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**“Strengthening the State Service on
Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic”**

KGZ/K50
Kyrgyzstan

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This evaluation report was prepared by Mr Angus Henderson. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kyrgyzstan lies along a significant transit route for illicit drugs emanating from Afghanistan¹. This northern distribution route moves opiates from northern Afghanistan, across Tajikistan, through southern Kyrgyzstan and along the silk route into the Russian Federation. An increasing demand for opiates within Central Asia and China is also supported by this distribution route². With limited natural resources, a weak criminal justice system and long standing border disputes, Kyrgyzstan is a prime transit location³. In addition low levels of government spending, corruption and under-resourced law enforcement agencies⁴ pose significant barriers to effective combating of drug trafficking⁵.

This report represents an independent mid-term evaluation of the UNODC project KGZ/K50 in support of the State Service on Drug Control (SSDC), from August 2011 until August 2015. The primary intended user of this report is the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan. This report makes a large number of recommendations some of which go beyond the terms of reference (TOR) of the evaluation. This evaluation comes at a period when UNODC is changing its assistance across the Central Asian Region. These recommendations are, therefore designed to assist the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan transition from delivering a standalone project, to becoming part of the Programme for Central Asia. In so doing, UNODC will transform its delivery, while ensuring that it continues to provide the level of support that the SSDC requires.

Established in 2010, the SSDC was the legal successor to the Drug Control Agency (DCA) of Kyrgyzstan. UNODC supported the Kyrgyz DCA from 2003 until its abolishment in 2009. In the interim period, UNODC supported Mobile Interdiction Teams (MOBITs) until the commencement of KGZ/K50 in 2011.

The SSDC has two interconnected but distinct functions. Firstly, SSDC is a government agency that directly supports the implementation of National Strategy on Drug Control and the Anti-Drug Programme. In order to achieve this, it possesses a number of legal and law enforcement departments that deliver counter narcotics effect. Secondly, it is Kyrgyzstan's primary apparatus for inter-agency and international counter narcotics coordination. As such, the SSDC takes the lead in drafting counter narcotic laws, formulating policy and overseeing the drafting and implementation of national strategy. SSDC provides the secretariat function to the State Coordination Committee (under the Vice Prime Minister) on Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors Control and the head of the SSDC is the Deputy Chairperson of this committee. Therefore, the SSDC is in a position of leading and implementing counter narcotics strategy within Kyrgyzstan and leading the national Kyrgyz response internationally.

¹ UNODC Regional Report <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html>

² UNODC reported in 2009 that 25% of heroin in China was from Afghanistan and this trend was likely to increase. Subsequent reports from UNODC indicate that approximately 15-20 tons of the Heroin trafficked from Afghanistan along the NDR is destined for the China.

³ UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia.

⁴ Synthesis of UNODC reports as per the TORs for this evaluation (see Annex 1).

⁵ 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan.

The overall objective of the K50 project is that “the State Service on Drug Control is developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement organisation⁶”. The project has three donors, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, who jointly pledged \$6,899,800 USD. The project has been revised twice and these revisions extended the project by 2 years, until Dec 2017, and doubled the budget. In effect, revision 2 represents the second phase of the original project, which allows for consolidation of, and continued support for the SSDC as it matures. Although the current project is due to finish in Dec 2017, the introduction of the Programme for Central Asia will potentially see UNODC law enforcement activities extended until 2019 and possibly longer.

The project is highly relevant in the context of Kyrgyzstan’s post conflict development plan, the International Communities development agenda, and the ever-present threat of illicit drugs. The project is highly relevant to UNODC’s mandate and in turn supports numerous delivery mechanisms that UNODC operate within Central Asia. The project responded to SSDC’s needs by providing technical assistance (to develop laws, policy and strategy), infrastructure, equipment and training, and increases their ability to cooperate internationally. Due to the SSDC’s role as the coordinating state body in the area of combating illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the Kyrgyz Republic the project has increased relevance, as it potentially allows UNODC to assist more than just the SSDC to combat illicit drugs; the project has the ability to influence all counter narcotic activity within Kyrgyzstan.

The project was well designed. It had a clear structure and a simple framework. Although the project documentation did not officially record what lessons it learnt from previous UNODC projects, its activities were based on identified capability gaps and the project did not repeat the mistakes associated with the previous UNODC project that supported the Kyrgyz DCA. As a means of tracking lessons learnt, this report examined all the previous evaluation reports, it listed all their recommendations, and explored each one in turn. It is recommended that UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) increase the visibility of its work, so that Regional and Programme Offices fully understand the importance of implementing lessons identified and make full use of the current online management tools.

The project’s simple design provided a clear implementation mechanism, which was well suited to supporting the formation and development of a new agency. Phase (revision) 2 is a logical progression that builds on the successes of phase 1. However, in the changing world – of programming – the project will have to change. The major recommendation of this report is that the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan transfers the project’s current standalone outcomes, into outcomes 1 and 2 of Sub Programme 1 of the Programme for Central Asia. Although UNODC moved to a programmatic approach 6 years ago there is little practical advice or guidance as to how the Programme Office of Kyrgyzstan should move a standalone project into a regional programme. It was evident from the interviews conducted during the evaluation that programming is still not well understood and/or appreciated by many (country level) staff, donors, or recipients and more could be done to successfully manage this process. It is recommended that the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) promulgate practical guidance as to how the Programme for Central Asia will be introduced, and that more widely HQ UNODC should devise a change management plan ahead of introducing future far-reaching change.

The project is well managed and highly efficient in what it delivers. The recommendations that seek to improve its efficiency reflect possible alterations to working practises that might occur once the project becomes part of a wider programme. The one area where the project could

⁶ K50 overall objective - as per the original project documentation.

improve is in the area of reporting. While UNODC's external reporting is highly respected, UNODC reports are long, complex and difficult to digest, and they are often out of date by the time they are read. In a digital world, revised formats are required, ones which cater for the more immediate and visual information requirements of donors and the public.

The project has built strong relationship with the various CLPs. The level of access gained by the evaluator and the depth of discussion are proof of the high regard that other organisations have for UNODC and the project. Despite these close relationships, some minor improvements to coordination could be made, and this report recommends the establishment of a law enforcement capacity-building platform to ensure that delivery of the Kyrgyz Republic's police reform programme is thoroughly coordinated between all international actors.

Phase 1 of the project has been very effective. When the SSDC was established it had virtually no infrastructure and/or equipment. Due to the project the SSDC now possess the tools it requires to function. The project assisted in drafting of the National Strategy on Drug Control and its Action Plan and this should be considered as the main achievement of the project to date. While the project trained over 200 SSDC officials, it did not implement a robust training evaluation system and project staff currently have no means of formally assessing the effectiveness of training and the impact of training across the organisation as a whole. The second major recommendation of this report is that the SSDC (assisted by UNODC) should conduct a comprehensive training needs analysis that examines the SSDC's requirements to train and educate its officials. Under the phase 2 of the project, UNODC should assist with building capacity within the SSDC, by providing education and training of SSDC staff in support of pre-identified capability gaps.

The SSDC now has the tools (the infrastructure and equipment) it requires and a plan (National Strategy on Drug Control) to work to. The SSDC now requires strong leadership to enact change, especially in the area of inter-agency cooperation. The third main recommendation of this report is that UNODC should continue (or re-focus on) supporting the SSDC in the area of inter-agency cooperation. The introduction of the Programme for Central Asia allows UNODC to deliver more than just four outcomes in support of the SSDC, it potentially provides support to other Kyrgyz LE agencies. The programme is comprehensive in the scale of activities and breadth of its implementing partners. While the K50 project will achieve many of its outcomes unilaterally, as a standalone project it will struggle to improve inter-agency coordination and international cooperation.

In addition to the risks identified in the project's documentation there are a number of additional risks associated to the project achieving its objectives, these are: adverse regional politics which influence the amount of practical cooperation between member states; leadership buy-in and the ability of the new chairperson to deliver change within the SSDC; appetite for change within Kyrgyz Ministries to deliver true inter-agency cooperation; and the ending of the US Defence Cooperation Agreement, which could reduce the level of assistance provided from one of the project's (and Kyrgyzstan's) major donors.

There was very little in the project documentation or reporting on the subjects of gender sensitivity and Human Rights. On inspection, training material included gender and human rights modules. Field visits and interviews confirmed that UNODC training and advice had been absorbed. SSDC Officers were keen to indicate how UNODC advice had changed their procedures, particularly in relation to detainee handling and how they were now more human rights compliant and gender sensitive. To have maximum effect it is recommended that the project be viewed as part of the wider Kyrgyz police reform programme. It would be useful for the project to reference UN/OSCE human rights and gender baseline studies, and in turn support wider UN gender and human rights goals as part of the overall police reform programme, rather than introduce unilateral project goals.

In conclusion, K50 is good project that provides relevant assistance that the SSDC and Kyrgyzstan wants and needs. K50 could continue to support the SSDC and try to increase inter-agency cooperation and coordination as a standalone project, or it could embrace change and become a central element of the Programme for Central Asia. The project is well positioned and could proceed along either path. However, it is the main recommendation of this report that the Programme Office of Kyrgyzstan should use the next 6 months to explore how it can achieve full integration under Sub Programme 1 of the Programme of the Central Asia. By combining all law enforcement activities under a single Sub Programme, K50 should be able to expand its delivery in support of the SSDC and potentially other Kyrgyz LE agencies without the need to rewrite the project document. While this move may appear easy, merger will be far harder to achieve, and hence this report recommends a large number of steps that should assist the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan in achieving this aim.

SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings ⁷	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations ⁸
Key recommendations		
<p>The Programme for Central Asia will place all UNODC country level activities into one central programme. The merger of all projects into the programme could take 12-18 months from Dec 2015. This move to a regional programmatic approach will change UNODC's structures and delivery mechanisms within Central Asia. To date there is little top down guidance which explains how and when the change from standalone projects to a central programme will occur.</p>	<p>Document Review, Internet Research, Interview and Observation</p>	<p>Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should develop plans for merging all LE activities (to include K50) under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia.</p> <p>Over the next 6 months ROCA should promulgate a plan explaining how existing projects will merge into the Programme for Central Asia. This should include guidance to donors on funding mechanisms, on merging of activities, a staff chart and a timeline.</p>
<p>Inter-agency cooperation, coordination and information sharing between Kyrgyz LE agencies and between Central Asian States are areas that require significant improvement. The Programme for Central Asia is designed to assist in these areas.</p>	<p>Interviews, Document Review, Internet Research, and Observation</p>	<p>As part of the merging all LE activities into SP1 of the Programme for Central Asia, over the next 12 months, the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore the possibility of supporting other LE agencies within means and capability to achieve the outcomes and outputs within the Programme for Central Asia that relate to inter agency cooperation, coordination and information sharing.</p>
<p>UNODC introduced the programmatic approach 6 years ago. The wholesale change imposed by this approach required a clear implementation plan, if it was to deliver the desired effect. The fact that there is little guidance from HQ UNODC or ROCA as to how Programme Offices should implement programming potentially reduces the effectiveness and impact of this change.</p>	<p>Document Review, Interview and Internet Research</p>	<p>At the corporate level HQ UNODC should look to develop a change management plan whenever it implements whole scale change. At the regional level ROCA should look develop a change management plan that supports the implementation of the new programme. This plan should include stakeholder analysis and plans for stakeholder engagement that support the actual plan which seeks to deliver the change.</p>
<p>The change of SSDC Chairperson and Deputies represents an opportunity for UNODC to reengage with the SSDC leadership and assist it to perform all of its mandated roles.</p>	<p>Document Review, Interview and Observation</p>	<p>Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should continue to develop plans which aim to concentrate more effort on assisting the SSDC to perform its interagency coordination role. This could include UNODC providing assistance to other agencies so that they are better able to work</p>

⁷ A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

⁸ Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

		with SSDC in delivery of the National Strategy on Drug Control.
UNODC and the donors have delivered a similar level of training in support of both the DCA and the SSDC for almost 10 years. Much of this training has been focused at the tactical level and there has been little focus on the senior management level and the SSDC's role as coordinating state body in the area of combating illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the Kyrgyz Republic.	Document Review, Interview and Internet Research	Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan (and donors) should assist the SSDC to conduct a comprehensive training needs assessment, with the view to produce a training delivery plan which seeks to develop the SSDC as both a law enforcement agency and as an inter-agency coordination mechanism ⁹ .
Important recommendations		
Donors are confused by UNODC bureaucracy and the multiple delivery mechanisms within Central Asia. It is not clear what added value there is to having the K50 Project, the Integrated Country Programme for Kyrgyzstan, the Regional Programme (RP) for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries and the Programme for Central Asia .	Interview and Internet Research	UNODC Regional Section for Western and Central Asia should examine the utility of having several different delivery mechanisms within Central Asia. The aim should be to clearly explain the need for and benefit of having different mechanisms, or merging as many as possible into a more coherent structure ¹⁰ .
Using UNODC links with the Kyrgyz Prison Service, under T90, better working relationships have been developed between the Prison Service and the SSDC. These relationships have been formalised and include prison officers receiving training on drugs, use of the Computer Based Training in the SSDC HQ and increased cooperation and sharing of low level intelligence / information.	Interviews	Over the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore the T90/K50 working model and examine if it has utility to be expanded as a means of increasing cooperation between the SSDC and other Kyrgyz ministries / agencies.
The National Strategy on Drug Control (NSDC) has been written and there is an implementation plan. The SSDC now requires strong leadership if it is to proceed with implementation. The new chairperson of the SSDC will require international support in order to fulfil the agencies role as a cross governmental coordination body.	Document Review, Interview, CLP Opinion	Over the next 24 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should assist the Chairman to develop strategic guidance for SSDC, the operationalisation of the NSDC.
		Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should assist the SSDC leadership to develop a working routine that meets the requirements to manage, develop and coordinate the SSDC.
Previous SSDC leadership was centralist and much of the daily management should have been performed by junior officers.	Document Review and Interview	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should assist the establishment of below deputy level platforms and working groups, as a means of empowering the more junior officials to take responsibility.

⁹ This plan needs to include detailed M&E tools so that the effectiveness of training can be assessed and the overall impact of training qualified.

¹⁰ The Regional Section state much of this recommendation is already on-going with the HARP, the booklet, the way they present programmes, verbal communications and regional workshops.

<p>While merging of all activities in K50 under SP1 of the Programme for Central Asia may take 12-18 months, some elements could be merged in a shorter time frame. Most PSC participants in the K50 PSC are the same as those for K22. Many of the outcomes under K22 and K50 already support outcomes and outputs under the programme for Central Asia. Programming could lead to efficiencies in delivery.</p>	<p>Document Review, Interview and Internet Research</p>	<p>Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct a Joint Project Steering Committee so that all LE (SP1) activities are discussed with Kyrgyz Government counterparts, international partners and donors in one forum¹¹; • The Programme Office should map all its law enforcement outcomes and outputs and ensure that commonality is identified between the various UNODC delivery mechanisms; • Explore how administrative staff can be shared between projects, by identifying overlaps and commonality of tasks.
		<p>Over the next 24 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should discuss with IEU the requirement for a joint evaluation of all LE (SP1) activities within Kyrgyzstan, instead of conducting a final evaluation of K50. This evaluation could then feed a cluster evaluation of all SP1 activities across the Central Asian Region.</p>
<p>Increased international cooperation (outcome 4) is the least effective outcome. The more educated and/ or experienced SSDC officials were more likely to suggest the need for greater cooperation leading to the conclusion that a greater emphasis should be placed on education.</p>	<p>Document Review, Interview and Internet Research</p>	<p>Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should further develop their plans for assisting the SSDC to increase its international cooperation. Areas for consideration are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued support of Regional Programme initiatives and ROCA inter-regional activities- DLOs and CARICC etc. • Ensuring that all SSDC education includes an international cooperation element • Examining opportunities for working level cooperation which allows case officers to regularly meet and exchange information with their counter-parts.
<p>SSDC staff are recruited from other government departments. There is a high turnover which reduces the agencies residual institutional knowledge. New staff members require on the job training, which is both hard to schedule and expensive. There is a requirement to conduct a comprehensive training needs assessment, and then devise a training delivery plan so that training shortfalls are highlighted and prioritised.</p>	<p>Document Review, Interview and Observation</p>	<p>As part of the key recommendation to conduct a full training needs analysis, over the next 6-12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should look to expand the training and general education of SSDC officials focusing on the following areas¹²:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deputies. • Middle Management. • Induction Training. • Specialist Training. • Mentoring the SSDC HQ staff. • Updating the SSDC's staff selection criteria, start standards and job descriptions.
<p>The SSDC is too small an agency to warrant the development of its own</p>	<p>Document Review, Interview and Internet</p>	<p>Over the next 24 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should examine</p>

¹¹ The Regional Section state that this recommendation is being addressed through ROCA Programme Governance mechanism, which includes Technical Working Groups and National Level Working Groups. The Programme Governance should function before/while all activities are merged under the Programme.

¹² The Regional Section state that this recommendation could possibly be done as part of ROCA Programme Exercise covering all CA countries and other LE agencies.

(stand-alone) training academy.	Research	mechanisms for developing sustainable training of particular note are the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • continued and expanded joint training with other agencies as a means of increasing inter-agency cooperation; • offering CBT to other agencies; • providing opportunities for SSDC officers to train at other locations, overseas, such as with FSKN and with external providers such as OSCE; • assistance with course design and content review to ensure that all training is relevant and linked to core roles and responsibilities.
The evaluation of UNODC provided training activities does not provide substantive data on the effectiveness or impact of the training.	Document Review and Interview	Within the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should devise and implement a more robust mechanism for evaluating UNODC provided training.
The Kyrgyz Government's police reform programme is primarily supported by OSCE. While there are strong partnerships between UNODC and OSCE more could be done to coordinate their joint actions in relation to counter narcotics and border controls.	Interviews	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore greater cooperation and joint working with other UN Agencies, Donors and IGOs (specifically OSCE); to include the formation of LE/Police reform platform.
The original project documentation includes a figure of 20% female participation; however, there is no baseline study to indicate where this target came from, if this figure is achievable and if not, then what are the reasons for low female participation.	Document Review and Interviews	Over the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should conduct a gender participatory desk review and include the results in the logical matrix.
There is and has been overlap between UNODC gender activities and those delivered by other UN agencies. Rather than implement an independent gender objective UNODC should reinforce mainstream UN goals.	Interviews	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should seek to reinforce OSCE's gender equality programme and UNDP's gender programme rather than devise unilateral activities.
PSC reporting is in-depth and very professional, but takes time to write. Donors reported the need to have a record of decisions, in both Russian and English, shortly after meetings.	Document Review and Interviews	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should look to augment its PSC reporting with action points in both English and Russian, which should be released shortly after meetings.
UNODC reports and research data are highly respected; however, these reports lack the kind of detail that donors require when reporting achievements back to their national capitals. UNODC web-sites are not intuitive and there is a general lack of on-line information relating to the project and the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan.	Document Review and Internet Research	Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should examine its reporting schedule and media plan. External public relations assistance may be required and the eventual aim should be to develop: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shorter and more frequent reports¹³; • Donor sound bites. • Improved web based information.

¹³ This does not reduce the requirement for official reports. These reports would be tailored to the more immediate information requirement of donors and the internet and would report activities, they could not represent analysis as this would be left to more formal and traditional reporting.

The IEU central repository for lessons learnt and online tool for tracking lessons identified is not well known or understood in the field level.	Document Review and Interviews	Over the next 12 months UNODC HQ (via IEU) should look to raise the awareness of Regional and Programme Offices of the IEU lessons learnt tool on Profi.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Background

Kyrgyzstan is a transit country for illicit drugs moving along the Northern Distribution Route (NDR), from Afghanistan through Central Asia and into the Russian Federation.¹⁴ Kyrgyzstan has ineffective border controls, serious economic challenges, high levels of public debt and problems with corruption¹⁵. These factors limit the ability of the government to take meaningful and sustainable measures against the drug trade, which in turn makes Kyrgyzstan extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking¹⁶. Most illicit drugs pass through the Tajik border and into the southern province of Kyrgyzstan (see map below¹⁷).



Map 1. Map of Kyrgyzstan.

¹⁴ UNODC Regional Report <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html>

¹⁵ Summary of the findings and background information from Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia (UNODC – Paris Pact) https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends_Central%20Asia-final.pdf

¹⁶ UNODC Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia a Threat Assessment.

¹⁷ Official UN Map of Kyrgyzstan <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kyrgysta.pdf>

The City of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan is a significant hub for the illicit drugs trade¹⁸ due to its geographical location, which lies on the old silk route. The impact of drug trafficking and the associated criminal activity have serious long term consequences for the political stability and security of the country. The government of Kyrgyzstan acknowledges the serious nature of the challenges it faces from narcotics trafficking through its commitment to this and other UNODC projects such as: K22 “Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossings points (BCPs) and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLOs)”; H22 “Establishment of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)”; T90 “Support to prison reform in the Kyrgyz Republic”; and the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan has dominated the worldwide opium market for more than a decade. Afghan opiates account for 90 per cent of the global supply, and the heroin it produces is worth some \$55 billion annually; with most of the profit made outside of Afghanistan, along the distribution routes¹⁹.

About a quarter²⁰ of all opium produced in Afghanistan is trafficked north through Central Asia along the NDR. The NDR comprises a number of sub-routes and while not all these sub-routes transit Kyrgyzstan, UNODC estimates that approximately 85 per cent of the opiate that flow through Central Asia, passed through Tajikistan and into Kyrgyzstan. The NDR is highlighted in the map below²¹. Afghan heroin is also meeting rapidly increasing demand in the Central Asian countries²². UNODC reports also indicate a growing importance of the northward trafficking routes for Afghan opiates, as they flow into China. UNODC estimates that approximately 15-20 metric tons of Afghan Heroin is trafficked into China annually²³.

¹⁸ Kyrgyz Mol as reported in UNODC The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment

¹⁹ UNODC Regional Report <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html>

²⁰ UNODC estimate that approximately 20-25% of the heroin produced in Afghanistan transits the Central Asian States on its way to the Russian Federation and European markets.

²¹ Source UNODC from <http://www.unodc.org/...ern-balkan-routes-WDR2010.jpg>

²² UNODC World Drug Report for 2014 indicates increased consumption within Asia.

²³ UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia.



Map 2. Northern and Balkans opium transit routes

Opiates Transiting Kyrgyzstan

UNODC figures estimate that approximately 6,400 tons of opium was produced in Afghanistan²⁴ in 2014. According to UNODC data, this is equivalent to 345 tons of pure heroin or 700 tons of export quality heroin. If these estimates are accurate, then vast quantities for opium and/or heroin have transited the NDR in the last 12 months. The actual quantity will depend on the refinement process and the level of internal consumption, but indicative figures would suggest that something in the region of 1500 tons of raw opium, or 187 tons of export quality heroin, or 100 tons of pure heroin may have crossed Afghanistan's northern borders. In addition, a potential 15,000 tons²⁵ of precursor chemicals, required to process this opium into heroin, may have flowed in the opposite direction.

²⁴ UNODC Annual World Drug Report for 2014.

²⁵ UNODC figures indicates that refining opium to pure heroin requires a 10:1 ratio of precursor chemicals to opium.



Map 3. The Northern Distribution Route in detail²⁶.

Within the central Asian region effective drug interdiction and border controls are hampered by insufficient national and regional cooperation and information sharing/exchange among legal and law enforcement authorities²⁷. Moreover, countries in the region often have limited capacities in the use of modern investigatory tools and methodologies²⁸. The recent years have witnessed a declining number of seizures in Central Asia in spite of the increase in opium cultivation in Afghanistan. During the same period (2011-2014) seizures in the Russian Federation increased and the Southern Caucasus experienced a rise in narcotics trafficking cases²⁹.

Other Drugs

Small-scale cannabis cultivation and large areas of wild cannabis growth are present throughout the eastern provinces of Kyrgyzstan. The fact that cannabis grows naturally, to such a degree in such remote areas, presents a challenge to the LE agencies. Although Cannabis is mainly produced for local consumption, the entrenched smuggling networks, widespread insecurity and a drug-based economy, mean that Kyrgyzstan is ideally placed to support the cannabis market and a proportion of Kyrgyz hashish and/or cannabis is trafficked to European and the Russian markets. While synthetic drug use is not widespread³⁰ in Kyrgyzstan itself, primarily due to economic factors, there is an increasing amount entering the country, which is satisfying a local recreational

²⁶ Source: map from UNODC report Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia.

²⁷ UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia.

²⁸ UNODC Programme for Central Asia.

²⁹ From UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in the Russian Federation.

³⁰ UNODC the programme for Central Asia.

requirement. The Kyrgyz Republic has been slow to ban new substances³¹ and there is a very real gap between what are legal and illegal drugs.

Addiction

There has been a steady increase in the number of drug addicted persons in Kyrgyzstan³². Drug use is widespread within all regions, but 80 per cent of registered users reside in the main cities of Bishkek, Osh and Chui Province. The use of opioid substances prevails³³, although cannabis derivatives are also widespread in Naryn, Talas, Issyk-Kul, Jalal-Abad and Batken oblasts³⁴. The number of registered opiate users has increased by 21 percent over the last five years³⁵ and anecdotal data indicates that there are more than 50,000 drug users in Kyrgyzstan³⁶.

Politics

Kyrgyzstan became an independent state in 1991. Although it was regarded as relatively progressive, in the immediate post-Soviet era, it suffered from a number of internal problems, such as widespread poverty and ethnic divisions (between north and south) which subsequently spilled over into inter-ethnic violence. As a consequence the country's first two presidents were swept from power by popular discontent. Inter-ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in the southern city of Osh left hundreds dead shortly before independence in 1990 and again in June 2010, following the overthrow of President Bakiyev. Levels of underrepresentation are especially high for the demographically largest ethnic minority group, the Uzbeks and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation seems to proceed with the minimal involvement of ethnic Uzbeks in the work of key state institutions.³⁷

When President Atambaev was inaugurated in December 2011, this marked the first peaceful transfer of presidential power in independent Kyrgyzstan's history. After the events of April 2010, a national referendum endorsed a new Constitution, which defined the parliamentary form of government. Kyrgyzstan became the first parliamentary republic in Central Asia³⁸.

³¹ In discussion with CLPs. There is a significant time delay (often years) between Agencies discovering substances and legal measures taken to prohibit its use.

³² UNODC Report into drug use in Central Asia as referenced by <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67176>

³³ UNODC Report https://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/CoPro/Web_Kyrgyzstan.pdf

³⁴ From SSDC Data translated by UNODC.

³⁵ The National Report on the Drug Abuse Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic. 2012. The State Service for Drug Control under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.

³⁶ Bureau Of International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan.

³⁷ United Nations Country Team in Kyrgyzstan Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Of Kyrgyzstan Second cycle. Dated 2014.

³⁸ UNDP: About Kyrgyzstan <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo/>

Borders

Kyrgyzstan has many disputed border areas. It has yet to ratify the 2001 boundary delimitation with Kazakhstan; disputes in Isfara Valley delay completion of delimitation with Tajikistan; delimitation of 130 km of border with Uzbekistan is hampered by serious disputes over enclaves. Trust between Kyrgyzstan and its neighbours in the border regions is low, and there have been a number of violent incidents along the borders. Cooperation and coordination between border forces and law enforcement agencies is severely hampered. Initiatives such as Afghanistan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan (AKT³⁹) are trying to sponsor greater cooperation between neighbours, and are a sign of, albeit slight, improvement⁴⁰.

Economics

Kyrgyzstan has a dominant agricultural sector. Cotton, tobacco, wool, and meat are the main agricultural products. The economy also relies heavily on the salaries of Kyrgyz workers in the Russian Federation⁴¹. A combination of the global downturn, falling oil prices and sanctions have hit these migrant workers disproportionately hard. Following independence, Kyrgyzstan was progressive in carrying out market reforms, such as an improved regulatory system and land reform; it was the first Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country to be accepted into the World Trade Organization. Much of the government's stock in national industries was sold. However, Kyrgyzstan's economic performance has been hindered by concerns about corruption and general regional instability which has lowered foreign investment. According to World Bank ratings, the Kyrgyz Republic has slipped from 70th position to 102nd in the places to do business. The country has some oil and gas reserves and a developing gold mining sector, but it relies on imports for most of its energy needs⁴².

Kyrgyzstan is a poor country and although poverty fell from a high of over 62% in 2000 to 32% in 2009⁴³, in recent years this has risen to 38%⁴⁴ with an increasing proportion of the poor being female. The 2011 global Human Development Report⁴⁵ ranks Kyrgyzstan 126th out of 187 countries. The country is in the lower part of the group of countries with medium human

³⁹ AKT is a Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries sponsored initiative. It provides a platform that allows Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and to discuss cross border CN cooperation.

⁴⁰ President of Kyrgyzstan visit to HQ UNODC

<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2015/March/president-of-kyrgyzstan-holds-security-talks-with-unodc-chief-during-vienna-visit.html>

⁴¹ Kyrgyzstan Economic Profile https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Kyrgyzstan

⁴² Kyrgyzstan Country Profile: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16186907>

⁴³ UNDP <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo/>

⁴⁴ Kyrgyzstan Profile: <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo/>

⁴⁵ UNDP 2011 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/humandevreportpresskits/2011report>

development and there are large regional and urban/rural disparities as well as inequalities between men and women⁴⁶. Poverty in the Kyrgyz Republic presents an urgent social and political challenge that threatens sustainable development. There are also growing incidences of HIV infections and increasing morbidity rates for other dangerous communicable diseases which pose serious challenges to the sustainable development of the country⁴⁷.

Organised Crime

Organised crime and corruption throughout the criminal justice system remain ongoing problems⁴⁸. Laws that cover narcotics-related corruption are not well enforced and in 2011 there were no arrests of government officials for corruption⁴⁹. Since then, several high ranking officials, primarily in the MVD, have been implicated in corruption cases⁵⁰. Narcotics-related corruption is likely widespread, especially in the poorer areas of the country⁵¹. Kyrgyzstan requires sufficient legal tools to tackle large drug trafficking networks operating within its borders or it risks the influence of organised crimes within its own political networks. Support to the Prosecutor General's Office and to LE Agencies which can investigate, cooperate internationally, track and seize assets is required in order to allow them to fight organised criminal enterprises.

The State Service on Drug Control

The SSDC was established by Presidential Decree dated 17 August 2010 as the recognized legal successor to the former Drug Control Agency (DCA) of Kyrgyzstan. UNODC assisted in the creation and development of the DCA (under project AD/KYR/G64) from 2003 to its abolition in 2009. Since 2009 UNODC supported counter narcotics operations via the Kyrgyz Mobile Interdiction Teams (MOBITs) under project KGZ/I75. Support to this project finished in 2011 when K50 was introduced.

The SSDC has two interconnected but distinct functions. Firstly, it is a governmental agency that has responsibilities for the implementation of the National Strategy on Drug Control and the Anti-Drug Programme. As such it has a number of departments which focus on legal and law enforcement activities. Secondly, it is the Kyrgyzstan's primary apparatus for counter narcotics

⁴⁶ UNDP: About Kyrgyzstan <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/countryinfo/>

⁴⁷ UNDP 2011 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/humandevlopmentreportpresskits/2011report>

⁴⁸ The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is an annual report by the Department of State to Congress prepared in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act.

⁴⁹ According to UNODC data, there were 5 arrests for drug related corruption in 2013 and 3 convictions in 2014. These were serving MoI officials.

⁵⁰ UNODC data indicates that there were 5 arrests in 2013 and 3 convictions in 2014 for drug related corruption.

⁵¹ The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is an annual report by the Department of State to Congress prepared in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act.

coordination across government, in support to the National Strategy on Drug Control. SSDC, therefore, takes the lead in drafting counter narcotic laws, formulating policy and implementing national strategies across all Kyrgyz ministries. SSDC is also the secretariat of the State Coordination Committee on Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors Control of the Kyrgyz Republic which is chaired by the Vice Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Deputy Chairperson of this committee is the head of the SSDC. Therefore, SSDC is in a unique position of both leading and implementing the Kyrgyz Republic’s counter narcotics strategy. In many ways it is a replica of the abolished DCA, and is very similar to the DCA of Tajikistan, albeit that it is not an independent agency under the president, but part of the overall interior and defence apparatus of state.

The project

The State Service on Drug Control (SSDC) was established in 2010. The KGZ/K50 project “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic” commenced in August 2011. Since 2011 the project has been revised twice and has been allocated additional funds. The effect of these revisions now sees the project extended until Dec 2017 and the funding doubled.

	Objective/Outcome	Means of verification	Baseline
Objective	The SSDC is developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement organisation	Increased quantity of drug seizures and joint law enforcement operations (when comparing situation before and after the project)	SSDC reports
Outcome 1	Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control which focuses on legal, legislative and policy support	The laws and regulations for effective functioning of the SSDC are reviewed, revised and adopted	No revised or adopted Laws
Outcome 2	Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened which focuses on the provision of infrastructure	Improved basic infrastructure and facilities handed over to SSDC	Assessment of SSDC ’s infrastructure needs
Outcome 3	Strengthening operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-	Number of officers trained	Zero
		Training curricula adopted in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for	Training curricula not

	narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training	SSDC officers as well as for officers of other law-enforcement agencies with drug control mandates developed, endorsed and put under systematic implementation.	available
		Number of officers completed the training on CBT courses	Zero
		Plan on development of forensic science laboratories elaborated and implemented	No plan available
Outcome 4	The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained which focuses on international cooperation	Number of SSDC Liaison Officers placed in neighbouring countries	Zero
		Activities in support of collecting and sharing operational information and participating in joint cross-border operations by SSDC through CARICC	No documented evidence

Table 1. K50 Objective and Outcomes

Funding

There are three donors to the K50 project, these are, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan who have jointly contributed \$6,899,800 USD. The USA and Russian Federation are both major bilateral donors to the Kyrgyz Republic and both deploy field agents in support of the SSDC. The Kazakh Government provided initial funding, but is not presently contributing towards the second phase of the project.

Donor	Collected Amount	Pledged	Percentage against Overall Project Budget
Kazakhstan	\$47,209		0.68%
Russian Federation	\$2,100,000		30.44%
United States of America	\$2,752,591		39.89%
Total Funded Budget:	\$4,899,800		71.01%
Unfunded Budget/Project Shortfall	2,000,000		28.99%
Project Overall Budget	6,899,800		100.00%

Table 2. K50 Donations

Opportunities and Risks

Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) which is mandated to promote regional information sharing and coordinate operations to combat transnational drug trafficking. On December 10, 2014, a senior Kyrgyz security services officer was selected as the Director of the CARICC. It is hoped that long standing dispute over the Directorship of CARICC is now over, and that the organisation will function more freely and that international cooperation (between drug control agencies) will improve⁵².

The project documentation indicate that the following as areas of risk to project success⁵³:

- insufficient state resources in the field of drug control;
- drug-related corruption;
- rivalry between SSDC and other law enforcement agencies;
- insufficient material-technical base to improve efficiency in the fight against drug trafficking;
- high turnover of SSDC staff;
- insufficient personnel skills to effectively fight organised drug trafficking and smuggling.

In July 2014, the Kyrgyz government terminated the 2009 U.S.-Kyrgyz Defence Cooperation Agreement under which significant counter narcotics assistance is provided. Without a Defence Cooperation Agreement, certain counter narcotics assistance will no longer be available; although this should not affect UNODC’s delivery of the project it could have an adverse effect on the SSDC (lost training and funding) which in turn could place pressure on UNODC to cover these gaps.

Evaluation Methodology

This report represents the independent mid-term evaluation of KGZ/K50; from August 2011 until August 2015. At present the project is due to end in December 2017. The primary intended user is the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan. The report assesses the performance of the project in five main areas: (1) the improvement of a legal framework in the field of drug control, the enhancement of multi-agency coordination and policy development on narcotic drug control; (2) the prevention and reduction of crimes related to illicit drug cultivation, production, trafficking and abuse through enhanced multi-agency cooperation and anti-drug strategy implementation; (3) the coordination of the SSDC in counter-narcotics activity within Kyrgyzstan; (4) the

⁵² This hope was echoed by many Kyrgyz officials who felt that CARICC had been marginalised and that the change in leadership provided a new beginning.

⁵³ These risks come from the TORs and are synthesis of the risks contained in the project’s logical framework.

sustainability of SSDC, specifically the Government's capacity for sufficient self-generated funding to maintain the SSDC; and (5) international cooperation, the ability of the SSDC to actively cooperate and share information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries.

The findings and recommendations of the evaluation will also inform stakeholders (State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic, UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia and Donor Countries) of the project's accomplishments.

The evaluation included a field mission to Kyrgyzstan where the evaluator was able to meet a large number of core learning partners (CLPs). From these interviews the evaluator gathered first-hand accounts of UNODC assistance, and this represents the primary means of assessing the project's achievements to date. Furthermore, this report includes data and records of meetings with officials at various SSDC field locations. This report uses the standard evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights, and lessons learned.

Sampling Strategy

The data collection strategy is a framework questionnaire (at Appendix VII) through which structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted. The framework questionnaire was designed to guide discussions and illicit responses from participants. Framework questions requested both fact and opinion. All answers were triangulated with the various other sources of evidence as outlined below. The primary means of data collection were:

Desk Review

The preliminary desk review included all relevant project documentation, as provided by UNODC, documents requested by the evaluator, and information independently accessed from open source data on the internet.

Interviews

The framework questions (at Annex II) guided all discussions. A total of 64 people were interviewed. Interviews were mainly in person, where that was not achievable they were conducted via Skype. Depending upon the nature of the meetings, some questions were not relevant and others asked instead. Interviewees were all asked to consent to the interview and were assured as to the confidentiality of the process. They were informed that quotes might be used in the report, but that their identifiers would not be used. Any information requested by an interviewee to be handled as confidential, was treated as such.

Observations

During the field mission the evaluator visited a number of SSDC field locations and was able to observe both daily routine and some training events. These observations assisted the evaluator to make qualitative judgements based on twenty years of experience delivering capacity building training. Observations were then triangulated with desk level reviews and interviews.

Previous Evaluations

K50 was preceded by G64⁵⁴, which supported the Kyrgyz DCA until it was abolished in 2009. It is also linked to I75⁵⁵ the development of Counter Narcotic Mobile Interdiction team. H03⁵⁶ support to the Tajik DCA and K22⁵⁷ which deals with border liaison offices are also relevant to this project. An assessment of all these evaluations were used as means of baselining K50’s activities and providing additional evidence.

Limitations

There were no major limitations to the conduct of this evaluation. Project staff ensured that they engaged with the evaluator at an early opportunity and devised a set of mutually agreeable dates for the conduct of the field mission. Due to the fact that UNODC provided training was not evaluated or assessed during its delivery the project staff and therefore the evaluation have no way of quantitatively assessing the effectiveness and/or impact of this training, beyond conducting interviews with SSDC officers who had attended training. The US State Department, through INL, did conduct a review of all the training that it has provided to drug law enforcement agencies across Central Asia, which included surveys and focus groups involving participants of the UNODC provided training events. This evaluation did not have the time or the resources to conduct a comparable study and relied on data provided by INL.

⁵⁴ UNODC project KYR/G64 “Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.”

⁵⁵ UNODC project KGZ/175 “Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan.”

⁵⁶ UNODC project TAJ/H03 “Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA).”

⁵⁷ UNODC project CA/K22 “Border Liaison Offices (BLO).”

II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Relevance

Kyrgyz Government

The Kyrgyz Republic has undertaken intensive efforts aimed at building and strengthening the democratic state, ensuring sustainable development, overcoming internal problems (the legacy of the past) and preventing emerging risks and challenges⁵⁸. The National Sustainable Development Strategy (published in January 2013) indicates how the Kyrgyz Republic, in partnership with government agencies, civil society and international organizations will respond to meet Kyrgyzstan's development challenges⁵⁹. President Atambayev⁶⁰ has stated that reducing drug trafficking remains a priority. He has provided political support to narcotics agencies in the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), and the State Border Guard Service, and has emphasized improving the capacity of the SSDC, which is responsible for coordinating all counter narcotics activities in the country⁶¹.

International assistance in Kyrgyzstan

As a State emerging from conflict, Kyrgyzstan has a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) which analyses how the UN can effectively respond to the Kyrgyz Republic's development priorities. It is guided by the goals of the Millennium Declaration and the Government's own Programmes and Action Plans. The UNDAF, in turn, translates these plans into a common operational framework of development activities, upon which individual United Nations organizations formulate their action plans. The current UNDAF, which is relevant to the project, covers the period of 2012-2016. UNODC was party to the development of this UNDAF and is a contributing agency towards its implementation; along the Peace and Cohesion, Effective

⁵⁸ UNCT <http://www.un.org/kg/en/publications/article/publications/by-agency/55-united-nations-office-of-commissioner-for-human-ri/4707-joint-un-country-team-s-in-the-kyrgyz-republic-submission-for-the-upr-process>

⁵⁹ UNCT website <http://www.un.org/kg/en/kyrgyzstan/overview>

⁶⁰ Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Of Kyrgyzstan <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54c0b92c4.pdf>

⁶¹ UNDP <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home.html>

Democratic Governance, and Human Rights pillar⁶². Therefore, the project is highly relevant to the Kyrgyz Government and their development agenda.

Donors

The United States Embassy’s stated law enforcement policy objectives in Kyrgyzstan are to strengthen the existing capacity of law enforcement bodies, expand its ability to investigate and prosecute criminal cases, enhance anti-corruption efforts, and increase overall security in the country; in particular support to the SSDC-developed national counter-narcotics program⁶³.

The Russian Federation’s interests are driven by three factors: a. its geographical proximity to Kyrgyzstan; b. close historical links; and c. the threat posed by opiates emanating from Afghanistan, which transit the northern distribution route into the Russian Federation.

UNODC Mandates

K50 contributes towards UNODC’s Strategic Framework, Sub programme 1: Countering transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking and illicit drug trafficking by ensuring that [b] Member States are equipped to take effective action against transnational organized crime, including: drug trafficking; money-laundering; trafficking in persons; smuggling of migrants; illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms; and emerging policy issues as mentioned in General Assembly resolution 64/179.

K50 also contributes toward the following UNODC Programmes:

Programme	Area	Outcome
Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries	Sub-Programme 1	Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation - outcomes 1.1 and 1.2
Strategic Outline for Central Asia and Southern Caucasus 2012-2015: A Comprehensive Approach to Implement UNODC’s Drug And Crime Mandate	Regional Office for Central Asia, priority areas 1 and 2	Greater regional cooperation and countering transnational organized crime and drug trafficking
The Programme for Central Asia	Sub-programme 1	Countering transnational organised crime, illicit drug trafficking and preventing terrorism - outcomes 1.1. and 1.2

⁶² UNDAF for Kyrgyzstan 2012 – 2016 <http://www.unesco.kz/new/en/unesco/news/2661/>

⁶³ 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan.

UNODC's Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016	Sub-programme 1	Outcome 1.1. "Drug and crime legislative and regulatory frameworks improved"
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Table 3. UNODC Programmes to which K50 contributes.

UNODC activities in the Kyrgyz Republic contribute to a number of different UNODC programmes. While the project is relevant to all the programmes, there does appear to be considerable overlap between the various programmes. Financial apportionment, staff structures and reporting are complex and hard to understand⁶⁴. The new Programme for Central Asia is an overarching strategic framework under which UNODC provides technical assistance within the Central Asian States. It aims to deliver effect in an integrated and comprehensive manner rather than via a series of standalone projects.⁶⁵ However, at the time of the evaluation there is little practical guidance as to how this Programme will be implemented, compared to the series of standalone projects that currently exist. Most of the project staff interviewed, were unaware of the new programme, and had little to no understanding of how it would or could affect them or the project. There is an urgent requirement for ROCA to promulgate a plan explaining how existing projects will be merged into the Programme for Central Asia (Recommendation 8). Despite UNODC's move to a programming approach, over the last 5-6 years, there is little practical advice to guide staff in its implementation. Without firm guidance, there is a potential risk that the overall effects that HQ UNODC wished to achieve, through programming, may not materialise. Without understanding why or how change will take place, staff can become confused and resistant to top down mandated change. Before implementing whole scale change HQ UNODC should aim to develop a change management plan which seeks to engage all stakeholders and explain why and how change will occur. (Recommendation 10). All but one of the CLP's interviewed were unaware that there was Programme for Central Asia. Most (including donors) were confused by the various layers of UNODC administration and failed to see what difference they made. Viewed from a country level perspective, what mattered was internal delivery and how external (regional) cooperation would occur. While the project is highly relevant to UNODC on a number of levels, exactly where the project sits within UNODC's hierarchy is unclear to the average CLP. UNODC's Regional Section for West and Central Asia should examine the utility of having so many projects and programmes in the medium to long term (Recommendation 9).

⁶⁴ In discussion with donors.

⁶⁵ https://www.unodc.org/documents/centralasia//MOU/programme_for_central_asia_2015-2019_en.pdf

The State Service on Drug Control

Despite previous UNODC and bilateral donor assistance to the DCA, when the SSDC was formed, in 2011, it possessed very little infrastructure and equipment. Most of the DCA’s equipment and infrastructure had been given to the ministry of the interior. The initial scoping for the project identified the following capability gaps⁶⁶: insufficient state resources in the field of drug control; no national level strategy or plan; high levels of drug-related corruption; rivalry between SSDC and other law enforcement agencies; insufficient material-technical base; high turnover of SSDC staff; and insufficient personnel and collective skills to fight organised drug trafficking and smuggling. The SSDC, therefore, had very little in terms of infrastructure and equipment before the commencement of the project, and the project was highly relevant and responsive to their needs.

As the agency mandated to coordinate the Kyrgyz Republic’s counter narcotics response, UNODC’s assistance to the SSDC is highly relevant. The fact that the SSDC is more than a LE agency, that is has a comprehensive mandate which aligns to many of the same areas of work as UNODC’s makes the project even more relevant. In light of a programming approach and the introduction of the Programme for Central Asia, UNODC should develop plans for merging all LE activities in Kyrgyzstan under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia (Recommendation 7). While merging all activities might take many months there are a number of quick wins which are discussed in greater detail in the effectiveness paragraph.

Conclusion: The project is extremely relevant to the Kyrgyz Government in that it provides legal, legislative and policy support to the Government’s central counter narcotics agency, the SSDC. The project further supports the SSDC through the provision of infrastructure, training and equipment and assists them to cooperate internationally. The project is highly relevant to the SSDC. As a newly formed body they lacked the expertise required to effectively assist the Government. In addition, when they were formed they had limited infrastructure, no training and little equipment.

Design

The project is in essence simple in its design and in its delivery. That is not to say that implementation and delivery are simple in practise, only that the framework in which the project operates is logical and simply stated. Although there is no formal record of the project’s design incorporating lessons from other projects, there is evidence that the project did learn lessons, or at least did not repeat the mistakes from the implementation of other projects, namely those which

⁶⁶ As assessed by UNODC in the original project documentation.

supported the Kyrgyz DCA, MOBITs and the Tajik DCA. Chapter V, which refers to lessons learned, explores what lessons can be drawn from these previous projects to K50.

The project has been revised on two occasions. The initial project was to run from 15 August 2011 – 15 August 2013 (2 years). Revision 1 was a no cost extension which extended the project until 15 December 2014 (3 years 4 months). Revision 2 (or phase 2) extends the project until 15 December 2017 (for a total of 5 years 4 months), and it increased the budget by approximately 100%. These revisions were not introduced to correct errors in the original design, they were, instead, added to increase the time required to deliver project outcomes and to provide the resources for a second phase.

K50's overall objective is *that* "the SSDC developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement organization. While this objective does not elaborate the SSDC's role across government, it does accurately describe the SSDC's primary function and where it sits within the Kyrgyz Government".

The Project's outcomes are as follows:

No	Outcome	Areas of focus
One	Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control	Legal ,legislative and policy support
Two	Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened.	Provision of infrastructure
Three	Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.	Equip and train
Four	The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained.	International cooperation

Table 4. Project Outcomes

Building on the outcomes above the project was able to generate a series of consistent outputs and activities that over time sought to achieve the expected outcomes by: supporting the drafting of policy and laws; providing infrastructure (new builds and refurbishment); training SSDC officers and providing specialist equipment (vehicles, search equipment, a laboratory and a library); and enhancing international cooperation with regional partners, the deployment of drug liaison officers and support to CARICC.

The SSDC, donors and the Kyrgyz Government were kept full abreast of the project’s progress and all parties were fully involved in the project’s steering committee (PSC). Meticulous notes, which were then published as standalone documents, highlight the detail that was covered during each PSC and the level of ownership achieved by the SSDC. Revisions to delivery and particularly alterations to the outcomes and outputs (in rev 2) were conducted in full conjunction with the SSDC and pertained to their changing requirements.

Although the Project’s Steering Committee’s (PSC’s) rephrased outcomes 1, 2 and added some new outputs and activities in revision 2, in essence the project remains broadly the same as the original design; phase 2 reflects the needs of a maturing SSDC.

There have been 10 PSC meetings since the project commenced. The post PSC publications are impressive in the level of detail that they recorded. Donors requested that due to the length of time it takes to produce these publications, it would be useful for UNODC to provide a record of decisions, shortly after the PSC; preferably in both Russian and English (recommendation 23). In addition donors requested that K50 continue to update them on a regular basis⁶⁷.

The SSDC Chairperson and many of the deputies have recently been replaced⁶⁸ for a failure to ensure that the SSDC fulfilled its coordination role across government⁶⁹. This change of leadership now presents an opportunity for UNODC to further the project’s objectives. The Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan is well aware of these facts and is encouraged to continue to develop their plans for assisting the SSDC to perform its interagency coordination role (recommendation 1). The following activities could (subject to PSC approval) commence under outcome 3, assistance: to the Chairman, to develop strategic guidance for the operationalisation of the Drug Control Strategy (recommendation 2); to the Chairman, Deputies and Department Heads to develop a new SSDC working routine (recommendation 3); to the SSDC, to establish below deputy level platforms and working groups across government (recommendation 4).

Conclusion: The project is highly relevant to the needs and priorities of the SSDC. It provided them with much of the support (legal, infrastructure, equipment and training) that they required to build the agency. Over the last 4 years the project has been responsive to their changing requirements, through PSC meetings, and has provided assistance which has allowed them to mature. The project is simple in its design and delivery, the outcome and outputs are logical, well thought out and responsive to the needs of the SSDC. As the SSDC evolves so too will the

⁶⁷ Donors would like to receive a projected list of activities every month. Donors would like to know what is planned and have the option of attending, if appropriate. Donors should not have to wait for a report after an event to know which events were/are taking place. K-50 has started to provide this level of information and it is highly appreciated.

⁶⁸ The Chairman and the majority of his Deputies had only been in post one week at the time of the evaluation.

⁶⁹ In conversation with numerous Kyrgyz officials, to include a member of reviewing body that recommended the removal of the previous Chairman.

project. One area that requires additional support is the inter-agency coordination role that the SSDC should perform across government.

Efficiency

Staff Structures

Project Staff	Support Staff	Comments
International Project Coordinator and head of Programme Office (Law Enforcement background)	Administrative Assistant (generalist)	With this structure being repeated throughout the Programme Office, in other projects, there might be some utility in pooling support staff in order to free up resource and generate additional specialists.
National Project Coordinator (generalist/legal PHD and previous work with OSCE)	Finance Assistant (generalist)	

Table 5. K50 Staff Structures

The project is extremely well run and administrated. The project team is well led, hardworking and dedicated. The filing system is comprehensive, well managed and all relevant documents are stored both electronically and filed as hard copies. Everything requested for the evaluation was provided and the evaluator was able to use the extensive filing system to data mine information.

The project (under phase 1) has been (and will be, until the Karakol SSDC station is finally built) focused on procurement of equipment and infrastructure, in addition to providing regular training activities. This produced a heavy administrative burden on the team. Other projects⁷⁰ have taken on additional staff to cope with similar levels of work. Under recommendation 7, which seeks to move all LE activities under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia, there should be scope to (a) pool administrative staff, allowing them to work where there is the greatest need, and (b) possibly free up additional resources which can be dedicated towards the provision of technical assistance. The majority of the project staff (and Programme Office staff on the whole) are generalists and few possess a background which allows them to directly provide technical assistance, mentoring or specialist advice (recommendation 7.3).

⁷⁰ T90 took on a second administrative assistant in 2014.

Implementation

The project kept to a simple plan, delivered activities with the full support of the SSDC and achieved implementation rates of 98% at the end of phase 1⁷¹. The chart below indicates when funds were apportioned to the project by donors, and when the project spent these funds:

Yearly Expenditure & Budget ⁷²		
Fiscal Year	Expenditure	Budget
2011	\$ 230,507	\$ 792,957
2012	\$ 697,164	\$ 1,554,157
2013	\$ 817,099	\$ 3,399,800
2014	\$ 1,242,087	\$ 3,399,800
Yearly Expenditure & Revised Budget		
2015 (as of Sept)	\$ 313,111.00	\$ 3,899,800
2016		\$ 3,899,800
2017		\$ 3,899,800
Total Budget		\$ 6,899,800

Table 6. K50 Budget by financial year

The following table indicates expenditure (as of Dec 2014 end of phase 1) versus the projected expenditure (as of 2012) and the percentage difference in spending compared to the initial budget:

Segment (until Dec 2014) ⁷³	Projected Expenditure (based on Project Document)	Actual Expenditures (before Project Revision II - time and cost extension of the Project)	% Difference
Reporting period	(effective as of August 2011)	(15 Aug 2011 - 31 Dec 2014)	
Total Travel	58,000	70,581	18%
Total Personnel	813,700	926,424	12%
Total Subcontracts	292,000	127,409	-129%
Total Training	538,000	309,244	-74%
Total Equipment	1,062,000	1,124,070	6%
Total Miscellaneous	245,000	67,210	-265%

⁷¹ UNODC Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan figures relate to monies spent as a ratio of the budget. Total spend to date, vice total allocation of funds, is lower as some planned elements of project have yet to be paid for.

⁷² UNODC ProFi information: as at Sept 2015.

⁷³ Ibid.

Cost Centre/ DPI (effective as of 2014)	0	18,298	100%
Project Sub-Total	3,008,700	2,643,236	-14%
Project Support Costs (13%)	391,100	343,620	-14%
(-Gain)/Loss		-5,236	
Project Grand Total	3,399,800	2,981,620	-14%

Table 7. K50 Expenditure⁷⁴

Revision 1 was a no cost extension, therefore, staff costs increased in direct proportion to the extension of time. The project did experience an increase in expenditure on travel due to similar reasons. There was also an increase in expenditure on equipment. This increase reflects the requirements for the SSDC and the procurement of items such as electronic gates, improved detainee cells and heating systems that were not originally budgeted for, and only became apparent as the project matured. The decreased expenditure on training was due to the fact that the project utilised officials from the donor nations and not consultants as initially expected; this reduced the overall cost. To date the project spent 86% of the allocated funds, however, a large portion has been set aside to build the SSDC station at Karakol; when this is factored in, expenditure is significantly higher and nearer the 98% implementation rate⁷⁵ achieved earlier on in the project's life cycle. Overall the project has been implemented in a very efficient and cost effective manner.

In light of introduction of recommendation 7, to merge all LE activities, there are a number of areas where greater efficiencies could be found. K50 should conduct a joint PSC with K22, so that all LE activities are discussed in a single forum. As most participants attend both PSCs, this should, in effect, save time and effort, and provide a more comprehensive discussion and rounded approach to governance. As projects merge into larger programmes, the need for standalone project evaluations should also disappear. Evaluations of complete programmes or even complete sub-programmes, while appearing to represent the optimum solution, may be too large and complex to conduct effectively. Focusing at the country level of implementation might provide the optimum solution, and ROCA in consultation with IEU should look to schedule a joint evaluation of all LE (SP1) activities / or maybe all Programme Office activities within Kyrgyzstan instead of a final evaluation of K50.

⁷⁴ Source UNODC Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan from Profi.

⁷⁵ As reported by UNODC project staff.

Reporting

The project team provides accurate and timely reports, as detailed by the project documentation and as required by HQ UNODC and donors. While standard reports are required as a means of demonstrating good governance and financial propriety, these formulaic reports are dry and lack texture; they provide reporting after the fact, which means that the information is often historical and out of date. Donors expressed a desire to receive shorter, more visual and more frequent updates that could then be used to suit their own upward reporting requirements (from embassy to national capital). In addition to reviewing standard reports, this evaluation trawled the internet for data relating to SSDC, UNODC and donors and found a disparity in the level and quality of information available. The UN in Kyrgyzstan web page only contains 4 press releases relating to UNODC; all are over 4 years old⁷⁶. The UNODC’s website is hard to navigate and there was little to no information readily available about the Programme Office or the project. The UN search engine is difficult to use and searching for the Programme office in Kyrgyzstan offers few useful links. The ROCA area on the UNODC website has limited information and only contains 9 press releases from the last 12 months⁷⁷. As an example the Integrated Country Programme for Kyrgyzstan (pdf) cannot be found within the first 100 pages of search results using Google.

The Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore ways and means of improving both its formal/traditional reporting and media/self-publicity/non-traditional reporting (recommendation 17). Of note are the following:

- Shorter, visual and more frequent updates. Independent parcels of information which when added together to form a story but independently can be consumed as and when required⁷⁸;
- Donor sound bites. Photos and captions relating to current events, from which the donors can cut and paste information into their update briefs;
- Improved web based communications. Some additional resources should be allocated to improving the online library of information and making it easier to navigate and data mine;
- When improving web based communications⁷⁹, UNODC should consider using the same resource to assist the SSDC public information department⁸⁰.

⁷⁶ <http://www.un.org.kg/en/media/news-releases/list/news-center/75-unodc>

⁷⁷ UNODC press releases on the website for Central Asia: <https://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/press/index.html>

⁷⁸ Donors felt that the shorter the report the more likely it is to be read. What donors aspire to is knowing what is happening and giving positive feedback as events occur and participating more regularly.

⁷⁹ Donors report that SSDC should take more credit for its successes, ie seizures to keep drugs off the street and

Conclusion: The project is highly efficient in what it delivers and in its use of resources. The project is well managed and delivers what it sets out to deliver on time and to budget. The project team comprises of mainly generalists who provided the administrative support required to build, procure and facilitate training. Merging K50 into the Programme for Central Asia may present an opportunity to review staff structures and possibly increase the number of specialists who could directly assist the SSDC. Project reporting is accurate and timely when judged against UNODC standards; however, in the more immediate digital age there are areas for improvement, where UNODC could get information out more quickly and in a more digestible format.

Partnerships and cooperation

Development of partnerships

During the course of the evaluation all the CLPs interviewed reported good communication with the project. The project staff have strong relationships with the various Kyrgyz ministries and agencies that they work with; as witnessed by the level of access and the discussions during the evaluation. The table below shows the various organisations that work in partnership with UNODC, most of whom attend the PSC.

International	Kyrgyz Authorities	Public	Regional
OSCE	SSDC	Public Oversight Council or SSDC	CARICC
UNCT	MoI	National Institute for Strategic Research	AKT
UNAIDs	Kyrgyz Department for Law Enforcement and Emergency Situations		RP
US Embassy	Kyrgyz MFA		DLOs
Russian Embassy	Kyrgyz Customs		Officers training with FSKN
Kazakh Embassy	Kyrgyz Border Police		BLOs
CADAP-6 (EU)	Kyrgyz MoI		

Table 8. K50 Core Learning Partners⁸¹

how their international cooperation and training has aided them to this end.

⁸⁰ Donors reported that UNODC should encourage SSDS to update its website to include activities with all partners. As present it does not do this and the information it does show is out of date. This support should also consider coordinating press releases and branding attributed in the press releases and training materials.

⁸¹ Partners are defined as those who were interviewed as part of the evaluation and/or mentioned in the projects documentation.

Cooperation

The UN agencies and IGOs interviewed stated that they felt there was a good level of cooperation between the various CLPs who supported the Kyrgyz Republic’s counter narcotics efforts, however, the general consensus was that more could be done to de-conflict international assistance. As an example the following was offered. A women’s working group offered by one IGO, was repeated 6 weeks later by UNODC. Although there is good communication between the agencies this example suggests that there are some areas where improvements could be made. UNODC should explore greater cooperation and joint work plans with other UN Agencies and IGOs (recommendation 20). One area for improvement is the ability to discuss all LE/Police reform issues, including donors on a formal platform. This platform could meet on a regular basis to discuss and de-conflict all LE capacity building assistance; possibly as a prelude to the PSC (recommendation 20).

The Public Oversight Council and National Institute for Strategic Research provided good insights into the ability of UNODC to advance the policy debate through research based advocacy. The Kyrgyz Republic presently lacks the analytical expertise of UNODC, and therefore UNODC’s reports carry considerable weight with the various policy formulation bodies within Kyrgyz Government. Public bodies felt that the SSDC’s reporting was one dimensional, in that it favoured arrest and seizure data and did not attempt to qualify primary data. For instance, there was no in depth analysis or exploration of second order effects. The data relating to arrests did not indicate if it was smuggler, dealer or user etc⁸². This is an area where UNODC adds considerable value, in that its reports are more comprehensive.

SSDC Coordination

Although President Atambayev has announced his intent to increase the effectiveness and capacity of the SSDC, the SSDC has struggled to find competent leadership. Between July and September of 2012, four chairmen were named to lead the SSDC, and the project coordinator is now interacting with his 5th chairperson. Since 2011 there has been a slight increase in overall drug seizures, although, overall net seizures remain low compared to the volume of drug entering the country. Since its creation the SSDC has focused more on its law enforcement duties than it has on its inter-governmental coordination role. There are a number of reasons for this. Intergovernmental coordination and cooperation are not natural to Kyrgyz Governmental processes, they are difficult to achieve, do not attract funds and are hard to measure. Arresting drug traffickers, on the other hand, is tangible. The recent change of SSDC chairperson presents an opportunity for UNODC to refocus the SSDC toward its intergovernmental role. The Programme Office of Kyrgyzstan should explore means for achieving greater synergy between Kyrgyz agencies (recommendation 5). As part of this plan, they should explore the T90/K50 working model which links the prison service to the SSDC and examine if it has utility to be expanded to other ministries or agencies (recommendation 6).

⁸² Donors reported that it is difficult to get statistical information from SSDC. What they want to see and report on is that their funds are boosting the seizures and prosecutions of narcotics smugglers and drug kingpins. The only statistics they currently receive are from news reports which do not link seizures to the equipment or training that they have provided.

Stakeholder engagement

Annual reports were well written, detailed, thorough, and covered all aspects of the project. However, the reports were very long and complex and are difficult for donors to digest. Reports are skimmed over and much of the key information can be missed. Donor's expressed a desire to be kept abreast of the project's activities on a more regular basis. There is no requirement to produce more reports, but rather trickle feed information to donors on a more regular basis, allowing them to develop greater insight or pass relevant facts to their national capitals (recommendation 17.2).

Over the next 12 months PO Kyrgyzstan should further develop their plans for international cooperation (recommendation 19). This should be achieved through the already established channels; RP initiatives and regional activities; BLOs, DLOs and CARICC; workshops and exchanges. In addition, K50 should ensure that future training and education activities include an international cooperation element so that SSDC and other LE officials understand how they can assist in achieving greater international cooperation at the working level (recommendations 19.4).

During the evaluation, and during interviews, it became apparent that the level of international/regional cooperation achieved and reported was directly linked to an official's level of education. The more educated (in terms of schooling and time served) a person was, the more concerned that person was with the level of international cooperation being achieved. Younger, less experienced officials, however, were more prone to talk about good levels of cooperation. UNODC should ensure that training and education for SSDC officials include an element on international relations, so that officials understand what right (good cooperation) looks like and how they can help improve regional cooperation (recommendation 19.4).

In addition to improving regional cooperation at the state to state level, there is a requirement to forge links at the working level. It is at this level that daily contact will be made and at this level that actionable intelligence is passed⁸³. Senior SSDC officers felt that despite regional initiatives such as AKT and CARICC, their daily working relationships with other international agencies was poor. UNODC should examine opportunities to improve international/regional cooperation at the working/tactical level. Linking the SSDC to the BLO construct is one area which could be explored (recommendation 19).

Conclusion: All project stakeholders have been properly and fully engaged and are regularly informed of events by project staff. The project has assisted in developing numerous bilateral and multilateral partnerships. There is room for improvement, especially in the wider arena of police reform. The span of CLPs encompasses many international, regional and national level stakeholders. An option would be to include public oversight bodies and think tanks. PSC meetings are inclusive, wide ranging and well documented. More could be achieved if the PSC meeting included other UNODC LE projects, such as K22 (the BLO project), as the main issues the SSDC faces are inter-agency cooperation and international coordination, and K50 alone will

⁸³ Countering the flow of drugs is complicated due to difficulties in co-ordinating efforts between national agencies within Central Asia and between this region and Afghanistan. This is reflected in limited intelligence sharing along lines of supply" from UNODC Illicit Opium Flows in Central Asia.

struggle to deliver outcome four unless it can reach into other agencies and across numerous projects.

Effectiveness

In order to explore the effectiveness of the project to date the following achievements were identified from reports and in discussion with the project team. They are grouped under each outcome and a simple qualitative assessment made.

Outcome	Achievement	Assessment
1	Supported the SSDC in drafting the National Strategy on Drug Control.	The single most important achievement of the project to date. Before the assistance of UNODC Kyrgyzstan did not have a National Strategy.
1	Supported the government in adopting a new Anti-Drug Programme/Strategy.	The second most important achievement of the project to date.
1	Supported SSDC’s development of an Action Plan related to the implementation of the Kyrgyz Anti-Drug Programme.	Main focus for phase 2 of the project will be the implementation of this action plan.
1	Presented recommendations for upgrading of the laws and regulations for the effective functioning of the SSDC.	Supporting the development of new laws is the main focus of outcome 1.
1	Facilitated visit of the Kyrgyz delegation to Vienna to sign the Integrated Country Programme, which builds on the technical assistance provided K50.	The future of the Kyrgyzstan Country Programme vice Programme for Central Asia vice Regional Programme needs to be considered by the Regional Section for Central and Western Asia (recommendation 9).
1	Facilitated the 1-st Meeting of the “State Coordination Committee on Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors Control of the Kyrgyz Republic”.	Assisting the SSDC perform its role as the secretariat to this body is important. So too are the discussions and the decisions made by this body. UNODC has a role to play by ensuring that the correct questions are posed and the right agencies tasked to provide answers and actions.
2	Refurbished SSDC Central offices in Bishkek and Osh.	Major refurbishment work has now been completed. Both sites were visited and are operational.

2	Submitted design and tender for the new administrative building for SSDC's Eastern Department in Karakol.	A new Karakol office should mark the last element of UNODC built infrastructure under the project. SSDC, however, still have plans for more offices and continue to lobby UNODC for additional funds
3	Procured analytical laboratory equipment for the SSDC Lab in Bishkek and Osh	Although rudimentary, both are fully functioning and capable of performing weighing and analysis of substances. The new Kyrgyz concept to rehouse all labs in one central location is both a threat ⁸⁴ (lack of accountability and oversight) and an opportunity (increased inter-agency cooperation and increased capacity).
3	Procured equipment for the SSDC: 11 off-road vehicles; crime scene kits; electronic scales; laboratory furniture; and IT ⁸⁵	The majority of equipment has now been procured and remaining items will be based on the changing requirements of the SSDC. With a move to programing, UNODC may wish to investigate the requirements of other LE agencies (recommendation 12).
3	Conducted 9 training courses for operational officers, investigators and analytical officers	Although well received and more training has been requested, the overall effect of this training is unknown ⁸⁶ . UNODC has not effectively evaluated its training and it should look to introduce an evaluation
3	Enabled 200 SSDC staff to increase their professional skills	

⁸⁴ Donors expressed concerns about the decision to merge the 4 existing forensics labs in to one. There was a feeling that any future equipment purchases should be delayed pending the outcome of the decision.

⁸⁵ See annex IIV for full details of all equipment donated to date.

⁸⁶ INL state that the training plan should also address how the effectiveness of the training can be determined. Although a large amount of training has taken takes place, there was n plan to follow up this training and ascertain if the personnel that were trained if the skills that were taught were being used or were effective.

3	Facilitated the participation of 7 Tajik DCA officers in joint training	<p>mechanism into future training events (recommendation 18).</p> <p>INL sponsored an evaluation of the training conducted by DEA agents in support of the project. This used feedback sheets from the course and conducted surveys and focus groups. The results from this evaluation were not overly positive. The report indicates that of 40 SSDC staff interviewed only 54% attended all the training provided⁸⁷. Although the course was billed for new SSDC officers, some of those selected to attend were in fact very senior. Surveys indicated that more focus should be on practical job skills rather than lectures.</p>
3	Established two CBT classes	<p>CBT infrastructure was visited and students observed. SSDC report high satisfaction with the facilities and plan to use it more in the future. UNODC are keen to promote CBT to other LE agencies and allow SSDC to provide the instruction.</p>
3	Trained 2 training managers for CBT	<p>Managers were observed in action. Both were able to load CBT programmes and run instructional periods.</p>
4	Facilitated in the participation of the SSDC delegation in 2 x CARICC events	<p>CARICC is a full time centre dedicated to the exchange of intelligence and operational data between member states. The new CARICC Director⁸⁸ is from the Kyrgyz Republic and most Kyrgyz interviewees felt that there was now an expectation that CARICC would deliver more under new leadership.</p>
4	Facilitated the annual participation of SSDC delegation to the Commission on	<p>SSDC participation in these events is important. International relations</p>

⁸⁷ Many of the Staff were called away during the course of the training and some did not more than the first day.

⁸⁸ The CARICC Director was appointed and at the time of the evaluation there was no data relating to increased cooperation within CARICC.

	Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna	cannot be improved without travel and exposure to other nation's drug control agencies. While this level of interaction will assist policy level cooperation, it does not by itself improve operational or tactical cooperation in the field. More could be done to link up the operators in the field (recommendation 19.5) in addition to supporting the higher level cooperation elements.
4	Facilitated participation of SSDC delegation at the Experts meeting on decriminalization of youth by reducing drug demand through rehabilitation and re-socialization of drug users, conducted by Federal Drug Control Service of Russia in Moscow	
4	Facilitated participation of SSDC delegation at the Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan) Ministerial meetings in Dushanbe	

Table 9. K50 Outcome achievements

Outcome 3 is dedicated to the provision of equipment and training. UNODC realised that without this level of assistance (particularly training) the SSDC would be unable to progress against any of the other outcomes. The issue of longer term education and training arose during numerous interviews. There was a split of opinion as to whether the SSDC required short term tactical training related to equipment – to become a better LE agency – and the longer term approach which professed a need to train civil servants in addition to LE officials. The longer term approach should deliver the desired objective, but will take time, and could possibly take resources away from some of the nearer term goals. The SSDC is a small organisation of about 350 staff. Independent, sustainable long term education and training will only be achieved in conjunction with other agencies and implementing partners. In addition to the current level of training UNODC should focus on the entire SSDC span of command, as just training front line officers will not unilaterally assist the SSDC to be more effective. Building on needs to conduct a full training review (recommendation 11), UNODC should look to expand the training and general education of the SSDC officials, this training should focus on the following areas (recommendation 13):

- Deputies. Due to their work schedules this training should be on the job and for short periods of time only;
- Middle Management. Similar to the deputies, however, middle management may be afforded longer training periods. There is merit in utilising the management courses provided by other government agencies and augmenting this education with some role specific training;
- Induction Training. Standardised induction training should ensure that all staff posted to SSDC are capable of fulfilling their basic roles and responsibilities;

- Specialist Training. Specialised training should continue, the aim is to ensure that all staff posted to SSDC are capable of fulfilling their job specific roles and responsibilities;
- Mentors. In conjunction with INL and FSKN, UNODC should examine the possibility of placing mentors into the SSDC HQ⁸⁹ (recommendation 14);
- UNODC should assist the SSDC’s Human Resource department to update its staff selection criteria, start standards and job descriptions to ensure that the SSDC recruits and retains the correct calibre of staff (recommendation 15).

UNODC should look at mechanisms for increasing and developing sustainable training. Of particular note are the following (recommendation 16):

- UNODC should continue and expand joint (SSDC) training with other agencies as a means of increasing inter agency cooperation;
- UNODC should encourage SSDC to continue offering CBT to other agencies;
- UNODC should explore opportunities for SSDC officers to train at other locations, such as: a. overseas, such as with FSKN; b. with other agencies, MoI (MVD) and the Border Guard Force etc; and c. with external providers, OSCE etc.;
- UNODC should assist SSDC with course design and content review to ensure that all training is relevant and linked to core roles and responsibilities.

Since it was created in 2011 the SSDC has not managed to increase the annual number of seizures and arrests of drug traffickers. The figures for the first half of 2015 represent a significant increase and are comparable to the total of 2011, which is the current high water mark.

Source ⁹⁰	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	First six months of 2015
Total drugs	8,286.60	17,942.80	13,655.90	17,608.50	11,784.50	
Heroin	156.8	332.3	242	247.1	285.6	
Opium	38.8	70.3	16.5	132.4	158.1	
Poppy straw	3.7	59.1	0.934	1.6	1.7	
Opium poppy	163.9	140.5	398.5	145.8	61.1	
Marijuana	1,375.30	1,936.60	2,031.20	3,589.60	1,889.70	
Hashish	507.9	629.7	367.5	541.3	464.1	
Cannabis hemp	6,012.20	14,578.80	10,421.60	12,946.30	8,900.40	

⁸⁹ Currently FSKN have one mentor who assists the regional SSDC HQ in Osh. US DEA agents conduct visits to HQ SSDC in Bishkek but don’t directly mentor staff. The DEA’s ability to operate with the SSDC is likely to be restricted in the future due to the ending of the US/Kyrgyz Defense Accord.

⁹⁰ National Statistics Committee, State Service on Drug Control, Kyrgyzstan, CARICC

Pharmaceutics	0.001	0.314	0.141	0.054	3.604	24,840
Other type drugs	28.1	195	177.6	4.4	19.9	
Total precursors	163.9	27,787.00	10,170.90	4,386.20	6,197.40	
Sulphuric Acid (litres)	89	4.0	10,170.90	n/a	n/a	
Hydrochloric Acid	n/a	0	0	n/a	n/a	
Ephedra herb	0	27,783	0	n/a	n/a	
Total seizures in kgs	8,450.50	45,729.80	23,826.80	21,994.70	17,981.90	24,840

Table 10. Kyrgyz Republic drug and precursor seizure data in kgs for 2010 -2015.⁹¹

In 2014 676 individuals were prosecuted. However, no significant person related to the production of illicit drugs intended for international markets has been documented⁹². In 2015, to date there have been 925 drug related arrests of which 86% have led to prosecutions via 787 criminal cases⁹³. The government has not passed legislation to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals, but it does cooperate with the EU Border Management Assistance Program to train law enforcement officers to detect and interdict precursor chemicals and illegal drugs, in addition to UNODC support via K22 (BLO).

Conclusion: Outcome one has achieved what it intended to achieve and is well placed to continue to deliver its expected (legal and policy related) outputs. Outcome two has also achieved what it intended and over time the requirement to provide this level of (infrastructure) support will reduce as the SSDC matures. Outcome three has delivered what it stated (in terms of equipment), but the overall effect may not be what was intended; as there is no way to ascertain the effectiveness of UNODC's training, and more needs to be done to understand the requirement for and the impact of SSDC education and training. Outcome four is a work in progress and the project will find it difficult to achieve this outcome unilaterally. International cooperation and coordination are wider ranging issues which will only be solved through a combination of projects and numerous activities. International cooperation is also highly dependent on the will of the member states to cooperate; within Central Asia, where there are many political disputes that hinder closer cooperation. Using the simple metric of increased seizures, it would appear that the Kyrgyz Law Enforcement Agencies (to include the SSDC) are getting incrementally better; but there has been no radical improvement. Drug seizure data alone does not tell the whole story and

⁹¹ UNODC from the National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic, via the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for combating illicit trafficking of narcotic drug, psychotropic substances and their precursors (CARICC).

⁹² INL Reports.

⁹³ There is no information relating to how many were not only prosecuted but also found guilty and or the length of their sentence and any impact this may have had on the smuggling of narcotics. This level of analysis is missing from all SSDC reports.

SSDC requires assistance in analysing raw data to determine the impact of their actions against narcotics trafficking and the impact that illicit drugs have on their country and its people. Overall impact will only be achieved when the numerous agencies cooperate in, and coordinate joint activities in a comprehensive manner. This is another reason why UNODC should redouble its efforts toward supporting the inter-agency cooperation role of the SSDC.

Impact

As the UN agency with a mandate for Drugs and Crime that has a comprehensive approach to the use of drugs and drug control, UNODC is ideally positioned to assist the SSDC fulfil both its agency role and its intergovernmental coordination role. Without doubt the main achievement of the project to date has been the drafting of the National Strategy on Drug Control, something that Kyrgyzstan did not have before the project commenced. The drafting process was assisted (enabled) by UNODC throughout, and supported by donors. It is in this area of legal, legislative and policy support that UNODC has achieved the greatest impact, this is due to the level of its expertise it provides⁹⁴ and the fact that the Kyrgyz Republic lacks much of the knowledge required to independently tackle these issues.

In the provision of infrastructure the project has largely delivered all that it set out to achieve (Karakol Station will be built shortly). With the project’s assistance SSDC now has sufficient infrastructure to perform its duties. This is a major achievement, but it is only a first step. It is now particularly important how the SSDC operates from this infrastructure in the longer term.

The original equipment requirements have also largely been met and the SSDC now possess the basic equipment it requires to fulfil its role. How this equipment is utilised is also important. Training has occurred and large number of SSDC officials (over 200 from 320) have been trained via the project. Low start levels, high staff turnover and a focus on the junior officials vice the entire span of command has reduced the impact of this training and as such this report recommends that UNODC conducts a complete review of training (recommendation 11).

In the area of international cooperation there is still more that needs to be achieved. While many of the pieces are in place (BLOs, DLOs and CARICC etc.) real time international cooperation and coordination is limited. International accords are required, as they provide the basis on which cooperation can occur, but agreements alone do not yield results. It is only when those who are meant to cooperate understand what it is they are meant to do and how greater cooperation will occur that an effect is achieved. Recommendation 19 refers to the need to focus on educating

⁹⁴ UNODC recently provided an independent expert who assist running a workshop which explored the development of counter narcotics laws. It was reported by the Kyrgyz attendees that this work challenged much of their current thinking; it posed a number of useful questions and provided a series of potential solutions.

those officials who will be required to cooperate. As a means to addressing the main problem – the flow of opiates from Afghanistan along the NDR – regional/international cooperation amongst states and their agencies is an area which should yield the biggest impact. Despite the lengths that UNODC has gone to (CARICC, BLOs and DLOs) this goal is still a long way from being realised.

Conclusion: The long term impact of the project is related to the development of counter narcotics laws and policies. This is an area where the project has already delivered the most and where, as long as the SSDC performs its secondary role of inter-agency coordination, it will continue to have the greatest impact. The provision of infrastructure, equipment and training and assistance with international cooperation all strengthen this central outcome, as they are the means which the SSDC uses to increase its effectiveness, but which are ultimately the product of joint/multi-agency approach and not just about the SSDC.

Sustainability

The functioning of many state agencies within the Kyrgyz Republic is beholden on international assistance. The SSDC is no different. The simple fact is that without the support of the donors and various IGOs, the SSDC would barely function as an operational agency. UNODC had to refurbish the heating system at the SSDC Main HQ in Bishkek, in order to ensure that the building was habitable during the winter months, because the SSDC was unable to fund this level of work from within their budget.

The SSDC is in effect still receiving the same level of training that Kyrgyz DCA received in 2006. FSKN and DEA agents still assist and the service would be unable to function without this international assistance. The SSDC is unable to replicate the level of training that it already receives from external agencies. Enhancing its inter-agency coordination role will necessitate additional training and education, which is completely beyond the means of the SSDC, both in terms of expertise and cost. Donors⁹⁵ still assist with the payment of salaries for investigative officers; as this is perceived as a key means of ensuring loyalty. Regular SSDC officers state that the basic level of pay is low and that new SSDC officers are continuously seeking promotion as a means of increasing their pay⁹⁶. Promotion is often out of the SSDC and back to their parent agency or Ministry. The frequent change of chairpersons, often with many of the deputies, has reduced the effectiveness of the SSDC and is another factor which effects sustainability. Wholesale and frequent change of SSDC personnel is an additional reason why institutional

⁹⁵ FSKN pay top up salaries to key investigative staff. MOBITs received additional pay and the previous UNODC project G64 made additional payments to vetted staff.

⁹⁶ In conversation with SSDC officers and backup by project staff and donors. This is another reason why donors continue to pay investigative staff.

knowledge is limited and why training at current level is unsustainable, without the assistance of the international community.

The project has provided a number of infrastructure improvements, including new builds. It has also provided vehicles and technical equipment⁹⁷. Despite a limited budget, the SSDC has taken over all the equipment provided by the project to date. The project has made certain consumables available to assist; notably the laboratory equipment. The SSDC do have plans for sustainment from their own budget. These plans, however, are fragile and provide only limited near term sustainment. However, as equipment fails there is no disposal and/or procurement plan which would see the issue of sustainment taken into the longer term. Given the current budget and lack of organic capability, the fact that the SSDC is not capable of sustaining itself this is not surprising.

The Programme for Central Asia lists a number of ways that UNODC can achieve greater sustainability. Against each of these the evaluation has compared what is currently occurring and makes comments about what could or should occur in the future. No recommendations are made at this point as all recommendations are cognisant of, and have been formulated, with the requirement to improve sustainability (in mind).

Technique	Current situation	Comment
Increase ownership.	The Kyrgyz Government and the SSDC own the project and state that they would have very little expertise in the area of counter narcotics without the support that the project delivers.	SSDC ownership is presently very high in terms of their involvement and oversight and there is not much more that can be achieved.
Elicit an in-kind contribution from the Kyrgyz Government.	Limited due to limited resources and budgetary pressures.	UNODC and donors should continue to advocate for in-kind contributions. Use of national training facilities and use of national resources should be considered for every activity.
Increase cost effectiveness of activities.	The project is well administrated and there is little that could be done, that has not already been done to	Moving to a programming approach and sharing administrative staff across SPI (recommendation 7.3) may

⁹⁷ Donors report that they have funded SSDC for more than ten years, donating to many technical equipment and infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, requests continue to flow in. Sustainability linked to conditionality are pressing issues which need to be addressed.

	reduce the cost of activities and UNODC procedures.	offer some savings which could be reinvested to increase assistance.
Increase institutional learning within the SSDC and other LE agencies.	The majority of training is delivered by external instructors. CBT is delivered by SSDC managers.	This is a potential area for growth and UNODC is encouraged to examine the provision to SSDC (recommendation 16.2).
Provide the correct level of human resources in order to mentor and support the SSDC.	Currently there are no full time mentors.	UNODC should examine the potential of hiring some Kyrgyz national experts who can assist the SSDC on a consultative basis (recommendation 14).
Increase the human capacity of the SSDC to absorb assistance and develop organically.	The SSDC suffers from a high level of staff turnover and new staff have limited skill levels. There is a requirement to professionalise SSDC and increase the education provided to its officers.	The results of a training needs assessment should assist HR Department in drafting job descriptions. These job descriptions should be used as the baseline for selecting new staff (recommendation 15).

Table 11. K50 Sustainability

Conclusion: Most of the equipment provided by UNODC comes with simple maintenance and repair packages. All the equipment provided to SSDC has been taken onto their accounting systems and its long term sustainability is a SSDC issue. How sustainable this solution is, will have to be seen. SSDC do not have a large operational budget and even repairing the heating system at the main HQ in Bishkek was beyond their means. The project will run for at least two more years during which time UNODC has funds to assist the SSDC. After that time sustainability will become a Governmental issue and the Kyrgyz Government will have to find funding. On current projections this seems unlikely and therefore the SSDC may require donor support for many more years to come. In regards to the professionalization of the SSDC, this report makes a number of recommendations which are aimed at providing long term sustainable solutions to training and education.

Human Rights and Gender

Human Rights considerations

Kyrgyzstan's democratic progress in recent years has been undermined by a number of discriminatory legislative proposals, including those related to "foreign agents"⁹⁸; interference in

⁹⁸ <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/04/uk-kyrgyzstan-rights-law-idUKKBN0OK1KA20150604>

the work of some human rights groups by security services⁹⁹; against minorities; and shortcomings in the country’s legal and judicial framework¹⁰⁰. Violence and discrimination against women and minorities remain serious problems¹⁰¹. In December 2013, the UN Committee against Torture¹⁰² expressed grave concern “about the ongoing and widespread practice of torture and ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, in particular while in police custody to extract confessions”. Although the government acknowledges that torture occurs in Kyrgyzstan, impunity remains the norm¹⁰³.

UNODC’s response

There was little written in the project’s documentation which describes how the project will observe and protect universal human rights. A review of course content and general working practises indicated that the Project Team understood the principal of universal human rights and that human rights issues had been embedded into all training material and courses (either delivered by UNODC or via a third party such as DEA/FSKN). In addition, all trainers and trainees were vetted before training was delivered. To date there have been no official instances of human rights abuses involving SSDC offices. During the field mission SSDC Officers were able to point out what UNODC training and assistance had delivered, of particular note was the SSDC’s involvement in community policing and community outreach. The SSDC in Osh listed a number of occasions where they had set up community events such as mobile displays and support for local youth groups. In addition, SSDC officers were very keen to show how detainees were treated and how UNODC has assisted them to make improvements to detention facilities. UNAIDs did report that certain law enforcement officers would arrest drug users in the vicinity of needle exchange clinics and at substance substitution clinics as a means of increasing their arrest quotas. While this data can not be verified, it should be of interest to the SSDC for a number of reasons that go beyond human rights. SSDC have a duty to implement the National Strategy on Drug Control which has a drug substitution element, any interference with this runs counter to national priorities and SSDC who should investigate this type of reporting, especially at a time when drug seizures are reducing, but arrests remain the same.

Following the adoption of the new Constitution, in 2010, Kyrgyzstan initiated a process of judicial reform, identifying key laws that needed to be amended in compliance with national and

⁹⁹ <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/kyrgyz.html>

¹⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/kyrgyzstan>

¹⁰¹ UNWOMEN National Review of the Kyrgyz Republic in the framework of the Beijing Declaration and # Platform for Action.

¹⁰² Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/106/04/PDF/G1210604.pdf>

¹⁰³ Amnesty International <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/>

international human rights principles, including the Law on Peaceful Assembly, Law on Freedom of Religion, Law on Access to Information, the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure, Penal Code, Civil Code, Civil Procedure as well as the Law on State Guaranteed Legal Aid. Kyrgyzstan is making progress and in February 2013 six expert working groups (EWGs) were formed by the President and tasked to prepare new drafts of the aforementioned codes. There is concern that the tight deadlines imposed by the Kyrgyz Government on the reform process may develop laws at the expenses of quality and compliance with international norms and standards¹⁰⁴. This is a key area where UNODC can assist under outcome 1.

Gender sensitivity

There is little written in the project documentation which describes how the project will promote gender sensitivity. UNDP¹⁰⁵ reports that transition and development in Kyrgyzstan have occurred without the full participation of women to the detriment of women's position in political and socioeconomic life. To this end there is already a UNDP development plan which seeks to accelerate the progress towards gender equality. As the lead international body for assisting the Kyrgyz Republic with their Police reform plan, OSCE has responsibility to assist Law Enforcement Agencies to increase female representation and to ensure that police training and operations are gender sensitive. Within the project documentation the target for training events was 20% female participation. However, the evaluation discovered that female representation in the SSDC and drug enforcement agencies on the whole significantly less than 20%¹⁰⁶. The figure of 20%, is therefore an arbitrary, unachievable and irrelevant metric. This evaluation would recommend that the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan conduct a gender baseline study (recommendation 21). This evaluation also recommends that instead of setting a unilateral figure for female participation, the project team should ensure that its gender specific targets and training are linked to OSCE's overall support of the Kyrgyz Republic's police reform plan and the UNDPs gender mainstreaming development plan (recommendation 22).

Conclusion: Although not expressly stated in the project's documentation, human rights and gender considerations have been included in the project's development and delivery. UNODCs work has made the SSDC more aware of its human rights obligations, especially its treatment of detainee. There is potentially more that the SSDC can do to understand human rights across a broader spectrum, ensuring that this is synchronised with other UN Agencies. There is undoubtedly more that the project can do to ensure that it is fully supporting the Kyrgyz

¹⁰⁴ United Nations Country Team in Kyrgyzstan Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Kyrgyzstan

¹⁰⁵ UNDP Kyrgyzstan Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2008-2010.

¹⁰⁶ While no official figures of female representation in the SSDC were provided during the course of the evaluation, officials indicated that it was less than 8%. In many cases officials were able to count the number of female officers in the SSDC on their hands.

Government’s police reform programme by making sure that all project activities are in line and fully conversant with wider UN objectives at the country level. Rather than unilaterally introducing gender equality quotas within the SSDC, the project would be better served aligning itself with the OSCE, who are the lead agency supporting Kyrgyz police reform, and assist in increasing female participation across a number of law enforcement agencies.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This mid-term evaluation seeks to address 5 main questions in relation to the K50 project. These questions are, to what extent there has: (1) been an improvement of a legal framework in the field of drug control, the enhancement of multi-agency coordination and policy development on narcotic drug control; (2) been increased prevention and reduction of crimes related to illicit drug cultivation, production, trafficking and abuse through enhanced multi-agency cooperation and anti-drug strategy implementation; (3) been increased coordination of the SSDC in counter-narcotics activity within Kyrgyzstan; (4) been sustainability of SSDC, specifically the Government's capacity for sufficient self-generated funding to maintain the SSDC; and (5) been international cooperation, the ability of the SSDC to actively cooperate and share information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries.

Judged against the five questions above, the conclusions to this evaluation report are as follows:

The ability to the Kyrgyz Republic to understand the issues relating to counter narcotics, to plan, develop policy and laws at the governmental level has been greatly improved, and this improvement can in a large part be attributed to the project. Kyrgyzstan now has National Strategy on Drug Control, an Anti-Drug Programme and an action plan. When the project commenced it had none of these documents. There is, however, still much to be done in the area of legal reforms and the SSDC will continue to require international assistance in drafting laws that adhere to international standards and norms. In terms of inter-agency working, the main issue now is the leadership required to drive forward change and initiate the coordination of counter narcotics activities across government. Despite UNODC's assistance inter-agency cooperation in Kyrgyzstan remains an area where more effort is required. There is a requirement to educate officials, develop appropriate structures and to build trust at the working level in order to take this issue forward. UNODC can assist, but there has to be significant buy-in from the SSDC and other Kyrgyz Ministries, and this will require commitment and strong leadership.

The previous chairman of the SSDC was overly focused on the provision of a LE drug control agency vice the establishment of inter-agency coordination mechanisms. While there has been a slight improvement in the total numbers of drugs and precursor seizures, eradication of cannabis and trafficking arrests, total numbers are low in comparison to the overall volume of illicit drugs and precursors transiting the country. While the preliminary 2015 seizure figures indicate an annual increase, there is no viable evidence to suggest that this increase is related to greater inter-agency cooperation. There is still too much competition between the various LE agencies and a

desire to increase kgs seized verses a comprehensive national wide programme that also seeks to reduce demand and the counter the effects of illicit narcotics. It is in this area that the project can have the biggest impact. Assisting the SSDC and the other agencies with counter narcotics, the interest to collaborate, coordinate and cooperate will increase; thus the impact of UNODC’s assistance. This will allow UNODC to achieve far more than when developing the SSDC as a LE agency.

The main barrier to achieving greater cooperation is trust. Only when officials from one agency understand the capabilities and role of another agency, know their counterparts, regularly interact with them can they start to trust them; and therefore work more closely in a coordinated manner. Developing trust is mainly an internal (Kyrgyz) matter, however, UNODC and donors have a role to play in helping to build trust and to demonstrate the benefits of greater cooperation, through demonstrating how trust delivers improved results. The second main issue is one of education. Many officials have not seen what good inter-agency cooperation looks like and therefore they require assistance in developing the knowledge and skills required to cooperate and how to coordinate amongst agencies; overcoming this will require assistance from external organisations. UNODC, therefore, has a key role in assisting the Kyrgyz Government by providing training which increases the professional standing of officials and exposes them to different ways of operating.

Many of the activities that currently occur under the project are an extension of what has occurred in the past and are similar to the previous project, which supported the Kyrgyz DCA. In addition, as SSDC staff rotate out of the agency to other jobs, much of the training provided by UNODC will have to be repeated. Sustainability therefore could be seen as an issue. UNODC should support SSDC to review its own requirements for training and education. While the SSDC is too small an organisation to merit its own dedicated training academy, there are other ways to improve training in a sustainable manner.

The actual impact of increased international cooperation is difficult to gauge. While there appears to be a will to engage and to cooperate internationally there is little evidence that there is actually much practical cooperation. By examining the cooperation that does occur it is not clear that this delivers any tangible substance. The project is highly relevant in terms of supporting UNODC and the international community’s goals and objectives within the Central Asian region. The project is highly relevant in terms of supporting the SSDC as the primary agency with responsibility for counter narcotics in the Kyrgyz Republic, but more needs to be done to ensure that Kyrgyzstan takes its place internationally and shares information and coordinates its counter narcotics efforts within the region. Therefore, outcome 4 which aims to increase international cooperation is very much a work in progress.

K50 is a very good project in what it aims to deliver and the manner in which it has been implemented. The scope of the project and the assistance it provided was limited, compared to the previous project which assisted the Kyrgyz DCA. K50 is a simple project with attainable objectives and outcomes. It is not overly complex, and instead it focuses on what UNODC could realistically provide and deliver in support of the SSDC. Phase one of the project has been very effective. When the SSDC was established it had limited infrastructure and equipment. Thanks to donors and UNODC, the SSDC now possesses the tools it requires to function. The project has also assisted in the drafting of National Strategy on Drug Control, which should be considered a major achievement. Via the project over 200 SSDC officials have received training; however, the project team did not design an internal monitoring and evaluation tool which could assess the effectiveness or impact of this training. The project has in effect entered a second phase (revision 2); at the same time the SSDC has experienced a significant change of leadership. Therefore, both the project and the SSDC may be in a position to re-focus on the inter-agency coordination role.

Given the fact that UNODC's work fits within the context of a wider Kyrgyz Police reform programme, which is primarily supported by OSCE, UNODC should explore its working relationships with OSCE and seek to develop a capacity building platform where all international coordination in support of LE and Legal entities can be coordinated.

The introduction of the Programme for Central Asia should allow UNODC to deliver more than just support of the SSDC, as the programme is comprehensive in its scale of activities and breadth of its implementing partners. While the project will achieve many of its outcomes alone, it will struggle to improve inter-agency coordination and international cooperation as a standalone project. It is the overall recommendation that the project merges all LE activities in Kyrgyzstan into SP1 as soon as possible, using the next 12-18 months to examine how programming works and allowing the expanded remit of SP1 to provide additional support to the Kyrgyz LE agencies; beyond the SSDC.

There are a number of risks to achieving the desired impact, namely: Kyrgyz appetite to change; complex regional politics; SSDC leadership buy-in; and the ending of the US Defence Cooperation Agreement.

K50 is extremely good in what it has tried to deliver and in the manner in which it has been implemented. K50 now finds itself at a cross road. It could continue to support the SSDC, moving to provide increased assistance in the areas of inter-agency cooperation and coordination, or it could embrace the change that will occur under the introduction of the programme for Central Asia and become part of the large programme. Due to a combination of effective management, strong partnerships and a recent change of SSDC leadership the project is well positioned to proceed along either path. It is the main recommendation of this report that the Programme Office of Kyrgyzstan uses the next 6 months to explore how it can achieve integration under SP 1 of the

Programme of Central Asia. By combining all LE activities under a single sub-programme, of a far wider programme, K50 should be able to expand its delivery in support of both the SSDC and potentially other Kyrgyz LE agencies without the need to rewrite the project document and without any delay awaiting signatures. While this move may appear straightforward, actual merger will be challenging and this report recommends a large number of first steps for consideration. Although many of these recommendation are officially out of scope with the terms of reference for this evaluation, they reflect what is occurring or is about to occur

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a comprehensive set of recommendations, which have been designed, primarily, to improve the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan's assistance in support of the SSDC. Some of the recommendations go beyond the scope of the TORs for the evaluation, but they are felt to be significantly important to either the Programme Office, ROCA or UNODC in Vienna that they have been included. While this long list of recommendations may imply the requirement for significant change to the project, this is not actually the case. Many of the recommendations have either, in-part been implemented, form the basis of the project's next phase, or are already well known to the project team and are about to be implemented. The majority of these recommendations are, therefore, fine-tuning. They are additional suggestions and they do not represent whole scale change. However, for the sake of completeness and as a means of demonstrating to donors and HQ UNODC how and why the project's delivery will alter in the future, all recommendations have been included in full. This recommendation section differs from the table at the start of the report, which lists recommendations by importance. Instead, in this section, recommendations are sub-divided into structural and procedural. Structural examines what the project delivers. Procedural examines how the project delivers.

Structural

The leadership of the SSDC has recently been changed; the chairman and many of the deputies have been replaced¹⁰⁷. This change of leadership represents an opportunity for UNODC, to reengage with the senior leadership, and assist them to perform all their mandated duties.

Recommendation 1. Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should continue to develop its plans¹⁰⁸ which aim to concentrate more effort on assisting the SSDC to perform its interagency coordination role.

The previous chairperson was overly focused on developing a law enforcement agency. The National Strategy on Drug Control has been written and there is an implementation plan. What the SSDC now requires is strong leadership to drive the inter-agency approach forward. In turn SSDC leadership requires international support. In light of recommendation 1, particular areas of focus are:

¹⁰⁷ The previous chairman of the SSDC was replaced in July 2015, one week before the evaluation.

¹⁰⁸ The Programme Office has always desired to move forward in this direction but it was unable to do so due to the fact that the previous chairman concentrated more on LE duties than inter-agency cooperation.

Recommendation 2. Assist the Chairman to develop strategic guidance for SSDC development; operationalisation of the Drug Control Strategy.

Recommendation 3. Assist the Chairman, Deputies and Department Heads to develop the SSDC’s working routine, one that meets their requirement to manage, develop and coordinate the activities of the SSDC. In addition, this working routine should examine external linkages, stakeholders, inter-agency coordination, reporting lines up and out, internal working routines and direction down with the SSDC.

The previous SSDC leadership was centralist in its approach. Much of the day to day management could and should have been performed by more junior officers; so doing would have allowed the management structure to engage across ministries and implement the National Strategy on Drug Control.

Recommendation 4. Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should assist in the establishment of below deputy level platforms and working groups.

With a change in SSDC chairperson and the commencement of the project’s second phase there is an opportunity for the project to assist the SSDC in both, law enforcement and inter-agency coordination roles.

Recommendation 5. Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore how it can assist the SSDC to achieve greater synergy between government agencies in relation to cross government counter narcotics activities. While the main part of this recommendation has largely been implemented, this recommendation seeks to expand the remit of the UNODC, so that it could potentially assist other agencies, enabling them to work with and in concert with the SSDC.

Using links that the Programme Office of Kyrgyzstan has with the Prison Service, under T90 project, better working relationships have been developed between the Prison Service and SSDC. These relationships have been formalised and include prison officers receiving training on drugs, use of the CBT in the SSDC HQ and increased cooperation and sharing of low level intelligence / information.

Recommendation 6. Over the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore the T90/K50 working model and examine if it has utility to be expanded as a means of increasing cooperation between the SSDC and other Kyrgyz ministries / agencies.

With the introduction of the Programme for Central Asia, it is planned that all UNODC country level activities across the Central Asian region will be delivered under a single programme, grouped into four sub-programmes. The merger of all projects into this central programme could

take between 12-18 months and will cause significant changes to UNODC structures. There are already a number of overlapping areas: most PSC participants in the K50 PSC are the same as K22 PSC; many of the outcomes under K22 and K50 support outcomes and outputs under the programme for Central Asia; and evaluations, research and interviews involve the same CLPs.

Recommendation 7. Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan is encouraged to develop plans for merging all LE activities so that they fit under SP 1 of the Programme for Central Asia. While a full merger might take 12-18 months, the following could be achieved in a shorter time frame and would be useful first steps:

- **7.1** Conduct a Joint PSC so that all LE (SP1) activities are discussed with all Kyrgyz Government counter parts, international partners and donors in one forum.
- **7.2** Readjust delivery towards common outcomes. The Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should map common outcomes and outputs and ensure that commonality is identified.
- **7.3** Pooling of resources. The Programme Office of Kyrgyzstan should explore how it can pool administrative staff between projects by identifying overlaps. The aim should be to share some administrative staff (generalists) in order to free up resources for additional project staff (specialists) who can directly assist LE agencies.
- **7.4** In consultation with IEU, the ROCA should discuss the requirement for a joint evaluation of all LE (SP1) activities within Kyrgyzstan, which can feed a cluster evaluation of all LE (SP1) activities across ROCA.

To date there is little top down guidance which explains how and when the change from standalone projects to programming will occur.

Recommendation 8. Over the next 6 months ROCA should promulgate a plan for how existing projects merge into the programme for Central Asia. This should include: guidance for donors; the merging of funds and activities; a timeline; and a staffing chart.

Donors are confused by the various levels of UNODC bureaucracy and the multiple delivery mechanisms within Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia more generally.

Recommendation 9. UNODC Regional Section for Western and Central Asia should examine the utility of having the Programme for Central Asia, the Integrated Country Programme for Kyrgyzstan and the RP in the medium to long term. The aim should be: to clearly explain the need for multiple programmes, and the benefit of having different structures; or the introduction of a more coherent structure in the future.

Wholesale change imposed by HQ UNODC requires an implementation plan if it is to deliver the desired effects. The fact that there is little guidance from HQ UNODC or ROCA as to how Programme Office’s should implement wholesale change/programming reduces the effectiveness of this change

Recommendation 10. Corporately HQ UNODC should ensure that it introduces a change management plan whenever it implements a whole scale programme of change. This should include stakeholder analysis and plans for stakeholder engagement, in addition to the actual implementation plan.

UNODC and the donors have delivered a similar level of training in support of both the DCA and the SSDC for almost 10 years. Much of this training was focused at the tactical level and there has been little focus on senior management or on the SSDC’s role to coordinate across government agencies.

Recommendation 11. Over the next 6 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan, FSKN and INL should assist the SSDC to conduct a comprehensive training needs assessment, with the view to produce a training delivery plan which seeks to develop the SSDC as both an agency and a coordination body in support of the implementation of the National Strategy on Drug Control.

Inter-agency cooperation, coordination and information sharing require significant improvement. The Programme for Central Asia incorporates all these elements. Rather than to recommend numerous improvements within this area, this report recommends (recommendation 7) that the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should merge all LE activities in SP1 of the Programme for Central Asia as the primary means of increasing inter-agency and international coordination and information sharing. As a means of amplifying this recommendation the following could take place.

Recommendation 12. The Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore the possibility of supporting other LE agencies within means and capability and as required to achieve the outcomes and outputs within the Programme for Central Asia.

SSDC staff are recruited from other government departments. In addition, there is a high staff turnover, which reduces the institutional knowledge of the agency as a whole. While some staff possess the professional qualifications to perform their duties, many do not. New staff members require on the job training, which is both hard to schedule and expensive. There is a requirement to conduct a comprehensive training needs assessment, and then devise a training delivery plan so that training shortfalls are highlighted and prioritised. This is particularly important given the proposed change of emphasis contained within recommendations 1-4.

Recommendation 13. Building on the training review (recommendation 11) the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should look to expand the training and general education of the SSDC officials, this should focus on the following areas:

- **13.1** Deputies. Due to their work schedules this training should be on the job and for short periods of time only.
- **13.2** Middle Management. Similar to the deputies, however, middle management may be afforded longer training periods. There is merit in utilising the management course provided by other government agencies and augmenting this education with some role specific training.
- **13.3** Induction Training. Standardised induction training should ensure that all staff posted to SSDC is capable of fulfilling their basic roles and responsibilities.
- **13.4** Specialist Training. Specialised training should continue, the aim is to ensure that all staff posted to SSDC is capable of fulfilling their job specific roles and responsibilities.

Recommendation 14. Over the next 6-12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan in conjunction with INL and FSKN should examine the possibility of placing mentors into the SSDC HQ. Mentoring is probably best performed by “grey beards” – respected Kyrgyz Nationals who once worked within the SSDC or for a similar government organisation, but who are no longer paid by the government. A working example could see mentors providing one or two days a week in the SSDC HQ and one with UNODC/donors.

Recommendation 15. Building on the training needs analysis (recommendation 11) UNODC should assist SSDC’s Human Resource department to update its staff Selection criteria, develop standards and job descriptions to ensure that the SSDC recruits and retains the correct calibre of staff.

With staff of approximately 350 the SSDC is too small an agency to warrant developing its own (stand-alone) training academy.

Recommendation 16. Following on from the training need analysis (recommendation 11), and over the next 12-24 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should continue to provide training support to the SSDC and look at mechanisms for increasing and developing sustainable training. Of particular note are the following:

- **16.1** UNODC should continue and expand joint (SSDC) training with other agencies as a means of increasing inter agency cooperation.
- **16.2** UNODC should encourage SSDC to continue offering CBT to other agencies.

- **16.3** UNODC should explore opportunities for SSDC officers to train at other locations, such as: a. overseas, such as the with FSKN; b. with other agencies, MoI and border Force etc; and c. with external providers, OSCE etc.
- **16.4** UNODC should assist SSDC with course design and content review to ensure that all training is relevant and linked to core roles and responsibilities.

Process

Project reporting conforms to UNODC standards. It is completed on time and contains the relevant level of information. UNODC research data is highly respected but it takes considerable time and effort to generate. UNODC reports often lack the kind of detail that donors require when reporting achievements back to their national capitals. UNODC web sites are not intuitive and there is general lack of information relating to the project and the Programme Office on-line. The UN country web-site has a link to UNODC news stories which contains 4 out of date features (from 2012). Information is often out of date before it is released.

Recommendation 17. Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should examine its reporting schedule and media plan. External public relations assistance may be required and the eventual aim should be to develop:

- **17.1** Shorter and more frequent reports;
- **17.2** Donor sound bites – a picture and a few sentences; data that is capable of being cut into a single power point slide;
- **17.3** Improved web based information; allowing users to data mine the above reports;
- **17.4** Public relations within the SSDC; if external assistance is brought in then it should also look to support the SSDC information campaigns.

While in and out tests are conducted during UNODC funded training activities, data collection was extremely limited. There has been no overall training evaluation conducted by the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan.

Recommendation 18. Within the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should devise and implement a more robust mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of UNODC provided training.

International cooperation is the least effective outcome under the project. Views from CLPs were that international cooperation was average to non-existent. The more educated and or experienced officials were more likely to suggest the need for greater cooperation.

Recommendation 19. Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should further develop their plans (under outcome 3) for assisting the SSDC increase its international cooperation. Areas for development are:

19.1 Continue to support for Regional Programme initiatives and ROCA inter-regional activities;

19.2 Continue support for DLOs;

19.3 Continue support for CARICC;

19.4 Ensure that all SSDC education includes an international cooperation element; and

19.5 Examine opportunities at working level cooperation; tactical implementation, which allows case officers to regular meet and exchange information with their counter-parts. Such as linking SSDC with the BLO project.

The Kyrgyz Government's police reform programme is primarily supported by OSCE. While there are strong partnerships between UNODC and OSCE more could be done to coordinate their joint actions in relation to counter narcotics and border controls under the umbrella of the police reform programme.

Recommendation 20. Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should explore greater cooperation and joint working plans with other UN Agencies and IGOs¹⁰⁹ to include, the formation of LE/Police reform platform (to include donors). This platform should meet on a regular basis (quarterly) and would into discuss and deconflict all LE capacity building assistance.

The original project documentation includes a figure of 20% female participation. However, there is no baseline study to indicate where this target came from. UNODC should clarify if this figure is achievable and if not what the risks to greater female participation are?

Recommendation 21. Over the next 3 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should conduct a gender baseline study and include the results in the logical matrix.

¹⁰⁹ Since this recommendation was made, the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan has already conducted a meeting with OSCE and has plans to increase joint training in the achievement of common objectives.

There is and has been overlap between UNODC gender activities and those delivered by other UN agencies. Rather than implement an independent gender objective UNODC should reinforce mainstream UN goals.

Recommendation 22. Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should seek to reinforce OSCE’s gender equality programme and UNDP’s gender programme rather than devise unilateral activities.

Programme Steering Committee (PSC) reporting is in-depth and very professional, but these reports take a long time to produce. Donors reported that they would prefer to have a record of decisions promulgated, in both Russian and English shortly after the meeting so that action points can be dealt with in a more timely fashion.

Recommendation 23. Over the next 12 months the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan should look to augment its PSC reporting with English and Russian action points; which should be released shortly after the meeting.

While IEU have a central repository for lessons learnt and a central mechanism for tracking lessons identified, neither of these systems are particularly well understood or used at the field level.

Recommendation 24 It is recommended that UNODC HQ (via IEU) ensure that HQ UNODC central lessons learnt tracking system is understood, accessible and used by field offices.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

The project design did not formally acknowledge learned lessons from previous UNODC law enforcement projects conducted in Central Asia. However, the project was based on a previous project which supported the DCA of Kyrgyzstan. As a means of assessing what lessons might have been identified and what might have been learnt (as demonstrated by altered delivery) this section lists the recommendations from the evaluations of G64 (support to the Kyrgyz DCA) I75 (support to MOBITs) and K22 (Border Liaison Offices) and TAJ/H03 (Support to Tajik DCA) and assesses what has been done to address or incorporate these recommendations within K50.

Legend:

Colour	Meaning	Comment
	Lesson Learnt and change has occurred	Lesson has been identified, understood, and either change implemented or design reflects the lesson
	Lesson “partially” Learnt and some change has occurred	Lesson has been identified and understood, and either some change has been implemented or some elements of design reflects lesson but not fully implemented and not fully reflected in the projects design
	Lesson not Learnt and no change has occurred	Lesson may have been identified and understood but not implemented e.g. due to a lack of resources or lesson may not have been seen as valid by the project team/donor or recipient
	Lesson is no longer valid	Lesson either no longer valid due to time or circumstance.

No	Lesson	Comment	Learnt
Terminal Evaluation of Project No. KYR/G64 “Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.” Published in 2008			
1	The project should have been regarded as a foundation.	K50 is very much regarded as a foundation project for the SSDC and Rev 2 is, in effect, phase 2 in a progressive series of activities.	Yes
2	G64 was far too ambitious in the context of a post-Soviet developing country.	K50 had 4 simple outcomes. It did not try and develop the SSDC into a multi agency CN law enforcement department, rather it concentrated (when SSDC leadership permitted) on inter agency	Yes

		coordination and the development of a legal apparatus.	
3	It was unrealistic to expect a new counter narcotics agency to mature in just 5 years.	Although not expressly stated, K50 was designed for far longer than 5 years. The extension which is in effect the second phase of the project demonstrates that assistance to the SSDC is more likely to be delivered for somewhere in the region of 10-15 years.	Yes
4	Given the economic situation it was questionable if the DCA could become self-sustaining.	Sustainability is an issue, but is not a defining issue. There is realisation that given the current economic climate the SSDC and many other government agencies will require donor assistance well into the long term.	Understood
5	Delivery could have been better had the needs analysis been conducted before the project documents were drawn up.	As the SSDC is a new agency, no needs analysis was conducted. However, the design was cognisant of the government’s and the SSDC’s requirements. The SSDC was formed from the DCA and previous experience of that project and the experience gained from the DCA project in Tajikistan provided useful lessons on which the design was based.	Yes
6	All UNODC Project Officers associated with what is essentially a law enforcement issue should have a solid background in either policing or law.	The International Project Officer is from a law enforcement background. None of the current supporting staff have a LE background, although all have the requisite skills to perform their jobs as per the JD in the project documentation.	Possible in the future
7	The insistence on polygraph as the primary measure of the integrity of candidates caused considerable misgivings.	This observation is no longer valid.	Not valid due to circumstance
8	The necessary laws regarding asset forfeiture and communications interception were not developed in time.	While the detail of this observation is no longer valid, the Kyrgyz Republic still requires improvements to its laws. Outcome 1 addresses this issue.	Yes
9	Negative inter-agency rivalry worked to detriment of the joint	This observation remains valid. SSDC needs to become the mechanism for increasing inter-agency cooperation. While this is a major element of the	In progress

	operations.	project, there remains the risk that before Kyrgyz agencies do not want to change they won't; and change takes considerable time and effort.	
10	The assumption that the former Soviet intelligence system would operate to current international law enforcement standards was naïve.	The focus for the SSDC has been on international cooperation at the regional level. While there are still many issues, UNODC has done much to encourage and improve cooperation. US INL data indicates that Kyrgyz LE agencies cooperated with DEA agents in relation to 48 investigations in 2014 ¹¹⁰ . However, intelligence generation and sharing remain key areas of weakness in all LE agencies and require significant investment and training.	Understood but not heavily invested in
11	The whole concept of intelligence needed addressing urgently otherwise international co-operation and information sharing leading to the disruption and interdiction of major criminal gangs is less successful than it should be.	This remains a valid observation which is not limited to Kyrgyzstan; it is true for every country in the wider region ¹¹¹ .	Understood but not fully implemented
12	Professional mentoring and training by people with policing backgrounds was required.	This observation remains partly true. It is one of this report's recommendations (recommendation 14) that UNODC investigate the use of mentors. Not international mentors but previous Kyrgyz officials who could be used on a consultative basis. UNODC staff have made good use of DEA and FSKN agents to provide training.	Understood but not fully implemented
Project No KGZ/175 Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan Final Evaluation. Published in 2012			
13	Concept of mobile interagency secure teams is valid. The need for special resources within the southern border region is confirmed.	Donors have now taken over direct responsibility for MOBITs from UNODC and they are a part of the SSDC.	Yes
14	The value of these resources to the counter trafficking agenda suggests a potentially broader role.	MOBITs are still limited in the use and role. UNODC, however, has no real influence over their use.	No
15	The potential for a broader role for MOBITs should be the subject of review within the new host agency	MOBITs are key element of the SSDC. The Southern HQ and MOBITs will shortly be collocated in a new HQ on the	Yes

¹¹⁰ INL report for 2104.

¹¹¹ UNODC Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia.

	(SSDC).	outskirts of Osh, however, their role remains broadly the same as the one that was assessed in the evaluation report	
16	The SSDC should develop an information and analysis infrastructure to introduce information-led methodology. As part of this methodology, the SSDC should consider the adoption of proactive management systems for its middle and senior managers. Anti-corruption strategies should be part of any design work on the building of such an infrastructure.	Remains valid and is the same the findings of this report; see recommendations 17.	Partially
17	For a development of affordable, practical and efficient methodology for the building and maintenance of teams with high integrity, the International Anti-Corruption Academy should be asked to use Kyrgyzstan as a case study and in particular contribute guidance on processes for monitoring integrity measures in future projects such as this.	Anti-corruption remains a priority issue. Recommendation remains valid and UNODC should continue to assist SSDC. Use of third party is a useful recommendation.	Partially
18	The acceptance of SSDC as the lead agency on counter trafficking work should be used to create protocols on information sharing and specific areas of operational responsibility between the national agencies. The Customs and Border Services should continue to have responsibility for overt detection of concealed contraband at recognised border crossing points but protocols regarding access to information from this activity should be made available to the SSDC. Discussions with other agencies should be held to identify areas of particular responsibility and the necessary protocols for the sharing of information within a legal framework. The development of multi-agency co-operation on drug	Remains valid and is an element of ongoing work and is echoed in the recommendations section of this report. See recommendations 1-5 and 12.	Partially

	trafficking should form part of the project to develop the SSDC.		
19	Continuation of the work by UNODC to clarify the use of (common) terms and to ensure that more detailed and specific design of information, intelligence and analysis components in (all UNODC) Projects. Complex inactions with other projects should form a specific part of project design and mechanisms for joint progress should be put into place. Projects must be managed for the whole of their duration and standards of reports must be maintained. Binary, quantitative and qualitative indicators should be collected to monitor progress of projects. In complex projects pursuing unproven theories (i.e. the best method of achieving integrity), indicators should measure key components of activity to enable detailed assessment.	Reporting and evaluation recommendations, which seek to improve the quality and use of data have also been made in this evaluation (see recommendation 17).	Understood
Mid-term project evaluation of Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossing points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices XACK22: Published in 2015 ¹¹² .			
20	Project activities must support and promote institutionalized BLO training sponsored by the host government(s) and opened to intra-agency participation.	Understood but not yet enacted. This evaluation report endorses this concept in recommendations 7 and 12	
21	The project team must facilitate dialogue with the CLPs on the establishing of cross border cooperation.	Outcome 4 of K50 seeks to achieve this objective.	Yes
22	Project staff should prepare and present information on the projects outputs and accomplishments to	This recommendation is echoed and expanded on in recommendation 17.	

¹¹² Recommendations from the Mid-term Independent Project Evaluation of the Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossing points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices XACK22 The Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2015/XACK22_Final_Evaluation_Report_March_2015.pdf

	perspective donors.		
23	To UNODC/ROCA: Recruit and retain knowledgeable staff members who are dedicated to UNODC mandates.	This recommendation is supported. ROCA’s desire is to recruit more specialists than generalists in the near future.	
24	Through trainings, seminars, and workshops bring together the PSCs and WGs to promote dialogue that will facilitate mechanisms that promote the exchange of information	This recommendation is supported and expanded on, to include country level PSC meetings (all SP1 agencies) and then expand to include inter-regional PSC, see recommendation 12.	Yes
Independent mid-term project evaluations of the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA) Phase 2 TD/TAJ/03/H03. Published in 2012.			
25	The DCA to seek external legal assistance to develop proposals, make appropriate representations and gain support for new or amended legislation/regulations in relation to money laundering; access to telephone billing; the polygraph vetting process; decriminalising some aspects of drug abuse and informant protection. Such assistance might be found through the Government or Donor community.	Similar to the situation in Kyrgyzstan – part of outcome 1 – support to SSDC to draft laws	Yes
26	A transparent job application system is devised for potential recruits to the DCA to ensure that all applications are acknowledged and accounted for.	This evaluation takes this recommendation further and recommends that a training needs analysis to assist in the development of standard job descriptions, see recommendation 11.	Yes
27	Employed staff who fail a polygraph examination be subject to rigorous investigation by Internal Affairs and proportionate action taken to ensure credibility of the process.	Not valid.	Not valid due to circumstance
28	The staff vetting process is enhanced by including financial and asset declarations and random drug	Similar to the situation in Kyrgyzstan, where SSDC staff are vetted before they can serve	

	testing.		
29	When resources become available the capability of Internal Affairs is enhanced to enable proactive investigation of alleged or suspected inappropriate behaviour or wrongdoing.	No data gathered in relation to internal affairs as this does not feature within the current project.	Unknown
30	An exit strategy for the additional allowance is negotiated with the Government. This should form part of any project extension. Negotiations with the Government should seek a phased transfer of this financial responsibility and consider the practicalities of a phased reduction in the level of allowance as a percentage of basic salary. Continued Donor support will be needed into the medium term.	UNODC does not top up the salaries of the SSDC.	Yes
31	An assessment of training needs for the intelligence and analysis function and covert policing.	Echoed by this evaluation and expanded to include all forms of training; see recommendation 11.	Yes
32	Inexperienced officers need a wide range of technical training. This requires expert training provision and the techniques to be undertaken require training design and implementation to take advantage of any available funding. Opportunities for training conducted by bilateral partners should be explored.	Echoed by the evaluation and expanded to include all training	
33	Law enforcement agencies are aware of the need for joint work to develop working protocols. Standardisation is not yet achieved. The ongoing work under UN Project F23 is progressed to develop standardised systems and agreed protocols for information sharing between law enforcement agencies.	Similar problems exist within SSDC and across Kyrgyz agencies. The issue is understood and a common thread in a number of projects, but to date little concrete change has been achieved.	On going
34	Internal Inspectorate and Audit functions are enhanced within the DCA.	No data gathered.	Unknown
35	Research be undertaken to establish the feasibility of the DCA Forensic	The Kyrgyz Government is developing a concept which would see all Forensic	Yes

	Services being marketed to other law enforcement agencies.	Labs grouped in a single location. While this concept appears to be more cost effective, donors have expressed their concerns, mainly due to the fact that they would lose visibility of their donation.	
36	Equipment issues relating to vehicles, radios, mobile phone interception and satellite phones are progressed.	Outcome 3 of K50 relates to this issue and has largely been achieved	Yes
37	Research be undertaken to develop performance measures that give credit for international joint operations.	SSDC is better at self-publicity. Donor reports do provide some credit to SSDC. The issue of reporting is expanded on in this evaluation.	Aware
38	Seizures of drugs by the DCA appear to be on the low side given the estimated scale of drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan. Performance targets are set for the DCA in respect of arrests, drug seizures, controlled deliveries, drug networks disrupted and prosecutions. The targets should be challenging and be a substantial increase compared to current levels.	Similar problems exist within Kyrgyzstan and along the Northern Distribution Route. While Opium production has increased seizures along the NDR have fallen.	Aware

The overall conclusion from the analysis above is that the project on the whole has learnt a great deal from other projects delivered by UNODC in similar fields. There are few lessons that have not been learnt or actioned. While there are many more that have not been fully actioned, they have generally been understood and have either been partially implemented or planned for. The recommendation section to this report has been developed with these shortfalls in mind and aims to assist the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan to improve design and delivery by learning from the past. There are obvious resource implications to implementing lessons which have not been addressed by this report. Resource allocation and prioritisation are a function of decision making (project staff and PSC) and should form part of an expanded matrix, which in turn could be used as a management tool.

It is recommended that ROCA and the Programme Office for Kyrgyzstan track lessons using IEU’s website and the Evaluation Application in ProFi (Lessons Learned Database) and produce a simple management tool similar to the format above with additional columns that note decisions, implementation dates, resource allocation and risk to implementation (recommendation 24).

ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

Terms of Reference of the
**Mid-term Independent Project Evaluation of
KGZ/K50 project**

**“Strengthening the State Service on Drug
Control of the Kyrgyz Republic”**

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

May 2015



UNITED NATIONS
New York, 2015

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I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Project number:	KGZK50
Project title:	“Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic”
Duration:	August 2011 - December 2017
Location:	Sub-Region - Central Asia (Kyrgyz Republic)
Linkages to Country Programme:	UNODC Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016
Linkages to Regional Programme:	N/A
Linkages to Thematic Programme:	Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking
Executing Agency:	UNODC ROCA
Partner Organizations:	N/A
Total Approved Budget:	\$6,899,800 (21 November 2014)
Donors:	Russian Federation, United States of America, Kazakhstan
Project Manager/Coordinator:	Mr. A. Fedulov
Type of evaluation (mid-term or final):	Mid-term Independent Project Evaluation
Time period covered by the evaluation:	August 2011 - August 2015 (until the end of the evaluation field mission)
Geographical coverage of the evaluation:	The Kyrgyz Republic
Core Learning Partners ¹¹³ (entities):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apparatus of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; • State Service on Drug Control of the KR (SSDC); • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic; • Ministry of Interior of the KR; • Customs Service of the KR; • Border Service of the KR; • National Institute for Strategic Studies of the KR; • Embassy of the United States of America in Kyrgyzstan; • Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kyrgyzstan; • Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan; • UNODC staff at HQ; UNODC staff in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA); • UNODC staff in the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan

¹¹³ The Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are the key stakeholders of the subject evaluated (project, programme, policy etc.) who have an interest in the evaluation. The CLP works closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the evaluation process.

Project overview and historical context in which the project is implemented

Kyrgyzstan is a significant transit country for drug trafficking on the so-called Northern Route: from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, and to world drug markets. UNODC estimates that 20-25% of heroin produced in Afghanistan travels through Kyrgyzstan. Osh town has been identified as a highly significant hub for the drug trade and is a principle focal point for drug flows. The country is still having ineffective border control, serious economic challenges, including a high level of public debt and facing severe problems of corruption. These and other factors have limited the ability of the government to take meaningful and sustainable measures against the drug trade and make Kyrgyzstan extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking. This weakness is ruthlessly and effectively exploited by different organized criminal groups operating in the region. With depleted financial resources, ongoing political transition and challenges in establishing strong and stable central, regional and local government institutions, the impact of drug trafficking and associated criminal activity in Kyrgyzstan, unless adequately addressed, has the potential to have serious long term consequences on political stability. The government of Kyrgyzstan has acknowledged the serious challenges it faces from endemic corruption and the threat of insurgency fuelled by drug money.

The main objective for the UNODC project “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic” (KGZK50), established in 2011, is to provide a comprehensive support to the Kyrgyz Republic in the field of drug control at national level through developing the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (SSDC) into an effective and sustainable law enforcement agency in the field of drug control. The support includes providing training and equipment for SSDC, promoting cooperation with its counterparts in the region as well as developing legal, administrative or physical infrastructure of SSDC.

The project contributes to the Sub-programme 1 of the UNODC Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016 (ICP).¹¹⁴ Project activities are formally coordinated through a Steering Committee which brings together the main Government counterparts, key international partners, donors and civil society organizations.

Implementation of the project since August 2011 has had a positive impact on the SSDC’s overall capacity and performance; however achieving the main immediate project’s goal and its outcomes has required more efforts, time and resources. In 2014, the project was extended until 31 December 2017 with the overall project budget increased from 3,399,800 USD to 6,899,800 USD.

SSDC of the Kyrgyz Republic was established by the Presidential Decree dated 17 August 2010. The SSDC is recognized as the legal successor to the former Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.

UNODC formerly supported the development of a Drug Control Agency (DCA) in Kyrgyzstan

¹¹⁴ Sub-programme 1 – Drug trafficking, organized crime and border management: Outcome 1.1. Drug and crime legislative and regulatory frameworks improved; Outcome 1.2. Institutional capacity to identify, investigate and prosecute drug trafficking and organized criminal activity enhanced; Outcome 1.3. Border management enhanced to intercept criminal activity; Outcome 1.4. Technical capacity of forensic science laboratories upgraded.

(project AD/KYR/G64), that was abolished in late 2009.¹¹⁵ In August 2010, the new President issued a decree establishing a new State Service on Drug Control and personally requested technical assistance from UNODC in a meeting with the UNODC Executive Director.

Summary of project achievements so far:

Since the beginning in 2011 the project has made progress towards achieving its outcomes by working in parallel on developing the Kyrgyz National Counter Narcotic Strategy, strengthening the institutional/technical capacity, improving the professional skills of national drug control officers and promoting regional counter-narcotic cooperation.

In this regard, the main achievements towards the overall project objective are the following:

- The support provided by the project had positive impact on SSDC's achievements in the area of drug control in Kyrgyzstan. According to the SSDC Drug Seizure Report, which is based on progress achieved during the first 6 months of 2013, there is a positive dynamic in the investigation of drug trafficking cases in Kyrgyzstan. The SSDC presented an increase of 85% in the number of solved and investigated crime cases against data from the semiannual SSDC records for 2012.
- According to the SSDC Semi Annual Drug Seizure Report for 2014, the SSDC presented an increase by 25 % of registered crime cases in relation to drug trafficking, in comparison to data from the same SSDC report for 2013.
- Furthermore, SSDC was successful in controlled delivery operations during first 6 months of 2013. There were 3 domestic and 2 international joint special operations with drug control agencies from Russia and Kazakhstan conducted by SSDC in 2013. In first half of 2013 SSDC has solved 138 new crime cases and 105 individuals have been convicted for drug related crimes. Also SSDC was successful in investigating of 5 crime cases related to drug corruption of the Kyrgyz state officials, mainly from the local police.
- There is a serious increase in interdiction of active criminals involved in drug trafficking in 2014. Furthermore, the SSDC successfully investigated three criminal cases related to drug corruption from the Kyrgyz state officials, with three police officers convicted. The SSDC has conducted four local operations in the country for strengthening the drug control regime in Kyrgyzstan.
- From January to April 2015, SSDC detected 82 drug-related crimes, seized approximately one ton 396 kilogram 347 gram of illicit drugs and at least one ton 283 kilogram 440 gram of precursors.¹¹⁶
- The SSDC noted that most of actions undertaken by the SSDC staff with utilization of the procured equipment under the K50 project. The SSDC officers have applied technical knowledge that they previously received from various specialized training sessions under the K50 project.
- Project implementation is monitored by a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of project beneficiaries, other state bodies, civil society and international organizations working in the field of criminal justice in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Steering Committee, as a regulatory body allows making decisions as to what successes have been achieved, what is the progress and what are the difficulties;
- The “Anti-drug program of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic” as of January 27, 2014 (# 54) and its Plan of Implementation have been developed with support of UNODC and approved by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic as a result of SSDC cooperation with UNODC.

The project is aligned with key national development priorities of the Kyrgyz Republic in the field of drug control, as set out in the following regulatory legal acts:

- The Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic (adopted in 1997);

¹¹⁵ In 2008, the evaluation of the project KYR/G64 “Kyrgyz Republic Drug Control Agency” covered the activities of the project implemented from 2003 (start of the project) up to the end of the project in 2008.

¹¹⁶ <http://svodka.akiipress.org/news:141327>, <http://svodka.akiipress.org/news:140523>, <http://svodka.akiipress.org/news:140524>.

- The Administrative Code of the Kyrgyz Republic (adopted in 1998);
- The Law 'On drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursors' (No. 66, 22 May 1998);
- Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 'On approval of the state control over the circulation of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors in the Kyrgyz Republic' (No. 466, 2004)
- Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 'On narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursors subject to control in Kyrgyz Republic' (No. 543, 2007)
- Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 'On the recording, storage and use of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors in the Kyrgyz Republic' (No. 54, 18 February 2011).

Related links:

<http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/kyrgyz-service-of-drug-control-shows-results-in-drug-seizure.html>

<http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/effectiveness-of-counteracting-illicit-drug-trafficking.html>

As per the current Project Logical Framework of 2014 there are 4 major Outcomes:

Outcome 1: Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control. Outcome 2: Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened.

Outcome 3: Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.

Outcome 4: The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained.

Towards project Outcome 1:

- As a result of the project's activities on supporting the Kyrgyz SSDC in finalizing the new National Strategy on Drug Control on 27 January, 2014, the government of the Kyrgyz Republic signed a decree on the adoption of a new Anti-Drug Programme/Strategy. The adoption of the strategy means that the main goal of the project, which is Outcome 1 of the project document, has been thoroughly achieved.
- In addition, in 2014 the project started working with SSDC on the development of an Action Plan related to the implementation of the Kyrgyz Anti-Drug Programme.
- In January 2014, in cooperation with the Kyrgyz SSDC, the project completed the activity related to the development of recommendations for upgrading of the laws and regulations for the effective functioning of SSDC. This activity involved the participation of an international Legal Consultant hired under project. As a result, the report with recommendations was submitted to the SSDC for consideration and approval.
- In the framework of the project, the support was given to the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on approval of the UNODC Integrated Country Programme for Kyrgyzstan for 2014-2016. The ICP draft document was submitted to the Government of Kyrgyzstan for consideration. Further, the draft document has been completed and brought to its logical end by the drug control body of Kyrgyzstan in cooperation with concerned ministries and departments

of the Kyrgyz Republic. As a result, on June 25, 2014, UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov, and Vice-Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, coordinating defense, public security and the rule of law, the fight against crime and corruption issues, Abdyrakhman Mamataliev approved a new program aimed at strengthening cooperation between the parties in combatting against illicit drugs and organized crime.

- In March 2015, UNODC coordinated the development of terms of reference of an international consultant on drafting of the law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors”. The consultant is expected to work in Kyrgyzstan in June-July 2015 for ten working days and to complete the home-based work in July 2015.
- Strengthening the coordinating role of the SSDC in the country is an important area of work. Within the framework of the project, UNODC office in Kyrgyzstan assisted in conducting two meetings of the State Coordination Committee for control of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors of the Kyrgyz Republic (SCCN) on June 26 and November 20, 2014, which were chaired by Mr. Mamataliev A.M., Vice Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic. As a result, the important decisions in the area of drug control by the State Coordination Committee were discussed and adopted. On 16 April 2015 UNODC supported the first regional meeting of the State Coordination Committee for control of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors of the Kyrgyz Republic (SCCD) with local authorities from Osh province and Osh city of Kyrgyzstan.

Related links:

<http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/unodc-organises-public-hearing-on-draft-anti-drug-strategy-for-the-kyrgyz-republic.html>

<http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/new-anti-drug-programme-kyrgyzstan.html>

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2014/June/unodc-and-kyrgyzstan-strengthen-their-cooperation-against-illicit-drugs-and-crime.html>

<http://oshnews.kg/v-oshe-obsudili-effektivnosti-meropriyatij-svyazannyh-s-nezakonnym-oborotom-narkotikov/>

<http://m.talas.turmush.kg/ru/news:126757>

Towards project Outcome 2:

- Continued preparation works for the initiation of a tender for the refurbishment works (overhaul of the heating system) at the SSDC Central office in Bishkek; for construction of a new administrative building for the SSDC Eastern Department in Karakol city; for the refurbishment works on the premises of the SSDC Southern Department in Osh.
- As a result, refurbishment works at the SSDC Central office in Bishkek and at the premises of the SSDC Southern Department in Osh concluded. The handover ceremony of the abovementioned facilities refurbished in Bishkek and in Osh was conducted in December 2014.
- Finalized development of the design and estimate documentation (DED) for the construction of a new administrative building for the SSDC Eastern Department in Karakol. In February 2015, the international tender bid (ITB) documents were submitted, cleared and approved. In March, advertisement was placed on UN website, the “Vecherny Bishkek” newspaper and sent to potential vendors. On 13 March, ITB on construction of the building of the SSDC office in Kara-Kol town was launched. On 19 March, the pre-tender meeting was held with the interested construction companies. The evaluation of bids is planned in April 2015.

Towards project Outcome 3:

- In January 2014, new ITB tender processes for the procurement of Gas Chromatography instruments and other analytical laboratory equipment for the Kyrgyz SSDC Lab needs have been initiated. The coordination on technical specifications with UNODC's Laboratory Scientific Section and UNOV's Procurement Unit is completed. This activity was finalized in 2014.
- In February 2014 the project handed over set of equipment to the Kyrgyz SSDC including: six off-road vehicles; crime scene kits; electronic scales; laboratory furniture; IT and other equipment.

- In accordance with vehicle needs assessment report, the project has initiated procurement process for additional 5 off-road vehicles required by the SSDC operational/investigative units located in the SSDC Department located in the South of Kyrgyzstan. These vehicles will be handed over by the end of 2014. As a result, 95% of SSDC needs in vehicles addressed.
- In accordance with the SSDC Training Plan for strengthening of professional skills of SSDC officers in 2013-2014, 9 training courses for operational officers, investigators and analytical officers were organized. The training sessions enabled for more than 200 Kyrgyz SSDC staff to upgrade their professional skills. These included participation of 7 Tajik DCA officers. The training sessions were organized in close cooperation with US DEA Regional training team and Federal Service on Drug Control of the Russian Federation.
- 2 CBT classes were established in 2012 under the project. Currently, two training managers are trained and working at the CBT classes. As a result, two CBT classrooms at SSDC offices located in Bishkek and in Osh are under permanent use. To date, SSDC actively uses the established CBT facilities for its training purposes and for training of officers from other Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies.
- In January 2015, UNODC approved with SSDC a training plan for 2015 developed jointly with DEA of the United States of America to enhance the capacity of SSDC in the fight with illicit drugs and updated it in March. Related letters were sent and received from SSDC.
- Upon request of SSDC of Kyrgyzstan, UNODC requested the Federal Service on Drug Control of the Russian Federation to provide a trainer to conduct the specialized training for forensic specialists of SSDC in May 2015. Positive reply is received. Training is under preparation.
- Required amount of vehicles for SSDC in 2015 has been assessed and identified.
- As a result of UNODC coordination with SSDC, SSDC confirmed its participation in the International Collaborative Exercises (ICE) 2015/1 round and forwarded to UNODC its certificates to import standards and test samples of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, in accordance with the requested lists. Such exercises allow the forensics laboratory of SSDC to evaluate its potential to learn and apply new research methods on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Forensics laboratory of SSDC is registered on the site of the Laboratory and Scientific section of UNODC.

Related links:

<http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/investigation-of-drug-related-crimes.html>

<http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/counter-narcotics-practical-applications-seminar-in-bishkek.html>

<http://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/new-anti-drug-programme-kyrgyzstan.html>

Towards project Outcome 4:

- Facilitated participation of SSDC delegation in 2 events held in CARICC, Almaty, the CARICC Experts meeting held on the 24 February, 2014 and the CARICC Council held on the 25 February, 2014. As a result, the Council adopted a resolution concerning the rotation of the CARICC Chairmanship. In accordance with this, CARICC will be chaired by the Kyrgyz Republic representative for the next two-year period. Chairmanship's rotation issues were also discussed and agreed.
- In order to support SSDC on cooperation with regional partners, the project team prepared and implemented visit of SSDC delegation composed of employees to Astana in August of 2014. During the official trip, the SSDC delegation participated in the meetings to exchange experiences with the colleagues from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan and studied experience on development of law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing with their colleagues.
- Facilitated participation of SSDC delegation at the 57th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) held in Vienna in March, 2014. During the event, Mr. Sultanov met with Mr. Yury Fedotov, the UNODC Executive Director and discussed various issues concerning the drug situation in Kyrgyzstan as well as cooperation with UNODC.
- Facilitated participation of SSDC delegation at the Experts meeting on decriminalization of youth by reducing drug demand through rehabilitation and re-socialization of drug users, conducted by Federal Drug Control Service of Russia in Moscow on 24 April, 2014.

- Facilitated participation of SSDC delegation at the SOM AKT (Senior Officials Meeting) and AKT (Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan) Ministerial meetings held in Dushanbe on 29 and 30 May, 2014 respectively.
- In March 2015, UNODC facilitated participation of the Kyrgyz delegation, the Chairman of SSDC Alymbai Sultanov and Advisor of SSDC Chairperson Timur Isakov at the 58th session of the Commission on narcotic drugs in Austria (Vienna) on 9-13 March 2015. At the session, Head of Delegation A. Sultanov reported about the drug situation in Kyrgyzstan and proposed measures to counter the threat of drugs at national, regional and international levels, taking into account the deterioration of the situation with drug trafficking in Afghanistan. On 11 March, A. Sultanov met with UNODC's Executive Director Y. Fedotov and discussed issues of enhancing capacity of SSDC.
- UNODC is in the process of organization of participation of two representatives of SSDC of Kyrgyzstan at the 9th Senior Officials Meeting and Ministerial Review Meeting of the parties to the MoU on sub-regional drug control cooperation in Central Asia on 4-5 May, 2015 in Turkmenistan.

Justification of the project and main experiences / challenges during implementation:

Kyrgyzstan is a significant transit country for drug trafficking on the so-called Northern Route: from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, and to world drug markets. UNODC estimates that 20-25% of heroin produced in Afghanistan travels through Kyrgyzstan. Osh town has been identified as a highly significant hub for the drug trade and is a principle focal point for drug flows. The country is still having ineffective border control, serious economic challenges, including a high level of public debt and facing severe problems of corruption. These and other factors have limited the ability of the government to take meaningful and sustainable measures against the drug trade and make Kyrgyzstan extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking. This weakness is ruthlessly and effectively exploited by different organized criminal groups operating in the region. With depleted financial resources, ongoing political

transition and challenges in establishing strong and stable central, regional and local government institutions, the impact of drug trafficking and associated criminal activity in Kyrgyzstan, unless adequately addressed, has the potential to have serious long term consequences on political stability and security.

The government of Kyrgyzstan has acknowledged the serious challenges it faces from endemic corruption and the threat of insurgency fuelled by drug money. The main government counterparts have shown commitment to the project and generally provide support towards implementation of the project activities. The project team is able to have regular meetings and consultations with project beneficiaries to ensure proper implementation.

Meanwhile, the project faces a number of challenges, which hamper effectiveness and sustainability of results. These include the following:

- insufficient state resources in the field of drug control;
- drug-related corruption;
- rivalry between SSDC and other law enforcement agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Interior, the Customs Service, the Border Service), although there are cases of joint anti-drug operations (e.g., between MoI and SSDC);
- insufficient material-technical base to improve efficiency in the fight against drug trafficking (e.g., SSDC departments in Osh, Djalal-Abad and Talas provinces do not have SSDC buildings and have to rent them from municipal or private entities for certain period of time);
- turnover of SSDC staff;
- insufficient skills of personnel to fight effectively with the organised drug trafficking and smuggling.

The project's work plan has been approved by the project's Steering Committee. To implement this plan in a timely manner UNODC needs timely submission of funds from the donors.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document:

The project KGZK50 has been revised twice:

Revision 1 (14/06/13)

- The aim of the project revision was to extend the project until 15 December 2014. Revised duration of the project was 15 August 2011 - 15 December 2014 (3 years and 4 months).
- The extension allowed the project to complete all remaining activities and fully reach its objectives, particularly related to project's outcomes: 2. Strengthening of basic infrastructure of the State Service on Drug Control (SSDC) of the Kyrgyz Republic, including its central office in Bishkek and the departments in Southern and Eastern Kyrgyzstan; 3. Strengthening of operational, investigative and analytical capacities of the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic through provision of equipment and training; 4. Supporting the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic in its active cooperation and sharing information with law enforcement agencies of other countries.
- There were three donors to the project – the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. The USA and the Russian Federation were two major donors of the project. In accordance with the Contribution Letter from the Russian Federation dated on 18 January 2011 the donor would provide its annual contribution in the amount of \$500,000 every year during 2011 and 2013. Contributions from the Russian Federation for 2011 and 2012 have been received. Contribution for 2013 was expected at the end of 2013 project year, but after scheduled end-of-project date in August 2013 thus this portion can be utilized in 2014 only. The USA has also provided its donor contributions in the amount of \$1,006,948. Next contribution was expected in 2013 as well. Total expected contribution from two major donors in 2013 was \$1,000,000 (proxy). Current shortfall of the project's budget was \$1,345,643. In order to achieve all project goals it was necessary to have time to collect all pledged contributions.
- As part of project revision change in output 2.3 "The State Service department in Eastern Kyrgyzstan located in Karakol refurbished" was proposed. Assessment of current condition of the SSDC department in Eastern Kyrgyzstan located in Karakol was done by a hired engineer. It was strongly recommended do not initiate any refurbishment works in present building due to its poor physical condition and to start with construction of a new administrative building nearby within the same funds. In this regard output 2.3 would be formulated as "New Administrative facility for the Eastern State Service department located in Karakol constructed". This issue has been approved by the Project Steering Committee in January 2013 in Bishkek.
- Proposed extension of the project and amendment in output 2.3 would not lead to increase/decrease of the Overall Budget.

Revision 2 (21/11/14)

- Implementation of the project since 2011 had a positive impact on the SSDC's overall capacity and performance; however achieving the main immediate project's goal and its outcomes required more efforts, time and resources.
- In accordance with request from SSDC on further support to drug control regime in Kyrgyzstan, the Executive Director of UNODC Mr. Yury Fedotov confirmed the importance of continued UNODC assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic and proposed an extension of the K50 project. In April 2014 the K50 Project Steering Committee decided to initiate the project revision process for its extension.
- The consultations on the project's extension were held with the major project donors including the United States of America and the Russian Federation, who confirmed their

position of continuation of support to the Kyrgyz Republic through implementation of this UNODC project. As a result, in September 2014, the UNODC received a letter from the Russian Federation with a pledge of 500,000 USD for the KGZ/K50 project extension. Furthermore, in July 2014, UNODC received a letter from the United States' Embassy to the Kyrgyz Republic commending the cooperation with the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and requesting a proposal for continuing the project.

- The revision maintained the original project objective, but amended some previous outputs and activities while adding new ones in order to increase its effectiveness and expanding of the overall positive impact.
- The project revision was aimed at achieving the following outcomes: (i) improvement of a legal framework in the field of drug control and support in implementation of the newly adopted Anti-Drug Strategy/Programme; (ii) strengthening of the SSDC's infrastructures in regions; (iii) strengthening operational, investigative, analytical and technical capacities of the SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners as well as (iv) support in promotion of cooperation and information exchange with counter-narcotic partners at the national level and with partners from neighbouring and other countries. In addition, the revision of the project enabled the project to complete the ongoing activities started in 2014.
- The project will also contribute to the Sub-programme 1 of the UNODC Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016 (ICP).
- As the result of the project, the project's duration was extended until 31 December 2017 and the overall project budget was increased from 3,399,800 USD to 6,899,800 USD with detailed information in the attached hereto budget information.

UNODC strategy context, including the project's main objectives and outcomes and project's contribution to UNODC country, regional or thematic programme:

The project provided comprehensive support to the new State Service on Drug Control in order for it to function as the lead and coordinating body for counter-narcotics activity in Kyrgyzstan as well as promoting cooperation with its counterparts in the region. The support included training and equipment as well as any necessary development of legal, administrative or physical infrastructure of SSDC.

In 2014, the project was extended until 31 December 2017. The project is aimed at developing the State Service on Drug Control (SSDC) into an effective, coordinative and sustainable specialized law enforcement organization in the field of drug control. The project will also contribute to Outcome 1.1 of the Sub-programme 1 of the UNODC Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016 (ICP): "Drug and crime legislative and regulatory frameworks improved".

All project Outcomes remained unchanged after the last project revision of 2014. However, in order to increase its effectiveness and expanding the overall positive impact the Outcomes 1, 2 and 3 were reformulated/rephrased by a decision of the Project's Steering Committee at its ninth session. Some outputs and new activities were added, revised and/or reformulated, under each relevant Outcome below:

<p>Overall objective: The State Service on Drug Control developed into an effective and sustainable specialized law enforcement organization.</p>	<p>Unchanged</p>
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<p>Outcome 1: Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control.</p> <p>Previous Outcome 1: Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of the State Service and finalize the National Strategy on Drug Control.</p>	<p>Reformulated</p>
<p>Output 1.1 The legal framework including current legislation revised and proposed for the SSDC consideration.</p> <p>Previous Output 1.1. The laws and regulations (including amendments to the existing legislation) on the State Service structures, mandates, functions reviewed/drafted and proposed to the Government for consideration.</p>	<p>Reformulated</p>
<p>Output 1.2. The coordination functions of the Kyrgyz State Committee on Drug Control in implementation of the National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control supported.</p> <p>Previous Output 1.2. Working Groups and/or other mechanisms supported to finalize the National Strategy on Drug Control.</p>	<p>Reformulated</p>
<p>Outcome 2: Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened.</p> <p>Previous Outcome 2: Basic infrastructure of the State Service, including its central office in Bishkek and the departments in Southern and Eastern Kyrgyzstan strengthened.</p>	<p>Reformulated</p>
<p>Output 2.1. New Administrative facility for SSDC Western Department located in Talas constructed.</p> <p>Previous Output 2.1. The buildings of the Central Office of the State Service in Bishkek refurbished.</p>	<p>New</p>
<p>Output 2.2. New Administrative facility for SSDC Southeastern Department located in Jalal-Abad constructed.</p> <p>Previous Output 2.2. The State Service department in Southern Kyrgyzstan located in Osh refurbished, including the refurbishment of the premises for special task force officers (2-3 rooms) and the refurbishment of the pre-charge detention centres in line with relevant UN standards.</p>	<p>New</p>
<p>Output 2.3. The State Service department in Eastern Kyrgyzstan located in Karakol refurbished.</p>	<p>Unchanged ongoing activity</p>
<p>Output 2.4. New Administrative facility for SSDC Eastern Department located in Naryn constructed.</p>	<p>New</p>

<p>Outcome 3: Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.</p> <p>Previous Outcome 3: Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of the State Service are strengthened through provision of equipment and training including establishment of Computer Based Training (CBT) within the Kyrgyz State Service of Drug Control.</p>	Reformulated
<p>Output 3.1. Specifications, type and quantity of equipment needed for SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners assessed, procured and handed over.</p> <p>Previous Output 3.1. Specifications, type and quantity of equipment needed for State Service and local branches assessed (including the audit of the assets returned from the Ministry of Interior), and procurement plan developed and carried out.</p>	Reformulated
<p>Output 3.2. A group of selected SSDC officers trained to serve as trainers for their peers.</p>	Unchanged
<p>Output 3.3. Training curricula in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers and its national counter-narcotic partners finalized, endorsed, incorporated into the current national training curriculum for law enforcement officers and implemented together with the national professional training institutions.</p> <p>Previous Output 3.3. Training curricula in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for State Service officers (including for regional/local departments and MOBITs) as well as for officers of other law enforcement agencies with drug control mandates finalized, endorsed, incorporated into the current national</p>	Reformulated
<p>training curriculum for law enforcement officers and implemented together with the national professional training institutions.</p>	
<p>Output 3.4. Computer Based Training (CBT) classrooms within national counter-narcotic partners of the SSDC established. Training managers will operate the learning system and monitor performance and impact through the e-Learning system.</p> <p>Previous Output 3.4. Computer Based Training classrooms established within the Kyrgyz State Service of Drug Control in Bishkek and Osh and training software installed in both classrooms with relevant courses for the Kyrgyz State Service on Drug Control. Training manager(s) will operate the learning system and monitor performance and impact through the Learning Management Information System.</p>	Reformulated
<p>Output 3.5. Capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners enhanced through assessment of vehicle requirement.</p> <p>Previous Output 3.5. State Drug Control Service capacities enhanced through assessment of vehicle requirement.</p>	Reformulated

<p>Output 3.6 Technical capacities of forensic science laboratories of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners upgraded.</p> <p>Previous Output 3.6. Technical capacity of forensic science laboratories upgraded at the Kyrgyz State Service on Drug Control.</p>	Reformulated
<p>Outcome 4: The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained.</p>	Unchanged
<p>Output 4.1: The placement of the SSDC Liaison Officers in <i>inter alia</i> Afghanistan, China, Tajikistan and Russia facilitated.</p>	Unchanged
<p>Output 4.2. Cooperation arrangements between SSDC enhanced with DCA of Tajikistan, FSKN of Russia, DEA of the United States, and other relevant foreign agencies facilitated. This will involve the conclusion of agreements/MOUs, and the support for study tours, workshops, and information sharing to promote joint cross-border law enforcement operations (including controlled deliveries) and the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.</p>	Unchanged
<p>Output 4.3. Utilization of the facilities of CARICC by SSDC for the purposes of information sharing and coordinating of joint law enforcement operations supported.</p>	Unchanged

Due to budget constraints, the budget revision of the project was completed by the end of April 2015 with the following prioritised outputs to be accomplished in 2015:

OUTCOME 1 Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control

Output 1.1 The laws and regulations on the SSDC structures, mandates, functions reviewed/drafted and proposed to the Government for consideration and approval

Output 1.2 The coordination functions of the Kyrgyz State Committee on Drug Control in implementation of the National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control supported.

OUTCOME 2 Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened.

Output 2.2 New Administrative facility for SSDC Southwestern Department located in Jalal-Abad constructed.

Output 2.3 New administrative facility for the Eastern State service department located in Karakol constructed.

Outcome 3 Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.

Output 3.1 Specifications, type and quantity of equipment needed for SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners assessed, procured and handed over.

Output 3.3 Training curricula in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers as well as for officers of other law enforcement agencies with counter-narcotic functions finalized, endorsed, incorporated into the current national training curriculum for law enforcement officers and implemented together with the national professional training institutions.

Output 3.4 Computer Based Training (CBT) classrooms within national counter-narcotic partners of the SSDC established. Training manager(s) will operate the learning system and monitor performance and impact through the e-Learning system (*currently, no funds are available for this activity*).

Output 3.5 Capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners enhanced through

assessment of vehicle requirement.

Output 3.6 Technical capacities of forensic science laboratories of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners upgraded.

OUTCOME 4 The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained.

Output 4.2 Cooperation arrangements between the State Service enhanced with DCA of Tajikistan, FSKN of Russia, DEA of the United States, and other relevant foreign agencies. This will involve the conclusion of agreements/MOUs, and the support for study tours, workshops, and information sharing to promote joint cross-border law enforcement operations (including controlled deliveries) and the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.

Output 4.3 Utilization of the facilities CARICC for the purposes of information sharing and coordinating joint law enforcement operations.

II. DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

<i>Year</i>	<i>Overall Budget</i>	<i>Total Approved Budget</i>	<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>Expenditures in %</i>
2015	\$ 6,899,800	\$ 3,899,800	\$ 146,697	16%
2014	\$ 6,899,800	\$ 3,399,800	\$ 1,242,087	97%
2013	\$ 3,399,800	\$ 3,399,800	\$ 817,099	68%
2012	\$ 3,399,800	\$ 1,554,157	\$ 697,164	99%
2011	\$ 3,399,800	\$ 792,957	\$ 230,507	60%

III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

Reasons behind the evaluation taking place:

Final Independent Project Evaluations are mandatory and should take place before completion of the project. Should a project have a duration of more than four years, a mid-term Independent Project Evaluation would need to be planned and budgeted for as well.

The purpose of this mid-term Independent Project Evaluation is to measure project progress half way through the project duration and provide for lessons learned. The evaluation's findings and recommendations will serve as the basis for future planning, design and management of the project during its final year, as well as to ensure ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of the UNODC services.

The results of this formative evaluation are intended for use by the project team and the Regional Office in Tashkent to learn from and make desirable adjustments to ongoing implementation. It will also inform stakeholders Core Learning Partners (see Annex III) including state partners, UNODC staff at HQ and staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), UNODC staff in the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan (the Project Team) and the representatives of the Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic) of project accomplishments.

The main stakeholders will get the possibility to provide comments on the Terms of Reference, take note of the selection of consultants; be interviewed and briefed as part of the evaluation process and shall receive the key findings. Their comments, opinions and ideas shall be reflected in the report where appropriate. Please see attached the list of the Core Learning Partners in Annex III.

It will be carried out by an Independent Evaluation Consultant, with logistical arrangements provided by the UNODC Programme Office in the Kyrgyz Republic and in line with the UNODC

evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates to be found on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html>.

Assumed accomplishment of the evaluation:

Through this evaluation, the project management team will obtain an assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in this specific area and draw on recommendation and lessons learned to inform future programming. This evaluation will also offer an opportunity to identify problems that may have to be addressed differently in the future. Furthermore, this evaluation will assess the progress made in implementing the recommendations from the previous evaluation of the project G64 in 2008.

Specific questions, among others, that are expected to be answered include; To what extent have the resources available converted to output in a timely and cost-effective manner for the knowledge products? And To what extent are the project results (outcomes and impact, if any) likely to continue / be sustained after the project has finished?

This evaluation will give an opportunity to learn lessons for a possible extension of the project by determining whether project objectives were met and resources were wisely utilized; to identify areas of improvement in the project

The main evaluation users:

The main users of this evaluation will be the Core Learning Partners (see Annex III) including state partners, UNODC staff at HQ and staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), UNODC staff in the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan (the Project Team) and the representatives of the Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic).

IV. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The unit of analysis of the mid-term Independent Project Evaluation is the activities that have been carried out under the project KGZK50, i.e. the whole project including the following components:

- ***Improvement of a legal framework in the field of drug control***
 - Enhanced multi-agency coordination and policy development on narcotic drug control;
 - Revised legislation in line with international standards drafted and adopted.
- ***Prevention and reduction of crimes related to illicit drug cultivation, production, trafficking and abuse.***
 - Enhanced multi-agency cooperation;
 - Anti-drug strategy and its Plan of Implementation adopted.
- **Coordinative role of SSDC** in counter-narcotics activity in Kyrgyzstan

- The SSDC actively coordinates its counter-narcotic activities with other law-enforcement agencies fighting with illicit drugs.
- ***Sustainability of SSDC***
 - Government's capacity for sufficient self-generated funding to maintain SSDC.
- ***International cooperation of SSDC***
 - The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries.
 - Cooperation arrangements between SSDC enhanced with DCA of Tajikistan, the Federal Service on Drug Control of Russia (FSDC), DEA of the United States, and other relevant foreign agencies facilitated.
- ***Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened.***
 - Planned procurement activities and refurbishment works completed or ongoing.
- ***Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners strengthened through provision of equipment and training.***
 - Number of officers trained and serving as trainers for their peers
 - Training curricula in basic, intermediate and advanced skills for SSDC officers and its national counter-narcotic partners finalized, endorsed, incorporated into the current national training curriculum for law enforcement officers and implemented together with the national professional training institutions.

The evaluation will also assess the extent to which the project contributes to the UNODC Thematic Programmes (e.g. design, efficiency, appropriateness to/support to thematic objectives etc.).

The time period to be covered by the evaluation:

Activities conducted over the period from August 2011 until the end of the evaluation field mission (tentatively: the end of June-September 2015) at the national level.

The geographical coverage of the evaluation:

The scope for the geographical coverage of the project will be Kyrgyzstan and project priority/pilot locations. One mission to Kyrgyzstan is planned, consisting of meetings with national counterparts in Bishkek, and field visits to project sites in Osh and Issyk-Kul provinces.

V. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned, and, will respond to the following below questions, however, provided as indicative only, and required to be further refined by the Evaluator.

<i>Relevance</i>
1. To what extent are the project outputs and activities consistent with the expected outcomes and objectives?
2. How well was the project planned in advance?
3. To what extent do the objectives, outcomes and outputs from the new project revisions respond to present circumstances and stakeholder expectations?
4. How relevant are the project outputs to the recipient government?
5. To what extent is the project relevant to the Kyrgyz Republic's State Drug Control Service needs and priorities?
6. To what extent have recommendations on relevance from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
<i>Efficiency</i>
1. To what extent is the project implemented in the most efficient and cost-effective way compared to alternatives?
2. To what extent was the structure and profile of the project management team appropriate?
3. To what extent is project reporting accurate, timely and satisfactory?
4. Are there any good practices regarding efficiency, e.g. are certain aspects or arrangements of the portfolio particularly efficient?
5. How could efficiency be further improved in the next years of implementation?
6. To what extent have recommendations on efficiency from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
<i>Effectiveness</i>
1. To what degree were the programme's outcomes and objectives achieved, or are anticipated to be achieved? What chief factors were responsible for the achievement or failure of the objectives?
2. How could project planning have been improved?
3. How could the effectiveness of the project be further increased in the next years of implementation?
4. To what extent have recommendations on effectiveness from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
5. To what extent has the seizure of illicit narcotic drugs been increased during the last years in comparison to data at the beginning of the project?
<i>Impact</i>
1. What is the anticipated long term impact of this project? Is the project likely to achieve that impact?
2. Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?
3. To what extent have recommendations on impact from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
<i>Sustainability</i>
1. What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of the equipment provided?
2. To what extent are project interventions sustainable in the long term? If not, what is needed to ensure their continued resilience and viability in the future?

3. To what extent have recommendations on sustainability from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
4. To what extent has the Government d the capacity for sufficient self-generated funding to maintain SSDC?
<i>Partnerships and cooperation</i>
1. To what extent were stakeholders properly engaged and informed?
2. How was the project conducive to the development of partnerships at the bilateral and multilateral level?
3. To what extent have partnerships been sought with national and international partners, including UN-agencies, UNODC-internally, public oversight bodies and civil society, etc.?
4. To what extent have recommendations on partnerships and cooperation from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
5. To what extent has SSDC coordinated its counter-narcotic activities with other internal and external law-enforcement agencies fighting with illicit drugs?
<i>Human rights and gender</i>
1. To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project development and implementation?
2. To what extent are gender considerations included in the project development and implementation? (i) To what extent the project intervention contributes to fulfilment of the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. (ii) To what extent the project intervention contributes to increased representation of women in the State Service on Drug Control?
3. To what extent have recommendations on human rights and gender from the previous evaluation (if any) been implemented?
<i>Lessons learned/best practice</i>
1. What are the lessons learnt for future project implementation?
2. What are the best practices that could be applied in the future activities and similar projects?

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The methods used to collect and analyse data

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, structured interviews, as well as other sources to be established by the evaluator. These could be primary data coming from questionnaires, surveys, or secondary data stemming from other entities.

1. A desk review of relevant documents including a preliminary analysis of findings to be presented in an inception report, containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools. The desk review list of documents will include but are not limited to the following:
 - the project document; all project revision documents; quarterly, semi-annual and annual project progress reports;
 - Independent Project Evaluation Report of the project G64 of 2008¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷http://www.unodc.org/documents/centralasia/PrisonReform/KGZT90_Component_Evaluation_July_2012.pdf

- assignment reports (expert reports), trainers' reports and
- donor reports;
- financial reports;
- relevant press releases;
- mission and monitoring reports (a final list will be provided to the evaluator and further material can be requested by the evaluator at any time);
- Terms of reference of the mid-term Independent Project Evaluation of KGZK50.

2. Field mission to Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) for 10 working days, and project pilot locations in Osh for two days and Issyk-Kul for two days provinces, consisting of:

Briefing and individual semi-structured face-to-face interviews with the Core Learning Partners (see Annex III), including state partners, UNODC staff at HQ and staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), UNODC staff in the Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan (the Project Team) and the representatives of the Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic).

- Site visits to selected project locations in Bishkek city, Osh city and Kara Kol city for physical inspection and discussions with beneficiaries.

3. Telephone interviews:

- Telephonic interviews are suggested to be made with: 1) relevant UNODC staff at HQ, i.e. Regional Section for Europe, West & Central Asia in Vienna; 2) and relevant UNODC staff in UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA).

The sources of data:

Semi-structured interviews with all relevant CLP's, i.e. donors, beneficiaries and all other relevant stakeholders, such as state partners, UNODC staff at HQ and UNODC staff in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), the Project Team and the representatives of Donor Countries (the Embassies of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic) outlined in Annex III, as well as further interviews with stakeholders as needed and proposed by the evaluator.

Field missions to project pilot locations; training assignment reports, adopted legislative acts/policies, internal/donor reports, statistical data.

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, structured interviews, field missions, questionnaires, surveys, observations and other sources to be established by the evaluator.

The independent project evaluation is to be conducted following UNODC/IEU's evaluation standards, norms, guidelines and templates, (to be found on the IEU website, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>), as well as UNEG Norms and Standards.

A list of materials for the desk review is found in Annex II.

VI. TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

The Evaluator will have the overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of all deliverables, as specified below:

- Inception Report, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines, and templates⁶ containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools (reviewed and cleared by IEU before the field mission can take place – this can entail various rounds of comments) by 24 July 2015;
- Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines, and templates¹¹⁸ by 31 August 2015 (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU – this can entail various rounds of comments);
- Final Evaluation Report, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines, and templates⁸, including annex with management response (optional) and IEU’s clearance by 25 September;
- Presentation of evaluation findings and recommendations to CLP and other key stakeholders.

Time frame for the evaluation:

29 June-25 September 2015

<i>Duties</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Deliverables</i>
Desk review; submission to IEU of the Inception Report)	29 June – 24 July 2015	Home based	Refined list of evaluation questions; Interview guide, Evaluation tools; Inception Report with refined work plan, matrix etc. – to be reviewed and cleared by IEU
Field mission: briefing, interviews; presentation of preliminary findings	27 July-7 August 2015	UNODC Kyrgyzstan; project locations	Presentation of preliminary findings
Drafting of the evaluation report; submission to IEU and Project Management	10-31 August	Home based	Draft evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation guidelines, handbook, templates, etc. – to be reviewed and commented on by IEU, Project Management
Project Manager shares the draft report (after initial IEU clearance) with CLPs for comments			
Finalization of report (incl. Management response optional)	By 25 September 2015	Home based; UNODC	Final evaluation report to be cleared by IEU

¹¹⁸ To be found here: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html>.

Time frame for the field mission:

It is anticipated that the evaluation will involve visits to Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek and project locations in Osh and Kara-Kol towns.

Tentative time-frame for the mission is 27 July-7 August 2015:

When? (tentative dates)	Evaluator’s working days	What tasks?	Results	Where?
27 July 2015	1 day	Introductory meeting with the project team and interviews with project beneficiaries and partners	• Brief interview reports	Bishkek
28 July 2015	1 day	Meetings and interviews with project beneficiaries and partners. Site inspection to SSDC central office in Bishkek	• Brief interview reports	Bishkek
29-30 July 2015	2 days	Site inspection: SSDC Southern Department in Osh	• Site visit reports	Osh city
31 July 2015	1 day	Meetings with project beneficiaries and partners	• Brief interview reports	Bishkek
3 August 2015	1 day	Meetings with project beneficiaries and partners	• Brief interview reports	Bishkek
4-5 August 2015	2 days	Site inspection: visit to SSDC Eastern Department in Kara Kol city	• Site visit reports	Kara-Kol
6 August	1 day	Meetings with project beneficiaries and partners; Presentation of preliminary findings to partners	• Brief interview reports	Bishkek
7 August 2015	1 day	Wrap up meetings with the project team and main project beneficiaries and partners	• Brief interview reports	Bishkek

VII. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

Number of evaluators needed:

The mid-term Independent Project Evaluation of the project will be carried out by one International Independent Evaluation Consultant identified by the project management through a competitive selection process and supported by the Project staff. The International Evaluation Consultant should be an expert in criminal justice/law enforcement area, and have experience in applying qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods and experience in evaluating technical assistance projects. Costs associated with the evaluator will be borne by the project. The International Evaluation Consultant shall act independently, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards guidelines and templates and UNEG Ethical Guidelines and in his/her individual capacity and not as a representative of any government or organisation that may present a conflict of interest. In his individual capacity and not as representative of the government or organization which appointed them. She/he will have no previous experience of working with KGZK50 project (except as an independent evaluator) or of working in any capacity linked with it.

The International Evaluation Consultant shall act independently in his/her individual capacity and must not have been involved in the development, implementation or monitoring of the project neither will be rendering any service to UNODC in the near future, to avoid conflicts of interests. He/she should adhere to the independence and impartiality of the evaluation process discussed in the UN Evaluation Group's Norms and Standards.

The role of the Evaluator:

Carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; implement quantitative tools and analyze data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; include a management response in the final report (optional); present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

More details will be provided in the respective job descriptions in Annex I.

Conflict of interest

According to UNODC rules, the International Evaluation Consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Reference to job description detailing qualifications and responsibilities:

The International Evaluation Consultant should have the following qualifications and experience:

- A strong professional record in designing and leading independent reviews and evaluations (at least 7 years);
- Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods;
- Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the drug control agency or police;

- Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the Central Asian region;
- Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC;
- Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills;
- Post graduate educational qualifications;

Languages:

- Fluency in spoken and written English required, with proven drafting skills, working knowledge of Russian is an asset.

The International Evaluation Consultant will be responsible for all deliverables meeting the required standards in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html> and submitted in a timely manner.

VIII. MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS

Roles and responsibilities of the Project Management:

The Monitoring and Evaluation Officer is responsible for managing the evaluation, drafting and finalizing the ToR, selecting Core Learning Partners together with the Project Manager and informing them of their role, recruiting evaluators, providing desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology, liaising with the Core Learning Partners, reviewing the draft report, assessing the quality of the final report by using the Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports, disseminating the final evaluation report, as well as developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations and follow-up action.

Project Management is responsible for managing the evaluation, finalizing the ToR, selecting and approving Core Learning Partners, reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology, reviewing the draft report, assessing the quality of the final report by using the Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports, as well as developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations and follow-up action.

The evaluation should be planned and conducted in close consultation with UNODC ROCA. The evaluation tools and methodology must be agreed with ROCA and cleared by IEU.

Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders:

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers. Members of the CLP are selected from the key stakeholder groups, including UNODC management, mentors, beneficiaries, partner organizations and donor Member States. The CLPs are asked to comment on key steps of the evaluation (Terms of Reference; Selection of evaluators; Draft Evaluation Report) and act as facilitators with respect to the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action.

Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit:

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>. All deliverables of this evaluation (Terms of Reference; Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report) are to be commented on and cleared by IEU.

Roles and responsibilities of the International Evaluation Consultant:

The Independent Project Evaluation will be conducted by the evaluator following UNODC/IEU's evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates, as well as UNEG Norms and Standards Norms and Standards of the UNEG and UNODC guidelines.

The International Evaluation Consultant shall submit a draft report to the Evaluation Manager, to ROCA and to the UNODC IEU for clearance, before the project manager submits the draft evaluation report to "Core Learning Partners". The report shall contain a full analysis of the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations. The report should be no longer than 20 pages, excluding annexes and the executive summary. The report shall be distributed by UNODC as required to the governmental authorities and respective donors, be published on the IEU website and be discussed at a Tripartite Meeting by the parties to the project.

Logistical support responsibilities:

The Monitoring and Evaluation Officer will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluator. For the field missions, the evaluator liaises with the UNODC Project Office as appropriate.

UNODC will provide office space, an internet connection and use of a desktop computer where appropriate as well as assistance with interpretation by an external and impartial person during the mission to Kyrgyzstan. The evaluator will need to provide his/her own laptop, cameras or other equipment. UNODC will assist with transport within the region and support international travel arrangements and the issuance of visa (where necessary).

IX. PAYMENT MODALITIES

The International Evaluation Consultant will be issued a consultancy contract and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. The contract is a legally binding document in which the consultant agrees to complete the deliverables by the set deadlines. Payment is correlated to deliverables and three instalments are typically are foreseen:

- The first payment upon receipt and clearance by IEU upon a satisfactory deliverable of the Inception Report (can entail various rounds of comments);
- The second payment upon receipt and clearance by IEU upon a satisfactory deliverable of the Draft Evaluation Report (can entail various rounds of comments);
- The third and final payment, i.e. the remainder of the fee only after completion and a satisfactory deliverable of the respective tasks, receipt of the final report and clearance by UNODC/IEU.

75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance, before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the

completed travel claim forms.

ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EVALUATOR

Post title	International Evaluation Consultant
Organisational Section/Unit	UNODC Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan
Duty station	Home based; missions to Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic, project pilot locations
Proposed period	29 June-25 September 2015
Actual work time	65 working days

1. Background of the assignment:

The Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in close coordination with the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) will undertake an independent mid-term project evaluation of the UNODC KGZK50 Project “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic”.

The evaluation will assess progress of project results articulated in the Work Plan and documents on lessons learned – during August 2011 – the end of the field mission of this evaluation (tentatively 27 July-7 August 2015). The evaluation will also assess the extent to which the project contributes to the UNODC Thematic Programmes (e.g. design, efficiency, appropriateness to/support to thematic objectives etc.).

2. Purpose of the assignment:

The evaluation of the project has been foreseen in the project document. It will be carried out by the International Evaluation Consultant. The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to assess project progress, lessons learned as well as areas requiring improvements identified during the implementation of the project activities in the Kyrgyz Republic. This evaluation exercise is meant to ensure ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of UNODC services.

The findings and recommendations of the evaluation are intended for use by the project team and the Regional Office in Tashkent to learn from and make desirable adjustments to ongoing implementation. It will also inform stakeholders (State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic, UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, Project Team and Donor Countries etc., of project accomplishments.

3. Specific tasks to be performed by the International Evaluation Consultant:

The International Evaluation Consultant will within the framework of the UNODC KGZK50 Project be responsible for the following deliverables:

- Drafting the inception report, containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools, in line with UNODC evaluation guidelines and templates, based on the desk review, and be submitted to IEU by 10 July 2015;
- Drafting the evaluation report, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates, to be submitted to IEU for review and comments by 18 August 2015;
- Revise the draft evaluation report based on comments received in the various consultative processes (IEU, internal and external) incorporating all comments and to be cleared by IEU by 31 August 2015.
- Finalize the final evaluation report, in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates, incorporating all comments of the stakeholders by 25 September 2015;

4. Expected tangible and measurable output(s):

- Inception report (20 working days)
- Draft evaluation report (26 working days)
- Final evaluation report (19 working days)

5. Dates and details as to how the work must be delivered:

Deliverable	Due date	Working days
1) Final Inception Report	10 July 2015 (first draft inception report) 24 July 2015 (final inception report)	20
2) Draft Evaluation Report	18 August 2015 (first draft evaluation report); 31 August 2015 (revised draft evaluation report);	26
3) Final Evaluation Report	25 September 2015	19

Payments will be made upon satisfactory completion and/or submission of outputs/deliverables

6. Indicators to evaluate the consultant's performance:

Timely and satisfactory and high-quality delivery of the above mentioned outputs as assessed by IEU (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates as well as UNEG Standards and Norms).

7. Qualifications/expertise sought (required educational background, years of relevant work experience, other special skills or knowledge required):

Required experience, knowledge, skills and qualifications:

The International Evaluation Consultant should demonstrate:

- A strong professional record in designing and leading independent reviews and evaluations (at least 7 years)
- Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods
- Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the police
- Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the Central Asian region
- Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC
- Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills
- Post graduate educational qualifications;

Languages:

- Fluency in spoken and written English required, with proven drafting skills, working knowledge of Russian is an asset.

ANNEX II. LIST OF BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS FOR THE DESK REVIEW

The desk review list includes the following documents, but is not limited to:

1. UNODC Strategic documents
2. UNODC Medium-term Strategy 2012-2015
3. UNODC Strategic Framework 2014-2015
4. Strategic Outline for Central Asia and Southern Caucasus 2012 – 2015; A comprehensive approach to implement the UNODC drug and crime mandate.
5. UNODC Integrated Country Programme of assistance for Kyrgyzstan 2014-2016

Project planning documents

1. Project Document (21/04/2011)

Project revision documents

1. Project Revision document (14/06/13)
2. Project Revision document (21/11/14)

Project annual and semi-annual progress reports

1. Annual Project Progress Report (2011)
2. Annual Project Progress Report (2012)
3. Annual Project Progress Report (2013)
4. Annual Project Progress report (2014)
5. Semi-Annual Project Progress Report (2010)
6. Semi-Annual Project Progress Report (2011)
7. Semi-Annual Project Progress Report (2012)
8. Semi-Annual Project Progress Report (2013)
9. Semi-Annual Project Progress Report (2014)

Project activities Reports:

1. Mission reports
2. Assignment reports
3. Minutes of Working Group meetings
4. Assessment mission reports
5. Monitoring reports
6. Standard Operating Procedures documents
7. Equipment Handing over reports
8. Trainer's/training reports (incl. pre- and post-training evaluation results)
9. Terms of reference of the mid-term Independent Project Evaluation of KGZK50
10. Donor reports
11. Financial report
12. Press releases

ANNEX III. LIST OF CLP MEMBERS

The list of CLP members includes the following names, but is not limited to:

№	Name	Position	Organization
1	Mr. Alik Karymbekov	Chief of Department of defense, law and order and emergency situations	Apparatus of the Government of the KR
2	Mr. Alymbay Sultanov	Chairperson	State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (SSDC)
3	Mr. Daniyar Mukashev	Chief of the Department of International Organisations and Security	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the KR (MFA of the KR)
4	Mr. Aibek Tilebaliev	Chief of the Unit of International Security of the Department of International Organisations and Security	MFA of the KR
5	Mr. Gulamdjan Anarbaev	First Deputy Chairperson	SSDC/Osh town
6	Mr. Timur Isakov	Advisor of the Chairperson of SSDC	SSDC
7	Mr. Nurjan Sadraliev	Acting Head of International Cooperation Service	SSDC
8	Mr. Timur Madyarov	Chief of staff	SSDC
9	Mr. Salamat Djusupov	Chief	Eastern SSDC Department/Kara Kol town
10	Mr. Alymjan Kozubaev	Head of the Main Directorate on Fight Against Illicit Turnover of Drugs	Ministry of Interior of the KR
11	Mr. Mukay Kadyrkulov	Deputy Chairperson	Customs Service of the KR
12	Mr. Chyngiz Satarbekov	Chief of Unit on Fight Against Illegal Turnover of Drugs	Customs Service of the KR
13	Mr. Talaybek Usubaliev	Deputy Chairperson	Border Service of the KR
14	Mr. Talant Sultanov	Director	National Institute for Strategic Studies of the KR
15	Ms. Joye Davis-Kirchner	INL Director	Embassy of the United States of America in the Kyrgyz Republic
16	Mr. Grigory Pustovitov	Advisor	Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kyrgyzstan

17	Mr. Erlan Aiseyitov	Advisor	Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan
18	Mr. Alexander Fedulov	Senior Programme Coordinator/Head of UNODC	UNODC Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan

		Programme office in Kyrgyzstan	
19	Ms. Vera Tkachenko	International Programme Manager	UNODC Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan
20	Mr. Yusuf Kurbanov	International Project Coordinator	UNODC Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan
21	Person to be included		UNODC Regional Section for Europe, West & Central Asia in Vienna
22	Person to be included		UNODC Regional Office in Central Asia (ROCA)

ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

The following interview guide was used during the course of the evaluation.

Interview Guide

Introduction: UNODC has asked me to conduct an independent mid-term evaluation of the project K50 “Strengthening the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic” The evaluation is focusing on three main areas:

- what progress has the project made?
- how well is UNODC delivering the project?
- how can the gains made by the project be sustained into the future?

As part of the evaluation, your feedback is very important.

Feedback, whether positive or negative, will help shape any future UNODC initiatives. Your responses will be kept confidential. You do not have to answer a question if you do not wish to do so; we can stop the interview when you wish.

Only summaries and/or non-attributable quotes will be presented in the evaluation report (any quotations being attributed to “a generic descriptive category”).

Thank you in advance for contributing to this evaluation.

Background

Ascertain the background knowledge of the interviewee. “Please state your name, your position and what you know of the project.”

Outcome 1: Relevant stakeholders take action to review/revise/adopt legislative/regulatory framework pertaining to the functioning of SSDC and implementation of the adopted National Strategy/Programme on Drug Control.

Outcome 2: Basic infrastructure of SSDC, including its regional departments strengthened.

Outcome 3: Operational, investigative and analytical capacities of SSDC and its national counter-narcotic partners through provision of equipment and training strengthened.

Outcome 4: The SSDC actively cooperates and shares information with law-enforcement agencies of other countries and UNODC's overall coordination role of support to the SSDC is effectively attained.

Relevance

- Do the project’s objectives, outcomes and outputs respond to present circumstances?
- How was the project planned?
- How relevant are the project’s outputs to the recipient government?
- To what extent is the project relevant to the Kyrgyz SSDC’s needs and priorities?

Efficiency

- Is the project efficient and cost-effective; are there any alternatives?
- How well is the project managed? Is the project team the appropriate size? Do they have the appropriate skill sets?
- How accurate and timely are the project’s reports?
- What practices, if any, can be regarded as efficient?
- How could efficiency be improved in the next couple of years? Do you have any ideas?

Effectiveness

- To what degree were the programme’s outcomes and objectives achieved, or are they anticipated to be achieved?
- What chief factors were responsible for the achievement or failure of the objectives?
- How could project planning have been improved?
- How could the effectiveness of the project be further increased in the next couple of years?
- Has the seizure of illicit narcotic drugs increased during the last couple of years?

Sustainability

- How is maintenance and repair of the equipment conducted?
- How sustainable, in the long term are the project’s gains?
- If not, what is needed to ensure their continued resilience and viability in the future?
- To what extent can the Government provide self-generated funding to maintain SSDC?

Partnerships

- Have stakeholders been properly and fully engaged / informed?

- How has project assisted in developing bilateral and multilateral partnerships?
- What partnerships been sought with national and international partners, including UN-agencies, UNODC-internally, public oversight bodies and civil society, etc.?
- How does SSDC coordinate its counter-narcotic activities with other internal and external law-enforcement agencies?

Impact

- What are the anticipated long term impacts of this project?
- Is the project likely to achieve these?
- Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?

Human Rights and Gender

- Have human rights considerations been included in the project's implementation?
- Have gender considerations been included in the project's development and implementation?
- How does the project contribute toward the National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?
- Does the project contribute toward increased representation of women in the SSDC?

Lessons Learned

- What are the lessons learnt for future project implementation?
- What are the best practices that could be applied to other projects?
- How effective are the project's governance structures?
- Did observations and feedback alter delivery, if so how?
- What lessons have been learnt? Which have been applied and which are still to be applied?

AOB

Do you have any additional comments or suggestions?

THANK YOU!

ANNEX III. DESK REVIEW LIST

The following table lists all the documents reviewed during the course of the evaluation.

Document – name	Comments
K50 Final Project Document (English)	
K50 Revised Project Document (Revision 1)	
K50 Revised Project Document (Revision 2)	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2011	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2012	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2013	
Progress Report K50 Annual dated 2014	
Semi Annual Report 2012	
Semi Annual Report 2013	
Semi Annual Report 2014	
UNODC K50 2014 Financial Report	
PSC minutes and presentations No 2	
PSC minutes and presentations No 3	
PSC minutes and presentations No 4	
PSC minutes and presentations No 5	
PSC minutes and presentations No 6	
PSC minutes and presentations No 7	
PSC minutes and presentations No 8	
PSC minutes and presentations No 9	
Kyrgyzstan’s Anti-Drug Programme SOPs – SSA	
SOPs – Customs Clearance	
List of equipment delivered	
Annual work plans	
Profi print outs	
Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia (UNODC – Paris Pact)	https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends_Central%20Asia-final.pdf
Addiction, Crime And Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium	https://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Counter_Narcotics/Addiction_Crime_and_Insurgency_The_transnational_threat_of_Afghan_opium.pdf
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014 Cultivation and Production	https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf
The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment	https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2

	011-web.pdf
Opiate flows through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: a Threat Assessment (UNODC)	https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf
UNODC Drug Treatment Data	https://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/CoPro/Web_Kyrgyzstan.pdf
UNODC Evaluation Meta-Analysis	http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Meta-Analysis/UNODC_Evaluation_Meta-Analysis_2011-2014.pdf
Independent final project evaluation of the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA) Phase 2 TD/TAJ/03/H03	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2012/Tajik_DCA_H03_Final_Evaluation_Report_rev.pdf
Mid Term Evaluation Report AD/KYR/G64 Drug Control Agency – Kyrgyz DCA Kyrgyzstan	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProjEvals-2006/projeval-2006-9-1_rev.pdf
Terminal Evaluation of Project No. KYR/G64 “Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.” Published in 2008	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2003-2009/2008/KYRG64_Terminal_Evaluation_Report.ENG.pdf
Final Evaluation of Project No KGZ/175 Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/kgz_i75_establishment_of_interagency_law_enforcement_mobile_groups_in_kyrgyzstan_rev.pdf
Project evaluation of Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossing points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices XACK22	https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2015/XACK22_Final_Evaluation_Report_March_2015.pdf
UNODC - Programme for Central Asia: A partnership framework for impact related action in Central Asia	https://www.unodc.org/documents/centralasia/MOU/programme_for_central_asia_2015-2019_en.pdf
Integrated Country Programme for Kyrgyzstan	Hard copy
Strategic Outline For Central Asia and Southern Caucasus 2012-2015: A Comprehensive Approach to Implement UNODC’s Drug And Crime Mandate	Precedes the Programme for Central Asia - hard copy
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the Kyrgyz Republic 2012-2016	http://www.unecce.org/fileadmin/DAM/operact/Technical_Cooperation/Delivering_as_One/UNDAF_country_files/Kyrgyzstan_UNDAF_2012-2016_ENG.pdf
UN MDGs in Kyrgyzstan: Third periodic report dated 2012	http://www.un.org.kg/en/publications/article/publications/un-agencies/50-united-nations-development-programme-in-kyrgyzstan/6177-third-periodic-report

United Nations Country Team in Kyrgyzstan Joint UNCT submission for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Of Kyrgyzstan	http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54c0b92c4.pdf
UNDP Gender Main Streaming in Kyrgyzstan	http://www.kg.undp.org/content/dam/kyrgyzstan/Publications/gender/kgz-UNDP_Kyrgyzstan_GM_Strategy_ENG.pdf
UN Kyrgyzstan webpage	http://www.un.org.kg/en/media/news-releases/list/news-center/75-unodc
Example of low level information sent out or uploaded onto a web site	http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/faculties/guildhall-all-faculty-of-business-and-law/guildhall-news/news- archive/dr-john-jupp-international-expert-in-kyrgyzstan/
INL Final Evaluation Report: Performance Evaluation of Central Asia Counternarcotics Programs dated August 25, 2015	
US Embassy Statement reference development of Kyrgyz Anti-Drug Strategy	http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/pr_02-28-14_us-government-supports-unodc-counter-narcotics-program.html
Bureau Of International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) - Country Report: Kyrgyzstan	http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol1/238987.htm
CIA World Fact book; Kyrgyzstan	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html
US State Department 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report	http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/index.htm
Analytical Review on the drug situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and the measures undertaken to combat illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors for the 1st half of 2015	From SSDC translated by UNODC from Russian
Kyrgyz Service of Drug Control Shows Results in Drug Seizure- UNODC website	https://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/kyrgyz-service-of-drug-control-shows-results-in-drug-seizure.html
UNODC-supported State Service on Drug Control in Kyrgyzstan showing results	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/unodc-supported-state-service-on-drug-control-in-kyrgyzstan-showing-results.html
Drug control and crime prevention in Kyrgyzstan	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/September/drug-control-and-crime-prevention-in-kyrgyzstan.html
Drug Trafficking Corrupts Kyrgyzstan's Politics and Underworld	http://www.princeton.edu/news-and-events/news/item/drug-trafficking-corrupts-kyrgyzstans-politics-and-

	underworld#sthash.hQfMTWy8.dpuf
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction	http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-overviews/kg
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez, A/HRC/19/61/Add.2, February 21, 2012	http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/106/04/PDF/G1210604.pdf
Human Rights watch – Kyrgyzstan’s UPR	https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/18/kyrgyzstan-upr-submission-2014
Evidence of UNODC police reform in the press	https://europa.eu/eyd2015/en/unodc/stories/policepeoplekyrgyzstan
An example of UNODC working with OSCE	http://www.osce.org/bishkek/120492
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the Kyrgyz Republic 2012-2016	http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Kyrgyzstan/Kyrgyzstan_UNDAF_2012_2016_eng.pdf
The Three Evils of Narco-Policy in Central Asia	http://registan.net/2013/07/09/the-three-evils-of-narco-policy-in-central-asia/

ANNEX IV. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED DURING THE EVALUATION

<i>Number of interviewees</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Country</i>
1	Kyrgyz Department for Law Enforcement and Emergency Situations	Kyrgyzstan
1	Kyrgyz Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Kyrgyzstan
26	State Service for Drug Control	Kyrgyzstan
1	Public Oversight Council or SSDC	Kyrgyzstan
3	Kyrgyz Border Police	Kyrgyzstan
1	Kyrgyz Customs	Kyrgyzstan
3	Kyrgyz Mol (Department for fighting illegal trafficking of drugs (MVD))	Kyrgyzstan
2	National Institute for Strategic Research	Kyrgyzstan
2	US Embassy (INL and DEA)	Kyrgyzstan
1	Russian Embassy	Kyrgyzstan
2	Kazakh Embassy	Kyrgyzstan
3	OSCE	Kyrgyzstan
1	CADAP-6 (EU)	Kyrgyzstan
1	UNAIDS	Kyrgyzstan
6	UNODC	Austria
1	UNODC	Uzbekistan
1	UNODC Paris Pact	Kyrgyzstan
7	UNODC	Kyrgyzstan

Total: 64 (8: female and 56: male)

ANNEX IV. LIST OF EQUIPMENT PROVIDED

	Equipment handed over to SSDC from 2011-2014	Model	Year of Purchase	Quantity
VEHICLES				
1	Lada Niva 21214		2012	9
2	ZAZ "Lanos"		2012	6
3	Toyota Land Cruiser 78	Toyota Land Cruiser 78 Hardtop 13 seater	2013	6
4	Ford Ranger DC2.2L Diesel	Ford Ranger DC2.2L Diesel, 4x4 6MT, white	2014	5
5	Light signal loudspeakers for vehicles		2013	6
Forensic Equipment				
1	Gas Chromatograph with Mass Spectrometry Detector (GC-MSD) set	Agilent GC7890	2014	1
2	Gas Chromatograph with Flame Ionization Detector (GC-FD) set	Agilent GC7890	2014	1
3	Gas Helium balloon		2014	2
4	Forensic Analytical balances DL-150 (up to 150 kg)		2013	3
5	Forensic Analytical balances PR-30B (up to 30 kg)		2013	3
6	Laboratory precision balance		2014	2
7	Laboratory analytical balance		2014	2
8	Fridge for chemical storage		2014	2
9	Centrifuge		2014	2
10	Forensic Crime Scene kits	TSAMOTA	2013	3

11	Forensic Crime Scene Re-supply kits	TSAMOTA	2013	3
12	Table for forensic analytical balances with granite cover		2014	2
13	Table		2014	3
14	Table		2014	1
15	Table		2014	1
16	Drawer unit		2014	1
17	Wardrobe		2014	2
18	Cabinet		2014	3
19	Cabinet		2014	1
20	Chair		2014	8
21	Drawer unit		2014	4
22	Armchair		2014	1
CBT classes				
1	4 in 1 Multifunction device (printer, copier, scanner, fax)	A4 15/2ppm (Black/Colour), 600x600dpi,60-163g/m2, 1200x1200 scanner,295Mhz, 128Mb, LCD, ADF, LAN network USB	2012	1
2	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC, Keyboard HP USB Standard JB-Russia Cyrillic , HP USB Optical BLK Mouse, Software-MS office 2010 Home and Business, Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	1
3	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC , Keyboard HP USB Standard JB - Russia Cyrillic, Mouse HP USB Optical BLK, Software Microsoft Windows 7, Professional Edition 64-bit, IntelCorei5-2400 Processor , Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	20
4	Computer	HP 8200 Elite MT PC , Keyboard HP USB Standard JB - Russia Cyrillic, Mouse HP USB Optical BLK, Software Microsoft Windows 7, Professional Edition 64-bit, IntelCorei5-2400 Processor, MS Office Home and Business 2010, Monitor HP Compaq LA2306x23 LED LCD EURO	2012	2
5	16-Port Fast Ethernet Switch	16-Port Fast Ethernet Switch, "Tenda", Brown color	2012	1

List of Equipemnt Provided

6	24-Port Fast Ethernet Switch	24-Port 10/100 Mbps Fast Ethernet Switch, Inner Switching PSU, IEEE802.3u	2012	1
7	Plug Power Adapter	100-240V, EU PL (31730900100)	2012	2
8	Digital Projector	BenQ MS 500+ , with ceiling mount	2012	1
9	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium, Brown colour, 90*70*75, brown colour	2012	1
10	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour, 120*70*75, Connecting element for desk R08-01.99Л, 70*70, brown colour	2012	1
11	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour,90*70*75, Connecting element for desk R08-01.99Л, 70*70, brown colour	2012	1
12	Desk	for computer class in Osh, Milano medium E48, Brown colour, 120*70*75	2012	3
13	Desk	for computer (right sided) class in Osh, Milano medium EB4-01.99C, Brown colour, 140*100*76	2012	1
14	Desk cupboard	for CBT class in Osh, Milano medium MC1-01.99C, Brown colour, 422*600*735mm	2012	1
15	Wardrobe	for CBT class in Osh, S82, Brown colour, 83*43*220mm	2012	1
16	Built-in closet with doors	for computer class in Osh, FD2, Brown colour, 83*34*220mm	2012	2
17	Chair	for Computer Based Training class, black color	2012	30
18	UPS	SVC, 600 VA, V-series, 360W, AVR stabilizer 165-270V, batt.:12V/7.5 Ah, Black color	2012	23
19	Desk	for the trainer in the Bishkek Computer Class, brown color	2012	1
20	Desk cupboard	Computer Class, brown color	2012	1
21	Bookcase	for Computer Based Training class, brown color	2012	1
22	Air conditioner	LG G-12 LH, white color	2012	1
23	Printer	HP Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1
24	Printer	HP Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1
25	Digital Projector,	BenQ MS 500+ with ceiling mount	2012	1
OTHER				
1	Automatic gates for SSDC office in Bishkek		2014	1

2	Air conditioners	Vestel ARS09	2013	6
3	Digital Video Camera	Sony HDR-PJ200E, with Secure Digital card 8Gb and bag	2012	1
4	Digital Photo camera	Canon EOS 1100D kit 1855, with Secure Digital card 8Gb and bag	2012	1
IT Equipment (from Dan Office)				
1	Transcend 500GB HDD extern 2.5" M2		2014	8
2	Toner	HP Black upto 10000 pages for HP M712xh	2014	10
3	Toner	HP Black upto12500 pages for HP M525dn	2014	10
4	Toner	HP Black 80X upto 6900 pages for HP Pro 400 M401dn	2014	30
5	Speakers	HP LCD Speaker Bar (to be mounted on monitor)	2014	36
6	Computer	HP 800 GI TWR (Russian/English)	2014	30
7	Monitor	HP EliteDisplay E231 23-In Monitor	2014	56
8	Notebook	HP Elitebook 850 G1 SOF,Microsoft Windows 7, WEBCAM,Intel, Bluetooth,Dual Point Backlit keyboard RUS, Microsoft office 2013, 65 Watt Smart AC Adapter,HP top load case, Logitech M525 Wireless Mouse, Danoffice IT Mousepad	2014	10
9	Computer	HP EliteD3esk 800 GI TWR ADV (Russian/English)	2014	6
10	Printer	HP printer LaserJet Pro 400 M401dn, cable patch	2014	15
11	Printer	HP LaserJet enterprise 700 M712xh (Black&White)	2014	2
12	Printer	HP printer multifunction laserjet enterprise M525dn, cable patch	2014	6
13	HUB Switch	HUB Switch 24 ports TP-LINK TL - SF1024D	2013	4
14	UPS	Mercury ELITE 650 VA PRO (AVR)	2013	45
15	Printer	HP Printer Laser Jet P2055dn	2012	1

List of Equipmemnt Provided

16	HUB Switch	HUB Switch 24 ports TP-LINK TL - SF1024D	2014	4
17	Scanner	HP Scanner scanjet N6310 document flatbed	2014	1
18	UPS	UPS SSD 3kVA TECH-COM	2014	1
19	Server	HP ProLiant ML350p Gen8 Tower Server	2013	1