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FINAL EVALUATION

AD/RER/F43

Assistance in Developing Controlled Delivery Techniques

Rule of Law

Central Asia

Report of the evaluation team

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Abbreviations and acronyms

CARICC	Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre
DCA	Drug Control Agency
DOMEDODOVO	Training Academy of the Russian Drug control Service
EU	European Union
GM	General Motors
MLA	Mutual Legal Assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ROCA	(UNODC) Regional Office for Central Asia
RORB	(UNODC) Regional Office for Russia and Belarus
SPF	Strategic Programme Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNV	United Nations Volunteer/s
WCO	World Customs Organization

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Summary matrix of findings, supporting evidences and recommendations

Findings: problems and issues identified	Supporting evidences	Recommendations
1. Although under way, none of the equipment agreed with the countries in October 2008 has been provided and procurement of vehicles has still not been closed.	Statements by project officers.	UNODC, ROCA should take all measures to ensure delivery of equipment under project F43, as soon as possible.
2. Although preparatory steps have been made, there is still a need to ensure achievement of the primary intention of project F43 - to establish legal framework, procedures and related mechanisms for the implementation of controlled deliveries, to strengthen inter-agency information sharing, operational coordination and cooperation.	Statements by project officer, CARICC officers and governments.	UNODC, ROCA, should review and strengthen its strategy for promoting improvement of internal frameworks and procedures for information sharing, operational coordination and cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the Central Asian countries.
3. Although progress has been made, there is still a need to build technical capacity in controlled delivery. There were no measures in place to ensure sustainability of training and no performance indicators at outcome level in the project document.	CARICC officers pointed to a number of shortcomings, due to low level of capacity. Statement by project officer. Analysis of project document. Some governments pointed to the need for training of newcomers.	UNODC, ROCA should ensure continuation of support to capacity building for controlled delivery. Further training should be systematized and sustainability ensured. To facilitate results-based management, performance indicators should be identified at the outcome level.
4. Progress in international cooperation in controlled delivery operations and likely also improvement of national legal frameworks, mechanisms, information sharing, coordination and cooperation is dependent on the success and value of CARICC to its member countries. It is therefore important that the current momentum of CARICC is strengthened and sustained. Termination of project F43 will severely limit the possibilities for CARICC to provide operational support, let alone conduct regional exercises, which have proved effective in building capacity and are desired by governments.	Statements by government and CARICC officers.	UNODC, ROCA should ensure continuation of support to regional exercises in controlled delivery in the context of the CARICC cooperation and make it possible for CARICC to provide operational support to ensure success of real operations.
5. Experience and knowledge is being accumulated at various levels and locations in the region. There is potential for systematizing and strengthening this and for capitalizing on it for the purpose of developing skill levels and capacities in a cost-effective manner.	Statements by governments and CARICC officers.	UNODC, ROCA, in the context of the CARICC cooperation, should explore possibilities for systematizing the experience and knowledge being accumulated in the region and support development of skill levels and capacities, based on knowledge transfer within the region.
6. There are prospects for supporting results-based management of possible future interventions.	Countries have data and are generally willing to report on operations and outcomes to CARICC.	Performance indicators and reporting format could be developed jointly by the countries/ CARICC/UNODC.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The project

i. To help address the extensive and increasing trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan into and through Central Asia, the project was to assist the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) as well as Azerbaijan (in the Caucasus region) *to set up and/or develop national mechanisms and capacities that will allow carrying out controlled deliveries properly* (the immediate objective), in order to dismantle criminal groups and networks behind the trafficking. To this end, the project was to help establish *legal framework, procedures and related mechanisms for the implementation of controlled deliveries* (output 1) and provide *specialized training and equipment* (output 2). As reflected in the project document for project RER/H22, *Establishment of a Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)*, project F43 was to be coordinated with this project in support of CARICC's role in coordinating international controlled delivery operations. Project F43 commenced in mid-2005, with a 2-year timeframe and a budget of US\$ 1,549,400. It was extended three times, set for completion at the end of 2009.

ii. The project document has little emphasis on outcome and no performance indicators at this level, hampering results-based management and evaluation. It envisaged a UNV at L4 level as project coordinator, limiting the budget for project management to US\$ 76,800. The project as designed, grossly overestimated the governments' commitment to output one, failed to take measures to ensure it in the project design, underestimated the diplomatic weight needed for its attainment, limiting financial recruitment options for project management, and provided poor guidance on implementation of output two, which figured as a secondary output, but, as it turned out, was the only realistically achievable one.

Main findings

iii. Disregarding the design and strategy problems mentioned above, the project was relevant in meeting the needs for strengthening capacities among the countries covered, although countries perceived it as project mainly to provide equipment and training. The project, as designed, is in line with the UNODC regional strategy for West and Central Asia and the SPF for 2008-2011, in particular pursuing strategic objective 3, *Mutual legal assistance*. It also aims at contributing to the overall objectives of the *Yellow paper - Securing Central Asia's borders with Afghanistan under the rainbow strategy* – more specifically to the objective of *strengthening intelligence analysis and sharing* - working in support of establishing CARICC as *“the regional focal point for communication, analysis and exchange of operational information in “real time” on cross-border crime, as well as a centre for the organization and coordination of joint operations.”*

iv. Progress is being made towards the **wider objective of promoting international cooperation in controlled delivery** and is contributing to identifying and disrupting criminal networks operating in the region. Operations have gained momentum, but experiences and capacities vary considerably. In all countries, however, controlled deliveries are reportedly handled in an increasingly competent manner and with improving results. Some of this is attributed to the support of the project and the stronger role of CARICC.

v. CARICC is materializing as an organization, with growing capacity and value to member states and a progressively evolving role. Member states have a high degree of confidence in CARICC and a strong sense of ownership of the organization. The benefits to CARICC from project F43 have been significant and enhanced its operational capacity. CARICC has so far initiated and supported 16 international controlled delivery operations with successful results and thereby demonstrated value. These, however, revealed that there are problems with information sharing and that internal procedures continue to create obstacles and hamper effective cooperation and coordination. Also, it is apparent, that capacities of member countries need strengthening. CARICC does not have funds for training, exercises and operational support. Through the cooperation with project F43, these shortcomings could be overcome, but as the project is being completed, it leaves a void behind.

vi. As for the **immediate project objective, to set up and/or develop national mechanisms and capacities that will allow carrying out controlled deliveries properly**, the project has been instrumental in strengthening capacities and has made some contribution towards development of national mechanisms for controlled delivery. The objective has therefore been partially achieved.

vii. The positive outcome has been brought about through cooperation with project H22 (CARICC) and realization of the potential for mutual reinforcement between the two projects. Achievement of the objective by project F43 alone would not have been realistic. The main results have been created through three regional exercises arranged in cooperation with CARICC. These appear to have kickstarted the operational functions of the organization and simultaneously geared the countries towards cooperation with and through CARICC, resulting in more and better executed controlled deliveries

viii. Although countries have not accepted assistance in developing mechanisms and procedures for coordination and cooperation at the national level (output 1), the project has probably achieved what could be realistically expected in this respect by producing a manual, which provides guidance on the legal and procedural framework for controlled delivery. This is seemingly promoting the development of suitable frameworks by serving as a reference, currently being used by two countries for this purpose.

ix. The main shortcoming of the project in building capacity has been its inability to provide equipment and related training, in time. At the time of the evaluation, no equipment had yet reached beneficiaries.

Institutional and management arrangements and constraints

x. As an appropriate UNV could not be identified, it was decided to place responsibility for project management with a national project officer, who commenced in July 2005. At the time of selection, the project officer was closely involved in development of the legal framework for CARICC, through participation in expert group meetings. He continued this function with about 3-4 expert group meetings annually. From September 2006, the project officer was also responsible for the implementation of the complex NATO/Russia project, to provide training in drug enforcement in general, including controlled delivery.

xi. Whereas the background of the project officer was technically appropriate for the project's output one, he did not possess the diplomatic weight for a task of the magnitude envisaged. Although his background was to some extent also appropriate for the procedural elements relating to exercises under output two, it was not so for the law enforcement elements under this output, which required experience with controlled delivery and procurement of specialized equipment in the region.

xii. As for procurement of equipment, many items were highly technical in nature, had to be agreed with all countries involved, purchased within the region or even locally, for which the UN procurement process is less geared and some items were difficult to obtain, due to their special (undercover) nature and vendors for this reason difficult to identify and approach.

xiii. The combination of these constraints led to delays in project implementation, limited delivery of training and provision of equipment only after the scheduled completion of the project. The Representative did consider replacing the project officer with an international coordinator, but decided not to do so, in view of the time a project revision and recruitment process would have taken as well as the uncertainty involved.

Lessons learned and best practices

xiv. It is important at an early stage of project implementation to revisit objectives and outputs to verify that achievement is realistic. Projects which experience serious implementation problems at an early stage, should be critically reviewed to see if there is a need for complete readjustment of the strategy. It is important to include adequate budget for management in technical cooperation projects, to ensure flexibility in recruitment. Part-time management should be avoided in complex projects or projects which are difficult to implement. In projects which require different types of expertise, it is important that the project document justifies and specifies one type of expertise to be possessed by the project coordinator and include specific measures and budget to ensure availability of other expertise required. Projects which include delivery of specialized equipment should identify the ways and means by which this is to be procured. Creating cooperation and coordination among countries and organizations might require a

longer-term approach aimed at strengthening facilitating factors and it is important to ensure real buy-in by beneficiaries as part of project preparation.

Recommendations

xv. UNODC, ROCA should: 1) take all measures to ensure delivery of equipment under project F43, as soon as possible; 2) review and strengthen its strategy for promoting improvement of internal frameworks and procedures for information sharing, operational coordination and cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the Central Asian countries; 3) ensure continuation of support to capacity building for controlled delivery, including for regional exercises in the context of the CARICC cooperation and make it possible for CARICC to provide operational support for real operations; 4) Explore possibilities for systematizing the experience and knowledge being accumulated in the region and support development of skill levels and capacities, based on knowledge transfer within the region.

Conclusion

xvi. In partially achieving its objective of setting up or developing *national mechanisms and capacities that will allow carrying out controlled deliveries properly*, the project was successful beyond what could realistically have been expected, given its design. Its strategy outlined a simple technical path for achievement of an objective over two years, which in reality called for a major diplomatic effort sustained over time. It failed to provide real guidance on its secondary track, provision of training and equipment, and to provide adequate resources for recruitment of a suitable project coordinator.

xvii. That the project after all came out as quite successful, on balance, is only because of its close cooperation with project H22 (CARICC) and realization of the potential for mutual reinforcement between the two projects. What stands out now, is the potential of CARICC for driving cooperation in controlled delivery and perhaps also for catalyzing improvement of national frameworks and mechanisms. This is linked to the strong sense of ownership by and value of CARICC to member states. The key to further progress is CARICC's ability to demonstrate value. What remains, following the delivery of equipment and closure of the project, is therefore a need to enable CARICC to continue the operational functions made possible by project F43 and, in particular, organize exercises in controlled delivery and initiate, coordinate and support real operations.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and context

1. To help address the extensive and increasing trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan into and through Central Asia, the project was to assist the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) as well as Azerbaijan (in the Caucasus region) *to set up and/or develop national mechanisms and capacities that will allow carrying out controlled deliveries properly* (the immediate objective), in order to dismantle criminal groups and networks behind the trafficking. To this end, the project was to help establish *legal framework, procedures and related mechanisms for the implementation of controlled deliveries* (output 1) and provide *specialized training and equipment* (output 2). The project was originally designed as a 2-year project with a budget of US\$ 1,449,400. It commenced operation with the arrival of the project manager in mid-2005 and was since extended over a few times until December 2009. Although the budget was increased to US\$ 1,723,000, funding remained at US\$ 1,550,000, provided by Russia, Norway and the United States.

2. As reflected in the project document for RER/H22, *Establishment of a Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)*, project F43 was to be coordinated with this project in support of CARICC's role in coordinating international controlled delivery operations.

3. The F43 project document follows an older UNODC format. It has little emphasis on outcome and no performance indicators at this level. The logframe appears to be inconsistent with the rest of the document and the few performance indicators identified, seemingly at the activity level, to be too general for meaningful utilization.

4. Sixteen activities provide the main guideline for project implementation, although not organized by output, with clear emphasis on producing output 1 (establishing framework, procedures and mechanisms). These include situation analyses, identification of common ground and assistance in drafting procedures and subsequently providing training on them. Activities towards output 2 (delivery of specialized training and equipment) appear limited. This emphasis is also apparent from the description of the project strategy, which is almost entirely devoted to output one, with reference to output two limited to the end of the following paragraph, which is also illustrative of the strategy: *“At a later stage of the project, technical assistance will be provided in a number of areas, as determined by needs assessment missions and/or requests from participating countries. Broadly these areas will cover policy-making; strengthening of inter-agency coordination; drafting of legislation; training of administrative personnel and enforcement staff; provision of certain equipment.”* One major activity, *“organization of field exercises on controlled deliveries, first at national, then at the regional level”*, should have called for a separate output.

5. In assessing risks and assumptions, the project document presumes that “*While some initial obstacles to cooperation are likely, the recent positive development in regional drug control cooperation ensures that critical project risks at the time of project design appear limited*”. The recent positive developments include ratification of the drug conventions by the countries. The commitment by Governments to establish coordination mechanisms for controlled deliveries is identified as an assumption, requiring “*consideration and monitoring*”, but not as a risk. No measures, such as e.g. prior obligations, are identified to sufficiently ensure governments’ commitment to output one.

6. The project envisaged a UNV at L4 level to manage the project. This modality limited the budget for project management and coordination to US\$ 76,800.

7. The project as designed, grossly overestimated the governments’ commitment to output one, failed to take measures to ensure it in the project design (although it is questionable whether this would at all have been possible), underestimated the diplomatic weight needed for its attainment, limiting financial recruitment options for project management, and provided poor guidance on implementation of output two, which figured as a secondary output, but, as it turned out, was the only realistically achievable one.

B. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

8. The evaluation was to assess: the relevance of the project in the context of government priorities and needs, the alignment of the project with UNODC’s strategic instruments e.g. strategic programme framework, the appropriateness of the project strategy and activities as the most effective UNODC measure for reducing illicit drug trafficking, the effectiveness of the project, i.e. the extent to which its objectives have been met. The evaluation findings should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system to support results-based management. The evaluation should provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project. The terms of reference for the evaluation are attached as annex 1.

C. Executing Modalities

9. UNODC was to serve as the Executing Agency for the project, UNOPS as associated executing agency providing services in respect of procurement of equipment and individual contractual services. For project allotments held by UNODC Tashkent, daily implementation was to be carried out in line with the UNODC-UNDP Working Arrangement. UNDP local offices were to provide administrative and financial services, as required. Overall execution responsibility was to remain with the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent in close coordination with the UNODC Regional Office for Russia and Belarus (RORB). ROCA, through its Representative, was to supervise and guide the work of the Project Coordinator.

10. At a project revision in June 2008, UNOPS was removed as associated executing agency, with procurement to be carried out by UNODC, ROCA itself.

D. Methodology

11. The evaluation was based on a 1) review of documentation, including documents setting out the rationale and strategic orientation for activities, the project and related documents, progress reports, documents relating to project implementation and production of outputs, previous evaluation report, situation analysis, procurement of equipment, etc. 2) interviews with representatives for law enforcement agencies in each participating country, CARICC, and UNODC staff.

E. Limitations to the evaluation

12. Limitations to the evaluation included: Somewhat limited time for the evaluation, which was carried out in conjunction with the evaluation of project I78. It was assumed that one evaluation report could cover both projects, but to ensure evaluation quality, the mission in consultation with the project officer, F43 and the project coordinator, I78, decided that two separate reports were required. 2) Lack of systematically collected data and information on achievement of the objective, due to lack of performance indicators.

II. MAJOR FINDINGS and ANALYSIS

A. Relevance of the programme or project

13. Disregarding the design and strategy problems, the project was relevant in meeting the needs for strengthening capacities among the countries covered, although these perceived it as a project mainly to provide equipment and training. Law enforcement authorities at central level in the countries confirmed the high priority accorded to controlled delivery as the most effective mean to reveal and bring criminal groups behind drug trafficking to justice and emphasized the need for technical assistance.

14. The project, as designed, is in line with the UNODC regional strategy for West and Central Asia and the SPF for 2008-2011, in particular pursuing strategic objective 3, *Mutual legal assistance*, addressing the three operational targets under this objective: 1) *Upgraded domestic laws (...)*, 2) *Created legal and operational mechanisms for joint operations (...)* and 3) *Established comprehensive cooperation networks among MLA central authorities and law enforcement agencies, empowered to conduct international controlled deliveries (...)*. It also aims at contributing to the overall objectives of the *Yellow paper - Securing Central Asia's borders with Afghanistan* under the *rainbow strategy*, which translates recommendations of the *Paris Pact Initiative* (the UNODC brokered international partnership to counter trafficking and consumption of Afghan opiates) into operational outlines – more specifically to the Yellow paper's objective of *strengthening intelligence analysis and sharing*. In this connection, project F43 is complementary to and works in support of CARICC, which is envisaged to be established as “*the*

regional focal point for communication, analysis and exchange of operational information in “real time” on cross-border crime, as well as a centre for the organization and coordination of joint operations.”

15. The project is in line with strategic themes, result areas and results under UNODC’s overall strategy, in particular the aim of enhancing capacity for international cooperation against crime, organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking and terrorism. (Result 1.2.6. of the strategy).

B. Attainment of the programme or project objectives

Perspective on progress in relation to objectives

16. Progress is being made towards the **wider objective of promoting international cooperation in controlled delivery** as reflected in the complex of strategic documents, mentioned above, and is contributing to identifying and disrupting criminal networks operating in the region. Operations have gained momentum and there seems to be a convergence among the countries in prioritizing use of the instrument. Experiences and capacities vary considerably. In all countries, however, controlled deliveries are reportedly handled in an increasingly competent manner and with improving results. A good part of this is attributed to the support of the project and the stronger role of CARICC. Experience and knowledge is being systematically accumulated at various levels and locations in the region, with potential for increasing use and development of skill levels and capacities.

17. CARICC is materializing as an organization, with growing capacity and value to member states and a progressively evolving role. Member states have a high degree of confidence in and satisfaction with CARICC as well as a strong sense of ownership of the organization. The benefits to CARICC from project F43 have been significant and enhanced its operational capacity. CARICC has so far initiated and supported 16 international controlled delivery operations with successful results and thereby demonstrated value. These, however, revealed that there are problems with information sharing and that internal procedures continue to create obstacles and hamper effective cooperation and coordination. Also, it is apparent, that capacities of member countries need strengthening. CARICC does not have funds for training, exercises and operational support. Through the cooperation with project F43, these shortcomings could be overcome, but as the project is being completed, it leaves a void behind. The success of CARICC is dependent on the value to member countries. A supplementary analysis of CARICC in the context of this evaluation is attached as annex 4.

18. As for the **immediate project objective, to set up and/or develop national mechanisms and capacities that will allow carrying out controlled deliveries properly**, the project has been instrumental in strengthening capacities and has made preparatory steps towards development of national mechanisms for controlled delivery. The objective has therefore been partially achieved. This overall assessment is based

on stakeholder statements. Lack of performance indicators and systematic collection of information makes it difficult to specify the extent of achievement.

19. The positive outcome has been brought about through cooperation with project H22 (CARICC) and realization of the potential for mutual reinforcement between the two projects. Achievement of the objective by project F43 alone would not have been realistic. The project has only carried out a part of the activities envisaged in the project document. The main impact has been achieved through three regional exercises arranged in cooperation with CARICC. These appear to have kickstarted the operational functions of the organization and simultaneously geared the countries towards cooperation with and through it, resulting in more and better executed controlled deliveries, in turn reinforcing cooperation and adding value and credibility to CARICC.

20. Although countries have not accepted assistance in developing mechanisms and procedures for coordination and cooperation at the national level, the project has probably achieved what could be realistically expected in this respect by producing a manual, which provides guidance on legal and procedural frameworks. This is seemingly promoting the development of suitable frameworks by serving as a reference, currently being used by two countries for this purpose. However, there also appears to be tendencies among the countries towards less coordination and cooperation. Trust and confidence in the handling of secret information, and cooperation in good will are key factors for agencies' position.

21. The main shortcoming of the project in building capacity has been its inability to provide equipment and related training on its use, in time.

Findings

22. There seems to be a **convergence among the countries towards prioritizing controlled delivery** as a critical tool in identifying and dismantling drug trafficking groups. Azerbaijani agencies, which are relatively new to the technique, in spite of strong interagency rivalization, unanimously place high priority on this instrument and are increasingly becoming prepared for it. Turkmenistan, which was previously isolating itself from international cooperation has come to terms with this internally and, although the number is not disclosed, has been involved in quite a few international operations. To countries which have already gained more experience, controlled delivery has become increasingly important. Virtually all countries refer to this as now figuring prominently in national plans and strategies, and in the cases of some countries, also in presidential speeches, as a tool accorded high priority.

23. **Experiences and capacities vary considerably** between the countries and among agencies. Whereas Azerbaijan conducted its first operation in 2008 and since then has carried out 4 controlled deliveries, Tajikistan has carried out 65 in the last five years and Kazakhstan, 55 in the last four years. The National Security Service of Uzbekistan claims to be involved in some stage of a controlled delivery operation

almost on a daily basis. Although some agencies have carried out controlled deliveries for more than a decade, it is the impression that more complex operations in cooperation with other countries is generally a phenomenon in the region of the past five years. The number of controlled deliveries have varied from year to year, dependent on availability of information on drug transports, but their frequency has generally increased. In all countries, controlled deliveries have reportedly been handled in a progressively more competent and effective manner, with much of the progress attributed to the support of the project and the stronger role of CARICC.

24. The table below is illustrative and shows the number of international controlled deliveries provided by some agencies during meetings with the mission. Domestic operations are also carried out. In the case of Kazakhstan, for instance, these amounted to 9, in 2007, 18, in 2008, and 17, in 2009.

Year/Country	Azerbaijan (All agencies)	Kyrgyzstan (Customs)	Kazakhstan (All agencies)	Tajikistan (All agencies)
2005	0	2	-	1
2006	0	4	25	4
2007	0	9	11	16
2008	2	13	12	37
2009	2	16	7	7

25. The convergence on priority, the difference in experience among countries and the fact that a considerable number of controlled deliveries have been carried out, point to some **potential for increasing capacities alone through exchange and transfer of experience and knowledge built within the region**. Thus, for instance, Customs in Tajikistan has developed and disseminated its own manual on controlled delivery. Most countries conduct systematic evaluations of controlled deliveries, at least on agency basis (e.g. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan), but some also on a joint inter-agency basis (e.g. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan). Simultaneously, CARICC is conducting analyses of operations, feeding back information to member states. Experience and knowledge is therefore being accumulated at various levels and locations in the region. There is potential for systematizing and strengthening this and for capitalizing on it for the purpose of developing skill levels and capacities in a cost effective manner.

26. This situation also carries prospects for supporting **results-based management** of possible future interventions. Countries were generally open to reporting to CARICC on key aspects of all controlled delivery operations in this regard. A format identifying performance indicators, reporting standards, etc. could be worked out jointly between the countries, CARICC and UNODC for this purpose.

27. With respect to development of **national mechanisms, legal frameworks and procedures**, all countries stressed that this was an internal issue, which did not require external assistance. Most countries also indicated that they were satisfied with their own procedures and that coordination and cooperation was strong. However, countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are using the manual produced by the project, which has generally been praised by countries, in developing legal and procedural frameworks for controlled delivery and might be moving towards improved inter-agency cooperation and coordination. Turkmenistan appears to be gaining experience with controlled delivery, moving away from divided opinions among and within agencies on the risks and related placement of responsibilities involved, towards a more unison perspective and a more coordinated approach. A contributing factor has seemingly been the establishment of the Drug Control Agency with coordinating responsibility, in January 2008.¹

28. In Kyrgyzstan the Drug Control Agency, responsible for overall coordination, was disbanded in October 2009, with certain functions being taken over by the Ministry of Interior, including the coordinating role in respect of controlled deliveries. The final modality, however, is uncertain and there is a risk that Kyrgyzstan is sliding towards weakened rather than strengthened coordination and cooperation. The same might be the case in Azerbaijan, where rivalization is already strong between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Security. As the Ministry of Interior, having a liaison officer in CARICC, participated in the exercise on the Caspian Sea, the Ministry of National Security did not. Coordination between the two agencies takes place by way of formal letter exchanged at head of agency level. Currently, agencies have to inform each other as well as the prosecutor-general of controlled deliveries, but a new procedure is being promoted whereby only the prosecutor-general has to be informed.²

29. In overcoming **barriers to coordination and cooperation**, trust and confidence in the handling of secret information is a critical factor for agencies, as is cooperation in good will. In some cases agencies expressed reluctance to share information, due to leakage or wrong handling in the past. Thus, customs in one country would only provide information to other agencies upon request. The Ministry of Interior in another country mentioned lack of cooperation and obstruction by agencies in other countries, for instance by not answering telephone calls at critical moments of an operation. The mission was informed of one case, where the cooperating agency in one country had leaked information on a controlled delivery to the criminals involved in the requesting country, who then turned against the informer. Agencies in Tajikistan complained that, due to lack of cooperation when an operation has been completed, they often

¹ At a joint meeting with law enforcement agencies in Ashgabat, DCA clearly took the lead in informing the mission of controlled delivery operations involving Turkmenistan.

² Information provided at an unofficial meeting with a senior officer from one agency.

do not receive information from the destination country of a controlled delivery. This has at times made it impossible to bring Tajik citizens involved in the criminal groups disclosed to justice.

30. **Training** by the project was generally deemed valuable, although not all agencies were in a position to recall activities and some not able to distinguish between training under F43 and under the NATO/Russia project. Some stressed the level of competence of the DOMEDODOVO training academy in Moscow and some expressed appreciation that operational officers had been involved in the training. Agencies of, in particular, Azerbaidjan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, were convinced that the training had strengthened competence and led to better operations, but no agency was able to point to a specific training element which had made a difference in a controlled delivery operation.³ Agencies generally identified the exchange of experience and establishment of international contacts as the most valuable element of the training. In making proposals for improvement, one agency mentioned that emphasis should be on practise rather than theory, and that content could include latest and more advanced approaches and technologies. Two agencies mentioned that case-studies for fewer countries might be useful, perhaps as part of a study-tour to Europe.

31. **Sustainability of training activities**, however, is dependent on the countries themselves. There were no in-built measures in the training activities, although cascade elements were foreseen in the project document. Measures by countries have included presentation and distribution of training material to agency staff and reproduction and dissemination of training material to all relevant officers, Many agencies, however, referred to the need for continued support in training, in particular, of newcomers.

32. All countries participating in the **exercises** had found them extremely useful, having improved interaction with neighbouring states, strengthened capacities and led to improved controlled deliveries. Also, countries stressed the clear demonstration of the operational value of CARICC, which had increased confidence in and utilization of the organization. Some countries, such as, Kazakhstan, had made a systematic, joint review of the situation before and after the exercise, identifying needs and possibilities for improvement. Other countries, such as Uzbekistan, had identified such needs on an agency basis. Agencies would in general like to see CARICC continue similar exercises. One agency would like to see exercises of a more difficult and complex nature.

33. With respect to **CARICC**, countries mentioned that they were to an increasing extent benefitting from information from or coordination of controlled delivery operations with CARICC and expressed increased goodwill towards the organisation and willingness to cooperate with it, although not all

³ According to one agency, training had increased trust and added value. "*Success in controlled delivery depends on planning, coordination information sharing, and professional behaviour. It is not possible to isolate training elements which has led to increased capacity and success*".

agencies were aware of CARICC's operational role. Uzbekistan is the only country which has not yet ratified the agreement establishing CARICC, but law enforcement agencies expect this to happen in the near future. Turkmenistan was the first country to ratify the agreement, confirming the change of course towards international engagement and has contributed staff as well as two liaison officers to the organization. Kyrgystan has benefitted from the operational role of CARICC and stressed that controlled delivery operations are dependent on rapid communication. Kyrgystan (Customs) have previously had to cancel or postpone operations, due to slow information flow, but sees CARICC as an instrument to minimize bureaucracy, assure speedy communication and increase the chances of success. Agencies in Tajikistan expressed the same opinion and see a strong operational role for CARICC as well as a role in ensuring complete feedback of information from destination countries upon completion of controlled deliveries. One Tajik agency, however, also mentioned that when only two countries are involved, there is no need for CARICC. In such cases, the agency would rely on bilateral communication lines.

C. Achievement of the project or programme outputs

34. The two project outputs were partially delivered. Beneficiaries considered the standard of good quality. Output 1, (*legal framework, procedures and related mechanisms for the implementation of controlled deliveries are set up*), was not realistically attainable and the project therefore only managed to make the preparatory steps for this output - in the form of a situation analysis and a reference manual to guide further action. Under output 2, (*specialized training and equipment is provided in order to conduct properly controlled deliveries*), emphasis became on exercises rather than training. One training course, one national and three international exercises, were carried out. Whereas the number of exercises might be adequate, in particular given the non-availability of CARICC for a period of time, the number of training courses has been much too low. Although equipment is under way, none has yet been delivered.

Output 1: Legal framework, procedures and related mechanisms for the implementation of controlled deliveries are set up

35. As project H22 (CARICC) by mid-2005 was working on an international framework for controlled delivery, project F43 focused on frameworks at the national level.

36. Following preparations for implementation, including identification of focal points in each national law enforcement agency, the initial activity of the project was a **comprehensive situation analysis**, identifying the legal, institutional and operational framework for controlled delivery in the Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan and Russia. This analysis was completed in May 2006, as the reference point and framework guideline for all further project activities. During the assessment, however, Governments clarified that they did not need assistance in developing national frameworks.

37. Based on a meeting on the report with all law enforcement agencies, a **reference book** for controlled delivery was produced at the request of agencies, disseminated in October 2006. It identified the legal requirements for controlled delivery, international agreements relevant to the region, competences of all 29 agencies, recommendations on best practices and international requirements for requests. It also identified the operational focal point (officer on duty) in each agency, available for requests on a 24 hour basis. The book was appreciated and will likely serve as the main reference of its kind for the foreseeable future.

Output 2: Specialized training and equipment is provided in order to conduct properly controlled deliveries.

Training

38. In February-March 2008, a one week advanced training course was carried out in Moscow (at DOMODEDOVO), with participation of all agencies. Emphasis was on round-table discussions and exchange of experience and included also operational officers from Russian drug enforcement agencies. This training was highly appreciated by participants.

Field exercises

39. As for the national field exercises foreseen in the project document, an exercise was only carried out in Uzbekistan, in May-June 2007, due to lack of interest in other countries. It was conducted over one week by instructors from the Central Directorate for Anti-Drug Service in Italy, focused on controlled deliveries through the postal system and the airport at Tashkent. It was well received.

40. In December 2007, a one-week staff exercise was held with participation of heads of department of all agencies, including Russia and Azerbaidjan. The exercise was carried out in cooperation with project H22 and also aimed at introducing CARICC to the countries, demonstrating its potential in an operational context. Emphasis was on the administrative process, establishing international contact, negotiation, etc. working with and through CARICC.

41. In May 2008, a regional meeting was held in cooperation with project H22 (CARICC) to prepare a regional field exercise, identifying routes, scenarios and resources needed. The exercise was conducted in October 2008, controlling a delivery from Tajikistan, via Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan, to Kazakhstan, with CARICC as the centre for communication and international coordination. This was the first real-time exercise for CARICC, with more than 200 information messages passed through it. The exercise was highly successful, much appreciated by participants and clearly demonstrated the potential, operational value of CARICC.

42. Following receipt of sufficient signatures for the establishment of CARICC as an international organization, project H22 (CARICC) had to prioritize this task and a second exercise was therefore postponed. The exercise was planned to control a delivery from the Iranian border through Azerbaidjan and via the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan, to Kazakhstan, but had to exclude Turkmenistan, as the Government decided not to participate. A working meeting with participating countries was held in August 2009, with CARICC in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in preparation of the exercise, which was carried out in September 2009, tracking a commercial truck through Azerbaidjan, across the Caspian Sea, into Kazakhstan. Also this exercise was successful, strengthened the credibility of CARICC and was appreciated by the governments.

Equipment

43. Identification of a consultant to provide technical advice on equipment commenced at the beginning of 2007. The UNODC roster was searched, but did not contain suitable candidates. Requests were sent to drug control agencies in a wide range of countries, but did not result in a positive response, probably due to the secrecy associated with the expertise and its narrow technical nature, limiting the number of potential candidates.

44. Following contact to the chief of the Russian drug control service in late 2007, two Russian experts were made available from this agency, in-kind. They carried out an assessment in all countries during February 2008 and recommended an equipment standard for each type of agency involved in controlled delivery.⁴ By mid-2008, the report - also identifying a detailed list for each country and organization with equipment specifications and possible vendors - was forwarded to all countries in a transparent process for consideration and preparatory measures to be taken in respect of import (ensuring licences in advance, etc.). By October 2008, the proposed equipment had been accepted by all countries. Local procurement could commence at the end of 2008.

45. Procurement was carried out through the procurement section in ROCA and the UNOV(UNODC) procurement service in Vienna, as procurement through UNOPS had been assessed to take longer and be more costly.

46. As neither the project officer, nor the ROCA procurement section had sufficient technical knowledge, a lengthy and cumbersome process followed in developing, updating and amending terms of reference and handling the required documentation for all equipment in close

⁴ Ministry of interior (national police), ministry of national security, customs and the drug control agency.

consultation with the Russian experts. As vendors for specialized equipment used in undercover operations do not normally register with the UN or check the website for announcements, additional obstacles included difficulties in identifying these. In the cases of undercover voice recorders and masked microphones, vendors did not respond to normal requests, but had to be approached through contacts in the law enforcement sector.

47. Vehicles to be procured for Uzbekistan and Azerbaidjan constituted a special case. To be used for undercover operations, they had to be inconspicuous, and could therefore only be procured from a local supplier. In the case of Uzbekistan, where vehicles are normally bought through immediate payment in cash or with credit card, only GM, Uzbekistan, which produces Uzbek cars locally, could accept UN bank-transfer as payment modality. However, as the company is only allowed to use a GM contract, the UN terms had to be incorporated into this and approved by the cabinet of ministers, as the Government holds more than 50% of the shares in the company. This approval has been obtained and the contract is currently with the UNOV procurement service for final approval (submitted 26 December 2009). The project officer expects that the vehicles, which are awaiting delivery, will be provided in early 2010. According to the project officer in Azerbaidjan, car dealers have problems with the extensive UN procurement form in English, which would furthermore not be a legally binding language in the country.

48. Equipment procured and foreseen to be provided include: inspection equipment (100pcs.), special technical tool for undercover audio recording (40 pcs.), digital voice recorders (100 pcs.), 10 megapixel cameras (10 pcs.), express drug testing kit (200 pcs.), body armour (10 pcs.), vehicles (10 pcs.).

49. At the time of writing this report, only photocameras had started arriving during the month of December. No equipment has yet been provided to beneficiaries.

Implementation

50. The project was approved in October 2004, with a budget of US\$ 1,549,400 and a planned duration of 2 years. Budget components (Excl. PSC) included: personnel: US\$ 173,400, training: US\$ 225,000, equipment: US\$ 899,000, miscellaneous: US\$ 30,700. Operation commenced in July 2005, due to a lengthy clearance process in the recipient countries.

51. From 2005 to 2008, implementation was problematic, as indicated in the table below. (The implementation rate against the initial allocation reflects planned and budgeted activities at the beginning of the year).

Year	Expenditure (US\$)	Implementation rate against final allocation	Implementation rate against initial allocation
2005	11,286	79%	4%
2006	89,499	56%	33.5%
2007	179,257	99%	47.3%
2008	134,819	85%	52.6%
2009	875,900	96%	103%

52. The project was first extended in July 2006, until June 2008, then at that time, extended until the end of 2008, as the recruitment for assessment of equipment needs had taken longer than expected. Realizing this was not sufficient, the project was extended in December 2008, until the end of 2009, in particular to finalize procurement of specialised equipment and training. An allocation is being issued for 2010 to close obligations. According to the project officer, once all payments have been completed, the available funds would have been depleted.

D. Institutional and management arrangements and constraints

53. The overall institutional and management arrangements were generally appropriate, except for the constraints placed on recruitment of the project coordinator, mentioned under section A. *Background and context*, above.

54. As an appropriate UNV could not be identified, it was decided to place responsibility for project management with a national project officer, who commenced in July 2005. At the time of selection, the project officer was closely involved in development of the legal framework for CARICC, through participation in expert group meetings. He continued this function with about 3-4 expert group meetings annually. From September 2006, the project officer was also responsible for the implementation of the NATO/Russia project, to provide training in drug enforcement in general, including controlled delivery. This project is funded by NATO and the Russia Council on an ongoing basis, commencing with funding in the amount of US\$ 920,000, growing over time to currently more than US\$ 3 million and has according to the project officer been somewhat problematic.

55. Whereas the background of the project officer, with an advanced university degree in international law, was technically appropriate for the project's output one, he did not possess the diplomatic weight for a task of the magnitude envisaged. Although his background was to some extent also appropriate for the

procedural elements relating to exercises under output two, it was not so for the law enforcement elements under this output, which required considerable technical expertise and experience with controlled delivery and procurement of specialized equipment in the region. There was no regional law enforcement adviser at ROCA from March 2005 to March 2007, as the adviser at the time, had been appointed to coordinate project H22.

56. Further constraints related to procurement of equipment. Many items were highly technical in nature, had to be agreed with all countries involved, purchased within the region or even locally, for which the UN procurement process is less geared and some items were difficult to obtain, due to their special (undercover) nature and vendors for this reason difficult to identify and approach.

57. The combination of these constraints led to delays in project implementation, limited delivery of training and provision of equipment only after the scheduled completion of the project.

58. Due to the staggered nature of implementation, the problems were not apparent until a late stage and even at that stage the real extent of difficulties only revealed itself step-by-step, with problems seemingly overcome at each step. On this background, the Representative did consider replacing the project officer. However, in weighing the costs in terms of time required for project revision and recruitment of an international coordinator as well as the risk that a person with the right profile might not be identified, decided to refrain from this.⁵

59. Based on, *inter alia*, the experiences with procurement under project F43, ROCA is working with UNDP and UNOV to ensure a more streamlined and rapid procurement process, better tailored to the ROCA projects of which many have equipment components.

60. According to the project officer, the support received from the UNOV procurement service and the ROCA procurement unit was of a high standard and always timely. Technical advice by the ROCA regional law enforcement adviser was also of high standard, often pointing the project officer in the right direction and identifying useful sources for further advice.

61. The project was closely coordinated with project H22 (CARICC). The nature of this appeared to be excellent, with the two projects mutually reinforcing each other. It was also coordinated with the NATO/Russia project, which is likewise managed by the F43 project officer and has provided training in

⁵ The considerations appear to be valid and it should be borne in mind that the main contribution of the project was the exercises involving CARICC, an organization which the project officer was highly familiar and even associated with. Looking back at the cumbersome procurement process, it is also a question, first whether a person with the right expertise – in the narrow, technical subject matter as well as in management of UN procurement processes in a regional project involving six countries – would have been available, second, how much faster the procurement process would have been, and third, to what extent this would have made a significant contribution in the overall context of the project, where the main outcome was determined by the exercises and went beyond the technical elements of the project.

controlled delivery. The project was monitored during implementation and progress reported on a semi-annual basis. Project activities or output components were few, but large and complex in nature and timing therefore set on an ad-hoc basis in consultation with and dependent on the availability of the 29 agencies involved as well as CARICC, in respect of exercises and preparations for these. Once officially set, timetables were kept.

III. OUTCOMES, IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

A. Outcomes

62. The project has made a good contribution to strengthening cooperation and coordination among the countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in carrying out controlled delivery operations. The exercises under the project have built capacity for cooperation among the countries concerned and contributed to enabling CARICC to coordinate international operations and thereby helped ensure its success in initiating and supporting a number of controlled deliveries. Once provided, the equipment will likely enhance national capacities and further strengthen success of operations. The project has also helped lay some foundation for the strengthening of legal frameworks, mechanisms and procedures to ensure cooperation and coordination at national levels. Whether and how to build on this, however, is an internal decision by each country itself.

B. Impact

63. In the likely longer term scenario, the value of CARICC will continue to increase. This would prompt the member states to strengthen cooperation with the organization, adding to its value both in terms of improving controlled delivery operations and intelligence gathering and analysis. To some extent, CARICC might also play a catalytic role in helping overcome trust, turf and rivalization issues among agencies, removing or reducing barriers to cooperation. As both CARICC and the countries will become more experienced with controlled deliveries, thus building up capacities, the likely longer term impact with regard to dismantling drug trafficking groups through controlled delivery operations and other intelligence led efforts could be considerable.

C. Sustainability

64. The main result of the project is the strengthened operational role and capability of CARICC and the related increased capacity of the countries concerned. The self-interest of both in dismantling organized crime and stemming the flow of drugs from Afghanistan, is the main factor for sustainability. As proved by the controlled delivery operations initiated and supported by CARICC, capacity is present and

producing results. Self-interest and the mutually reinforcing factors mentioned above, makes sustainability and likely further consolidation of gains, the most probable scenario.

65. With respect to the foundation laid for improvement of mechanisms and procedures through the manual produced under output one, this preparatory step cannot be undone. The manual will continue to have value as a guideline and basis for development of procedures for some time to come, prompting countries to strengthen their internal systems.

66. Although training activities were carried out on a limited scale and measures to ensure sustainability were not included, it seems that the exchange of experience and creation of international contacts, which were deemed a significant outcome by participants, have helped strengthen national capacities as well as international cooperation and is likely to remain a valuable benefit for some time.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

A. Lessons learned

67. It is important at an early stage of project implementation to revisit objectives and outputs to verify that achievement is realistic.

68. Projects which experience serious implementation problems at an early stage, should be critically reviewed to see if there is a need for complete readjustment of the strategy.

69. It is important to include adequate budget for management in technical cooperation projects, to ensure flexibility in recruitment.

70. Part-time management should be avoided in complex projects or projects which are difficult to implement.

71. In projects which require different types of expertise, it is important that the project document justifies and specifies one type of expertise to be possessed by the project coordinator and include specific measures and budget to ensure availability of other expertise required.

72. Projects which include delivery of specialized equipment should identify the ways and means by which this is to be procured.

73. Whereas building technical capacity in an isolated sense is relatively straightforward, creating cooperation and coordination among countries and organizations is more difficult and might require a

longer-term approach aimed at strengthening facilitating factors rather than attempting to create cooperation and coordination through technical means of a short-term nature.

74. In projects which aim at creating cooperation and coordination among countries and organizations, it is important to ensure real buy-in by beneficiaries as part of project preparation.

B. Best practices

75. In projects with large equipment components it is important that a reliable system on an outsourcing basis is in place and brought on stream at an early stage for fast identification and specification of needs, obtainment of quotations, technical vetting and final procurement and delivery.

76. Unless there are compelling reasons to sequence activities and production of outputs it is best to start activities whenever convenient and possible, irrespective of any order assumed in the project document.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Issues resolved during the evaluation

77. As this was a final evaluation with all activities under completion, no issues were resolved during the evaluation.

B. Actions recommended

78. Although under way, none of the equipment agreed with the countries in October 2008 has been provided.

79. **Recommendation 1:** UNODC, ROCA should take all measures to ensure delivery of equipment under project F43, as soon as possible.

80. Although preparatory steps have been made, there is still a need to ensure achievement of the primary intention of project F43 - to establish legal framework, procedures and related mechanisms for the implementation of controlled deliveries, to strengthen inter-agency information sharing, operational coordination and cooperation.

81. **Recommendation 2:** UNODC, ROCA, should review and strengthen its strategy for promoting improvement of internal frameworks and procedures for information sharing, operational coordination and cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the Central Asian countries.

82. Although progress has been made, there is still a need to build technical capacity in controlled delivery. CARICC officers pointed to a number of shortcomings, due to low level of capacity. There were

no measures in place to ensure sustainability of training. Some governments pointed to the need for training of newcomers. There were no performance indicators at outcome level in the project document.

83. **Recommendation 3:** UNODC, ROCA should ensure continuation of support to capacity building for controlled delivery. Further training should be systematized and sustainability ensured. To facilitate results-based management, performance indicators should be identified at the outcome level.

84. Progress in international cooperation in controlled delivery operations and likely also improvement of national legal frameworks, mechanisms, information sharing, coordination and cooperation is dependent on the success and value of CARICC to its member countries. It is therefore important that the current momentum of CARICC is strengthened and sustained. Termination of project F43 will severely limit the possibilities for CARICC to provide operational support, let alone conduct regional exercises, which have proved effective in building capacity and are desired by governments.

85. **Recommendation 4:** UNODC, ROCA should ensure continuation of support to regional exercises in controlled delivery in the context of the CARICC cooperation and make it possible for CARICC to provide support to ensure success of real operations.

86. Experience and knowledge is being accumulated at various levels and locations in the region. There is potential for systematizing and strengthening this and for capitalizing on it for the purpose of developing skill levels and capacities in a cost-effective manner.

87. **Recommendation 5:** UNODC, ROCA, in the context of the CARICC cooperation, should explore possibilities for systematizing the experience and knowledge being accumulated in the region and support development of skill levels and capacities, based on knowledge transfer within the region.

88. Countries are carrying out evaluations of controlled delivery operations and were generally open to reporting to CARICC on key aspects of these in relation to results-based management.

89. **Recommendation 6:** UNODC, ROCA could initiate joint development of performance indicators, reporting standards, etc. by the countries, CARICC and itself, to support results-based management in relation to possible future interventions for capacity building in the area of controlled delivery.

VI. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

90. Although the project only partially achieved its objective of setting up or developing *national mechanisms and capacities that will allow carrying out controlled deliveries properly*, it was successful beyond what could realistically have been expected at the time it was approved.

91. The project was designed on a wave of optimism, following ratification of the UN drug conventions by the Central Asian countries. It grossly overestimated real commitment by the countries to improve coordination and cooperation, in particular, prospects for gearing internal mechanisms and procedures at national levels to international cooperation, which was the primary track of the project. Its strategy outlined a simple technical path for achievement of an objective over two years, which in reality called for a major diplomatic effort sustained over a long period of time. It failed to provide real guidance on its secondary track, provision of training and equipment, and to provide adequate resources for recruitment of a suitable project coordinator.

92. Technically speaking, the national project officer, who was recruited to manage the project, had qualifications for its primary track, as well as good knowledge of the region, but not the diplomatic weight required to move the issues beyond the preparatory stage. Simultaneously, he did not have technical qualifications for the secondary track, which called for a senior law enforcement officer with experience in controlled delivery and procurement in this area. As, furthermore, the project document did not contain a clear, detailed strategy for achievement of the objective, the project was set for difficulties. These were in turn compounded by the engagement of the project officer as manager of another, quite complex project as well as resource person for frequent expert group meetings on development of the legal framework for CARICC.

93. As the project officer did not have experience with procurement in the highly specialized area of controlled delivery and as the UN procedures are poorly geared for procurement in the region and regional or local vendors poorly prepared for them, the implementation problems were especially visible in this area, with delivery of equipment taking place only after the scheduled completion of the project.

94. That the project after all came out as quite successful, on balance, is only because of its close cooperation with project H22 (CARICC) and realization of the potential for mutual reinforcement between the two projects. The main impact was achieved through the three regional exercises arranged in cooperation with CARICC. These appear to have kickstarted the operational functions of the organization and simultaneously geared the countries towards cooperation with and through it, resulting in more and better executed controlled deliveries. As for its primary track, the project officer did manage to prepare the ground for further progress by producing a reference manual on procedural and other requirements. This manual was well received by the countries, is being used to some extent and might with time lead to improvement of national frameworks and mechanisms.

95. What stands out now, is the potential of CARICC for driving cooperation in controlled delivery and perhaps also for catalyzing improvement of national frameworks and mechanisms. This potential appears to be linked to the strong sense of ownership by and value of CARICC to the member states. The key to further progress is therefore CARICC's ability to maintain momentum and demonstrate value.

96. What remains, following the delivery of equipment and closure of the project, is therefore a need to enable CARICC to continue the operational functions made possible by project F43 and, in particular, organize exercises in controlled delivery and initiate, coordinate and support real operations.

Annex 1.



TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PROJECT TERMINAL EVALUATION

PROJECTS TITLE Assistance in Developing Controlled Delivery Techniques (TD/RER/F43)
& NUMBER: Strengthening border control along the Turkmen-Afghan border, in particular at Imam-Nazar checkpoint (TD/TKM/I78)

1. BACKGROUND

In line with UNODC's Strategic Programme Framework for Central Asia (2008 – 2011), the UNODC assistance in Central Asia targets seven main sectors, as follows:

- I. Improved regional coordination
- II. Mutual Legal Assistance
- III. Enhanced information / intelligence collection, analysis and exchange
- IV. Effective regional precursor chemical control
- V. Strengthened border control & cross-border cooperation
- VI. Effective responses to drug abuse and HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care
- VII. Strengthened national capacities in countering transnational organized crime (i.e. human trafficking and smuggling of migrants), corruption, money laundering & terrorism

Of these areas, counter-narcotics enforcement (CNE) is by far the largest operation and is considered strategically important to the region. The CNE projects with varying objectives account for 88 percent of the region's total portfolio.

Two of CNE projects are planned to be finalized in December, 2009 and subject to the Terminal Evaluation according to the UNDOC Rules and Regulations:

- ▶ RER/F43 - "Assistance in developing Controlled Delivery Techniques"

Budget (US\$)	1,723,000
Duration	2005 – 2009
Funding shortfall (US\$)	173,000

The project assists the MOU member states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Azerbaijan) to set up and/or develop national mechanisms and capacities to carry out controlled deliveries. This will, in turn, enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies in the region to dismantle the criminal networks involved in illicit drug trafficking. The project also assists the MOU member states in improving their ability to detect sources and destinations of drug shipments, as well as to identify national, regional and international trafficking routes. By doing so the project serves as one of the key elements for effective implementation of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre

(CARICC) initiative one of the objectives of which is the assistance in creating regional mechanisms for joint operations including controlled deliveries through the network of liaison officers seconded to CARICC from participating states.

In the line with its immediate objective, the project provided support in setting up the legal framework, procedures and mechanism for controlled delivery operations; and provision of trainings and specialized equipment to the beneficiary countries.

In 2007, the project was evaluated as part of the cluster evaluation of several UNODC Counter Narcotics projects in Central Asia. Findings and recommendations of the evaluation team has been taken into consideration in further project implementation. Monitoring of the project achievements was regularly carried out by the Project Steering group consisting recipient Government, donor country and UNODC.

▶ TKM/I78 - “Immediate assistance to Turkmenistan for the strengthening of activities at Imam Nazar checkpoint at the Turkmen -Afghan border”

Budget (US\$)	2,299,700
Duration	2006 – July 2010
Funding shortfall (US\$)	Fully funded

One of the most important border crossings between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan is Imam-Nazar even though the road infrastructure is extremely poor. This border crossing is confronted with an increasing stream of cargo and passengers but there are inadequate facilities, limited technical equipment and a lack of professional training available to Customs Officers and Border Guards.

This project aims at a significant improvement of interdiction capacities against illicit trafficking across the Afghan-Turkmen border. Its immediate objectives are: development of border infrastructure and facilitation of enforcement cooperation and coordination at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint.

Similar to RER/F43 project the TKM/I78 project was evaluated as part of the of the cluster evaluation of several UNODC Counter Narcotics projects in Central Asia. Findings and recommendations of the evaluation team has been taken into consideration in further project implementation. Monitoring of the project achievements was regularly carried out by the Project Steering group consisting recipient Government, donor country and UNODC.

2.PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

In compliance with the project document, the external terminal evaluation is initiated by UNODC to provide insights that will help UNODC increase the effectiveness and impact of its technical and training assistance. Since both RER/F43 and TKM/I78 projects were focused on strengthening interdiction capacities at the main drug trafficking routes and at enhancing

regional operational cooperation it was decided to evaluate both projects together. This would help UNODC to have a broader picture of the border control assistance provided by the regional project as well as a deeper insight on the implementation of a particular project at the national level.

Keeping this in mind, the evaluation is expected to assess the extent of:

- the relevance of projects in the context of government priorities and needs,
- the alignment of projects with UNODC's strategic instruments e.g. strategic programme framework,
- the appropriateness of projects strategies and activities as the most effective UNODC measure for reducing illicit drug trafficking
- the effectiveness of projects, i.e. to what extent have the objectives of the projects been achieved?

The evaluation findings should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system to support a results-based management of the projects. The evaluation should provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project.

The evaluation report will be shared with relevant units of UNODC (including IEU), government counterparts, and the donor countries.

3. EVALUATION SCOPE

The terminal evaluation covers the activities of the projects implemented in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from actual date of the start up to December 2009. In particular, the specific areas of evaluation should cover the following:

- (1) Overall assessment of the project (context and rationale)
 - To what extent have the projects been developed and implemented within the framework of the existing UNODC strategic instruments such as the Rainbow Strategy
 - To what extent are the projects logic, concept and approaches appropriate and relevant to achieving the government policies and objectives?
 - What were the intended results, supporting projects/activities, inputs and processes required? Risks and assumptions considered?
 - To what extent complementarities and synergies of the projects with other projects implemented by UNODC in the Central Asia and Azerbaijan created?

- (2) Attainment of the projects objective
 - To what extent have the projects achieved their intended objective to date?
 - What is the evidence of the law enforcement agency having strengthened its capacities to counter drug trafficking?
 - Evidence of relevant national officers and personnel trained by the projects have improved their operational skills and knowledge and have utilized them on their day-to-day assignments?

- (3) Implementation strategy (operational plan, monitoring and evaluation)

- Do the projects have a clearly identified specific target group(s) and measurable objectives in the programme documents?
- To what extent have the projects implementation processes been effective and efficient in achieving the overall objective? Have the programme managers adapted to change, by adjusting the programme design and direction, when deemed necessary?
- Have the resources been mobilized and utilized efficiently?
- Is there an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor and assess the overall progress of the project? How have programme achievements and lessons learned been disseminated to the stakeholders?

(4) Achievement of outcomes and outputs

- Have the law enforcement personnel been trained as intended by the project with capacity building objectives? Assess training quality and utilization of training
- What are the immediate changes brought about by the projects in the country? Any specific evidence documented?

(5) Institutional and management arrangements (backstopping and support mechanisms regional and field offices, national governments and other local counterparts)

- What are the specific roles and responsibilities of staff at region, field office, country, donors and other partners in implementing and managing the projects?
- Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by the relevant parties (administrative / managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?
- What are the potential challenges that may prevent the operations from producing intended results?

(6) Impacts (long-term effects)

- What are the potential impacts of the projects?
- To what extent can the project expect to achieve the positive impacts based on projects results observed at the moment?

(7) Sustainability

- To what extent are the projects interventions sustainable?
- What concrete actions or measures have been taken, or are required, to ensure the sustainability of national agencies established / supported by the projects (e.g. structural, managerial and behavioural change)?
- To what extent have the findings and recommendations from the past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified
- Is there adequate local commitment to support policy change?

(8) Lessons learned and best practices

- What are the best practices (if any) documented during the current operations?
- What specific lessons (if any) can UNODC draw from the projects experiences?

4. EVALUATION METHODS

The evaluation of the project will be based on the following:

1. The study of relevant strategic and project documents (project proposals, project reports; progress reports, reports produced by outside experts; mid-term and thematic evaluation report, statistics on drug seizures etc.);
2. Where necessary, initial briefing by responsible UNODC staff in the Regional

- Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent;
3. Interview of training participants
 4. Interviews with the officers from the national counterparts under projects, UNODC Project Managers and other relevant personnel, and, where it is necessary and required, donors ;
 5. Visit to the Imam-Nazar check point in Turkmenistan under TKM/I78 project and verification that the procured border protection and surveillance equipment is being properly used and handled.

In conducting the evaluation, the evaluator needs to take account of relevant international standards, including “Guiding principles for evaluation at UNODC”, “Standards of evaluation in the UN system”, and “Norms for evaluations in the UN system”.

Upon completion of the fact-finding and analysis phase, a draft evaluation report will be prepared. The draft should be circulated to the parties for comments. The evaluator may choose to take the comments into account in producing the final report, for which he/she will be solely responsible.

Quality assurance is provided by the Core Learning Partners. Their role is to review these very TOR, including the methodology of the evaluation, the draft report and final report. The consultant will consider comments received and will reflect them, as appropriate, without compromising her independence and impartiality. While the Project Managers are also part of the Core Learning Partners, their role is also to manage the process and logistics of the evaluation, while the Independent Evaluation Unit at HQ backstops this evaluation and approves the selection of the consultants, the methodology as well as the draft and final reports.

5. COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION MISSION

The terminal evaluation of the projects will be carried out by an independent evaluator proposed by the project managers and appointed by the UNODC.

The donors to the projects may participate in the evaluation as observer. Costs associated with the evaluation will be borne by the projects. All costs for a donor appointed observer will be borne by the donor government directly. It is expected, for example, that representatives of the US Embassy in Turkmenistan will join the evaluation team. (excellent paragraph – who will you be inviting?)

The evaluator shall act independently in his/her individual capacity, and not as a representative of the government or organization which appointed him/her. The independent evaluator should adhere to the independence and impartiality of the evaluation process discussed in the UNODC guiding principle for evaluation. The evaluator therefore will not have been involved in the development, implementation or monitoring of the project neither will he not be rendering any service to UNODC in near future, to avoid conflicts of interest due to potential future involvement. The report will be prepared by the independent evaluator.

The evaluator should have the following qualifications:

A minimum first-level university degree and a minimum of 10 years of relevant work experience in, or ii) in lieu of a first-level university degree, minimum of 10 years of professional experience in, at least one of the following areas:

- Developing evaluation methodologies and carrying out evaluations, including the drafting and finalization of evaluation reports.

- Law enforcement / cross border operations (with knowledge of technical equipment for border control e.g. x-rays and other search tools, and drug testing kits) / customs / paramilitary operations
 - Institutional capacity building / organizational management / training of law enforcement personnel
 - Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
- Preference will be given to candidates who have had prior experiences with UNODC project evaluation(s) in the area of drug law enforcement and capacity building, or those who have similar experiences with any other regional/international organizations. (careful! The evaluator's impartiality and independence is key)
 - Experience in conducting independent evaluations (if possible, within the UN system);
 - Familiarity with the drug control situation in Turkmenistan and/or Central Asia;
 - Knowledge of bilateral/multilateral technical cooperation, particularly in counter-narcotic enforcement issues
 - Excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English. Knowledge of Russian will be considered as an asset.

6. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The evaluator will be briefed and debriefed on the projects by the Regional Office in Tashkent (ROCA). The UNODC Project Coordinators will also provide necessary substantive and administrative support.

Although the evaluator should be free to discuss all matters relevant to her/his assignment with the authorities concerned, the incumbent is not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of UNODC or the Government.

The evaluator will submit a draft report to UNODC Headquarters – the Independent Evaluation Unit, and to ROCA, as well as to all “Core Learning Partners”. The report will contain the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team as well as a recording of the lessons learned during projects implementation.

The evaluator is expected to present (a) A detailed evaluation plan/matrix before starting the mission;(b) the evaluation methodology, including tools, templates, sample size, use of monitoring data, etc (c) A draft evaluation report should also be sent to the Independent Evaluation Unit, UNODC Vienna, for their review, prior to its finalization and (c) A final evaluation report, incorporating all comments and feedback on the draft report provided by the consultant.

The evaluation expert, while considering the comments provided on the draft, would use its independent judgment in preparing the final report.

The final report should be submitted to UNODC no later than three weeks upon completion of the mission. The report should be no longer than 15 pages, excluding annexes and the executive summary. The report will be distributed by UNODC as required to the governmental authorities and respective donors.

The expected timetable of Evaluation Mission as follows:

3 Working day in ROCA, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

20 working days in projects' countries;

8 working days for writing the draft and final evaluation report

The suggested date for the evaluation mission: **December 2009**

The mission will include the meetings with the national authorities, the donor countries and visiting the selected project sites.

7. PAYMENT

The Evaluators will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures.

The fee for the services will be defined according to the UN rules and procedures and depending from the qualification of the candidate, but shall not exceed 750 USD per day.

The projects will cover all the cost related to travel of evaluator and provide him/her with tDSA for each location based on the UN rates established for each location to be visited.

The fee will be paid only after the final report is accepted by the UNODC.

8. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

- Timely and accurate submission of the documents.
- Substantive and linguistic quality of the documents prepared.
- Conformity of the project evaluation report with the standard format and guidelines for the preparation of project evaluation reports and technical guidance received.
- Report should contain recommendations for future course of action.

Annex 2

List of persons interviewed and field visit schedule

6 December 2009: Arrival Baku, Azerbaidjan

7 December:

Mr. Alakparov Adil Adalat, Deputy Chief, Central Administrative Board, Drug Enforcement Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs

Mr. Mammadli Elshad Khagani, Senior Criminal Intelligence Officer, Drug Enforcement Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs

8 December:

Unofficial meeting with Government official

UNODC:

Mr. Fuad Hashim-zadeh, Projects Coordinator

8 December: Arrival Ashgabat, Turkmenistan

10 December

Field visit to "Imam Nazar" border crossing point

Mr. Gurban Annayev - Head of Customs

Mr. Annamyrat Kakajanov - Head of Border Guards

11 December

Turkmenabat, Regional Customs Department

Mr. Dovran Nepesov - Head of Customs Department

Mr. Dovlet Bayryyev - Deputy Head

Mr. Rahman Jorakuliyev - Senior Inspector, responsible for "Imam Nazar" check-point

16 December

Meeting with Government officials

Ashgabat, State Customs Service, Conference Hall

Mr. Maksat Kakaliyev - Chief of Department, State Customs Service

Mr. Babayev - major, State Border Guards Service

Mr. Agagul Berdfyyeva - Head of Department, Ministry of Interior

Ms. Chary Garajayev - Chief of Division, Ministry of Interior

Mr. Shatlyk Orazmamedov - Officer of the Ministry for the National Security

Mr. Pena Nurgeldiyev - Senior Inspector, State Migration Service

Mr. Meylis Begliyev - Senior Inspector, State Migration Service

Mr. Nurmuhamed Yusupov - Head of Department, State Drug Control Service

Mr. Gulnabat Baylyyeva - Head of Department, State Drug Control Service Mr.

Merdan Annagulyyev - Senior Inspector, State Drug Control Service

UNODC Project Office, Ashgabat:

Mr. Ercan Saka - Head of UNODC Office in Turkmenistan and Project Coordinator, I78

Mr. Chary Atayev - National Project Officer

International community in Turkmenistan:

United States of America

United Kingdom

Mr. George Scott, Deputy Head of Mission

Turkey

Ms. Muzaffer Uyav Gültekin, Third Secretary

OSCE

Ms. Anne Suotula, Political Officer

18 December: Arrival Almaty, Kazakhstan

UNODC Project H22 (CARICC):

Mr. Farkhudin Jonmakhmadov, Head, Division for Assistance in International Operation

Mr. Alikber Abdullayev, Specialist, Division for Assistance in International Operation

Mr. Uygun Gaipov, Specialist, Division for Assistance in International Operation

UNODC:

Ms.National Project Officer

18 December: Arrival Astana, Kazakhstan

19 December:

UNODC Project H22 (CARICC):

Mr. Beksultan Sarsekov, Director, CARICC

20 December

Drug control agency, Ministry of Internal Affairs:

Mr. Altai Boshanov - Deputy head of committee,

Mr. Mukhammed-Ali Saparov - Officer of Drug related crime investigation department

Mr. Essymbek Atalikhov - officer of Interagency cooperation department

Customs Control committee, Ministry of finance:

Mr. Alexandr Balakleyets - Head of Anti-drug smuggling department, Anti-smuggling division

National Security committee:

Mr. German Didenko - Head of International drug trafficking division

UNODC:

Mr. Azhar Bergeneva, National Project Officer,

21 December: Arrival Almaty, Kazakhstan

22 December: Arrival Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Mr. Kumushbek Kurmanaliev, Head of Drug Control Department, Customs Committee

23 December:

Mr. Talantbek Kurbanov, Head, Counter Organized Crime Department, Ministry of Interior

UNODC:

Mr, National Project Officer

23 December: Arrival Dushanbe, Tajikistan

24 December:

Mr. Bukhoriev Mansur Gaibovich, Chief, Anti-Drug Smuggling Department, Ministry of Interior

Mr. Nazarov Rustam, Urmanovich, Director, Drug Control Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan

Mr. Vaiciddin A. Azamatov, First Deputy Director, Drug Control Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan

Mr. Rahmatov Nematboy Sanginov, First Deputy, Customs Services

25 December:

Mr. Zaripov Davlat Nuralievich, Chief, Terrorism Administration, State Committee for National Security

UNODC:

Mr. Gary O'Hara, International Project Coordinator, Law Enforcement

Mr....., National Project Officer

26 December: Arrival Tashkent, Uzbekistan

28 December:

Mr. Uralov - Deputy Head of the Unit, National Security Service;

Mr. Erkabaev - Chief of the Department, National Center on Drug Control;

Mr. Duliev - Expert, National Center on Drug Control;

Mr. Musaev - Chief of Unit , State Customs Service;

Mr. Djangaziev - Deputy Head of Department , MoI

UNODC, ROCA, Tashkent

Mr. James Callahan, UNODC Representative, ROCA

Mr. Farkhad Sabirov, National Project Officer, Project F43

13 December: Departure Tashkent, Uzbekistan – end of mission

ANNEX 3

Evaluation assessment questionnaire

Project/programme title: Assistance in Developing Controlled Delivery Techniques

Project/programme number: AD/RER/F43

The evaluators are required to rate each of the items shown below on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest), as follows:

- 5 = Excellent (90-100 per cent)
- 4 = Very good (75-89 per cent)
- 3 = Good (61-74 per cent)
- 2 = Fair (50-60 per cent)
- 1 = Unsatisfactory (0-49 per cent)

These ratings are based on the findings of the evaluation and thus are a translation of the evaluation results.

A.	Planning	Rating				
		1	2	3	4	5
1.	Project design (clarity, logic, coherence)		x			
2.	Appropriateness of overall strategy	x				
3.	Achievement of objectives			x		
4.	Fulfilment of prerequisites by Government		x			
5.	Adherence to project duration	x				
6.	Adherence to budget			x		

B.	Implementation	Rating				
		1	2	3	4	5
7.	Quality and timeliness of UNODC inputs	x				
8.	Quality and timeliness of government inputs			x		
9.	Quality and timeliness of third-party inputs					
10.	UNODC headquarters support (administration, management, backstopping)			x		
11.	UNODC field office support (administration, management, backstopping)			x		
12.	Executing agency support			x		

C.	Results	Rating				
		1	2	3	4	5

13.	Attainment, timeliness and quality of outputs		x			
14.	Achievement, timeliness and quality of outcomes			x		
15.	Programme/project impact				x	
16.	Sustainability of results/benefits					x

D.	Recommendations <i>The evaluator should choose ONE of the four options below.</i>	Rating				
	Continue/extend without modifications					
	Continue with modifications					
	Revise project completely					
	End project	x				

E.	Comments Provide relevant explanations and comment on issues such as clarification, replicability, best practices etc. Although the project itself should be terminated following completion of activities (delivery of equipment), support to capacity building for controlled delivery should continue, in particular, in the context of the CARICC cooperation.
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Annex 4

CARICC in the context of regional capacity building for cooperation in controlled delivery

CARICC is materializing as an organization, with growing capacity and value to member states and a progressively evolving role. The member countries have a high degree of confidence in and satisfaction with CARICC as well as a strong sense of ownership of the organization. The benefits to CARICC from project F43 have been significant and enhanced its operational capacity. CARICC has so far initiated and supported 16 international controlled delivery operations with successful results and thereby demonstrated value. These, however, revealed that there are problems with information sharing and that internal procedures continue to create obstacles and hamper effective cooperation and coordination. Also, it is apparent, that capacities of member countries need strengthening. CARICC does not have funds for training, exercises and operational support. The financial resources of member countries are strained. Through the cooperation with project F43, these shortcomings could be overcome, but as the project is being completed, it leaves a void behind. The success of CARICC is dependent on the value to member countries. In addition to demonstrating value through its activities, recent experiences with media reporting on a completed case, suggest that more systematic use of mass media can help raise the profile of CARICC and inform a broader audience of activities and results.

CARICC is being established through UNODC project H22, *Establishment of a Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)*, since the end of 2004. It is to serve as a regional focal point for communication, analysis and exchange of operational information in “real time” on cross-border crime, as well as a center for organization and coordination of joint operations. On November 1, 2007 the Centre started its limited operations within a "pilot phase" pending the CARICC Agreement entering into force. This took place on 22 March 2009. CARICC was officially inaugurated in its new, secure building in Almaty, provided by Kazakhstan, on 9 December 2009.

Along with its main objective, the project was also to promote capacity building of national drug intelligence units through close coordination with UNODC project AD/RER/F23 “*Drug law enforcement systems for information, intelligence analysis and exchange*”. Similarly, the CARICC project was to be coordinated with project F43, *Assistance in developing controlled delivery techniques*, to support development of capacities.

CARICC is coordination body for four branches of national law enforcement agencies. According to its Director, the role of CARICC has not yet been identified.

Countries mentioned that they were to an increasing extent benefitting from information from or coordination of controlled delivery operations with CARICC and expressed increased goodwill towards the organisation and willingness to cooperate with it, although not all agencies were aware of CARICC’s operational role. Uzbekistan is the only country which has not yet ratified the agreement establishing CARICC, but law enforcement agencies expect this to happen in the near future. Turkmenistan was the first country to ratify the agreement, confirming the change of course towards international engagement and has contributed staff as well as liaison officers to the organization. According to CARICC, Turkmenistan is providing information, but has difficulties, due to complex internal procedures. Kyrgyzstan has benefitted from CARICC and stressed that controlled delivery operations are dependent on rapid communication. Kyrgyzstan (Customs) have previously had to cancel or postpone operations, due to slow information flow, but sees CARICC as an instrument to minimize bureaucracy, assure speedy communication and increase the chances of success. Agencies in Tajikistan expressed the same opinion and see a strong operational role for CARICC as well as a role in ensuring complete feedback of

information from destination countries upon completion of controlled deliveries. One Tajik agency, however, also mentioned that when only two countries are involved, there is no need for CARICC. In such cases, the agency would rely on bilateral communication lines. Agencies would in general like to see CARICC continue exercises similar to those initiated by project F43. One agency would like to see exercises of a more difficult and complex nature.

Since its pilot phase, CARICC has been gaining considerable momentum. Currently staffing is at 32, including support staff and liaison officers. Whereas a division for analysis has been in operation since the pilot phase, a division for operational activities commenced work in August 2009. Liaison officers are supposed to represent all law enforcement agencies in a country and facilitate communication and coordination with all of them. To ensure this, countries are represented by two liaison officers, normally drawn from the two main competent authorities. Liaison officers make it possible for countries to maintain day-to-day communications with CARICC, strengthening the sense of ownership.

The crucial information base of CARICC is growing day by day. Information and data are increasingly being provided by member states - and are improving in quality and operational value. CARICC expects that this will be accelerated when the organisation moves into the new, secure building in February, 2010, where member states can be reassured of the safe storage and handling of classified information, and when an additional agreement on “*exchange and protection of operations and secret information*”, currently under finalization, has been made with members. Observer countries, such as Turkey, also provide information and through agreements with and observer status for organizations, such as Interpol and WCO, the access of CARICC to external databases is increasing. It is expected that Afghanistan will acquire observer status in the near future. This will significantly strengthen the work of CARICC.

Since its pilot phase, CARICC has initiated and supported 16 international controlled delivery operations. These have led to 27 arrests, disruption of 16 criminal groups and seizure of 220 kg of heroin. The results of analyses following each operation are fed back to member states.

Although there has been improvement of the legal framework for cooperation, in particular in the sense that legislation in all countries allows participation in controlled deliveries, CARICC officers pointed out that the 16 cases had revealed problems with information sharing also at national level and that internal procedures continue to create obstacles and hamper effective cooperation and coordination. At times procedures are contradictory among countries and reference is sometimes made to established practice or procedures which do not exist in writing. In February, CARICC will hold a meeting with heads of agencies on how best to ensure coordination of joint operations. A related technical obstacle is that not all countries are aware that CARICC uses “interpol 1-24/7” or “WCO CENCOMM 2” for secure communication.

In the opinion of CARICC officers, capacities of member countries need strengthening. Experience and skill levels vary and can be quite low. Lack of right equipment has at times hampered operations. In respect of surveillance, for instance, there have been cases where an undercover vehicle has had to give up control of a drug transport, as there were only those two vehicles on the road and the operation was becoming obvious. Tracking equipment could have helped in such situations. In respect of communication, there have been cases of breakdown, due to sudden lack of mobile network coverage. Satellite telephones could have ensured communication. Quite often, controlled deliveries are stopped too early and the full benefits of operations not reaped. For instance, when drug transports have entered big cities or at airports, where law enforcement agencies have been afraid of losing control. Better surveillance equipment and training could help remedy this situation. CARICC officers suggested that some equipment could be available with CARICC and lent out to member states for specific operations.

According to CARICC staff, the benefits from project F43 have been significant, especially from the two exercises in 2008 and 2009. These enabled CARICC to establish communication channels with competent authorities and test the communication and information exchange mechanism in practice and in a real-time situation, using the secure channels. Subsequently, the exercises ensured success of real operations, where the mechanisms were used. Project F43 also benefitted from CARICC, in particular from its good links with the competent authorities. There is a need for more training of officers involved in coordination. CARICC does not have operational funds and cannot finance training, exercises and

operational support. The financial resources of member countries are strained. Through the cooperation with project F43, these shortcomings could to some extent be overcome.

The Director of CARICC sees the way forward and the prospects of moving the governments in the right direction, as dependent on the value CARICC can demonstrate to the countries. After the last controlled delivery, information was released to the mass media and the case extensively reported. Although the secrecy of the information handled poses some constraints, continuing such practice could increase the attention and interest of governments. This would suggest the need for development of a carefully tailored communications strategy.