4. What lessons can be learned to inform future programming and best practices in the area of migrant smuggling data collection and information exchange?
VI. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The methods used to collect and analyse data

Include desk reviews of relevant project document, three field missions, observations and interviews with key stakeholders, the donor and CLPs. Surveys and questionnaires as deemed appropriate by the evaluator.

The sources of data

The evaluator can use data and information gathered on training sessions, results from the Training Impact Assessment Survey, the Knowledge Impact Assessment survey in addition to other project information outlined in Annex 2. Raw data of surveys and training workshops are available at the UNODC ROSEAP.

Interviews with CLP’s and donors and relevant stakeholders in the Bali Process outlined in Annex 3. Interviews with other INGO’s and NGO’s working with Migrant Smuggling.

Field missions to Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Jakarta, and UNODC field offices and related national projects and project coordinators and consultants.

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, structured interviews, field missions, questionnaires, surveys, observations and other sources to be established by the evaluator.

The independent project evaluation will be conducted following UNODC/IEU’s evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates, (to be found on the IEU website, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html), as well as UNEG Norms and Standards.

VII. TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

Time frame for the evaluation

14 July 2014 to 27 October 2014

Time frame for the field mission
It is anticipated that the evaluation will involve visits to Thailand (Bangkok) to interview staff at UNODC ROSEAP, partners, Thai government counterparts and other Thai based CLPs; UNODC project office in Cambodia (Phnom Penh) and UNODC project office in Indonesia (Jakarta). Tentative time-frame for mission to Bangkok is 25-29 August 2014 and field visits to Phnom Penh and Jakarta over the period 1-14 September 2014.

Expected deliverables and time frame

The evaluation is scheduled to take place between mid-July and early October 2014. In order for this timeline to be met, UNODC/IEU will need to clear the TOR and the Project Manager is then to identify and contract the independent consultant by mid-June.

It is important that key government counterparts in each of the participating countries are kept informed of progress and timing as well as are being involved throughout the evaluation process. They should also be provided with a chance to comment on / input to the evaluation draft TOR and (final) draft evaluation report.

The evaluator will have overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of all deliverables as specified below. The exact timings are indicative at this point in time:

1. Inception Report (following the UNODC/IEU Guidelines\(^{63}\)), including a field work plan, refined methodology (including questionnaires, etc.), preliminary findings of the desk review and possible limitations to the evaluation (c. 5 pages) to be submitted by 1 August 2014 (well before the beginning of the field mission) to be reviewed by the project manager and subsequently be submitted through the application in ProFi on Independent Project Evaluation for review and clearance by IEU. All requested changes are to be incorporated by the evaluator before clearance by IEU. No field mission is to be undertaken before clearance by IEU.

2. Aide Memoire (c 10 pages), containing a summary of work undertaken and preliminary findings in terms of project relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and partnerships. By 21 September 2014.

3. Draft evaluation report, reflecting the evaluation findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned to be submitted by 5 October 2014 and be reviewed by the project manager and subsequently be submitted through the application in ProFi on Independent Project Evaluation to IEU for review and clearance. All requested changes relating to factual errors (if the sources are provided) and IEU quality assurance are to be incorporated by the evaluator. All CLPs should also have the opportunity to provide comments after the draft report has been reviewed and cleared by IEU.

4. Final evaluation report incorporating all requested changes and include a UNODC management response (optional) (c 30 pages plus annexes), to be submitted by 20 October 2014 to be reviewed by the project manager and subsequently submitted through the application in ProFi on Independent Project Evaluation for review and clearance by IEU.

\(^{63}\)All UNODC/IEU norms, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process are to be found on the IEU-Website: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html
UNODC guidelines and formats for evaluation reports are referenced at Annex 4.

On the basis of the Terms of Reference, s/he will carry out the following duties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Estimated Timeframe incl deadlines</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk study of project documents, reports, etc and collection of additional information as required. Preparation of field work plan and method paper.</td>
<td>14 July -31 July</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Refinement of key issues and questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of Inception report; subsequently review and incorporation of comments</td>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Inception Report – to be cleared by IEU before field mission takes place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with staff at UNODC ROSEAP, partners, Thai government counterparts and other Thai based CLPs. Teleconference with appropriate stakeholders.</td>
<td>25 Aug – 29 Aug</td>
<td>UNODC ROSEAP, with visits to other offices / locations in and around Bangkok/Phone e-mail</td>
<td>Interview notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits conducting of interviews and participatory learning events with CLPs</td>
<td>1 Sept - 14 Sept</td>
<td>Evaluation missions to Phnom Penh, Cambodia; and Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>Interview notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of Aide Memoire and presentation of preliminary findings and discussion with the project manager at UNODC ROSEAP</td>
<td>15 Sept - 21 Sept</td>
<td>UNODC ROSEAP</td>
<td>Aide Memoire and appropriate presentation materials (e.g. PPT slides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow up as needed with teleconference with appropriate stakeholders. Drafting of the evaluation report; incorporating comments provided by</td>
<td>22 Sept - 5 Oct</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Draft report to be reviewed and cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

Number of evaluators needed

This evaluation envisages one expert evaluator to undertake the exercise.

The evaluator shall not act as a representative of any party and must remain independent and impartial. The evaluator must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the project under evaluation.

The evaluator is contracted by UNODC. The qualifications and responsibilities for the evaluator are specified in the job description attached to these Terms of Reference (Annex 1).

The role of the lead evaluator

Carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html; lead and coordinate the evaluation process and the oversee the tasks of the evaluators; implement quantitative tools and analyze data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and the guidelines and template on the IEU website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; include a management response in the final report; present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

More details will be provided in the respective job descriptions in Annex I.
Conflict of interest

According to UNODC rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Reference to job description detailing qualifications and responsibilities

The consultant should demonstrate:

- A strong professional record in designing and leading independent reviews and evaluations (at least 5 years)
- Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods
- Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the police
- Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the SE Asian region
- Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC
- Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills
- Post graduate educational qualifications

Languages:
The consultant must have excellent English spoken, reading and proven drafting skills. Knowledge of another language relevant to the evaluation might be an advantage.

Absence of Conflict of Interest:
According to UNODC rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Ethics:
The evaluator shall respect and apply the UNEG Ethical Guidelines.

See Annex 1 for full job description.

IX. MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS
The evaluation will be participatory, involving the project’s core learning partners (CLP) in various steps of the evaluation-process. These include the key partner government agencies and individual counterparts that the project has worked with in the target countries.

Roles and responsibilities of the Project Manager

The Project Manager is responsible for managing the evaluation, drafting and finalizing the ToR, selecting Core Learning Partners and informing them of their role, recruiting evaluators, providing desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology, liaising with the Core Learning Partners, reviewing the draft report, assessing the quality of the final report by using the Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports, as well as developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action and disseminates the final evaluation report to all internal and external stakeholders.

Management will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team and providing the necessary logistical support in terms of organizing meetings, travel and accommodation in each country visited, and any necessary interpreter services.

For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate.

Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers. Members of the CLP are selected from the key stakeholder groups, including UNODC management, mentors, beneficiaries, partner organizations and donor Member States. The CLPs are asked to comment on key steps of the evaluation and act as facilitators with respect to the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action. A preliminary list of Core Learning Partners (key individuals to be engaged in and consulted during the evaluation process) is provided at Annex 3.

The evaluation will be participatory, involving the project’s core learning partners (CLP) in various steps of the evaluation-process. These include the key partner government agencies and individual counterparts that the project has worked with in the target countries.

Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit


Logistical support responsibilities

The Project Manager will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team. For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate.

X. PAYMENT MODALITIES

Consultants will be issued consultancy contracts and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. The contract is a legally binding document in which the consultant agrees to complete the deliverables by the set deadlines. It is the responsibility of the requesting office to carefully consider and determine the estimated time period that the consultant would need, to be able to produce quality work and fully complete all the expected deliverables on time. It is particularly essential that sufficient time is planned for the drafting and finalizing of the report, including the process of consultation and incorporation of comments and changes. Payment is correlated to deliverables and three installments are typically are foreseen (25%, 25% and 50% of total fees):

- The first payment (25 per cent of the consultancy fee) upon receipt of the Inception Report and clearance by IEU;
- The second payment (25 per cent of the consultancy fee) upon receipt of the Draft Evaluation Report and clearance by IEU;
- The third and final payment (50 percent of the consultancy fee, i.e. the remainder of the fee) only after completion of the respective tasks, receipt of the final report and clearance by UNODC/IEU, as well as presentation of final evaluation findings and recommendations.

75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance, before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completed travel claim forms.

1. ANNEXES

Annex 1. Job descriptions of evaluator
ANNEX 1. JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF EVALUATORS

Terms of Reference

Title: International Evaluation Expert

Organisational Section/Unit: UNODC Regional Centre for Southeast Asia and the Pacific/ Smuggling of Migrants - Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) for East Asia and the Pacific

Duty Station: Home based with travel to Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia

Proposed period: A period of two and a half months between 14 July and 30 October 2014

1. Background of the assignment:

As the pace of globalisation and economic integration continues, inadequate inter-governmental responses to migration challenge the well-being of vulnerable individuals. The increased flows of legal migration inevitably imply a significant rise in irregular migrants prepared to use the services of smugglers to escape conflict or to better their economic status.

In East and Southeast Asia, it is estimated that as many as one out of every four migrant workers may be classed as having an irregular status. Official statistics regarding the number of identified smuggled migrants, however, remain low. The continued deportation of possible smuggled migrants, without prosecuting any of the criminal networks, result in a larger demand for smuggling of migrant services.

A challenge for governments across the regions is determining the extent of the problem and the characteristics of the organised crime groups involved. While information exists on regular migration, there is a lack of specific data on smuggling of migrants and irregular migration. Little is known, for example, about the number of persons smuggled; transportation conditions they endure; their experiences upon arrival in their destination country; smuggling routes; methodologies used by criminal groups; or deaths in transit.

Prior to the initiation of the XSPT78 Project there was no common approach or mechanism for the collection of information on smuggling of migrants. While national data sets sometimes exist, the information was not systematically collected or shared. The collection of such information
itself is often hindered by a lack of awareness and capacity constraints of relevant actors at the national level. For instance, statistics regarding migrant smugglers and their clients, where they exist, are unlikely to be disaggregated by nationality, gender or age. National differences regarding the quality of information are compounded by different national collection frameworks and differing definitions of offences and concepts without reference to international standards. This includes the definition of “smuggling of migrants” contained within the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (the Migrant Smuggling Protocol).

Against this backdrop the project’s objective was to assist states in increasing their capacities to identify and effectively act against smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air – as defined in the articles 3 and 6 in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol - in East Asia and the Pacific by establishing systems to generate, manage, analyse, report and use migrant smuggling information.

The Project was launched in January 2010 and was aligned with the UNODC regional plans outlined in the 2009-12 Regional Programme Framework for East Asia and the Pacific. The project falls under the planned objective, outcome and outputs within the regional programme framework’s Rule of Law pillar.

Over the four year course of the smuggling of migrants Project significant inroads towards creating a common approach and mechanism for the collection of information on the processes of smuggling of migrants, increasing awareness of smuggling of migrants and training of frontline law enforcement officers have been made.

A secure, internet based, data sharing tool for State authorities, the Voluntary Reporting System on Migrant Smuggling and Related Conduct (VRS-MSRC) was created and launched in July 2013. Currently, 19 states and territories have confirmed their participation and uploaded data and information on smuggling of migrants including:

- Qualitative assessment of flows
- Major routes used
- Fees paid
- Means of transport used
- Profiles of irregular and smuggled migrants
- Profiles of migrant smugglers

At the 4th and 5th Bali Process Ministerial Conferences in 2011 and 2013 ministers welcomed UNODC’s assistance with the VRS-MSRC and encouraged member states to participate in the initiative.

Three knowledge products on migrant smuggling in Asia have been produced, including a thematic review of available literature relating to smuggling of migrants with focus on 14 countries in Asia together with a comprehensive annotated bibliography. A comparative research study on financial flows within Asia and Europe relating to migrant smuggling was also published in August 2013 and circulated to key law enforcement officials.

As of March 2014 a total of 375 frontline law enforcement officers, public security and immigration officials, across 7 countries have undergone 2, 5 or 10 day migrant smuggling training course on either operational analysis (how to use information to support an on-going investigation), strategic analysis or attended a senior managers’ course.

2. Purpose of the assignment:
Through this evaluation, UNODC should obtain a frank assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in this specific area and draw on recommendation and lessons learned to inform future programming. This evaluation will also offer an opportunity to increase accountability for all stakeholders involved and identify problems that may have to be addressed differently in the future.

UNODC is committed to support Member States in strengthening their capacity to address the threat of migrant smuggling even after the completion of the Project, as indicated in the new 2014-17 Regional Programme. The identification of best practices and/or mistakes during the evaluation process will help improving data and information sharing, and strengthen Members States capacity to effectively tackle migrant smuggling. As such the evaluation will support more informed policies among Member States and UNODC.

The evaluation and all its deliverables must be in line with the full evaluation ToR.

3. **Specific tasks to be performed by the consultant:**

Under the supervision of the Project Coordinator (Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking) the International Evaluation Expert will within the framework of the XSPT78 Smuggling of Migrants Project will be responsible for the following tasks:

a. Ensure quality and timely delivery of all activities and report  
b. Carry out the desk review  
c. Provide methodological evaluation quality assurance throughout the evaluation process and inputs  
d. Develop and submit the evaluation Inception Report to the Project Manager (clearance by IEU), and take into account any comments received  
e. Conduct planned missions, undertake interviews and facilitate the participation of CLPs  
f. Implement appropriate quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis tools and methods  
g. Triangulate data and test rival explanations  
h. Ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled  
i. Prepare and submit an Aide Memoire which includes preliminary findings  
j. Present findings to the project implementation team and CLPs (as possible/appropriate)  
k. Draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC and IEU evaluation policies and requirements to be reviewed by the project manager and cleared by IEU.  
l. Finalise the evaluation report on the basis of feedback received, incorporating all requested changes in accordance. To be cleared by IEU.

m. Apply ethical evaluation standards in line with international best practice (UNEG Ethical Guidelines)

4. **Expected tangible and measurable output(s):**

5. **Dates and details as to how the work must be delivered:**

On the basis of the Terms of Reference, s/he will carry out the following duties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Estimated Timeframe incl deadlines</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk study of project documents, reports, etc and collection of additional information as required. Preparation of field work plan and method paper.</td>
<td>14 July -31 July</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Refinement of key issues and questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of Inception report</td>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Inception Report – to be cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with staff at UNODC ROSEAP, partners, Thai government counterparts and other Thai based CLPs</td>
<td>25 Aug – 29 Aug</td>
<td>UNODC ROSEAP, with visits to other offices / locations in and around Bangkok/ Phone e-mail</td>
<td>Interview notes</td>
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<td>Field visits conducting of interviews and participatory learning events with CLPs</td>
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<td>15 Sept - 21 Sept</td>
<td>UNODC ROSEAP</td>
<td>Aide Memoire and appropriate presentation materials (e.g. PPT slides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of the evaluation report</td>
<td>22 Sept - 5 Oct</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Draft report to be cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email / phone discussions with UNODC, incorporation of comments received from UNODC and completion of final</td>
<td>6 Oct - 27 Oct</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Final report – to be cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. **Indicators to evaluate the consultant’s performance:**

The consultant’s performance will be based on quality of the final report and timeliness of delivery.

7. **Qualifications/expertise sought (required educational background, years of relevant work experience, other special skills or knowledge required):**

**Required experience, knowledge, skills and qualifications:**

The consultant should demonstrate:
- A strong professional record in designing and leading independent reviews and evaluations (at least 5 years)
- Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods
- Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the police
- Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the SE Asian region
- Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC
- Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills
- Post graduate educational qualifications

**Languages:**
The consultant must have excellent English spoken, reading and proven drafting skills. Knowledge of another language relevant to the evaluation might be an advantage.

**Absence of Conflict of Interest:**
According to UNODC rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

**Ethics:**
The evaluator shall respect and apply the UNEG Ethical Guidelines.
ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

The table below represents the overall evaluation question matrix. Depending on respondents' level of interaction with the project and their familiarity with the subject, different question sets were used in the course of interviews or in the surveys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY QUESTION</th>
<th>SUB-QUESTION 64</th>
<th>Measure/Indicator</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How relevant was the project to the defined needs and priorities of the Member States, the International Community and the donor?</td>
<td>Are project objectives aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of Member States, UNODC, UN mandates and those of the donors? If not where are there tensions and how are these resolved?</td>
<td>Outcomes and outputs correspond with project documentation.</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews</td>
<td>Project design Project documentation Reports Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are the objectives of project aligned with regional initiatives and how are member states utilizing / reacting to the projects outputs?</td>
<td>Outcomes and outputs correspond with project documentation.</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews</td>
<td>Member States strategy papers Project documentation Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How relevant is the Project in regards to the identified problem?</td>
<td>To what extent is data sharing through the VRS-MSRC relevant to fight migrant smuggling at national and regional level?</td>
<td>Outcomes correspond with regional strategy papers</td>
<td>Desk level review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the design of the project technically sound?</td>
<td>Are the projects objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to a clear strategy?</td>
<td>Partners, beneficiaries, donor and UNODC staff understand</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews</td>
<td>Member States strategy papers Project documentation Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the design solve the identified problem set?</td>
<td>Partners, beneficiaries and Donor agree</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Participating States Donor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64 The number of possible sub-questions is quite large. The sub-questions contained in this matrix are only a starting point. Additional relevant sub-questions may be generated as the need arises for inclusion in data gathering instruments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Rights and Gender Mainstreaming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>To what degree was gender considered a factor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>To what extent did human rights impact the Project?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What were the project’s outcomes and how effective has the Project been in achieving these?</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent has the Project improved their capacity to develop and share information on migrants smuggling?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has UNODC developed a strong and trustworthy relationship with Government partners?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How efficient has the implementation of the Project been?</td>
<td>Project implementation was in line with original design</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews UNODC Staff Participating States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there less costly interventions modalities to those used in the projects?</td>
<td>Options for project implementation were examined</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews UNODC Staff Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the UNODC’s human resource structure appropriate and efficient?</td>
<td>Staff structure and support was adequate</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews UNODC Staff Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are internal UNODC factors affecting effectiveness, including human resources, logistical support, flexibility in supply and budgetary controls and other resources?</td>
<td>External parties viewed Project as a success. UNODC staff were supported.</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews UNODC Staff Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What formal governance structures did the project report to? How was information feedback to these structures?</td>
<td>Formal governance was recorded as minutes and recommendations acted on.</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews UNODC Staff Participating States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are UNODC efforts sustainable? How was sustainability built into the project?</td>
<td>Project design considered sustainability</td>
<td>Interviews Survey UNODC Staff Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How has UNODC ensured that benefits from its assistance continue after UNODC technical assistance stops?</td>
<td>UNODC staff can explain how the Project’s efforts will be sustained</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews UNODC Staff Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will/can Governments continue to support the data and information sharing after the Project?</td>
<td>Participating States indicate a willingness to resource the Project.</td>
<td>Interviews Survey UNODC Staff Participating States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the overall impact of the Project?</th>
<th>What has the project achieved?</th>
<th>Desk level review Interviews Survey</th>
<th>UNODC Staff Participating States Open source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the cooperation and information sharing among Governments improved in the fight against the smuggling of migrants?</td>
<td>increased detection of smuggling of migrant activities increased investigations, greater number of prosecutions and convictions increased detection and dismantling of smuggling networks enhanced cross-border cooperation greater adherence the Migrant Smuggling Protocols</td>
<td>Interviews Survey</td>
<td>UNODC Staff Participating States Open source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What quantifiable data is there to support these claims?</td>
<td>What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of the Project?</td>
<td>Additional benefits beyond those above</td>
<td>Interviews UNODC Staff Participating States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders are supportive of UNODC efforts and keen to receive additional support</td>
<td>What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders about the overall impact of UNODC’s assistance?</td>
<td>Interviews Survey</td>
<td>UNODC Staff Participating States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How effective have the Project’s partnerships been?</th>
<th>To what extent has UNODC generated synergy with other potential partners including other UN agencies, NGOs/CSOs, etc?</th>
<th>Partnerships with other actors actively sought and established</th>
<th>Interviews UNODC Staff Donor Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did stakeholders feel that they were kept abreast of developments, delays and delivery?</td>
<td>Partners felt that they were actively engaged</td>
<td>Interviews Survey</td>
<td>UNODC Staff Donor Partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Lessons Learnt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What lessons have been identified and should be learned?</th>
<th>What did the Project do well, that could be transposed to other projects?</th>
<th>Desk level review Interviews</th>
<th>UNODC Staff Participating States Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did observations and feedback alter delivery, if so how?</td>
<td>Project’s successes can be related into a couple of key activities that were successfully executed</td>
<td>Desk level review Interviews</td>
<td>UNODC Staff Participating States Donor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VRC Focal Points were sent the following questionnaire. In addition many were either interviewed in person or via telephone.

Introduction. The UNODC project, T78 Smuggling of Migrants and Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit is due to end in October 2014. To date the project has collected data, on the smuggling of migrants, produced smuggling of migrant publications, encouraged policy debate through the Bali Process, and supported the training of immigration services in a number of South East Asian countries. The following questionnaire represents an element of the final evaluation, which seeks to assess the project’s impact.

Questions:

1. How long have you been a VRS-MSRC Focal Point?

2. From the following list, please indicate the areas in which you believe the project may have assisted. Please place answers in priority order, with 1 being the highest.
   a. increased detection of smuggling of migrant activities.
   b. increased investigations.
   c. greater number of prosecutions and convictions.
   d. increased detection and dismantling of smuggling networks.
   e. enhanced cross-border cooperation.
   f. greater adherence the Migrant Smuggling Protocols.

3. Can you provide an example of how UNODC (through this project) has assisted in the achievement of any one of the outcome areas listed above? Please provide details in the format below and /or a link to an open source publication.
   a. Where and when did this event take place?
   b. Who does this event involve?
   c. What was the situation before UNODC assistance?
   d. What did UNODC/the project do to assist?
   e. What was the outcome or overall effect of UNODC assistance?
   f. Link to on-line story, publication or report.

4. From your experience how is VRS-MSRC data collected? Is this a simple process or does it pose a challenge?

5. From your experience who uses VRS-MSRC data?
6. In your opinion how useful is VRS-MSRC? (provide a score between 1 and 10, where 1 is not very useful and 10 is extremely useful, and briefly explain your score)

7. In your opinion how user friendly is VRS-MSRC? (provide a score between 1 and 10, where 1 is not very useful and 10 is extremely useful, and briefly explain your score)

8. From your experience who uses UNODC publications on the smuggling of migrants?

9. In your opinion how useful are UNODC publications on the smuggling of migrants? (provide a score between 1 and 10, where 1 is not very useful and 10 is extremely useful, and briefly explain your score)

10. In your opinion is there anything more UNODC could do to improve it smuggling of migrants publications and/or VRS-MSRC?

Those working at the Bali Process level were sent a slightly different version.

Introduction. The UNODC project, T78 Smuggling of Migrants and Operation of a Coordination and Analysis Unit is due to end in October 2014. To date the project has collected data, on the smuggling of migrants, produced smuggling of migrant publications, encouraged policy debate through the Bali Process, and supported the training of immigration services in a number of South East Asian countries. The following questionnaire forms part of the final evaluation.

VRS-MSRC Synopsis. One element of T78 is “VRS-MSRC, an internet-based, secure system that collects, shares and facilitates the analysis of migrant smuggling data for the purpose of strengthening strategic analysis to inform policy development at inter-regional, regional, and national levels.

Questions:

1. In what capacity have you seen or used UNODC publications relating to the smuggling of migrants and/or VRS-MSRC?

2. How long have you been aware of UNODC publications relating to the smuggling of migrants and/or VRS-MSRC?
   a. Publications.
   b. VRS-MSRC.

3. From the following list, please indicate the areas in which you believe UNODC and the project have assisted. Please place answers in priority order, with 1 being the highest.
   a. increased detection of smuggling of migrant activities.
   b. increased investigations.
   c. greater number of prosecutions and convictions.
   d. increased detection and dismantling of smuggling networks.
e. enhanced cross-border cooperation.

f. greater adherence the Migrant Smuggling Protocols.

4. Can you provide an example of how UNODC (through this project) has assisted in the achievement of any one of the outcome areas listed above?

a. Example as text; and/or

b. Link to on-line story, publication or report.

5. From your experience who uses UNODC publications on the smuggling of migrants?

6. In your opinion how useful are UNODC publications on the smuggling of migrants? (provide a score between 1 and 10, where 1 is not very useful and 10 is extremely useful, and briefly explain your answer)

7. From your experience who uses VRS-MSRC data?

8. In your opinion how useful is VRS-MSRC? (provide a score between 1 and 10, where 1 is not very useful and 10 is extremely useful, and briefly explain your answer)

9. In your opinion is there anything that UNODC could do to improve: their communications; quality of smuggling of migrant publications; and/or the VRS-MSRC system?

10. Please feel free to provide any additional comments or address issues not covered by the questions above.
ANNEX III. DESK REVIEW LIST

**Project documents**

Original Project Document 2010
Annual Progress Report 2010
Annual Progress Report 2011
Annual Progress Report 2012
Annual Progress Report 2013
Project Revision Report 2011
Project Revision Report 2013
Project Revision Report 2014

**Knowledge products/key reports on Smuggling of Migrants**

Assessment of Cambodia’s Structures and Capacities to Collect and Analyse Data on Migrant Smuggling 2010
Assessment of Indonesia’s Structures and Capacities to Collect and Analyse Data on Migrant Smuggling 2011
VRS-MSRC - Overview of Key Questions and Requested Data
VRS-MSRC - Access Guidelines
VRS-MSRC – User Guidelines
Migrant Smuggling in Asia – A thematic Review of Literature 2012
Migrant Smuggling in Asia – An Annotated Bibliography 2012
Migrant Smuggling in Asia – Comparative Research on Financial Flows within Asia and Europe 2013
Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific – a Threat Assessment 2013
Migrant Smuggling in Asia – An Annotated Bibliography 2014

Migrant Smuggling in Asia 2014

Migrant Smuggling From Sri Lanka – an overview 2014

Assessment of Cambodia’s structures for reporting, sharing and collecting data on irregular migration and migrant smuggling 2014

Smuggling of Migrants – Assessment methodology 2014

**Impact assessments**

Training evaluation assessment

Knowledge impact assessment and information awareness survey and Bali process reports and declarations

Bali Process Ad Hoc Group Co-chairs Statement March 2009

Bali Process SOM Co-chairs Statement March 2009

Fifth AHG SOM Co-Chairs Statement October 2012

Bali Process - Co-chairs statement June 2012

Bali Process Ad Hoc Group Immigration Intelligence Best Practice Workshop – Outcomes Statement.

Bali process Ministerial Co-chairs statement BRMC IV-1

Bali Process Immigration Aspects of Airport Security Co-chairs' Statement


Bali Process Co Chairs Statement.12 Nov 2012

Bali Process UNTOC outcome summary 2012

Fifth ministerial conference co-Chair’s statement 2012
Outcomes Statement 26 July 2012

Jakarta declaration on addressing irregular movement of persons, August 2013.
ANNEX IV.  CORE LEARNING PARTNERS

VRS Focal Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director, Irregular Maritime Arrivals Entry Services Section, Immigration Intelligence Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Border Check, Department of Immigration, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chef de l’Unité d’Analyse Stratégique, DCPAF/SDIIIST/OCRIEST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Organized Crime and Triad Bureau, A Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Head of Section for International Cooperation for United Nations Directorate General of Immigration, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>People Smuggling Task Force, Indonesia National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Officer, International Safety and Security Cooperation Division, Foreign Policy Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Department of Immigration, Lao PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Emigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Immigration New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Additional Director Immigration &amp; Anti-Human Trafficking Federal Investigation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretariat for Migrant Worker’s Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Senior Immigration Officer/ICT Immigration Division Ministry of Commerce, Industries, Labour &amp; Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Donmuang Airport Immigration 2 Division, Immigration Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief of the Migrant smuggling and Human Trafficking Bureau Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department Turkish National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Senior Intelligence Analyst Strategic Risk &amp; Analysis Directorate Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Bali Process focal points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Australia’s People Smuggling Ambassador, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - People Smuggling, Refugees and Immigration Section - International Organisations and Legal Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, International Legal Assistance Branch, South-East Asia Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director Policy Coordination and Engagement, Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Under Secretary of State, SOMTC Leader, Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Special Advisor on Human Smuggling and Illegal Migration, Privy Council Office, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Organized Crime Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Second Secretary/ Head of Section for TOC Affairs, Directorate of International Security &amp; Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regional Representative for Southeast Asia, IOM Regional Office for Southeast Asia, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IOM Regional Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy Director Malaysian Department of Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bali Process Project Coordinator, Regional Support Office – Bali Process (Bangkok), Immigration New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Senior Regional Asylum/Migration Policy Officer, UNHCR, Regional Office in Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Senior Regional Protection Adviser, UNHCR, Regional Coordinator's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director, Social Division, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Donor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director, Regional Programmes and Evaluation Section, International Engagement Branch Refugee, Humanitarian and International Policy Division, Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Assistant Director Global Team, Immigration Intelligence Branch Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>First Secretary - Immigration &amp; Citizenship Australian Embassy Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>First Secretary- Migration Integrity Officer - Department of Immigration and Citizenship Australian Embassy Bangkok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## UNODC – HQ Vienna

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief - Global Report on Trafficking in Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief - Research and Trend Analysis Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Research Officer - Global Report on Trafficking in Persons Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Research Officer - Statistics and Surveys Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer - Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Section (DTA/OCB/HTMSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief - Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crime Prevention Expert - Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief - Corporate Software Solutions Section (DM/ITS/CSSS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regional Representative for South East Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regional Adviser - Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Regional Adviser - HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Project Coordinator (SoM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator (Global SMART)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
UNODC Project Office in Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>OIC Country Office and Project Associate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNODC Country Office in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Country Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Project Associate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX V. SWOT ANALYSIS

The following is a copy of the SWOT analysis that forms the conclusion section.

### Strengths
- UNODC part of Bali ad hoc
- Increasing bilateral arrangements
- Increased UNODC credibility and ability to uphold protocols
- Forged strong partnerships
- The Project is tangible and is developing a network
- Project developed the baseline
- Products have been produced
- Member States appreciate training
- Relevant, but edge of LE agenda

### Weaknesses
- Tracking SoM is peripheral issue – to what end?
- Partner overlap – IOM, UNHCR, INTERPOL
- VRS does not seek to understand SoM universe
- VRS falls between operational and strategic
- Project was poorly conceived and designed. PIU/KURs never identified.
- Resource constrained compared to outcomes
- Data reliant on first world states
- States don’t process data or use the system to full extent
- Reporting is complex and IT is fragile
- Reliance of human analysis and data assurance
- Timeliness and relevance of publications
- Overlap with partners

### Opportunities
- End of project = change of direction
- Additional donor funding = extension
- Membership of Bali ad hoc Group = increased exposure and leverage
- Change of project coordinator = fresh ideas
- Part of the regional programme = examine inter-dependencies
- Possible global programme?
- Partner appetite = increase partnerships
- IS = understand transnational threats

### Threats
- Change of project coordinator = project drift
- Under resourced = limits achievement of outcomes
- Expectation management = can UNODC deliver?
- Countries don’t input data = VRS relevance
- Member States use the system and realise that the data base not fit for purpose = found wanting
- Exposure increases risk of failure
- IOM in the same space and better resourced
- Politics = countries don’t want to change