MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT

Project Number:
AFG/I85

Project Title:
Regional Cooperation in Precursor Chemical Control between Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries

Thematic area:
Law Enforcement

Country:
Afghanistan

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Disclaimer

Independent Project Evaluations are scheduled and managed by the project managers and conducted by external independent evaluators. The role of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) in relation to independent project evaluations is one of quality assurance and support throughout the evaluation process, but IEU does not directly participate in or undertake independent project evaluations. It is, however, the responsibility of IEU to respond to the commitment of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in professionalizing the evaluation function and promoting a culture of evaluation within UNODC for the purposes of accountability and continuous learning and improvement.

Due to the disbandment of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) and the shortage of resources following its reinstitution, the IEU has been limited in its capacity to perform these functions for independent project evaluations to the degree anticipated. As a result, some independent evaluation reports posted may not be in full compliance with all IEU or UNEG guidelines. However, in order to support a transparent and learning environment, all evaluations received during this period have been posted and as an on-going process, IEU has begun re-implementing quality assurance processes and instituting guidelines for independent project evaluations as of January 2011.
Abbreviations and acronyms

ABP  Afghan Border Police
ANA  Afghan National Army
ANDCS  Afghan National Drugs Control Strategy
ANDS  Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP  Afghan National Police
ANSF  Afghan National Security Forces
ASNF  Afghan Special Narcotics Force
BEK  British Embassy Kabul.
CARICC  Central Asian Regional Intelligence and Coordination Centre
CJTF  Criminal Justice Task Force
CN  Counter Narcotics
CNPA  Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CNTA  Counter Narcotics Training Academy
DEA  Drugs Enforcement Agency (US)
DDG CNPA  Deputy Director General – Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
DG CNPA  Director General Counter - Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
DRC  Drugs Regulation Committee
ET  Evaluation Team
HMRC  Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
LE  Law Enforcement
LFM  Log Frame Matrix
MCN  Ministry of Counter Narcotic
MDTS  Mobile Detection Teams
MOF  Ministry of Finance
MOI  Ministry of The Interior.
NDS  National Directorate of Security (Intelligence Services)
NGOs  Non Governmental Organizations
NIU  National Interdiction Unit
PCM  Project Cycle Management
PCU  Precursor Control Unit.
PFP  Project Focal Point
PRC  Project Review Committee
ROL  British Rule of Law Team
RBM  Results Based Management
SDTK  Special Drugs Tribunal Kabul
SOCA  Serious and Organized Crime Agency (UK)
SOSI  Company a successor of Blackwater (SOSI stands for the name of the owner/Managing Director a US/Armenian)
SPFA  Strategic Programme Framework for Afghanistan
TADOC  Turkish National Police Training Academy
Executive Summary

A. Summary Major Achievements and Findings

1. The PCU has been established in March 2009, albeit belatedly. The formal establishment of PCU will facilitate project implementation.

2. The project has been providing training in computer skills and English and in identification of precursors to CNPA, MDTs and Customs officers, which contribute to improved performance as evidenced in an increase in precursor seizures. These courses continue to provide critical complimentary skills to the specialist training in precursor detection, identification and investigation independently provided by the French and British police experts.

3. The project has also made modest improvements in its role in the preparation of the forthcoming TARCET II operations. PCU has presented relevant intelligence to the preparatory committee and has worked on better awareness of the operation among relevant CN agencies in Afghanistan. It is expected that the PCU and its staff are better prepared this round to add value to the operation. However, it should be stressed that the knowledge and awareness of the operation outside of the planning team and among the CNPA senior officers in charge is extremely limited.

4. The project, however, has yet to capacitate the PCU to effectively coordinate precursor control activities, including, intelligence gathering and exchange, investigation and interdiction among relevant CN agencies. PCU will need more technical assistance to develop a realistic and achievable role for itself including, in the training of officers of relevant CN law enforcement agencies and taking a lead in organizing intelligence-led interdiction operations.

5. At the regional level, to date, there is no evidence of agreements reached with neighbouring countries in the exchange of intelligence and joint operation in the control of precursor trafficking. It is hoped that the outcome of successive TARCET operations will encourage both the GOA and the participating neighbouring countries to realize the need for more intensive bilateral and regional cooperation in joint CN and precursor control strategies and operations.

6. The project development process lacked participatory and dynamic implementation planning. Project Identification and Analysis and Project Planning Phases were predominantly carried out by project development experts with out close and substantive involvement of Afghan counterparts and stakeholders. This gap in Project Cycle Management (PCM) process has denied the project of vital input from relevant stakeholders resulting in poor project design, which in turn affected project management, monitoring and evaluation and significantly undermined national ownership.

7. Similarly, the Log Frame Matrix, a critical monitoring and evaluation tool, failed to establish hierarchical coherence between “Overall Objective”, “Immediate Objectives”, “Outputs” and “Activities”. Further, results performance indicators have not been designed in conformity with SMART principles. This weakness denied the project
Management of important tools for monitoring achievement of outputs and objectives. In almost all cases the indicators failed to specify completion time, quantity and quality criteria. In the absence of the foregoing specific indicators, it has been difficult to effectively manage projects and monitor achievements against plans. Further, it also impeded more objective evaluation of the project.

The project document has made provisions for effective project management. The respective roles of UNODC, Government of I.R.A counterparts, donors, UNODC HQ based technical departments have been appropriately specified. The lack of utilizing these implementation arrangements has, however, impeded project delivery. Therefore major improvements are particularly required in project management and monitoring practices: i) retention of project coordination staff, ii) formation of functioning Project Review Committee (PRC), iii) effective use of work plans as management tool, iv) inclusive project revision exercises involving counterparts and key stakeholders.

The high turnover of international project coordinators has hampered project planning and continuity of activities. Coupled with absence of effective guidance and supervision from senior managers at the HQs and Country Office, proactive project management was not possible.

The use of work plans in the implementation of the project is another area, which project management has not taken particularly seriously. In cases where work plans were prepared, counterparts were not consulted on the feasibility of such plans and neither was these plans referred to in six-monthly or annual progress reports to assess progress against plans. The establishment of a functioning PRC would have provided an opportunity for regular review of project progress, targets, and assumptions and for taking mitigation measures to advance implementation.

Prescribed mechanisms were not sufficiently utilized to encourage national ownership. The designation of a Project Focal Point (PFP) would help to facilitate communication between UNODC and counterparts, expedite decisions on the part of counterparts, improve transparency and accountability of both parties, and promote appreciation of mutual responsibilities and roles.

B. Assessment by Evaluation Criteria

RELEVANCE
The project is relevant to the objectives and priorities established in the: i) I.R.A National Drug Control Strategy formulated in January 2006, ii) the Afghanistan Compact agreed between the I.R.A and the International Community in 31st January-1st February 2006, iii) the Paris Pact Initiative’s 7 interlinked action plans, collectively known as the RAINBOW STRATEGY, that aim to encourage the I.R.A. and its neighboring countries to combat drug trafficking and associated organized crime, with support of the Paris Pact partners; and iv) UNODC mandate and Strategic Programme Frameworks for I.R.A, 2005- 2008 and 2009 -2011.
OWNERSHIP
Review of project document, examination of project reports, discussion with counterparts and donors and project management has revealed that the project has not sufficiently utilized participative mechanisms that allow counterpart ownership of the PCM process, including those management arrangements articulated in the project document. Significant gaps included the failure of establishing a functioning of PRC, joint regular review of progress reports, and revision of projects together with donors and counterparts. ET contends that this lack of meaningful ownership denied counterparts to develop capacity to plan and manage programmes and projects, which is essential for ensuring sustainability of initiated project processes and achievements realized as a result of programme/project intervention.

EFFECTIVENESS
The project has little to show in terms of achievement of objectives as discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The PCU was constituted in March 2009, impeding the responsible counterparts to play their role in the implementation of the project. On the part of project management, the failure of sustained retention of international project coordinators, lack of supervision and follow-up from senior managers and failure to use effective monitoring tools inhibited implementation.

EFFICIENCY
Institutional constraints, particularly the inflexibility of the Tashkil¹ review, which requires mandatory approval for creating government bodies, units within ministries and associated budget for operations has imposed constraints in the timely utilization of project provided equipment, vehicles and facilities.

The project has not used periodic work plan, a key management tool, in the course of implementation. Work plans were largely prepared haphazardly without the involvement of counterparts or PRC. Project progress reports do not consequently make reference to work plans or benchmarks. This gap denied the review of time frame estimates, assumptions and carrying out rigorous analysis of the inter-relationship of activities and outputs across project components to identify sequential and parallel activities that could have helped to expedite project delivery.

Inadequacies identified in project analysis and planning phases, within the PCM process, particularly in: the hierarchical structure of Overall Objective, Immediate Objectives, Outputs and Activities; vague and in some cases irrelevant results performance indicators; lack of baseline information on indicators, lack of well thought out data collection and analysis process with designated responsibilities has obstructed the production of useful periodic progress reports for effective and proactive project management.

SUSTAINABILITY
Afghanistan only partially fulfils key conditions that improve the probability for continued long-term project-derived outcomes and impacts after this technical assistance project ends. These conditions include: i) demonstrated political commitment to Counter Narcotics strategy; ii) the implementation of the Counter Narcotics Law of Afghanistan is institutionalized at the ministerial

¹ Tashkil is the term used to describe the structural organigram of a governmental department in which staff numbers and positions are determined. The Tashkil process requires all new or existing units to be reviewed and approved by a central government body prior to allocation of budgetary and logistical.
levels, whose monitoring is charged to a Cabinet Committee; iii) As one of the least developed countries, Afghanistan could face financial constraints and essential technical capacity in the development and implementation of CN programme that could effectively tackle the risk of poppy production and illicit drug trade imposes. Afghanistan would, therefore, require continued international financial support to build capacity in the planning and management of CN activities in the medium to long-term.

C. Project Strengths and Weaknesses (on the basis of PCM and Evaluation Criteria)

On the basis of findings evaluation makes the following observations:

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<th>PCM &amp; Evaluation Criteria &amp; Achievements</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
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| Relevance                                | Alignment to:  
  - GOA National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS)  
  - Afghanistan Compact  
  - Paris Pact Initiative’s, RAINBOW STRATEGY  
  - UNODC Strategic Programme Frameworks for GOA, 2005-2007, And 2009 -2011. | Failure to closely involve counterparts in the PCM process:  
  - project development (Analysis and Planning phases);  
  - Development of Logical Framework Matrix (hierarchical structure of Overall Objectives, Immediate Objectives, Outputs and Activities; and Objectively Identifiable performance indicators, source and means of verification, and assumptions and risks)  
  - Failure to establish a functioning PRC  
  - Review project progress reports  
  - Joint revision of project strategies  
  - Lack of mechanisms to involve relevant national stakeholders in the implementation of project (e.g. Customs and CFTJ in: revision of project strategies, reviewing progress reports and in the review of evaluation reports) |
| Ownership                                | - Customs clearance for project inputs  
  - Responsibility in the designation of trainees,  
  - operational management and Budget for staff during training, | |
| Effectiveness                            | - Establishment of PCU, although Belatedly,  
  - training provided in computer skills and English in preparation for specialty training  
  - Comparatively better preparation | - PCU has yet to deliver on developing functioning intelligence database on persons involved in precursor trafficking, seizures, routes, origins and entry points, types of chemicals, locations of clandestine laboratories, |
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| activities for forthcoming TARCET II operations, | - training needs analysis  
- fostering coordination mechanism among relevant national stakeholders and integrated training curriculum | |

**Efficiency**

- Poor project design  
- Inflexible requirements of the Tashkil  
- Failure to use work plans as a management tool  
- Lack of rigor in specifying performance indicators project results (at the output and objective levels) and in the design of hierarchical structure and coherence (overall objective, immediate objectives, and outputs)  
- Lack of supervision from senior managers from the UNODC HQ and the Country Office.

**Sustainability**

- Strong political commitment  
- Structures for internalization of project results legislated (Counter Narcotics Law of Afghanistan)  
- Ministerial level and counterpart agencies (CNPA) in place.  
- Strong support from the International community for CN activities  
- Lack of effective Coordination mechanisms at national, provincial and district levels  
- Risk of inadequate national resources for the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy.  
- Lack of planning and management capacity in CN activities

**Project Implementation Arrangements and Practices**

- Project Document has provided appropriate management arrangements:  
  - Project Review Committee  
  - Clear roles for Project Management Team and National Counterparts  
  - Clear project monitoring modality  
- Inability to retain project management team (Int'l and National Project Coordinators)  
- Failure to use periodic work plans to manage project  
- Lack of rigor in the preparation and assessment of progress reports and their failure to report against plans  
- Lack of management and planning capacity on the part of counterparts  
- Failure to establish a functioning PRC (that could have represented: CNPA, PCU, donors, other relevant law enforcement agencies, MCN, and Ministry of Finance (Customs))

**D. Summary Key Recommendations**

1. Project developers should closely involve national counterparts, through a planning workshop in the: identification of project ideas, defining the development problem, developing solutions and strategies, and implementation planning through the formulation of logical framework matrix. Project developers should not be allowed to dominate Project Analysis and Identification and Project Planning phases. Experts should rather act as facilitators of the processes.
2 UNODC Country Office Afghanistan should organize intensive 3-5 day **Workshops on Results Based Management (RBM)** to help project management team (International and national project staff) and counterparts comprehend the principles and practices of managing projects by results i.e. to effectively plan, manage and evaluate project implementation.

3 As prescribed in the project document, in the future, the revised project should establish a **Project Review Committee (PRC)** to assist project management take important decisions, such as, through the provision of advice on policy issues; adopt annual work plans and corresponding budget; approve major changes to project design when required; and review semi-annual project progress reports.

4 The project needs to start effective use and review of periodic implementation **work plans**. Using work plans in project management is a key tool within integrated PCM that allows effective monitoring and proactive management and objective evaluation of achievements against planned results. Work plans should be prepared in close consultation with project counterparts.

5. **Project Focal Point (PFP)** should be designated to follow up the overall implementation of project activities under the overall guidance of the DM-MoI, who would be responsible for coordinating project activities on behalf of the counterparts. This recommended arrangement would streamline communication, encourage counterparts to keep engaged throughout the project lifecycle, and could improve level of national ownership and enhance accountability of both project management and counterparts.

6. Formal and functioning **coordination mechanism** should be established between the PCU, Customs, and Drug Regulation Committee (DRC) and other related law enforcement agencies for sharing intelligence, experience and joined-up working in the planning and implementing precursor control strategies to improve their combined effectiveness in tackling precursors trafficking in Afghanistan.
1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose and Objective of Mid-Term Evaluation

1. This Mid-Term Evaluation of project “Regional cooperation in precursor chemical control between Afghanistan and neighboring countries” Project AD/AFG/06/I85 is tasked to provide information on the extent to which the project has realized its strategies: i) the identification of key chemicals and entry points to Afghanistan, ii) the development of both regional and international information analysis and exchange systems designed to target and dismantle international criminal operations, iii) capacity building in terms of training and provision of equipment for interdiction along key Afghan borders, and iv) the establishment of special mobile training teams to provide training on precursor identification and control to Afghan law enforcement officers.

2. The evaluation also assesses whether the project has been designed, executed and monitored using the standard methodologies and tools of Project Cycle Management (PCM), including the logical framework matrix. Moreover, the Mid-Term evaluation determines project performance using the following evaluation criteria:

3. Relevance: determines whether project objective meets the needs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (I.R.A.) in line with the approaches and priorities identified in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Afghanistan National Drug Control Strategy (ANDCS). Evaluation also reviews the degree to which the project is aligned with UNODC mandate, Strategic Programme Framework for Afghanistan (SPFA), and multilateral instruments and declarations including, Compact, Paris Pact and G8 2004.

4. Ownership: focuses on whether the project provides and utilizes appropriate mechanisms and implementation approaches, as provided for in the project document, to promote national ownership that allows Afghan counterparts to get involved effectively across the PCM process, in decisions and monitoring and evaluation, as appropriate. This criterion seeks to determine the extent the project provided Afghan counterparts to gear the project to their needs and also benefit from the experience.

5. Effectiveness: assesses the status of achievement of project outputs and to what extent realized outputs contributed towards achieving the project objective, i.e. reduction in the smuggling precursors into Afghanistan.

6. Efficiency: addresses performance of delivery mechanisms, inputs to activities in terms of their cost effectiveness in transforming the means into results. Relevant issues for review include: quality of project management arrangements and practice; the use of internal and external resources to achieve project objective; international consultancies; use of equipment (vehicles and equipment, and IT); utilization of trainers and trained officers; planning tools including needs assessment; national expertise and knowledge; international best practice and regional experience; and recommendations of previous evaluation reports on related LE projects, where available.
7. **Sustainability**: this criterion determines whether national and local authorities are creating the necessary conditions that ensure sustainability of processes, activities and results achieved from implementation of this project on their own. Evaluation assesses whether key prerequisites of political commitment, institutional arrangements, resources and appropriate structures, including monitoring and evaluation systems have been created for sustained implementation of project processes and results at the CNPA/PCU.

8. **Lessons learned and best practices**: Discern lessons learned and best practices from the implementation of this project to improve project design and enhance project effectiveness in similar future interventions.

1.2 Methodology

9. The Mid-Term Evaluation carried out desk review of project related documents, including, project document, project progress reports, and project revisions. Moreover, evaluation has consulted related national and international CN policy related documents, including, ANDS, UNODC CN Strategic Programme Framework for Afghanistan, Paris Pact, Compact, G8 Declarations in 2004.

10. Document review has been complemented through triangulation exercise by conducting several structured interviews with Afghan counterparts (CNPA authorities, MoI, MCN, MoF – Customs MDT, CJTF), donors and other international CN actors (SOCA, British Embassy – Rule of Law unit, and EC, ) and UN Agencies including UNAMA. (For complete list of interviewees refer Annex II).

11. Evaluation has conducted a series of meetings with project management to solicit feedback on findings established at each stage of this participative evaluation in line with agreed evaluation plan.

1.3 Structure of Evaluation Report

12. As a mid-term evaluation the focus is more on accomplishment of activities and realization of outputs than on project outcomes.

**Chapter 2**: addresses project background, including prevailing country context that led to the need for the formulation of the project. A concise project summary is also presented to provide key project information, such as, start date, end dates, donor, project budget, revisions, objective, outputs and activities.

**Chapter 3**: Within the framework of PCM framework, assesses project analysis phase (situation analysis comprising problem analysis and objective analysis) and planning phase addressing project design and development of Logical Framework Matrix. This chapter attempts to elaborate on consultation modalities adopted, through PCM process, with Afghan stakeholders, and donors to identify the development need and establish the rationale for intervention. Soundness of project design to assess the logical relationship between cause-effect and means-end relationships, and clarity of performance indicators, assumptions and risks are also discussed.

**Chapter 4**: presents project achievements and findings, including project implementation arrangements and practices and their effect on progress of implementation. Included is also analysis on the status of project implementation in terms of output against work plan and their
contribution to the project objective.  
**Chapter 5:** discusses major constraints encountered in the course of implementation: institutional, programmatic, funding, security and others, if any that influenced, for example, quality of outputs, timely completion of activities, budget overspent and action taken to mitigate identified constraints.  
**Chapter 6:** assesses findings established in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 using evaluation criteria prescribed in the evaluation TOR namely: relevance, ownership, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.  
**Chapter 7:** presents lessons learned from the implementation of this project for use in further improving effectiveness of PCM for similar UNODC Law Enforcement (LE) projects in the future.  
**Chapter 8:** presents recommendation directed to counterparts, UNODC and donors as appropriate for consideration.  
**Chapter 9:** summary conclusion.  

2. Project Context  

2.1 Country Context  

13. According to UNODC estimates Afghanistan converts approximately 71.5% of its raw opium into morphine base and then into heroin. It is estimated that 420 metric tonnes or approximately 420,000 kilograms of heroin are produced and trafficked throughout the world. Law enforcement official’s estimate that between 70% and 90% of the heroin found in Europe has been processed from opium produced in Afghanistan. Almost all of the opiates consumed in Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries and most of the opiates found in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and in Africa originate in Afghanistan. Linkages between international drug trafficking, international organized crime, international money laundering, and terrorism have been directly related to the Afghan narcotics industry. It is feared that established counter insurgency organizations will sustain their organizations from the narcotics industry as financing from traditional sponsors tends to diminish.  

14. In response to this alarming situation and in collaboration with the I.R. of Afghanistan, UNODC has launched a number of projects to assist the Afghan Government in the whole counter narcotics response, primarily in the provision of capacity building of drug control. Within United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), UNODC is also helping to mainstream the need to assist farmers and local communities to establish alternative livelihoods. UNODC projects cover drug control programme focussing on: demand reduction by developing baseline information on the scale and extent of drug abuse in the country, enabling the implementation of integrated projects in abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation services to populations where drug abuse has already been identified; continues to conduct a comprehensive opium poppy survey and other strategic studies to monitor and assess the levels of cultivation and sustainability of national and international efforts; assisting in the building of a central drug investigation unit with satellite offices capable of investigation and intelligence capacity; and interdiction force to provide support to the investigation units. In January 2005 UNODC launched another Law Enforcement project aimed at strengthening the controls along the Afghan/Iran border.  

15. Recently, it has been established that a large volume of internationally controlled and non-controlled chemicals are required to produce heroin from opium. None of those chemicals needed are currently produced in Afghanistan. The needed chemicals are obtained legally in Europe/Middle East/Asia and then diverted into the illegitimate market. Opium conversion
laboratory operators in Afghanistan contract with international criminal organizations (brokers)

who arrange for the required chemicals to be illegally smuggled into the country. At the Paris Pact Consultative Group meeting held at Vienna in October 2004 it was agreed that strong support should be given to the country of Afghanistan to promote regional cooperation to stop the smuggling of chemical precursors into Afghanistan. In addition, at a G8 Afghan counter-narcotics meeting held at London in March 2005 the importance of precursor detection and controls was again highlighted. UNODC has therefore designed the project under review to tackle the newly emerging precursor trafficking into Afghanistan with the collaboration of the international community.

2.2 Project Background

16. Within the broad Counter Narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, precursor control is an important part of the international strategy to reduce the production and trafficking of Afghan opiates. But it is clear that capacities need to be built within the Afghan law enforcement community to counteract the smuggling of chemicals required to produce Afghan heroin. Afghanistan needs to be made a part of a well-structured comprehensive precursor interdiction strategy that works in cooperation with the international law enforcement community.

17. Within this context, UNODC proposed and designed this multi-faceted project, to establish a Precursor Control Unit (PCU) within the intelligence department of the CNPA. The project envisages for the PCU to closely work with the CNPA, investigators and Mobile Detection Teams, Border Police (BP), Customs, National Interdiction Unit (NIU), AFGHAN SPECIAL NARCOTICS FORCE (ASNF), and the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) prosecutors, who will all need special training to prosecute these most complex cases. At the regional level this project will develop close operational ties with ongoing projects in Central Asia, South-West and South Asia. The project also provides for the promotion of a framework for exchange of intelligence among countries in the region and international CN community. This approach will allow the law enforcement community to target large scale smuggling organizations for prosecution. Finally, the direct involvement of UNODC personnel along with assistance from INCB Precursor Control Section and international experts will provide the expertise and oversight needed to implement the project. A critical component of this project will be training Afghan law enforcement officers in interdiction, detection, and prosecution as well as in the disposal of hazardous chemicals.

3. Project Analysis and Planning Phases

3.1 Project Identification and Analysis Phase

18. The project was primarily initiated by UNODC and developed by UNODC project development experts in response to the recommendations made at the Paris Pact Consultative Group meeting held at Vienna in October 2004, where it was agreed that strong support should be given to Afghanistan to promote regional cooperation to stop the smuggling of chemical precursors into Afghanistan. In addition, at a G8 Afghan counter-narcotics meeting held at London in March 2005 the importance of precursor detection and controls was again highlighted. While it is clear that the Afghan counterparts were concerned about precursor trafficking and sought appropriate support, the review of project development documents do not
reveal substantive involvement of Afghan counterparts in the project identification and analysis phase. As established in Chapter 4, 5 and 6, effect of factors that inhibited the timely delivery of project results, including institutional constraints, on the part of both Afghan counterparts and UNODC Country Office Afghanistan could have been mitigated and apparently incorrect assessment of risks and assumptions could have been minimized had Afghan counterparts and project management at the UNODC Country Office Afghanistan were closely involved at this stage.

19. Under the framework of PCM, project identification starts from problems faced by MOI and CNPA and other law enforcement agencies in combating illicit drug trafficking, particularly those relating to lack of relevant skills and knowledge. As the problem could be perceived in different ways by different groups of stakeholders, it is thus vital to bring together representatives of key stakeholders in the analysis phase. In the case of this project, a workshop could have been organized involving: MOI, CNPA Kabul Authorities, Chiefs of CNPA provincial offices, MCN, and donor country representatives involved in providing Technical Assistance on CN, and sister UN Agency representatives, Customs Authorities, Prosecutor’s Office and Department of Justice.

20. Essentially the identification process should focus on defining the problem from the perspectives of key and other stakeholders. The major tools of analysis in this phase are Problem Analysis and Stakeholder Analysis. The outcomes of this phase are: Identification of stakeholders affected by Project AD/AFG/06/I85, major existing problems that inhibit effective CN efforts, and a Problem Tree representing causes and effects hierarchically. UNODC project development staff/consultants could use various interview and discussion techniques to identify stakeholders affected positively or negatively by the project idea. Moreover, at this stage developers could consult thematic or project evaluation reports relating to previous projects to further articulate existing problems. This exercise helps the project developers to prepare for participatory planning workshop.

21. After collecting and analyzing sufficient information, a participatory workshop could then be organized, where identified stakeholders could contribute to further articulate the identification of key problems in the existing situation. In the course of the workshop, the main technique used would be the drawing up a problem tree. The purpose of the problem tree is to identify hierarchically ordered problems in terms of cause and effect relationship. Often important consideration in such exercise should be identifying underlying and secondary problems, for example, is “lack of trained officers in Customs on precursor identification” or the problem “inhibiting the performance of law enforcement agencies” or there are other related problems, for example “lack of resources?” or because of “issues relating to recruitment and HR management?” or “is it lack of planning and management capacity in the CNPA on precursor control strategy”. Which one is the underlying problem and which ones are the secondary of third-level problems. Such questions addressed in a workshop with active participation of stakeholders, ensures the development of a clearer picture of existing situation leading to more effective solutions.

22. The next stage relates to objective analysis, in effect it is a mirror image of the problem tree formulated in the preceding Stakeholder and Problem analyses. It presents the positive aspects of a desired future situation by converting the ‘causes and effect’ relationships into “means to end” relationship. Again the outcome of this exercise is presented in an “objective tree” leading to clustering the means into respective “outputs” or “project components” that help realize desired “outcomes” or “objectives” and eventually to the “Long-term Objective” as identified in
23. Essentially, problem analysis and objective analysis processes help generate set of interrelated immediate objectives and their respective means (components or key outputs) of achieving those objectives, whose technical feasibility, effectiveness and appropriateness could be further elaborated and defined in the subsequent project planning phase.

24. These exercises are only beneficial to the extent they allow active and close participation of stakeholders. The process of identifying the existing problems and determining solutions that would result in desired changes in the capability of CNPA, through the creation of a PCU, equipping it with appropriate technology, providing existing and future members with relevant training, and providing similar support to other related law enforcement agencies, the Customs and the Drug Regulatory Commission, can only reflect the objective conditions if the process is co-owned by the stakeholders. ET, however, contends that, like the other projects under evaluation, the situation analysis phase was predominantly led and carried out with little substantive involvement of the Afghan counterparts.

3.2 Project Planning Phase

25. The project used the Logical Framework Approach to set out the intervention logic, i.e., the means to end relationship (outputs, and objective) established in PCM Phase 1. The outcome of this exercise is the log frame matrix, which provides the basis for checking the feasibility of the project. The Matrix defines the activities to be undertaken, the resources required, and the responsibilities of project management. In the third, fourth and fifth columns, objectively verifiable indicators, sources and means of verification and assumptions and risks are established. Under the PCM process, this exercise should be carried out with close involvement of counterparts as their input reflects realistic environment around which the project will be implemented, including institutional constraints, available national expertise and knowledge, stakeholder expectations, and their respective capacities. The information provided under these columns, once adopted, serve as the basis against which project progress is monitored and evaluated.

26. In the following paragraphs, ET discusses the major elements in the project Log Frame Matrix, to assess their clarity, feasibility and measurability and hierarchical coherence and causal relationships.

27. **Overall Objectives:** The project document does not state the **Overall Objective**, i.e. the development objective of this project. Instead the Matrix puts “To promote regional cooperation, develop practical measures and capacity for chemical interdiction, develop international target packages, and prevent suspicious consignments of chemicals from entering Afghanistan” as **Immediate Objective**. The formulation is not correct because it states the set of means for achieving a certain objective without defining a development objective in a change language, specifying the desired situation to be achieved as a result of project intervention, for example “Decreased rate of precursor trafficking into Afghanistan”, or “Decreased trafficking of processed or semi-processed drugs from Afghanistan”, indicating measurable project aim or objective.

28. **Objectives:** The Matrix presents a set of 4 “Objectives”, which are again not stated in a “change language” but “action” language mentioning the “output” in the same formulation, for example, **Objective 2** in the Matrix is formulated as “Development (denoting activity) national
capacity...in the region to identify and seize suspicious consignments of chemical in targeted production”. As in the case of the “Immediate Objective” discussed above, the Objectives do not indicate measurable desirable situation the project is expected to achieve or to work towards.

29. **Outputs and Activities:** In the project Logical Framework matrix, the outputs and activities are mixed up with “activities”, making it difficult to differentiate one from the other. This presentation affects the proper determination of successive Log frame elements, i.e. objectively verifiable performance indicators and sources and means of verification. Fundamentally, the means (output and activities) and ends (immediate objectives) relationship is not clearly recognizable, in a way that allows the identification, and measurement of contribution and effect of individual outputs to immediate objectives. This confusion could have been avoided had project analysis and planning phases were properly carried out while developing the project.

30. **Activities:** It is apparent that the lack of clarity of cause and effect relationship between activities and respective outputs has impeded the formulation of effective work plan. In fact, the log frame did not generate activities involved in realizing respective outputs. The lack of hierarchical structure of project elements (overall objective, immediate objectives, outputs and activities), is consequently reflected in successive project work plans. Clarity of sets of activities resulting in the realization of specific outputs could have allowed for the project to identify activities that could have been initiated in parallel and those that should be implemented sequentially to expedite overall project delivery within optimum time frame.

31. **Objectively Verifiable Performance Indicators:** Indicators are formulated in response to the question, “How would project management and counterparts know whether or not what has been planned is actually happening or materialized?” For performance indicators to effectively serve the purpose of project monitoring and evaluation, they need to be designed on the basis of SMART, Specific to the objective it is supposed to measure, Measurable (quantitatively or qualitatively), Available at an acceptable cost, Relevant to the information needs of managers, Time-bound – expected time of delivery) principles. Appropriate indicators should be specified for all result levels, i.e. “Overall Objective”, “Immediate Objectives” and “Outputs” to ensure performance assessment and the monitoring of hierarchical contribution of lower to higher result levels against plans.

32. In light of the above principles, ET makes the following observations on Project AD/AFG/05/I85 indicators stipulated in the Logical Framework Matrix (LFM). “Overall Objective” has not been specified; Objectives are not formulated in measurable form i.e. in a way that indicate a desired change in the current situation; outputs are not clearly identified and formulated; and activities are mixed up with outputs. With respect to indicators, they have not been defined along SMART principles (quantity is not in most cases specified where possible) and time frame is missing in virtually all indicators.

33. In almost all cases the performance indicators fail to specify completion time, quantity and quality. In the absence of the foregoing specific indicators, it is difficult to manage projects and monitor achievements against plans. Further, it also impedes objective evaluation of the project.

34. **Sources and Means of Verification:** When indicators are formulated, the source of information and means of collection should be specified. The source of verification should specify the format in which the information should be provided, who should provide the
information and how regularly (monthly, quarterly, annually) it should be provided. Particularly with regard to those indicators identified for collection from counterparts or other public institutions, details on content and format should be discussed and agreed. Their accessibility, reliability and relevance should be jointly assessed before adopting them. Balance between efficacy in analysis and ease of data collection and cost should also be weighed carefully while formulating such indicators. In the case of this project, ET has not observed, regular reports from counterparts, for example, on: number of mobile teams established, size of such teams, training offered on the identification, detection and handling of precursor chemicals; and number of participants and their profiles and respective feedback on the efficacy of training.

35. In conclusion, ET contends that on the basis of the above findings, project development has not followed the PCM phases in project development: there is little evidence that Project Analysis and Planning phases were rigorously carried out with the participation of counterparts; project elements (results and activities) are not hierarchically structured in project logical framework matrix; and performance indicators do not in most cases conform to SMART principles. Consequently, these deficiencies have impeded effective project management and monitoring.

4. Analysis of Achievements and Findings

4.1 Project Implementation Arrangements and Practice

36. Although the project document provides standard UNODC project management guidelines and implementation arrangements, evaluation has established that lack of consistent, pro-active management practices and systematic project monitoring and reporting has played a greater part in less than satisfactory project achievements (for detail see Section 4.2).

37. The project document has made provisions necessary modalities for effective project management. The UNODC Country Office Afghanistan, as the executing agency, is responsible for the implementation and accountability of the project funding under the overall supervision of UNODC HQ. Specialist units at UNODC HQ also collaborate in the provision of technical advice. UNDP provides the procurement and administrative services as requested by UNODC Country Office Afghanistan. There has been no major issue on adequacy or transfer of budget provision for project activities and the provision of backstopping services from UNODC HQ relevant units.

38. Afghan counterparts, specifically the key stakeholders, MOI and CNPA provide valuable contribution in terms of facilitating logistics, customs clearance, and providing training candidates.

39. The project document also provides for International and National Project Coordinators to lead on project implementation assisted by Afghan Country Office support services, including procurement, finance and administration.

40. The Evaluation Team has, however, established the need for major improvements in project management practices if this project is to make substantive achievements. These areas include: i) the timely recruitment and retention of project coordination staff, ii) formation of Project Review Committee (PRC), iii) effective use of work plan as management tool for successive planning periods (six-monthly and annual), iv) inclusive project revision exercises involving stakeholders.
41. Recruitment and retention of international and national project coordinators has posed some challenges to project AD/AFG/06/I85. The first International Project Coordinator was recruited 5 months after the official start of project implementation only to stay for 12 months (6th of September 2006 to 16th September 2007). A replacement International Project Coordinator was recruited on 12 November 2007 who stayed a year, until November 2008. The last International Project Coordinator was recruited end of last year, who resigned in July 2009, staying only about 7 months. Retention of National Project Coordinator was, in contrast, much better. The first National Project Coordinator stayed about 26 months (July 2006 to September 2008) and the current National Coordinator was recruited in December 2008, 6 months after the latter's resignation. Recruitment and retentions has, therefore, delayed the early start of the project; the high turnover of International Project Coordinators denied the project of momentum and continuity of activities and forged working relationships with counterparts.

42. The project has not yet, over 3 years into project implementation, formed a Project Review Committee (PRC), composed of representatives of the Government of Afghanistan (MOI, MCN and the CNPA), donors, and the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan to monitor and review progress of project implementation. As prescribed in the project document, PRC assists project management in taking important policy decisions, such as, providing advice on measures to mitigate constraints to expedite and speed up implementation; approving six-monthly and annual work plans and corresponding budget prepared by the international project coordinator; recommending major changes to project design, ensuring that the changes are made in compliance with the rules and regulations of Islamic Government of Afghanistan and UNODC; reviewing semi-annual project progress reports prepared by international/national project coordinators; and reviewing effectiveness of project delivery mechanisms. The project has not benefited from invaluable support by involving key stakeholders in the preceding areas. Moreover, PRC is a mechanism that could have allowed the project management to develop and sustain support by keeping them engaged in decisions related to the implementation of the project. PRC also allows for creating consensus on the status, direction and collaboration of project implementation among stakeholders, including donors.

43. The use of work plans in the implementation of the project is another area, which project management has not taken particularly seriously. In cases where work plans were prepared, counterparts were not consulted on the feasibility of such plans and neither was these plans referred to in six-monthly or annual progress reports to assess progress against plans. On the basis of these findings, ET team contends that the process of drawing out work plans, jointly developed with counterparts, would have helped project management to: identify parallel and sequential activities, solicit and ensure timely commitment of counterparts, monitor progress and timely accomplishment of activities and outputs, revisit assumptions and risks in order to make them more realistic taking into account the views of counterparts on changing situations. Using work plans in project management, is therefore, a key tool within integrated PCM that allows managing projects against planned results.

44. The project has submitted monitoring reports (six-monthly and annual) in the required UNODC standard format. Reporting could, however, be improved to include a brief work plan for the succeeding period to provide full status of project progress and outstanding activities. Most importantly, there is no evidence that reports are shared with counterparts before they are officially adopted. Project management is also required to produce detailed reports on activities, for example, training programmes delivered by the project and other partner providers. There is, however, scant documentation of such activities. Reports on such activities should include:
purpose of the activity, content of the training or study tour, feedback of participants on the benefits they think they gained from the training, and how they shared their experience with their colleagues at home in more formal manner, for example by preparing a report for discussion in a formal meeting. Reporting activities in such substantive and result oriented manner increases the common awareness on international best practices among concerned officers and improves project documentation and provide useful evidence for reporting and evaluation.

45. The Deputy Minister of Interior for CN is responsible for UNODC’s CNPA support projects, which in itself is an important indication that the Government of Afghanistan is committed to the project purpose at the highest level. While it is apparent that this arrangement provides an opportunity to solicit decisions directly from the top, in practice, as evaluation team found out, DM-MoI is too busy to interact with project management in detail as frequently as project management would like. In the course of structured interviews it was not apparent to the ET that comprehensive awareness on the totality of project outputs and activities among the key beneficiaries of the project exists. ET, therefore, believes that a senior official, with equivalent to the rank of Director General of the CNPA should be formally designated as Project Focal Point (PFP) to follow up the overall implementation of project activities under the guidance of the DM-MoI. The PFP would be responsible for following up project implementation, coordinating and compiling their side of progress reports, chairing the Project Review Committee meetings, jointly reviewing project reports and project revisions with UNODC project management and donors, regularly briefing the DM-MoI on PRC meetings and recommendations, and coordinating overall activities in collaboration with beneficiary CNPA units. This recommended arrangement would streamline communication, encourage counterparts to keep engaged throughout the project lifecycle, and could improve level of national ownership and enhance accountability of both project management and counterparts.

46. In conclusion, the above discussion indicate that quality of outputs, use of inputs, and timely delivery of results could be improved through planning for results that allows active participation of counterparts throughout the PCM process. As discussed in Section 3.1 the project intervention logic to create a functioning PCU is essentially sound, but the solutions could only be achieved by phases and only if development and implementation planning were driven by employing participative planning and monitoring mechanisms.

47. ET, therefore, highly recommends that UNODC organize 2-3 days workshop on Results Based Management (RBM) for project management team and counterparts. The purpose of the workshop should be to help project managers and counterparts to comprehend the concept of RBM and work out the project implementation plan in the approach elaborated in Section 3.2 above.

48. The workshop should be preferably facilitated by an Afghan national expert, with the support of international project development experts and using on-going projects, and workshop materials and proceedings should be translated into local language and made available for participants. The outcome of the workshop would be the preparation of work plan, and completion of the Log Frame Matrix (in appropriate detail and format as discussed in Section 3.2).

4.2 Project Achievements
4.2.1 Assessment of Overall Achievement

49. The FORMAL establishment of a Precursor Control Unit in March 2009 within the existing intelligence structure of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) was a significant achievement. This decision was taken at Tashkil, review of the MOI, almost at the end of the project completion. It is hard to; therefore, imagine making any meaningful advance on implementation prior to this recognition.

50. As discussed in Chapter 3 in detail, the lack of rigor in project development and design resulted in unrealistic expectations and assumptions; primarily, because there was little consultation with relevant counterparts in the project analysis and planning phases. Secondary and primary problems were not properly researched and identified in the course of project development and planning. For example, the need for meeting basic training in computer skills and English before the establishment of a PCU and a database was not anticipated. A more in-depth project development and planning efforts would have helped to formulate a more realistic project.

51. Some efforts have been put on compiling intelligence database comprising information on persons involved in trafficking precursor chemicals and on chemicals seized. However, due to lack of training, what has been so far achieved is limited and records are patchy. Seizures are being made and illegal chemical laboratories are being destroyed but often are not reported or properly recorded.

52. As discussed in the following Section, the project has recently accomplished some activities, including preparations towards the forthcoming TARCET II operations. As commented by the donor, however, the project would have achieved much more if it had acted proactively through systematic planning and monitoring activities. Technical units at the HQ were not also regularly informed of associated problems to make their assistance possible.

53. In the succeeding Sections evaluation closely examines progress of projects in more detail.

4.2.2 A Dedicated Precursor Control Unit (PCU) at CNPA (Objective 1)

54. A Precursor Control Unit has finally been formally established within the existing intelligence structure of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). This decision was taken in March 2009 at Tashkil, review of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), almost at the end of the project completion. The current approved staff strength is 9 including the Head of the Unit, with the promise of MOI authorities to raise the officers to 11 shortly. The PCU will coordinate activities aimed at countering trafficking of precursor chemicals, under the overall operational responsibility of the CNPA.

55. The designated officers selected for this specialist unit have gone through formal selection process, which included tests in Basic English, computer skills, investigative techniques, and basic knowledge of narcotics and precursor chemicals. Candidates were also given polygraph tests to determine their personal integrity, a requirement of such sensitive responsibility.

56. All nine selected officers have now commenced a 16 week course of English Language skills and computer training, being delivered within the Counter Narcotics Training Unit, by a
local Afghan trainer. At the end of this foundation training, the officers will receive more specialist investigative skills training including, intelligence, informant handling, interdiction, seizure, evidence collection, court exhibits, giving evidence, interview skills, case preparation, and safe precursor chemical handling and disposal.

57. In addition to the service provided by the forensic laboratory established by the UNODC Project AFG/G38 and being strengthened by Project AFG/J43, a total of 700 ‘user friendly’ field testing kits have now been donated to the Project by the French Government, for the field identification of narcotics and precursor chemicals, primarily heroin and acetic anhydride, the main object of Operation TARCET II. These kits, already distributed to various law enforcement units in key target provinces, are simple, functional and easily usable by relatively unskilled staff.

58. Following the destruction of 21 tonnes of seized precursors in Kabul in November 2007, and the further destruction of 24 tonnes of precursors in Helmand in February 2008, Project I85 has supported a programme of disposal under the control of a committee of national experts.

59. The Project has also supplied a new vehicle for exclusive use of the unit, office furniture including desks and chairs, 3 desk top computers, 3 printers, 1 lap top computer, a new Toyota Hi Lux vehicle, and digital camera, projector, and essential stationery. The vehicle is, however, currently being used by other services within the CNPA Intelligence department.

4.2.3 Improved Capacity for Identifying and Seizing Precursors in Targeted Production Areas (Objective 2)

60. A number of CNPA law enforcement and Customs officers have been trained on precursor identification, investigation and control methods. The training comprised an overview of current precursor trafficking trends, identification of specific chemicals that are used in heroin production including associated chemical hazards. Negotiation with relevant CNPA managers took place to ensure that the trained officers were retained on duties where their newly acquired skills were most likely to have an impact against precursor trafficking. Following this training, the project plans the manning of mobile detection teams from a pool of officers within CNPA fully trained in precursor issues. This will include use of specialist identification, search, sampling and investigation methods and technique (Output 2).

61. Evaluation is aware that UNODC is in the final stages of recruiting an international consultant for training needs analysis, whose task also includes identifying PCU training needs on: intelligence, detection and interdiction, and disposal of precursor chemicals.

4.2.4 Increased Capability to detect and destroy Heroin Laboratories (Objective 3)

62. In collaboration with CARICC and other international law enforcement agencies, UNODC Country Office Afghanistan have played significant regional role in the exchange of information e.g. types of precursors seized and destroyed, routes etc. This has been achieved through promoting active regional and international collaboration, participation.

63. To assist in this endeavour, the UNODC manual on safe handling and disposal of chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and the INCB Annual Report on precursor chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances have been translated into local languages (Dari and Pashto). The publication of this literature was
completed in 2008 and a substantial number were distributed to the command staff of the relevant Afghan law enforcement agencies (CNPA, Afghan Border Police, and Afghan Customs) and to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, as an additional investigative tool to identify, recognize, seize and properly handle precursor chemicals. As a result of this initiative, a number of smaller informative ‘booklets’ on precursors are being devised for wider distribution. (Output 3)

64. These efforts should, however, be extended to importers, trade bodies and civilian communities through the Drug Regulatory Committee to further improve awareness.

4.2.5 Improved Intelligence Database System on Precursor Chemicals for Launching targeted Enforcement Regional Operations (Objective 4)

65. Compared to contributions made to TARCET I operations, which was apparently limited, some progress has been made in the gathering of intelligence on precursor seizures and current trafficking activities. The CNPA has presented strategic intelligence to Paris Pact and other strategic partners, and specific tactical intelligence was provided to Operation TARCET II and participating partners. Of particular interest was the volume of seizures occurring in Afghanistan, and more particularly trafficking routes and entry points into the country. This information will also be further developed and enhanced for possible use in the planning of future precursor interdiction operations in the region. Preparation towards TARCET II operations and PCU’s roles looks as follows:

i. The nations participating in this operation, planned in UNODC Office Tashkent, are at present, Afghanistan (regional lead) Iran, Pakistan (Triangular Agreement) and the CARICC nations, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, also China, Turkey, and Russia.

ii. The CNPA, particularly, the Precursor Control Unit, will play a critical role in the provision and analysis of intelligence throughout this operation. This will serve as both an invaluable operational training exercise, but also could facilitate bilateral agreements among participating countries and agencies on intelligence sharing, best practice, training and the planning and launching joint operations in the future.

iii. In furtherance of Operation TARCET II, an initial planning meeting took place in Tashkent between 12th-13 May 2009, attended by all major players, and it has been followed by a meeting in August to finalize the implementation planning of the operation.

iv. Afghanistan’s contribution to TARCET II will be coordinated by the CNPA Head of Intelligence, with direct involvement of the PCU performing a critical intelligence analysis role

66. Through the TARCET programme and own initiatives, the UNODC Project, has now successfully identified several international training providers, in particular, Turkey, Russia, China, and France. The French National Police training team have already delivered two, fourteen-day precursor control courses to a total of forty students within the Counter Narcotics Training Academy in Kabul. Three similar courses are planned in the near future by the French team. The Turkish government has offered either place at their national TADOC law enforcement training academy, or to send relevant training teams to Kabul to provide training.
Similar offers have also been received from Russia and China.

67. The establishment of a functioning PCU is work in progress. Playing a leading role, as it should, in the preparation of operation TARCET II is, therefore, a function of the level of capacity the PCU builds, which is premature. At present there is no evidence that the CPU has reached this stage. The PCU could however organize itself to benefit from the process and outcome of the operation in terms of training, lessons in the gathering and effective use of intelligence, and from the experience of organizing and carrying a multilateral operation.

4.2.6 Outstanding Issues and Project Outputs

68. The planned completion time frame has already been expired in June 2009. ET is aware that the project budget has a balance of about USD 60,000 from original budget of 2,499,500. Therefore an urgent decision should be taken on exit strategy.

69. ET contends that the PCU and precursor control strategy has not yet been fully developed and the necessary capabilities provided. It is apparent, therefore, that the PCU and related law enforcement units need strengthening to avoid the proliferation of drug laboratories and the production of illegal substances in Afghanistan. UNODC and Afghan counterparts should, therefore, mobilize the necessary funds to continue this important project; in order to enable the PCU to effectively contribute to TARCET operations and eventually serve as the key law enforcement unit responsible for combating precursor trafficking into Afghanistan.

70. ET maintains that UNODC should revise the project in light of the current situation including, outstanding project outputs, scale and routes of precursor trafficking, origins of precursors, particularly, through the use of intelligence shared from the Tar cet operations, and its own sources; review CNPA and PCU capacity, capabilities of the border police, customs, Drug Regulatory Committee and other Afghan law enforcement agencies. The resulting revised needs should then be developed into a new project, with discernible and achievable objectives, outputs and activities through the involvement of concerned stakeholders under the PCM project development framework. ET believe, that given the enormous interest of donors, the Paris Pact and other international CN bodies, funding could be mobilized for this important project.

71. As it stands now, specific outstanding project activities relate to:

1. Recruitment of an international project coordinator
2. Develop and implement a comprehensive training programme for the PCU leader and staff to become a credible force in order to enhance the overall operational effectiveness of assigned officers to play a leading role in the region in counter narcotics, particularly in the effort to build operational cooperation against precursor substances across the region.
3. The development of database of sources, routes, and types of precursors illegally entering into Afghanistan.
4. The development and implementation of effective internal coordinating mechanisms between CN law enforcement mechanisms with respect to precursor trafficking – intelligence, interdiction and investigative functions.

72. It is ET’s considered conclusion that the project should be continued in a revised and focussed form to accomplish the above outstanding outputs in order for Afghanistan to offer a credible contribution to the regional strategy of countering precursor trafficking.
5. Major Constraints and Observations

73. The following are the major constraints that inhibited progress in the implementation of the project:

i) Counterpart institutional constraint, particularly the Tashkil process, in practice, public counterparts cannot benefit from donor assistance before they are officially confirmed by the central review commission. As the process takes time, project implementation is often hampered, as demonstrated in the delayed establishment of the PCU and official designation of the necessary staff. Hence, the PCU was officially created in March 2009, although this project started in April 2006.

Due to this constraint, the function of precursor was covered by a senior officer and staff from the CNPA general intelligence and the project donated equipment and vehicle is still being used by the CNPA commanders.

ii) The inability to retain the essential managerial staff to run the project has been also one of the most damaging disabler to making progress in implementation.

iii) In the course of extensive interviews of project staff, counterparts and bilateral CN agencies operating in Afghanistan (British, American, for example), ET has found out that despite claims to the contrary made in project progress reports, the project has not realized the following as planned in the project document.

- Afghanistan has not yet signed international agreements in the sharing of intelligence, best practices and training.
- There is little evidence of exchange of intelligence with collaborating foreign CN agencies.
- Consequently, there is no evidence to suggest that the PCU provided intelligence for operations carried out by the US mentored National Interdiction Unit (NIU) or UK mentored Mobile Detection Teams (MDTs).

6. Assessment based on Evaluation Criteria

74. In this section the ET presents assessments reached in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 using evaluation criteria stipulated in the evaluation Terms of Reference:

6.1 Relevance

75. The project is relevant to the objectives and priorities established in the: i) I.R.A National Drug Control Strategy formulated in January 2006, ii) the Afghanistan Compact agreed between the I.R.A and the International Community in 31st January-1st February 2006, iii) the Paris Pact Initiative’s 7 interlinked action plans, collectively known as the RAINBOW STRATEGY, that aim to encourage the I.R.A. and its neighboring countries to combat drug trafficking and associated organized crime, with support of the Paris Pact partners; and iv) UNODC Strategic Programme Framework for I.R.A, 2009 -2011.

76. National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS): The project contributes to the over-arching
objective of securing “a sustainable decrease in .......trafficking....of illicit drugs with a view to complete and sustainable elimination”. The project particularly addresses Priority Four, “Strengthening state institutions both at the centre and in the provinces”. Project AD/AFG/06/I85 main purpose is to develop a comprehensive precursor chemical control strategy composed of: i) identification of the key chemicals and entry points into Afghanistan; ii) the development of both regional and international information analysis and exchange systems designed to target and dismantle international criminal operations; iii) capacity building in terms of training and equipment for interdiction along key Afghan borders, and iv) the establishment of special mobile training teams to provide training for provincial offices in precursor identification and control. These project components are aligned with the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy to tackle the illicit drugs industry of the country, and in particular to the objective of its Pillar II to improve international and regional cooperation to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs and precursor material across borders.

77. **The Afghanistan Compact:** This project addresses Counter-Narcotics, the cross-cutting priority identified in The Compact, the cornerstone for cooperation between the Afghan Government and its international partners, signed between the I.R.A. and 51 participating countries and 10 multilateral international development organizations in the London meeting of 31 January- 1 February 2006. The Compact aims to achieve a significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics. The project seeks to improve those areas identified in the Compact, including, “interdiction, law enforcement and judicial capacity building; and building national and provincial counter-narcotics institutions”.

78. **Paris Pact Initiative:** UNODC, as a lead UN agency in the provision of technical assistance in counter narcotics and organized transnational crimes to member States, has made invaluable contribution in the creation of the Paris Pact international partnership committed to counter trafficking and consumption of Afghan opiates. The project is aligned with the Paris Pact recommendations, articulated in the Rainbow Strategy Papers, particularly The Red Paper, targeting precursors used in Heroin Manufacturing: Operation Tarcet and the Yellow Paper: securing Central Asia’s borders with Afghanistan. By creating a dedicated PCU, the Government of the I.R. of Afghanistan aims to strengthen its role in pushing forward the aims of the Paris Pact recommendations in the noted Strategy Papers, particularly the promotion of exchange of intelligence, launching joint regional CN activities and cooperation in institution building.

**UNODC Strategic Programme Framework for Afghanistan (SPFA)**

79. The project is aligned with UNODC mandate and regional CN strategic programme frameworks. UNODC is mandated to support governments in their fight against drugs and crime and to coordinate this action at a worldwide level. Since the adoption of the 1988 Convention against Illicit Drug trafficking precursor control is an essential part of UNODC’s mandate. The UNODC draft Strategic Programme Framework for Afghanistan 2005-2007 and 2008-2011 identify chemicals trafficking as one of the priority problems in Afghanistan and West Asia. The Strategic Programme Frameworks include the development and implementation of measures to strengthen precursor control by improving national capacities for effective drug law enforcement and border control.

6.2 Ownership
80. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, examination of project reports, discussion with counterparts and donors and project management has revealed that the project has not sufficiently utilized the participative mechanisms that allow counterpart ownership of the PCM process, including those management arrangements articulated in the project document. ET contends that this deficiency had negative effect on the progress of project implementation and could have detrimental effect on sustainability of project achievements and processes.

81. UNODC project development experts conducted cursory consultations with MCN, MOI, and CNPA to assess the existing situation on precursor trafficking: scale, types of chemicals, identified routes and borders, and capacity of existing law enforcement agencies. But there is little evidence demonstrating active involvement of counterparts in the development of the project, PCM stages.

82. Situation Analysis comprising Stakeholder Analysis and Problem Analysis has not been formally conducted. There is no evidence that UNODC project developers have seriously analyzed relevant stakeholders to utilize their perspectives in elaborating the structure, functions, beneficiary law enforcement organizations, identification of skills and knowledge gaps in precursor control activities. The absence of such involvement has been manifest from the lack of sense of urgency, concerns and initiatives on the part of counterparts to mitigate the failure to realize significant outputs discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. In the project development phases, the experts could have organized a workshop involving, for example: MOI, CNPA Kabul Authorities, Chiefs and officers of CNPA provincial offices, MCN, and donor country representatives involved in providing Technical Assistance on CN, and sister UN Agency representatives, Customs Authorities, Prosecutor’s Office and Department of Justice to define the development problem (lack of capacity to combat precursor smuggling into Afghanistan) and associated cause and effects from varying perspectives and expectations. Instead, the situation analysis was in effect conducted by the UNODC solicited project developers with limited involvement of stakeholders.

83. Likewise, the succeeding process of objective analysis, to determine the means and ends relationship of proposed solutions were not formally determined with the participation of relevant stakeholders in a workshop.

84. As discussed in detail in Section 3.2, the Planning Phase, constituting the Logical Framework Matrix, seem to have been formulated mechanistically void of rigor in analysis, hierarchical coherence and precise formulation of Overall Objective, Immediate Objectives and Outputs, less verifiable and in some cases irrelevant performance indicators, largely vague sources and means of verification and assumptions and risks. ET attributes these inadequacies demonstrated in the LF Matrix to lack of broader involvement of wider stakeholders in an extended workshop.

85. The above drawbacks in the project analysis and planning phases clearly undermined proactive management, monitoring and evaluation but not less importantly denied counterpart ownership of the project development process. Involvement of stakeholders in these phases in a meaningful way could have provided counterparts the opportunity to improve their capacities in project development, implementation and monitoring.

86. As discussed in detail in Section 4.1, the project has not adhered to the implementation arrangements prescribed in the project document, particularly the establishment of the PRC. A
PRC has not been formed to approve work plans, adopt regular project reports, review project revisions and advise project management on strategic and implementation issues. ET contends that the absence of PRC denied project management of invaluable support and the counterparts of ownership. The lack of comprehension, appreciation, and awareness on the part of counterparts interviewed of project components, reports, and constraints was evident in discussions. Further, there is little correspondence between counterparts and project management on the delay of project implementation.

87. Most importantly lack of meaningful ownership denied counterparts to develop capacity to plan and manage programmes and projects, which is essential for ensuring sustainability of initiated project processes and achievements realized as a result of programme/project intervention.

6.3 Effectiveness

88. The project has little to show in terms of achievement of objectives as discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The PCU was constituted in March 2009, impeding the responsible counterparts to play their role in the implementation of the project. On the part of project management, the failure of sustained retention of international project coordinators, lack of supervision and follow-up from senior managers and failure to use effective monitoring tools inhibited implementation.

89. Now that the PCU has been officially established, the project could be reformulated following PCM project analysis and planning tools to develop a more achievable version.

6.4 Efficiency

90. On the basis of analysis presented in Chapter 3, Section 4.1, and Chapter 5, ET makes the following observations.

91. At the end of the life of this project, May 2009, the project has not completed large part of activities and outputs planned in the project document. The project has suffered from delayed start of implementation due to: failure of retention of national and international project coordinators; failure to use project management tools (work plans regularly monitored and revised, analytic and action oriented progress report), and lack of senior management supervision to assist in the identification of mitigation measures to push delivery. These inefficiencies have resulted in less than satisfactory achievements.

92. The project failed to use periodic work plans to manage project implementation which would have helped project management to monitor progress. Using work plans in project management is a key tool within integrated PCM that allows proactive project monitoring and evaluation against planned results. In the case of the project under evaluation, work plans are prepared without rigor, largely launched haphazardly, without the involvement of counterparts or PRC, resulting in the absence of any reference to benchmarks in reporting. Not using PRC mechanism has also denied the project to benefit from local knowledge and expertise. Another related point is that the ET has observed that there has been lack of rigorous analysis of the inter-relationship of activities and outputs across project components to identify sequential and parallel activities in order to bring forward project delivery.
93. Quality of monitoring reports is also in large part determined by the rigor of the analysis and planning phases in PCM framework. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the identified inadequacies in: the loose hierarchical structure and coherence between Overall Objective, Immediate Objectives, Outputs and Activities; vague and irrelevant indicators; lack of baseline information on indicators, lack of well thought out data collection and analysis process with designated responsibilities has obstructed the production of useful periodic progress reports for project management. These constraints not only affected systematic monitoring of project implementation it also affected the quality and rigor of evaluation report.

94. ET has observed institutional constraints particularly the Tashkil requirement impeding utilization of project inputs. A case in point is for example the inability of the PCU to use a project funded vehicle because it arrived before the formal establishment of the PCU. This situation could have been avoided if assumptions were assessed during the formulation of logical framework matrix with the involvement of counterparts.

6.5 Sustainability

95. Evaluation identifies and assesses key conditions or factors that are likely to contribute or undermine the persistence of benefits after this project ends. Four aspects of sustainability are considered: political commitment, financial sustainability, institutional framework and structure, and support of the international community.

96. As discussed in previous chapters, the GOA has demonstrated strong commitment to counter narcotics in the National Development Strategy and National Drug Control Strategy adopted in January 2006.

97. The GOA has created relevant CN Law Enforcement and other related organizations at Ministerial level. Although the PCU is at its formative development stage, overall the National Drug Control Strategy and the I.R.A Law on Counter Narcotics has established appropriate structures and agencies and national monitoring mechanisms to implement the Counter Narcotics Law and foster partnership with relevant international community in the development and implementation of CN programmes. The PCU has yet to build capacity and effective coordination and monitoring mechanism among CN law enforcement agencies is still work in progress but these structures and institutions are constantly being strengthened.

98. ET observes that the Government of I.R.A. does not seem to possess the financial resources to sustain project processes and outcomes resulting from the intervention of this project. But there is immense will and commitment from the international community for the support of CN activities in Afghanistan and in the region. Financial capability is not expected to jeopardize sustenance of project achievements.

99. The enormity of illicit drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan is widely recognized, among the international community, as a problem that will continue to threaten regional and international security. International support can, therefore, be safely assumed to continue to support Afghanistan, in the medium to long-term, as demonstrated in The Afghanistan Compact and Paris Pact Initiative. But there is no substitute to developing internal capacity, hence the need for continued technical assistance from the international community.

7. Lessons Learned
100. ET observes the following lessons from the development and implementation of the project:

101. **Project Design:** Consultation to project documents and analysis of project logical framework matrix revealed that project development experts failed to sufficiently involve counterparts in the project identification and planning phases. The PCM analysis and development phases seem to have been carried out without meaningful involvement of counterparts.

102. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, the failure to involve counterparts and key stakeholders, particularly the MCN, CNPA, Customs, and the Drug Regulatory Committee has resulted in poor project design. As a consequence, ET has established the following problems in project implementation directly attributable to weakness in project design, including: assumptions relating to institutional constraints were underestimated (e.g. the effect of Tashkil review process on the formal establishment of the PCU); failure to consider and properly assess technical capacity of counterpart to contribute to project implementation, as demonstrated in the course of structured interviews; lack of clarity in logical and hierarchical linkages between “overall objective”, “immediate objectives”, “outputs” and “activities”; and lack of completeness in defining performance indicators in accordance with SMART principles and verifiable sources of information.

103. These design weaknesses have also affected the determination of realizable project time frame for achieving the anticipated multiple outputs and objectives.

104. The lesson learned from this experience is that counterparts should be fully involved in the project design process in order to more correctly assess current situation, determine desired changes, and develop achievable project.

8. Recommendations

**PCM – Analysis and Planning Phases**

**UNODC Country Office Afghanistan**

**Recommendation 1**

105. In the future, project developers should closely involve national counterparts in the: identification of project ideas, stakeholder analysis, defining the development problem, developing solutions and strategies, and implementation planning through the formulation of logical framework matrix. Project developers should not dominate Project Analysis and Identification and Project Planning phases. Experts should rather act as facilitators of the processes.

**Recommendation 2**

106. A series of workshops should be organized with wide participation of counterparts and other stakeholders to benefit project development from variety of perspectives and expectations of stakeholders that could be affected positively or negatively from project intervention. Participants could represent direct project beneficiaries, indirect beneficiaries, and donors, related institutions of excellence, relevant UN Agencies, INGOs, official donor agencies, and international development agencies.
Recommendation 3
107. The key outcomes of the workshops should include stakeholder analysis, problem analysis, objectives analysis, and strategy (solutions analysis) serving as input to the second phase i.e. project design or implementation planning phase. The outcome of the latter phase should essentially cover the elaboration of the Logical Framework Matrix elements – hierarchical linkage of overall objectives, immediate objectives, outputs and activities; verifiable results level performance indicators; sources and means of verification; and assumptions and risks. The process and outcomes of the exercise should be grounded on the correct evaluation of current situation and the determination of desired changes, which could not be reached without allowing the counterparts to take a lead in the process.

Recommendation 4
108. UNODC Country Office Afghanistan should organize successive workshops on Results Based Management (RBM) to help project management team (International and national project staff) and counterparts comprehend the principles and practices on developing and managing projects by results i.e. to effectively plan, implement, monitor and regularly evaluate project implementation.

Project Implementation Arrangements and Practice

CNPA and UNODC Country Office Afghanistan

Recommendation 5
109. As prescribed in the project document, in the future, the revised project should establish a Project Review Committee (PRC) to assist project management take important decisions, such as, through the provision of advice on policy issues; adopt annual work plans and corresponding budget; approve major changes to project design when required; and review semi-annual project progress reports. The PRC mechanism ensures continued support of stakeholders by keeping them engaged in decisions related to the implementation of the project. PRC also allows for creating consensus on the direction of project implementation and promotes collaborative attitude among stakeholders, including donors.

Recommendation 6
102. The project needs to start effective use and review of periodic implementation work plans. Using work plans in project management is a key tool within integrated PCM that allows effective monitoring and proactive management and objective evaluation of achievements against planned results. The preparation of work plans should necessarily involve rigorous analysis of inter-relationships of activities and outputs across project components to identify sequential and parallel activities in order to expedite project delivery.

Recommendation 7
103. Project Focal Point (PFP) should be designated to follow up the overall implementation of project activities under the overall guidance of the DM-MoI. The PFP should take responsibility for monitoring project implementation, coordinating and compiling their side of progress reports, chairing the Project Review Committee meetings, jointly reviewing project reports and project revisions with UNODC project management and donors, regularly briefing the DM-MoI on PRC meetings and recommendations, and coordinating overall activities in collaboration with beneficiary CNPA units. This recommended arrangement would streamline
communication, encourage counterparts to keep engaged throughout the project lifecycle, and could improve level of national ownership and enhance accountability of both project management and counterparts.

**Recommendation 8**

104. Project management should produce detailed reports on activities, for example, training programmes delivered by the project and other partner providers. Reports on such activities should include: purpose of the activity, content of the training or study tour, feedback of participants on the benefits they think they gained from the training, and how they shared their experience with their colleagues at home in more formal manner, for example by preparing a report for discussion in a formal meeting. Reporting activities in such substantive and result oriented manner improves project documentation and provide useful evidence for reporting and evaluation.

**Recommendation 9**

105. **National Coordination Mechanisms:** it is recommended that formal and functioning coordination mechanism is established between the PCU, Customs, and Drug Regulation Committee (DRC) and other related law enforcement agencies for sharing intelligence, experience and joined-up working in the planning and implementing precursor control strategies to improve their combined effectiveness in talking precursors trafficking in Afghanistan.

**Ownership**

**UNODC Country Office Afghanistan**

**Recommendation 10**

106. UNODC should take serious and practical steps to improve national ownership of project analysis, planning, implementation and monitoring. Lack of meaningful involvement in the relevant PCM process denies counterparts practical opportunities to develop capacity to plan and manage programmes and projects, which is essential for ensuring sustainability of initiated project processes and achievements realized as a result of programme/project intervention. Moreover their involvement improves relevance of projects.

**Sustainability**

**CNPA, PCU and UNODC Country Office Afghanistan**

**Recommendation 11**

107. The collaborative relationship established with the participating international CN agencies in operation TARCET should be continued and strengthened. The revised project should contain a dedicated and clear component intended to particularly build PCU capacity to benefit from and eventually contribute to successive TARCET operations.

**Institutional Constraint**

**Government of the I.R. of Afghanistan (Ministry of Interior)**

**Recommendation 12**

108. UNODC makes representation to MOI authorities advocating for flexibility to reduce the effects of Tashkil requirements impeding project delivery. UNODC with concerted efforts in
collaboration with other UN agencies, perhaps via the DRSG office, seek for fast truck procedure once project documents are co-signed by relevant Afghani authority.

9. Conclusion and Exit Strategy

109. The continuation of the project in a revised form is essential to achieve the initial project objectives. The revised project should necessarily consider: the outstanding project activities; the revision of assumptions in light of constraints encountered in the course of implementation; the status of project components and synchronization of the various project outputs and activities, including capacity building in database development, specialty training in intelligence gathering, processing and analysis; internal coordination mechanisms between investigative, intelligence, interdiction functions; and finally continue articulating and planning confidence building measures to foster strategic partnership with neighbouring countries to make exchange of intelligence and joint operations possible.

110. Most importantly, the revision of the project should be carried out with the active involvement of all national stakeholders (the MCN, CNPA, PCU, and Customs) and international CN agencies currently assisting Afghanistan on the ground. This will help avoid mistakes made during the analysis and planning phases in the course of developing this project.

111. Fundamentally, there is a key institutional structure that needs revisiting, particularly for the CNPA. It is essential that Intelligence MUST be kept within a sterile corridor between operational arms. Therefore the concept of the PCU being both an Intelligence AND operational arm is basically flawed. The PCU should certainly be a centre of excellence for all precursor knowledge and intelligence, e.g. identification of: labelling, interdiction methods, routes, labelling, organisations and suspects. The actual running of operations and executive action must, however, be controlled and directed through the Head of CNPA Intelligence and the Head of CNPA Operations. A role for the PCU to accompany the operational arm in the field can, however, be legitimately envisaged only in an advisory capacity, for example, related to seizure, handling, exhibiting and disposal of precursors.

112. In the CNPA, however, there are currently at least FIVE intelligence units each operating within its own silo, responsible to different organisations and management, which entails operational confusion and leads to fragmentation and dissipation of overall intelligence effort. In the context of the current situation, for sound operational reasons, there is a need for maintaining separate Technical Interception Unit (TIU) and Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU) in the development and vetting phases of the CNPA. Creating a semi autonomous Precursor Control Unit with a strong intelligence remit, being developed without the general intelligence project is essentially flawed.
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR MID-TERM EVALUATION

Project AFG/I85

Regional Cooperation in Precursor Chemical Control between Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. In the early 1990s Afghanistan firmly established itself as the main source of illicit opium/heroin produced, trafficked, and consumed throughout the world. It was estimated that Afghanistan provided approximately 70% of the world’s opium. From 1995 through 2001 Afghanistan was under the control of the Taliban government. Significant declines in opium production did occur. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the Taliban government was removed from power and a new democratic government was formed. During this change over period farmers immediately began to replant vast poppy fields. The UNODC poppy survey undertaken in 2002 estimated that some 74,000 hectares were cultivated with the potential for producing 3,400 metric tonnes of opium. In 2003 Afghanistan produced 3,600 metric tonnes of opium or a 6% increase. In 2004 the UNODC reported a major increase in poppy production of 131,000 hectares with the potential of producing 4,200 metric tonnes of opium. In the latest UNODC report (2005) it is estimated that Afghanistan produced 4,100 metric tonnes of opium which amounts to a staggering 87% the entire world’s output.

2. According to UNODC estimates Afghanistan converts approximately 71.5% of its raw opium into morphine base and then into heroin. It is estimated that 420 metric tonnes or approximately 420,000 kilograms of heroin are produced and trafficked throughout the world. Law enforcement official’s estimate that between 70% and 90% of the heroin found in Europe has been processed from opium produced in Afghanistan. Almost all of the opiates consumed in Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries and most of the opiates found in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and in Africa originate in Afghanistan. Linkages between international drug trafficking, international organized crime, international money laundering, and terrorism have been directly related to the Afghan narcotics industry. It is feared that established counter insurgency organizations will sustain their organizations from the narcotics industry as financing from traditional sponsors tends to diminish.

3. A large volume of internationally controlled and non-controlled chemicals are required to produce heroin from opium. None of those chemicals needed are currently produced in Afghanistan. The needed chemicals are obtained legally in Europe/Middle East/Asia and then diverted into the illegitimate market. Opium conversion laboratory operators in Afghanistan contract with international criminal organizations (brokers) who arrange for the required chemicals to be illegally smuggled into the country. At the Paris Pact Consultative Group meeting held at Vienna in October 2004 it was agreed that strong support should be given to the country of Afghanistan to promote regional cooperation to stop the smuggling of chemical precursors into Afghanistan. In addition, at a G8 Afghan counter-narcotics meeting held at London in March 2005 the importance of precursor detection and controls was again highlighted.

4. Project I – 85 is funded by the European Commission ($2 499 500 USD) under the direction of the United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with the cooperation of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The project has the following indicators:

- Number of intelligence reports generated to neighbouring countries and international partners including the International Narcotics Control Board and the regional technical analysis unit in Tashkent.
- Quantity and quality of intelligence data recorded and disseminated from the PCU computer database.
- PCU fully established with properly trained staff and adequate resources.
- Number of intelligence reports disseminated to operational central coordination units established to support UNODC facilitated initiatives in the region.
- Relevant laboratories provided with operational and specialist forensic equipment, training and knowledge.
- Number of vehicles subjected to risk profiled stops in and around Kabul, especially those en route from Nangarhar province, and in partnership with Mobile Detection Teams (MDT’s).
PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

5. The overall aim of the task will be for you to evaluate all above Law Enforcement projects in terms of Quality of Project Management Cycle determine what the project has achieved to date and if it has attained its objectives successfully and efficiently, taking into account the often difficult conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and to generate recommendations to be used to improve project implementation. In this regard, the extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met as well as what has been achieved so far should also be assessed considering:

- To ensure that project and programme managers increase their awareness on quality- control with regards to project and programme implementation.

- To ensure that technical assistance recipients (and donors) have a standardized benchmark to measure project and programme impact.

- To ensure that UNODC becomes a more client-oriented and management–by-objectives technical assistance delivery machinery.

EVALUATION SCOPE

6. The evaluation shall focus mainly on the project’s concept and design (relevance), achievement of (or progress towards) objective, outcomes and outputs (effectiveness) and implementation (efficiency). The evaluation should appraise:

Project concept and design:

7. The evaluation should analyse whether and how the project contributed to a priority area or comparative advantage for UNODC emphasising on project cycle management and its effectiveness. It should review the problems identified by the project and the corresponding strategy chosen in order to address these. The evaluation should also encompass an assessment of the relevance and attainability of the objectives and of planned outputs, activities and inputs, as compared to other cost-effective alternatives. An analysis of the clarity, logic and coherence of the project should also be conducted. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

- Whether the achievement indicators and impact measures are in line with project outputs, outcomes and overall objectives?

- Has the current project management system (including existing monitoring and reporting mechanisms) been appropriate and efficient and what have been the strengths and weaknesses of the project management mechanism utilised and what lessons can be learned to further enhance RBM in the future?

- Is the present project document in line with UNODC’s project document format (including its logical framework matrix)? Do existing performance indicators / measures lend themselves to measure project progress towards the achievement of the project’s objectives? Are indicators / measures in place to also keep track of whether the project contributes to achieving the objectives of UNODC’s Strategy?
• Would training on PCM required for project coordinators as well as project assistance.

• Have internal and external project resources been used in the most efficient way to achieve project objectives? Has an adequate mechanism been in place to ensure that resources are used efficiently?

• To what extent has the project been designed, implemented and evaluated in a participatory way involving relevant stakeholders including counterparts and beneficiaries?

• Are the objectives of the project aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of Government of Afghanistan, Compact, Afghanistan Development Strategy, and UNODC mandates?

• Is the logic of project interventions sound?

• How well do the project objectives reflect the specific nature of the problem and needs of precursor chemical control capacity and policies in Afghanistan?

• Are the objectives of the project aligned with the UNODC Triangular Action Plan?

• To what extent have the findings and recommendations from the past evaluations been followed up on and included in the current project design?

• Does the project include interventions to ensure sustainability?

Objective, outcomes and outputs

8. The evaluation should seek to determine whether results are being achieved satisfactorily (effectiveness). The beneficiaries' perception of the achievements should be taken into consideration, as ownership is an important factor in determining sustainability. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

• Has the Precursor Chemical Unit contributed to the intelligence data base of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan?

• Are current activities appropriate for meeting stated project objectives?

• Has precursor chemical identification training resulted in an increase in the institutional knowledge within the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan?

• Are the objectives of the project contributing to the regional program under the umbrella of the Rainbow Strategy?
  - Has the project carried out activities laid down the in the Red Paper?
  - Did the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan play an active role in Operation TARCET?
  - Has there been a tangible result from the activities carried out within the region?

9. Are there any intended effects of interventions on people, institutions and the physical environment?

Implementation:

10. The evaluation should assess how efficiently project implementation has been carried out so far. This includes assessing the extent to which organizational structure; managerial support and coordination mechanisms used by UNODC effectively support the project and cost effectiveness. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:
- Are there less costly methods which could achieve the same outcome/impact at the beneficiary level? Were these alternatives considered while designing this project?
- To what extent has UNDP been efficient, effective and transparent?
- To what extent has partnership been sought with other relevant actors (including UN-agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?
- Was there effective coordination among government, UNODC and other implementing partners including donor countries & task forces established as coordination bodies?
- Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by field and HQ staff including human resource management, logistical support, administrative / managerial support and coordination?
- Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?
- How are external factors like limits on access to interventions sites, effecting project implementation?
- Is there an effective project monitoring system in place?
- Is there need for a risk mitigation strategy? Has one been developed?

**EVALUATION METHODS**

11. The evaluation team should present a detailed statement of evaluation methods or the approach used to identify information sources and collect information during an evaluation, and to analyse the data. The evaluation methods will include:

   (a) Document review: this will comprise of all major documents, such as the project documents, progress and monitoring reports, terminal narrative reports, as well as assessments, manuals developed under the project etc. (desk study)

   (b) Field assessment missions to Kabul.

   (d) Meetings, interviews, and focus group related to the work of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan.

   (e) Request selected Counter Narcotics Police staff to complete and submit a questionnaire prepared by the Evaluators.

12. Before the field mission, the Evaluators are to prepare an evaluation methodology, including questions and questionnaires that are acceptable to UNODC. Following the completion of the fact-finding and analysis phase, a draft evaluation report will be prepared by the Evaluators and presented to UNODC within the stipulated timeframe and in accordance with UNODC standard evaluation report outline (please refer to item 6). The draft report should include, introduction, a detailed statement of the evaluation methods used during the appraisal. Inputs from UNODC should be recorded and taken into account by the Evaluators, as relevant and appropriate.
EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

13. Evaluator A: Will look at the technical side of the project implementation such as impact of the project implementation, delivery of the services to the beneficiary etc.

Evaluator B: Will more look at how the project is being managed at the UNODC. He/she will be evaluating the internal UNODC sections’ support to the project, financial flows, reporting, monitoring etc.

14. The Evaluators should hold an advanced degree in law, social sciences or relevant field and have proven experience on above key issues, preferably with the United Nations in postings in post conflict areas. In addition, the Evaluators should also meet the following criteria:

- Be familiar with the project implementation in international organizations in a United Nations mission.
- Have experience in conducting independent evaluations and or assessments.
- Have at least 10 years relevant professional experience with at least 2 years of director level Law enforcement or security forces experience in an international environment.
- Evaluator should have expertise with Training police trainers, high level counter narcotics investigation, Police intelligence, judicial officer experience in post conflict settings.
- Have a post-graduate degree in a relevant area or equivalent international law enforcement experience; i.e. Deputy Director of United Nations program or pillar effort, or Deputy commissioner level experience in international United Nations Missions
- Possess excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English.

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

15. This evaluation will be a joint effort between the evaluation team and UNODC. The primary focal points for the evaluation will be the international project manager and the national project coordinator. The Evaluators will have access to all relevant documents and the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan will provide the required support for the Evaluators during the evaluation. The UNODC officials responsible for briefing of the Evaluators are:

UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan:
- Representative
- Deputy Representative
- International Project Coordinator
- National Project Coordinator
- International Mentors in the field

UNODC Head Quarters in Vienna (Austria):
- Chief, Technical Cooperation Section II
- Project Coordinator, Europe, West and Central Asia Unit

UNODC Country Office will secure office space, administrative basic support, and travel arrangements for the Evaluators during his/her stay in Kabul. UNODC will also assist with accommodation bookings, visa facilitation etc.

TIME FRAME & TENTATIVE PROGRAMME FOR THE EVALUATORS
16. The Evaluator will be recruited for 18 days to carry out the evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme &amp; Activity*</th>
<th>Days Required</th>
<th>Tentative dates</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travelling to Afghanistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 19, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing by Country office staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 20, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk-review of documentation at COAFG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>May 21 – 24, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings/interviews with Ministries, Departments, UN Agencies and relevant stakeholders, visit to project intervention sites</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>May 25 – 31, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings with International partners</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>June 01 – 04, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal meetings with UNODC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>June 06 – 07, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare draft report</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>June 08 – 14, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporating the UNODC comments in the report and preparing the final draft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>June 15 – 18, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 20, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Working Days</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note**: Detailed itinerary and programme will be prepared upon arrival and in consultation with the Evaluators.

Deliverables of the evaluation (for each project). CLARIFY THE DELIVERABLES EXPECTED OF EACH CONSULTANT! WHO DOES WHAT? WHO IS EXPECTED TO WRITE WHICH PART OF THE REPORT? ETC.

- Evaluation plan and detailed terms of reference with methodology;
- Evaluation draft report with findings;
- Final evaluation report.

Payment.

The Evaluators will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures. The final payment will be made only after the acceptance of the final draft of the evaluation report by UNODC HQs and the Country Office for Afghanistan.

Evaluation report.

The evaluation report should be inline with UNODC’s evaluation policy and handbook and follow the standard UNODC report outline that is listed below:

- Evaluation summary (maximum 4 pages)
- Introduction
- Background (Project description)
- Evaluation purpose and objective
- Evaluation methodology
- Major findings
- Lessons learned (from both positive and negative experiences)
- Constraints that impacted project delivery
- Recommendations and conclusions
Annex 2

List of Interviewees

Ministry of Interior, CNPA

1. General Ali Mirza  Head of Counter Narcotics Police Intelligence Department
2. General Shiasta Director General Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
3. General Sikandari  Director of Administration  Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan.
4. Colonel Nangale Current Head of Precursor Control Unit. CNPA.
5. Colonel Fowlad Deputy Head of Counter Narcotics Academy
6. Dr. Khalid and team- Head of CNPA Drugs Laboratory.
7. Captain Naim, Head - Precursor Control Unit.
8. Colonel Noor Mohammad Zazai Head of Investigation Counter Narcotics Task Force CNPA
9. Mr.Farhad , Chief Prosecutor, CNPA Criminal Justice Task Force Kabul Airport.

Ministry of Counter Narcotics

10. Dr. Mohammad Zafar, Deputy Minister of Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics

Ministry of Finance, Customs Authority

11. Sultan Shah Deputy Head of Afghan Customs in Ministry of Finance and Revenue,plus intelligence/investigation staff

Drug Regulation Committee

13. Dr. Abdul Shakoor, Executive Secretary

Embassies

14. Mr. Ingo Badoreck Attache European Commission.
15. Mr. Haroon Azizi Project Officer SSR European Union.
16. Mr. George Noel-Clarke Political Advisor to the E.U. Special Representative

Specialist International Counter Narcotics Agencies

17. Mr. David Wilson SOSI International Programme Manager.
18. Mr. Clive Peckover Head of Rule of Law Team British Embassy
19. Mr. Stuart Copley Deputy Country Manager Serious and Organised Crime Agency.
21. Mr. David Wright Senior Counter Narcotics Advisor Helmand (British Embassy Drugs Team)
22. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Schue Counter Narcotics Advisor U.S. CSTC-A.
23. Mr. Larry Leveron Senior CNPA Mentor SOSI (Blackwater ex DEA)
24. Mr.Carlos Gonzales CNPA Mentor (SOSI)
25. Mr. Hamid Rohilai  Administration Mentor Adam Smith Institute.  
26. Mr. Frank Balazs Senior Mentor to CNPA ( SOSI) 
27. Mr. Bruce Bryda CNPA Mentor ( SOSI).  
29. Mr. Mathew Shankweiler U.S. Border Management Task Force U.S. Embassy  

**UN Agencies**  

30. Ms. Elizabeth Bayer, UNAMA Counter Narcotics Advisor  
32. Bertrand Redonnet, UNAMA, Counter Narcotics Deputy Advisor  
33. Khuda Baksh Choudary, Chief Police Advisor to UNAMA  

**UNODC Country Office Afghanistan**  

34. Mr. Jean-Luc Lemahieu, UNODC Representative - Afghanistan....... 
35. Mr. Patrick Halewood, Senior Advisor, Counter Narcotics 
36. Mr. Mark Calhoun, Programme Manager, LE 
37. Mr. Wais Qais, International Project Coordinator, LE Projects 
38. Mr. Stuart Barton, Mentor and Acting International Coordinator for Project I85 
39. Mr.Mohammad Akbar UNODC National Project Coordinator, Project I77 
40. Dr. Eisa Nang, National Project Coordinator, Project J43 
41. Mr. Abdul Qadir UNODC Project Associate I77 within the Training Academy 
42. Mr.Mohammad Niazi English and I.T. skills mentor at CNTA Project I77