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# FINAL EVALUATION

TD/TKM/I78

Strengthening border control along the Turkmen-Afghan border,  
in particular at Imam-Nazar checkpoint

Rule of Law

Turkmenistan

**Report of the evaluation team**

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

BLO	Border Liaison Office
BCP	Border Crossing Point
CARICC	Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre
DCA	Drug Control Agency
EU	European Union
LEA	Law Enforcement Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ROCA	(UNODC) Regional Office for Central Asia
SDCC	State Drug Control Commission
SPF	Strategic Programme Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
WCO	World Customs Organization

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## Summary matrix of findings, supporting evidences and recommendations

Findings: problems and issues identified	Supporting evidences	Recommendations
1. There are clearly prospects for making progress with the Government on vital strategic issues through a sustained diplomatic effort.	Concrete progress by the Government in accepting and supporting the concept of cross-border cooperation as well as indication of continuing movement in a favourable direction on this issue, in particular reflected at the level of individual agencies. Advantage could be taken of Turkmenistan's strong interest in and commitment to securing its borders and strengthening controls, closer integration in the Paris Pact Initiative (as e.g. demonstrated by its rapid ratification of the agreement establishing CARICC and the support to the development of the violet paper) and overall ambition of gradually opening up to the world.	UNODC should continue and, if possible, enhance efforts to influence the position of the Turkmen Government on cross-border cooperation and information sharing, by systematically applying the wide range of diplomatic channels and opportunities - such as visits by the Executive Director, the Representative or senior headquarters staff, meetings and events under the various strategic arrangements and agreements in the region - in support of the efforts at the local level by the project office.
2. Progress has been made by project I78 in strengthening controls at the Turkmen border with Afghanistan in a sustainable manner and an important foundation has been laid for progress in strengthening other key border points, such as at Farab. Progress has also been made in cross-border cooperation, in spite of the sensitivities of this subject and opened potential prospects for further progress. Project J92 and K22 makes it possible to build on and continue this work and are therefore fully supported by the evaluation.	Findings presented throughout the evaluation report as well as the project documents of J92 and K22.	UNODC should continue the support to Turkmenistan and its neighbouring countries in strengthening border control and cross-border cooperation, in particular, through project TKM J92 and XAC K22, building on the achievements and experiences reaped under project I78.
3. The cumbersome communication and approval system, whereby all requests to the Government have to be sent through the ministry of foreign affairs, is not conducive to project implementation.	Information from project staff, donors and other UN agencies.	UNODC, at the level of the Executive Director, senior HQ staff and the Representative, ROCA should continuously raise the issue with the Government of having the State Drug Control Commission identified as the entry point for UNODC communication with the Government.
4. Due to the strong economic development in Turkmenistan over the last years, donors appear to be increasingly hesitant with respect to funding of technical assistance.	Assessment by the project coordinator, certain donors and UN sister agencies. Given Turkmenistan's high level of support for Afghan development in the area across the border and given the strengthened capacity for border control in Turkmenistan, one way forward in cross-border cooperation could be to build UNODC assistance around a Turkmen assistance component for development of border controls in Afghanistan. Turkmen funding of conferences on cross-border cooperation points to cost-sharing as a realistic option, if benefits are deemed sufficient.	ROCA/the project office should explore possibilities for a future partnership on a cost-sharing basis with Turkmenistan, including for support to Afghanistan in border control.
5. Lack of information has hampered monitoring and evaluation at the	Due to secrecy of this type of information, the Government has so	At an early stage of the follow-up project, J92, performance indicators at

Findings: problems and issues identified	Supporting evidences	Recommendations
outcome level of project I78. Although a range of performance indicators are identified in project J92, it might be difficult to obtain much information from the Government. Efforts should nevertheless be made to ensure this.	far not been in able to provide it.	the objective and outcome levels should be discussed and agreed with the Government, and base-line data identified, based on the indicators in the project document as well as what other information the Government might be able to offer.
6. It was difficult to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of training activities.	Absense of performance indicators at the outcome level and of skills and knowledge acquirement in evaluations of training activities.	To strengthen assessment of training results, evaluation of skills acquired from training events, should be included in evaluations.
7. In building on the achievements of project I78, project J92 realizes that a certain measure of training capacity is now in place in Turkmenistan and that therefore only advanced training is required by the project. It is important, nevertheless, to ensure that this training responds to the needs expressed by some agencies during this evaluation for up-to-date information on concealment methods.	Customs and Ministry of Interior expressed a need for up-to-date information and trainings on concealment methods.	In tailoring training under project J92, focus on contemporary concealment methods should be ensured.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

i. To help stem the trafficking of drugs and precursor chemicals across the border between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, the project, which commenced in mid-2006, as a national UNODC project in Turkmenistan, was *to develop border infrastructure at the (Turkmen) Imam-Nazar border checkpoint and strengthen border control capacity of law enforcement agencies* (immediate objective 1). In doing so, it was *to facilitate effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination at the checkpoint* (immediate objective 2). In addition, the project in April 2008 was expanded to include promotion of *cross border cooperation between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan through the establishment of a Border-Liaison Office at the Imam-Nazar border check point* (immediate objective 3). The total budget came to approximately US\$ 2.3 million. The project was completed in December 2009. The duration had been 3 ½ years. The project was to complement assistance by the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), constructing a new building for border control at Imam-Nazar.

ii. The project document reflects a relatively straightforward strategy, with focus on one border checkpoint, but has little emphasis on outcome and does not include performance indicators at this level, hampering results-based management and evaluation.

iii. The project is relevant and fully in line with Government plans and priorities, and with the UNODC regional strategy for West and Central Asia and the strategic programme framework for Central Asia, 2008-2011, in particular pursuing strategic objective 5, *strengthened border control and cross-border cooperation*. In 2007, it became embodied in the *Paris Pact initiative*, included in the *violet paper* of the *rainbow strategy*.

### Delivery and achievement of objectives

iv. The project has clearly made a contribution to achievement of **strategic objective 5**. Although the emphasis of achievement has been on strengthened border control, rather than cross-border cooperation, the project has also made headway in respect of the latter, which is a highly sensitive issue for the Turkmen Government, and in particular improved the ground with the Government for further progress.

v. The project has fully achieved **immediate Objective 1**: *To develop border infrastructure at the Imam-Nazar border checkpoint and strengthen the border control capacity of law enforcement agencies*. With respect to effectiveness and impact on cross-border trafficking, however, lack of information, such as e.g. seizure data, limits evaluation.

vi. A large amount of well-identified and selected infrastructural, non-infrastructural and specialized equipment was effectively delivered and installed, as necessary. A total of 196 Law enforcement officers received relevant training. In delivering the outputs, measures had been included to ensure sustainability.

vii. **Immediate Objective 2**, to *facilitate effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination at the Imam- Nazar border checkpoint*, has not been attained in the manner envisaged in the project document. Attainment was not realistic, as inter-agency coordination is considered a strictly internal matter. However, it seems that the project, through its multiagency approach, in general has promoted coordination and cooperation at the checkpoint.

viii. In conjunction with the aim of establishing a formal mechanism at Imam-Nazar, the activities identified in the project document indicated that this should be done “*with possible involvement of the Afghan counterparts*”. Cross-border cooperation is a sensitive issue, as Turkmenistan is a neutral country and aims at isolating itself from conflicts and acts of terrorism in the region. The border with Afghanistan is particularly sensitive. In spite of this, the project coordinator managed to make considerable progress in this area based on a step-by-step approach - first broadening the cross-border concept to include all neighbouring countries, introducing comprehensive conferences on cross-border cooperation, which now seem to have become an established practice, with funding from the Government itself, then securing Afghan participation in training events, and finally convening a joint Turkmen-Afghan meeting on cross-border cooperation.

ix. **Immediate objective 3** reflected a further expansion of the project ambitions: to *promote cross-border cooperation between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan through the establishment of border liaison offices at Imam-Nazar checkpoint*. Like in the case of immediate objective 2, attainment of the third objective was not fully realistic, given the position of the Government and was not achieved. There was some indication that the project has promoted the issues and moved the position of the Government in a direction more favourable to the BLO concept, in particular among agencies directly involved in border control, thereby laying some foundation for potential future progress.

## **Implementation**

x. Implementation did not gain momentum before March 2007, following the formation of a new Government. Conditions in Turkmenistan, however, were difficult. No international or foreign agency has direct access to national agencies. The official channel of contact is through the Ministry of Foreign affairs. All activities have had to be approved on a case-by-case basis, necessitating careful planning.

xi. Adjusting to this reality, the project, In April 2008, was extended by 16 months until July 2009. Whereas at the end of 2006, the implementation rate was at 21%, it grew in 2007, to 94% and in 2008, to 95%. By the end of 2009, the project will have been completed with a balance of about US\$ 61,000.

xii. As a complementary measure going beyond the project itself, the project coordinator took initiative to activate law enforcement donor coordination meetings and law enforcement round table meetings. These make it possible for donors to receive information directly from the Government, coordinate activities and avoid duplication.

### **Main outcome**

xiii. The increased capacity at the Imam-Nazar border crossing has seemingly led to both increased seizures and to traffickers avoiding the checkpoint and the border controlled from this by the Border Guard. Unfortunately, however, lack of statistics makes it difficult to substantiate this. Capacity for training in drug law enforcement, in particular basic training has been raised. A coordinated approach to training has been promoted. The project has likely also increased the awareness of the benefits of a multi-agency approach to e.g. training. Coordination between donors and the Government as well as among the donors has been enhanced and according to donors contributed to increasing aid effectiveness.

xiv. With respect to the achieved level of capacity for border control, sustainability is high, the main driving factor being the strong interest of the Government in border control, which is also a security issue. Another factor for sustainability is the built-in elements for this in the activities of the project. As for the headway made in the area of cross-border cooperation, the knowledge and interest generated among law enforcement agencies might continue its momentum, but would probably not reach the state of concrete cooperation without external encouragement and support. The increased level of coordination among the international community and the Government is fully dependent on continuation of the UNODC presence and is very much linked to the project coordinator himself.

### **Lessons learned and best practices**

xv. Placing the goal posts of a project at an unrealistic level in areas of strategic importance might open a possibility to step by step push barriers and create important progress. It is possible to make progress with a government through sustained dialogue on sensitive issues such as cross-border cooperation. In achieving results, a combination of political sense, diplomatic skills and ability to improvise and ensure implementation can be more important than technical skills, even in implementing projects of a highly technical nature. In projects with large equipment components it is important that a reliable system on an outsourcing basis is in place and brought on stream at an early stage for rapid identification and specification of needs, obtainment of quotations, technical vetting

and final procurement and delivery. In narrow law enforcement projects, broadening training to take into account needs for rotation of law enforcement staff might help ensure sustainability. When technical capacity is built at a specific location, on-site training is advantageous. Including national trainers as co-trainers in trainings by international trainers is likely to strengthen the quality and appropriateness of trainings as well as national training capacity and help ensure sustainability.

### **Recommendations and conclusions**

xvi. Although not all objectives could be fully achieved, project I78, in spite of serious operational constraints, has been very successful in attaining its main objective of strengthening control of the northern Turkmen border with Afghanistan, ensuring not only sustainability of achievements, but also the likely further strengthening of Turkmen borders in general, through spin-off results of the project. Taking into account the obstacles for achievement of objectives related to internal coordination and cross-border cooperation, the project has made impressive headway towards these. On this background, the project has made a good contribution to the achievement of objectives under the existing complex of strategic plans.

xvii. It is important that the UNODC capacity in Turkmenistan, which is dependent on mainly one national project, is maintained and that the project coordinator and the office continue the efforts in moving forward the agenda under the existing objectives and plans and in doing so, continue to be accorded priority in terms of support by UNODC HQ and ROCA.

xviii. UNODC should continue and, if possible, enhance efforts to influence the position of the Turkmen Government on cross-border cooperation and information sharing. UNODC should continue the support to Turkmenistan and its neighbouring countries in strengthening border control and cross-border cooperation, in particular, through project TKM J92 and XAC K22, building on the achievements and experiences reaped under project I78. UNODC should continuously raise the issue with the Government of having the State Drug Control Commission identified as the entry point for UNODC communication with the Government. ROCA/the project office should explore possibilities for a future partnership on a cost-sharing basis with Turkmenistan, including for support to Afghanistan in border control. At an early stage of the follow-up project, J92, performance indicators at the objective and outcome levels should be discussed and agreed with the Government, and base-line data identified.

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. Background and context

1. To help stem the trafficking of drugs and precursor chemicals across the border between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, the project, which commenced in mid-2006, as a national UNODC project in Turkmenistan, was *to develop border infrastructure at the (Turkmen) Imam-Nazar border checkpoint and strengthen border control capacity of law enforcement agencies* (immediate objective 1). In doing so, it was *to facilitate effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination at the checkpoint* (immediate objective 2). In addition, the project in April 2008 was expanded to include promotion of *cross border cooperation between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan through the establishment of a Border-Liaison Office at the Imam-Nazar border check point* (immediate objective 3). The total budget came to approximately US\$ 2.3 million. The project was completed in December 2009. The duration had been 3 ½ years.

2. Turkmenistan is a presidential republic with a centralized one-party system, leaving much power in the hands of the president. Under the first president, who passed away in December 2006, the country started to slowly recognize the drug problem. The second president, who took office in January 2007, fully recognized the problem and called for international assistance in addressing it. He also started opening the country to the outside world on an incremental basis. All Government agencies report to the president and a strong presidential office ensures coordination among agencies. In the area of drug control, the State Drug Control Commission (SDCC) is the overall coordinating body, comprising all ministers. SDCC was established with UNODC support in 1996 and is UNODC's key interlocutor. The head of Law Enforcement Administration (LEA) in the President's Office is the Deputy Chairman of SDCC. LEA is responsible for coordination of all law enforcement activities. As SDCC is not an operational body, the Drug Control Agency (DCA) was established in January 2008, modelled on similar institutions in the region, responsible for coordination of all drug control activities. It is headed by the Chairman of SDCC.

3. The project was to complement assistance by the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), constructing a new building for border control at Imam-Nazar. The United States was the main donor to the project.

4. The strengthening of border control capacity was to be achieved through provision of infrastructure, equipment and training of law enforcement personnel as well as through exchange of best practices. Cooperation and coordination was to be attained through establishment of mechanisms and procedures for information exchange and coordination among law enforcement bodies operating in the area, with

possible involvement of the Afghan counterparts, as well as establishment of systems for information exchange at the inter-agency level. Cross-border cooperation was to be promoted by establishing a pilot border liaison office at the Imam-Nazar border checkpoint.

5. The project effectively commenced with the arrival of the Project Coordinator in July 2006. It was a follow-up to project TUKF42, which served to strengthen the main border crossings along the Turkmen-Afghan border, in particular Serkhetabad checkpoint at the southern part of the border. (see the map of Turkmen borders, attached as annex 4). In this context, project I78 was to close a remaining significant gap along the Afghan-Turkmen border.

6. The project document is clear, reflecting a straightforward strategy aimed at providing training and equipment, and promoting cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies with focus on one border checkpoint. It follows an older UNODC format and has little emphasis on outcome, hampering monitoring and evaluation at this level.

7. The project document does not include an overall objective. The immediate objectives are formulated as outputs rather than objectives and do not e.g. specify what the beneficiaries are expected to do (better) as a result of the outputs. Performance/achievement indicators are not specified at the level of the three immediate objectives, but only at the output level. Some of the outputs are extremely general in nature and so are the output indicators. To some extent, the project document has the character of a framework for the envisaged activities, which partly appear to be indicative in nature, thereby leaving much to be specified during the course of implementation.

8. There is some inconsistency between the description of the expected end-of-project situation and the immediate objectives, outputs and activities. It is assumed that the project would lead to “*information on patterns of trafficking in drugs and precursors and on known drug traffickers (being) computerized and regularly analyzed*”, but this is not specified as a deliverable in the project document. Although significant, a reference to possible *involvement of the Afghan counterparts*, mentioned *en passant* in the activities to promote interagency coordination and cooperation is not reflected in the outputs or objectives.

## **B. Purpose and scope of the evaluation**

9. The evaluation was to assess: the relevance of the project in the context of government priorities and needs, the alignment of the project with UNODC’s strategic instruments e.g. strategic programme framework, the appropriateness of the project strategy and activities as the most effective UNODC measure for reducing illicit drug trafficking, the effectiveness of the project, i.e. the extent to which its objectives have been met.

10. The evaluation findings should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system to support results-based management. The evaluation should provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project. The terms of reference for the evaluation are attached as annex 1.

### **C. Executing Modalities**

11. UNODC served as the Executing Agency for the project, UNOPS as associated executing agency providing services in respect of procurement of equipment and individual contractual services. UNDP, Turkmenistan provided administrative and financial services. Overall execution responsibility remained with the Representative, UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, supported by the Regional Law Enforcement Advisor, who supervised and guided the work of the project coordinator, L4, in the execution of the project. The State Drug Control Commission (SDCC) was the Government counterpart agency. A Project Steering Committee, comprising representatives of the SDCC, law enforcement bodies of Turkmenistan and UNODC met annually to consider annual work plans, review of progress, and overall policy guidance on project implementation. The US donor also participated in these meetings.

### **D. Methodology**

12. The evaluation was based on a 1) review of documentation, including documents setting out the strategic orientation for activities, the project and related documents, progress reports, minutes of meetings, such as of the steering committee, a range of documents relating to project implementation, such as needs assessment reports, training reports, documents related to procurement of equipment, contracting of international consultants, etc. 2) observation at the project site and 3) interviews with stakeholders, including a) law enforcement and coordinating agencies within the Government, at central level in Ashgabat, provincial level in Turkmenabad and local level at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint, b) representatives of the international (donor) community, and c) UNODC staff, 4) unofficial meetings with UN and other agency staff.

### **E. Limitations to the evaluation**

13. Limitations to the evaluation included: 1) Somewhat limited time for the evaluation, which was carried out in conjunction with the evaluation of project RER/F43, with both projects having to be covered during a ten-day stay in Turkmenistan. It was assumed that one evaluation report could cover both projects, but to ensure evaluation quality, the mission in consultation with ROCA and the project coordinator, I78, decided that two separate reports were required. 2) Non-availability of information

on drugs and precursor seizures and other data which could provide indication of improved border control, due to Government restraints on provision of information. 3) Limited time at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint (about 1 ½ hour), due to the remoteness of the checkpoint and the long travel time required for a return trip in one day. 4) Limited experience with the project by senior officers, due to rotation, in particular at the checkpoint itself and at the local Customs headquarters in Turkmenabad, but also among partners within the international community.

## II. MAJOR FINDINGS and ANALYSIS

### A. Relevance of the programme or project

14. The project was highly relevant in meeting the needs for strengthening border control along the northern part of the Turkmen border with Afghanistan. Law enforcement authorities at central level in Ashgabat confirmed that the strengthening of the Imam-Nazar checkpoint was a Government priority and part of a plan aimed at constructing or re-constructing border control points, in response to Government concerns and a high level of attention to the issue.

15. The project was conceived under the previous UNODC Strategic Programme Framework (SPF) for Central Asia. It is fully in line with the UNODC regional strategy for West and Central Asia and the SPF for 2008-2011, in particular pursuing strategic objective 5, *strengthened border control and cross-border cooperation*, addressing a number of operational targets under this objective, such as: *increased interdiction capacity of border guards, customs and law enforcement bodies posted in the border areas (e.g. by provision of modern equipment, specialized training, drug detecting dogs, etc. – to be achieved by 2010.*

16. The Project became embodied in the *Paris Pact initiative* (the UNODC brokered international partnership to counter trafficking and consumption of Afghan opiates) and included in the *violet paper* of the *rainbow strategy*, which translates Paris Pact recommendations into operational outlines, in November 2008. The violet paper was created as a result of the Paris Pact Expert Round Table held in Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan in 2007 and the project is an integral part of its three phased *Turkmen border initiative*, inter alia aimed at building capacity along the Turkmen borders and information/intelligence sharing through cross-border cooperation with the Afghan and Iranian neighbours, in turn contributing to the overall objectives of the Rainbow Strategy's *yellow paper - Securing Central Asia's borders with Afghanistan.*

17. The project is in line with strategic themes, result areas and results under UNODC's overall strategy, in particular the aim of enhancing capacity for international cooperation against crime, organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking and terrorism. (Result 1.2.6. of the strategy).

## **B. Attainment of the programme or project objectives**

18. The project has clearly made a contribution to achievement of **strategic objective 5**, mentioned above, contributing significantly to the attainment of most of the operational targets set for it. The northern part of the Turkmen border with Afghanistan and the Imam-Nazar border crossing is important in the context of the UNODC strategy to strengthen controls at the borders of Central Asian countries with Afghanistan. Although the emphasis of achievement has been on strengthened border control, rather than cross-border cooperation, the project has also made headway in respect of the latter and in particular improved the ground with the Government for further progress.

19. Cross-border cooperation is a sensitive issue, as Turkmenistan is a neutral country and aims at isolating itself from conflicts and acts of terrorism in the region. The border with Afghanistan is particularly sensitive and the high priority accorded by the Government to border controls also reflects security concerns. A clash between national security forces and drug criminal groups in Ashgabat in September 2007 highlighted this and drew attention to the need for better coordination between law enforcement agencies, as immediately stated by the president after the clash. The border with Afghanistan is therefore well guarded. In this context, large radioactive detection equipment has been installed with support of the United States at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint, reflecting its significance in the wider context of anti-organized crime.

20. As for **immediate Objective 1**: *To develop border infrastructure at the Imam-Nazar border checkpoint and strengthen the border control capacity of law enforcement agencies*, it is clear from observation at the checkpoint, record of training and equipment provided and unanimous statements by law enforcement authorities at central level in Ashgabat, provincial level in Turkmenabad and at the checkpoint itself, that the project has fully achieved this objective. With respect to effectiveness and impact on cross-border trafficking, however, law enforcement authorities were not in a position to disclose information such as seizure data at a level of detail, which could allow further evaluation.

21. According to law enforcement authorities at Central level (Border Guard), the capacity for all aspects of border control at the Imam-Nazar border post has dramatically increased since 2006, due to the new building, the large amount of specialized equipment, and the considerable training which has significantly raised the skill level of law enforcement officers. It was also confirmed that the strengthening of controls included the 300 km border stretch handled from the checkpoint by the Border Guard. A representative for customs at central level, confirmed that there is “no doubt a big difference” in the capacity of Customs now and pointed to an increase in the flow of not only passengers and cargo through the checkpoint, but also of drug seizures, mainly heroin and other opiates. There had been no seizures of precursor chemicals.

22. According to Customs in Turkmenabad, drug seizures reported at the checkpoint have amounted to 3-4 cases in 2009, involving 10 kgs of mainly opium found in trucks, against 4 kg seized in 2008. According to Customs, seizures were definitely linked to the higher capacity created by the project and staff is still becoming more experienced in using the specialized tools. Customs at the checkpoint recalled 2 seizures in the last 9 months (since the Head of Customs took up his assignment at the post). Both were attributed to the support by the project and were concealed in trucks, discovered with endoscope. In the first case, one kg of heroin was seized, in the second, 400 grams. These figures are surprisingly low and raise questions with respect to reliability. The total seizures of drugs for Turkmenistan in 2008, was officially 2,142 kg, with heroin accounting for 244kg. From January to June 2009, seizures came to 1,009kg, with heroin accounting for 154kg. The reliability of these figures is questioned by the international community.<sup>1</sup> A breakdown of official seizure statistics by year and drug is provided in annex 5.

23. In response to a question by the mission as to whether there is indication that traffickers are avoiding the border controlled from Imam-Nazar, the Border Guard at central level was convinced that this was the case and pointed to the fact that no illegal attempts of border crossing had been registered since the improvement of the checkpoint. Customs could currently not provide information on this, but mentioned that analysis of individual cases might provide indication. A representative from the ministry of interior expressed the opinion that an analysis was needed. According to law enforcement officers at the checkpoint, people are aware that modern search techniques are being used at the checkpoint. Truck drivers most likely inform others and *“the checkpoint with its size and modern facilities looks scary to traffickers”*. They therefore assume that they will normally not dare to cross the border at Imam-Nazar.

24. According to Customs in Turkmenabad (supervising customs at the checkpoint), the capacity for border control has been significantly improved by the project and made it possible to speed up procedures. About 30-40 trucks and 10 persons daily pass the checkpoint. All passengers, cargo and vehicles are searched. The time required has been brought down and the search done more effectively. There is now sufficient specialized equipment at the post.

25. The equipment appears to be well looked after. According to Customs in Turkmenabad and law enforcement officers at the checkpoint, there are strict directives for its maintenance and for reporting on any damage, which is then immediately taken action on by the entity responsible.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the I78 project document, *“Seizure history in Turkmenistan indicates likely heavy illicit traffic in drugs and, probably, precursors through the country. Between 1997 and 2000 approximately 60 tons of drugs were seized, including three tons of heroin and more than eight tons of opium. During 1998, 41 tons of acetic anhydride were seized in different operations by Russian Border Guards. After 1998, Turkmen authorities took control of the borders, and no further precursor seizures were reported”*.

26. At a meeting with the heads of the Border Guard and Customs at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint, the mission was informed that out of 7 customs officers on duty at the checkpoint at the time of the interview, 3-4 had received training by the project. For the Border guard it was 1 out of 6. In particular the X-ray machine has made it possible to simplify the search process. Suspicious transports are identified based on the training by the project and given a more careful search. The training material, compact discs, etc. received by the project are passed on to newcomers at the border post to raise their skill level at entry.

27. Customs at central level found that the training and equipment had been provided by the project in a timely manner, and had been “very good..very much in need...and well targeted.” In the future, however, Customs would like to receive more advanced training and become acquainted with the latest state of the art technologies and approaches. The Ministry of Interior, which is not represented at the border checkpoint, had participated in three training activities and expressed the same wish for training based on the latest state of the art – in particular providing information on new concealment methods including good examples of cases. “Traffickers constantly develop their technologies”.

28. According to Customs in Turkmenabad, the many multiagency training courses had been of value, as they made it possible to share experiences across agencies. Customs recommended that in future, training be conducted only on a joint basis. It had been very helpful that some training courses had been conducted at the site. Satisfaction was also expressed with the involvement of law enforcement officers at other checkpoints in training activities, as this has helped ensure that capacity is not disrupted as a result of rotation. There was a need for future training to take into account changing methods of traffickers. Having completed the training of trainers component, customs is carrying out training from its training centre.

29. **Immediate Objective 2**, to *facilitate effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination at the Imam- Nazar border checkpoint*, has not been attained in the manner envisaged in the project document. However, it seems that the project, through its multiagency approach, in general has promoted coordination and cooperation at the checkpoint.

30. Whereas Customs and the Border Guard at central level found that the project had strengthened cooperation among law enforcement agencies and also with the military, which is involved in border control, other agencies, in particular Ministry of Interior (MOI), which is not represented at the checkpoint, maintained that the project had not made any contribution in this respect and that the mechanisms for cooperation at the checkpoint have existed since independence and are based on a legal framework with a joint reporting system, as information sharing is a necessity in the (centralized) Turkmen system.

31. According to the heads of Customs and the Border Guard at Imam-Nazar, the level of internal coordination and cooperation is high at the checkpoint. Inter-agency meetings for coordination purposes take place on a regular basis at various levels. Orders issued by one ministry are distributed to agencies under other ministries. Search activities are carried out jointly. Training of newcomers is done on a multiagency basis. The joint training activities of the project have contributed to officers knowing each other better. They normally stay at the post for one week at a time and live, eat and sleep together giving them a feeling of belonging to one big family across agencies. There is a high level of information and knowledge exchange among them.

32. **Immediate objective 3**, *to promote cross-border cooperation between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan through the establishment of border liaison offices at Imam-Nazar checkpoint*, was not achieved by the project. However, there was some indication that the project has promoted the issues and moved the position of the Government towards acceptance of the cross-border concept, in particular among agencies directly involved in border control, thereby laying some foundation for potential future progress.

33. Law enforcement agencies at central level stressed the importance of cross-border cooperation and in particular the Border Guard referred to cross-border training as a mean to improve cooperation.

34. With respect to a need for structured systems, agencies drew attention to an existing system, based on agreements with other countries from the time of the Soviet Union and applied in all republics along the former Soviet border.<sup>2</sup>

35. According to the Border Guard, however, the Government is considering the possibility of establishing border liaison offices as an option to strengthen cross-border cooperation.

36. Customs at central level mentioned that, although there has been no contact with law enforcement at the Afghan side of the border, the relationship is good. Workshops and seminars with participation of Afghan law enforcement officers have led to increased knowledge of drug trafficking and related issues within Customs in Turkmenistan.

37. Customs officers at Imam-Nazar had attended workshops and seminars on cross-border cooperation, but without presence of Afghans. The heads of Customs and Border Guards at the

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<sup>2</sup> According to this system, the local Head of the Border Guard, who is the agency holding the command at the border post is authorized to take contact and hold meetings with his counterpart in the country across the border to settle issues. In the case of Imam-Nazar, meetings would be called by and held at the level of the head of the local Border Guard Group based in Turkmenabad, by raising a flag at the border post to indicate the need for a meeting. The border post would not participate in the meeting, which would not be addressing operational matters.

checkpoint were positive towards cross-border cooperation and believed it might bring additional seizures.

### **C. Achievement of the project outputs**

38. The outputs pertaining to delivery of equipment and training under **immediate objective one** (*To develop border infrastructure at the Imam-Nazar border checkpoint and strengthen the border control capacity of law enforcement agencies*) were fully achieved and ensured full attainment of the objective, as formulated. A large amount of well-identified and selected infrastructural, non-infrastructural and specialized equipment was effectively delivered and installed, as necessary. A total of 291 Law enforcement officers received relevant training, covering basic, advanced, on-site, and specialized training courses as well as three study tours. In delivering the outputs, measures had been included to ensure sustainability.

39. The outputs had been identified in the project document, as follows: 1) Border checkpoint is properly equipped, 2) Operational officers are trained, 3) Expertise of the law enforcement units in drugs and precursors control up-graded, and 4) Detection and interdiction capacities for drugs and precursors in Imam-Nazar increased.

40. Delivery of all outputs was focused on equipment and training and was based on two thorough needs assessments by international experts under the project in November 2006 (training) and March 2007 (equipment). The reports were discussed with the Government at law enforcement interagency meetings and priorities were subsequently included in the annual project workplans (2007 and 2008), taking into consideration available funds. Delivery of equipment was completed in December 2008, delivery of training, in March 2009.

#### **Training:**

41. In support of overall effectiveness, cooperation and coordination and in accordance with the recommendations of the assessment, a multiagency approach was used, weighing participation of agencies according to topic. All relevant law enforcement agencies benefited from the training activities, as follows: The State Drug Coordination Commission, State Drug control Agency, State Customs Service, State Border Guard Service, State Migration Service, Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Interior.

42. To ensure quality and draw on as wide a range of expertise and experience as possible, the total of 27 international trainers were drawn from 13 different countries or international organizations, with 12

trainers selected from the Turkish TADOC, due to familiarity with the region, language and cultural similarity with Turkmenistan.

43. At the initiative of the Project coordinator, training was carried out with participation of local trainers as co-trainers to include local inputs and experiences and place training in the context of national procedural frameworks. This also served as a measure to reinforce the national training capacity and help ensure sustainability of project benefits. A total of 10 local trainers participated in the training activities.

44. Training was not limited to staff at Imam-Nazar, but covered law enforcement officers within the entire Lebap province, as officers are rotated within the province.

45. Sustainability was also reinforced through identification and selection of potential trainers during training sessions and provision of a special course to develop their training skills for onwards training, following the completion of the standard training programme.

46. A large number of officers received training in the following topics (participants indicated in brackets): 1) Basic training: identification of drugs (two courses) (27), 2) Advanced training: a) search and interview techniques (19), b) identification of false travel documents (23), c) risk assessment, profiling, targeting (20), d) drugs and crime investigation and report writing techniques (26), 3) Practical on-site training at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint for checkpoint officials: a) search techniques (land border) (9), b) risk profiling application (8). 4) Specialized training: a) train the trainers course (18), b) training on national drug framework development (two courses with 15 participants in each).

47. Training reports included evaluation of training outcomes by participants. However, these did not include assessment of the skills and knowledge acquired, but only the opinion of participants on training contents and delivery of this by the trainers.

48. To provide knowledge transfer on best practice, study tours were arranged to Turkey, on a) drug interdiction structure and techniques (13), b) national drug training programme application (15), and to the United Kingdom, on national drug training policy and strategy (3).

49. Training on development of a national training framework was carried out at the recommendation of the international expert as a mean to bring about a higher training standard based on a systematic, prioritised and coordinated framework established by Turkmen law enforcement agencies themselves – following 6 guiding principles recommended by the expert. This would also help strengthen sustainability of training activities in drug control under this and other projects. The first national training framework was developed in February 2009.

#### **Equipment:**

50. Infrastructural equipment was delivered by the project as an integral part of the new building provided by the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).

51. Outside the building, this included: a) 2 entry guard posts, b) 5 inspection cabins (four in the vehicle inspection area and one in the warehouse), c) 2 inspection area roofs, d) 4 incoming and 3 outgoing inspection pits, e) one weigh bridge (80 tons), f) one weigh bridge cabin, g) one warehouse area with inspection facility and holding area, h) a fence covering the customs controlled area, i) lighting of the entire customs controlled area, street light poles and luminaries. Inside the building, delivery included: 2 luggage scanners and 2 metal detectors.

52. Non-infrastructure equipment was provided through UNOPS with approval from UNODC HQ and included: a) 4 Camcorder videos, b) 3 digital cameras, c) 4 digital dictation devices, d) 4 fire resistant steel safes, e) 2 projectors with screens, f) one photo printer. To strengthen search, detection and substance identification, specialized equipment encompassed: a) one complete search set, b) one complete detection set, c) one forklift, d) 5 binoculars with night vision, e) 3 scales (from mg to 300 kg). Two jeeps were provided to the customs and Migration service for transportation between the border post and their local headquarters in Turkmenabad.

### **Inter-agency coordination and cross-border cooperation**

53. **Immediate objective 2**, *to facilitate effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination at the Imam- Nazar border checkpoint*, was to be achieved through the delivery of two outputs: 1) *Law enforcement bodies operating in the area established mechanisms for information exchange and coordination of efforts* and 2) *Systems for inter-agency information exchange established*. In conjunction with the aim of establishing a formal mechanism at Imam-Nazar, the activities identified in the project document indicated that this should be done “*with possible involvement of the Afghan counterparts*”.

54. When approaching the Government on inter-agency coordination in 2006, the project coordinator was informed that this is considered a strictly internal matter on which no external assistance is welcomed.

However, although the outputs were not attained, the project did succeed in promoting interagency cooperation through emphasis on this in the implementation of other activities.

55. The ambition of involving the Afghan counterparts, which was stipulated with some reservation in the project document and only figuring among the project activities, was interpreted by the project

coordinator to include cross-border cooperation on the Turkmen-Afghan border in a more comprehensive sense – in line with wider UNODC strategic objectives for the region.

56. Whereas the Government since 2006 declined attempts by the project to organize seminars on cross-border cooperation between Afghan and Turkmen law enforcement agencies, it was possible in April 2007, following the change of president, to conduct the first training workshop with Afghan participation. Twenty-three Turkmen and two Afghan officers participated in this workshop - on integrated border management - without a cross-border component - held at Imam-Nazar.

57. To ensure acceptance by the Government, the project coordinator broadened the cross-border concept to include more countries. This made it possible in November 2007 to hold the first international conference on *cross-border cooperation between Turkmenistan and its neighbouring countries* in Ashgabat. The conference was followed by a second one in June 2008.

58. With a third international conference on cross-border cooperation in June 2009, the conference had demonstrated success and seemingly become an established practice. The conferences were not identified or budgeted in the project document. Whereas the project could accommodate 20% of the funding requirements, the project coordinator had to raise the remaining funds from other sources. The first conference was based on contributions from United Kingdom and NATO, the second, on Government funding, clearly indicating that the Government valued the meetings. The third meeting was funded with Government, private sector and WCO contributions.

59. This step-by-step approach led to a breakthrough in the Turkmen position, which enabled the first Turkmen-Afghan cross-border meeting to be held in October 2008, at the Serhatabad border crossing. Turkmenistan did not approve of the meeting to be held at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint, indicating that this issue was still sensitive. In the words of the project coordinator, the meeting was merely to “shake hands” and become acquainted with who was on the other side of the border. The meeting was held with donor participation.

60. To build on these positive developments towards cross-border cooperation, the United States, following discussion with the Representative, ROCA encouraged UNODC to add a component to project I78 promoting its border liaison approach, proved successful in South East Asia, at Imam-Nazar, on a pilot basis. This was added as a third immediate project objective, fully funded by the United States in the amount of US\$ 199,600.

61. Reflecting a further expansion of the project ambitions, **immediate objective 3**: to *promote cross-border cooperation between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan through the establishment of border liaison offices at Imam-Nazar checkpoint*, envisaged three outputs: 1) Field assessment mission

conducted, 2) Border liaison office established and equipped, 3) Cross-border cooperation and drug enforcement performance enhanced.

62. Like in the case of immediate objective 2, above, attainment of the third objective was not fully realistic, given the position of the Government. Under the circumstances, where the new objective also enabled an extension of the project rather than termination by June 2009, the Government apparently decided to tolerate the idea of establishing a border liaison office, “*if required*”, as it was stated in the minutes of the project steering committee (15 January 2009). The mission was informed by the project coordinator that the understanding with the donor was to “give it a try and see how far it was possible to get”.

63. this background, outputs 1 and 2 were not achieved, but some progress continued to be made by the project in the area of cross-border cooperation, also with respect to the establishment of BLOs.

64. As a contribution towards this, joint Turkmen-Afghan training workshops were held in September 2009 at Imam-Nazar and Serhetabad checkpoints.

65. In September 2009, the project arranged a multiagency study-tour for mid-level managers from Turkmen law enforcement agencies to the UNODC Regional Centre in Bangkok to become acquainted with the border liaison office concept, which has been implemented for more than a decade in the South East Asia region, with success. This provided Turkmenistan with technical knowledge of what the BLO concept entails.

66. In 2009 an official list of focal points for border cooperation at Turgundi and Arkina checkpoints across from the checkpoints in Serhatabad and Imam-Nazar, was received by the project from the Afghan Government and submitted to Turkmenistan. A proposed meeting to be held on the Afghan side of the border did not meet with approval by the Turkmen government, although there was indication that the Government was shifting its position in favour of a meeting. Whereas, according to the project coordinator, the head of one significant agency had apparently been supporting the idea, the president’s office was against.

67. The project in November 2009 made a visit to the Afghan side of the border without participation by Turkmen officials to meet with the designated focal points. The project coordinator concluded that Afghanistan had limited capacity for border control, but was fully ready to cooperate with Turkmenistan.

68. On this basis, the project coordinator mentioned that given the strong economic development in Turkmenistan over the last years and its high level of support for Afghan development in the area across the border (where about one million ethnic Turkmen live), and given the strengthened capacity

for border control in Turkmenistan, one way forward in cross-border cooperation could be to build UNODC assistance around a Turkmen assistance component for development of border controls in Afghanistan.

### **Complementary measures**

69. As a complementary measure going beyond the project itself, the project coordinator took initiative to strengthen coordination, cooperation and exchange of information by activating law enforcement donor coordination and law enforcement round table meetings. The first meeting is attended by the local donor and international community representatives and held on a quarterly basis. The round table meetings are attended by the international law enforcement community, diplomatic missions and senior officials of national law enforcement and coordinating agencies. Costs to the project are minimized by using the UN house facility or cost sharing with the participating agencies.

70. Donors place high value on the meetings, where participants inform each other of ongoing and planned activities. They unanimously expressed the opinion that the meetings offer one of the few opportunities to receive information on law enforcement and related activities in the country – directly from the Government – and make it possible to coordinate activities and avoid duplication. One donor pointed to the increasing number of participants at each meeting, as a good indicator of their success. The international community is often represented at the level of ambassador while the national delegations are comprised of ministers, deputy ministers, chairmen and deputy chairmen. The last law enforcement round table meeting, on 18 December 2009, was attended by all deputy ministers of the law enforcement community who are also the project beneficiaries.

### **Implementation**

71. Outputs were delivered within the planned time frame and with the resources available to the project. Annual workplans were developed by the project, approved by ROCA and shared with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs each year. At the end of the year, a report on activities was submitted to the Ministry. However, the work plans were put into practice with a measure of flexibility. There were delays in the construction of the checkpoint building by USCENTCOM, but not in the delivery of heavy equipment by the project. All training activities, once approved by the Government, were completed as planned. International experts (not provided in-kind by a donor) for training were recruited in consultation with UNODC, ROCA based on the UNODC roster, following the UNDP administrative and financial rules. Payment was released based on the reports on the trainings from the experts, also including evaluation of the training by participants.

72. The project officially started on 31 March 2006, with local staff rolled over to it from project TUK/F42. The International project coordinator took up his assignment in mid-July 2006. At the end

of 2006, the implementation rate was only 21%. Until that time, activities had included the establishment of the office, recruitment of staff (admin. assistant), training, planning activities and arranging/carrying out assessments of needs. A low level of cooperation by the national counterparts, the sudden death of the president in December 2006, the election of a new president and time required for formation of a Government, did not allow full cooperation from authorities until March 2007. In 2007, the implementation rate came to 94% (72% against the initial allocation) with basic and advanced training courses being conducted and on-site mentoring as well as inter-agency and cross-border cooperation concepts being developed, bringing the total expenditures for 2006-2007, to US\$ 1,426,000. The situation, however, did not allow the full completion of the procurement of equipment in 2007. In April 2008, the project was extended by 16 months until July 2009. The implementation rate for 2008 was 95% (126% against the initial allocation), with total expenditures at US\$ 440,240, leaving US\$ 425,900 for implementation in 2009. By the end of 2009, the project will have been completed with an expected balance of about US\$ 61,000.

#### **D. Institutional and management arrangements and constraints**

##### **Overall institutional and management arrangements**

73. The overall institutional and management arrangements were appropriate and effective, taking into account the constraints mentioned below. Monitoring and backstopping by UNODC HQ and ROCA were timely and of high quality and so were the services provided by UNOPS, UNDP Tashkent and other partners. Main factors influencing the scope and pace of project implementation related to the political system of Turkmenistan. These factors included the sudden death of the President in December 2006 and developments following from this.

74. In addition to the project coordinator, project staff includes a national project officer, an administrative assistant and a driver. The project coordinator serves at head of the project office, representing UNODC in Turkmenistan in the absence of the Regional Representative, UNODC ROCA and is responsible for supporting the implementation of 15 regional or global UNODC projects covering Turkmenistan. Under a regional drug demand reduction project (I29), a national project officer, an administrative assistant and a driver are outposted to the Ashgabat project office. Under global project J33 (the Paris Pact Initiative) a national strategic analyst and a project assistant under the project GLOG80 (Container Control) are outposted. All staff are supervised by the project coordinator, I78 and work in an integrated manner attending to issues on a priority basis across projects.

75. The project office appears to be well run, with motivated, competent and efficient staff. The preparations for the roundtable meeting with the Government and donors on 18 December 2009 were carried out simultaneously with the support to the evaluation mission in a busy, but calm atmosphere, with all matters seemingly well under control. It was noted that the national project officer, who had been with UNODC since 1996, had a wide network of contacts, enjoyed a high degree of respect and trust among government officials and was effective in overcoming obstacles and moving issues forward. According to the project coordinator, the project officer effectively facilitates communication with the Government, optimizing diplomatic leverage and actively promotes favourable movement in the government position on issues of importance to UNODC.

### **Coordination and collaboration arrangements with implementing partners and other stakeholders**

76. The project has been implemented in a way that has ensured synergy of the project activities with the assistance being provided to Turkmenistan by the bilateral donors and other international organisations.

77. Assistance to Turkmenistan in the area of drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, has been provided by some donor countries - the US and UK, as well as by international organisations, e.g. OSCE, EU. In addition, a joint EU/UNODC project on drug control at airports has been providing assistance in strengthening controls at the airport in Ashgabad. OSCE, often in close cooperation with UNODC, has been providing training to law enforcement personnel in strengthening their interdiction capacities. All donors met with had appreciated the coordination of activities by the project.

78. The project has also been implemented in close coordination and harmonization with regional UNODC law enforcement projects such as: AD/RER/F23 - "Criminal Intelligence Systems", AD/RER/E29 - "Precursors Control", AD/RER/F43 - "Controlled Delivery Techniques", AD/RER/F60 - "Computer-based Law Enforcement Training", AD/RER/H22 - "CARICC - Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre", which are supported by the project office for activities related to Turkmenistan.

79. The procurement of heavy equipment by the project has been carried out in partnership and coordination with US CENTCOM, as it had to be installed in conjunction with the progress of the construction of the checkpoint building by USCENCOM. For this equipment, UNOPS had subcontracted GAP Construction Company to obtain offers and propose the items required. Through the partnership arrangement, USCENCOM, as an in-kind contribution to the project, provided detailed technical review and approval of those items and subsequently monitored and reported on

installation, allowing the project to request UNOPS effectuation of payment on technically sound grounds.

### **Backstopping**

80. The project coordinator confirmed that backstopping services from UNODC HQ and ROCA had been timely and of a high standard. At the strategic level, the attention of the Executive Director, who paid a visit to Turkmenistan in January-February 2008 and of the Chief of regional section in the context of the Paris Pact Initiative, had been highly appreciated and ensured stronger integration of Turkmenistan in the rainbow strategy. In particular the important role played by the Chief of section in the development of the Caspian Sea and Turkmen border initiative, which led to firm integration of project I78 in what became the violet paper of the rainbow strategy, had been appreciated and had strengthened the project coordinator's status with interlocutors in Turkmenistan. At the day-to-day operational level, the desk officer at HQ had been acting as a facilitator with HQ units, ensuring speedy delivery of support.

81. Great appreciation was also expressed with respect to the supervisory role by and backstopping support received from UNODC, ROCA both by the Representative and the Law Enforcement Advisor. In particular appreciated by the project were the visits by the Representative, about four times yearly, which had helped straighten out issues with the Government and mobilize support for the activities of the project office. The Representative had provided active help in trouble shooting and gone into a high level of detail also on technical matters to resolve problems. Particularly appreciated had been his role in ensuring funding for the extension of the project from June to December 2009 and in persuading the Government to accept the extension, although it did not yet have an explicit favourable position on BLOs. The direct intervention of the Representative had also been appreciated with respect to office matters, such as in resolving a crisis on salary increases with UNDP, Turkmenistan at the time of drastic dollar and thereby salary depreciation, which had helped minimize the loss of staff.

### **Monitoring during implementation**

82. The project was followed closely during implementation. Delivery, maintenance and use of equipment were monitored through frequent on-site visits by project staff throughout the lifetime of the project. The visits also led to observations with respect to the construction of the building, which were welcomed by US CENTCOM. Delivery of equipment was completed in December 2008. Training sessions were attended by the national project officer and payment approved on the basis of satisfactory training reports.

### **Major constraints and problems impacting implementation and delivery**

83. Major constraints for implementation included factors related to the centralized and relatively closed Turkmen system. No international or foreign agency has direct access to national agencies. The official channel of contact is through the ministry of foreign affairs. Unofficial contact is not encouraged or limited. The normal lead time for a request for a meeting with authorities is about 5-10 days. Participation by Government officials in meetings or training outside Turkmenistan requires the approval of the President's office. This situation necessitates careful planning of all activities well in advance. Until a new Government was in place, in March 2007, constraints also included restrained Government cooperation under the previous president.

84. The project coordinator in particular used the project steering committee and working groups to strengthen planning and communication with the Government. Although these meetings could be used as a sounding board, they could not be used for obtaining agreement on a course of action. The timeframe for official approval of e.g. an annual workplan is a few weeks and awaiting this would have jeopardized project implementation. Instead, all activities have had to be approved on a case-by-case basis at the planning stage. The government normally does not commit itself to minutes or plans deriving from meetings. If the government is not in favour of a request, it might not turn it down, but rather decide not to respond. This adds to the time required for planning and implementation. According to international officials interviewed, the Government is somewhat unpredictable with respect to approval of activities.

### **III. OUTCOMES, IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY**

#### **A. Outcomes**

85. The project has established a high level of capacity for border control at the Imam-Nazar border crossing. Provision of considerable infrastructural and search equipment together with a raised technical skill-level among law enforcement officers at the checkpoint has enabled both faster and more systematic search activities, based on modern approaches and techniques. Some measure of strengthened cooperation among officers from the different law enforcement agencies, brought about by project training activities, might have contributed to the improved capacity.

86. The increased capacity has seemingly led to both increased seizures and to traffickers avoiding the checkpoint and the border controlled from this by the Border Guard. Unfortunately, however, lack of statistics at a sufficient level of detail makes it difficult to substantiate these statements which are based on information received from law enforcement officers interviewed. With respect to seizures, the information received was consistent at all levels (central level at Ashgabat, local level at Turkmenabad and at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint). Turkmenistan only provides seizure statistics at

aggregate (national) level. It is not possible to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the project from these data. The official seizure statistics is provided in annex 5.

87. Capacity for training in drug law enforcement, in particular basic training, has been raised. Cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies has been enhanced in this area with the first national training framework developed in February 2009, with support from the project. The project has likely also increased the awareness of the benefits of a multi-agency approach to e.g. training. Coordination between donors and the Government as well as among the donors has been enhanced and according to donors contributed to increasing aid effectiveness.

88. Awareness of the benefits of cross-border cooperation, including of the BLO concept, has increased and so has support for this at agency level. A shift towards a favourable position on the issues is probably taking place at the political level and will likely strengthen prospects for a successful outcome of UNODC project XAC K22, *Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossings points (BCPs) and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLOs)*, which is currently under consideration by the Central Asian countries as well as of UNODC project TKM/J92, *Strengthening border control along the Turkmen-Uzbek border, in particular at Farap checkpoint*, which was approved by the Turkmen Government in December 2009.

89. The UNODC presence provided through the project has significantly strengthened communication, information flow, cooperation and coordination between Turkmen law enforcement agencies and the international community, in particular under the areas of the UNODC mandate, and might also have strengthened internal coordination among Turkmen law enforcement agencies with respect to donor relations. Focused on the quarterly roundtable meetings, which provide the international community with a rare opportunity for direct contact with high-level Government officials, and are receiving increased attention, this development might also be conducive to the general opening of Turkmenistan to the world.

## **B. Impact**

90. The project has made trafficking of drugs and precursor chemicals across the northern part of the Turkmen border with Afghanistan and in particular through the Imam-Nazar checkpoint more difficult. It has also helped create pre-requisites for acceleration of border control at all Turkmen borders through setting in motion a continuously improving capacity for training. Together with the strengthening of the other main border post on the Turkmen-Afghan border (Sehatabad) and increased mobility of the Border Guard, provided by the UNODC predecessor project, F42 and other important initiatives, controls along the Turkmen side of the border with Afghanistan have been strengthened. This in turn is likely forcing traffickers to use alternative trafficking routes and develop new

concealment techniques. The project, through demonstrated results and skillfully used potential for diplomatic leverage, also appears to be enhancing the Government's willingness to engage in cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries. This is improving prospects for the strengthening of border controls envisaged under the UNODC strategy for West and Central Asia, the Strategic programme framework for Central Asia and the Rainbow strategy - in particular its yellow and violet papers.

91. As cross-border traffic at Imam-Nazar is increasing and as the project has enabled the checkpoint to accommodate more traffic, it has also made a contribution to facilitating cross border trade.

### **C. Sustainability**

92. With respect to the achieved level of capacity for border control, sustainability is high, the main driving factor being the strong interest of the Government in border control, which is also a security issue. This is reflected in the strict measures put in place to ensure maintenance of equipment at Imam-Nazar and in measures to ensure capacity for and continuation of training in border control. Another factor for sustainability is the built-in elements for this in the activities of the project, not least the initiative to include national trainers in training courses, develop a pool of trainers drawn from participants in trainings, and ensuring that training was spread out to officers at other border posts to help maintain a high level of trained staff in the context of rotation within the province.

93. As for the headway made in the area of cross-border cooperation, the knowledge and interest generated among law enforcement agencies might continue its momentum, but would probably not reach the state of concrete cooperation in this area without external encouragement and support.

94. The increased level of coordination among the international community and the Government is fully dependent on continuation of the UNODC presence and is very much linked to the project coordinator himself.

## **IV. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES**

### **A. Lessons learned**

95. When circumstances are difficult and uncertain, a project document of a framework nature which leaves much to be decided during the course of implementation might lead to better results.

96. Placing the goal posts of a project at an unrealistic level in areas of strategic importance might open a possibility to step by step push barriers and achieve important progress.

97. It is possible to move the position of a government through sustained dialogue on sensitive issues such as cross-border cooperation.

98. In achieving results, a combination of political sense, diplomatic skills and ability to improvise and ensure implementation can be more important than technical skills, even in implementing projects of a highly technical nature.

99. In designing projects of a technical nature to be implemented under difficult circumstances, emphasis should be on purchasing technical expertise on an ad-hoc basis rather than have the expertise be available with the project itself – e.g. possessed by the project coordinator.

## **B. Best practices**

100. In projects with large equipment components it is important that a reliable system on an outsourcing basis is in place and brought on stream at an early stage for rapid identification and specification of needs, obtainment of quotations, technical vetting and final procurement and delivery.

101. In narrow law enforcement projects, broadening training to take into account needs for rotation of law enforcement staff might help ensure sustainability.

102. When technical capacity is built at a specific location, on-site training might be advantageous.

103. Including national trainers as co-trainers in trainings by international trainers is likely to strengthen the quality and appropriateness of trainings as well as national training capacity and help ensure sustainability of interventions.

## **V. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. Issues resolved during the evaluation**

104. This was a terminal evaluation. During the evaluation, the follow-up project J92, mentioned above, was approved by the Government. There were therefore no issues in need of resolution. An attempt to acquire further information on results of the project, such as e.g. seizure statistics, however, was made, but without success.

### **B. Actions recommended**

105. There are clearly prospects for moving the position of the Government on vital strategic issues through a sustained diplomatic effort, taking advantage of Turkmenistan's strong interest in and commitment to securing its borders and strengthening controls, closer integration in the Paris Pact Initiative, (as e.g. demonstrated by its quick ratification of the agreement establishing CARICC and the support to the development of the violet paper) and overall ambition of gradually opening up to the world.

106. **Recommendation 1:** UNODC should continue and, if possible, enhance efforts to influence the position of the Turkmen Government on cross-border cooperation and information sharing, by systematically applying the wide range of diplomatic channels and opportunities available - such as visits by the Executive Director, the Representative or senior headquarters staff, meetings and events under the various strategic arrangements and agreements in the region - in support of the efforts at the local level by the project office.

107. The project will have been completed on 31 December 2009. A follow-up project, TD/TKM/J92 Strengthening border control along the Turkmen-Uzbek border, in particular at Farap checkpoint, has already been approved by the Government, absorbing all staff under project I78 from 1 January 2010. Project J92 has been modelled on project I78, draws on the experiences reaped and builds on its achievements. It will in particular be strengthening the checkpoint at Farab, on the border with Uzbekistan, likewise in the province of Lebap and also aims at promoting cross-border cooperation. The project document specifies a range of performance indicators, also at the outcome level. The project will also ensure continuation of activities related to the UNODC representation in Turkmenistan beyond the scope of the project itself. In addition, a regional project, XAC K22, *Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossings points (BCPs) and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLOs)*, has recently commenced and is currently under consideration by the Turkmen Government. The evaluation of project I78 has found that progress has been made in strengthening controls at the Turkmen border with Afghanistan in a sustainable manner and an important foundation has been laid for progress in strengthening other key border points, such as at Farab. Progress has also been made in cross-border cooperation, in spite of the sensitivities of this subject and opened potential prospects for further progress. Project J92 and K22 makes it possible to build on and continue this work and are therefore fully supported by the evaluation.

108. **Recommendation 2:** UNODC should continue the support to Turkmenistan and its neighbouring countries in strengthening border control and cross-border cooperation, in particular, through project TKM J92 and XAC K22, building on the achievements and experiences reaped under project I78.

109. The cumbersome communication and approval system, whereby all requests to the Government have to be sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is not conducive to project implementation. The State Drug Control Commission has been identified as the Government Counterpart Agency for UNODC projects.

110. **Recommendation 3:** UNODC, at the level of the Executive Director, senior HQ staff and the Representative, ROCA should continuously raise the issue with the Government of having the State

Drug Control Commission identified as the entry point for UNODC communication with the Government.

111. Due to the strong economic development in Turkmenistan over the last years, donors appear to be increasingly hesitant with respect to funding of technical assistance. Given Turkmenistan's high level of support for Afghan development in the area across the border and given the strengthened capacity for border control in Turkmenistan, one way forward in cross-border cooperation could be to build UNODC assistance around a Turkmen assistance component for development of border controls in Afghanistan.

112. **Recommendation 4:** ROCA/the project office should explore possibilities for a future partnership on a cost-sharing basis with Turkmenistan, including for support to Afghanistan in border control.

113. Lack of information has hampered monitoring and evaluation at the outcome level of project I78. Although a range of performance indicators are identified in project J92, it might be difficult to obtain much information from the Government. Efforts should nevertheless be made to ensure information, based on the indicators in the project document as well as what the Government might be able to offer.

**Recommendation 5:** At an early stage of the follow-up project, J92, performance indicators at the objective and outcome levels should be discussed and agreed with the Government, and base-line data identified.

It was difficult to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of training, in particular in the absence of performance indicators at the outcome level, as skills acquirement was not included in training evaluation.

114. **Recommendation 6:** To strengthen assessment of training results, evaluation of skills acquired from training events, should be included in evaluations of these.

115. In building on the achievements of project I78, project J92 realizes that a certain measure of training capacity is now in place in Turkmenistan and that therefore only advanced training is required by the project. It is important, nevertheless, to ensure that this training responds to the needs expressed by some agencies during this evaluation for up-to-date information on concealment methods.

116. **Recommendation 7:** In tailoring training under project J92, focus on contemporary concealment methods should be ensured.

## VI. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

117. Although not all project objectives could be fully achieved, project I78, in spite of serious operational constraints, has been very successful in attaining its main objective of strengthening control of the northern Turkmen border with Afghanistan, ensuring not only sustainability of achievements, but also the likely further strengthening of Turkmen borders in general, through spin-off results of the project.

118. Taking into account the obstacles for achievement of objectives related to internal coordination and cross-border cooperation, the project has made impressive headway towards these, which were not realistic at the time it was approved. On this background, the project has made a strong contribution to the achievement of objectives under the complex of strategic plans, reflected in the machinery of e.g. the Paris Pact Initiative, the UNODC Regional Strategy for West and Central Asia and the strategic programme framework for Central Asia, as well as national plans.

119. The main factors behind this success has been the combination of 1) an ambitious project document, prompting progress on issues on which the Government has been hesitant, but which are important in the overall strategic context of stemming drug trafficking from Afghanistan, 2) a dynamic project coordinator, who understood how to operate in the difficult Turkmen environment, move around sensitivities and ensure project implementation as well as creating enabling results beyond the project itself – supported by an experienced national project officer with a technical background in law enforcement, able to operate through a large personal network of contacts in government agencies in a winning, convincing and trust-building way, maximizing Government support for the project, as well as a well functioning and efficient project assistant and other support staff, who could ensure timely administrative processing for the many activities undertaken by the project including those relating to UNODC representation in Turkmenistan in general, and 3) an increasing understanding of the drug problem by the Government, in the context of ambitions to open up to the world, and related susceptibility to gradually accept the measures required to address it.

120. It is important that the UNODC capacity in Turkmenistan, which is dependent on mainly one national project, is maintained and that the project coordinator and the office continue the efforts in moving forward the agenda under the existing objectives and plans and in doing so, continue to be accorded priority in terms of support by UNODC HQ and ROCA.

Annex 1.



**TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PROJECT TERMINAL EVALUATION**

**PROJECTS TITLE** Assistance in Developing Controlled Delivery Techniques (TD/RER/F43)  
**& NUMBER:** Strengthening border control along the Turkmen-Afghan border, in particular at Imam-Nazar checkpoint (TD/TKM/I78)

**1.BACKGROUND**

In line with UNODC’s Strategic Programme Framework for Central Asia (2008 – 2011), the UNODC assistance in Central Asia targets seven main sectors, as follows:

- I. Improved regional coordination
- II. Mutual Legal Assistance
- III. Enhanced information / intelligence collection, analysis and exchange
- IV. Effective regional precursor chemical control
- V. Strengthened border control & cross-border cooperation
- VI. Effective responses to drug abuse and HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care
- VII. Strengthened national capacities in countering transnational organized crime (i.e. human trafficking and smuggling of migrants), corruption, money laundering & terrorism

Of these areas, counter-narcotics enforcement (CNE) is by far the largest operation and is considered strategically important to the region. The CNE projects with varying objectives account for 88 percent of the region’s total portfolio.

Two of CNE projects are planned to be finalized in December, 2009 and subject to the Terminal Evaluation according to the UNDOC Rules and Regulations:

- ▶ RER/F43 - “Assistance in developing Controlled Delivery Techniques”

Budget (US\$)	1,723,000
Duration	2005 – 2009
Funding shortfall (US\$)	173,000

The project assists the MOU member states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Azerbaijan) to set up and/or develop national mechanisms and capacities to carry out controlled deliveries. This will, in turn, enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies in the region to dismantle the criminal networks involved in illicit drug trafficking. The project also assists the MOU member states in

improving their ability to detect sources and destinations of drug shipments, as well as to identify national, regional and international trafficking routes. By doing so the project serves as one of the key elements for effective implementation of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) initiative one of the objectives of which is the assistance in creating regional mechanisms for joint operations including controlled deliveries through the network of liaison officers seconded to CARICC from participating states.

In the line with its immediate objective, the project provided support in setting up the legal framework, procedures and mechanism for controlled delivery operations; and provision of trainings and specialized equipment to the beneficiary countries.

In 2007, the project was evaluated as part of the cluster evaluation of several UNODC Counter Narcotics projects in Central Asia. Findings and recommendations of the evaluation team has been taken into consideration in further project implementation. Monitoring of the project achievements was regularly carried out by the Project Steering group consisting recipient Government, donor country and UNODC.

▶ TKM/I78 - “Immediate assistance to Turkmenistan for the strengthening of activities at Imam Nazar checkpoint at the Turkmen -Afghan border”

Budget (US\$)	2,299,700
Duration	2006 – July 2010
Funding shortfall (US\$)	Fully funded

One of the most important border crossings between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan is Imam-Nazar even though the road infrastructure is extremely poor. This border crossing is confronted with an increasing stream of cargo and passengers but there are inadequate facilities, limited technical equipment and a lack of professional training available to Customs Officers and Border Guards.

This project aims at a significant improvement of interdiction capacities against illicit trafficking across the Afghan-Turkmen border. Its immediate objectives are: development of border infrastructure and facilitation of enforcement cooperation and coordination at the Imam-Nazar checkpoint.

Similar to RER/F43 project the TKM/I78 project was evaluated as part of the of the cluster evaluation of several UNODC Counter Narcotics projects in Central Asia. Findings and recommendations of the evaluation team has been taken into consideration in further project implementation. Monitoring of the project achievements was regularly carried out by the Project Steering group consisting recipient Government, donor country and UNODC.

**2.PURPOSE OF EVALUATION**

In compliance with the project document, the external terminal evaluation is initiated by UNODC to provide insights that will help UNODC increase the effectiveness and impact of its technical and training assistance. Since both RER/F43 and TKM/I78 projects were focused on strengthening interdiction capacities at the main drug trafficking routes and at enhancing regional operational cooperation it was decided to evaluate both projects together. This would help UNODC to have a broader picture of the border control assistance provided by the regional project as well as a deeper insight on the implementation of a particular project at the national level.

Keeping this in mind, the evaluation is expected to assess the extent of:

- the relevance of projects in the context of government priorities and needs,
- the alignment of projects with UNODC's strategic instruments e.g. strategic programme framework,
- the appropriateness of projects strategies and activities as the most effective UNODC measure for reducing illicit drug trafficking
- the effectiveness of projects, i.e. to what extent have the objectives of the projects been achieved?

The evaluation findings should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system to support a results-based management of the projects. The evaluation should provide information on findings, lessons learned and recommendations with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project.

The evaluation report will be shared with relevant units of UNODC (including IEU), government counterparts, and the donor countries.

### **3. EVALUATION SCOPE**

The terminal evaluation covers the activities of the projects implemented in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from actual date of the start up to December 2009. In particular, the specific areas of evaluation should cover the following:

- (1) Overall assessment of the project (context and rationale)
  - To what extent have the projects been developed and implemented within the framework of the existing UNODC strategic instruments such as the Rainbow Strategy
  - To what extent are the projects logic, concept and approaches appropriate and relevant to achieving the government policies and objectives?
  - What were the intended results, supporting projects/activities, inputs and processes required? Risks and assumptions considered?
  - To what extent complementarities and synergies of the projects with other projects implemented by UNODC in the Central Asia and Azerbaijan created?
- (2) Attainment of the projects objective
  - To what extent have the projects achieved their intended objective to date?
  - What is the evidence of the law enforcement agency having strengthened its capacities to counter drug trafficking?

- Evidence of relevant national officers and personnel trained by the projects have improved their operational skills and knowledge and have utilized them on their day-to-day assignments?
- (3) Implementation strategy (operational plan, monitoring and evaluation)
- Do the projects have a clearly identified specific target group(s) and measurable objectives in the programme documents?
  - To what extent have the projects implementation processes been effective and efficient in achieving the overall objective? Have the programme managers adapted to change, by adjusting the programme design and direction, when deemed necessary?
  - Have the resources been mobilized and utilized efficiently?
  - Is there an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor and assess the overall progress of the project? How have programme achievements and lessons learned been disseminated to the stakeholders?
- (4) Achievement of outcomes and outputs
- Have the law enforcement personnel been trained as intended by the project with capacity building objectives? Assess training quality and utilization of training
  - What are the immediate changes brought about by the projects in the country? Any specific evidence documented?
- (5) Institutional and management arrangements (backstopping and support mechanisms regional and field offices, national governments and other local counterparts)
- What are the specific roles and responsibilities of staff at region, field office, country, donors and other partners in implementing and managing the projects?
  - Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by the relevant parties (administrative / managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?
  - What are the potential challenges that may prevent the operations from producing intended results?
- (6) Impacts (long-term effects)
- What are the potential impacts of the projects?
  - To what extent can the project expect to achieve the positive impacts based on projects results observed at the moment?
- (7) Sustainability
- To what extent are the projects interventions sustainable?
  - What concrete actions or measures have been taken, or are required, to ensure the sustainability of national agencies established / supported by the projects (e.g. structural, managerial and behavioural change)?
  - To what extent have the findings and recommendations from the past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified
  - Is there adequate local commitment to support policy change?
- (8) Lessons learned and best practices
- What are the best practices (if any) documented during the current operations?

- What specific lessons (if any) can UNODC draw from the projects experiences?

#### **4. EVALUATION METHODS**

The evaluation of the project will be based on the following:

1. The study of relevant strategic and project documents (project proposals, project reports; progress reports, reports produced by outside experts; mid-term and thematic evaluation report, statistics on drug seizures etc.);
2. Where necessary, initial briefing by responsible UNODC staff in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent;
3. Interview of training participants
4. Interviews with the officers from the national counterparts under projects, UNODC Project Managers and other relevant personnel, and, where it is necessary and required, donors ;
5. Visit to the Imam-Nazar check point in Turkmenistan under TKM/I78 project and verification that the procured border protection and surveillance equipment is being properly used and handled.

In conducting the evaluation, the evaluator needs to take account of relevant international standards, including “Guiding principles for evaluation at UNODC”, “Standards of evaluation in the UN system”, and “Norms for evaluations in the UN system”.

Upon completion of the fact-finding and analysis phase, a draft evaluation report will be prepared. The draft should be circulated to the parties for comments. The evaluator may choose to take the comments into account in producing the final report, for which he/she will be solely responsible.

Quality assurance is provided by the Core Learning Partners. Their role is to review these very TOR, including the methodology of the evaluation, the draft report and final report. The consultant will consider comments received and will reflect them, as appropriate, without compromising her independence and impartiality. While the Project Managers are also part of the Core Learning Partners, their role is also to manage the process and logistics of the evaluation, while the Independent Evaluation Unit at HQ backstops this evaluation and approves the selection of the consultants, the methodology as well as the draft and final reports.

#### **5. COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION MISSION**

The terminal evaluation of the projects will be carried out by an independent evaluator proposed by the project managers and appointed by the UNODC.

The donors to the projects may participate in the evaluation as observer. Costs associated with the evaluation will be borne by the projects. All costs for a donor appointed observer will be borne by the donor government directly. It is expected, for example, that representatives of the US Embassy in Turkmenistan will join the evaluation team. (excellent paragraph – who will you be inviting? )

The evaluator shall act independently in his/her individual capacity, and not as a representative of the government or organization which appointed him/her. The independent evaluator should adhere to the independence and impartiality of the evaluation process discussed in the UNODC guiding principle for evaluation. The evaluator therefore will not have been involved in the development, implementation or monitoring of the project neither will he not be rendering any service to UNODC in near future, to avoid conflicts of interest

due to potential future involvement. The report will be prepared by the independent evaluator.

The evaluator should have the following qualifications:

A minimum first-level university degree and a minimum of 10 years of relevant work experience in, or ii) in lieu of a first-level university degree, minimum of 10 years of professional experience in, at least one of the following areas:

- Developing evaluation methodologies and carrying out evaluations, including the drafting and finalization of evaluation reports.
  - Law enforcement / cross border operations (with knowledge of technical equipment for border control e.g. x-rays and other search tools, and drug testing kits) / customs / paramilitary operations
  - Institutional capacity building / organizational management / training of law enforcement personnel
  - Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
- Preference will be given to candidates who have had prior experiences with UNODC project evaluation(s) in the area of drug law enforcement and capacity building, or those who have similar experiences with any other regional/international organizations. (careful! The evaluator's impartiality and independence is key)
  - Experience in conducting independent evaluations (if possible, within the UN system);
  - Familiarity with the drug control situation in Turkmenistan and/or Central Asia;
  - Knowledge of bilateral/multilateral technical cooperation, particularly in counter-narcotic enforcement issues
  - Excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English. Knowledge of Russian will be considered as an asset.

## **6. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**

The evaluator will be briefed and debriefed on the projects by the Regional Office in Tashkent (ROCA). The UNODC Project Coordinators will also provide necessary substantive and administrative support.

Although the evaluator should be free to discuss all matters relevant to her/his assignment with the authorities concerned, the incumbent is not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of UNODC or the Government.

The evaluator will submit a draft report to UNODC Headquarters – the Independent Evaluation Unit, and to ROCA, as well as to all “Core Learning Partners”. The report will contain the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team as well as a recording of the lessons learned during projects implementation.

The evaluator is expected to present (a) A detailed evaluation plan/matrix before starting the mission;(b) the evaluation methodology, including tools, templates, sample size, use of monitoring data, etc (c) A draft evaluation report should also be sent to the Independent Evaluation Unit, UNODC Vienna, for their review, prior to its finalization and (c) A final evaluation report, incorporating all comments and feedback on the draft report provided by the consultant.

The evaluation expert, while considering the comments provided on the draft, would use its independent judgment in preparing the final report.

The final report should be submitted to UNODC no later than three weeks upon completion of the mission. The report should be no longer than 15 pages, excluding annexes and the executive summary. The report will be distributed by UNODC as required to the governmental authorities and respective donors.

The expected timetable of Evaluation Mission as follows:

**3 Working day** in ROCA, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

**20 working days** in projects' countries;

**8 working days** for writing the draft and final evaluation report

The suggested date for the evaluation mission: **December 2009**

The mission will include the meetings with the national authorities, the donor countries and visiting the selected project sites.

## **7. PAYMENT**

The Evaluators will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures.

The fee for the services will be defined according to the UN rules and procedures and depending from the qualification of the candidate, but shall not exceed 750 USD per day.

The projects will cover all the cost related to travel of evaluator and provide him/her with tDSA for each location based on the UN rates established for each location to be visited.

The fee will be paid only after the final report is accepted by the UNODC.

## **8. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

- timely and accurate submission of the documents.
- Substantive and linguistic quality of the documents prepared.
- Conformity of the project evaluation report with the standard format and guidelines for the preparation of project evaluation reports and technical guidance received.
- Report should contain recommendations for future course of action.

## **Annex. 2.**

### **List of persons interviewed and field mission schedule:**

8 December 2009  
Arrival at Ashgabat

10 December 2009  
Field visit to "Imam Nazar" border crossing point

Gurban Annayev - Head of Customs  
Annamyrat Kakajanov - Head of Border Guards

11 December 2009  
Turkmenabat, Regional Customs Department

Dovran Nepesov - Head of Customs Department  
Dovlet Bayryyev - Deputy Head  
Rahman Jorakuliyev - Senior Inspector, responsible for "Imam Nazar" check-point

16 December 2009  
Meeting with Government officials  
Ashgabat, State Customs Service, Conference Hall

Maksat Kakaliyev - Chief of Department, State Customs Service  
Babayev - major, State Border Guards Service  
Agagul Berdfyyeva - Head of Department, Ministry of Interior  
Chary Garajayev - Chief of Division, Ministry of Interior  
Shatlyk Orazmamedov - Officer of the Ministry for the National Security  
Pena Nurgeldiyev - Senior Inspector, State Migration Service  
Meylis Begliyev - Senior Inspector, State Migration Service  
Nurmuhamed Yusupov - Head of Department, State Drug Control Service  
Gulnabat Baylyyeva - Head of Department, State Drug Control Service  
Merdan Annagulyyev - Senior Inspector, State Drug Control Service

UNODC Project Office, Ashgabat:  
Ercan Saka - Head of UNODC Office in Turkmenistan and Project Coordinator, I78  
Chary Atayev - National Project Officer

UNODC, ROCA, Tashkent  
James Callahan, UNODC Representative, ROCA

International community in Turkmenistan:

United States of America

United Kingdom  
George Scott, Deputy Head of Mission

Turkey  
Muzaffer Uyav Gültekin, Third Secretary

OSCE  
Anne Suotula, Political Officer

### Annex 3.

## Evaluation assessment questionnaire

Project/programme title: “Strengthening border control along the Turkmen-Afghan border, in particular at Imam-Nazar checkpoint”

Project/programme number: TKM I78

The evaluators are required to rate each of the items shown below on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest), as follows:

- 5 = Excellent (90-100 per cent)
- 4 = Very good (75-89 per cent)
- 3 = Good (61-74 per cent)
- 2 = Fair (50-60 per cent)
- 1 = Unsatisfactory (0-49 per cent)

These ratings are based on the findings of the evaluation and thus are a translation of the evaluation results.

A.	Planning	Rating				
		1	2	3	4	5
1.	Project design (clarity, logic, coherence)			x		
2.	Appropriateness of overall strategy			x		
3.	Achievement of objectives		x			
4.	Fulfilment of prerequisites by Government		x			
5.	Adherence to project duration		x			
6.	Adherence to budget				x	

B.	Implementation	Rating				
		1	2	3	4	5
7.	Quality and timeliness of UNODC inputs				x	
8.	Quality and timeliness of government inputs				x	
9.	Quality and timeliness of third-party inputs				x	
10.	UNODC headquarters support (administration, management, backstopping)				x	
11.	UNODC field office support (administration, management, backstopping)				x	
12.	Executing agency support				x	

C.	Results	Rating				
		1	2	3	4	5
13.	Attainment, timeliness and quality of outputs				x	

14.	Achievement, timeliness and quality of outcomes				X	
15.	Programme/project impact				X	
16.	Sustainability of results/benefits				X	

<b>D.</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>Rating</b>				
	<i>The evaluator should choose ONE of the four options below.</i>					
	Continue/extend without modifications					
	Continue with modifications					
	Revise project completely					
	End project				X	

<b>E.</b>	<p><b>Comments</b></p> <p><b>Provide relevant explanations and comment on issues such as clarification, replicability, best practices etc.</b></p> <p>This was a terminal evaluation without the project foreseen to be continued.</p> <p>The project will have been completed on 31 December 2009. A follow-up project, TD/TKM/J92 <i>Strengthening border control along the Turkmen-Uzbek border, in particular at Farap checkpoint</i>, has already been approved by the Government, absorbing all staff under project I78 from 1 January 2010. Project J92 has been modelled on project I78, draws on the experiences reaped and builds on its achievements.</p>
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Annex4.

Map of Turkmen borders. (Source: UNODC Project TKMI78)



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Annex 5.

Official seizure statistics

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008(*)	2009(**)
Type	Quantit						
Heroin	80 kg	266 kg	180 kg	201 kg	325 kg	244 kg	154 kg
Opium	138 kg	665 kg	748 kg	2, 655 kg	2,283 kg	1,502 kg	562 kg
Marihuana	0	0	135 kg	154 kg	85 kg	67 kg	95 kg
Hashish	0	0	18 kg	206 kg	115 kg	68kg	156 kg
Poppy straw	0	0	142 kg	169 kg	473 kg	261 kg	42 kg
Opiates	94 kg	332 kg	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>312 kg</b>	<b>1 ,263 kg</b>	<b>1, 225 kg</b>	<b>3,386 kg</b>	<b>3,283kg</b>	<b>2,142kg</b>	<b>1009kg</b>

(\*)Not officially confirmed.

(\*\*) The figures represent the period of January-June 2009 only.

Source: UNODC Project TKM I78