

# **FINAL EVALUATION**

**Project No KGZ/175**

**Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan**

**Counter-narcotics enforcement**

**Kyrgyzstan**

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# CONTENTS

		<b>Page</b>
	Abbreviations and acronyms	iii
	Summary matrix of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations	v
	Executive Summary	ix
<b>I.</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>Paragraph</b>
	A. Background and context of the project	1.1 1
	B. Purpose and scope of the evaluation	1.12 3
	C. Executing modalities of the project	1.13 3
	D. Evaluation methodology	1.17 4
	E. Limitations to the evaluation	1.18 4
<b>II.</b>	<b>Major findings and analysis</b>	
	A. Relevance of the project	2.1 5
	B. Attainment of the project objectives	2.8 7
	C. Achievements of the project outputs	2.30 13
	D. Institutional and management arrangements and constraints	2.34 15
<b>III.</b>	<b>Outcomes, impact and sustainability</b>	
	A. Outcomes	3.1 16
	B. Impact	3.6 17
	C. Sustainability	3.10 18
<b>IV.</b>	<b>Lessons learned and best practices</b>	
	A1. Lessons learned - Operational Issues	4.1 20
	A2. Lessons learned – Project Management	4.7 21
<b>V.</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	
	A. Issues resolved during the evaluation	5.1 22
	B. Actions recommended	5.2 22
<b>VI.</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	6.1 27
	<b>Annexes</b>	
	A. Terms of reference of the evaluation	
	B. List of persons interviewed, field visit schedule, interview schedule	
	C. Project Objectives and Outputs	
	D. Performance tables	

## Abbreviations and acronyms

CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CLP	Core Learning Partnership
DCA	Drug Control Agency
IWG	International Working Group
MOBITS	Mobile Law Enforcement Units
Mol	Ministry of Interior
NIWG	National Interagency Working Group
mt	Metric Ton
SSDC	State Service on Drug Control
UNTOC	United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime

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## Summary matrix of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations

Findings: problems and issues identified	Supporting evidence	Recommendations
<p><b>The Future Role of MOBITS</b></p> <p>Concept of mobile interagency secure teams is valid. The need for special resources within the southern border region is confirmed.</p> <p>The value of these resources to the counter trafficking agenda suggests a potentially broader role.</p>	<p>Drug trafficking problems within southern Kyrgyzstan remain at the same level as at the project commencement; The territory is a difficult area to police and special arrangements are necessary in liaison with the Customs and Border Services.</p> <p>Achieving the same level of vetting for other officers in the SSDC is problematic in the short and medium term.</p>	<p>MOBITs should continue (subject to below) providing funding to support the counter corruption aspects can be found (vetting and bonuses);</p> <p>The potential for a broader role for MOBITS should be the subject of review within the new host agency (SSDC)</p>
<p><b>Developing Intelligence and analysis</b></p> <p>MOBITs need a broader information base if the level of performance is to be improved</p>	<p>MOBITs are dependent upon the skills of their officers to find suitable informants or the supply of information from other agencies. Protocols for inter-agency sharing of information do not yet exist, modern information and analysis systems for information-led policing do not yet exist</p> <p>Corruption is a particular risk in the use of information, intelligence and analysis against drug trafficking</p>	<p>The SSDC should develop an information and analysis infrastructure to introduce information-led methodology.</p> <p>As part of this methodology, the SSDC should consider the adoption of proactive management systems for its middle and senior managers</p> <p>Anti-corruption strategies should be part of any design work on the building of such an infrastructure</p> <p>MOBITs should either:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Be given wider access to</li> </ol>

		<p>information from within the SSDC by taskings as a secure competent field intelligence resource, or</p> <p>b. As a pilot and through a small augmentation, they could be used as an experimental intelligence cell to pilot new processes for the SSDC</p>
<p><b>The Vetting and Bonus Process</b></p> <p>MOBITs will not be sustainable without continuation of bonus payments and support for the vetting processes</p>	<p>No Government funds exist to meet the payments of bonuses and special allowances.</p> <p>Only one polygraph examiner is available to serve the needs of the re-building MOBIT teams and the construction of other larger teams within the host agency</p>	<p>Support is necessary from donors or the UNODC in the short term.</p> <p>For a development of affordable, practical and efficient methodology for the building and maintenance of teams with high integrity, the International Anti-Corruption Academy should be asked to use Kyrgyzstan as a case study and in particular contribute guidance on processes for monitoring integrity measures in future projects such as this.</p>
<p><b>The contributions of the different agencies to the countering of drug trafficking</b></p> <p>Multi-agency components of this project were not pursued beyond the composition of teams.</p>	<p>The NIWG was not used to pursue the broader issue of Inter-Agency cooperation. Rivalry is seen by some as a useful motivator</p>	<p>The acceptance of SSDC as the lead agency on counter trafficking work should be used to create protocols on information sharing and specific areas of operational responsibility between the national agencies.</p> <p>The Customs and Border Services should continue to have responsibility for overt detection of concealed contraband at recognised border crossing points but protocols regarding access to information from this activity should be made available to the</p>

		<p>SSDC</p> <p>Discussions with other agencies should be held to identify areas of particular responsibility and the necessary protocols for the sharing of information within a legal framework.</p> <p>The development of multi-agency co-operation on drug trafficking should form part of the project to develop the State Service on Drug Control.</p>
<p><b>Improvements to Project Design and Execution</b></p> <p>Project Design was inadequate</p> <p>Project modalities were not completed</p> <p>Performance Monitoring was inadequate</p>	<p>Insufficient clarity in the use of terms, design of concept with regard to the information, intelligence and analysis components and the work plan to achieve these components</p> <p>Relationships with other projects and bi-lateral donors were not properly formalised</p> <p>Project Coordinator and Project Staff contracts not renewed beyond the end of 2008; inadequate records of project, Incomplete minutes of meetings; No 18<sup>th</sup> month review</p> <p>No data collected to assess whether the objectives in relation to integrity were being achieved. No qualitative data on operational performance targets</p>	<p>Continuation of the work by UNODC to clarify the use of terms and to ensure more detailed and specific design of information, intelligence and analysis components in Projects</p> <p>Complex inactions with other projects should form a specific part of project design and mechanisms for joint progress should be put into place</p> <p>Projects must be managed for the whole of their duration and standards of reports must be maintained.</p> <p>Binary, quantitative and qualitative indicators should be collected to monitor progress of projects. In complex projects pursuing unproven theories (i.e. the best method of achieving integrity), indicators should measure key components of activity to enable detailed assessment</p>



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project was a three year plan to create small interagency mobile law enforcement groups called MOBITs based in south Kyrgyzstan to increase resources in the difficult border region with Tajikistan to interdict drug trafficking into the country.

The concept included certain key ideas: interagency composition to enhance the cooperation between agencies and as a counter corruption component, special vetting and bonus payments to ensure a high level of integrity within the teams and training in special investigation techniques to expand their capacity for operations. The teams were also intended to participate in enhanced intelligence collection and analysis, improve the qualitative and quantitative information and knowledge within Kyrgyzstan on the extent of various types of crime and to engage in collaboration with law enforcement agencies of neighbouring and other countries. How they were to do this was poorly addressed. The teams were provided with vehicles, a separate base and advanced strongholds in the difficult border areas and the project implied a flexible rapid deployment when required and the ability to initiate operations from their own information sources. It appears to have been assumed that the provision of a correctly trained and resourced team was sufficient to achieve a new level of impact against drug trafficking and organised crime but a lack of development of information sources undermined the concept.

The formal objectives were:

**Objective 1:** Improve national interdiction results and investigative capacity

*Output 1 – establishment of joint mobile interdiction teams*

*Output 2 – Enhancement of intelligence analysis/investigative capacity of the joint mobile interdiction teams*

**Objective 2:** Ensure integrity and sustainability of joint mobile interdiction teams

*Output 1 – system in place for the constant monitoring of integrity of mobile teams*

*Output 2 – Mechanism for self-sustainability of joint mobile interdiction teams under development*

The project commenced in late 2007 after some procedural delays and concluded at the end of 2010.

The initial host agency for the MOBIT teams was the Drug Control Agency and under their aegis and that of this project, four teams were constructed, based in Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan with advanced strongholds in Alay, Aidarken and Batken. Equipment and training was funded or provided

by the donor or CENTCOM on a bi-lateral basis. Initial results of interdiction were slow and at the mid term review in 2009, concern was expressed over performance levels. No issues were, however, raised over integrity.

In late 2009, the then President, President Bakiyev abolished the DCA (the host agency) and transferred the MOBIT resources into the Ministry of Interior. As the independence of the Units had been an important aspect of the project and was thus compromised, the project was suspended at the request of the donor.

In March, 2010, MOBITs were formally moved into the newly created Chief Department on Counter Drug Trafficking of the Ministry of the Interior and a request for the reinstatement of the project was accepted. Subsequently in August, 2010, President Otunbaeva established the new State Service on Drug Control and the MOBIT resources were to be moved from the MoI to the SSDC. This process of movement was slow and indeed some resources are not yet recovered. Following a further project revision, support was continued until the closure of the project at the end of December, 2010.

The impact of the changes in host agency means that at the end of the project, there were no active MOBIT teams. The SSDC is, however, in the process of reconstructing the teams and approximately one third of the personnel have now been inducted.

It is no fault of the project that the host agencies were changed. The implication for the evaluation is that most key interlocutors were no longer available and that the evaluation had to proceed by taking stock of what had been achieved under the DCA and MoI and what is planned under the SSDC.

The evaluation found justification for the concept of interagency mobile teams that had been specially vetted and secured against corruption and the need for arrangements for a counter narcotics team to operate in the restricted border area. However, the value of confining such a special team to interdictions within the border area is not supported. Such a team is unique within Kyrgyzstan and can have a broader value. In this context it is interesting to note that while under DCA control, they were deployed, inter alia, on controlled deliveries indicating that they were at least from time to time operating in a broader role.

The concerns over performance identified at the mid year review in 2009 are valid. MOBIT teams recovered only 6.6% of the total annual national heroin seizures in 2008, 7.7% in 2009 and 19.4% in the first seven months of 2010. Overall, seizures for the whole country fell between 2008 and 2010. This is a disappointing performance in the context of the project objectives for improving national interdiction results and in relation to the MOBITS is considered to be linked to the disappointing

outcome of the aspirations of this project to enhance the intelligence and analysis ability of the teams.

The objective to enhance the intelligence and analysis ability is entirely in the right direction. Drug trafficking is a highly skilled clandestine activity with few visible opportunities for law enforcement. Investments in the development of new sources of information, dedicated analysts and active management are essential to provide the opportunities for skilled teams such as MOBITs. However, the MOBIT teams are small units, their training has concentrated on special investigative techniques and it is doubtful if they had the capacity for developing the kind of enhanced intelligence collection and analysis envisaged in the project document. This was something better intended for development with the host agency – in which the MOBIT teams should obviously participate.

Without better sources of information, it is difficult to see how the MOBIT teams could deliver the higher level of interdiction expected and whilst this was not articulated, it is assumed the principle behind the project concept was that there was either ample information waiting to be acted upon or once the threat of corruption was removed, there would be no shortage of information from which the MOBITs could benefit. Whether this is a correct deduction of the thinking at the time of the project concept, the reality has been that insufficient information appears to be available to lift the MOBIT teams to a new level of performance. Since the SSDC is currently rebuilding the MOBITs as envisaged in the project document, this will be an issue to be addressed.

There is an important lesson learned from this issue. Quite rightly, significant and valuable effort was put into the construction and preparation of the teams and the provision of buildings and equipment courtesy of the donor and bi-lateral support of CENTCOM. That effort should have been matched with similar work on the operability of the teams, in particular the sources of information from which they would generate their business. Such projects must not only look to the structural and physical needs but also to the cultural and organisational requirements.

The implementation modalities were generally well conceived but the records of such important matters as the half year reviews, the minutes of the International Working Group (IWG) and the National Interagency Working Group (NIWG) are inadequate. Better record keeping may have assisted in recognition of the lack of progress on the intelligence and multi-agency cooperation issues. In hindsight, the failure to use the NIWG as a vehicle for contributing to the aspirations for the development of inter-agency cooperation may have been a significant missed opportunity.

There is now substantial work in progress within the State Service on Drug Control to create a viable and efficient agency. Much energy is inevitably taken up with creating the legal status of the new agency, securing personnel and resources. Within this demanding situation it was good to hear that

the methodology of the agency was being considered and it is within this broader context that the recommendations concerning this project are drawn.

## **Recommendations**

1. The SSDC is committed to reconstructing the MOBIT teams. This presents a perfect opportunity to consider, in the light of the developments since the start of this project, how the valuable resource of the MOBITs should be used. The requirement for skilled, trustworthy teams able to operate in the Osh Oblasty is still present. But in the context where corruption is an ever present threat, MOBITs may be better employed in more flexible circumstances. Whilst the evaluation strongly recommends the continuance of the MOBIT teams, it is also recommended that the operational role of the teams be reviewed so that in the context of the new SSDC, they can, as one option, provide a top level resource tackling the most difficult targets. This is subject to the continuation of the vetting and polygraph processes
2. The MOBITs need a broader base of information sources if they are to be successful. They must either do that themselves or receive taskings from the host agency. The intelligence aspirations of this project were quite correct, even if they were not successfully actioned. The broader resources of the SSDC will also need to develop a new infrastructure of information and analysis including the development of proactive management styles. This must also attract high levels of security which, given the pressures on the vetting procedures currently being experienced, may be impossible to achieve in the short term. A possible interim solution is a second option for the MOBIT teams to be augmented with a limited number of extra officers to form an intelligence cell which can be used as a forerunner of a broader capacity within the SSDC. It is recommended that the SSDC engages in the construction of an intelligence and analytical capability in the way considered best suited to their current stage of development.
3. Consequent upon the recommendation that MOBITs should continue, it follows given that reconstruction is taking place, continued support is necessary for bonus payments and the vetting procedure. This clearly cannot continue indefinitely but equally the objective within the project document that MOBITs would become self sufficient from asset seizure is completely unrealistic.

The absence of monitoring processes during the project make it impossible to judge the extent to which the multi-agency construction, vetting and polygraphing contributes to integrity. Nevertheless, there is a perception that it does, certainly at a deterrent level and

probably beyond. The point is that without some form of external support, MOBITS will not continue, yet there is potential value to be achieved here. It needs two things: a review of how MOBITS can best be used as a specialist resource (as argued in Recommendations 1 and 2) and a temporary continuation of funding to enable discussions to be held and plans remade (as part of the SSDC project).

It is recommended that funding be found to support the current rebuilding process and to maintain bonuses for a finite period agreed with the host agency. Such period would have to be linked to a review at a defined period on the operational progress of the new MOBIT teams.

The Kyrgyzstan problem with the integrity of its operational officers engaged in counter trafficking work is not unique. This is a problem that reoccurs in many, if not all, countries. It is recommended that the International Anti-Corruption Academy should be asked to use the current situation of Kyrgyzstan as a case study to identify practical, effective and affordable means of constructing teams with high integrity and the best processes for monitoring and maintaining of integrity in such specialist units.

4. The multi-agency aspects of this project were important both as an integrity measure and the sharing and broadening of operational experience. However, that is only addressing a limited aspect of the need for inter-agency cooperation. It is recommended that the SSDC as the lead agency on counter trafficking activities engages in dialogue with partner agencies to establish protocols on the conduct of operations and the sharing of information.
5. Project management had weaknesses in design, the execution of the implementation modalities was poor and the performance measurement inadequate. These were crucial factors contributing to the outcome. Clarity of design, completion of the set modalities and the design of performance measures that identify progress towards the objectives must be essential parts of future projects.

The political changes to the host agencies have impacted on this project. Nevertheless it has been effective for a sufficient period to determine the next steps. There is value in the concept of a multi-agency, highly trained and special vetted group of teams. That value, however, is reduced if similar developments in the use of information and analysis are not pursued. The recent creation of the State Service on Drug Control provides an opportunity to take the recommendations of this evaluation forward.



# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. Background and context

1.1 Kyrgyzstan is affected by the trafficking of narcotics, principally opium and heroin originating in Afghanistan through its south and south-western borders with Tajikistan. The trade is controlled by organized crime groups and feeds an internal market and the Northern Route to the Russian Federation. The Central Asian Route is estimated at carrying 90mt of Afghanistan heroin and although traffickers can choose between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the current assessment is that most of the flow appears to proceed through Tajikistan to the southern Kyrgyz town of Osh before transiting to Kazakhstan<sup>1</sup>. Links are perceived between traffickers and internal extremism within Kyrgyzstan; related organized crime and corruption add to the political and social economic problems of the country.

1.2 This project was formed in August, 2006 to link with an existing larger project intended to create a Drug Control Agency within Kyrgyzstan (KYR/G64) and was intended to supplement that project with special resources denominated 'mobile law enforcement' units (MOBITS). The original duration of the Project was intended to be until the end of 2009.

1.3 It was intended that MOBITS would:

- Address the ever increasing influx of drugs, trafficking in human beings and firearms, smuggling of goods and illegal immigration;
- Serve as an efficient tool to combat corruption and organized crime;
- Correct the problem of poorly coordinated or competing law enforcement agencies; and
- Address the very porous border for precursor chemicals between Kyrgyzstan and China.

1.4 MOBITS would achieve these goals by:

- The creation of unified mobile teams who would:
  - undergo special security screening and a polygraph test,
  - receive allowances on a temporary basis to make conditions of service competitive and to contribute towards reducing the risk of corruption amongst members,
  - thus expand the capacity to interdict narcotics, and
  - enhance all agency cooperation

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<sup>1</sup> World Drug Report, 2010, UNODC, Page 22

- Combine the experience and knowledge of all agencies;
- Be supported by international expertise and best practice through training, mentoring and consultancy.

1.5 The project objectives were:

**Objective 1:** Improve national interdiction results and investigative capacity

**Objective 2:** Ensure integrity and sustainability of joint mobile interdiction teams

Details of the Outputs and Activities are shown in Annex C.

1.6 In practical terms the project document envisaged the end of project situation thus:

- Fully operational mobile law enforcement groups integrated into the national law enforcement system;
- Enhanced intelligence collection and analysis capacities on trans-national crime through specialized training and equipment delivery;
- Enhanced cooperation among Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies;
- A minimum of 40 thoroughly selected and security screened law enforcement staff trained and equipped to conduct highly specialized enforcement tasks in different operational, information and analytical aspects;
- Mobile law enforcement groups collaborating with law enforcement agencies of other countries, particularly those from neighbouring countries;
- Adequate quantitative and qualitative information and knowledge within Kyrgyzstan on the extent of the various types of crime;
- National legal, administrative and structural provisions in place, or under final development to ensure self-sustainability of MOBITS, beyond the lifetime of this project.

1.7 It was envisaged that the gains in seizures, revenue and intelligence would be substantial and that the created revenue could be used to finance the team's future operation after the project. Thus a clear-cut phased exit was mandated in the project document so that the Government of Kyrgyzstan would take over the staff and operational expenses.

1.8 There were two Project revisions during the life of the Project prompted by changes in the structure of the parent Drug Control Agency. In late 2009, the then President, President Bakiyev abolished the Drug Control Agency and divided its functions between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Health. Since independence was an important part the

rationale, at the request of the donor the project was suspended until the situation stabilised.

- 1.9 In March, 2010, the MOBITS resources under this project were moved into the command of the newly formed Chief Department on Counter Drug Trafficking of the Ministry of Interior and a request was received for the reinstatement of the project until December, 2010. Accordingly a Project Revision notice was issued and the Project recommenced.
- 1.10 On 17<sup>th</sup> August, 2010, following a decree by President Otunbaeva, a State Service on Drug Control was established and the legal process of transferring resources from the Ministry of Interior to the new State Service commenced. A second Project Revision notice was issued to reflect the change in national ownership of the MOBIT teams from the Mol to the State Service on Drug Control and facilitate the payment of bonuses as teams were reconstructed until the end of the project.
- 1.11 These project revisions made no substantive changes to the project. No revision was made when the DCA was abolished or the project staff was discontinued. This loss of staff had a major impact upon the project and as a consequence there was no line of responsibility left.

## **B. Purpose and scope of evaluation**

- 1.12 The object of this evaluation is to assess the impact of the assistance provided to achieve the objectives and outputs<sup>2</sup>, to support a results-based management of the project and to provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact and sustainability. A Core Learning Partnership (CLP) was proposed to encourage a participatory evaluation process as set out in the Terms of Reference at Annex A. Members of the CLP were interviewed and their views taken into account.

## **C. Executing modalities of the project**

- 1.13 UNODC was chosen as the executing agency for the project, using the sub-office in Bishkek and the Regional Office in Tashkent. Administration, financial services and daily implementation was provided by the UNDP local office. Day to day implementation was to be provided by an International Project Coordinator with support from the Regional Law Enforcement Advisor<sup>3</sup>. The word 'International' appears to add nothing to the role, there

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<sup>2</sup> Annex C

<sup>3</sup> Terminology from the Project Document

being no international activities foreseen and the terms of reference were drawn for a 'Project Coordinator'.

- 1.14 The project design envisaged the initial creation of four Mobile Interdiction Teams, a review after 18<sup>th</sup> months whereupon depending on the review findings, a further six teams would be constructed. Each officer would be thoroughly vetted and polygraph tested and to reduce the risk of corruption, each successfully recruited officer would receive an additional personal allowance from the project.
- 1.15 An expatriate law enforcement officer would be temporarily seconded to each team as mentor and advisor. Frequent review, monitoring and evaluation were foreseen to address the complexities of the project and to review the effectiveness of donor payments for additional allowances. Strategic decisions arising during implementation and the duration of the project were to be addressed by an International Working Group comprising all project stakeholders; the Kyrgyz Government, the donor(s) and UNODC being core members. A National Interagency Working Group (NIWG) comprising decision-making staff of the agencies participating in this project, the project donor, observers and UNODC project staff completed the structural arrangements.
- 1.16 The project document makes no reference to the bi-lateral support that was delivered to this project without which it could not have made the progress it did. However, the lack of clarity over the separation of responsibility must raise questions over project design. There is no clearer example of this than the provision of polygraph support (see paragraphs 3.12 and 3.13).

#### **D. Methodology**

- 1.17 The evaluation was conducted in two stages: a documentary review of all available project papers and performance tables followed by a mission to Kyrgyzstan comprising interviews with key stakeholders in the political arena, the host agency and partnership agencies. This was supplemented with field visits to the Osh and Batken regions of Kyrgyzstan.

#### **E. Limitations to the evaluation**

- 1.18 The political changes within Kyrgyzstan and the changes in the controlling agency have impacted on the evaluation. There are no live MOBIT teams in existence upon which a judgement of operation performance can be judged. MOBIT resources have not yet been fully 'recovered' from the Ministry of the Interior and energy is currently concentrated on new recruitment to recreate the MOBITs, therefore effectively placing the project back in

structural terms to where it was in 2007. A consequence of the change is that most people involved at the outset of this project were not available to the evaluator, a point made worse by poor recording of project processes. Nevertheless, there are process and cultural issues that have been examined which provides significant value in the evaluation.

## **II. MAJOR FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS**

### **A. Relevance of the project**

2.1 The rationale for this project was to address:

- The lack of resources, particularly in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan;
- The structure of various, sometimes poorly coordinated or competing law enforcement agencies;
- The perceived need for unified mobile groups equipped with adequate enforcement mandate, authority and resources;
- The perceived need for a multi-agency approach to combine the experience and knowledge of all agencies;
- The need for a concerted border operation against various forms of cross-border trafficking;
- The need to guard against corrupt actions by team members by two processes: a special recruitment process of specific security screening and polygraph examination, and the provision of allowances to make their conditions of service competitive and to reduce the risk of corruption;
- Enable front-line operational data to be collected for analytical purposes;
- Permit the supply of international expertise and best practice through training, mentoring and consultancy.

This rationale is valid. Whether this requirement could and can be entirely met by the response proposed is another matter.

2.2 The southern border with Tajikistan is remote, hard territory which favours the traffickers. The terrain cannot be comprehensive monitored, the line of the border is imprecise in many places and law enforcement personnel are easily observed by traffickers or those working for them. Whilst in winter the trafficking routes are closed by the weather, 'in season' this is a formidable policing task for any country, let alone a country significantly limited by resources. The south-western Tajikistan border does remain open during winter and border and customs resources monitor established crossing points. Other parts of this border are

also remote and difficult to police and the hinterland was described by operational officers as problematic. The border zone is operated by the Border Service and Customs and in the normal course of business regular police<sup>4</sup> are not permitted.

- 2.3 In this situation, the proposal for a mobile, inter agency, trusted and highly trained unit is valid. There is a need for such a unit to be legally able to operate within the border area, to be accepted by the Customs and Border Services, to work with internal and external partners and to be self sufficient. The design of MOBITS within this Project – certainly as an initial concept – met this requirement. This requirement is still needed today and all interviewees were emphatic in their continued support for the principle of the concept.
- 2.4 The likelihood that the multi-agency construct would achieve the aspirations of enhanced cooperation between agencies was optimistic. Multi-agency cooperation in drug trafficking is a matter of great complexity and the selection of personnel from various agencies to teams the size of MOBITS was never going to address the objective as written. However, the idea for multi-agency teams as the beginnings of inter-agency cooperation, in easing the process of acceptance for their specialist role and as a contribution to the counter corruption strategy was sound. The broader goal of enhanced multi-agency cooperation was an issue for the larger project on the establishment of the Drug Control Agency. It follows that this issue must transfer – and feature as a major issue – in the building of the new SSDC.
- 2.5 The requirement for front-line data and indeed, analysis of data is entirely relevant. Again though, this is not a requirement restricted to the MOBITS project but more appropriate to the former project to enhance the Drug Control Agency. The work in this area had to sit within a broader information and analysis framework if it was to be successful. The project did not make progress on these issues for a variety of reasons discussed in paragraph 2.14 et seq. It did address technical skills<sup>5</sup> through training and the provision of specialist equipment through CENTCOM and nothing in these comments are intended to undermine the value of that important support. However, this work did not (and could not) supply the development of a police information and analysis infrastructure. This need remains and is extremely important. The idea that the limited number of personnel working within the MOBIT teams could, on their own, using existing methodology bring a dramatic increase in effectiveness in this difficult area of policing was very optimistic. This was a failure of the project design and planning.

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<sup>4</sup> nor members of the public

<sup>5</sup> essentially Special Investigation Techniques

- 2.6 Law Enforcement wages are low and drug profits high. The integrity issues intended to be addressed by this project are therefore also entirely relevant. It is perhaps not necessary to reprise the full and rather obvious arguments to justify this statement. It was and continues to be relevant to have a special selection process and to have a process of continuous overview during the life of the MOBIT teams. It is perhaps sufficient to say that if MOBITS are to attain their high objectives and to seriously impact on drug trafficking and associated criminal business, then we must expect that organised criminality will wish to invest in infiltrating or buying the loyalty of team members. This is a perpetual risk for which there must be a permanent strategy, not just for MOBITs but the whole SSDC.
- 2.7 In considering the sustainability of the concept of this project, the bonus payments and vetting processes necessary to continue this aspect of the construct are the most vulnerable<sup>6</sup> and made more so by the demands of the new State Service on Drug Control which is building at a similar time. The new agency has the difficult task of quickly achieving effective operational ability and watertight integrity and within this framework MOBITS are also reconstructing. There is great pressure here and it is impossible to see MOBITS continuing without some additional external support.

**B. Attainment of the project objectives**

- 2.8 The project had two objectives; to improve national interdiction results and investigative capacity, and to ensure integrity and sustainability of the teams. The abolition of the Drug Control Agency by the previous Government makes evaluation of the attainment of these objectives somewhat difficult. However, prior to the abolition of the DCA, four MOBIT teams had been recruited and deployed by late September, 2007 using temporary accommodation whilst bespoke facilities were being completed. Multi-agency recruitment, vetting, interviewing and appointment took place and an integrity review process existed under the aegis of the Internal Affairs Officer. The project review for 2007 identifies unavoidable delay in the signing of the project document, longer than expected recruitment of the Project Coordinator, protracted debate of the inter-agency composition of the teams, over hasty recruitment processes, lack of agreement over operation in border regions and concerns over the impact of corruption. Nevertheless, seven operations were reported as under progress.

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<sup>6</sup> As opposed to the lack of source information

## 2.9 ***Improving national interdiction results and investigative capacity***

The 2008 review reported MOBITS as fully operational and in the first half of the year 4kgs of heroin and 18.5kgs of hashish had been seized. Progress was being made on internal and external partnerships and valuable bi-lateral support continued to be received from US CentCom. However, there were concerns over the level of performance and a serious funding problem with the consequence that the procurement of equipment was put on hold so that focus could be maintained on the provision of bonuses to MOBIT team members.

- 2.10 During 2009, the closure of the DCA occurred. Prior to the closure, 101.5kgs of drugs had been seized in the year, five controlled operations between Tajikistan and Russia had been conducted and six supplementary operations had been concluded. It is encouraging to see that MOBITS were not just participating in border interdiction but also in operations such as controlled deliveries which permit an opportunity for the dismantling of or greater disruption to organised crime groups. 2009 ended with the movement of the teams to the Mol upon the abolition of the DCA.
- 2.11 MOBIT performance in the seizure of heroin was 6.6% of the total seized in the whole country in 2008, 7.7% in 2009 and 19.4% in the first seven months of 2010. These percentages do not include the contributions of MOBITS via controlled deliveries which were interdicted in other countries. Performance against Opium was consistently very low with the striking exception of seizures in August, 2009 which represented 53.8% of the country's annual total. Overall, annual seizures fell during the duration of this project.
- 2.12 It is impossible to say whether the seizures by MOBITs teams would have been achieved by others if this project had not existed. Nevertheless the performance achieved did not meet the expectations of the either the IWG or NIWG. The reaction to this was pressure on MOBIT leadership to improve performance and, in 2009, the introduction of a system of withholding bonuses for underperforming officers.
- 2.13 This withholding of bonuses was a distortion of their purposes. Bonuses were never intended as performance incentive payments but an enhancement paid to members as a contribution to integrity (see paragraph 2.24). If the theory of bonus payments to preserve integrity is correct, then this action to use bonuses as performance enhancing incentives undermined a key principle of the project.

#### 2.14 *'Improved intelligence collection mechanism'*

This concern over performance highlights weaknesses in the intelligence component of the project. Of course, officers must perform to expectation and there is a normal management requirement to ensure that the teams are functioning properly and that each component of proactive and reactive work is being delivered to the required standard. However, the project training has focussed mainly upon the delivery of what are denominated 'Specialist Investigative Techniques'<sup>7</sup> and not at all on the construction of an information, intelligence or analysis infrastructure. Without such a development, the MOBIT project suffers the constraint of being limited – not by the energy, resources and vision of the host organisation but by the competence of individual officers and their ability to find informants who are placed to provide information on large-scale trafficking. Whilst the special selection of the best operational officers should have given the MOBITs a good start, this reliance on a single source of information cannot be the best solution for tackling what is a major national problem. But there was also the question of whether the selection process resulted in the 'best' staff. Some interlocutors reported that officers, they **perceived** as the best operationally, could not be selected because of the stringent vetting requirements.

2.15 Policing globally is in the process of major change. Policing started as a visible uniformed presence and patrols intended to prevent crime by deterrence and to catch offenders in the act. It quickly developed into both a visible preventative uniformed force and a reactive investigation service. Now, many countries are discovering that those two are insufficient and proactivity is being introduced as a third method of service delivery. Whilst proactivity started as a development of reactivity as a response to increasing sophistication amongst criminals, the modern criminality of illicit commodity markets and trafficking make such an approach essential.

2.16 In each phase or era of policing, a management and resource infrastructure was also necessary to support the service delivery method – the patrolling uniformed officer set the requirement for the basic management hierarchy; the reactive investigation created the infrastructure of investigation skills, information records, forensic capability etc – now there is a need for an information infrastructure with complementary management to ensure the hidden activities of organised crime are counteracted. Relying on the standard police methodology formed to support and direct reactive investigations will not succeed.

2.17 This new methodology starts with a strategic picture of the nature of the problem (a corporate understanding of everything that is known about the who, what, where, how, why

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<sup>7</sup> Article 20, UN Convention on Trans-national Organised Crime

and when involved in drug trafficking), the construction of teams to address specific operational needs, specific information gathering resources, a routine dedicated analytical capability and a participative management structure. The latter has evolved from standard police 'supervision' practice to one that manages the deployment of resources using a variety of tactics according to the intelligence picture presented. Of course, such an infrastructure is expensive and challenging for a country with limited resources and there will also be legal issues. The threat of corruption has the potential to negate such investments and will always be a crucial strategic issue. But the reality is that in the absence of such a development, opportunities for success will be limited to technical assistance to identify concealed consignments, the ability of individual officers to identify traffickers at 'pinch points' such as border crossing points or such information as can be forthcoming from informants or public. These options, whilst valuable and always part of the toolkit of the police officer, are not sufficient to tackle illicit commodity trafficking on the scale now encountered.

2.18 Viewing this project in this context, any team working against this or similar organised crime activity need to address four intelligence assets: sources of information, people, systems and knowledge. Whilst people, systems and knowledge were variously addressed, the issue of sources of information was not. This was a major oversight and constrained the MOBITS to fall back on a process where individual members, recruited their own informants from which operations eventually flowed. Of course informants play a crucial role in this work but without a broader intelligence construct which is used by managers to actively direct their officers to increasing the 'yield' from informants, the Commander is dependent upon the opportunities that his officers can bring to the team.

2.19 The solution lies in more careful project design which has better regard for the operability of the special resources it was aiming to construct. This project was distinguished by its imprecise use of terms:

- f* 'Enhance intelligence analysis/investigative capacity'
- f* 'Improve intelligence collection mechanism'
- f* 'Provide the coordinating agency with a comprehensive database to conduct more detailed analysis and profiling'
- f* 'Enhanced intelligence collection and analysis capacities on trans-national crime'
- 'Conduct highly specialised enforcement tasks in different operational, information and analytical aspects'

- ‘Adequate quantitative and qualitative information and knowledge within Kyrgyzstan on the extent of various types of crime’
- ‘Front-line operational data to be collected for analytical purposes’

2.20 There is a need for UNODC to lead on clarity of terms and understanding of process. The UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime starts this process and more recently the draft concept note on *‘Criminal Intelligence and Special Investigation Techniques’*<sup>8</sup> is an important step in that direction. A team such as MOBITs can be asked to do the full service of proactivity from start to finish or can fit in to a particular part of the process to deliver particular skills. In this respect, their training in Special Investigation Techniques<sup>9</sup>, courtesy of the bi-lateral support made them ideal for intelligence development and pursuing the interdiction but not the initial identification of geographic or human intelligence targets. In the latter situation they needed to fit within a broader framework of proactivity or – as is rather implied but not developed – undertake that broader activity themselves. This issue of clarity is particular relevant in projects where the analysis of information or the collection of intelligence is an integral part.

#### 2.21 **Operability**

The evaluation interviews showed that the concept was built around a headquarters base in Osh with forward facilities at Batken, Aidarken and Alay, mobile teams of four officers who will use informants (agents) to develop intelligence to identify suitable targets for interdiction. Support staff and investigators for case building were to be located at the Osh headquarters. Countries attempting drug trafficking interdiction at borders have limited choices. They can interdict at recognised border points using technical assistance, intelligence or individual personal skills to discover concealed consignments. They can also endeavour to maintain 100% monitoring of the border perimeter or use intelligence to identify the use of illicit crossing points. The project document is not clear on the intended focus of the deployments of MOBITS just stating that they would be mobile and operate in the border region. Yet 100% physical or technical monitoring of the border is impossible because of the terrain. It follows that information was therefore the only viable base for MOBITs operations.

2.22 The project document is limited in its justification of the ‘concept’ of MOBITS. It is clear that mobility, a high level of integrity and trust, integration (in the sense of multi-agency construction) and effectiveness and efficiency were driving factors and these were clearly

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<sup>8</sup> Currently understood to be in draft by members of the Organised Crime and Illicit Trafficking Branch

<sup>9</sup> See Article 20, UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime

sound ideas. However, for the reasons explained in paragraphs 2.18 to 2.19, the ability to deliver significantly enhanced results was compromised

### 2.23 ***Ensure the integrity and sustainability of the teams***

Significant effort was put into the project by the donors and project office to work on this part of the first objective. Unfortunately there was no monitoring of corruption during the life of the project, nor is there any available separate assessment on corruption within the Drug Control Agency or MOBITS. The Project Work Plan envisaged an 'International Enforcement Consultant' as part of the monitoring of integrity but the work plan describes the role as 'observing, monitoring and mentoring' the teams.

2.24 At the heart of the thinking on integrity within this project was the concept that a mixture of staff from different parent organisations, special vetting and polygraphing would insure the best selection of staff and that the subsequent constant monitoring by the Internal Affairs Officer<sup>10</sup> (also the MOBITS personnel officer) would meet the need for integrity. It is a matter of record that vetting and polygraphing took place, that not all candidates were successful and that an Internal Affairs Officer with appropriate powers existed during the lifetime of the Drug Control Agency. What does not exist is any data that contributes to an assessment as to whether these expensive processes were successful.

2.25 This lack of data is a Project Design failure. This is an issue which affects many countries and any information which contributes to understanding on the subject would have been valuable. As it stands, there is no data to support either a continuation or cessation of these expensive processes. On balance, the processes probably should continue as there is little alternative, and, as recorded elsewhere in this evaluation, there is a view that the process may have a useful preventative or deterrent effect. However, it is essential that future projects attempting to address this vital issue must construct, and have agreed, processes for monitoring this aspect of the objectives. The difficulty of achieving such monitoring in practice is acknowledged but it is of such importance that it cannot be left to casual overview. The theoretical side of this process is also difficult. There is little research to provide guidance of what monitoring might be useful and how results are interpreted. I take the view that this is essential work for the UNODC backed International Anti-Corruption Academy to pursue.

2.26 The multi-agency composition of the MOBIT teams appears to be argued in the Project Document on the basis of three points: first that it would address corruption, second,

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<sup>10</sup> Within the Drug Control Agency

organised crime, and third, it would address the poor coordination and competition between agencies. These important points are poorly explained in the Project Document. It is assumed that the contribution to anti-corruption was an internal measure because this was how interviewees perceived the point and there was no specific external anti-corruption role described. So, some notion existed that staff from mixed host agencies provided a natural policing effect within the teams. The contribution to tackling organised crime is assumed to be the notion of 'better targeting'. In other words working towards a higher level of targets for larger seizures and disruptions of organised crime groups. However, as discussed elsewhere, steps to improve the information that fed the teams did not happen. And as regards contributing to better coordination and a reduction of competition, there was no plan. This should have been an action for the National Interagency Working Group.

- 2.27 The multi-agency objectives were always going to be difficult but it may have been exacerbated by speedy recruitment. The 2007 Annual Project Assessment records that a number of officers did not have the necessary counter-narcotics knowledge and experience and apportion the cause of this to hasty recruitment to meet a training deadline. The reason for the deadline is not known; it may have been availability of staff, funds or other logistics. The comment rather implies a failure of the recruitment process but at this distance in time, we have no way of knowing what went on; did the desire for integrity starve the teams of knowledge and experience? Could more time have resulted in a different result? We simply cannot tell!
- 2.28 What can be said though is that the issue was not mentioned as a constraint or problem in 2008 even though poor performance of the teams was mentioned in the Annual Progress Report. It was also reported during the evaluation that the subject was again raised at the undocumented multi-agency wrap-up meeting in 2010 where it was said that officers from different agencies were not up to DCA standards of training and ability and agencies did not want to share information. Nevertheless, the SSDC is attempting to construct the new MOBIT teams on a similar interagency basis.
- 2.29 The point is that these issues were inevitable going to arise. It is to be hoped that the training provided bi-laterally would have helped but this was an area where additional project design and monitoring was required.

### **C. Achievements of the project outputs**

- 2.30 The harsh reality of the End of Project situation measured either against the project objectives or the expected outcomes listed in paragraph 1.6 is not good. As a consequence

of the restructuring of the national drug agencies, there are no current operational MOBIT teams. Enhanced intelligence and analysis capabilities do not exist, collaborative work by MOBITS within the country and with neighbouring states is not currently effective and quantitative and qualitative information and knowledge on the extent of crime is not available. That, however, is not the end of the matter.

- 2.31 I am of the view that some of these outputs – whilst entirely valid in the context of the national work against the trafficking of drugs – were very optimistic. For example ‘enhanced cooperation among Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies’ and ‘adequate quantitative and qualitative information and knowledge within Kyrgyzstan on the extent of various types of crime’ are very substantial objectives. Whilst MOBITS should contribute to these objectives and indeed provide a top level operational resource to work from the information so generated, these were really objectives more fitted to the project to develop the DCA. MOBITS as conceived and resourced jointly by the Government and the donor funds could do no more than contribute to these objectives.
- 2.32 It also must be acknowledged that four MOBIT teams did exist; that they had an inter-agency component, had been vetted in accordance with the project intentions and had started to work. There were two reasons given during the evaluation interviews for the abolition of the Drug Control Agency by the former Government; one that it was not delivering the results necessary, the other that it was getting too close to people in power. The evaluation process was not intended to examine this issue and therefore this report cannot make judgement. But in a sense that is immaterial because both explanations are important issues which the successor, the State Service on Drug Control, must keep within its sights.
- 2.33 The context of drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan is that it is said to be influencing Government. The importance of maintaining an independent agency is therefore crucial and it is encouraging to see that the SSDC has been set up on this basis reporting direct to the President. The other issue of vital importance to the SSDC is that it must deliver improvements. In this context it was encouraging to hear the members of the SSDC stating that a ‘new’ methodology – as distinct from traditional police methodology - was required so those improvements could be achieved. That ‘new’ methodology must be the development of an intelligence or information led approach with active management. Active meaning that a strategy for the development of information sources is created and senior officers bring that strategy to life by overseeing and directing progress on the development of sources of information. This is in contrast to the Police Methodology. The difference is

simple. In the reactive police methodology, sources are handled as they become available from time to time. In an information or intelligence led approach, senior officers have access to the 'quantitative and qualitative information and knowledge' and use it to direct officers to a variety of information sources in the crucial theatres of activity.

**D. Institutional and management arrangements and constraints**

- 2.34 The institutional and management arrangements in the project document appeared sound. It comprised a Project International Working Group (IWG) to bring together the project stakeholders, a National Interagency Working Group (NIWG) to bring together the various national partners, project coordination from the UNODC Regional Office in Tashkent via a Project Coordinator, support from the Regional Law Enforcement Advisor and the ability to call on additional policy and technical assistance from UNODC Vienna. These should have been sufficient for this project.
- 2.35 However, two major problems exist. Firstly the Project Coordinator's contract expired in 2008 and was not renewed; similarly project staff contracts were not renewed in 2009. The reason for this is unclear but it cannot have had other than a major impact on the progress of the project. Secondly, the documentation of the project was poor and some of the modalities were not executed. There was, for example, no review after 18 months (by which time the Project Coordinator's contract had expired).
- 2.36 Annual reports exist for each of the three years of the project. They are clear but rather brief documents which set out the achievements made towards the realization of the objectives and the main activities and achievements for the year under review. However, only three sets of minutes are available for the IWG and none at all for the NIWG. As mentioned above two Project Revision documents have been issued in 2010 to reflect the changes to the project consequent on the abolition of the DCA and then the creation of the SSDC. Overall this is not a sufficient record of progress for a project of this size or importance. That said, two of the identified problems within the project (the impact of the abolition of the DCA and the failure to invest in building an intelligence infrastructure) would not have been addressed through these mediums. The latter issue of poor performance was identified but diagnosed as the failure of individuals rather than a project concept or management failure. The absence of a Project Coordinator may have been a contributory factor.

### **III. OUTCOMES, IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY**

#### **A. Outcomes**

- 3.1 The outcome of the project is necessarily impacted by the abolition of the DCA and the creation of the SSDC. Nevertheless it is possible to make some judgements based upon the arrangements that existed before the abolition of the DCA and the plans that now exist under the SSDC. It is important that the SSDC is committed to recreating the MOBIT teams and using the resources provided by the donors.
- 3.2 The work under the DCA demonstrated that it was possible to create inter-agency teams and get agreement from partners for work within the border area. This latter commitment is being continued as a memorandum of agreement was signed between the new Commander of the MOBITs and the Head of the Border Guards in Batken during the evaluation mission. Comparing this with the situation prior to the project, this is progress. The new MOBITs Commander is currently building new teams and has immediate plans for 5 groups comprising 20 officers with another 16 officers providing management, support and investigative roles. The intention thereafter is to recruit a further 10 officers to form more groups. The new SSDC structure comprises three separate commands under a headquarters function; the South Department, the East department and MOBITs. Whilst the role of the South Department is to carry out activities countering illicit drug trafficking in the southern part of the country, the MOBITs are defined as carrying out activities in the southern border area and interacting with border and customs services.
- 3.3 By the end of November, 2010, staffing levels of MOBITS were at 33% of the establishment. The SSDC has maintained the project vetting criteria and is aiming at a multi-agency composition of 24 former Drug Control Agency staff, and 4 from each of the Ministry of Interior, Border Service and State Customs Service. The Commander confirmed that their primary source of information will be informants supplemented with information flowing from partner agencies. This is likely to replicate the problem faced by MOBITs during their existence within the DCA. Although the other agencies have said that they can and will pass on information to the MOBITs, they also have said that they see competition as a healthy form of encouragement and consequently the situation is unlikely to change from the DCA era.
- 3.4 Senior local officers of the partner agencies confirmed their support for the MOBITs concept although it was clear that some in the Chief Department on Counter Narcotics of the Ministry of Interior thought that MOBITs should be still within their command. It is also

clear that there is a view held by some that MOBITs should be within the South Department of the SSDC as part of their standard resources although it should be made clear that the Head of South Department is fully supportive of the separate command decision. He is already working with his counterpart to establish working protocols and practices.

- 3.5 There is a process in action to 'recover' the remaining MOBIT resources from the Ministry of Interior. Given the scarcity of resources available, the reluctance to complete this speedily is easy to understand but it is absolutely essential. The building stock is available and the Headquarters building in use. The remote strongholds in Alay and Aydarken were not visited during the evaluation mission but it was good to see that the Commander MOBITs had come to an agreement to share part of the Batken premises<sup>11</sup> with the local Commander of the Border Services. Relationships there appeared cordial, professional and collaborative.

## **B. Impact**

- 3.6 In terms of head line performance, MOBITs did not deliver significant interdiction results during the time of their existence under the DCA. This was recognised during the mid year review in 2008 and whilst subsequent performance against Hashish improved, improvements in relation to Heroin and Opium – the main drivers of this project – was marginal during 2009. It must be acknowledged though that performance in the first seven months of 2010 was better against heroin.
- 3.7 This problem of performance is likely to return with the re-constructed teams since they are intending to follow the same operational methodology. This is an area that will need attention.
- 3.8 Since no comprehensive intelligence database was constructed during the DCA years for whatever reason, it follows that there has been no impact in respect to the anticipated end of project outcome of adequate quantitative and qualitative information and knowledge within Kyrgyzstan, nor the more specific output of enhanced intelligence analysis by the MOBITs.
- 3.9 The valuable training provided bi-laterally by CentCom in special investigation techniques has unfortunately been dissipated by the abolition of the Drug Control Agency. Whilst some previously trained staff may be re-selected, we may generally regard this valuable investment as having been lost.

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<sup>11</sup> Within the Border Service compound at Batken

### C. Sustainability

3.10 There is a precarious sustainability regarding the concept of MOBITs. There is support within the Presidential Administration, the SSDC, Ministry of Interior, Border Service and State Customs Service for the continuation of the concept as a specially selected, well trained mobile integrated team. However, there are some significant risks.

#### 3.11 **Vetting**

The vetting procedure is of necessity slow, expensive and can disappoint. Slowness is unfortunately inevitable as a mistake will be fatal to the integrity of the teams. The concept only works whilst there is joint inter-agency support and that will invariably depend upon trust. It is vital that the vetting process, however, slow and involved is maintained. The expense comes with the polygraph examination. Trained polygraph examiners are scarce and again the process is time consuming. There is only one available polygraph examiner at present and during the evaluation mission he was on leave. There is an urgent need for extra polygraph examiner skills on a short term basis if the current policy is to be maintained so the teams can be rebuilt as quickly as possible. Medium and long term, the SSDC requires sufficient resources to be able to maintain staffing levels due to loss by natural wastage and to contribute to the constant monitoring process. The disappointment comes when candidates fail the polygraph process. Candidates only reach the polygraph stage once through a pre-check and with endorsement by senior officers. Naturally failure of candidates will carry with it the potential for an unfair pejorative view on the judgment of those senior officers making the endorsements.

3.12 These three issues will bring pressure on the policy. The first and third issues are inevitable but the availability of polygraph examiners is a matter of resource provision. That resource provision was complicated and points again to the problem of the design of this project and its relationship with other projects and bi-lateral support.

3.13 The polygrapher was never employed under this project. The design of this project assumed use of the polygraph originally employed under the DCA project<sup>12</sup> without any responsibility for the costs of the activity. The polygrapher was then later issued with a UNODC staff contract; in effect the polygrapher stopped working for the DCA and was employed by UNODC to conduct examinations of DCA staff, but with a salary paid under DCA project funding. Likewise, polygraphing equipment that should have been handed over to the

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<sup>12</sup> KYR64

beneficiary at the end of the DCA project in 2009 was inexplicably retained and used by UNODC.

3.14 The polygraph facilities were the result of a contribution in kind from the USA to the DCA. They were not envisaged in the original G64 project document, but references to polygraph facilities appear retrospectively in the G64 project revision of 2007. There is, therefore, a further question mark as to how a major change in G64 project implementation (i.e. the polygraph unit) could be established before a project revision had been submitted and approved. The issue of polygraph support both for the SSDC and MOBITS must be addressed if sustainability is to be maintained.

3.15 ***Bonuses***

The payment of bonuses to MOBIT staff has always been a crucial part of the argument within the project to achieve or contribute to the achievement of improved integrity. The project was quite right to place a focus on the creation of a special team in whom greater trust could be placed but with the end of the project, funds from the donor to pay these bonuses (and modest living allowances) will cease. The intention of project to create sustainability by funding this extra cost from the seizure of trafficker's assets was at best optimistic and probably unrealistic. Experience in other countries has demonstrated that the tracing and seizure of significant assets is both slow and very difficult. No support for the extra costs is likely to come from this avenue for the foreseeable future and accordingly this is a grave risk to sustainability.

3.16 ***Sources of Information***

The lack of development of the intelligence and analysis infrastructure is also a potential risk. The MOBITs concept is limited by its sources of information and this is reflected in the past performance. It is unlikely that the current Commander can significantly improve results without better access to intelligence. This is not an issue of his energy or industriousness; it is just a simple argument that 20 officers left to their own skills to recruit informants in the remote and difficult region that is the Osh Oblasty are unlikely to make the serious inroads into the country's drug trafficking problems that the project anticipated. This is, however, an issue that can be tackled. The project was right to identify the development of intelligence and analysis as a major requirement but it is unfortunate that no significant progress has been made on this issue.

### 3.17 **Inter-Agency**

The final risk to sustainability comes from the inter-agency nature of the counter narcotics business. There are seven agencies or sub sections who may contribute to counter narcotics work; the State Customs Service, the National Security Service, the Border Service, the Ministry of Interior Police, the Chief Department on counter narcotics of the Ministry of the Interior, the State Service on Drug Control and the MOBIT teams. The Border Service and State Customs Service in Osh were clear that they saw the SSDC as the lead national agency on counter narcotics work and that they had no problem in passing on information and intelligence to the SSDC and the MOBITs in particular. However, it was also said there and elsewhere that MOBITs would benefit from the rivalry of the different departments as this would serve to sharpen their resolve to be the best.

- 3.18 Whilst such rivalry would be fine if other departments were maintaining a challenge by operating in their own discrete operational territory. However, if they were to start their own successful intelligence developments and operations, then a large part of the justification for MOBITs would fall away. This demonstrates the importance of good intelligence sources to the MOBIT teams. Of course it is possible to argue that such intelligence developments would fail in other agencies because of the threat of corruption but that just simply loses the opportunity for the country and starves MOBITs of work they could and should be doing. The reality is that the areas of operation of each agency and the protocols regulating the sharing of information must be resolved.

## **IV. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES**

### **A1. Lessons learned – Operational Issues**

- 4.1 The crucial lesson learned in this project is that the construction of special operational resources however well vetted and trained is not sufficient to impact difficult criminal activities such as drug trafficking. Some regard must be made to the sources of information which enable them to put those valuable skills and special trust status to good use. It was not as though there was evidence of a pool of information sitting unused because there was nobody either competent or trustworthy enough to deal with it. The Osh Oblasty is not an area that can be comprehensively monitored, certainly by a team of 20 officers and there are already resources in the form of the Border Service and Customs Service operating at formal border crossing points. Energy has gone into technical skills development and whilst that is also essential, it ignores the issue of how to find out where to put those skills to use.

- 4.2 This issue arises because the project failed to appreciate the changing nature of police methodology in relation to illicit commodity trafficking. In standard police reactive methodology, police are either called to a crime scene or use their knowledge of local crime to place patrols, static guards or conduct routine checks on people and vehicle. Drug trafficking is of course a total clandestine activity. The greatest value is acquired by crossing borders and consequently traffickers will plan routes, concealment methods and times meticulously so as to be unobserved by police and public alike.
- 4.3 It is probably accurate to say that no one country has discovered the solution but it is also right to say that the development of information-led proactivity is the method favoured by most. Now, proactivity is being used in Kyrgyzstan; there is evidence of successful controlled deliveries but if this is to make major impact on the drug trafficking problem, greater access to originating information has to be achieved.
- 4.4 An information-led approach is needed as a service for Directors and Commanders as well as operation teams. Operational teams must still seek out intelligence sources but this is a directed activity as well as one of the personal ingenuity of individual officers; directed in the sense that such activity by individual officers is steered into areas identified by analysis as having the greatest potential
- 4.5 Such an approach does not work on a dossier based system where intelligence is kept piecemeal in the safes of individual Commanders. The aggregation of data enables each country to build up piece by piece, a picture of the criminal business operating within its territory. There will be many gaps in knowledge but also the collective picture will be informative and provide Commanders with the opportunity to direct their officers into useful areas for the collection of data or new sources of information.
- 4.6 The vulnerability of such an infrastructure is one of corruption. It follows that there is nothing more useful to a trafficker than to know whether he has fallen under suspicion. But the choices are limited; avoid the information infrastructure because of the risk of corruption and law enforcement resources are constrained to existing local sources of information. It follows that the development of an information infrastructure must always be accompanied with a counter corruption strategy.

## **A2. Lessons learned – Project Management Issues**

- 4.7 With hindsight an opportunity was missed to develop the additional role of the NIWG to work on the issues of inter-agency cooperation, and the information and intelligence goals of the project. The project report does not specify the role of the NIWG although it is

defined in Annex 8. Otherwise the NIWG just gets a cursory mention under Risks and Assumptions in paragraph 5. If the NIWG had been seen as it should have been as part of the implementation modalities, this opportunity might have been recognised.

- 4.8 The opportunity for project performance indicators to aid progress of the complex issues of the project was not fully utilised. The Workplan Milestones set out in Annex II of the Project Document are more binary milestones rather than qualitative or quantitative. Binary measure are important but on their own insufficient. It is appreciated that these are difficult areas to measure but qualitative and quantitative indicators measuring the important components of activity (rather than the ultimate results of seizures) would have indicated whether progress was being made into the more difficult areas of, for example, enhanced intelligence collection. This is an important issue for any project supporting the development of the State Service on Drug Control.
- 4.9 The nature of reporting within the Project was poor. The Annual Progress Reports are sparse and Project Revisions should have been made when project staff left<sup>13</sup>. There is no evidence of project linkage by the Project Coordinator and as a consequence most of the complex information and multi-agency issues were not progressed. The planning of the integration between projects that pre-existed and had relevance to this project was limited to a responsibility placed upon the Project Coordinator. This was insufficient and led to missed opportunities. Similar the consideration of bi-lateral funding support at the time of project design (if possible) would have enabled the better integration of activities.

## **V. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. Issues resolved during the evaluation**

- 5.1 Given the process of reconstruction in progress at the time of the evaluation mission, there were no issues resolved during the evaluation.

### **B. Actions recommended**

- 5.2 The SSDC has committed to rebuilding the MOBIT teams and intends deploying them in the same manner as under the Drug Control Agency. The fact that the State Service on Drug Control has been created and the responsibility taken away from the Chief Department on counter narcotics of the Ministry of the Interior does demonstrate a serious commitment to the drug trafficking problem. The issues raised concerning sustainability therefore need to

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<sup>13</sup> Accepting that there was no one to write the Revisions!

be resolved. However, these issues cannot be resolved in isolation and must form part of the development of the new SSDC.

- 5.3 **Issue 1 –The Future Role of MOBITS.** This evaluation supports the concept of a specially vetted inter agency team. The risk of corruption is high and whilst there is a sound argument for the whole of the SSDC to be the subject of such special vetting, it is clear that the resources to permit that, certainly in the short term, do not exist. In that situation there is value in a highly trusted team being available to the Chairperson for the most sensitive and beneficial operations. The management culture within the SSDC ought to be that all senior officers see such a team as an essential resource for achieving success for the Service as a whole.
- 5.4 Although this evaluation is supportive of the concept of the special team, the issue of their operational deployment is less clear. The need for competent resources in the southern part of the country is not in dispute and there is a need for the SSDC to be able to act with authority in the border region. Whether, given the problem over sources of information, that is the best use for the MOBITs is another matter. There appears to be only three choices for their operational deployment: interdiction – in the sense of using the teams to stop people and vehicles at legitimate border crossing points to discover hidden consignments, proactivity in the sense of working from intelligence to be at the right place at the right time to seize a consignment or a broader role in longer term intelligence development using all available sources in order to dismantle Kyrgyzstan based organised criminality. The first option for interdiction is currently a matter for the Customs and Border Services and should remain but the SSDC need the information that can be gathered from this activity and routine border crossing monitoring. The other two choices need further consideration.
- 5.5 **Issue 2 – Developing intelligence and analysis.** If the SSDC is to develop an information infrastructure which fits them to make the kind of impact on the business of drug trafficking that is required, then, given the problem with resourcing special clearance of staff, it may well be prudent to consider a different role for MOBITs directed to the more sensitive areas of intelligence analysis and development. If on the other hand, the SSDC decides that for whatever reason it will not or cannot make that move into a more sophisticated intelligence culture at this time, then the recommendation would be to persist with the role as foreseen by this project but with the proviso and supplementary recommendation that support is given to the managers of the team to broaden their ability to work from new sources of intelligence.

- 5.6 Indeed there is a potential compromise given the need for broader sources of information from which the MOBITs can operate, the need for extra operational resources in the Osh Oblasty and the need for the development of an intelligence infrastructure within the broader SSDC Command. That compromise would be to maintain the current operational focus of the MOBITS but use the secure command building and a limited number of extra officers, suitably selected, vetted and trained to form an experimental intelligence cell. With appropriate support this could enable the Chairperson to examine the feasibility and nature of a broader intelligence infrastructure within the SSDC whilst maintaining the thrust of this project. It is accepted that such a compromise proposal has resource implications in respect of training, some limited IT equipment and applications and security.
- 5.7 **Issue 3 – The Vetting and Bonus Process.** In the short term, it is difficult to see how MOBITs can be successfully reconstructed without continuing short term support from the donors or UNODC for the polygraph. The alternative is a compromise of the vetting plan which would be unwelcome by the senior officers of the SSDC and in the view of this evaluation, present the Commander of the MOBITs with an unworkable separation of responsibilities between his officers. As a consequence urgent consideration of how continued support for the vetting process can be provided is recommended.
- 5.8 The bonus and allowance payment issue is equally pressing. The optimistic view in the project document that MOBITs could become self sufficient for funding as a result of asset seizure after 3 years has produced a dilemma. The donor cannot be expected to continue funding for an indeterminate period, yet without the funding one part of the construct for promoting integrity falls. Since it appears there is no likelihood of the Government being able to fund the payments in the short term, this issue has the potential to bring rapid failure. The SSDC is a very new organisation facing a substantial task of work. It has to build personnel and systems rapidly and as discussed above there are some substantial issues of methodology to resolve. In that context, the organisation needs time to determine its future course and in the meantime it would be unfortunate if the cultural progress and energy made by this project were to evaporate. In a sense the argument is that in order to retain some value from the funding already provided by the donor, a continuation of that support for a further finite period would be beneficial until the role of MOBITS is established.
- 5.9 The problems of corruption in relation to drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan are by no means unique. Indeed there is probably no country immune from the problem. The long term difficulty here is two-fold: firstly resourcing (in terms of skills and finance) a vetting process which is inclusive of at least three components – pre-checks, polygraph and interview and

secondly resourcing a perpetual overview of integrity. Each of these processes has their problems. Pre-checks can only be made against records and information that is available, opinions about polygraphs differ and it needs at least a trained skilled operator and final interviews are frequently subjective rather than objective.

- 5.10 This evaluation cannot clarify opinions about the polygraph. The view of psychologists is that “no physiological response unique to lying has ever been discovered”<sup>14</sup> and according to physiological measures that are used to detect deception can be affected by a number of factors, only one of which relates to lying itself. This means that the polygraph examiner has an important and highly skilled role. Errors in the process can exclude potentially sound candidates as well as passing potentially unsound candidates. There is no way of identifying those errors.
- 5.11 Perhaps the value of the polygraph within this project lies as much with the deterrent effect as its ability to discern potential weaknesses in individuals. This may well cause unsuitable applicants to think again before applying. However, the polygraph process is valued by the senior officers of the SSDC and in the absence of other processes should probably continue. However, since the whole issue of securing trustworthy staff and continuing to maintain integrity in a cost effective means in perpetuity is now of interest to many countries, I recommend that the UNODC supported International Anti-Corruption Academy in Vienna should be asked to use the SSDC as a Case Study for long term recommendations and to contribute guidance on processes for monitoring integrity measures in future projects such as this.
- 5.12 ***Issue 4 –The contributions of different agencies to the countering of drug trafficking.***  
Reference has already been made in paragraph 3.14 to the number of agencies who will play some role in counter narcotics work in Kyrgyzstan. The evaluation identified that there is no clarity around the roles of the different agencies. For example, officers of the Chief Department on counter narcotics of the Ministry of Interior talked of conducting exactly the same operations as the SSDC geographic commands using informants and undercover officers. The evaluation was not in a position to identify whether this was a description of a current reality or an ambition but a number of officers spoke of the necessity for rivalry whilst at the same time agreeing that the SSDC was the lead agency for the country.
- 5.13 It is clear that the SSDC cannot do all the work necessary within Kyrgyzstan and, indeed, valuable work by other agencies ought not to be restricted. However, as the SSDC emerges as an effective body, it will need to ensure that its long term operations against the top level

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<sup>14</sup> Gudjonsson, Gisli, *The psychology of interrogations, confessions and testimony*, Wiley & Sons, Chichester and New York

targets are not compromised by well intended actions of other agencies, that specific areas of responsibility are delineated to each agency<sup>15</sup>, that information held by other agencies which contributes to the overall picture of drug related criminality is submitted to the SSDC and that protocols exist to enable the SSDC to have the opportunity to engage, post arrest, in other agencies operations for the potential future intelligence benefit.

5.14 Whilst this is an area of work more directly related to the SSDC as a whole, it is relevant to this project because of the need for MOBITs to get access to and work from the best available information. This is a challenging development and gets right into one of the unattained and undeveloped aspects of this project namely ‘enhanced cooperation among Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies’.

5.15 **Issue 5 – Improvements in Project Design and Execution.** At the heart of failings in this Project is the thinking at the design stage; next the manner of project implementation and performance monitoring. The aspirations appear sound but the analysis of how those aspirations were to be achieved – if done – did not translate into the Plan. Too much reliance was placed upon training and natural management in the existing style to deliver results in a complex environment. The project also needed to be closer to the existing projects on Criminal Intelligence Systems<sup>16</sup> and the Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency<sup>17</sup> and possibly others. That close relationship was foreseen<sup>18</sup> but evidence of it in practice is absent.

5.16 A view was raised that treating this project as a separate project was a further design failure and that this would have been better added to the existing DCA project. The point has significant merit. By being a separate project, its use of shared resources was made more complex and major issues perhaps better suited to the larger project were not pursued, a point exacerbated by the failure to use the NIWG imaginatively as part of the project to address all multi-agency issues. However, we must have regard for the context at the time of the initiation of this project; would such a development with the DCA project have been unacceptable to the multi-agency partners at that time? If this is the case, this separate project may well have made some progress since SSDC ‘ownership of inter-agency MOBITS is certainly now accepted by local commanders of the Customs and Border Services.

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<sup>15</sup> This already exists with regard to the Customs and Border services but the role of the MoI resources – which for example, could be targeted towards local drug dealing – certainly needs resolving

<sup>16</sup> AD/RER/F23

<sup>17</sup> KYR64

<sup>18</sup> Paragraph 4.4 of the Project Document

- 5.17 An objective, disciplined and better recorded approach to project coordination would have benefited this project. Seen against the larger DCA project<sup>19</sup>, this project appears small and easily achieved. And indeed in the context of the construction of a limited number of teams, appropriately trained and resourced, there is relative simplicity. However, to achieve the objective of an improvement in national interdiction results was not just the provision of such teams. It required fundamental improvements to sources of information and operability. The absence of the planned 18<sup>th</sup> month review was crucial here. That should have identified the failure to make progress on the main objective and subsequent analysis, perhaps with outside expertise might have assisted.
- 5.18 Performance data for such a complex project was shallow (see Annex D). There was no data upon which to monitor the outcomes of the initiatives to ensure integrity. Performance indicators planned were largely binary but additional data that measured quantitative and qualitative aspects of the project should have been included.

## **VI. CONCLUSIONS**

- 6.1 The intention of this project to provide special resources to tackle drug trafficking in the southern border region was well founded. It does, however, in hindsight suffer from over ambition. Its major failure was to assume that the need for trusted mobile trained and equipped resources was sufficient to deliver a significant impact on drug trafficking in the region.
- 6.2 There is no doubt that the resources as defined are badly needed in the region and in that respect the project but for the decision of the former President would have delivered at least five fully functioning MOBIT teams by the time of the end of the project. However, the performance tables up until the time of the abolition of the Drug Control Agency demonstrate the need for the sources of information from which the teams would operate to have had greater thought. As the teams are being rebuilt there is a pressing need to address this issue, and, as the Chairperson of the State Service on Drug Control has made plain his desire to find a new methodology in order to advance and deliver a greater impact on drug trafficking, the moment may be right for the provision of assistance to identify what that new methodology is.
- 6.3 The development of a new methodology will take time and in the meantime, the MOBIT resources are an important tool with the potential to be used in a variety of ways to help pilot and develop this new methodology.

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<sup>19</sup> KYR64

6.4 The political changes that impacted on this project could not have been foreseen and consequently the project has ended effectively with major components of the project being restarted. Yet for no fault of the project or the new host agency, the funding and project support has expired. At the very least, the SSDC needs breathing space to complete its initial process of construction. If the investment made so far by the project is not to be lost, a finite further period of support from either or both of the donor and UNODC is essential.

## ANNEX A

### Terms of Reference

<b>Title:</b>	Independent Evaluator (Consultancy)
<b>Organizational Section/Unit:</b>	UNODC Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan
<b>Duty Station:</b>	Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
<b>Proposed period:</b>	December 2010
<b>Actual work time:</b>	20 working days

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#### 1. Background of the assignment:

Kyrgyzstan is being increasingly affected by the trade in narcotics carried out by organized crime groups. Traffickers are deploying more vigilant, effective and aggressive methods in their operations and there are indications that drug trafficking through and into Kyrgyzstan is fuelling extremism and other criminal activities. In addition, related organized crime and corruption are adding to the political-socio-economic problems of the country.

The southern border provinces of Osh and Batken have continued to experience a high flow of drugs. For a number of years, there has been a well-established trafficking route from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province in Tajikistan along the Pamir highway and the town of Murghab into Osh province. In the last few years, trafficking activities have continued to remain high on the long and mountainous border between the Tajik Garm region and Batken in Kyrgyzstan. Smuggling through the Kyrgyz Republic carries drugs mainly to the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley, and across the Northern border into Kazakhstan. Through trafficking drugs into Kyrgyzstan and onwards, traffickers can achieve high profits. Depending on its purity, a kilogram of heroin costs US\$ 4,000-6,000 in the Southern Batken and Osh provinces bordering Tajikistan, but US\$ 7,000-10,000 in Bishkek and the Northern provinces.

To process opium into more refined and profitable products such as morphine base and heroin, traffickers require thousands of metric tons of various industrial precursor chemicals which need to be imported. Historic seizure evidence shows that attempts were made to smuggle acetic anhydride into Afghanistan from various locations including Pakistan, India, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Turkey and some Central Asian states.

Mobile law enforcement is currently recognized as one of the most efficient ways to combat organized and trans-national crime and mobility in law enforcement operations through the establishment of joint interagency mobile interdiction teams (MOBITs) is an accepted strategic objective of Kyrgyzstan. The project is aimed at establishing Mobile Interdiction Teams (MOBITs) to

be deployed throughout the country, which will be able to combat drug trafficking and organized crime as well as to collect and analyze criminal intelligence information. The project developed effective, intelligence-led mechanisms to fight illicit drug trafficking and other trans-national crime by providing for all aspects of technical assistance such as vehicles, equipment, intelligence awareness training at the front line, and multi-step training in criminal intelligence analysis at national and regional level. Mobile team members were selected from all agencies through a competitive, performance-based process and vetted by all-agency background checks and polygraph testing.

The UNODC project TD/KGZ/I75 started in January 2007 and was initially designed for a period of three years and three months until 31 March 2010. The project revision was made at the request of the sole donor and the project duration was extended for additional nine months until 31<sup>st</sup> December 2010 in order to facilitate bonus payments to MOBIT officers, continue support with integrity vetting and assist in the external final project evaluation. All original projects objectives remained unchanged. The total approved budget is USD 1, 299 919.

The immediate objectives of the project were the following:

Objective 1: To improve national interdiction results and investigative capacity.

Objective 2: To ensure integrity and sustainability of Interagency Mobile Interdiction Teams (MOBITs).

During the implementation of the project these objectives have been mostly achieved with Drug Control Agency being recognized as a leading national agency in countering drug trafficking in the country. However, in October 2009, the Drug Control Agency (the MOBIT parent agency) was abolished by presidential edict. A letter received at that time from the donor instructed UNODC to suspend all activities under the project until the situation stabilized. Although DCA functions were subsumed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in October 2009, national plans for MOBITS were not confirmed until March 2010 when MOBIT officers were reassigned to the Department for Countering Drug Trafficking of the MoI. Moreover, subsequent political unrest in April 2010 forced the President and administration to resign. And in June 2010 systematic inter-ethnic violence in the south of the country has caused further instability and concern. MOBIT officers as Ministry of Interior resources were deployed to deal with that situation. The Chief Department for Countering Drug Trafficking of the MoI replaced the Drug Control Agency as the national counterpart from March 2010 to September 2010. However, a State Service of Drug Control has been established by President Decree as of 17 August 2010 as a coordinating body on counter drug trafficking and replaced MoI as a national counterpart. All abovementioned circumstances impact on project implementation, and resulted in partial delivery of some of the planned activities.

The terminal evaluation of the projects will be carried out by an independent evaluator appointed by the UNODC. Costs associated with the evaluation will be borne by the project. The evaluator will act independently in his/her individual capacity in order to adhere to the independence and impartiality of the evaluation process discussed in the UNODC guiding principle for evaluation at all times of the evaluation. The evaluator therefore must not have been involved in the development, implementation or monitoring of the project before, neither will he/she be rendering any service to UNODC in the near future to avoid conflicts of interest.

## **2. Purpose of the assignment:**

In compliance with the project document, the external terminal evaluation is initiated by UNODC to

assess the impact of the assistance provided in relation to the objectives and the outputs set out in the project document. The evaluation findings should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system to support a results-based management of the project. The evaluation should provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project. These will then be incorporated in the designing and implementation process of similar projects.

The Evaluation will further be supported by the UNODC Evaluation Functions in regards to the provision of guidelines, formats, assistance, advice and clearance on evaluation procedures and quality control of evaluation outputs.

A **Core Learning Partnership (CLP)** is proposed to encourage a participatory evaluation process. Members of the CLP shall be the International Narcotics Law enforcement unit of US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan, State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic, BOMCA/CADAP project. The CLP will be briefed on key findings of the evaluation and can provide comments, as appropriate.

### 3. Specific tasks to be performed by the independent evaluator:

The terminal evaluation will be a project life span evaluation and consequently cover the time period from the starting date of the project's implementation (January 2007) up to the end of the project (December 2010). The geographical coverage of the evaluation consists of field visits to UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, UNODC Programme Office in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, MOBITs premises in Osh, Kyrgyzstan as well as MOBITs check points in Batken, Aidarken and Alay provinces of Osh province, Kyrgyzstan.

In particular, the specific areas addressed by the following evaluation questions should be covered by the terminal evaluation:

#### (1) Relevance

- f* Were the objectives of the project in line with defined needs and priorities?
- f* Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs and priorities? Why?
- f* Have the needs of project beneficiaries been met by the project? If not, why not?

#### (2) Effectiveness

- f* To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?
- f* To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?
- f* Were the project activities adequate to realize the objectives?

#### (3) Efficiency

- f* How well inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) are converted into outputs?

#### (4) Sustainability

- f To what extent has the project established processes and systems that make it likely that the capacity building in the MOBITs will continue after the project ends?
- f Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
- f Are the project outcomes likely to be sustainable? If not, why not? Which remedial actions would have been good to take?

(5) Impact

- f To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address and on the targeted beneficiaries?
- f To what extent the project has caused and is likely to cause changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on society?
- f Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Please provide examples?

(6) Project design and performance assessment

- f Was the project design appropriate? If not, why not?
- f Was the project managed efficiently?
- f Were risks appropriately identified by the project? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks?

(7) Partnership

- f What was the role played by the implementing agency in leveraging resources, internal or external and expanding partnerships with other actors to support and expand this project?

(8) Lessons learned and best practices

- f What are the best practices (if any) documented during the project implementation?
- f What specific lessons (if any) can UNODC draw from the project experiences for future directions especially keeping in mind UNODC possible further support to the development of the State Service on Drug Control?

**4. Expected tangible and measurable output(s):**

The evaluator will develop and propose a thorough evaluation methodology prior to undertaking the field mission that will include:

1. The study of relevant project documents and project progress reports, including reports produced by outside experts etc in a thorough desk review
2. An initial briefing by responsible UNODC staff in Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and in Programme Office in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;
3. Interviews with the re-established State Service on Drug Control as parent agency, Ministry of Interior, Border Guards, Customs and other law enforcement bodies as well international community actors such as US Embassy, BOMCA/CADAP project representatives and others working in the field of combating drug trafficking, and, where it is necessary and required;
4. Interviews with the MOBITs staff members as recipients of the technical assistance, especially those who have received training, and who use standard operational procedures.
5. An assessment of the Governments achievements in terms of investigative and operational

capacities through focused interviews and analysis of data and drugs and precursors trafficking trends.

All evaluation findings need to be at least cross checked and at best triangulated through various sources and methods in order to ensure their credibility and reliability.

While conducting the evaluation, the evaluator will be guided by relevant international standards, such as “Guiding principles for evaluation at UNODC”, “Standards of evaluation in the UN system”, and “Norms for evaluations in the UN system”.

Upon completion of the fact-finding and analysis phase, the evaluator will prepare a draft evaluation report. The draft will then be circulated among the CLP and IEU for comments. The evaluator will take into account these comments when writing the final evaluation report where feasible but without at the same time giving up the independence and impartiality of the evaluation and its findings. For the Final Evaluation Report, he/she will be solely responsible.

Further Roles and Responsibilities:

While the management and project staff of UNODC Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan is also part of the Core Learning Partners, their role is also to manage the process and logistics of the evaluation. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of UNODC in Vienna will backstop this evaluation and endorse the selection of the consultant as well as the evaluation methodology proposed by the hired evaluation consultant. IEU will also comment on the draft and final evaluation report.

**5. Dates and details as to how the work must be delivered:**

The evaluator will be briefed and debriefed on the project by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and Programme Office in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The latter will also provide necessary substantive and administrative support.

Although the evaluator should be free to discuss all matters relevant to his/her assignment with the authorities concerned, the incumbent is not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of UNODC or the Government.

The evaluator will submit a draft evaluation report to UNODC Headquarters – the Independent Evaluation Unit, to ROCA, as well as to all “Core Learning Partners”. The report will contain the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluator as well as a recording of the lessons learned during projects implementation. Further, the evaluator will follow the instructions provided by the Evaluation Handbook of UNDOC regarding the content, structure and annexes of evaluation reports.

The evaluation expert, while considering the comments provided on the draft, would use its independent judgment in preparing the final report.

The final report should be submitted to UNODC no later than two weeks upon completion of the mission and should be no longer than 15 pages, excluding annexes and the executive summary. The report will be distributed to the CLP by UNODC as required to the governmental authorities.

The expected timetable of Evaluation Mission as follows:

#	Dates	Responsible Party	Tasks	Location	Total days
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1	10-11 December	Evaluator	Desk review of all related documentation	Home – based task	2
2	14 December	UNODC ROCA	Briefing meeting	Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan	1
3	13, 15, 16, 20 December	UNODC PO in Kyrgyzstan	Meetings with donor, stakeholders, project staff and project beneficiaries	Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan	4
4	17-19 December	UNODC PO in Kyrgyzstan	Field visits to the MOBITs premises in Osh, as well as MOBITs check points in Batken, Aidarken and Alay if necessary	Osh, Batken, Aidarken, Alay regions of Kyrgyzstan	3
5	22-26 December	Evaluator	Preparation of final evaluation report	Home-based task	5
6	27-31 December	UNODC PO in Kyrgyzstan	Follow up on comments / feedback from IEU and CLP and other stakeholders		5
	<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>20</b>

**6. Indicators to evaluate the consultant's performance:**

- Timely provision of debriefing of Evaluation Findings in Kyrgyzstan
- Timely submission of draft Evaluation Report
- Timely submission of final Evaluation Report

**7. Qualifications/expertise sought (required educational background, years of relevant work experience, other special skills or knowledge required):**

The Evaluator should have the following qualifications:

A minimum first-level university degree and a minimum of 10 years of relevant work experience in, or in lieu of a first-level university degree. Further, a minimum of 10 years of professional experience in at least one of the following areas:

- Developing evaluation methodologies and carrying out evaluations, including the drafting and finalization of evaluation reports.
- f Criminal Justice / Crime Prevention / Counter narcotics enforcement issues (with knowledge of the requirements of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime).
- f Institutional capacity building / organizational management / training of law enforcement personnel

In addition, the evaluator should have:

- f Experience in conducting independent evaluations (if possible, within the UN system);
- Familiarity with the with the drug control situation in Kyrgyzstan and in Central Asia;;
- Knowledge of bilateral/multilateral technical cooperation, particularly in counter-narcotic enforcement issues;
- Excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English. Knowledge of Russian will be considered as an asset.

**8. Payment terms:**

The Evaluator will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures.

The fee for the services will be defined according to the UN rules and procedures and depending from the qualification of the candidate. The fee will be paid as a lump sum (100%) only after the final report is accepted by the UNODC and IEU.

The projects will cover all the cost related to travel of evaluator and provide him/her with DSA for filed visits to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and Bishkek and Osh, Kyrgyzstan based on the UN rates established for each location to be visited.

## ANNEX B

### List of Persons interviewed, field visit schedule and Interview Guide

#### PROGRAMME OF PROJECT TERMINAL EVALUATION MISSION WITHIN TDKGZI75 PROJECT

#### “ESTABLISHMENT OF MOBILE INTERDICTION TEAMS IN KYRGYZSTAN” (MOBITS)

13-20 December 2010

#### Key Objective

In compliance with the project document of TDKGZI75 “Establishment of Mobile Interdiction Teams in Kyrgyzstan”, the external terminal evaluation is initiated by UNODC to assess the impact of the assistance provided in relation to the objectives and the outputs set out in the project document. The evaluation findings should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system to support a results-based management of the project. The evaluation should provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project. These will then be incorporated in the designing and implementation process of similar projects.

#### Participants:

1. Roger Gaspar , Independent Evaluator;
2. Steven Brown, Senior Law Enforcement Adviser, UNODC ROCA;
3. Vera Tkachenko, Head of UNODC POKYR;
4. Madina Sarieva, National Project Officer, UNODC POKYR.

#### **Arrival Time:**

Roger Gaspar	13 December, Monday	19:00
Steven Brown	13 December, Monday	19:10

**Visa:** Visa Telex Number will be sent via email before arrival to get Visa Upon Arrival at the airport “Manas” in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

**Accommodation:** Park Hotel, [www.parkhotel.kg](http://www.parkhotel.kg) Standard Single Room rate – 115 USD  
87, Orozbekov Street, Bishkek Tel + 996 312 665518

**Translator:** Oleksander Gryshchuk +996 772 267430

**Address of UNODC Programme office in Bishkek:** 26-1 Kerimbekov Street, Bishkek;  
Tel: +996 312 32 17 32

**Contact Details:** In urgent cases please call Madina Sarieva on +996 555 75 77 97

#### **Documents provided to the Evaluator:**

- Project Document;

- Project Revision Document (approved on 09 July 2010);
- Project Revision Document (last one);
- Annual Project Progress Reports from 2007 to 2009;
- Status Report as of November 2010;
- President Decree #131 as of 17 August 2010\_eng translation;
- President Decree # 204 as of 27 September 2010 –eng translation;

### 1 Day, 14 December, Tuesday

- 08:30-09:00 Pick up from the Park Hotel
- 09:00-11:00 Briefing with **Mr. Steven Brown**, UNODC Senior Law Enforcement Adviser for Central Asia  
*Venue: premises of UNODC Programme Office*
- 11:00-12:30 Meeting with **Mr. Alan Theriault**, Counter Narcotics Programme Manager, CENTCOM, US Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic  
*Venue: premises of UNODC Programme Office*
- 13:00-14:30 *Lunch in the café “Khorchma”*
- 15:00-16:00 Meeting with **Mr Vitaly Orozaliev**, Chairperson of the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic  
*Venue: premises of SSDC – 80, Toktogul Street, Bishkek*
- 16:00-17:00 Meeting with **Mr. Duishenbek Zilaliev**, Inspector of Department on defense, security and public order, Presidential Administration  
*Venue: 207, Abdymomunov Str., Bishkek*
- 17:00-18:00 Briefing with **Mr. Steven Brown**, UNODC Senior Law Enforcement Adviser for Central Asia  
*Venue: premises of UNODC Programme Office*

### 3 Day, 15 December, Wednesday

- 08:00-08:40 Flight Bishkek-Osh (TF145)  
*Transportation in Osh to be provided by the MOBITs & State Service of Drug Control*
- 09:00-13:00 Meeting with **Mr. Konurbek Baiterekov**, Mobile Interdiction Teams (MOBITs) Commander and other MOBITs officers  
*Venue: 166, Kurmanjan Datka Str., Osh*
- 13:00-14:00 *Lunch*
- 14:00-18:00 Meeting with **Mr. Kanybek Nurmatov**, Head of Southern Department of the State Service on Drug Control  
*Venue: 130a, Sargalchaeva Str., Osh*
- 18:00 Drop in “Sunrise” Guest House

#### 4 Day, 16 December, Thursday

- 06:00 Departure from Osh to Batken
- 12:00 – 14:00 Meeting with Mobile Interdiction Team working in Batken and visiting MOBITs check point
- 14:00-20:00 Departure from Batken to Osh  
*Transportation to be provided by the MOBITs*

#### 5 Day, 17 December, Friday

- 10:00-11:30 Meeting with **Mr. Akylbek Jambilov**, Head of Southern Branch of the Chief department on counter narcotics of the Ministry of Interior  
*Venue:*
- 11:30-13:00 Meeting with **Mr. Cholponbek Turusbekov**, First Deputy Commander and **Mr Bektemir Isabekov**, Head of Operational Department of Border Troops under State Service of National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic  
*Venue: premises of Border Troops in Osh*
- 13:00-14:30 *Lunch in the café "Nirvana"*
- 15:00-16:30 Meeting with **Mr Sultan Mamasadykov**, Deputy head of Osh Branch of Customs  
*Venue: premises of State Customs Service in Osh*
- 18:40 Departure flight Osh-Bishkek (TF180)  
19:40 Arrival to Bishkek and pick up from airport to the Park Hotel

#### 6 Day, 18 December, Saturday

- 10:00-11:00 Meeting with **Mr. Marat Imankulov**, Secretary of the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan  
*Venue: 207, Abdymomunov Str., Bishkek*
- 11:30-13:30 Meeting with **Mr Vitaly Orozaliev**, Chairperson of the State Service on Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic  
*Venue: premises of SSDC – 80, Toktogul Street, Bishkek*

#### 8 Day, 20 December, Monday

- 09:00 Pick up from the Park Hotel
- 10:00-11:00 Meeting with **Ms. Janyl Shamyrganova**, Officer of Counter narcotics department of the State Customs Service of Kyrgyzstan of the Kyrgyz Republic  
*Venue: 4a, Baitik Baatyr Str., Bishkek*

- 11:30-12:30 Meeting with **Mr. Adilbek Botobaev**, Head of Chief department on counter narcotics of the Minister of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic  
*Venue:*
- 12:30-13:30 *Lunch in the café "Cyclon"*
- 14:00-15:30 Meeting with **Mr. Sergey Kiselev**, Representative of the Federal Service on Drug Control in the Kyrgyz Republic  
*Venue: premises of UNODC Programme Office*
- 16:00-18:00 Debriefing meeting with **Ms. Vera Tkachenko**, UNODC Head of Programme Office in Kyrgyzstan and **Ms. Madina Sarieva**, UNODC National Project Officer  
*Venue: premises of UNODC Programme Office*
- Departure Time:** (Drop off to the airport will be arranged by the UNODC POKYR)

Roger Gaspar	21 December, Tuesday	07.45, BMI (to London)
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## Interview Guide

### Background Information

- Involvement of criminal groups in public/political life
- Non-drugs 'TOC and OC'
- Current drug perspective
- Extent of heroin imports
- Main routes
- Domestic market
- Export routes
- Knowledge of precursor activities
- Neighbouring law enforcement partnerships

### Legal and Institutional frameworks

- Resilience of the SSDC
- Powers of the SSDC
- Inheritance from the DCA/MoI Chief Department for the Countering of Drugs
- Structure of SSDC
- Positioning of Mobits
- Lines of Command of Mobits and relationships (practical and legal) with other parts of the SSDC
- Availability of legislation/gaps in legislation for defined function

### **Government Policies etc**

- Performance against stages of the National Programme
- Current status of the programme
- Situation in respect of the SSDC

### **Justification and Strategy**

- Extent of non-drugs trafficking especially people trafficking
- Extent of corruption within various law enforcement agencies
- Extent of co-operation between internal law enforcement agencies

### **Project Strategy**

- Do Mobits have a full law enforcement powers to deal with any types of crime
- Is this restricted to mandated staff
- Are salaries paid in accordance with the intentions
- Has the right of retirement back to original agencies been respected
- Was the vetting procedure followed in every case
- Were staff who failed the vetting process removed immediately
- Is there a written protocol on procedures for recruitment, staffing and monitoring
- What does the mid term evaluation say
- Were further teams constructed; if not, why not
- Operation of the grant payment scheme

### **End of Project Situation**

- Are teams fully operational
- Results
- Integration into national law enforcement system
- What are the intelligence collection and analysis arrangements
- What was the specialised training; who received it
- What is the special equipment provided
- Evidence of enhanced cooperation between LE agencies
- Number of staff effective in Mobits
- Elements of competence – operational, information and analytical
- Existence of cooperation pacts with neighbouring LE agencies
- Extent of information available
- Evidence of the passing of information to other agencies
- Extent of information available with Kyrgyzstan on drugs and other TOC/OC crime
- Legal and administrative provisions in place
- Existence of an exit strategy
- Operation of exit strategy

## **Objectives, Outputs, Activities and Inputs**

- Achievement of objectives as per Project Initiation Document
  - Coordinating body identified
  - Coordination processes in existence
- Existence of International Working Group
  - Minutes of meetings
  - Existence of project strategy/implementation processes/monitoring processes
- Existence of inter-agency MOU in operation
- Development of Standard Operating Procedures
- Nomination, recruitment and screening procedures for all participating agencies
- Milestone dates for creation of Mobits
- Extent of training provided
- Operation of mentoring system
- Examination of intelligence collection mechanisms/use of technical equipment
- Existence and content of database for analysis and profiling
- Completion of recruitment and vetting processes
- Exceptions within the recruitment processes
- What systems for monitoring integrity exist/interim use of polygraph etc.
- Existence of protocol on integrity and monitoring
- Legal processes to benefit from asset seizure
- Monitoring system for assessing asset availability
- Delivery of Inputs as specified
  - By UNODC
  - By Government
  - By bi-lateral support
- Results
  - Drug seizures
  - Operations
  - Information/Intelligence
  - Analytical product
  - Sources of Information

## **Implementation Modalities**

- Staff as specified
  - International Project Coordinator
  - Support from Regional Law Enforcement Advisor
- International Working Group
  - Membership
  - Minutes of meetings
  - Role
  - Problems in operation and support of project
  - Monitoring of benchmarks
  - Integration of benchmarks into implementation methodology

## **Coordination and Partnership arrangements**

- Relationship with existing UN projects
  - Criminal Intelligence Systems
  - Precursor control
  - Controlled delivery techniques
  - Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency

## ANNEX C

### Project Objectives and Outputs

<b>Programme Title:</b>	Strategic Programme Framework for Central Asia
<b>Project No.:</b>	KGZ/175
<b>Project Title:</b>	Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan
<b>Duration:</b>	Three years (2006 – 2009)
<b>Estimated Starting Date:</b>	December 2006
<b>Thematic Area :</b>	Counter-narcotics enforcement
<b>Executing Agency:</b>	UNODC
<b>Implementing Agency:</b>	UNODC/ROCA
<b>Government Counterpart Agency:</b>	Drug Control Agency, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Service, National Security Service, Customs Service
<b>UNODC Budget:</b>	US\$ 1,999,700

### *Extract*

**OBJECTIVE 1: IMPROVE NATIONAL INTERDICTION RESULTS AND INVESTIGATIVE CAPACITY**

**OUTPUT 1: ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT MOBILE INTERDICTION TEAMS (MOBITs)**

#### **Activities**

- Identify and select a coordinating body to lead the mobile teams (MOBITs).
- Establish a Project International Working Group (IWG, Annex 7) to define the project strategies and monitor its progress.
- Negotiate and clear all contents of inter-agency MOU negotiated and arrange for signing by all participating agencies.
- Develop Standard Operating Procedures and deployment concept.
- Design and agree on nomination, recruitment and screening procedure for all participating agencies.
- Recruit/Establish first four pilot MOBITs (subsequent six MOBITs upon positive mid-term evaluation).
- Provide training and equipment to each team.
- Establish permanent mentoring system to monitor the teams' operational capacity and performance.

**Output 2: ENHANCE OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/INVESTIGATIVE CAPACITY OF JOINT MOBILE INTERDICTION TEAMS**

**Activities**

- Improve intelligence collection mechanism designed to allow these teams using advanced technology including GPS, video and still cameras deployed with teams to identify and record priority risk areas.
- Provide the coordinating agency with a comprehensive database to conduct more detailed analysis and profiling.

**OBJECTIVE 2: ENSURE INTEGRITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF JOINT MOBILE INTERDICTION TEAMS**

**Output 1: SYSTEM IN PLACE FOR THE CONSTANT MONITORING OF INTEGRITY OF MOBILE TEAMS**

**Activities**

- Complete recruitment and vetting in accordance with existing process and standards that are agreed and already applied to the DCA.
- Develop mechanism to ensure integrity of operations through periodic polygraph tests, monitoring by international mentors and through periodic reviews by the agreed internal affairs units<sup>1</sup> of the agencies involved in the project implementation.
- Establish written Protocol on Integrity and Monitoring.

**Output 2: MECHANISM FOR SELF-SUSTAINABILITY OF JOINT MOBILE INTERDICTION TEAMS UNDER DEVELOPMENT**

**Activities**

- Establish national rules that allow the allocation of revenue and attributed assets to sustain all operational and personnel costs of teams. (2007)
- Establish a monitoring mechanism to constantly assess the level/volume of expected new income to government budget. (2007)

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<sup>1</sup> **Note:** that the Project Document states that “these do already exist independently within each agency participating in this project”

**ANNEX D - DRUG SEIZURES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES FOR THE PERIOD 2007-2010**

<b>Drug seizures by all law enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2007</b>															
<b>YEAR 2007</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>TTL for 2007</b>
Heroin	4397	23235	25097	27666	8648	27286	<b>116329</b>	14839	44533	33431	45619	76278	100339	315039	<b>431368</b>
Opium	7549	8877	1728	2418	-137	16543	<b>36978</b>	20254	866	67745	86247	57611	874	233597	<b>270575</b>
Hashish	23236	13102	59413	2294	25338	22307	<b>145690</b>	8411	17083	80676	20263	94907	73144	294484	<b>440174</b>
Marihuana	28932	43353	41090	5329	100334	624666	<b>843704</b>	32024	1632164	1288189	131089	13866	87417	3184749	<b>4028453</b>

<b>Drug seizures by all law enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2008</b>															
<b>YEAR 2008</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>TTL for 2008</b>
Heroin	16413	7365	15667	20294	12470	60077	<b>132286</b>	577	18606	16703	6403	34210	90190	166689	<b>298975</b>
Opium	54	1556	1730	2	16338	18196	<b>37876</b>	3660	2097	3928	0	191	92249	102125	<b>140001</b>
Hashish	21215	24005	210729	43232	15516	100458	<b>415155</b>	1006	24977	3849	3287	5076	3790	41985	<b>457140</b>
Marihuana	16771	47574	82853	22656	22021	1178994	<b>1370869</b>	-337455	447844	552131	-288249	883708	793833	2051812	<b>3422681</b>

<b>Drug seizures by all law enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2009</b>															
<b>YEAR 2009</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>TTL for 2009</b>
Heroin	4570	9502	78380	11980	79343	56796	<b>240571</b>	9394	5514	54793	2899	21435	6513	100548	<b>341119</b>
Opium	793	663	49843	68607	12769	1175	<b>133850</b>	203440	21841	7381	15500	5	-5805	242362	<b>376212</b>
Hashish	11285	44595	128045	31782	66923	235583	<b>518213</b>	10099	80643	39635	7173	46141	16124	199815	<b>718028</b>
Marihuana	54640	13292	30066	20354	41751	52429	<b>212532</b>	779193	17187	791071	147591	-43109	124221	1816154	<b>2028686</b>

<b>Drug seizures by all law enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2010</b>															
<b>YEAR 2010</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>TTL for 6 months</b>	<b>TTL for 2010</b>
Heroin	1148	10960	21076	3680	51743	11740	<b>100347</b>	113760							
Opium	17327	1953	1956	6	9690	1755	<b>32687</b>	33742							
Hashish	5316	21947	49431	15688	191999	56736	<b>341117</b>	362903							
Marihuana	20979	22717	59452	31128	5688	-3575	<b>136389</b>	189427							

