

Terminal Evaluation Report

Project No. KYR/G64 “Drug Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic.”

Report of the Independent Evaluator

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Executive Summary ~ The Project, designed to establish and support the Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency by provision of necessary expertise, resources, equipment and training to establish a strong and well-equipped national institution that is capable of taking the lead in national counter-narcotics operations, has been inhibited by problems from the outset; it was intended that it would replicate the successful DCA in Tajikistan but it included stipulations by the donor that were not part of the Tajikistan Project, including the use of the Polygraph as the primary method of integrity testing of applicants and selected staff. This caused some difficulties and remains a source of resentment amongst staff although senior personnel have accepted that the Polygraph can be a useful tool. Significant additional costs were associated with this requirement and will remain because of the need to train more personnel to operate the system; at present there is only one officer who is trained in its use.

On the general matter of corruption the Deputy Head of Customs drew attention to a collegial meeting that had taken place at the Ministry of Interior on 28th October 2008 at which it was made clear that there is a major problem with drugs not only transiting the country but also causing addiction and dependency within Kyrgyzstan to such an extent that the country is not properly equipped to deal with it. Concern was also expressed at the high levels of drug related corruption in the law enforcement agencies and the DCA was not excluded. This was confirmed by the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Interior who asserted that there are particular problems in the South of the country.

There have been several changes of Director of the agency and several Project Officers, as well as civil unrest and political instability in the country, all of which have delayed progress and development.

The Project was used to renovate buildings to a high standard in most areas and plans are in hand to continue this work. Basic equipment and vehicles were provided but there is said to be need for more technical equipment and training in its use to enable the conduct of advanced operations. It is said that criminals have better technology including the ability to listen to DCA communications and thus frustrate intelligence gathering and operations.

The current economic climate has created major concerns within the agency about the loss of bonuses and salary supplements regarded as essential to ensure the retention of experienced staff and to minimise the risk of corruption. The Director has said that it is absolutely necessary to find further donors to fund these salary requirements and to support the sustainability of the agency. However, there has been a significant turnover of staff and a serious loss of experienced officers because of their need to ensure sufficient income for the support of themselves and their families. This is a crisis that has prevented the full development of the professional competence of the agency.

The aim of the Project was over ambitious and it was unrealistic to anticipate the level of development described in the original Project Document. Objectives have been partially achieved and there have been limited successes with the interdiction of some criminals, relatively small seizures of drugs and precursor chemicals and several successful operations, including controlled deliveries, with national and international partners.

The DCA is well aware of the need for professional competence to address the global drug problem but it is a long way from reaching the desired standards. At the end of the Project there is the distinct possibility that without further significant donations the DCA may fail.

It is questionable whether the DCA is widely accepted as the lead coordinating counter narcotics agency despite the mantra that is often repeated by its officers. Instances which contradict this have been quoted and negative inter-agency rivalry remains to the detriment of more successful activities. Nevertheless it is asserted that the agency has achieved a standard of counter-narcotics competence in advance of all other law enforcement agencies and if so then by that definition it could be said to be in the lead. Also it is claimed that by comparison with the other agencies the DCA has better equipment but that this is nowhere near the technical standard that is necessary for the acquisition of useful intelligence.

Intelligence gathering and analysis is basic and relies heavily on the former Soviet system which is widely regarded as being outdated and not up to international law enforcement standards. Further training in this area is highly desirable and has been requested at all levels (Project RER/F 23 is relevant to this training requirement). Advanced equipment and training in its use is required.

There was little evidence that there was much connection between and action resulting from the establishment of benchmarks by the International Working Group whose task was to oversee the progress of the DCA; this mechanism does not appear to have been very effective since mid-term.

Uncertainties regarding the continuation of the project due to unstable donor funding and the DCA's growing disappointment negatively influenced the IWG capacity fully to perform its oversight functions.

There was a lack of law enforcement expertise amongst some of those designated to oversee the Project and there would have been significant benefit had all the Project Officers had this background. After the intermediate evaluation report there appeared to be a loss of momentum with the emphasis being on securing a satisfactory exit strategy rather than consolidating what limited advantages had been obtained from the Project and looking for a way forward to improve counter narcotic activities in Kyrgyzstan.

Whilst it may be said that the Project has resulted in improved operations and seizures and the DCA has developed some pride in its achievements and awareness of what more is necessary, it has not resulted in the professional levels anticipated in the Project Document. A basic foundation has been laid and it is highly desirable that further Projects be designed and funded to build on this.

Kyrgyzstan and the whole of Central Asia, is confronted with two major problems. The first is the need to develop highly skilled and professionally competent counter narcotics agencies able to achieve levels of effective policing that meet international standards; this will be incremental and take many years. The second is to address immediately the enormous production and export of drugs from Afghanistan. This requires professional skills that are not currently available to the DCA. Experienced mentors and serving officers from more advanced countries are the obvious way of remedying the skills deficiency as in the case of the mentors attached to the MOBIT project. There would also be considerable benefit in attaching experts to relevant

Ministries and agencies in Kyrgyzstan to give guidance and advice about necessary developments.

Recommendation: it is strongly recommended that consideration be given to seeking support for further Projects to remedy the existing deficiencies and to develop the skills and necessary competence as defined in the original Project Document for G64. It is also necessary to address the problem of corruption more effectively.

Consideration should be given to the possibility of introducing experienced international experts on secondment to key institutions such as the Customs Agency and the DCA, as advisors on procedures and up to date methods.

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Independent Project Evaluations are scheduled and managed by the project managers and conducted by external independent evaluators. The role of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) in relation to independent project evaluations is one of quality assurance and support throughout the evaluation process, but IEU does not directly participate in or undertake independent project evaluations. It is, however, the responsibility of IEU to respond to the commitment of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in professionalizing the evaluation function and promoting a culture of evaluation within UNODC for the purposes of accountability and continuous learning and improvement.

Due to the disbandment of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) and the shortage of resources following its reinstatement, the IEU has been limited in its capacity to perform these functions for independent project evaluations to the degree anticipated. As a result, some independent evaluation reports posted may not be in full compliance with all IEU or UNEG guidelines. However, in order to support a transparent and learning environment, all evaluations received during this period have been posted and as an on-going process, IEU has begun re-implementing quality assurance processes and instituting guidelines for independent project evaluations as of January 2011.

1. Introduction

- 1. Purpose ~ Reasons for Evaluation:** The purpose of this report is to evaluate how far the aims of the project have been achieved, how successful the original objectives were in their design and assessment, and to identify any lessons learned to be considered when planning future projects. The specific requirements are set out in the Terms of Reference. These may be summarised as being an assessment of how far the original objectives of the project have been achieved and to what extent this has contributed to improvement in Kyrgyzstan's control of illicit drugs.
- 2. Evaluation Methodology** ~ the evaluation was conducted between 18th October and 1st November 2008 by visits to ROCA at the beginning and end of the mission and by travelling to various DCA locations in Kyrgyzstan. Relevant documents were examined and visits were made to various agencies concerned with the DCA. Comprehensive discussions/interviews were conducted with relevant personnel as listed below and arranged by UNODC Bishkek.
- 3. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS -**

For a range of reasons the Drug Control Agency of Kyrgyzstan has had a problematic development with changes of Director, UNODC Project Officers, and the National Government all of which have made smooth progress very difficult. Nevertheless there has been some improvement and it is evident that the importance of drug control within the country and the need for international co-operation is widely accepted in all law enforcement agencies; the government of Kyrgyzstan is supportive of the DCA but current economic difficulties inhibit its ability to provide adequate funding necessary to match expectations and it seems likely that this situation will prevail for the foreseeable future.

However, the claim that the DCA has been accepted by all as the lead agency with a coordinating role appears to be not entirely true and many both within the DCA and elsewhere spoke of inter-agency competition, the refusal in some cases to share information and continued rivalry to the detriment of more successful anti-drug operations. Indeed, I was informed of one instance where an officer from another agency had been disciplined for co-operating with the DCA in an operation, after a letter of thanks from the DCA had been sent to his supervisor. Clearly this is a matter for the relevant Ministries in Kyrgyzstan to ensure that unhealthy rivalry is diminished. A Presidential Decree and national legislation establishing the lead position of the DCA appear to have been ignored and it is for the Government of Kyrgyzstan to overcome this problem.

Generally the buildings have been refurbished to a good and acceptable standard. In Karakol arrangements are said to be in hand to provide better accommodation. Vehicles and basic communications equipment have been provided but there was some criticism that the type of vehicle supplied is easily identified as that used by the DCA; more flexibility in vehicle type

was requested. It appears that there has not been much attention paid to the benefits of using dogs more widely in the searching of vehicles and premises, although there have been instances where the Border Guard have used dogs in joint operations and the possibility of acquiring more trained dogs and handlers is under consideration.

Discussions with staff across the DCA have painted not a very encouraging picture for the future of the Agency. The dominant theme has been the loss of bonuses and additional allowances which are said to have resulted in a reported high turnover of staff and a significant loss of experience to the Agency by the Senior Deputy Director and others. Even the Director who claimed that the DCA is capable of stand-alone sustainability spoke of the need to find donors to continue to maintain the level of pay and allowances necessary to support the DCA. This was a situation anticipated in the mid-term evaluation document. It appears that a culture of donor dependency is evolving with the expectation that external funding will be available indefinitely.

It should be noted, however, that the Government introduced the level of salaries for the DCA and the DCA is included in the national budgeting process. Resources are limited for all law enforcement agencies and it is unlikely that present economic circumstances will allow for any increases for the DCA, thus external funding will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future.

Far from the Agency having developed its professionalism and expertise to achieve *“a significant improvement of interdiction capacities against illicit drug trafficking and related other crimeand a related increase in drug enforcement operations resulting in major seizures and the dismantling of organised trafficking and criminal networks”* (see Project Document), it is struggling to maintain the level of competence necessary to undertake limited operations resulting in relatively small seizures compared with the vast amount of drugs being produced and exported from Afghanistan and transiting through Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan and beyond (See information on seizures in Annexe). This is not to say that there is not some dedication and enthusiasm amongst some officers or that limited progress has not been made; simply that the great expectations listed in both the original and revised Project Documents have not materialised and were probably not achievable in the time available even with the extension to the Project. There has been a good relationship established with the Tajikistan DCA and with UNODC support a Co-operation Agreement has been signed.

There were widespread allegations that the Agency does not have the necessary technical equipment and funding to undertake its role successfully and there were complaints of inadequate training and poor intelligence and prosecution systems that seriously hold back progress (this is common for all law enforcement agencies). Whilst this may be true it should be noted that the DCA requires consolidation of its basic law enforcement techniques before seeking to “run before it can walk”. One officer compared the situation with being “locked in the system of our Grandfathers” and others complained that obtaining criminal records,

fingerprint comparisons and forensic science analyses took weeks. When this was put to a senior officer he agreed and stated that there is an urgent need to update the system to match international law enforcement standards. The consensus appears to be that training in gathering and analysing intelligence is essential if progress is to be made and this should be considered in any future projects that may be designed and implemented. This reflects the requirements of law enforcement agencies throughout Central Asia (reference Project XAC "Pilot Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Central Asian and Afghan Law Enforcement Personnel Mid-term evaluation report; Project RER/F 23 is also relevant)

Further observation from several sources indicated that the legislation in Kyrgyzstan is in need of further amendment to enable such things as Asset Forfeiture, telephone intercepts and access to billing records, but such developments were not anticipated in the near future and the Director expressed his opinion that legislation is satisfactory for the time being; clearly this is a matter for the DCA Director and staff to raise with the Government of Kyrgyzstan as appropriate.

Attainment of Objectives: ~

There were three primary objectives common to both the original and revised Project Documents viz –

1. To Establish the Drug Control Agency, as an integral and fully sustainable part of the legal and institutional framework of Kyrgyzstan.
2. To support the DCA in the recruitment process of the DCA staff and in the monitoring of this process.
3. To provide the DCA with the necessary structures, equipment and training to ensure adequate start of effective operations.

Objective 1 = legally the DCA has been established and formally it is described as the lead agency in all drug related activities (both licit and illicit) with the co-ordinating role; in reality it appears that a lack of total co-ordination remains despite claims to the contrary by senior personnel and negative inter-agency rivalry continues in some areas. The Agency is fully aware of what is required and strives to achieve improved capabilities in the conduct of operations and in co-operation with other agencies both national and international. There are examples of successful seizures and interdictions of criminals, and controlled deliveries outside the country. However, in terms of the original Project Document it cannot be claimed that this objective has been fully achieved to the level that was anticipated at the inception. Seizures in comparison with the amount of drugs estimated by UNODC to be transiting the country, are relatively small and it is doubtful that there has been a significant impact against drug trafficking and organised criminal gangs. Nevertheless credit must be given for the relative successes that have occurred and for the degree of enthusiasm for improvement that is apparent with some officers in the

DCA. Staff in the Agency and others, have expressed the view that the Project KYR G64 should be even further extended until such time as the Agency achieves significant progress.

Objective 2 = the Kyrgyz DCA is established and is currently operational; staff have been successfully recruited but it cannot be claimed that the DCA is totally viable because economic and financial restraints have resulted in a high turnover of staff and significant loss of expertise which has been attributed directly to the loss of bonuses and allowances. While senior personnel expressed their satisfaction with the Polygraph, vetting is unpopular with DCA officers and vulnerable because it is said that there is only one person remaining who is trained to operate the system so that continued dependence on this integrity testing method will require further training of personnel and increased, unbudgeted expenditure. The credibility of the system is suspect and generally officers do not regard it as a fair and equitable method of dealing with applicants and serving officers. The internal investigative system is preferred and it was said that there are other more acceptable methods that could be employed such as those which prevail in the Tajikistan DCA. Assets and financial declarations for officers and their extended families, and random drug testing are options that could be considered.

Objective 3 = this objective has not been fully achieved. Buildings have been, or are in the process of being prepared to a good and acceptable standard and useful equipment has been supplied. However, there are requests for more sophisticated technical equipment and training on the grounds that it is alleged that the criminal gangs have very advanced apparatus and thus they are said to be able to frustrate much of the operational effectiveness of the DCA. No evidence of where this information originated was offered. The demand for better equipment does not appear to be based on evidence and appears to be more to do with extravagant ambition at this stage of development; there needs to be a much better concentration on fundamentals and acquiring competence rather than advanced equipment.

The agency does not appear to be in a position to undertake undercover operations or to infiltrate criminal gangs adequately and it is doubtful that the handling of informants is as professionally competent and secure as it should be; it was claimed that there are insufficient funds available to pay informants adequately.

It should be noted that throughout the development of the Project there were uncertainties about donor funding which limited UNODC's ability to implement the project as required. Since the Project revision in 2006 only 50% of required funding has been available, although regular promises of more funds were made to such an extent that the project continued with all available funding being used for salary supplements; this meant that there were insufficient funds available for specialised equipment, training and mentoring.

There were complaints that the forensic science staff has not been supplied with professional journals which are said to be essential for them to keep abreast of developments and it is alleged that neither is the staff trained to a higher level of competence. Nevertheless the Head of the

Laboratory spoke with satisfaction that her staff is well regarded and that the Forensic Science Laboratory had developed to such a degree that the courts accept the expert opinion of its officers; I was unable to establish whether this was self-congratulatory or fact. Given the claim that staff are not being trained to advanced standards this needs to be taken into account in any further projects and/or training.

It is very apparent that training in intelligence gathering and analysis is essential for more advanced operations and this deficiency combined with the current loss of experienced officers to the DCA for financial reasons makes it obvious that the objective has fallen well short of the desirable outcome.

Project Results:

The Project complies with the Strategic Programming Framework and the laws of Kyrgyzstan and the limited development has been implemented accordingly.

The expected end of project results as defined in the original document, have been achieved in part, but progress is inadequate and inhibited by current economic circumstances.

- The DCA is operational and its role is generally accepted by other agencies although full integration is doubtful; continued measures to ensure the coordinating role of the Agency are being pursued;
- Staff has been selected but for reasons already explained there is a high turnover with a consequential loss of expertise. Security screening both by Polygraph and Internal Investigation is accepted by senior management within the DCA and they expressed confidence that there is little corruption within the DCA although Heads of Departments at HQ expressed concern that this may soon occur because of poor salary conditions. However, at a collegial meeting at the Ministry of Interior on 28th October 2008 it was apparently acknowledged that the drug problem within Kyrgyzstan is growing to such an extent that the law enforcement agencies are not equipped to deal with it. There was also concern at the depth of drug-related corruption that is present in all Law Enforcement agencies in Kyrgyzstan, including the DCA. However, no evidence of the prosecution of any officer was produced and there was a great deal of prevarication when questions about this were raised.
- Collaboration with a wide range of international enforcement agencies and organisations such as Europol and Interpol has been claimed; successful controlled deliveries are said to have taken place; there have been limited seizures of drugs and precursor chemicals; demand reduction and prevention and awareness activities have been pursued; the DCA has achieved a basic level of competence but much more needs to be done;

- There is insufficient quantitative and qualitative information regarding all aspects of drug cultivation, production, trafficking and abuse because the information and analysis system is dated and fails to provide immediate access to information. Preparatory work is underway to support the conduct of joint analysis with the National AIDS Centre. However, the DCA carries out regular awareness raising and preventive campaigns, including publication of a magazine for youth called “Lifeline”, organization of seminars to education institutions under the programme “street children” , lectures in Bishkek and Osh with involvement of public organizations, local communities and religious leaders on the subject “How to secure our city from narcomania, prostitution and HIV/AIDS”. Regular awareness raising campaigns on the occasion of the World Drugs day were organized jointly with UNODC (which included tournaments, competition among schoolchildren, etc.).
- It cannot be said that the necessary infrastructure is either in place or under final development to ensure the self-sustainability of the DCA beyond the lifetime of this Project and there is a distinct possibility that without adequate funding the DCA may fail. In terms of the revised Project Document there is not an assured continuity and retention of trained staff within the Agency; salary levels are clearly inadequate; there are insufficient experienced and trained human resources to counter drug operations on the necessary scale; and although there is a desire to progress and develop the concept of intelligence-led policing this is a long way from full and competent implementation. The development of MOBIT [Mobile Interdiction Teams under aligned Project KGZ/I75] is predicated on this concept which may be said to be under development but it is too soon to make any sound judgement about progress. A meeting with the Head of MOBIT in Osh occurred but discussions about progress were limited other than to note that in the first year of development teething problems have prevented significant achievements.
The question arises as to which agency should oversee the development of MOBIT and whether or not there would be advantages in a joint approach between all law enforcement agencies. It is unclear how intelligence led policing can hope to be effective given the apparently unsatisfactory state of the Intelligence system within Kyrgyzstan and this issue needs to be addressed as a matter of great importance.

Are law enforcement projects in central Asia collectively contributing to reduce drug trafficking? Are these projects developed to complement each other?

The implementation strategy: there were problems with the recruitment and turnover of Project Coordinators for a variety of unfortunate but legitimate reasons; it would have been beneficial if all of the coordinators had a law enforcement or legal background. These problems were compounded by several changes of Director brought about for a range of reasons including conflict about the use of the

Polygraph, political change and local circumstances all of which caused interruption to desirable progress and continuity. However there was adequate support from ROCA which took appropriate and immediate action to try to alleviate problems as they arose.

The impacts of this Project are difficult to assess. Certainly most personnel are aware of the global drug problem and the necessity to take effective action against drug traffickers and organised criminal groups but some are frustrated by their own lack of progress and the working conditions under which they operate. There have been improvements in the interdiction of some criminals, small seizures of drugs and precursors, some successful operations with international partners including controlled deliveries, and the development of a degree of pride in an agency which some wish to be as successful as the terminology used in the Project Documents.

However, whilst some good work has been done by UNODC staff and consultants in attempting to achieve the objectives of the project the overall conclusion must be that, although some counter-narcotic foundations have been laid, some lessons learned and appropriate training and guidance have been given, nevertheless these have failed to have any significant or meaningful impact against organised crime and drug trafficking; the borders remain porous, the police agencies are incapable of addressing the trafficking problems effectively; and cross border cooperation between neighbouring countries is minimal. There is a problem that must be addressed immediately by a greater focus on such matters in the counter-narcotics training activities that are in hand.

Sustainability: with much more support, finance, training and equipment the prospect of long term impacts may be improved but the DCA is far from being a stable and sustainable organisation under present conditions. A positive impact and sustainability with continued support may be possible but failure is also a distinct possibility. It seems that it will be many years before the Government will be able to provide sufficient self-generated funding to maintain the agency.

4. Lessons learned: ~

1. Although the Project Document was clear in its aims and objectives it was far too ambitious in the context of a post Soviet developing country. It was unrealistic to expect the newly formed law enforcement, counter narcotics agency to mature in such a brief period such that it could achieve a *“significant improvement of interdiction capacities against illicit drug trafficking and related other crime...”* It was also unreasonable to expect that there would be *“major seizures and dismantling of organised trafficking and criminal networks”*. Given the unstable and fragile economic situation it was also questionable that the DCA would become progressively self-sustainable. The Project should have been introduced and regarded as the foundation for the DCA after which further progress in terms of development could have been achieved with more advanced projects built upon firm

foundations. The basic concepts of the project were sound, if over-ambitious, but delivery could have been substantially better had the needs analysis been conducted more fully before the Project Documents were drawn up. There was failure to recognise that successful development of an effective DCA would take many years before it could hope to match international standards of effectiveness.

2. It is highly desirable that all UNODC Project Officers associated with what is essentially a law enforcement issue should have a solid background in either policing or law; failure to ensure this may mean that supervision of the Project is less professional than it could be. This is not to say that the Project has not been well managed but simply that the whole essence of the work is to improve law enforcement capabilities and techniques. Without a full professional background or adequate and readily available support from a suitably qualified mentor, the Project Officer will be limited in both understanding and necessary professionalism.
3. The insistence on the use of the Polygraph as the primary measure of the integrity of candidates caused considerable misgivings amongst potential applicants from other law enforcement agencies from the outset and deterred many from applying for fear that exposure of past misdeeds or dishonesty might jeopardise their positions within their own agencies. Not only were the costs of this exercise grossly underestimated but it is arguable that they were disproportionate to the results achieved when compared with a similar situation in the Tajikistan Agency which has functioned well for nearly a decade without resort to the Polygraph. Nevertheless, the Polygraph appears to have been accepted as a useful tool by senior management. The ordinary members of the DCA are universally critical of its use/value and are hostile to its continued use. A further problem may arise in that there is only one person capable of conducting Polygraph testing and his absence would result in difficulty in maintaining this form of integrity testing.
4. The anticipation that complicated matters requiring legislation would progress smoothly to implementation was also a mistake. Five years on, the necessary laws regarding asset forfeiture and communications interception are nowhere near the statute book. Forfeiture was regarded as one way in which funds eventually would become available in helping the DCA become self-sustainable. This problem was noted in the mid-term evaluation and was recorded in the revised Project Document.
5. Although there are claims that the DCA has been accepted by other law enforcement agencies and those concerned with licit drugs, treatment and demand reduction, it is apparent, particularly in the case of law enforcement that negative inter-agency rivalry remains to the detriment of more successful interdictions.

6. The assumption that the former Soviet intelligence system would operate to current international law enforcement standards was perhaps naïve. There is evidence that the whole concept of intelligence needs addressing urgently in terms of basic, intermediate and advanced level training otherwise international co-operation and the sharing of information leading to the disruption and interdiction of major criminal gangs will be less successful than it should be. This was acknowledged by all with whom I spoke and it is very clear that this matter is in urgent need of attention if progress is to be achieved. UNODC project RER/F23 provided some assistance to DCA in supporting the intelligence database systems. To that extent the speila software was provided to DCA and its analysts were trained in its use. Unfortunately, DCA Management did not maintain the analytical unit to the appropriate level and was reluctant in cooperating with RER/F23 project.

7. Failure to distinguish between the two major problems confronting Central Asia ~ on the one hand the need for long term development of an efficient system of counter narcotics policing, which will take many years to achieve, and on the other, the enormity of the global drug problem that requires immediate and highly professional action. What is happening at present is little better than tinkering with small seizures compared with the vast amounts of drugs that will continue to be produced and exported from Afghanistan for many more years. Professional mentoring and training by people with efficient policing backgrounds is necessary. The huge increase in the production of opium was well known in 2006 and this should have been considered in the revised Project Document so that an adjustment could have been made to the overly ambitious expectations.

5. RECOMMENDATION:

Clearly the DCA has not become as effective as was anticipated in the Project Documents. There is a clear and enduring need to ensure that a highly efficient, well trained and adequately equipped agency be fully developed to the highest possible standards commensurate with accepted international competence. Although the DCA has not yet achieved these standards it is still possible to build on the basic foundations and it is strongly recommended that consideration be given to seeking support for a further Project to remedy the existing deficiencies including corruption. Without this there will be a serious failure in efforts to stem the flow of illicit drugs through Kyrgyzstan.

Consideration should be given to the possibility of seconding international experts to key Ministries to give advice on a permanent basis; a greater use of mentors in the field would also be highly beneficial as in the case of MOBIT.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:

The intentions behind the development of the DCA in Kyrgyzstan, modelled on the successes achieved in Tajikistan, were good. However, there was inadequate assessment of the conditions prevailing within Kyrgyzstan and insufficient attention given to laying solid foundations upon which to build a competent agency. Expectations were too ambitious and the time scale set for achieving success was unrealistic. The insistence on the introduction of the Polygraph against prevailing advice at the time has caused massive additional costs and created much hostility and uncertainty both within the DCA and in other Law Enforcement agencies.

The recommendation in the Mid-Term Evaluation that a suitable exit strategy should be developed resulted in a loss of momentum with the anticipation that further assistance would not be forthcoming. This combined with the difficult economic and political climate, and the apparent lack of initiative of the International Working Group, produced a negative effect.

The increasing production and supply of drugs in Afghanistan was all too apparent when the Project was started and had worsened by 2006; no consideration was given to this in the revised Project Document. It should have been realised that the whole of Central Asia and Afghanistan is confronted with the two-fold problem defined above: on the one hand the need to develop highly professional and competent law enforcement agencies throughout the region over a necessarily prolonged gestation period, and on the other, the enormity and expected continuity of drug production in Afghanistan has created the need for an urgent and immediate professional response. This requires mentoring and training to a high level of competence by experienced international experts if there is to be any hope of addressing the drug problem in this part of the world adequately. Corruption is clearly a major problem which must be addressed. Failure to ensure this will compound the global problems associated with drug trafficking, namely serious public health problems with the spread of blood borne diseases, large scale international organised crime and the economic consequences of money laundering, and the continued financing of international terrorist groups.

Annexes: ~

Evaluation Terms of Reference: –

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PROJECT TERMINAL EVALUATION

PROJECT TITLE: Kyrgyz Republic Drug Control Agency (DCA)

PROJECT NUMBER: KYR/G64

I. BACKGROUND

This project has been designed to establish and support the Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency by provision of necessary expertise, resources, equipment and training to establish a strong and well-equipped national institution that is capable of taking the lead in national counter-narcotics operations.

The UNODC project KYR/G64 started in 2003 and was initially designed for a period of three years.

The immediate objectives of the project were the following:

1. To establish the Drug Control Agency, as an integral and fully sustainable part of the legal and institutional framework of Kyrgyzstan.
2. To support DCA in recruitment process of the DCA staff and in the monitoring of this process.
3. To provide the Drug Control Agency with the necessary structures, equipment and training to ensure adequate start of effective operations.

The project was revised in January 2007 to extend the project duration for additional two years up to December 2008, to increase staff levels at the DCA to fulfil growing analytical needs and needs of other units, and training units and officers, in close cooperation with bilateral donors and/or other UNODC projects. All original projects objectives remained unchanged.

During the implementation of the project these objectives have been mostly achieved with DCA being recognised as a leading national agency in countering drug trafficking in the country. However, due to a significant funding shortfall the project could not fully deliver some of the planned activities.

II. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

In compliance with the project document, the external terminal evaluation is initiated by UNODC to assess the impact of the assistance provided in relation to the objectives and the outputs set out in the project document. The evaluation findings should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system to support a results-based management of the project. The evaluation should provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to

efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project.

The evaluation report will be shared with relevant units of UNODC, government counterparts, and the donor country (United States).

III. EVALUATION SCOPE

The terminal evaluation covers the activities of the project implemented from 2003 (start of the project) up to the end of the project in 2008. In particular, the specific areas of evaluation should cover the following:

- (1) Overall assessment of the project (context and rationale)
 - To what extent has the project been developed and implemented within the framework of the existing UNODC strategic instruments such as the Strategic Programming Framework (SPF)?
 - To what extent are the project logic, concept and approaches appropriate and relevant to achieving the government policies and objectives?
 - What were the intended results, supporting projects/activities, inputs and processes required? Risks and assumptions considered?
 - To what extent complementarities and synergies of the project with other projects is being implemented by UNODC in the country created?

- (2) Attainment of the project objective
 - To what extent has the project achieved its intended objective to date and prognosis at the end of project?
 - What is the evidence of the Drug Control Agency having developed capacities to counter drug trafficking as a result of this project?
 - Evidence of relevant national officers and personnel trained by the projects have improved their analytical and operational skills and knowledge and have utilized them on their day-to-day assignments?
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- (3) Implementation strategy (operational plan, monitoring and evaluation)
 - Did the project have a clearly identified specific target group(s) and measurable objectives in the programme document?
 - Did the activities planned under the objectives move on track (schedule and substance wise)?
 - Did programme managers adapted to change, by adjusting the programme design and direction, when deemed necessary? Were activities planned sufficient to attain the desired objectives? If not what adjustment were made in project design?
 - Were resources mobilized and utilized efficiently?
 - Is there an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor and assess the overall progress of the project?

- (4) Achievement of outcomes and outputs
 - What were the expected outputs from the project? Were all planned outputs likely to be achieved at the end of project?

- Have the law enforcement personnel been trained as intended by the project with capacity building objectives? Assess training quality and utilization of training
- (5) Institutional and management arrangements (backstopping and support mechanisms regional and field offices, national governments and other local counterparts)
- What are the specific roles and responsibilities of staff at region, field office, country, donors and other partners in implementing and managing the project?
 - Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by the relevant parties (administrative / managerial support and coordination)?
- (6) Impacts (long-term effects)
- What are the potential impacts of the project?
 - To what extent can the project expect to achieve the positive impacts based on project results observed at the moment?
- (7) Sustainability
- To what extent are the project interventions sustainable?
 - What concrete actions or measures have been taken, or are required, to ensure the sustainability of national agencies established / supported by the projects (e.g. structural, managerial and behavioural change)?
 - Is there adequate local commitment to support policy change?
- (8) Lessons learned and best practices
- What are the best practices (if any) documented during the current operations?
 - What specific lessons (if any) can UNODC draw from the project experiences for future directions especially keeping in mind UNODC possible engagement with establishment of Drug Control Agencies in other countries?

IV. EVALUATION METHODS

The evaluation of the project will be based on the following:

1. Study of relevant documents (project reports; monthly report; progress report: reports produced by outside experts; statistics on drug seizures);
2. Initial briefing by responsible UNODC staff in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), Tashkent, and in the Project Office in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;
3. Interviews with DCA, other law enforcement institutions, the embassy of the United states (donor) ;

In conducting the evaluation, the evaluator needs to take account of relevant international standards, including “Guiding principles for evaluation at UNODC”,

“Standards of evaluation in the UN system”, and “Norms for evaluations in the UN system”.

Upon completion of the fact-finding and analysis phase, a draft evaluation report will be prepared. The draft should be circulated to the parties for comments. The evaluator may choose to take the comments into account in producing the final report, for which s/he will be solely responsible.

V. COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION MISSION

The terminal evaluation of the project will be carried out by an independent expert appointed by the UNODC. The donor to the project may provide expert to participate in the evaluation as observer. Costs associated with the UNODC expert will be borne by the project. All costs for expert appointed by donor will be borne by the donor government directly.

The expert shall act independently in his/her individual capacity, and not as a representative of the government or organization which appointed him/her. The independent expert should adhere to the independence and impartiality of the evaluation process discussed in the UNODC guiding principle for evaluation. The report will be prepared by the independent expert appointed by the UNODC. This expert should have the following qualifications:

- experience in conducting independent evaluations (if possible, within UNODC system);
- familiarity with the drug control situation in Kyrgyzstan and in Central Asia;
- Knowledge of bilateral/multilateral technical cooperation, particularly in counter-narcotic enforcement issues;
- Excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English. Knowledge of Russian will be considered as an asset.

VI. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The expert may be briefed and debriefed on the project by UNODC HQs and the field office in Tashkent (ROCA) and project office in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The UNODC Representative for Central Asia and his staff will also provide necessary substantive and administrative support.

Although the expert should be free to discuss all matters relevant to its assignment with the authorities concerned, it is not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of UNODC or the Government.

The evaluation expert will submit its report to UNODC Headquarters and to ROCA. The report will contain the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team as well as a recording of the lessons learned during project implementation. The evaluation expert, while considering the comments provided on the draft, would use its independent judgment in preparing the final report. A copy of the draft report should also be sent to the Chief of the Independent Evaluation Unit, UNODC Vienna, for his review, prior to its finalization.

The final report should be submitted to UNODC no later than three weeks upon completion of the mission. The report should be no longer than 15 pages, excluding

annexes and the executive summary. The report will be distributed by UNODC as required to the governmental authorities and respective donors.

The timetable of evaluation mission as follows:

Two (2) working days in ROCA Tashkent, Uzbekistan (briefing and de-briefing);

Eight (8) working days in Project office in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;

Five (5) working days for writing the final evaluation report

The mission will include visits to the DCA Southern and Eastern branches in Osh and Talas, respectively.

The suggested date for the evaluation mission: **September-October, 2008**

VII. PAYMENT

The Evaluator will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures. The final payment will be made only after the final report is accepted by the UNODC.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

- Timely and accurate submission of the documents.
- Substantive and linguistic quality of the documents prepared.
- Conformity of the project evaluation report with the standard format and guidelines for the preparation of project evaluation reports and technical guidance received.
- Report should contain recommendations for future course of action.

Organisations and places visited and persons met: ~

People met: ~

UNODC :

- **Mr. James Callahan ROCA**
- **Ms. Zhuldyz Akisheva ROCA**
- **Ms. Madina Sarieva Project Assistant, Bishkek**
- **Mr. Ugo Enea – Project Coordinator of KGZ/I75 (MOBIT) project, Bishkek**
- **Mr. Mirlan Mamyrov National Project Officer, RAC/I29 project, Bishkek.**

USA

- **The Ambassador of the United States of America to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan –The Hon. Ms.Tatiana C. Gfoeller.**
- **Mr. Lee Litzenberger – Deputy Chief of Mission US Embassy, Bishkek.**

- **Mr. Robert Delcore – Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, US Embassy.**
- **Mr. Frank Chisare – DEA Mentor – Osh.**
- **Mr. Samuel Murad – DEA Mentor – Osh.**

Kyrgyzstan

- **Mr. B.B.Nogoibaev – Director DCA.**
- **Mr. V.K. Orozaliev – 1st Deputy Director DCA.**
- **Mr. M.T.Ismailov –Advisor to Director.**
- **Heads of Department DCA HQ Bishkek as a group.**
- **General Sh. M. Mirzakarimov Head DCA South, Osh.**
- **Mr. B.J.Abdrahmanov Head MOBIT, Osh.**
- **Head of Border Guard, Osh.**
- **Mr. T.Duishimbiev – Head Eastern DCA.**
- **Mr.E.Esenaliev – Head MoI Eastern Branch Issyk-Kul.**
- **Mr.Z.Moldoshev – Chairman Border Guards.**
- **Mr. A.A. Sultanov – Head of defence, law and order, and emergencies Department of Government Apparatus.**
- **Mr. S. Suvanaliev – Deputy Chairman of Customs.**
- **Mr. D.Kurmanaliev – Customs Officer.**
- **Mr. D .I. Fedorov – Deputy Minister of the Interior.**

Places visited: ~

**UNODC ROCA Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan DCA Bishkek, Osh, Karakol.**

Annexe - Statistical Information: ~

CENTRAL ASIA: DRUG SITUATION AT-A-GLANCE (UNODC)

Mid-year 2008

Drug Seizures in Central Asia


During the first 6-months of 2008, a total of 15.1 tons of drugs were seized in Central Asia, 1.1 tons more than during the same period in 2007. An increase in total drug seizures was reported in Uzbekistan (by 91%), Kyrgyzstan (by 50%), Tajikistan (by 24%) while seizures in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan decreased (32% and 11% respectively). Of the total amount seized, heroin represented 3.2 tons (last year 1.7); opium – 2.3 tons (3.1); marijuana – 8.3 tons (8.4); and hashish 753 kg (354).

Heroin

Compared to 2007, total heroin seizures nearly doubled in 2008 (94%) due to considerable increases in seizures in Uzbekistan (410%) and Kazakhstan (290%), and

to a lesser extent, Tajikistan (15%) and Kyrgyzstan (11%). The sharp increases in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were a consequence of several large volume seizure cases in January-June 2008. Turkmenistan reported a 20% decrease in heroin seizures.


According to semi-annual heroin seizures, for the first time Kazakhstan ranks first among Central Asian countries in heroin seizures with 35% of total heroin seizures (1,111 kg). Tajikistan's share of regional heroin seizures has remained high constituting 32% (1,030 kg) of total seizures in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan seized 24% (771 kg), 5% (162 kg), and 4% (133 kg) respectively.



Opium

In the first half of 2008, opium seizures decreased by 25% compared to the same period in 2007. Given the rise in heroin seizures (94%), this could indicate that more opiates trafficked through the region are in the form of heroin rather than opium.

Tajikistan continues to seize the largest proportion of opium constituting approximately 58% of total seizures in Central Asia (1.4 tons). This figure represents a modest 10% increase on the same period in 2007. Despite the decrease in seizures, Turkmenistan (-55%) and Uzbekistan (-26%) seized over 400 kg of opium each. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan seized 38 kg (+2%) and 13 kg (-92%) respectively.



Cannabis group

Kazakhstan annually leads the region in marijuana seizures, confiscating more than 20 tons every year. As of 1st July 2008, law enforcement agencies in the republic have seized over 5 tons of marijuana representing 61% of total amount of seizures in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan seized 1,371 kg (16%), 1,179 kg (14%), and 681 kg (8%) respectively.

In Central Asia, 753 kg of hashish were seized for the first six months of 2008, more than double the amount seized in same period in 2007 and six times the amount seized in same period in 2006. The majority of hashish seizures were made in Kyrgyzstan (415 kg) and Kazakhstan (218 kg).

Drug Seizures made by LEAs of Kyrgyzstan (kg)

For the first six months of 2008, the total quantity of drugs seized amounts to 7.1 tons of drugs and precursors, including heroin 133 kg (116 kg in 2007) and opium 38 kg (37 kg in 2007). According to officials, hashish seizures sharply increased by 185% amounting to 415 kg (80 kg in 2007).

DCA makes significant contribution to the total opiates seizures in Kyrgyzstan. About 45% of opiates seizures for the 1st six months were made by DCA. DCA seized 50 kg heroin (-46% decrease compared to 2007) and 25 kg opium (17% increase). Besides, DCA seized 5.5 tons sulphuric acid.

Agency	Year	Total Seizures	Heroin	Opium	Hashish	Cannabis
TOTAL	2005	4,461	203	116	131	1,984
	2006	4,698	261	302	154	2,400
	2007	6,870	431	270	440	4,028
	2007 (6 monts)		116	37		
	2008 (6 monts)		133	38		

Agency	Year	Total Seizures	Heroin	Opium	Hashish	Cannabis
Including by agencies:						
DCA	2005	185	41	62	13	65
	2006	930	115	117	97	601
	2007	1,118	136	130	104	738
	2007 (6 monts)	213	93	22	80	2
	2008 6 months	n/a	50	25	n/a	n/a
MoI	2005	4,200	124	54	116	1,883
	2006	3,718	136	184	55	1,764
	2007	5,035	262	141	323	3,265
Security	2005	30	27	0	2	-
	2006	12	6	2	0.4	4
	2007	38	33	-	5	0
Customs	2005	26	0.3	0	-	26
	2006	12	5	0.01	1.0	5
	2007	672	-	-	8	19
General Prosecutor's Office	2005	19	10	0	0	9
	2006	13	0	0	0	13
	2007	0.2	0	-	0.04	0.1