Independent project evaluation of

Strengthening Land Border Control in Timor Leste

TIL/X78
Timor Leste

July 2015
This evaluation report was prepared by Mr A J Henderson, independent consultant. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html

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**ABREVIATIONS**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BLO</td>
<td>Border Liaison Office</td>
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<td>BPU</td>
<td>Border Patrol Unit (UPF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Computer Based Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Border</td>
<td>Mountainous border area between Indonesia and Timor Leste</td>
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<td>HRDDP</td>
<td>Human Rights Due Diligence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation on Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MABSAG</td>
<td>Model Border Service Academy Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>Policia National Da Timor Leste</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>POIDN</td>
<td>Programme Office for Indonesia</td>
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<td>ROSEAP</td>
<td>Regional Office for South East Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Technical Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>TLCPP</td>
<td>Timor Leste Community Policing Programme</td>
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<td>TLPDP</td>
<td>Timor Leste Police Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOCTA</td>
<td>Transnational and Organised Crime Threat Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPF</td>
<td>Unidade de Patrulhamento de Fronteira (BPU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>UN Mission in Timor Leste</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

After decades of occupation and conflict, Timor Leste became a sovereign state in 2002. Peace was short lived, however, and violence devastated the country during the build up to the presidential elections in 2006. In response, UN Security Council Resolution 1704 established the UN Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) and deployed 1,600 international police officers to restore law and order, and to rebuild the national police force (PNTL). In 2012, when UNMIT withdrew, the International Community realised that the PNTL still possessed many capability gaps.

Drug use and trafficking are justifiable concerns of the Timorese Government; but, there is little empirical data to indicate the scale of the problem. The US State Department assess the country to be minor destination for narcotics consumption, with insufficient law enforcement capacity\(^1\). In 2012, Timor Leste possessed no maritime and only a limited land border capability. UNODC’s Regional Threat Assessment of 2013\(^2\) did not mention Timor Leste, and there is little evidence to suggest that it is a key facilitation node for transnational crime. While drug seizures, in the capital Dili, have increased over recent years, Indonesian Police state that vehicle and fuel smuggling are the most prevalent transnational crimes. Trafficking in any form, however limited, provides space for other criminal activities to occur, and when coupled with insufficient law enforcement capability, it becomes a major concern.

The Project

In 2012 the US, Australia and New Zealand commenced as series of Police development programmes that sought to address recognised capability gaps within the PNTL. Between February 2013 and July 2015, UNODC delivered a portfolio of border management mechanisms in Timor Leste. The aim was to strengthen the land border between Indonesia and Timor Leste through technical assistance to the PNTL’s Border Patrol Unit (BPU). The sole donor was the US International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The Project assisted the BPU to better manage the land border, by ensuring that it was better equipped, better trained and had better cross border cooperation with Indonesia.

This report represents the final independent project evaluation of TIL/X78 on Strengthening Land Border Control in Timor Leste. The primary intended user is the Programme Office for Indonesia

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1 US State Department reporting from 2012.
(POIDN) which oversaw the Project. The evaluation was based on the standard DAC criteria of: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights, and lesson learned. The evaluation included a desk level review, and a 14 day visit to Indonesia and Timor Leste, during which time the evaluator was able to meet a wide variety of officials and law enforcement officers.

Relevance

Given Timor Leste’s turbulent history, the fact that it is Asia’s youngest country and has newly formed law enforcement agencies; UNODC’s involvement is fully warranted and is in-line with its mandate. TIL/X78 directly supported: UNODC’s Regional Programme for South East Asia and the Pacific, by improving the ability of the BPU to tackle illicit trafficking; and UNODC’s Country Programme for Indonesia\(^3\) outcome 1.1, which sought to improve border security through increased measures to counter illicit trade and trafficking.

While the project was initially donor driven; prior to implementation UNODC conducted a technical needs analysis (TNA) which confirmed the BPU’s requirements in detail. The Indonesian Government was not consulted to the same degree, and during the Project’s second year, they expressed their desire to discontinue with the border liaison office (BLO) construct, in favour of existing bilateral border arrangements. Had there been a full design phase, ahead of implementation, this fact might have been identified and alternative solutions developed earlier.

Impact

The baseline against which the Project is measured, is the TNA of December 2012. The main findings of this report indicate that the BPU were marginalised and poorly equipped. They had conducted little training and not a single BPU officer had received any of UNODC’s Computer Based Training (CBT) in the National Police Academy. There was only a rudimentary operational plan and there were no standard operating procedures (SOPs). The BPU had few vehicles and all “Green Border” patrolling was on foot. There was a shortage of radios, night viewing devices and search equipment. In terms of capability enhancements the Project has enabled the BPU to search, move and communicate. The BPU is now a mainstream organisation, its visibility and standing within the PNTL has increased. It is better trained, with over 300 BPU officers having received direct or indirect training. It has a defined operational concept, an operational plan and a series of SOPs. Therefore, the BPU is more credible and capable of managing the land border than it was in 2012.

Effectiveness

Compared to the baseline, the BPU is considerably better equipped. It possesses transportation, modern communication systems, search equipment and night viewing devices. The BPU has been trained. While project documentation stated that the Kirkpatrick 4 step evaluation methodology would be used to assess this training, unfortunately this did not occur. What is known is the fact that the Project trained over 300 BPU officers and that additionally UNODC training material and

\(^3\) UNODC Country Programme for Indonesia 2012-2015.
techniques have supported the training of over 650 other PNTL officers. Senior PNTL and BPU commanders and their Indonesian counterparts have been exposed to alternative cross border coordination mechanisms. Although the BLO concept did not evolve as planned, there is cross boarder liaison and regular dialogue, even if this occurs via existing bilateral arrangements.

Efficiency

The Project built upon a number of projects that UNODC had successfully implemented within the region. It utilised CBT, BLO and the model border service academy guide (MBSAG). It, therefore, built on success and took many lessons from these projects forward into Timor Leste. The Project was very cost effective. It spent over 50% of the allocated budget on the end user; on equipment and training. Training was conducted by international police officers, serving within the region, and it incurred only minimal cost. Over 1000 PNTL officers received direct or indirect training at an overall cost of $200,000. Project documentation, while well written, lacked detail, such as a risk matrix, a work plan and a budget. When activities altered, the Project struggled to redistribute funds. A combination of insufficient management detail and a short delivery timeframe provided an unnatural delivery profile, which saw the Project trying to expend almost 50% of its allocated budget within the final 7 months. Monitoring and reporting were areas of weakness. While reports were timely and simple, they failed to provide any wider view, such as context or unintended results. There was little formal monitoring within the Project and even simple techniques such as assessing the level of knowledge prior to and after training were not conducted. There was no recorded formal governance; and while very close working relationships were developed with all partners and recipients, there were no records of meetings that agreed annual work plans.

Sustainability

The Project documentation claimed that sustainability would be built into the project from the outset. The training element of Project is fully sustainable: core UNODC lesson plans have been adopted by the National Police Academy and they now form part of both the basic police recruit and specialised border police curricula; CBT was already established within the Academy and the additional modules will only enhance its use; due to a dispersed laydown, the BPU relies on a train the trainer approach, where Post Commanders trickle down training when they return from external courses. In terms of procurement the Project had some notable successes; the provision of motorbikes with simple maintenance packs were considered to be highly sustainable by the PNTL. Conversely the procurement of Ford Rangers were not supported by an on-island maintainer. These trucks have already failed and the PNTL is now unable to purchase the spare parts required to repair them.

Partnerships

The Project built strong working relationships with the PNTL which went up to the Chief of the Cabinet of the Timorese Government. These relationships were made possible by the fact that the project had representation in Timor Leste. Close relationships were developed between the

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4 Project Staff stated that according to global policy UNODC can provide equipment but it cannot maintain equipment. This responsibility lies with the beneficiary.
Project and numerous US Law Enforcement Agencies operating within the region. The use of serving officials, as instructors was made possible through networking. While the Project established good working relationships with many of the other Intergovernmental Agencies operating in Timor Leste, there were instances where greater cooperation could have been achieved. For example, senior PNTL and Indonesian Police Officials stated that resolving tension and reducing crime along the border was through engaging civil society. Linking the BPU to the New Zealand led Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) should be considered a priority as the Project closes.

**Human rights and gender**

In the area of human rights and gender sensitivity the Project supported the lead taken by UNDP and UNHRC. It assisted the Timorese Government by reviewing and supporting legislation on smuggling of migrants. The Project worked particularly closely with IOM and the Prosecutor, based at the US Embassy, to ensure that training content was human rights compliant and gender sensitive.

**Conclusion**

The Project timeframe was limited and after 2 years of delivery the full impact of the Project has yet fully materialise. Overall, though, the Project did achieve its aim. The BPU is better equipped, better trained and better placed to manage the land border than it was in 2012. While the BLO concept did not develop as planned there is cross border coordination. There were areas where the Project could, and maybe should have done more; however, these are mainly management issues, which can be resolved during the design and drafting of any future projects and programmes.

**Way ahead**

This report makes a number of recommendations which are listed by importance (in the summary table) and by theme (in the recommendation section). This report also provides a series of options that UNODC may wish to consider as it moves forward. It is the overall recommendation of this report that UNODC assistance to Timor Leste should: provide joint border training, using a pool of international SME’s attached to embassies; link the new port in Dili to the Global Container Control Programme; promote, in conjunction with international partners, greater inter-agency cooperation between the various Timorese Law Enforcement Agencies; encourage increased cross border cooperation with Indonesia; assist with mutual legal assistance, harmonisation of laws, which includes intelligence sharing and extradition; and provide advice on the adherence to international transnational protocols, in terms of both legislative and policy support. When delivering this technical assistance UNODC may wish to consider increased cooperation and delivery with other International Agencies, and the possibility of jointly-funded projects.
SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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<th>Findings</th>
<th>Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial project documentation failed to differentiate between inputs and outputs, or sufficiently articulate what it was that the project was aiming to change and how this was going to be achieved. BLO was offered as the solution. However, the outputs should have focused on enhancing cross border cooperation, allowing a number of different solutions to be devised.</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews</td>
<td>HQ UNODC / ROSEAP should consider using Theory of Change (ToC) methodology when designing projects. ToC forces the designer to focus on the desired change first. Once the area or entity requiring change has been identified, a series of logical steps are designed to deliver change. Only then should activities be devised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the second BLO conference Indonesia stated that it preferred existing bilateral arrangements. Had Indonesia been consulted during the design phase this may have been identified earlier. Conversely the TNA conducted during the design phase accurately captured the BPU requirements</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews</td>
<td>HQ UNODC / ROSEAP should consider including a design or inception phase in all future programme and projects. As part of this phase all stakeholders should be approached and a draft concept socialised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are a large number of international actors providing assistance to the PNTL. While UNODC developed close working relationships with many of these organisations there appears to have been a number of missed opportunities where increased</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews</td>
<td>ROSEAP / POIDN should ensure that future projects stipulate what partnerships will be developed with other IGOs and UN agencies. Project documentation should indicate in a table format who the project works with, how this will occur and at what level.</td>
</tr>
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5 A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.
6 Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaboration could have been beneficial to all parties</th>
<th>This table can then be cross referenced with planned activities in the logical framework and annual work plans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A new sea port will be developed to the west of Dili. This port will see an increase in shipping and in the number of sea containers entering the country</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
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### Important recommendations

| Project staff recorded activities, they logged numbers trained, types of equipment delivered and the number of meetings hosted. There were few quantitative or qualitative measures of success because the Project Documentation (outcomes and outputs) failed to articulate to what end activities were occurring | Desk review and interviews | **ROSEAP / POIDN** should develop mechanisms for measuring success; these should be more than activity based success criteria. |

| Project documentation was sufficient to commence implementation, but was missing much of the management detail required to execute the plan (budget, work plan and risk matrix) | Desk review | **ROSEAP / POIDN** should provide additional staff training so that staff become more proficient at project design and project management |

| While there was sufficient annual and semi-annual reporting, there were no official records of meetings that agreed annual work plans | Desk review | **ROSAEP / POIDN** should ensure that all future projects include some formal governance structure and a recorded annual review. This does not have to be the formal Steering Committee format |

<p>| The Project trained BPU officers in a wide variety of border management techniques and search skills. However, at the integrated border crossing points the BPU is not the lead agency and it provides more of a visible deterrent. There was feeling amongst some of the BPU that their skills were in advance to some of the other border agencies and that multi-agency cooperation required enhancing | Desk review and interviews | Future <strong>POIDN</strong> assistance to Timor Leste should focus on multi-agency cooperation and not just a single agency. At integrated border crossing points there is representation from customs, immigration and quarantine. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Senior PNTL and Indonesian Police Officials stated that the key to resolving tension and reducing crime in border areas was through engaging the civil societies that lived along the borders</th>
<th>Desk review and interviews</th>
<th>Future <strong>POIDN</strong> assistance to the BPU should include community policing. This should not be delivered by UNODC, but should be in conjunction with the New Zealand lead community policing programme</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rangers were procured by the Project, even though they were both unsuitable for the terrain (breaking within weeks) and unsustainable in the longer term (no mainland dealer)</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Future <strong>POIDN</strong> assistance should consider sustainability in more detail. The procurement of the motor bikes is a good example of a platform commonly found on the island, rugged, familiar with the user, suitable to the terrain, easy to maintain and delivered with a simple repair kit as standard.</td>
</tr>
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<td>The second order effects of trickle-down training and/or training the trainer were considerably higher than the initial training effects achieved by the Project. However the impact of this training was not captured nor measured in any of the Project’s reports</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews</td>
<td>Future <strong>POIDN</strong> projects should attempt to measure the effect of this trickle-down or train the trainer approach. Staff should look beyond the initial recipient and gauge what trainees do with their new found knowledge. Examples are, follow up interviews, questionnaires, and examining training curriculum to identify knowledge transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>The initial design included an output relating to CBT in direct support of the BPU. This output (and associated funding) was then moved to the Global eLearning Programme for reasons of economy of scale and coherence. New CBT modules which support the BPU should have been delivered in May 2015, however, they will now be delivered in Aug 2015; after the Project closes</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews</td>
<td><strong>ROSEAP / POIDN</strong> should continue to monitor the delivery of CBT in Timor Leste and continue to support CBT through the Global eLearning Programme</td>
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<td>UNDP and IOM are operating in a similar space as UNODC and this presents an opportunity for closer collaboration. There were a number of examples of missed opportunities where greater cooperation would</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews</td>
<td><strong>POIDN</strong> should seek to work even more closely with other UN agencies; particularly UNDP and IOM. Full stakeholder analysis during any design phase is critical. Areas of mutual interest should be explored and concerns noted.</td>
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<td>have led to greater impact. Community policing and gender sensitive policing being two examples</td>
<td>There should be an agreed joint action plan included in all future project documentation</td>
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<td>Conviction for narcotics related crime in Indonesia carries a potential death penalty. The passage of intelligence, and extradition of suspects between Indonesia and Timor Leste are two areas fraught with legal implication</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews POIDN may wish to consider conducting a legal review to focus on areas of mutual legal assistance and extraction between Indonesia and Timor Leste</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>As the youngest nation in Asia, Timor Leste requires assistance in taking its place on the international stage</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews POIDN may wish to consider assisting Timor Leste in ratifying and abiding by international protocols. In addition there is an opportunity to assess the Timor Leste’s laws, and assist the legislative in developing laws that are in-line with international standards and norms</td>
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<td>The Project did not make reference to the studies and work conducted by UNDP and UNWOMEN which could have been used as a baseline for female participation</td>
<td>Desk review and interviews POIDN should ensure that future projects conduct a gender baseline study and ascertain if there is anything that UNODC projects can positively achieve unilaterally or in direct support of other UN agencies</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Background

The recent history of Timor Leste has been tainted with conflict. After 24 years of Indonesian occupation, the country became self-governing in 1999. The period from 1999 until 2002 saw a number of transitional and interim administrations, each supported by a resident United Nations Mission. In 2002 Timor Leste finally became a sovereign state, however, peace was short-lived and the country experienced devastating internal violence in 2006. In response to this violence, the President requested that the UN Security Council establish a UN police force to maintain law and order until the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) could undergo reorganization and restructuring. Security Council Resolution 1704 established the UNMIT which included over 1,600 international police officers. Following peaceful parliamentary elections, in 2012, UNMIT withdrew. While the official UN mission finished, many in the International Community realised that as a new country, the law enforcement agencies of Timor Leste still required assistance if they were to effectively deal with the security issues facing the country.

Map 1. Timor Leste

Transnational threats

Drug use and drug trafficking are rightly areas of concern for the Government of Timor Leste. However, there is little empirical evidence to indicate their levels of use or trafficking. In 2012 Timor Leste possessed no maritime and a very limited land border capability. Not only were the State’s resources to combat transitional crime limited, but the relatively higher cost of living and lower incomes, compared to Indonesia, presented fertile ground for corruption.8

Recorded drug seizures suggest a predominance of land border smuggling, by vehicle, and in relatively small quantities.9 Drug seizures are increasing, particularly in Dili; and in 2014 and 2015 there were seizures of Methamphetamine transiting between Timor Leste and Indonesia. During this same timeframe the BPU seized $20,000 of smuggled cash. The limited reporting10 that does exist indicates that narcotics flow in both directions and that many of the criminals appear to be more opportunistic than organised (drugs are smuggled in low volumes via vehicles and on persons and not via industrial means). The country is assessed as a minor destination for narcotics consumption11, with the issue related to insufficient law enforcement capacity rather than the availability of narcotics per se.

There are few reports to suggest that there are any major smuggling routes into and through Timor Leste. Hard facts about drug smuggling are scarce and much of the reporting that does exist is often media generated, circular and sensational. The 2013 UNODC South East Asia and Pacific Transnational and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (TOCTA) did not even mention Timor Leste, and there is little evidence to suggest that Timor Leste is, or is about to become, a key facilitation node for transnational crime.

Despite having a predominantly young population, one that would normally be considered at risk, drug use is relatively low compared to neighbouring countries;12 this is mainly due to the high cost of living. There are high levels of unemployment and most of the drug use, that would attract transnational crime, is based on a small young professional set, which use drugs for recreational purposes.13 A study of prisoners in Dili jail, in 2012, found that none were serving drug related sentences and that no prisoners were recorded as being on drugs, or displaying withdrawal symptoms.14 Culturally drug use is taboo and given the small population and tight family based culture, concealing drug use and the proceeds of large scale crime is difficult.

8 SP2 of the Regional Programme for South East Asia and the Pacific has a $1.2 USD project promoting anti-corruption in Timor Leste https://www.unodc.org/indonesia/en/project/indonesia/sp-2.html
9 UNODC POIND confirmed this finding which was taken from official statements and press releases.
10 Press reports and official statements from 2012-2015.
12 UNDP sponsored report into drug use in Timor Leste.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
Like many other islands within the region, Timor Leste’s proximity to Australia provides the potential for the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking\textsuperscript{15}. However since Australian policy changed, there have been few reported cases of people smuggling in Timor Leste\textsuperscript{16}.

Indonesian Police indicate that vehicle and fuel smuggling across the land border are their two biggest concerns\textsuperscript{17}. The disproportionate value of vehicles and fuel in Timor Leste compared to Indonesia drives the demand and there is a profitable business involving stolen vehicles, fake registrations and black market fuel. This cross border trafficking presents a potential for more than vehicles to cross the border, however, there are only 3 land crossing points served by passable roads and much of the “Green Border” can only be traversed on foot or bike.

The international response

After 6 years of direct UN assistance, to rebuild the PNTL, the international community assessed that as UNMIT withdrew there still remained capacity gaps within the PNTL. A number of smaller scale assistance missions / international programmes were established as a consequence. These missions were primarily led by the US, Australia and New Zealand and they sought to professionalise the PNTL\textsuperscript{18}. In 2012 the US militaries Pacific Command (PACOM) underspent and provided some Department of Defense funds to INL for Law Enforcement capacity building within the Pacific region\textsuperscript{19}. Timor Leste was selected as a suitable location on the basis that the UN Mission was transitioning and that the PNTL still had many capability gaps. The Support Police, Sustain Peace programme was launched in May 2012, and within Timor Lester INL sought to support stability and security through a variety of projects. Components of the programme included: investigative training in cooperation with the Australian Federal Police; Community policing programme co-financed by USAID and the New Zealand Aid Programme; assistance to the Maritime Police and Border Police; PNTL logistical and accountability assistance; Police accountability through civil society; and youth engagement\textsuperscript{20}. Therefore TIL/X78 should be viewed as one element within a much larger international development plan.

\textsuperscript{15} Lutfia, Ismira, Indonesia, East Timor call for Regional Forum to Address People Smuggling, Trafficking, Jakarta Globe (4 March 2011).
\textsuperscript{16} Press reporting and official Timorese statements.
\textsuperscript{17} In discussion with Indonesian Police and border officials. Supported by UNODC and PNTL reporting.
\textsuperscript{18} Online International Assistance Programme literature (Aus, NZ and US) and UNDP project documentation dated 2102.
\textsuperscript{19} Email between UNODC Bangkok Office and INL.
Technical needs assessment

The baseline against which the Project’s impact should be measured is the UNODC technical needs assessment conducted in December 2012. The main findings of this report are as follows:

Historically the BPU had been viewed as a punishment assignment. Border posts were located in remote areas and there was limited opportunity for leave\(^\text{21}\). The unit was manned by a number of staff subject to disciplinary action; as a result morale was extremely low. The current Commander had introduced a number of reforms and the professionalism of the unit had improved; but it started from a low point.

Since their formation in 2003 the BPU had not received any regular, structured or formalised Police training relevant to their civilian border guard duties. Although UNPOL delivered several individual training\(^\text{22}\) sessions these were limited to basic police duties. On completion of basic training, at the National Police Academy in Dili, BPU Officers underwent a further two months ‘in-house’ training delivered by BPU staff. This training was entirely military in content. As of 2012, none of the BPU had received any CBT at the Academy, although many of the modules\(^\text{23}\) were specifically designed to assist with their duties. The BPU Commander highlighted a number of training topics\(^\text{24}\) suitable for BPU development. All these subjects were included in the Model Border Service Academy Guide (MBSAG)\(^\text{25}\) which at the time of the TNA was an ongoing UNODC project funded by INL. There were no written Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or Guidance Manuals to assist BPU officers in the field. The issue of language arose during the TNA. BPU management considered that translation / interpretation should be provided in Bahasa Indonesian rather than Tetum.

The UNODC inception report stated that the BPU appeared to be both marginalised and poorly equipped. There was limited radio communications which presented a potential danger to staff in terms of their health and safety while on patrol. There was a shortage of motorised vehicles, and patrolling of the Green Border was undertaken entirely on foot. The BPU possessed little or no computer equipment and information was not routinely recorded. Statistical analysis of data was not performed making the identification of smuggling trends impossible to capture and recognize.

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\(^{21}\) The inception report highlighted the fact that conditions Border Posts care extremely harsh and leave entitlements infrequent making it difficult for BPU personnel to maintain contact with their families.

\(^{22}\) In total 41 UPF officers received some training from UNMIT / UNPOL.

\(^{23}\) Director of the Police Training Centre confirmed that 84 UNODC CBT / eLearning modules were being used by the PNTL, but that the UPF had not received any instruction.

\(^{24}\) Leadership, Human Resource and Personnel Management, Stress Management, Timor-Leste’s Penal Code & Penal Code processes, Criminal Code processes, adherence with and application of internationally agreed conventions with regard to Human Rights, the appropriate use of force, Immigration law, Customs anti-smuggling and trafficking procedures, document examination and the application of Diplomatic Immunity procedures.

\(^{25}\) The Model Border Service Agency Guide was developed by the UNODC Bangkok Office and consists of a complete ‘tool kit’ of training curriculum for all border law enforcement agencies.
Finally the UNODC report stated that while the standard of accommodation utilised by the BPU was satisfactory, BPU offices were not routinely connected to telephone lines and were without access to the internet. There were issues with stable electrical supplies, telephone and internet connections. While some border posts were equipped with solar panels and others such as the Border HQs at Batugade had diesel powered generators there is no budget for maintenance or repair. The BPU possessed very little operational equipment and was, therefore, unable to perform even the most basic search of vehicles, examine documents or surveillance of the ‘Green Border’.

The Project

Between February 2013 and July 2015 UNODC delivered a portfolio of border management mechanisms in support of the PNTL’s border patrol unit the BPU. The sole donor was the US International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).

Table 1. TIL/X78 Donor Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount $USD</th>
<th>Type of donation</th>
<th>Use of donation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
<td>829,749</td>
<td></td>
<td>TIL/X78: procurement, training and cooperation with Indonesian border agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
<td>274,651</td>
<td></td>
<td>Global eLearning: CBT in support of TIL/X78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,104,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Project provided infrastructure, equipment, joint border liaison offices with Indonesia, and conducted border management training at the National Police Academy and border check points.

Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation report represents the final independent project evaluation. It comes as the Project is due to close at the end of July 2015. The primary intended user is the Programme Office for Indonesia (POIDN), which oversaw the Project. It has also been designed to assist the Regional Office for South East Asia and the Pacific (ROSEAP) as it designs a new regional programme. The evaluation follows the standard DAC evaluation criteria of: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned.
Using these sub headings, as the means of presenting findings, the evaluation sought to answer three main questions. Firstly, what difference did the project make, what tangible evidence was there to support the notion that the Project increased the PNTL’s ability to better manage the land border with Indonesia? Secondly, how well did UNODC deliver the Project, what succeeded and what could have been improved? Finally, how can the gains made by the Project be sustained into the future, what elements of the Project will survive, or might be required into the future, and how will the PNTL sustain capability enhancements once UNODC assistance ends?

The evaluation was split into three phases:

(a) Project documentation review and internet search.

(b) Field mission, interviews and observations.

(c) Follow up questions and triangulation.

The collection strategy produced a framework questionnaire through which structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted. This framework questionnaire was designed to guide discussions and illicit responses from participants. Framework questions requested both fact and opinion. The primary means of data collection were:

Desk Review

Preliminary desk review of all relevant project documentation, as provided by UNODC, documents requested by the evaluator, and information independently accessed from open source data on the internet.

Interviews

The framework questions (at Annex II) guided all discussions. A total of 29 people were interviewed. Interviews were either in person or via Skype. Depending upon the nature of the meetings, some questions were not relevant and others asked instead. Interviewees were all asked to consent to the interview and were assured as to the confidentiality of the process. They were informed that quotes might be used in the report, but that their identifiers would not be used. Any information requested by an interviewee to be handled as confidential, was treated as such.

Observations

During the two week field mission to both Timor Leste and Indonesia the evaluator visited four check points, the National Police Academy and the BPU’s zone headquarters. These observations assisted the evaluator to make qualitative judgements based on twenty years of experience of working in the area of border management, and of conducting training. Observations were triangulated with the desk level review and interviews.
Sampling Strategy

According to project documentation, and UNODC staff, the universe of participants / core learning partners (CLPs) was made up of 15 individuals. Selection of interviewees was based on significant involvement in the design, implementation, funding and/or governance of the project. In addition, to the identified points of contact, there were 14 other stakeholders who were contacted (such as UN Agencies and UNODC Staff at ROSEAP). These stakeholders were requested to answer questions, and or comment on the various elements of the Project that they possessed knowledge of via email.

Limitations

There were no major limitations to the conduct of this evaluation. Project staff ensured that they engaged with the evaluator at an early opportunity and devised a set of mutually agreeable dates for the conduct of the field mission. Reading material was provided months in advance of the contract, which provided the evaluator ample opportunity to read the substantive project documentation, and to develop an inception report. As the Project did not conduct an assessment phase, whereby it reviewed the impact of its training there was no raw data from which to ascertain the effectiveness of UNODC training. The evaluator had to explore qualitative data sources and anecdotal evidence whilst conducting interviews.
II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Relevance

Strategic Context

In terms of a strategic transnational threat, Timor Leste is of no great interest to UNODC, the USA (the donor), or to the wider International Community. Timor Leste did not feature in UNODC’s Regional Transnational and Organised Crime Threat Assessment dated 2013 and there is little intelligence to suggest that there are any major transnational threats emanating from the country. However, given Timor Leste’s history, and the fact that it is a young and relatively immature sovereign nation, which has yet to ratify many of the international protocols, UNODC’s involvement appears warranted and very much in-line with its mandate. With fledgling law enforcement apparatus, supported by UNDP and a host of other international donors, UNODC had a legitimate interest in Timor Leste’s border management, its cooperation with neighbours and its response to transnational crime.

TIL/X78 directly supported sub programme 1 of UNODC’s Regional Programme for South East Asia and the Pacific, in that it sought to improve the ability of the BPU to tackle illicit trafficking, and it tangentially supported sub-programme 3, Criminal Justice, by exploring cross border issues and cooperation with Indonesia. The project also dovetailed with UNODC’s Country Programme for Indonesia, specifically outcome 1.1 which sought to improve border security through increased measures to counter illicit trade and trafficking.

The Project supported US INL priorities for the South East Asia and Pacific region which sought to build capacity within law enforcement agencies as a means of mitigating the threat of

26 TOCTA 2013.
27 US State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Safety.
future transnational and organised crime within Timor Leste. Many of the INL’s work streams (of which the project is but one element) were sub contracted to different agencies, and UNODC became one implanting agency in a much larger portfolio of INL sponsored activities.

Operational Context

Given the background, the historical precedence of the UN’s involvement in Timor Leste and particularly the previous police mission (UNMIT), the fact that it was a new nation and required support, it is evident from the evaluation that the Project was the right type of project for UNODC to conduct. The Project should not be viewed in isolation, but as one part of a series of International Community assistance programmes in support of the PNTL and the justice sector more widely. UNDP have a programme aimed at developing the operational capacity of the PNTL leadership, and Australian and New Zealand led police development programmes assist the PNTL with investigations and community policing respectively.

The Project responded to a perceived capability gap and met the requirement of the host nation; although the PNTL did not directly request the Project, and had little knowledge of the Project until the document was written and signed by UNODC. The capability gap was essentially donor identified, and in many ways so too were the solutions. INL had funded similar (BLO and CBT) UNODC projects in the South East Asia Region and therefore already had a preferred solution in mind. While UNODC undertook the Project and provided assistance in line with its mandates, assistance was confined to a limited area; one where UNODC had a comparative advantage and where it knew it could make a difference. Once the Project documentation was presented to the PNTL they did embrace it. However, it took an additional 7 months for the Commandant of the PNTL to sign the Project Document, which in effect delayed the commencement of the project for 7 months.

Design

Project objectives

The Project’s overall objective and outcomes are listed below:

http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/223079.htm
30 UNDP: Capacity building in support of the PNTL.
**Objective**: The Border Patrol Unit of the National Police of Timor Leste is better trained and equipped to control and manage the land border leading to improved border security

| Outcome 1: Effective interdiction of smuggling attempts along the land border | Outcome 2: Enhanced cooperation and interaction with Indonesian counterparts at the border areas | Outcome 3: Sustainable capacity for high quality border management training is in place at the National Police Training Academy |

**Table 2. Project objective and outcomes**

In basic terms the Project sought to assist the BPU to better manage their land border with Indonesia, by ensuring that they were better equipped, better trained and had better cooperation with their Indonesian counterparts. The objective was clear, the outcomes were logical and they supported the objective.

**SMART outcomes and outputs**

The three outcomes supported change in three areas where UNODC had previous experience. While the outcomes were well conceived and played to UNODC’s strengths, some of the language used to articulate the outputs was too vague. There was some confusion, which meant that all activities, even administrative ones, delivered outputs. For instance an internal HR matter, the hiring of a project associate was articulated as an output, when it should have been an input. Too many of the outputs focused on internal UNODC activities and not enough on the planned changes to recipient organisations.

**Recommendation.** UNODC should conduct a Theory of Change (ToC) when designing new projects or programmes. Allow outputs to be the sum of a number of activities and a number of outputs to become the steps to achieve the desired change.

Given the limited amount of information known before the start of the Project and the fact that no baseline study was completed, beyond the TNA, the Project had few measurable targets. Project staff logged numbers of officers trained, equipment types delivered and meetings hosted, but were unable to articulate to what end. The short duration of the Project was not conducive to a full monitoring and evaluation cycle. Within the two year time frame (with a 7 month extension) there was only enough time to conduct initial training, procure some equipment and conduct preliminary border liaison meetings. The duration of the Project could be questioned; however, this was a particular scenario, where one US Department’s funds were re-apportioned to another...
Department. These funds came with strict guidelines, timeframes and it was a “use it or lose it” proposal. While this accounts for the use of previous project methodologies, it does not excuse the lack of thought applied to the measurement of success.

**Recommendation.** Future programmes and projects should provide some mechanism for measuring success. These must be more than activity based success criteria.

The evaluation realised the difficulty in measuring success, particularly over such as short time frame. The evaluation had hoped to develop some case studies based on interviews. However, no suitable incidents were found and it soon became apparent that the Project was only just beginning to deliver, and that the BPU had yet to see tangible outcomes from their training, equipment or acquired border management techniques.

**Needs of the PNTL**

The TNA conducted by UNODC prior to the commencement of the Project should be viewed as best practise. Although short in duration, it closed with an enormous amount of detail and provided a basic baseline assessment of the BPU and their requirements. The report found that there were well recorded training shortfalls. BPU training was entirely military in content and not specifically designed to their civilian police role. No BPU officers had received any CBT (previously provided by UNODC) at the National Police Academy. There were no written standard operating procedures (SOPs) and there was no operational plan. The BPU had a limited number of radio communications, which impacted in their ability to patrol. They also had a shortage of motorized vehicles and all patrolling of the Green Border was on foot. There were issues with stable electrical supplies, telephones and internet connections. There were no computers and very little information was recorded. Statistical analysis of data was not performed. The BPU possessed little operational equipment and was unable to perform even the most basic search of vehicles, examination of documents or surveillance of the ‘Green Border’.

**Needs of Indonesia**

During the inception and design phase Indonesia was not substantively consulted. After two rounds of BLO conferences, Indonesia declared that it was disinterested in taking the BLO concept any further and that it preferred to conduct border liaison via exiting bilateral arrangements. The funds earmarked for BLOs were diverted toward providing more equipment for the BPU.

**Recommendation.** UNODC projects and programme should include a design or inception phase. As part of this phase all stakeholder should be approached and a draft concept socialised. This
would allow recipients to assess what is on offer and their feedback concerns; increasing ownership and the likelihood of success.

Efficiency

Delivery profile

The delivery profile of the Project does not conform with expected norms; which would see a slow start, with increased expenditure during the mid-life point and a declining rate toward the end; as the project closes down. The two main reasons for this are design and duration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yearly Expenditure</th>
<th>Percentage of total approved Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
<td>Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>161,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>262,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>405,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>829,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. TIL/X78 Annual expenditure

Project documentation was written and approved in 2012, yet the Project did not start to deliver until mid-2013. Documentation lacked a work plan, a risk matrix, a budget and much of the detail required to execute the Project; in effect it was little more than a proposal from which to gain funding. Although the Project received a no cost extension, many of the holes in the initial documentation were not rectified. Annual work plans were simplistic and lacked detail. Reporting, although adequate, was simplistic and lacked depth. It reported pure facts, trained 40, procured 10, but failed to deliver any form of narrative which explained why activities were occurring and how they contributed to the outcomes or the objective.

Some elements of the Project (such as BLO) were not delivered and funding was carried forward. The relatively short duration of the Project did not afford much time to increase implementation rates and, therefore, the Project ended up trying to spend the majority of its funds in the last 7 months.

Recommendation. UNODC Staff require training in project management and project design. The initial project documentation was sufficient, but it should have been updated and the detail added over time.
The Project design was linked to BLO and CBT, UNODC projects successfully implemented by ROSEAP, which sought to build capacity within law enforcement and border agencies. It also sought to utilise the UNODC funded CBT suite in the National Police Academy. It built on success and was therefore extremely efficient in the manner in which introduced concepts to the BPU.

Funding for CBT was moved the UNODC Global eLearning Programme. This funding will deliver CBT in Bahasa at the National Police Academy. The rollout of this element has been delayed which means that CBT funded by INL will not commence before the Project ends. This event was beyond the control of the Project.

Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget segment</th>
<th>Forecast expenditure as a % of the total</th>
<th>Actual expenditure as a % of the total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff and personnel costs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating expenses</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisitions</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellowship, grants, others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme support costs (PSC)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. TIL/X78 Actual versus forecast expenditure per segment

The Project was cost effective in that it spent over 50% of the allocated budget on procurement and training. Expenditure on procurement was slightly lower than expected due to the BLO concept not progressing as planned. Border cooperation with Indonesia was mainly travel and DSA. Training was conducted by UNODC staff or international police officers serving within the region and only incurred travel and DSA costs. The remainder of the training was conducted cost free at the National Police Academy. Some students were sent to local law enforcement colleges such as JCLEC in Indonesia, which accounts for fellowships. PSC was standard for UNODC projects at just under 13%. Project operating costs and staff costs rose, mainly due to the 7 months extension.

The project had a 7 month no cost extension, which was agreed by the donor. This extension covered the period after UNODC signed off the Project and before the PNTL counter signed the project document. Discounting this extension, the Project delivered inputs on time and to budget.
Compatibility

ROSEA, in Bangkok, has a long history of providing assistance across the region and had many successful programmes such as BLOs, CBT, the Model Border Service Academy Guide (MBSAG) and Training Academy infrastructure which were included in the Project. Therefore, the Project built on success and was compatible with other UNODC Projects.

The original design envisaged implementation from Bangkok. However, with the donor based outside of the country and Indonesian involvement, implementation was transferred to the Programme Office for Indonesia (POIDN). This change speeded up implementation and all activities were brought back on track, and implemented as planned.

Monitoring and evaluation

The Project was implemented by a national associate in Timor Leste, with an international staff member overseeing delivery from Indonesia. The international staff member also headed the Programme Office for Indonesia and was therefore sufficiently well placed to oversee remote activity while still retaining the capacity to actively engage with officials when required. Annual work plans and reporting were timely and simple. Reporting did not provide a wider view of the project, in terms of context or in terms of secondary/unintended results. For example the number of BPU officers who received trickle-down training was not reported. There was little formal monitoring within the Project and even simple technicians such as assessing the level of knowledge prior to and after training were not stipulated and therefore were not conducted.

There was no mid-term evaluation. Given the limited timeframe of the project, 2 years this is understandable. There also appears to have been no formal governance. There was a very close working relationship between UNODC, the donor and the PNTL. There was sufficient annual and semi-annual reporting, but there are no recorded meetings that agreed the way ahead and the direction of future travel.

Recommendation. Future UNODC projects should include some formal governance structure and a recorded annual review. At the very least this should be a minuted meeting between all parties and a recorded agreement of the next years annual work plan. This does not have to be the complete Project Steering Committee format.
Quality

The BPU reported that the training they had received was of a suitable quality and was relevant to their needs. The design of course material was based on training needs identified during the TNA. CBT was relevant and well designed, however, the fact that it was in Bahasa was questioned by the BPU. This query is at odds the findings of the TNA, where after consultation with the BPU, it was found that they preferred Bahasa. BPU officers reported that they preferred instructor led training compared to CBT, as it was more informative and hands on. The BPU commanders indicated that training periods should be longer, to allow the material to be fully absorbed, as many of their officers do not possess the same level of education as the instructors. In additional it takes time and effort for the BPU to move officers to centralised training locations and therefore fewer longer courses are preferred, as they are easier to attend and more cost effective than short and more frequent courses.

Partnerships and cooperation

The Project built strong working relationships with the PNTL, the national headquarters, the national academy and the BPU leadership. These relationships were made possible by the fact that the Project had representation in Timor Leste and the fact that this was performed by a national associate who spoke Tetum. The Project also developed strong working relationship with Indonesian law enforcement agencies, even though this was only a small element of the project.

The table below lists the key stakeholders and the evaluator’s opinion as the effectiveness of the relationships; gauged from UNODC and stakeholders comments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Programme</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP / Capacity Building Support To Policia National Da Timor Leste (PNTL)</td>
<td>Strengthen the management and administrative capacity of PNTL Headquarters</td>
<td>Good relationship at the senior level. Daily interaction limited to financial oversight through UN system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Federal Police / Timor Leste Police Development Programme:</td>
<td>Leadership and investigative development</td>
<td>Limited relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese capacity building</td>
<td>Bilateral support to PNTL and legal sector</td>
<td>No official relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Police / Timor Leste Community Policing Programme</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>Limited relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Foundation /Conflict Mitigation through Community-Oriented Policing (CMCOP)</td>
<td>USAID funded project linked to programme above</td>
<td>No official relationship, but linked via donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Embassy</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Very strong relationship – linked to many areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Customs and Borders Protection (CBP)</td>
<td>Assisted with training</td>
<td>Strong relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)</td>
<td>Assisted with training</td>
<td>Strong relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Senior Police Advisor Logistics and Administration accountability</td>
<td>Based in the same office and daily contact – very strong relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Coast Guard / NCIS Maritime support to Maritime Police</td>
<td>Maritime Support to PNLT</td>
<td>No official relationship, but linked via donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Embassy</td>
<td>Assisted with training</td>
<td>Good working relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Embassy</td>
<td>Assisted with training</td>
<td>Good working relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>BPU training for SoM and Human Trafficking</td>
<td>Strong joint training. This cooperation has led to a possible fully joint programme being developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German sponsored Port</td>
<td>Customs, port and container</td>
<td>No linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>advice</td>
<td>Working relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
<td>Working to help people effected by armed conflict</td>
<td>Working relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>Beneficiary organisations</td>
<td>UNODC is based in the PNTL and has daily contact which goes beyond the project – strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU</td>
<td>Main beneficiary units</td>
<td>Very strong relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timorese Government: Chief of Cabinet</td>
<td>Interested party</td>
<td>Strong relationship. Participation in World Drug Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste Customs</td>
<td>Minor beneficiary</td>
<td>Limited to a few officials who attended training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL Training Academy</td>
<td>Minor beneficiary</td>
<td>Strong relationship. Participated with facilitation of training courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian MFA</td>
<td>Primary CLP</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian BNN</td>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Customs</td>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNDOC established excellent working relationships with recipients; with those it regularly worked with. UNODC presence in the PNTL HQ enabled it to develop close ties to the PNTL leadership and become a trusted agent. UNODC has not been part of UNMIT and, therefore, came to Timor Leste with a new approach, which was less about top down guidance and more akin to bottom up partnership. After many years of working with and being trained by a UN Police Force, the PNTL welcomed this change and UNODC’s approach was seen as positive. These strong relationships went up into the Timorese Government, as is witnessed by the fact that Timor Leste celebrated world drug day 26 June 2015, and that it was planned for the president to give an opening speech at the (UNODC organised) event.

There were close relationships developed between the Project and the various US INL sponsored programmes. This was a result of the donor being US and of solid networking by Project Staff.
Numerous US Agencies were used to assist with training events, at minimal cost. This format should be considered as best practice. Not only were SMEs utilised, but it was hugely cost effective and also provided the seconded officials with contacts that they may not have already developed. There were also strong relationships at the working level between the Project and the US funded programmes due the fact the US Senior Law Enforcement Advisor operated from the same office as the Project.

Although the Project was visible at the country level and amongst senior leadership within the international community, it was not well coordinated with the other law enforcement programmes at the working level, and many desk level staff where unaware of its existence. As such the Project missed a number of opportunities to cooperate more closely with some of the other programmes. For instance, the requirements for BPU officers to receive community based training and support the overall gender mainstreaming approach developed by UNDP. The placement of International Staff overseeing the Project in another country (Indonesia) did not help this process, as it was remote from Timor Leste. However, there has to be a balance between the huge cost of adding an International Staff position to the Project, to coordinate between assistance missions, and the actual requirement to deliver something meaningful on behalf of the recipient.

Recommendation. Future UNODC projects and programmes need to do more than just state that they will work in partnership with other IGOs and UN Agencies, they should indicate how this will occur and in relation to what issues.

Recommendation. Whatever elements of the Project goes forward into the future, it must consider greater cooperation and de-confliction with partners. Full stakeholder analysis is critical. Areas of mutual concern can then be explored and a joint action plan agreed.

Recommendation. UNODC is encouraged to continue working more closely with other UN Agencies particularly UNDP and IOM. There is a large overlap between these organisations and UNODC has an important role to play in corralling international effort in support of mutually agreed priorities.

The BPU currently does not have authority to operation within the Dili Port, this is the responsibility of the Maritime branch of the PNTL. With the proposed relocation of the port to a more suitable deep water harbour to the west of Dili, they is the potential for a substantial increase in the amount of shipping and the number of containers arriving in Timor Leste; at present the size of the port severely restricts the offloading of ships.
**Recommendation.** Future UNODC assistance to Timor Leste should consider supporting the border and customs officials in the port, possibly by establishing the global container control programme.

**Effectiveness**

**Against the objective**

*The Border Patrol Unit of the National Police of Timor Leste is better trained and equipped to control and manage the land border leading to improved border security.*

Judged against a baseline of no role specific training and very limited equipment, the Project has enabled the BPU to become far better trained and considerably better equipped. The BPU is better placed to manage its land border as it now has a viable operation concept and the capability to deliver increased security. While the BLO construct did not develop as planned, the funds were used to support the BPU instead; there are mechanisms in place that allow border liaison to occur.

**Against each outcome**

**Outcome 1: Effective interdiction of smuggling attempts along the land border**

According to the baseline there was ad hoc interdiction along the border with the majority of interdiction intelligence coming from Indonesian sources. Since the start of the Project there has been no discernible change in the number of interdictions, or the BPU’s ability to generate and action its own intelligence. However, the BPU does now have an operational concept and a lay down plan. The BPU is split into three front line companies and a number of smaller specialist squads. They cover 4 integrated crossing points, 28 check points and the airport. The BPU has a set of SOPs and some of UNODC training and guidance has been encapsulated within them.

The BPU now possesses the following equipment, which aids their mobility, communications and ability to conduct searches.

*Picture 11: BPU Operational Map*
Table 6. Equipment procured by the Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ford Rangers trucks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawasaki motorcycles</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Tool kits provided – sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorola Radios</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Links to the in place communication system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Desk tops for report writing and limited training. Some interconnectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Vital as there are numerous power outages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night visions devices</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Advanced search training required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telescopic cameras</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical drills</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rummage tools packs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit drugs identifier kits</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle inspection kits</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All BPU Officers receive basic recruitment training at the National Police Training Academy. After basic training they are posted to the various branches of the PNTL, where they conduct a 3 month period of role specific training. All BPU recruits now receive specific border patrol training which incorporates much of the training that UNODC has delivered. In addition some of UNODC’s CBT has been delivered to the National Police Academy’s trainers. These trainers in-turn provide training to PNTL recruits, and professional development training to many other PNTL officers. Therefore, as a result of UNODC assistance there has also been an overall uplift within the PNTL in regards to border management techniques and skills. There is no way to fully assess this effect. The only hard facts are that since the project commenced: approximately 650 recruits have received basic training that incorporates elements of UNODC training material; 50 recruits have received specialist border police training; and 122 BPU commanders have received direct UNODC training which they have in turn passed onto their officers.

**Outcome 2: Enhanced cooperation and interaction with Indonesian counterparts at the border areas.**

This outcome was the least successful element of the Project. UNODC took an already functioning concept that had been implemented in a number of other countries and tried to implement it in Timor Leste. The Project document stated that Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) would be established in the regions of Bobonaru, Covalima and Oecusse. This has not occurred due to Indonesia’s wishes, and the funding was instead allocated to the BPU. Due to UNODC’s efforts, senior PNTL managers and Indonesian counterparts are now more aware of effective border management strategies (having conducted
study periods), even if the Indonesian Government does not wish to proceed with the BLO concept.

Table 7. Activities conducted under outcome 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Timor Leste</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mekong Region study tour</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLO conference 2014</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLO conference 2015</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross border training 2015</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Joint training event rather than the BLO conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome 3: Sustainable capacity for high quality border management training is in place at the National Police Training Academy.

Infrastructure and curriculum of the National Police Training Academy has been upgraded and now includes elements specific to border control. In total the Project has directly and indirectly assisted training to over 1000 law enforcement officials. The breakdown of trainees is included in the table below.

*Picture 13: BPU Sergeant using UNDOC funded computer and communications*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Number of Students instructed directly by the Project</th>
<th>Number of Students instructed in-directly by the Project</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BPU Commanders</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Border interdiction, Anti Money Laundering, Human Trafficking, and Transnational Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU Officers</td>
<td>280 (approx)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trickle down training from commanders who attended UNODC training above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Recruits</td>
<td>650 (approx.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elements of UNODC training embedded in the basic Police course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU Recruits</td>
<td>50 (approx.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elements of UNODC training embedded in the BPU recruit course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste Customs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Border interdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL Academy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Crime (as instructors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Crime (as students instructed by PNTL trainers above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL HQ</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Crime (as students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1000 (approx)</td>
<td>1129 (approx)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Number of officers trained by the Project

Although there is no exact way of ascertaining the effectiveness of UNODC’s training much of it has been used in the delivery of secondary training courses. Therefore, the total number of officers reached is many times beyond the reported figures of 129 officers directly trained. The Project documentation mentioned that it would use Kirkpatrick’s 4 level evaluation model to assess the effectiveness of its training; however, this did not occur.

The output of the original Project relating to CBT was broken out and the funds allocated to UNODC’s Global eLearning Programme. At the time of the evaluation the PNTL had yet to receive new and updated CBT modules in Bahasa. There had been delays in translating certain elements of this module. It is expected that this CBT will be finalised and ready for installation by August 2015; however, this is after the Project ends.
Impact

What difference did the Project make?

The impact of the Project has to be viewed through a number of lenses, as there is no single viewpoint. Impact in many ways depends on the perspective of the organisation, be it recipient, donor or participant. Practically speaking, and compared to the TNA (which forms the baseline) the following can be deduced:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Project end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism and standing</td>
<td>Marginalised. Discipline issues seen as a punishment posting</td>
<td>Increased professional standing. Considered to be more mainstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role specific training</td>
<td>None. Almost exclusively military in nature</td>
<td>Basic training, role specific training and development training related to civilian police functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to CBT</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>30 officers with more to follow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Plan and SOPs</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Concept, plan and SOPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Radios, phones and some internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable supplies</td>
<td>Lack of guaranteed power</td>
<td>Generators, solar power and UPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Trucks and motor bikes (see page 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search equipment</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Basic search equipment and night viewing devices (see page 18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. BPU capabilities in 2015 compared to baseline study conducted in Dec 2012.

PNTL

From the PNTL perspective they have been able to draw-on an additional resource to build capacity in what was a marginalised and under developed capability. This additional resource was not tied to any other assistance and it provided the PNTL with freedom of choice. The Project allowed them to pick and choose assistance that suited their needs, rather than accept a one package fits all approach, which had been the case under UNMIT. While the PNTL recognise the
fact that they still require assistance, there is a degree of “assistance fatigue” and any mechanism that provides greater ownership is a real positive. UNODC’s involvement also brought with it international recognition and enhanced (if limited) cooperation with Indonesia.

**BPU**

The BPU has greatly benefited from the resources that UNODC provided. It is materially better off, and the equipment such as night view devices, search kit and motor bikes provide a massive capability enhancement. The BPU’s professional standing within the PNTL has risen; due mainly to the fact that it too had an international partner. The professionalism of the PNTL officers has increased, not only those who attended UNODC trainings but also the other officers who benefited from the trickle-down effect of this training. The BPU has an operational concept and is more widely accepted within the PNTL. Finally the BPU is marginally better equipped to cooperate with Indonesia. If cooperation has not markedly improved, at least 30 officials have been introduced to viable border cooperation mechanisms and it is up to Indonesia and Timor Leste to take this issue forward under bilateral arrangements.

**Donor**

From a donor perspective the BPU is a far better educated and more capable force than it was three years ago. There will be no massive increase in narcotic interdictions along the border. The Project was not able to provide that level of change in such a short time frame. However, the BPU has appreciated the assistance provided under the Project and will be a willing partner when it has to cooperate with other international law enforcement agencies in the future. For a modest investment, strong relationships have been forged, about 1000 police officers have received training and the BPU is far better at managing the border.

**UNODC**

From UNODC’s perspective the project broadly achieved its aim; as highlighted in the effectiveness paragraphs above. UNODC is seen as different and distinct from previous UN Missions (such as UNMIT), and it has been accepted as a trusted agent. The PNTL is appreciative of UNODC’s technical assistance, it is willing to receive similar assistance in the future, and it values UNODC’s efforts and advice.

**Social impact**

During interviews senior PNTL and Indonesian Police Officials stated that the key to resolving tension and reducing crime in the border areas was through engaging the societies that inhabit these areas. For the BPU to succeed they must be capable of understanding and responding to the needs of these communities. One area for development is linking the BPU’s professional development with the ongoing Community Policing Programme. While the BPU will never take the lead at integrated border crossing points, it is the one agency that does have daily interactions with border communities, especially in the remote hinterland where it is very often the only visible instrument of government.
Recommendation. Future assistance to the BPU should include community policing skills. This should not be delivered by UNODC, but should be in conjunction with the New Zealand led community policing programme. This should be a priority issue ahead of the Project closing.

Unintended consequence

The BPU’s primary role is to guard the border; they are a deterrent force with the majority of the public interface being conducted by other agencies. The BPU, therefore, play a supporting role at the integrated check points (the main border crossing points). An unintended consequence of the Project is the fact that the BPU are now slightly better informed and educated, when dealing with some of the threats posed by transnational crime, than many of the other front line agencies, such as Immigration, Customs, Quarantine and the district / national investigators. This has led to a feeling, amongst some in the BPU\(^{33}\) that they are better equipped to deal with transnational crime, but that they lack a clear mandate to tackle it.

Recommendation. Future UNODC assistance to Timor Leste should concentrate on assistance that promotes and delivers multi-agency cooperation.

Sustainability

Continuance

Both the project documentation and the inception report highlighted the issue of sustainability. The project document claimed that sustainability was built into the project from the outset. While the activities relating to the training and cooperation with Indonesia appear to be fully sustainable, this assertion is only partially correct in the case of the equipment provided.

The most obvious failing is the case of the 4 Rangers provided under the project. These vehicles have already failed, in fact they were unsuitable platforms, and the PNTL is now unable to purchase the spare parts required to fix them. The provision of a truck for which there is no

\(^{33}\) Mentioned during interviews with BPU officers.
dealership on the island and which cannot be supported by cannibalisation of others trucks (such as Hilux/Toyotas) was a failing. Conversely the provision of motor bikes has been very successful. These motor bikes were procured with simple maintenance packs. BPU officers understand how to maintain and fix motor bikes and these ruggedized bikes are sustainable into the medium term. The more technical search equipment has been taken onto account by the BPU. BPU officers stated that they required more training with this equipment, including maintenance. While the BPU can maintain it in the short term, longer term it will require PNTL funding towards upkeep and/or replacement. PNTL asset management is a recognised weakness which is slowly being addressed by the US Police Advisor Programme. However, this programme is due to end soon and may not be extended.

Recommendation. Future UNODC assistance projects should consider sustainability in more detail. The issue of the Rangers while unfortunate could have been foreseen and additional funds set aside to offset the cost of repairs. However, this option may well be in contravention of UNODC policy. Instead a more suitable vehicle that could have been supported by an on Island maintainers could have been selected.

Ownership

According to PNTL and BPU senior officers the training received by the BPU has been well received. Junior officers interviewed confirmed this view, and were able to indicate what training had trickled down from their check point commanders. Command level BPU Officers, from the rank of Sergeant and above, attended a variety of UNODC courses in central locations. On returning to their check points, integrated posts and HQ locations, these commanders were expected to train their junior officers. This unofficial trickle-down or train the trainer effect is a cost effective and a sustainable means of training. It has been greatly received and has directly changed the way in which the BPU operate. They are now considerably more focused on their civilian police duties than purely on static guarding and military patrolling.

Recommendation. Future projects should attempt to measure the effect of this trickle-down or train the trainer approach. For this project the second order effects were considerably higher, but the impact was not captured or measured.

34 Assessment management and tracking is a major component of the US assistance package.
**Stakeholder engagement**

The only external assistance that the BPU currently receives is from UNODC, via this Project. A number of other International Programmes assist the PNTL and the other border agencies, so at the macro level there will be continued stakeholder engagement after the Project ceases. Indonesia and Timor Leste already conduct a Joint Border Committee as part of bilateral arrangements and therefore, cross border cooperation will continue at the same level.

**Embedded elements**

At the micro level the BPU receives limited support and there will be minimal engagement beyond ongoing CBT provided at the National Police Academy. Trainers from the academy have undertaken UNODC training with the purpose of being able to instruct these modules without assistance. On the last training package 3 of the 10 students were academy trainers. The academy has a fully functional CBT suite (provided by UNODC previously) and a computer aided learning suite (provided by other international donors). The CBT element of TIL/X78 is still being built and is scheduled for delivery after the Project ceases. A segment of Project funding was transferred to the Global eLearning Programme and this training is therefore sustainable into the medium term.

**Recommendation.** UNODC should continue to monitor the delivery of CBT in Timor Leste and support it through the Global eLearning Programme.

**Human Rights and Gender**

**Human Rights**

The project followed UNODC standardised guidelines for the implementation of the UNs Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) requirements. This included conducting background checks of the recipients of UNODC assistance in a transparent and accountable manner, in order to ensure that human rights were respected both by the participants and by UNODC. There were no recorded instances of Human Rights violations or records that indicated participants were at risk or had conducted violations in the past.

The main human rights issue discussed during the evaluation was the different legal threshold for narcotics prosecution and sentencing. Indonesia has a zero tolerance policy and strict sentencing; with drug smuggling carry the death penalty. Timor Leste has higher thresholds for prosecution...
and far lighter sentences. This disparity can lead to some (interviewees) seeing Timor Leste as a potential safe haven. Timor Leste in turn has issues fully cooperating with Indonesia, as in so doing cooperation could lead to conviction and a potential death sentence. The evaluation did not have sufficient time or access to explore this issue in detail. Interviews uncovered some evidence to suggest that these differences do effect cooperation. Uncorroborated evidence suggests that a Timor Leste official was allegedly disciplined for allowing a controlled delivery to move into Indonesia. Although not conclusive a number of BPU officers stated that they would always arrest suspects in Timor Leste, and that they would not provide information or allow Indonesian officers to make the arrest.

Recommendation. Future UNODC assistance to Timor Leste and Indonesia should involve a legal review and focus on areas such as mutual legal assistance and extraction.

Timor Leste ratified the 1988 Drug Convention in June 2014. Although the total number of protocols ratified was not researched by this evaluation, it is fair to assume that as a relatively new country Timor Leste will not have ratified and enacted all of the UN protocols and mandates relating to transnational and international crime.

The project did work with the UN Resident Coordinator Human Rights Advisor and assisted the Timorese Government in drafting a law combating human trafficking in Timor Leste.

Recommendation. Pending the results of legal review there is potentially more scope for UNODC to assist Timor Leste in ratifying and abiding by international protocols. In addition there may be scope to assess Timor Leste’s laws and assist the legislative in developing laws that are in line and abide with international standards and norms.

Gender mainstreaming

Project documentation stated that female officers would be encouraged to participate in all activities, that project staff would gather disaggregated gender data and that gender sensitivity would be enhanced during training serials related to detention, access to justice and victim support.

UNODC training material provided guidance to BPU officers on gender sensitivity and human rights. Project staff kept training records and gender related data. However, while UNODC can encourage cooperation, ultimately gender participation is dependent on two factors, the number of female officers serving in the PNTL and the PNTL’s ability and or will to change. As there was no gender baseline included in the project document it is almost impossible to ascertain if the
project has made any impact on improving the access of female officers to training, or if gender sensitive training has improved the BPU’s gender sensitivity.

A PNTL assessment conducted by UNDP in 2012 stated that 19% of the force was female. At the highest level equality was recognised as a potential issue and the UNDP’s PR advisor was supporting the PNTL to develop a communications strategy designed to reach out to the wider female population and increase female recruitment rates.

The other police development programmes, such as TLPDP, designed gender sensitivity into their projects in conjunction with other IGOs. These programmes supported vulnerable person units, in collaboration with UNWOMEN established the PNTL’s gender unit, and supported the development of safe houses for the victims of domestic violence/sexual assault in Dili, Maliana and Oecussi. Domestic violence remains one of the most common crimes in Timor Leste.35

Recommendation. Prior to conducting future projects UNODC should consider how it can assist gender mainstreaming in more detail. While there may be some positive effects from their projects, real change can only occur when the totally of the UN’s programmes work together for a common goal. UNODC should ensure that its staff understand wider UN goals and how other UN organisations such as UNDP and UNWOMEN are addressing these issues. UNODC may achieve more by directly supporting other UN agencies than conducting unilateral activities.

It is further recommended that prior to implementation UNODC conduct a gender baseline study and ascertain if there is anything that UNDOC projects can unilaterally achieve. A base line study, could have been no more than a simple internet search coupled with a few interviews.

The BPU currently have 12 female officers, which represents about 4% of their overall strength; this is far lower than the PNTL’s average of 19%. While improvements have been made, in terms of recruitment, terms and conditions and career prospects, the BPU has not been able to emulate the PNTL’s figures. The primary reason is that BPU officers spend long periods away from their homes and families, serving in isolated check points. Most female officers serve in headquarter locations, where they can remain close to their families. As a result, while overall PNTL female recruitment figures are likely to improve, the number of female officers in the BPU is unlikely to increase in the short or medium term. The low overall female representation within the BPU and

35 Timor Leste’s law on domestic violence is just the beginning. Article by the Asia Foundation based on a speech made by the incoming president of Timor Leste 04 March 2015. http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2015/03/04/timor-lestes-law-on-domestic-violence-just-the-beginning/
the BPU’s rank distribution meant that female participation in UNODC training was less than 1%. Training targeted those who were responsible for front line check points and squads, who in turn would train other officers. Few female officers perform front line duties and fewer still are in command positions. Female officers may have received trickle-down training, but there is no official records of this training and all numbers are estimates based on interviews.

Recommendation. Collaboration with other police development programmes is vital to ensuring that BPU officers receive gender specific training, such as victim support and community policing skills, so that even if the number of female officers in the BPU is unlikely to alter in the near term, at least this predominantly male force is better equipped to deal with the needs of the female population. Linking the BPU to the Community Policing Programme is one area that the Project should concentrate on, prior to closure.
III. CONCLUSIONS

Timor Leste did not feature in UNODC’s Regional Transnational and Organised Crime Threat Assessment dated 2013 and there is little intelligence to suggest that there are any major transnational threats emanating from the country. However, given its history, and the fact that it is Asia’s youngest country UNODC’s involvement is warranted and fully in-line with its mandate. The US, Australia, New Zealand and UNDP all provide assistance to the law enforcement agencies of Timor Leste. As the UN agency with a transitional crime focus UNODC had a legitimate interest in Timor Leste’s border management. TIL/X78 directly supported UNODC’s Regional Programme for South East Asia and the Pacific and dovetailed with UNODC’s Country Programme for Indonesia. Therefore, the Project was highly relevant even if there was no clear or present threat.

Overall the project was successful and there were a number of strong points, which can be summarised as follows:

The Project was relevant to needs of the recipient and their perceived capability shortfalls. While these capability shortfalls were essentially donor identified, a TNA did confirm the requirement in detail.

ROSEAP, in Bangkok, had a long history of providing assistance across the region and had many successful programmes such as BLO, CBT and MBSAG which were all included in the Project. Therefore, the Project built on success and was compatible with other UNODC Projects.

The Project was cost effective as it spent a high proportion of the funds directly in support of the BPU. Over 50% of the allocated budget was spent on procurement and training. Training was conducted by UNODC staff or international police officers serving within the region and only incurred travel and DSA.

The BPU is now better trained, and equipped to control and manage the land border. According to the baseline there was ad hoc interdiction with the majority of interdiction intelligence coming from Indonesian sources. While there has been no discernible change in the number of
interdictions, or the BPU’s ability to generate and action its own intelligence, the BPU does now have an operational concept and a set of SOPs.

Project documentation claimed that sustainability was built into the project from the outset. The training activities and cross border mechanisms with Indonesia are sustainable now and into the future. Some equipment such as provision of off road motor bikes has been very successful. These motor bikes were procured with maintenance packs. BPU officers understand how to maintain and fix motor bikes and these ruggedized bikes are sustainable into the medium term.

The BPU is better trained than it was in 2012. Although there is no exact way of ascertaining the effectiveness of UNODC’s training, over 1000 PNTL Officers will have benefited directly or indirectly via the Project. The overall cost was $200,000 which represents excellent value for money.

All BPU recruits now receive border patrol training which incorporates much of the training UNODC has provided. In addition some of UNODC’s training has assisted the instructors at the National Police Academy and therefore there has also been an overall uplift in PNTL training.

The Project built strong working relationships with the PNTL, both the national headquarters, at the National Police Academy and with BPU leadership. These relationships were made possible by the fact that the project had representation in Timor Leste. There were close relationships developed between the Project and the various US agencies working within the region. The use of officials seconded to Embassies as trainers was an excellent use of existing resource. There were also strong relationships between the various other International Agencies working in Timor Leste.

From the PNTL’s perspective; they have been able to draw on an additional resource to build capacity in what was an underdeveloped capability. The Project allowed them to pick and choose assistance that suited their needs, rather than accept a one package fits all approach, which had been the case under UNMIT.

From a donor perspective the BPU is a far better educated and a more capable force than it was in 2012. While there has not been a massive increase in narcotics interdictions along the border, the BPU are a willing partner and will cooperate fully with other international law enforcement agencies. For a modest investment, strong relationships have been forged, and about 1000 PNTL officers have received training.

Conversely the Project had a number of areas where it did not perform as strongly, these can be summarised as follows:

There was a seven month delay between delivering the project documentation and the PNTL signing it, this was a consequence of remote development; from Bangkok. Another example of remote development was Indonesia’s decision to discontinue with the BLO concept in favour of existing bilateral arrangements, mainly because they had not been consulted upfront.
The Project’s delivery profile was abnormal. There was a very slow start and then a rush to spend funds as the Project was due to close. The two main reasons for this were design and duration. The Project was only two years in duration and the original documentation lacked much of the management detail required to execute the Project, such as the risk matrix, the budget and work plan. As delivery altered (eg the when BLO concept changed) the Project found it hard to redistribute funds in the remaining time frame.

Monitoring and reporting were areas of weakness. The Project reported pure fact and failed to deliver any form of narrative to explain why activities were occurring and how they contributed to the outcomes. Reporting failed to provide any wider view of the project, such as context or unintended results. Project staff logged numbers trained, equipment delivered and meetings hosted, but outcomes and outputs were unable to articulate to what end. There was little formal monitoring within the Project and even simple techniques such as assessing the level of knowledge prior to and after training were not conducted; despite the project document stating that this would be conduct in detailed surveys. While very close working relationships were developed there were no recorded meetings that agreed the way ahead and the direction of future travel.

While the BPU are generally content with the majority of equipment procured under the Project, the exception is the Ford Ranger trucks which they are now unable to maintain. The BPU also report that they require advanced training on some of the search and surveillance equipment as many of their officers are presently unable to use it.

The BPU is primarily a deterrent, and majority of the public interface is conducted by other agencies. One unintended outcome of the Project is the fact that some in the BPU feel they are slightly better educated than many of the other front line agencies.

There are also areas where the Project could be used to deliver more than it was originally intended, these are:

Senior PNTL and Indonesian Police Officials stated that resolving tension and reducing crime in the border areas is through engaging the societies that inhabit them. While the BPU will never take the lead at integrated border crossing points, it has daily interaction with border communities in the remote hinterland and is very often the only instrument of government available to these communities. The BPU should be linked to ongoing community policing programme.

The main human rights issues discussed during the evaluation were the different legal thresholds for narcotics prosecution and sentencing between Indonesia and Timor Leste. This disparity could lead to friction between border agencies and is an area in which UNODC could assist. There is also potentially scope for UNODC to assist Timor Leste in ratifying and abiding by international protocols.

Project documentation stated that female officers would be encouraged to participate in all activities. UNODC training material provided guidance to BPU officers on gender sensitivity and human rights. Project staff kept training records and gender related data. However there was no
gender baseline included in the project document so it was difficult to ascertain if the project made any impact on improving the access of female officers to training, or if gender sensitive training has altered the BPU.

Finally, the Project delivered what it set out to achieve. The BPU is better equipped and better trained and better placed to manage the land border with Indonesia, than before the Project commenced. There is coordination and cooperation between Timor Leste and Indonesia, however, this relies more on bilateral relationships than UNDOC’s BLO concept. While there were areas where the Project could and maybe should have done better, these are more internal project design and management issues which UNODC’s Offices in Indonesia and Bangkok have the opportunity to rectify during the drafting and design of future programmes.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

General

This recommendation section expands on the list of recommendation contained within the summary table at the beginning of the report. There are two parts to this section. The first is a summary of the recommendations, which have been grouped thematically; these recommendations are relevant to both ROSEAP and POIDN. The second is a series of options that POIDN may wish consider as it moves forward to either the next phase of the project, or to a different type of assistance in support of Timor Leste.

UNODC future assistance:

- should involve a legal review. The focus should be areas such as mutual legal assistance and extraction between Timor Leste and Indonesia. Pending the results of any review UNODC:
  - should seek to assist Timor Leste in ratifying and abiding by international laws and protocols.
  - could assess Timor Leste’s laws and assist the legislative in developing laws to combat transnational and organised crime that are in line with international standards and norms.
- should concentrate on training and capacity building assistance that promotes multi-agency cooperation.
- should consider supporting the border and customs officials in Dili port, and possibly establishing the Global Container Control Programme within Timor Leste.
- should continue to monitor the delivery of CBT in Timor Leste and support it’s delivery through the Global eLearning Programme.
- should conduct stakeholder analysis, explore areas of mutual concern and agree a joint action plan.
- should consider greater cooperation and de-confliction with other international partners. Particular focus should be IOM, UNDP and the other police development programmes within Timor Leste.
- should include community policing skills. This should not be delivered by UNODC, but in conjunction with the established New Zealand led community policing programme.
UNODC project design:

- should conduct a Theory of Change and map what change is required and then consider how it is likely to be achieved.

- should attempt to measure the effect of any trickle-down training or train the trainer effect.

- should include a design or inception phase. As part of this phase all stakeholders should be approached and a draft concept socialised ahead of ratification. This would build on what was seen as best practice during X78.

- should provide mechanisms for measuring success, that are more than activity based success criteria.

- should indicate how UNODC projects will work with other UN Agencies and do more than just state that they will work in partnership with other IGOs and UN Agencies. It should articulate a plan.

UNODC processes:

- should include some formal governance structure such as a recorded annual review.

- should consider sustainability in greater detail.

- should provide the means for greater collaboration with other development programmes.

- should consider gender mainstreaming in the widest context, in conjunction with, and in support of other UN Agencies.

- should equip staff more ably to perform project management and project design tasks.

Way ahead

Ultimately the decision as to proceed with projects in Timor Leste is for the Programme office for Indonesia to make. It is the recommendation of this report that of the following possible options listed below, option three is the most rounded course of action. Areas that this option might focus on are encouraging greater cross border cooperation with Indonesia through the continuation of joint border training with Indonesian Officials, using international SME’s attached to embassies within the region. Enhancing and increasing inter-agency cooperation within Timor Leste through training and study periods. Consider introducing the Global Container Control Programme to Dili port. Assess the legal apparatus in Timor Leste and ascertain adherence to transnational protocols. Assist with mutual legal assistance and extradition. Consider greater cooperation and delivery with other IGOs and UN Agencies to the extent of investigating co-funded projects and/or joint ventures with other agencies.

Options
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Weakness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Close the project</td>
<td>• Cost effective and most likely given due to the lack of funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Does not assist law enforcement agencies in Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• UNODC presence in Timor Leste is reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Extend the project, reduce expenditure on equipment and maintain training</td>
<td>• Continued support for BPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Continued UNODC presence in Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No readily identifiable funding source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited international support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Focus on technical assistance. Identification of legislative to ratify</td>
<td>• Conforms to UNODC core skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>protocols and training support to multiple agencies</td>
<td>• Cost effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Easier to conduct at distance (insert SMEs as and when required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Continued UNODC presence and relevance in Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Need to identify funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Places pressure on reaming in-country UNODC staff member to become an expert in many fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Possible conflict with other programmes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Possible options: strengths and weaknesses
V. LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons can be learned from the implementation of TIL X78 and could be taken forward to improve UNODC’s performance in the future?

- The inception report, which occurred before the project was implemented, was a great success. The ability to conduct a technical needs assessment greatly helped shape the design of the assistance and ensured that the needs of the BPU were fully taken into account from the start. The fact that Indonesian assistance was not subject to a TNA and that planned activities involving their border officials did not progress as planned further proves the benefit of a design phase.

- The international multi-agency training with Indonesian officers which replaced the BLO conference is a great example of flexible planning and use of readily available resources. UNODC has the ability to corral international effort, pulling in staff seconded to embassies to deliver courses that are consistent, based on the needs of the recipient and cost effective.

- Conducting a project at arm’s length is difficult to coordinate. While having a national associate was of enormous benefit, in terms of language and influence within the PNTL, there was also a need for an international staff member, to deconflict and coordinate activities amongst the other programmes. Any solution has to consider balance and cost. The Project construct rightly focused on the recipient and despite setbacks the Project was broadly executed as planned, the question is what more could have been achieved if its efforts had been better coordinated with other international actors? Would this coordination have been worth the cost of an international staff member permanently assigned to the Project? And was there enough work to warrant placing additional staff in country? The answer is that it would have cost too much and been too unbalanced in terms of work and effort.

The following can be drawn from unintended results:

- By focusing on BPU, possibly at expenses of other agencies, the Project may have engineered a feeling amongst the BPU that it was more qualified than some of the other border agencies present at the integrated posts. Future UNODC assistance should be aware of these dynamics and should avoid focusing on a single entity such as the BPU to the exclusion of the others. It should, instead, focus on the development of a capability in the round, and look at how other agencies make up this capability and assist them all, within means, and, as and when capable.
ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

Terms of Reference of the

Final Independent Project Evaluation of the project
“Strengthening Land Border Control in Timor Leste” (TIL X 78)

TIL X 78, Timor Leste

March 2015
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## I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Project number:</strong></th>
<th>TIL X 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project title:</strong></td>
<td>Strengthening Land Border Control in Timor Leste</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Duration:**       | 2 years 5 months  
February 2013 to 31 July 2015 |
| **Location:**       | Timor Leste |
| **Linkages to Country Programme:** | Not applicable |
| **Linkages to Regional Programme:** | Regional Programme for Southeast Asia - Sub-Programme 1: Illicit Trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime  
Output 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 |
| **Linkages to Thematic Programme:** | Not Applicable |
| **Executing Agency:** | UNODC, Indonesia Programme Office |
| **Partner Organizations:** | The Policia National de Timor-Leste (PNTL) |
| **Total Approved Budget:** | $USD 829,749 |
| **Donors:** | International Narcotics Law Enforcement Affairs, USA |
| **Project Manager/Coordinator:** | Mr. Troels Vester |
| **Type of evaluation (mid-term or final):** | Independent Final evaluation |
| **Time period covered by the evaluation:** | February 2013 to 31 May 2015 |
Project overview and historical context in which the project is implemented

Timor-Leste, also known as East Timor, is a small country about 300km long at its longest point and about 80km at its widest. It has a population of approximately 1.1 million and is located in Southeast Asia at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. It has a coastline extending 706km with its only land border, of 228 km in the west, separating it from the Indonesian portion of the Island of Timor.

Timor-Leste comprises the eastern half of the island of Timor, the nearby islands of Atauro and Jaco, and the district of Oecussi-Ambeno which is an exclave on the north-western side of the island within Indonesian West Timor.

It is divided into thirteen administrative districts: Lautém; Baucau; Viqueque; Manatuto; Dili; Aileu; Manufahi; Liquiçá; Ermera; Ainaro; Bobonaro; Cova-Lima and Oecussi-Ambeno. In turn, these thirteen administrative districts are subdivided into 65 sub districts.

Colonised by Portugal in the 16th century, East Timor declared its independence in 1975 but was invaded and occupied by Indonesia later that year, and declared Indonesia’s 27th province the following year. Following the resignation of Indonesian President Suharto in June 1998 a referendum on self-determination was announced in 1999 resulting in the East Timorese people voting for full independence.

The Core Learning Partnership (CLP are the key stakeholders of the subject evaluated (project, programme, policy etc.) who have an interest in the evaluation. The CLP works closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the evaluation process.
independence. Emerging from 24 years of Indonesian occupation in 1999 there followed a series of transitional and interim administrations supported by resident United Nations Missions until 2002 when Timor Leste became a new sovereign state.

Security was short-lived when again the country flared into devastating internal violence in 2006 destroying vast amounts of infrastructure. The recent history of Timor Leste has been tainted with conflict and insecurity. In April 2012 largely peaceful presidential elections were held and the following month Timor-Leste celebrated its 10th anniversary since its restoration of independence.

Following peaceful parliamentary elections in early 2012 the UN Mission withdrew in December 2012. With the withdrawal of UNMIT and the phased handover from UNPOL to full PNTL control comes many capacity and operational challenges that this project seeks to address. Notably in relation to border control and specifically in relation to land border control there still exists a porous and unsettled border with Timor Leste’s Border Patrol Unit (Unidade de Patrulhamento de Fronteiras, UPF) poorly equipped for its broad role. It will support infrastructure development, cross border cooperation and high quality sustainable training in border management delivered both through the Police Academy and at the workplace. The illicit passage of drugs, people and goods represent the greatest challenges at land border controls between Indonesia and Timor Leste.

Justification of the project and main experiences / challenges during implementation

Among the UN agencies UNODC had a long engagement with public security in the context of its mandates. UNODC possesses specialised expertise in the areas of crime prevention, criminal justice reform and drug control and is able to support the implementation of the various Conventions, standards and norms. UNODC works with international financial institutions and organisations closely involved with infrastructure development. Since 1971, UNODC has had an established office in Bangkok serving the region. In this region, it has developed specially-targeted tools in respect of the Border Liaison Office (BLO) concept, Computer-Based Training (CBT) and Training Academy infrastructure all of which were utilised within this project.
The primary challenge experienced during implementation of this project was the delay in the commencement of the implementation. Originally the project was designed to be implemented from the Regional Office based in Bangkok, but, however, due to proximity and other key issues such as the donor being based in Jakarta and involving Indonesian counterparts such as the National Narcotic Board would facilitate the implementation of the project, it was transferred to Indonesia Country Office. This speeded up implementation and the activities were brought on track and as planned.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document

The project document was designed and approved in October 2012. However, the actual implementation commenced only in February 2013. Here again the project document was actually signed by the implementing partner, PNTL only on 06 September 2013 after which the implementation actually picked up. Certain activities were conducted prior to the signing of the project document by PNTL as well. Therefore a no-cost extension of the project was sought for seven months.

The project has been revised once in October 2014 for extending the duration till 31 July 2015 at no costs, which was agreed by the donor. No changes were made to the outcomes. However, the output related to the eLearning was deleted and correspondingly the approved budget as well, as the funding concerning the development of the eLearning module was not included as pledge under this project by the donor but included as a separate pledge directly to the Global e Learning programme for this activity. No other changes were made to the design of the project.

UNODC strategy context, including the project’s main objectives and outcomes and project’s contribution to UNODC country, regional or thematic programme

This Project links with The Strategic Framework Sub-Programme 1: Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking.

This Project falls within the strategic context of the UNODC Regional Programme Framework for East Asia and Pacific 2009-2012 and 2014-2017 more specifically Sub-Programme 1 Illicit Trafficking and Sub-Programme 3 Criminal Justice.

The project’s main objective was to strengthen the land border control in Timor Leste through effective interdiction of smuggling attempts; strengthening land
border crossing points by supplying equipment; training of officers to control the green border areas; enhanced cooperation and interaction with Indonesian counterparts at the border areas; establishing Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) in the regions of Bobonaru, Covalima and Oecusse and sustainable high quality training on border management at the National Police Training Academy;

II. DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Approved Budget</th>
<th>Yearly Expenditures &amp; Budget 2015</th>
<th>Percentage from Total approved Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
<td>Expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>161,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>262,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>405,380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

Reasons behind the evaluation taking place

The final independent evaluation is conducted close to the end of the project as envisaged in the project document. This external evaluation initiated by the UNODC is also in line with the UNODC Guidelines on evaluation. The project ends on 31 July 2015 and therefore it is proposed to conduct the evaluation in May and June 2015. The evaluation seeks to provide accountability to donor by determining whether the project objectives were met or not, the utilization of resources, to identify areas for improvement and to learn lessons for executing the next phase of the project as well as formulate a strategy after the life of the project. The outcome of the evaluation will be shared with Core Learning Partners / beneficiary agencies as well as donor and is expected to provide insight to the Project Manager and donor on its achievement of objectives and to suggest new strategic directions including exploring possibilities for the next phase of this project and the extent to which it has fed into the Regional Programme of UNODC.
IV. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The Final Independent Project Evaluation will assess the performance of the project in two areas:

1. Progress of the portfolio towards achieving the objective of the project and the status of the portfolio in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, human rights and gender, lessons learned and best practices.

2. Operational performance in terms of relevance and effectiveness of the project governance, management mechanisms and also level of compliance with national context and requirements.

The performance of the portfolio should be assessed against the project result framework, both to show the achievement of the project objective, as well as to review the validity of the result framework as a reporting tool. The final report will represent both project findings as well as the programmatic assessment.

Both above mentioned areas should be thoroughly reviewed, but stronger focus should lie on assessing the quality of project portfolio with the intention to promote capturing of lessons learned and especially recommendation for the future.

The evaluation shall cover the project on “Strengthening land border controls in Timor Leste” from February 2013 till end of the field mission (tentatively May/June 2015). It shall cover the geographic jurisdiction of Timor Leste as well as the land border areas with Indonesia since it included cooperation in establishing Border Liaison Offices with Indonesia. The project activities and objectives are detailed within the project document.

The evaluation report will be prepared in English.
V. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned, and, will respond to the following below questions, however, provided as indicative only, and required to be further refined by the Evaluator.

### Relevance
Relevance of a project or programme is the extent to which its objectives are continuously consistent with recipient needs, UNODC mandate and overarching strategies and policies

| 1. To what extent did the project respond to the needs of the target groups? |
| 2. Are the project objectives and results clear and logical, and do they address clearly identified needs? |
| 3. To what extent are the project outputs and outcomes suitable and informative targets, e.g. are they Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (SMART)? |
| 4. To what extent were local circumstances taken into consideration when planning and implementing this project? |

### Efficiency
Efficiency is a measure of how resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into outputs.

| 1. To what extent are inputs provided/ available on time to implement activities from all parties involved? |
| 2. To what extent are inputs provided/ available at planned cost (or lower than planned), from all parties involved as a measure of cost effectiveness? |
| 3. To what extent was UNODC Regional Office and HQ based management, coordination and monitoring efficient and appropriate for Field Offices? |
| 4. To what extent have all planned outputs been delivered in a logical sequence with high quality? |

### Effectiveness
Effectiveness is the extent to which a project or programme achieves its objectives and outcomes
1. To what extent did the project achieve its planned objectives?

2. What are the results achieved beyond the log frame and the variance between planned objectives and outcomes in the log frame, and actual achieved objectives and outcomes?

3. What is the quality of the outcomes? How do target groups and stakeholders perceive them? What is the feedback of target groups and stakeholders?

4. To what extent were appropriate measures taken to mitigate unplanned negative and positive effects on target groups contributing to results produced/services provided?

**Impact**

Impact is the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term economic, environmental, social change(s) produced or likely to be produced by a project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, after the project was implemented.

1. What difference has the project or programme made to beneficiaries?

2. What are the intended or unintended positive and negative long-term social, economic, technical, environmental, and other effects on individuals, communities, and institutions?

3. What are the micro- or macro-level long-term social, economic, technical, environmental, and other effects on individuals, communities, and institutions?

**Sustainability**

Sustainability is the extent to which the benefits of the project or programme will last after its termination and the probability of continued long-term benefits. Projects and programmes need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

1. To what extent are the project results (impact if any, and outcomes) likely to continue after the project?

2. Is stakeholders’ engagement likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after external funding ceases?

3. What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and how will it impact sustainability after the project ends?

4. How far is the project embedded in local structures that the interventions are likely to continue after the project ceases?

**Partnerships and cooperation**

Partnerships and cooperation is a measure of the level and quality of UNODC’s cooperation with partners and implementing partners (e.g. donors, NGOs, Governments, other UN agencies etc.).

1. To what extent have partnerships been sought and established (including UN agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?

2. Were efficient cooperation arrangements established:
between UNODC and Governments?
- between UNODC and donors?
- between UNODC and executing agencies?
- between UNODC and other UN agencies?
- between UNODC and other partners (e.g. International agencies)?

**Human rights and gender**
Evaluate whether mainstreaming of human rights and gender was considered in project design and implementation

1. To what extent were human rights consideration mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?
2. To what extent were gender consideration mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?
3. Were there any human rights violation reported by beneficiary stakeholder agencies involved in project implementation?
4. Whether gender balance was achieved in selection of participants for training, workshops, and whether gender categorization was reported?

**Lessons learned**
Lessons learned and best practices, finally the evaluation will look at lessons learned and best practices of the project.

1. What lessons can be learned from the project implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the future?
2. What best practices emerged from the project implementation?
3. What lessons can be drawn from unintended results?

---

**VI. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY**

The methods used to collect and analyse data

The evaluation team will conduct a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the project achievements. The evaluation should be conducted in the following phases:
1. A desk review of relevant reports and data that will mainly address quantitative issues;

2. Submission of proposed methodology (Inception Report, in line with IEU guidelines and templates) to be reviewed and cleared by UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit, before the field mission can take place;

3. Field-research and visit to stakeholder agencies, land border check posts at Mota-Ain (Bobonaro municipality) where more qualitative issues can be addressed;

4. The preparation of the draft evaluation report which include findings and recommendations in accordance with UNODC’s Guidelines on Evaluation, to be reviewed by the Project Manager and IEU, subsequently cleared by IEU.

5. Presentation of evaluation finding at a meeting to beneficiaries, stakeholder agencies, donor and project team.

1. Desk Review

During the desk review, the written material that should be examined may include but may not be limited to:

- The Project Document and Project revision documents
- Annual Costed work plans
- Project Performance Progress Reports (annual and semi-annual)
- Training programmes course schedules, feed - back, impact assessment of learning and course completion reports
- Details of equipment supplied for strengthening border infrastructure and evidence of its use in land border check posts
- Monitoring and Evaluation tools of the project
- UNODC Human Rights and Gender Guidelines
- Any other material that would be relevant.

2. Submission of Inception Report
The evaluator will submit proposed methodology including sample questionnaire (in line with the IEU guidelines and templates for Inception Report) to the Project Manager and IEU for review and approval before the field mission can take place.

3. Field Assessments

- Field research, interviews and meetings may include but may not be limited to:
  - Face-to-face discussions with the UNODC staff including members of the project team, international organizations involved in the implementation of the project.
  - Observation of ‘Training in action’ in one of the training courses that may be on-going during their visit. Timing is to coincide with delivery of a program.
  - Discussions with target audience, beneficiaries and stakeholders
  - Discussions with participants of training programmes.
  - Discussions with trainers of the training programme
  - Field visit to the land border check posts at Mota-Ain (Bobonaro municipality)
  - Discussions with officers of National Narcotics Board (BNN) and Indonesia National Police in Jakarta
  - Discussions with participants of the Border Liaison Workshop

4. Preparation of the Evaluation Report

A comprehensive report shall be prepared by the evaluator in English in accordance with UNODC’s Guidelines on Evaluation which will be the output of the evaluation. The draft report will be reviewed by project management and IEU, after initial clearance of IEU, the advanced draft report will be shared with Core Learning Partners for comments, before the report can be finalised by the evaluator. The final report shall be submitted not later than 17 July 2015.

5. Presentation of Evaluation Results
The findings of the evaluation will have to be presented by the evaluator to the project team, beneficiaries, government counterparts and donor, obtain their inputs and finalize the report for approval by the IEU of UNODC, Vienna.

VII. TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

Time frame for the evaluation

The evaluation process shall commence by 01 March 2015. Documents required for desk review shall be furnished to the evaluator prior. This will facilitate him/her to conduct the desk review for a week and prepare the inception report.

Time frame for the field mission

The evaluator shall be on mission to Jakarta, Dili and the border check post at Mota-Ain (Bobonaro municipality) from 18-28 May 2015 for meetings with Project Manager, National Narcotic Board (BNN) and Indonesian National Police and core learning partners based in Timor Leste.

Expected deliverables and time frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk review and preparation of Draft Inception Report</td>
<td>01 May 2015 to 10 May 2015 (07 working days)</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>List of evaluation questions; Evaluation tools; Draft Inception report (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliverable A – Final Draft Inception Report in line with UNODC</td>
<td>By 12 May 2015</td>
<td>UNODC, Jakarta and Timor Leste</td>
<td>To be cleared by IEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation guidelines, handbook, templates, norms and standards</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with staff at UNODC Jakarta; Dili; Evaluation mission:</td>
<td>18 May 2015 to 28 May 2015 (09 working days</td>
<td>UNODC, Jakarta and Timor Leste</td>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>briefing, interviews; presentation of preliminary findings</td>
<td>excluding travel time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of the</td>
<td>29 May 2015 to 26</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td></td>
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### Evaluation Report


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date/Timeframe</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft evaluation report (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>June 2015 (09 working days)</td>
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<tr>
<td>** Deliverable B – Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC Evaluation guidelines, handbook, templates, norms and standards **</td>
<td><strong>By 26 June 2015</strong></td>
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<td><strong>To be cleared by IEU</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporation of comments from project management and IEU</td>
<td>26 June 2015-14 July 2015 (4 working days)</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Revised draft evaluation report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Management: share draft evaluation report with Core Learning Partners for comments</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporate comments from Core Learning Partners and IEU</td>
<td>15 and 16 July 2015 (02 working days)</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Revised draft evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation on Final Report</td>
<td>17 July 2015</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliverable C - Finalization of report incl. Management response (if needed) cleared by IEU; and presentation of final evaluation findings</td>
<td>By 17 July 2015</td>
<td>Home base; UNODC</td>
<td>Final evaluation report; evaluation findings and recommendations All to be cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VIII. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

**Number of evaluators needed**

An International Consultant will be engaged for conducting the Independent Final Evaluation. No national consultants will be hired as it is a small project and there do not exist sufficient capacities in nationals to conduct an evaluation. The evaluator will however be assisted by the National Project Coordinator based in Dili for coordinating meetings/ interviews. An independent translator will be provided by UNODC for the duration of the field mission.
The role of the evaluator

Carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html; lead and coordinate the evaluation process; implement quantitative tools and analyze data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and the guidelines and template on the IEU website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; include a management response in the final report; present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

Absence of Conflict of Interest

The services of an International Consultant who has not been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from this project will be engaged for conducting the Independent Final evaluation.

Reference to the evaluators ToR detailing qualifications and responsibilities

Please refer to Annex II for the details of the evaluator’s ToR.

IX. MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS

Roles and responsibilities of the Project Manager

The Project Manager is responsible for managing the evaluation, drafting and finalizing the ToR, selecting Core Learning Partners and informing them of their role and sharing with them the ToR for comments, recruiting evaluators, providing desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology, liaising with the Core Learning Partners, reviewing the draft report, sharing the cleared draft evaluation report...
with CLPs for comments; assessing the quality of the final report by using the Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports, as well as developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action (to be updated once per year).

Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers. Members of the CLP are selected from the key stakeholder groups, namely the Border Patrol Unit of National Police, Timor Leste, participants in training programmes and workshops, officers of the National Narcotic Board and Indonesian National Police at the Indonesian Embassy, Dili, US Embassy, Dili. They will be asked to comment on key steps of the evaluation and act as facilitators with respect to the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action.

Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html.

IEU reviews and clears all deliverables of this evaluation – Terms of Reference; Selection of consultants; Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report.

Logistical support responsibilities

The Project Manager will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluator. For the field missions, the evaluator liaises with the UNODC Office in Jakarta, Indonesia and National Programme Coordinator based in Dili, Timor Leste.

X. PAYMENT MODALITIES
The International Consultant will be issued consultancy contracts and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. The contract is a legally binding document in which the consultant agrees to complete the deliverables by the set deadlines. The Consultant will be required to work for 35 days from 1 May to 17 July 2015. The payment will be based on deliverables as indicated in table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverable</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Working Days</th>
<th>To be accomplished by (date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td><strong>Final Draft Inception Report</strong> in line with UNODC Evaluation handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>Tentatively 15 May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td><strong>Draft Evaluation Report</strong> in line with UNODC Evaluation Policy, Handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tentatively 26 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td><strong>Final Draft Evaluation Report</strong> in line with UNODC Evaluation Policy, Handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments) and presentation of findings</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>Tentatively 17 July 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance, before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completed travel claim forms.
ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EVALUATOR

Independent Project Evaluation of the UNODC project

Terms of Reference for the International Evaluation Consultant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post title</th>
<th>International Evaluation Consultant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Section/Unit</td>
<td>UNODC, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty station</td>
<td>Home base; missions to Indonesia and Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed period</td>
<td>01 May 2015 to 20 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting date required</td>
<td>01 May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual work time</td>
<td>35 working days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fee Range</td>
<td>(Level C as per ST/AI/2013/4) USD 390 per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Background of the assignment:

The recent history of Timor Leste has been tainted with conflict and insecurity. Emerging from 24 years of Indonesian occupation in 1999 there followed a series of transitional and interim administrations supported by resident United Nations Missions until 2002 when Timor Leste became a new sovereign state. Security was short-lived when again the country flared into devastating internal violence in 2006 destroying vast amounts of infrastructure. Following peaceful parliamentary elections earlier this year the UN Mission is poised to withdraw in December 2012 but there are still capacity gaps existing with regard to the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL) and specifically their ability to proactively monitor and enforce the land border with Indonesia. This project will assist the Border Patrol Unit of the PNTL to better undertake their mandates in this regard. It will support infrastructure development, cross border cooperation and high quality sustainable training in border management delivered both through the Police Academy and at the workplace.

2. Purpose of the assignment:

Conduct the final independent Project Evaluation of UNODC project TIL/X78 in line with the full Evaluation ToR (will be provided once the contract is signed). The Final Independent Evaluation shall cover the project on “Strengthening land
border controls in Timor Leste” from February 2013 till May/June 2015. It shall cover the geographic jurisdiction of Timor Leste as well as the land border areas with Indonesia since it included cooperation in establishing Border Liaison Offices with Indonesia. The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned and assess the performance of the project in two areas:

1. Progress of the portfolio towards achieving the objective of the project and the status of the portfolio in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, lessons learned and best practices.

2. Operational performance in terms of relevance and effectiveness of the project governance, management mechanisms and also level of compliance with national context and requirements.

3. Specific tasks to be performed by the evaluation consultant:

Under the guidance of the Independent Evaluation Unit, the International Evaluation Consultant will conduct the Independent Project Evaluation of the UNODC project TIL X 78 on Strengthening Land Border Controls in Timor Leste. On the basis of the Evaluation Terms of Reference, key responsibilities of the Evaluator include (i) development of the evaluation design with detailed methods, tools and techniques, (ii) leading the evaluation process and assigning responsibilities to team members, (iii) ensuring adherence to the UNEG Norms and Standards, UNODC Evaluation Guidelines and Templates, and the evaluation ToR, and (iv) ensuring overall coherence of the report writing, (v) ensuring that all deliverables are submitted in line with UNODC evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates.

4. Expected tangible and measurable output(s):

The evaluator will be responsible for the quality and timely submission of his/her specific deliverables, as specified below. All products should be well written, inclusive and have a clear analysis process.

- Draft inception report, containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools; in line with UNODC evaluation guidelines and templates (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments).
- Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings and recommendations to internal and external key stakeholders (if applicable).
• Draft evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments).
• Revised draft report based on comments received from the various consultative processes (IEU, internal and external).
• Final evaluation report, in line with UNODC evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments).
• Final PowerPoint presentation to stakeholders.

5. Dates and details as to how the work must be delivered:

The consultant will be hired part time for 35 working days (home-based and field missions) over a period of three months from 01 May to 20 July 2015.

On the basis of the Evaluation Terms of Reference, s/he will carry out the following deliverables and tasks. A time-bound calendar will be proposed when the contract will be signed.

The detailed, tentative timeline for the evaluation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverable</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Working Days</th>
<th>To be accomplished by (date)</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desk review and Inception Report (including revisions according to IEU comments)</td>
<td>0 7 days</td>
<td></td>
<td>Home base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incorporate IEU’s comments on Draft Inception Report</td>
<td>02 days</td>
<td></td>
<td>Home base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Final Draft Inception Report in line with UNODC Evaluation handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>09 days</td>
<td>15 May 2015</td>
<td>Home base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews with staff at UNODC HQ; Evaluation mission: briefing, interviews and presentation of preliminary findings</td>
<td>09 days</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNODC Indonesia Office in Jakarta, Dili in Timor Leste and land border check posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drafting of the evaluation report, Guidelines and Templates; submission to Project Management and IEU for comments;</td>
<td>09 days</td>
<td></td>
<td>Home base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incorporation of comments (including revisions according to IEU comments)</td>
<td>02 days</td>
<td></td>
<td>Home base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments) |  |  |
---|---|---
Submission of cleared Draft Evaluation Report to Core Learning Partners (CLPs) for comments | 02 days | Home base |
Incorporation of comments of CLPs and finalization of report | 03 days | Home base; UNODC/HQ |
Presentation of findings | 1 day | Home base |
C. Final Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC Evaluation Policy, Handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments) and presentation of findings | 06 days | 17 July 2015 |

Payments will be made upon satisfactory completion and/or submission of outputs/deliverables (as cleared by the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit).

Payment Details

The evaluator will be issued a consultancy contract and paid in accordance with United Nations rules and procedures. Fees payment correlates to the following deliverables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverable</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Working Days</th>
<th>To be accomplished by (date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Final Draft Inception Report in line with UNODC Evaluation handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>Tentatively 15 May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC Evaluation Policy, Handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tentatively 26 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Final Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC Evaluation Policy, Handbook, norms, standards and templates; reviewed and cleared by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments) and presentation of findings</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>Tentatively 17 July 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance, before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completed travel claim forms.

Payments will be made upon satisfactory completion and/or submission of outputs/deliverables and cleared by IEU.
6. Indicators to evaluate the consultant’s performance:

Timely and satisfactory delivery of the above mentioned outputs as assessed by IEU (in line with UNODC evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates as well as UNEG Standards and Norms).\textsuperscript{37}

7. Qualifications/expertise sought (required educational background, years of relevant work experience, other special skills or knowledge required):

Advanced university degree (Master’s degree or equivalent) in social sciences, economics or related field, with specialized training in evaluation; technical expertise in various evaluation methodologies and techniques, including multiple stakeholders and post conflict situation; 10 years of progressive experience in evaluation design methodology (qualitative and quantitative models); prior experience in planning, designing, implementing, analyzing and reporting results of qualitative and quantitative studies including survey design and implementation; experience in policy planning and policy analysis; experience in the subject of the evaluation such as law enforcement, criminal justice, organized crime in the UN system is an asset; understanding of gender and human rights considerations is an asset; excellent communication and drafting skills; fluency in oral and written English is required.

The consultant should demonstrate:

- extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods;
- a strong record in designing and leading evaluations;
- technical competence in the area of evaluation (advanced university degree or practical experience);
- excellent communication and drafting skills in English; proven by previous evaluation reports

The consultant must have excellent spoken and written English.

Absence of Conflict of Interest

\textsuperscript{37} Please visit the IEU website for all mandatory templates and guidelines to use in this evaluation: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/normative-tools.html
According to UNODC rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Ethics

The evaluators shall respect the UNEG Ethical Guidelines.

ANNEX II. LIST OF BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS FOR THE DESK REVIEW

- The Project Document and Project revision documents
- Annual Costed work plans
- Project Performance Progress Reports (annual and semi-annual)
- Minutes of meetings of the Project Steering Committee
- Training programmes course schedules, feedback, impact assessment of learning and course completion reports
- Details of equipment supplied for strengthening border infrastructure and evidence of its use in land border check posts
- Monitoring and Evaluation tools of the project
- UNODC evaluation guidelines, templates, handbook, policy

ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

General

The evaluation was based on the standard DAC criteria of: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned.

Using these sub headings, as the overall format for presenting findings, the evaluation sought to answer three main questions. Firstly, what difference did the project make, what tangible evidence is there to support the notion that the Project increased the PNTL’s ability to manage the land border with Indonesia. Secondly, how well did UNODC deliver the Project, what succeeded and what could have been improved. Finally, how can the gains made by the Project be sustained into the future, what elements of the Project will survive, or might be required into the future, and how will the PNTL sustain capability enhancements once UNODC assistance ends.

Evaluation Questions

The questions below emerged from the TORs and the desk review and formed the basic question set from which various other questioning instruments can be developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Relevance of a project or programme is the extent to which its objectives are continuously consistent with recipient needs, UNODC mandate and overarching strategies and policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>To what extent did the project respond to the needs of the target groups?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Are project objectives aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of the participants, UNODC, UN mandates and those of the donors? If not, were/are there tensions, and how were/are these resolved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Are the project objectives and results clear and logical, and do they address clearly identified needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>To what extent are the project outputs and outcomes suitable and informative targets, e.g. are they Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (SMART)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>To what extent were local circumstances taken into consideration when planning and implementing this project?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Efficiency is a measure of how resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>To what extent were inputs provided / available on time to implement activities from all parties involved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>To what extent were inputs provided / available at planned cost (or lower than planned), from all parties involved as a measure of cost effectiveness?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>To what extent was UNODC Regional Office and HQ based management, coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and monitoring efficient and appropriate for Field Offices?

4. To what extent have all planned outputs been delivered in a logical sequence and to what degree of quality?

**Effectiveness**  
*Effectiveness is the extent to which a project or programme achieves its objectives and outcomes*

1. To what extent did the project achieve its planned objectives?
2. What were the results achieved beyond the log frame and the variance between planned objectives and outcomes in the log frame, and actual achieved objectives and outcomes?
3. What was the quality of the outcomes? How did target groups and stakeholders perceive them?
4. What was the feedback of target groups and stakeholders?
5. To what extent were appropriate measures taken to mitigate unplanned negative and positive effects on target groups contributing to results produced/services provided?

**Impact**  
*Impact is the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term economic, environmental, social change(s) produced or likely to be produced by a project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, after the project was implemented*

1. What difference did the project or programme make to the beneficiaries?
2. What were the intended or unintended positive and negative long-term social, economic, technical, environmental, and other effects on individuals, communities, and institutions?
3. What were the micro- or macro-level long-term social, economic, technical, environmental, and other effects on individuals, communities, and institutions?

**Sustainability**  
*Sustainability is the extent to which the benefits of the project or programme will last after its termination and the probability of continued long-term benefits. Projects and programmes need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable*

1. To what extent are the project’s results (impact (if any) and outcomes) likely to continue after the project?
2. Is stakeholders’ engagement likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after external funding ceases?
3. What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups and how will it impact sustainability after the project ends?
4. How far is the project embedded within local structures that the interventions are likely to continue after the project ceases?

**Partnerships and cooperation**  
*Partnerships and cooperation is a measure of the level and quality of UNODC’s cooperation with partners and implementing partners (e.g. donors, NGOs, Governments, other UN agencies etc.)*

1. To what extent have partnerships been sought and established (including with other UN agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?

   Were efficient cooperation arrangements established:
   - between UNODC and Governments?
   - between UNODC and the donor?
   - between UNODC and the executing agency?
   - between UNODC and other UN agencies?
   - between UNODC and other partners (e.g. International agencies)?

**Human rights and gender**  
*Evaluate whether mainstreaming of human rights and gender was considered in project design and implementation*
1. To what extent were human rights consideration mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?

2. Were there any human rights violation reported by beneficiary stakeholder agencies involved in project implementation?

3. To what extent were gender consideration mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?

4. Whether gender balance was achieved in selection of participants for training, workshops, and whether gender categorization was reported?

**Lessons learned**

*Lessons learned and best practices, finally the evaluation will look at lessons learned and best practices of the project*

1. What lessons can be learned from the project implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the future?

2. What best practices emerged from the project implementation?

3. What lessons can be drawn from unintended results?

4. What did the project do well, that could be transposed to other projects?

5. Did observations and feedback alter delivery, if so how?

**Interview Guide**

**Introduction:** UNODC has asked me to conduct a final evaluation of the project “Strengthening Land Border Control in Timor Leste" The evaluation is focusing on:

- what difference did the project make?
- how well did UNODC deliver the project?
- how can the gains made by the Project be sustained into the future?

As part of the evaluation, your feedback is very important. Feedback, whether positive or negative, will help shape any future UNODC initiatives. Your responses will be kept confidential. You do not have to answer a question if you do not wish to do so; we can stop the interview when you wish.

Only summaries and/or non-attributable quotes will be presented in the final Evaluation Report (any quotations being attributed to “a generic descriptive category”).

Thank you in advance for contributing to this evaluation.

**Background**

Ascertain the background knowledge of the interviewee.

**Relevance**

To what extent did the project respond to the needs of the target groups?

What are the national priorities and action plans? Does the project support these? If not, were/are there tensions, and how were/are these resolved?

Were the project’s objectives clear and logical and did they address clearly identified needs?

What impact have local circumstances have on the design of the project?
Efficiency
Were you fully aware of all the activities UNDOC planned and resourced?
Where these cost effective?
What could have UNODC done to be more cost effective?
Where UNODC activities delivered in a logical and transparent fashion?

Effectiveness
In your view did the project achieve its objectives?
What was the quality of these outcomes?
What risks were to project success and in your view how did UNDOC overcome these?

Sustainability
In your view does the PNTL still have capability gaps?
What might need to occur after the project closes out?
To what extent will stakeholders engage after the project closes out?
What elements of the project have the PNTL taken on? Is there a funding gap?
How can the PNTL sustain the capability it has achieved with UNODC assistance?

Partnerships
Who are the key partners in the implementation of this project?
How are these kept abreast of developments?
How was cooperation established?
What more could be done?

Impact
In your view what difference did the project make?
Please give an example/s?

Human Rights and Gender
Were human rights considered during the design and implementation of the project?
Were there any human rights violation reported during the course of the project?
Was gender equality considered during the design and implementation of the project?
Was gender balance achieved in selection of participants for training and workshops?

Lessons Learned
What lessons can be learned from the project implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the future?

Did observations and feedback alter delivery, if so how?

**AOB**

Do you have any additional comments or suggestions?

**THANK YOU!**
The following documents were reviewed as part of the evaluation process, either during the inception phase or during the evaluation itself:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document – name</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception Report TL BPU – Executive Summary (21 January 2013)</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TILX78 Project Doc 07 (1 August 2013)</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TILX78 - Temporary Waiver</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 annual workplan final</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 annual workplan final</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL Signed no cost-extension Letter</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Agenda</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL-UNODC_TILX78 2nd Quarterly Report_2013</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL-UNODC_TILX78 3rd Quarterly Report_2013</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL-UNODC_TILX78 4th Quarterly Report_2013</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL-UNODC_TILX78 1st Quarterly Report_2014</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL-UNODC_TILX78 2nd Quarterly Report_2014</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL-UNODC_TILX78 3rd Quarterly Report_2014</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL-UNODC_TILX78 4th Quarterly Report_2014</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly financial report April - June 2013</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
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<td>Quarterly financial report July - Sept 2013</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
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<td>Quarterly financial report Sept – Dec 2013</td>
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<td>Quarterly financial report April - June 2014</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quarterly financial report July - Sept 2014</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tentative Agenda BLO Conference</td>
<td>Project documentation</td>
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<td>TILX 78 ToR for Evaluation_02APR2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle photo</td>
<td>Open source data</td>
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<td>BLO conference press coverage</td>
<td>Open source data</td>
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<td>BLO press coverage</td>
<td>Open source data</td>
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<tr>
<td>Giving of keys</td>
<td>Open source data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Vacancy announcement for UNODC post</td>
<td>Open source data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The search for common ground Police, protection and coordination in Timor-Leste</td>
<td><a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/534691674.pdf">http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/534691674.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Timor-Leste 2014 Crime and Safety Report</td>
<td><a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/diplomatic-">http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/diplomatic-</a></td>
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<td>Drug bust in Timor Leste</td>
<td><a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/diplomatic-">http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/diplomatic-</a></td>
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<td>The Diplomat: Speech given by Timor Leste</td>
<td><a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/diplomatic-">http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/diplomatic-</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambassador the US</td>
<td>access-timor-leste/</td>
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<td>Fundasaun Mahein: new types of organized criminal operations in Timor-Leste</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/2013/10/03/forma-foun-operasaun-kreme-organizadu-ih-a-timor-leste/">http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/2013/10/03/forma-foun-operasaun-kreme-organizadu-ih-a-timor-leste/</a></td>
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ANNEX IV. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED DURING THE EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Police (PNTL)</td>
<td>Timor Liste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Border Police (BPU)</td>
<td>Timor Liste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Police Training Academy</td>
<td>Timor Liste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>US Embassy</td>
<td>Timor Liste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>US Senior Police Advisor</td>
<td>Timor Liste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CPNATL</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNODC Project Staff</td>
<td>Indonesia and Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNODC Regional Staff</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>BNN</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>US Regional Police Advisor</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Total: 28