

4 August 2003

## **TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT**

FS/PHI/00/R05 Coalitions against trafficking in human beings in the  
Philippines

Thematic Area: Capacity Building

Country: Philippines

### **Report of the evaluator:**

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UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This Project was a Pilot of the UN Global Programme Against Trafficking in Human Beings (GPAT). It was initiated in the Spring of 1999 by the (then) Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Within the GPAT initiative, the Philippines were chosen as a pilot following a strong expression of interest by the Government to have a project addressing trafficking, and an indication a donor country (United States of America) that such a pilot would be considered favourably.

The aim of the Project was to improve criminal justice responses to trafficking in human beings, particularly as it related to the involvement of organized criminal groups, through strengthened national and regional/international policies and practices.

The immediate objectives in achieving this aim were:

- To strengthen government agencies' knowledge of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organized crime, and to improve agency coordination;
- To strengthen the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organized crime; and
- To improve international cooperation in cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to transnational organized crime.

The Project was designed as a short, sharp six months of intensive work incorporating a comprehensive integrated menu of 26 activities and 11 outputs. Subsequently, two supplementary activities were added to the menu. The focus was on capacity building of law enforcement and the criminal justice system more generally and an emphasis was placed on cooperation of government institutions. The 'Coalition' involved the efforts of up to 30 different entities (various local government agencies, research and UN institutions. Project-related issues were coordinated through

a small local secretariat and overseen by an Inter-Agency Executive Committee (IAEC).

The Project, subtitled 'Phase 1', was expected to contribute to Phase 2 – which focuses on victims.

Ultimately, due to a combination of external factors (political upheaval and climatic conditions, and internal factors associated with the design and implementation), the Project was extended to nine, then 12 months, then 21 months. The final activity under the project was eventually completed two and a half years following its inception and the Terminal Report of Activities was submitted at three years post-implementation. During the Project's life, the political factors included three changes in government, including a *coup d'etat* and the arrest of the President. Climatic conditions included a major monsoon, involving substantial flooding for months. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that usual processes of government were suspended for periods of up to six months, delaying meaningful implementation. In addition, due to the changes in government, there were associated changes in Departmental heads and changes in policies which contributed to changes to the project initiated within the Philippines.

The present evaluation covers the period from when the first activity was completed (mid 1999 and prior to the formal commencement of the Project) to January 2003, but includes current (June 2003) status assessments of outputs/outcomes where appropriate. The evaluation assessed: a) the Project concept and design; b) Project implementation; and c) the outputs, outcomes and impact of the Project. It initially comprised three components; a desk review of available documents, a roundtable at which members of the IAEC participated; and interviews with key informants from Project agencies. A field test of one Project element (a centralised, shared database) was later added to the evaluation components. In all, the desk review comprised examination of 101 documents/ reports, the Roundtable was attended by 16 officers from nine agencies, and intra-Philippines meetings were held with 29 Officers from 14 agencies. Including extra-Philippines meetings, discussions were held with a total of 53 persons from government and non-government agencies, donor countries, UN personnel and international experts.

This terminal evaluation finds that the Project concept was sound, but the design high risk. In particular, the timeframe was too short and there were too many activities and outputs which could reasonably be expected to be implemented and coordinated through the local part-time National Coordination/ Secretariat, or to be managed and monitored through the remote (Vienna) UNODC framework. The political and climatic delays and design flaws prevented the intended integrated concurrent implementation of activities, and resulted instead in a fragmented sequential list of tasks to be accomplished over an extended period. Continuity and momentum were lost.

Nonetheless, 21 of the 28 activities and 10 of the 11 outputs were ultimately fully or partly achieved, albeit overdue (and in some cases grossly overdue). These results are a testimony to the National Coordinator's (supported by an enthusiastic secretariat), and UNODC's perseverance in difficult circumstances. In general however, the quality of the outputs was low to moderate. Government's knowledge of and the capacity of law enforcement and the criminal justice system to combat trafficking were marginally raised, however there is no evidence that prevention, investigation or prosecution practices have improved. Nor did the Project tangibly improve international cooperation.

The presence of the Project within the Philippines and the imprimatur of a Presidential Executive Order for the Inter-Agency Executive Committee did raise awareness of the trafficking problem and as a 'by-product', the Project contributed to the passage of a law specifically addressing trafficking. The new Act provides for a new Council which does not however, include agencies that were central to this Project.

Specifically concerning Phase 1, it is recommended

1. That this Phase of the Project be considered 'completed' and no further funds advanced;
2. That from a Project perspective, the IAEC consider its task complete;
3. That the IAEC provide the new Council established by the new anti-trafficking Act with all documents in relation to Phase 1 to familiarise itself with achievements to date; and
4. That if invited, UNODC provide the new Council with a personal briefing on Phase 1 including

the results of this evaluation.

Concerning Phase two, it is recommended

5. That monitoring, management and local coordination arrangements be reviewed urgently; and in particular;
6. That a fulltime local coordinator be appointed and funded for Phase 2; and
7. That remote management/ monitoring be avoided.

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

This evaluation report should be read in conjunction with the Project Terminal Report provided by the National Coordinator in January 2003.

### Acronyms

AIC	- Australian Institute of Criminology
BI	- Bureau of Immigration
CFO	- Commission on Filipino Overseas
CICP	- Centre for International Crime Prevention
DFA	- Department of Foreign Affairs
DSWD	- Department of Social Welfare and Development
DOLE	- Department of Labour and Employment
DOJ	- Department of Justice
GPAT	- Global Programme Against Trafficking
DILG	- Department of the Interior and Local Government
IAEC	- Inter-Agency Executive Committee
ILO	- International Labour Organization
IOM	- International Organization for Migration
NAPOLCOM	- National Police Commission
NBI	- National Bureau of Investigation
NCRFW	- National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
NGOs	- Non-Governmental Organizations
ODCCP	- Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
OWWA	- Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
PCTC	- Philippine Center on Transnational Crime
PPSC	- Philippine Public Safety College
PIA	- Philippine Information Agency
POEA	- Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
PNP	- Philippine National Police
SGISM	- Shared Government Information System

- UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
- UNODC - United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
- UNOPS - United Nations Office for Project Services
- UNICRI -United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice  
Research  
Institute
- USAID - United States Assistance on Infrastructure and Development

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **A. Background**

This Project was a pilot project of the UN Global Programme Against Trafficking in Human Beings. It was initiated in the Spring of 1999 by the (then) Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).

The aim of the Project was to improve criminal justice responses to trafficking in human beings, particularly as it related to the involvement of organized criminal groups, through strengthened national and regional/international policies and practices. At the national level, the Project was designed to improve the efficacy of action and policies of the various agencies involved in preventing trafficking in human beings, with particular emphasis on investigation and prosecution of such offences. At the regional/international levels, the Project aimed at facilitating cooperation of key government agencies of countries of origin, transit and destination, formulating related policies and recommendations and thus strengthening international cooperation and joint action against the transnational components of trafficking in human beings. The immediate objectives in achieving this goal were:

- To strengthen government agencies' knowledge of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organized crime, and to improve agency coordination;
- To strengthen the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organized crime; and
- To improve international cooperation in cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to transnational organized crime.

To provide local oversight and management of the Project, an Inter Agency Executive

Committee (IAEC) comprising 15 key executives from 13 national agencies was convened, and local coordination was provided by a secretariat established within the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).

The Project commenced in April 2000, following an extensive start-up mission in 1999, with an expected duration of six months. Funding of US\$200,000 was initially provided, with a matching 'in-kind' contribution from the Philippines government and Aus\$50,000 'in-kind' technical/research assistance provided by the Australian Institute of Criminology. Funds were subsequently increased to \$US219,231 and in December 2000 a further US\$50,000 was provided by the United States government bringing the total (dollar) funding to US\$269,231

The final activity required under the Project was completed in late 2002 and the Terminal Report was received in January 2003. Paul Williams<sup>1</sup> was engaged in May 2003 to conduct the evaluation.

## **B. Scope and Purpose<sup>2</sup>**

The present evaluation covers the period from when the first activity was completed (I.E. mid 1999 - prior to the formal commencement of the Project) to January 2003, but includes current (June 2003) status assessments of outputs/outcomes where appropriate. The evaluation assesses: a) the Project concept and design; b) Project implementation; and c) the outputs, outcomes and impact of the Project. Lessons learned and recommendations on possible follow-up activities have been made, as appropriate.

## **C. Methodology**

The methodology is referred to in the literature as a triangulated convergent validity (TCV) study. It initially comprised three components; a desk review of available documents, a roundtable at which members of the Project Inter Agency Executive Committee participated;

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Williams, Research Scholar, School of Social Sciences, The Faculties, Australian National University, Acton, ACT, Australia, 0200. Mr Williams had previously (2001) been involved in the Project as an international expert assisting the Philippines Centre on Transnational Crime in establishing a centralised database on trafficking.

and interviews with key informants from Project agencies. A field test of one Project element (a centralised, shared database) was later added to the evaluation components. Excluding the desk review and follow-up activity in Australia, all components of the evaluation were completed during a site visit to Manila, the Philippines. Evaluation questions were derived from the Project objectives, activities, outputs and expected outcomes, and performance indicators were developed to provide the evidence base for answering these questions. The rationale for the evaluation design was to obtain as many perspectives as reasonably possible within the available timeframe. Results from each perspective (using a TCV) are expected to ‘converge’, and to essentially ‘tell the same story’ or to contribute to a fuller picture than that which would be available from only one perspective. Most often, they cross-validate each other, however it is not uncommon to find that there may be inconsistencies. In such circumstances, the skill of the evaluator is relied upon in determining the appropriate weight which should be placed on each perspective.

An initial *desk review* was conducted in the week of 23-30 May 2003. This was supplemented by a further review of Philippines documents provided during the site visit, in the week of 9-16 June 2003 and of UNODC documents provided during a visit to Vienna in the week of 8-12 July 2003. In all, the desk review comprised examination of 101 documents/ reports<sup>3</sup>.

The *site visit* to Manila took place in the week of 1-6 June 2003. Meetings were held with 29 Officers from 14 agencies. Where available, informal *ad hoc* discussions were held with lower level staff. The Roundtable was attended by 16 officers from nine agencies. Meetings were also held with two donor countries (the United States and Australia), in both the Philippines and Australia, comprising 10 officials from 8 agencies/sub-agencies. These meetings were supplemented by electronic (email) communications with visiting international experts and UN personnel, in the week of 9-16 June 2003, and with discussions with UN personnel in Vienna in the week of 8-12 July 2003.<sup>4</sup> In all, discussions were held with 53 persons.

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<sup>2</sup> Refer to Annex 1 for the full Terms of Reference for the evaluation

<sup>3</sup> Refer to Annex 3 for a full list of documents

<sup>4</sup> Refer to Annex 2 for full list of informants.

Meetings with agency officers were semi- structured and comprised an examination of:

- Roles and responsibilities of officials as they related to the Project;
- Addressing evaluation questions and performance indicators developed for the evaluation as they related to agency-specific activities/ responsibilities;
- Achievements of the Project, outputs and outcomes;
- Strengths and weaknesses of the Project design and management;
- Opportunities and threats to the sustainability of the Project in the short to medium term; and
- Recommendations on the conduct of similar Projects.

The *field test* of the PCTC database comprised technical, operational and strategic tests and the provision of supporting documentation.<sup>5</sup>

Preliminary results were presented to UNODC in Vienna on 11 July 2003.

#### **D. Limitations**

The absence of an agreed *detailed* evaluation framework *as part of the Project document* meant for many of the evaluation questions and performance indicators which had been developed *post hoc* and agreed to by the National Coordinator, that the required data/ information had not been collected during the conduct of the Project. Attempts to reconstruct these data were in some instances unsuccessful. The time available for the evaluation (1 week desk review, 1 week site visit) was extremely short and the length of time which had elapsed between the final activity (late 2002) and conducting the evaluation (June 2003), resulted in the unavailability of many of the key agency Project personnel (due to reassignment, resignations etc.). In particular, only three of the original members from the 13 agencies comprising the Inter-Agency Executive Committee were available. Some details of Project implementation which might have been material to the evaluator (E.G. records of small group coordination meetings, telephone conversations, email correspondence), were also unavailable. Among informants who were available for interviews and who had participated in the Project, there was

considerable memory recall difficulties as, in many instances, activities for which they had carriage were completed up to three years previously. Most informants had not participated in the Project and they were forced to rely on documentary evidence, which in many instances was cursory or non-existent.

## **I. PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN**

The overarching aim of the Project was to improve criminal justice responses to trafficking in human beings, particularly as it related to the involvement of organized criminal groups, through strengthened national and regional/international policies and practices.

### *Target beneficiaries*

Objectives and activities were directed mainly towards law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges (magistrates), and coordinating bodies dealing with issues related to trafficking in human beings. At the national level, Governmental institutions that were to be addressed included: Department of Foreign Affairs, (DFA), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE), Department of Justice (DOJ), Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), Bureau of Immigration (BI), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP), and the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC).

### **A. Overall Assessment**

The Project was designed as a short, sharp six months of intensive work incorporating a comprehensive integrated menu of 26 activities and 11 outputs. It required the efforts of up to 30 agencies (local and UN) coordinated through a small secretariat and overseen by an Inter-Agency Executive Committee. The proposed local coordinating and management *structure* and *mechanism* were nonetheless sound and justifications well analysed. The available (\$)

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<sup>5</sup> Test specifications and results are to be provided under separate cover

budget was relatively modest for the scale of activities. Intra-Philippines criminal justice system and international cooperation deficiencies were well analysed and identified, but whether the Philippines was a suitable location of a Pilot Project of this type was not well established. A reliable estimate of the scale of trafficking in human beings into, through and from the Philippines and the involvement of transnational organised criminal groups in the activity was not (and is still not, despite the achievements of the Project) known. This evaluation acknowledges however, that the impetus for the Project was host/donor country driven, regardless of the actual scale of the problem and/ or location-suitability for a Pilot. Analyses of the capacity of the Philippines to respond to the challenge correctly identified potential risks, however it does not appear that contingency plans were developed for their possible eventuality. Similarly, monitoring arrangements included in the design were insufficient to detect difficulties in a timely manner. For example, standard UN procedures require a first progress report at six months (that is at the time of its intended completion). This requirement (standard contract clause) was not amended to reflect the shorter timeframe applying to the Project.

The design could not have been finalised without the consent of the Philippines government. Extensive negotiations and discussions took place between the parties during the start-up period prior to an agreement being reached. This evaluation finds that the high-risk and optimistic tenor of the Project design were appreciated by the Philippines government and doubt existed within the government on its capacity to deliver. The government was committed to improving its anti-trafficking measures, but had concluded that its response could not be achieved in the short to medium term from internal resources. The Project offered an opportunity to 'fast-track' its efforts and the immediate objective was to secure the funding on offer. There were a number of interested parties in the Philippines which possessed varying levels of understanding of the likely resources required to achieve the desired tasks. Similarly, among the interested parties, there were varying levels of negotiation skills and the final design agreed to between UNODC and the Philippines became a semi-consensus model which attempted to satisfy all of the interests to varying degrees, but which was likely to test implementation. The greatest impact would be observed in national coordination. The compression of a large number of activities into a six-

month time frame was beyond any reasonable coordination capacity that might be expected even in a longer time frame.

## **B. Problem analysis, objectives and achievement indicators**

### PROBLEM ANALYSIS

The over-riding ‘problem’ was identified as Trafficking in Human Beings, especially women and children. Of an estimated seven million Filipinos overseas, approximately four million were workers, half of which were estimated to be undocumented and the majority of whom were thought to be women. It was assumed without evidence that a large number (unspecified) of the undocumented cases involved trafficking. Further, it was assumed that the recruitment, transport and deployment of trafficked Filipinos had in most cases, been accomplished by transnational organised criminal groups through the use of deceptive and coercive means.

Despite the Philippines government’s active involvement in combating trafficking, three major impediments were identified:

- i responsibility for various aspects of addressing the problem was dispersed across up to 20 agencies. Accordingly, the Project sought to ‘harmonise’ government programmes and activities. The establishment of the IAEC was one mechanism envisioned to improve national coordination
- ii. Law enforcement in particular, and the criminal justice system more generally, was hindered by the absence of specific legislation against trafficking.

Additional obstacles to well-targeted and well-defined investigation strategies which were identified included:

- insufficient resources;

- inadequate awareness among law enforcement officers and prosecutors of the issue of trafficking and existing legislation; and
- insufficient victim/witness protection;

and

- iii existing levels of international cooperation were impeded by a lack of understanding of different legal regimes and the absence of practical frameworks within which to cooperate

#### *Evaluation findings*

The problems associated with dispersal of responsibility for anti-trafficking measures across agencies, the absence of specific legislation, inadequate awareness among law enforcement officers and prosecutors, insufficient victim protection and international cooperation, were well analysed and given appropriate weight.

However, the over-riding problem of the nature and extent of trafficking of Filipinos, in light of the desire and consent of the host/donor countries for a Pilot, was given cursory attention only. Prior to the development of an agreed definition of 'trafficking' two studies had been completed before the Project's *Rapid Assessment Report (RAR)* of 1999<sup>6</sup>. The first, a *Pilot Project Against Trafficking in Women*, was a two-year project between the Philippine government and the government of Belgium, wherein three women were assessed in the RAR as victims of trafficking. The second, *Trafficking in Women to Japan for sexual exploitation: A survey on the case of Filipino Women* was conducted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The latter study was confounded by the definition of sexual exploitation to include (any form of) prostitution and uncertainty over the concept of a 'willing victim'. The subsequent RAR was unable to classify *any* of the documented cases as trafficked and used the term

<sup>6</sup> David, F. 2000. *Rapid Assessment: Smuggling and Trafficking from The Philippines*, UNICRI. The report

‘trafficked women’ (in inverted commas) throughout the report in relation to the IOM study. Nonetheless the RAR was able to conclude that trafficking did occur and that organised crime groups were involved. It cautioned however, that ‘Little information is collected or made available as to the scope of trafficking from the Philippines, the involvement of organised crime groups and the routes used’. Further, the RAR recommended that ‘There is a need for further targeted research in this area...’.

Subsequent to international agreement on a definition of ‘trafficking’ an independent examination of ‘officially documented’ Philippines’ cases occurred during the course of the current Project in 2001, wherein approximately 185 case files held by the PCTC were tested against the UN’s check-list for the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. UNICRI researchers Dr Alexis Aronowitz and Mehdi Bacha conducted the review. A handful of cases only, could be classified as meeting the Protocol definitional requirements. On the same UN mission a very small sample of trafficking cases (n=2) from the CFO database were presented to UN personnel and international experts including the current evaluator, as exemplars of the phenomenon. Neither met the Protocol definitions. The study of Filipino victims by ISDS completed in 2001 as part of the current Project, was unable to locate recent victims of trafficking (the mean length of time from trafficking was approximately a decade), and of the 39 cases documented, perhaps just two would meet the Protocol definition. Finally, all other cross-analysis reports (Japan, Italy, Malaysia) completed as part of the current Project, had similar difficulties in identifying and recruiting victims. The cross-analysis results might simply reflect the need for a different methodology, or they might be indicative of a more realistic estimate of the ‘true’ prevalence of the problem (or both).

In summary, at the time of the Project’s development and approval, the number of victims was not known, nor was the extent of involvement of transnational organised criminal groups in the practice. Had the Pilot been developed primarily from the UNODC rather than host/donor country driven, baseline studies might have been conducted prior to deciding if the Philippines

was a suitable location for a Project of this type (on the justifiable merits of the other identified deficiencies in the criminal justice system and international cooperation spheres). This evaluation recognises however, that in practice, and particularly concerning the general unavailability of specific funding for such studies, most (UN) baseline studies are included as components of wider projects.

Overall rating: Concept appropriate; Design – high risk.

## OBJECTIVES

The aim of the Project was to improve criminal justice responses to trafficking in human beings, particularly as it related to the involvement of organized criminal groups, through strengthened national and regional/international policies and practices. The immediate objectives in achieving this goal were described in the INTRODUCTION above, and were clearly located as capacity building.

### *Evaluation findings*

The objectives were appropriate. They fit squarely within the Global Programme against Trafficking in Humans. The capacity of government institutions - law enforcement and prosecution, in particular – were likely to have been strengthened; for example, through the support of a national coordination mechanism, specialized databases, training, awareness raising and closer cooperation between law enforcement agencies and prosecution. The level of information, and its capacity to provide a tool for better policy planning and action by assessing trafficking flows and the involvement of organized crime groups therein, was likely to be improved. Cooperation among key agencies of countries of origin, transit and destination at the regional and international levels *through the Project alone* however, was unlikely to be improved. Similarly, the formulation of related policies and recommendations in strengthening joint international action against transnational organized criminal aspects of trafficking in human beings was unlikely, nor even provided for, by the success (or otherwise) of the Project. Within the relatively short time frame originally envisioned, achievement of the objectives was always

going to be difficult and success was going to be difficult to measure (refer to Achievement indicators below).

Overall rating: Moderate

#### ACHIEVEMENT INDICATORS

Each of the activities/outputs had time frames attached. The Project document also refers to ‘expectations’ in the short and medium terms and ongoing sustainability following the Project, which if achieved, could be construed as indicators of achievement. Finally, as was observed with the ‘standard’ reporting clause, a ‘standard’ UN evaluation protocol clause, rather than a more substantive framework, was included in the final Project document.

“The terms of reference, duration and purpose of any evaluation mission will be agreed upon with the Government prior to fielding an evaluation team”.

Two activities, the ISDS and other regional cross-analysis studies, and a review of the PCTC database capability, were subject to separate contracts with different indicators. The ISDS contract specified tasks and a timeframe, and achievement indicators were limited to ‘requirements *satisfactorily* (undefined) met’. Concerning the PCTC database, a detailed ‘statement of work’ was included in the contract, but the only identifiable achievement indicators were the *completion* of a report (about mid-way through the review), and on completion of the review, *preparation* of a final report, each with due dates only.

#### *Evaluation findings*

Attachment of time frames does not constitute achievement indicators. For example, an output could have been ‘achieved’ within the proposed time frame, but its quality might be less than optimal. Accordingly, this evaluation finds that the design of the Project did not provide for meaningful or comprehensive achievement indicators.

Overall rating: Low

### **C. Outputs, activities and inputs**

#### ACTIVITIES/ OUTPUTS

Twenty-six activities, including the production of 11 outputs were envisaged. A number of the activities/outputs were designed to feed into a follow-up project (FS/PHI/01/R refers). The first output (Rapid Assessment Report) had been completed prior to the formal commencement of the current Project.

#### *Evaluation findings*

The outputs and activities constituted a well-targeted and integrated menu which was likely to achieve the first two of the intended immediate objectives, with one slight exception<sup>7</sup>. The third (international cooperation) was unlikely to be achieved through the proposed activities alone. Additionally, within the six months Project timeframe (and available budget, including matched 'in-kind' contributions from the government), expectations were overly optimistic (refer also to inputs immediately following and PROJECT RESULTS, section III). This was appropriately recognised during the first Project Progress Review (PPR) (January-June 2000) and an extension of the timeframe to nine months was approved. Subsequently a requirement for an extension from nine to 12 months was also appropriately recognised (July-December 2000 PPR) and approved. Ultimately, an extension from 12 Months to 21 months appears in the January – June 2001 PPR (but without substantiation).

Overall rating: Moderate.

#### INPUTS

The original Project budget was US\$200,000. Additional funding of US\$69,231 was approved during the life of the Project, amounting to US\$269,231

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<sup>7</sup> Target beneficiaries included 'judges'. No activity included judges/magistrates as participants, informants etc. If they were to be beneficiaries, then it would have to have been indirectly (as a result of increased knowledge etc. among law enforcement/prosecutors) through more efficient/ effective trials.

To a large extent, the Project design relied heavily on ‘in-kind’ contributions and prior obligations and prerequisites of the Philippine government for success. All of the defined inputs of the Philippine government were administrative/structural (E.G. provision of office accommodation/ other venues/ equipment/ transportation/ provision of data). The most critical of these were the availability and provision of data and active, effective involvement of the IAEC.

#### *Evaluation findings*

If the Project was implemented as designed (I.E. as a short, sharp six months of intensive activity), and all of the prerequisites and obligations were met, it was just possible that the inputs would have been *sufficient*, not extravagant, nor even slightly generous to allow for possible over-runs. The longer the Project was to take beyond the intended six months, the higher the risk that inputs would be stretched. Local coordination/ secretariat functions were provided according to the Project design on a part time basis (50% full-time equivalent (FTE)). A six months’ *full time* secretariat/coordination function was manageable for the proposed tasks; a nine months’ part-time commitment would cause some difficulty due to the intrusion of other responsibilities of the National Coordinator (who was appointed Commissioner of Police during the life of the Project); twelve months considerable difficulty; and beyond that, unmanageable, with loss of momentum, continuity, and fragmentation.

Overall rating: Moderate

#### **D. Executing modality and managerial arrangements**

The executing modality and managerial arrangements for the Project was the joint responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)/ National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). To facilitate the participation of counterpart agencies and to promote shared ‘ownership’ of Project activities, an Inter Agency Executive Committee (IAEC) was established and met for the first time on 25 January 2000. NAPOLCOM established a secretariat to service the IAEC and to provide

local day-to-day coordination. The IAEC was to be jointly chaired by NAPOLCOM and DFA and it comprised executive representatives from 13 national agencies. The president of the Philippines signed Executive Order 220 creating an executive Council ‘to Suppress Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Children’. During the life of the Project, the IAEC operated as a *de facto* Council.

Local UNOPS/UNDP was responsible for providing overall management services for the execution of the Project activities in accordance with the rules and regulations of the United Nations. Extra-Philippines management was to be provided by UNODC, which was charged with ensuring adequate financial contributions according to the available budget and to provide expertise, advisory, and technical services as required. UNICRI was to execute and provide overall coordination of research/ assessment related Project activities.

To assist UNODC and UNOPS the National Coordinator was to provide six monthly evaluation reports to be issued according to the outputs envisaged in the Project; and financial monitoring records of expenditures were to be reviewed with UNOPS records. Reports from the National Coordinator were to highlight any additional areas of assistance required, as identified during the Project implementation.

#### *Evaluation findings*

- IAEC

The structure, mandate and representation were appropriate.

- DILG/NAPOLCOM

The selection of NAPOLCOM was appropriate. The justification

...local government units, which play a vital role in community mobilizing, are under the DILG. NAPOLCOM, through its Crime Prevention and Coordination Service (CPCS) is mandated ‘to develop a national crime

prevention and information program’ as stated in Sec. 10 (3) of RA 8551. And as such, CPCS also functions as the coordinative arm of the entire criminal justice system through maintaining the ‘Technical Committee on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

was overwhelming. Similarly, provision of secretariat services and the selection of the National Coordinator (NAPOLCOM and Ms Sanidad-Leones respectively) were justifiable,

in view of the availability of national expertise, in particular the input of NAPOLCOM and its Director of the CPCS, and its potential to carry on with the coordination of activities after the end of the Project

however the 50% FTE allocation was insufficient to service the full range of responsibilities effectively and efficiently. These services were ultimately fulfilled largely through unpaid work outside of dedicated Project hours.

During the evaluation (and earlier) DOJ, DFA and CFO were identified as possible alternatives for the secretariat,. However the scale, scope and focus of activities, and the immediate aims of the Project, suggest that they would have not been best positioned to deliver expected outcomes.

#### UNOPS/UNODC/UNICRI

UNOPS was responsible for providing overall management services for the execution of the Project activities. The specific services, primarily financial were outlined (once again) in a ‘standard’ UN interagency letter of agreement between it and UNODC. Additionally, the Project was to be constantly monitored during implementation jointly by the UNODC and UNOPS.

All decisions regarding the implementation of the Project could only be undertaken in consensus with the Government, UNOPS and UNODC, and revisions which were subsequently made to

the Project could only be undertaken with the consent of the UNOPS and UNODC.

*Evaluation findings*

UNOPS did not have a local field office in Manila, and its intended role was to be fulfilled by the local United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Briefings were regularly provided to the local UNDP by UNODC, both in writing and during missions to Manila. As the letter of agreement between UNODC and UNOPS specified mainly financial assistance, there was little scope for *practical* support for the Project or for local monitoring or management. In practice, all monitoring and management was conducted by UNODC. UNDP's largest contribution was to act as a funding conduit for the Project, and in this endeavour it appears to have encountered difficulties in securing the release of funds in a timely manner. The executing modality and management arrangements were hampered by remote monitoring by UNODC and the relative inexperience of the then CICIP in managing Projects. It is understood that the Project was the first for CICIP. This evaluation has been unable to establish if delays in payment were as a result of late requests from the National Coordinator, late forwarding of requests by UNDP to UNOPS, from late processing of requests by UNOPS, or from a combination of all three, as parties dispute the various claims. In some instances, completion of services had to be verified by UNODC prior to UNOPS approval to UNDP Manila for release of funds. UNOPS documentary evidence however, appears to reflect acceptable turnaround intervals once requests were received. (Refer also to PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION section immediately following).

Overall rating: low to moderate.

## **II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

### **A. Overall Assessment**

The Project was hampered from its inception by political and climatic upheaval. During its life there were three changes in government, including a *coup d'etat* and the arrest of the President. There was a major monsoon, involving substantial flooding for months. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that usual processes of government were suspended for periods of up to six months, delaying meaningful implementation. These delays, which contributed to the need for an extension from six months to nine months, from nine months to 12 months, and then almost indefinitely, ultimately resulted in an 'as long as it takes' outlook within both UNODC and the Philippines government. Instead of a short, sharp six months of activity, the Project became a drawn out sequential fragmented list of individual tasks to be accomplished, with consequent loss of integration. The personal commitment of the National Coordinator, with the enthusiastic support of the NAPOLCOM secretariat, was instrumental in ensuring that the majority of tasks were implemented. However, the volume of activities being attempted through the part-time coordination available, combined with the fragmentation due to the imposed delays, resulted in (systemic) implementation failures which might have been identified earlier, had a different monitoring approach (E.G. local rather than remote) been adopted.

Overall rating: Moderate (in the prevailing political climate).

### **B. Delivery of inputs**

The Government was to provide all inputs specified under item F of the Project document. In particular it was to establish and maintain the IAEC and the coordinating secretariat during the implementation and after completion of the Project. Finally, the Government was to make available the use of existing facilities and personnel required by the Project.

Inputs were specific to each output and activity. For example, Output 1.2 was

A coordination mechanism (“Inter-Agency Executive Committee”-IAEC) for addressing trafficking in human beings in the Philippines is supported, and related functions and procedures of Government agencies are harmonized.

The government inputs attached to Output 1.2 were a) Regular participation of IAEC members in coordination meetings, and b) Information on Government agencies’ activities.

Similarly, UN inputs were tied to each activity/output. Using the same Output 1.2 as above, CICIP was to provide a) CICIP staff (3 x 5 days DSA & Travel); b) 1 x national consultant (Project Coordinator) (6 working months x 50%); and c) meetings costs, conference facilities, printing, and hospitality.

#### *Evaluation findings*

UNODC/UNICRI inputs (financial inputs excluded), with minor (appropriate) adjustments as the Project rolled out, were provided as specified in the design. Financial transfers are alleged by the government (and UNDP) to have been characterised by delays. Of 10 progress payments, two are alleged not to have been released (Survey of SGISM (US\$6,000), DFA primer brochure (US\$2,000)), and six are alleged to have been delayed by up to six months, requiring transfers of funds internally within NAPOLCOM from other projects. The Survey of the SGISM was terminated with the mutual agreement of the government and UNODC (and funds reallocated to other Project activities). UNOPS records however, appear to indicate that the US\$2,000 for the DFA primer was approved. The government has no record of receipt for this element.

Concerning the Philippines government, the eventual lengthening of the Project from the intended six months to 12 months and subsequently beyond two years (refer also to PROJECT RESULTS section III below) severely tested its capacity to provide the necessary inputs. In particular, the treatment of activities as a sequential ‘list’ to be achieved, rather than as concurrent activities within the design, required inputs to be accommodated on an *ad hoc* basis

while other ongoing (non-Project) responsibilities had to be met. Nonetheless, the administrative/infrastructural inputs (E.G. venues, transport etc.) were met, but not within the anticipated time frame. The failure of prerequisites to materialize (E.G. development of the SGISM – as opposed to the actual Project activity of a review of its intended function, which was abandoned) and the failure of the PCTC database to achieve functionality (as opposed to the actual Project activity of a review of its state of functionality) meant that data which were to be provided to the Project were unavailable in a timely manner, or not at all. The risks that ‘data on the SGISM would not be available or up to date’, and that ‘initial data not being available from PCTC’ had been recognized in the Project document, but contingency plans had apparently not been developed for their possible eventuality.

A breakdown in the effectiveness of the IAEC (refer also to management and implementing of activities immediately below) resulted in other inputs being provided in an untimely manner. For example, the selection and availability of 300 Law Enforcement workshop participants, which was due to be conducted in June 2000, was delayed. Similarly, the selection of law enforcement officers and prosecutors to attend a workshop on guidelines for a coordination mechanism was delayed. Both activities did not eventuate until four months following due dates and reports were not subsequently submitted to UNODC by the Philippines government until six months later.

### **C. Management and implementation of activities**

The IAEC, National Coordinator and supporting secretariat were established within appropriate timeframes. Legal authority (EO 220), albeit referring to an Executive Council, was assessed as providing a legitimate mandate for the IAEC. A Memorandum of Understanding which provided for appropriate agency representation and membership, and obligations and responsibilities, was signed on 14 June 2000. The IAEC appropriately established sub-committees with responsibility for management and implementation of component elements of the Project. These sub-committees apparently met informally however, and did not report back

to the IAEC as sub-committees.<sup>8</sup> Rather, (some) reports of progress were submitted by the agency which had main carriage of the component

The local UNDP was briefed on the Project remotely (verbally) and in person during missions. In total, eight missions were undertaken to Manila, the Philippines, by UNODC and UNICRI, between July 2000 and March 2002 to provide assistance to the government and to monitor implementation, a somewhat excessive number, but understandable in light of the remote UNODC management and difficulties identified during Project Progress Reviews.

Both the government and UNODC/UNICRI agree that a number of contract variations were made to the Project (E.G. extension from six months to nine months duration; increase in available funds from US\$200,000 to US\$219,312, then to US\$269,312). Government documentary records on requests for extensions of time/additional funding are scant on detail (E.G. dates of requests/ reasons), or non-existent. UNODC PPRs, in general, are appropriately completed and provide the necessary details.

#### *Evaluation findings*

Despite the intentions for the IAEC to be an *executive* (as opposed to an *executing*) committee with appropriate decision-making and endorsement powers, and despite subsequent advice presented to it by UNODC on its intended role to provide the National Coordinator with both Agency-specific authoritative support (that is, to be able to commit their agencies to action and to direct agency officers to provide the National Coordinator with (reasonable levels of) assistance), and to provide the National Coordinator with an Inter-Agency cooperation and coordination network/ mechanism, useful involvement was limited. The secretariat provided appropriate levels of support to the IAEC (E.G. production of minutes, pre-meeting agenda and supporting documentation), however meetings were not scheduled with a predetermined

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<sup>8</sup>. The passage of time between implementation and the evaluation, the reassignments and resignations of key personnel and the unavailability of records of informal meetings, telephone conversations and email communications referred to earlier, restricted the evaluation of this component

frequency or with Project milestones in mind.

Following constructive early meetings, in many instances, non-executive alternates at Director or Desk Officer level attended in place of the designated executive. Despite the urgings of the National Coordinator for all attending members' alternates to present themselves only if they had been delegated to exercise agency authority, this was not always adhered to. In the circumstances, without the authority to commit their agencies, matters were often carried over. Due to the eventual lengthening of the Project beyond the original six months, there was significant turnover among representatives following reassignments and resignations, which required additional IAEC meeting time in bringing new members 'up-to-speed'. In practice, the coordination and co-operational role of the IAEC fell largely to the National Coordinator outside of formal IAEC meetings, an additional burden in an already stretched environment. DILG's (as opposed to its sub-agency NAPOLCOM) active involvement was also limited.

With Project components that IAEC members had accepted responsibility for, there was little effort *by the Committee* to review the production or substance of implementation work plans. Several 'proposals' for components were presented to the IAEC, however these did not amount to substantive work plans, as might commonly be understood elsewhere, and their presentation was as a courtesy. While the IAEC was not an implementation committee and had no formal role in endorsing or monitoring member agency performance, an opportunity for collective interest, encouragement and *esprit de corps* for the Project as a whole and for support to and for individual Agency components, was nonetheless missed.

At the second IAEC meeting, it was appropriately decided that DILG/NAPOLCOM would be responsible for the technical and day-to-day management issues and DFA would attend to matters of international cooperation/liaison. In practice, liaison between the IAEC and UNODC/UNICRI was conducted via the National Coordinator and there is no evidence of international matters being brought before the IAEC for DFA's prescribed role. Finally, a significant member organisation (CFO) withdrew from proceedings entirely.

The National Coordinator and the IAEC decided that as two major Project components (ISDS victim survey, PCTC database) were directly funded by UNICRI and UNODC respectively, outside of the IAEC/NAPOLCOM framework, it was *culturally and administratively inappropriate* for the IAEC and the National Coordinator to become involved in either the management or monitoring of associated activities. As these functions were contractually attached to UNICRI and UNODC, the decision was a pragmatic approach, but in light of their importance to the Project (baseline and ongoing data), earlier communications between UNODC/UNICRI and the IAEC/National Coordinator than eventuated, might have averted some of the problems encountered.

Finally, while UNODC-prepared PPRs, in general, documented the numerous contract variations, failure to provide written agreements with the government reflecting these changes (E.G. as formal variations to be attached to the original project document as Schedules) led to differences in opinions between the government and UNODC/ UNOPS/ UNICRI as to the exact nature and extent of variations.

#### **D. Monitoring and backstopping**

Under the Project DILG/NAPOLCOM were primarily responsible for implementing and monitoring criminal justice response components, particularly in law enforcement and prevention elements. Agencies which were involved in the Project were identified as possessing the necessary ability to plan, monitor, and coordinate Project activities. The IAEC and the National Coordinator were charged with the responsibility to carry out regular coordination meetings and monitoring of policy implementation of member agencies (activity 1.2.2). The National Coordinator was also charged with regularly reviewing financial monitoring records with UNOPS, and the government generally, was charged with the responsibility of maintaining an accurate inventory of equipment provided during the duration of the Project. As already referred to, these tasks were to be accomplished on a part-time basis, originally intended to be for a six-month duration. The delays and extensions of the Project timeframe have already been

referred to above.

The Project was also to be constantly monitored during its implementation by the UNODC and UNOPS. UNODC and UNICRI were to provide guidance and advice to the national coordinator as and when required.

#### *Evaluation findings*

The absence of a fulltime National Coordinator and the subsequent intrusion of other responsibilities during the extended timeframe beyond the intended six months duration contributed to less than optimal local monitoring. Agencies with primary carriage of Project components largely self-monitored, but difficulties which were identified were rarely reported to the IAEC/National Coordinator. The limited useful/practical involvement of the IAEC has already been referred to, and the possibility of collective leverage of members being brought to bear (and or perception of joint contribution to the overall success of the Project as a whole by member agencies) was lost.

The eight missions to Manila by UNODC/UNICRI facilitated 'on the ground' monitoring, and remediation attempts were made where difficulties were identified. It appears that early mission monitoring identified entrenched difficulties and the Project might have been redesigned at that time (E.G. identifying a smaller number of focused activities, reducing outputs). Two Project elements (the UNICRI research studies and the PCTC database) were in serious difficulties from their inception and these difficulties persisted throughout (refer also to PROJECT RESULTS section III below). Importantly, both these elements had been declared by the National Coordinator and the IAEC as culturally and administratively inappropriate to intervene without specific requests from the agencies involved. The IAEC and National Coordinator's role for these Project elements was effectively to merely 'receive and note' results.

Concerning the ISDS study in particular, monitoring within UNICRI was impeded by a lack of corporate knowledge and continuity. Turnover of personnel resulted in three different teams having responsibility. When the final team appropriately sought to recover the early setbacks,

ISDS resented the newly imposed micro-management and the relationship between ISDS and UNICRI was soured irreparably. Similarly within UNODC, due to staff turnover, three different liaison personnel were involved in the Project and the Philippines government identified this as a factor which contributed to continuity difficulties.

Overall, backstop arrangements were deficient. Turnover of staff, including those as a result of changes in government and Departmental heads, was a problem from both sides. Intra-agency reassignment of personnel and responsibility for Project elements were accompanied by failure to provide adequate transfer of knowledge. For example, within DFA, responsibility for the Project was transferred from its UNIO section to its Migration section. The ‘transferor’ (UNIO) had only recently been appointed to the position and was unable to provide the ‘transferee’ (Migration) with any meaningful assistance. The Project was only one of a number of responsibilities of the Migration Officer and it had a lower priority than the other responsibilities. Similarly, within PCTC, a reassignment of the sole trained researcher meant that the replacement was provided with only one day’s training (for a function that required three month’s intensive training). The ‘newness’ of responsible officers has already been referred to in relation to the IAEC.

### **E. Circumstances affecting the Project (Prerequisites)**

The Government was to nominate the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) of the DILG as Implementing Agencies. Other agencies to be included in the IAEC (E.G. Department of Justice, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Labour and Employment, Department of Social Welfare and Development) were to cooperate with the Project in order to provide all required national counterpart services for its implementation. The Government was also expected to facilitate all expert, technical and monitoring missions to be undertaken in the context of the Project and related UNODC activities in the Philippines, and it was to ensure the missions' access to Project sites, relevant criminal justice data, records, agencies and authorities.

#### *Evaluation findings*

The limited involvement of the IAEC has already been referred to. Cooperation from participating agencies, with the exception of CFO which withdrew, was forthcoming but tardy, and with a few exceptions, less than fulsome. Access to criminal justice data was impeded by the failure of the SGISM to materialise and the PCTC database to achieve functionality.

Concerning facilitation of international experts, the National Coordinator and secretariat were professional and efficient *during missions*, however some difficulties were identified prior to and subsequent to missions, principally concerning responses to emails and provision of materials. This might have been a result of telephony/internet service provider (ISP) difficulties within the Philippines. Details of common ISP difficulties have been provided to the National Coordinator.

### III. PROJECT RESULTS

The National Coordinator provided a Terminal Report in January 2003. Rather than repeat the achievements discussed in the Report (which unfortunately contained some slight omissions), summary information is presented in Tables 1 through 3 at Annex 5. Briefly however, most of the outputs activities and immediate objectives were achieved, albeit overdue (and in most instances grossly overdue). In general however, the quality of the outputs was low to moderate.

#### A. Outputs

Ten of eleven outputs were achieved in full or part. The one failure was the review of the SGISM, which was mutually abandoned.

The followings were the intended outputs (and excluding the general lateness of production) actual results, by the end of the project:

- 1) A rapid assessment and cross-analysis report on interregional trafficking routes emanating from the Philippines, addressing organized crime involvement and existing institutional responses will be available for both policy decisions and project planning – **Achieved; quality high**
- 2) A national coordination mechanism, the Inter-Agency Executive Committee (IAEC), will have been supported, integrating all agencies addressing issues related to trafficking in human beings – **Achieved; quality moderate**
- 3) A survey on the status of the Shared Government Information System (SGISM) and recommendations on assistance in its further development and operationalization will be prepared – **Not achieved**

- 4) Information on organized crime involvement will have been collected from concerned government agencies and NGOs and a related database will be established – **Achieved; quality high**
- 5) Training materials for various professional categories, including a booklet compiling relevant legislation and regulations for law enforcement and prosecutors, will be prepared – **Partly achieved, quality moderate to high**
- 6) 300 law enforcement officers will have participated in basic awareness-raising and training courses on the investigation of trafficking-related cases – **Achieved; quality unknown.**
- 7) Guidelines on investigation and prosecution of cases related to trafficking in human beings will be prepared and a model for a coordination mechanism between the prosecution service and law enforcement agencies and other relevant agencies will be developed for pilot testing during the follow-up project – **Achieved; quality high**
- 8) The database of the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) which is currently being established will be assessed, particularly as it relates to the collection of information on the involvement of organized criminal groups in trafficking in human beings. Recommendations will also be prepared as to the inclusion of assistance to PCTC in the further development of its database in this area, in the follow-up project – **Achieved; quality initially low, following corrective action, high**
- 9) A report and recommendations on the present system of protection and support for victims and witnesses of trafficking in human beings will be

available, including action under the follow-up project – **Achieved; quality high**

- 10) A strategic plan for combating trafficking in the Philippines will be formulated which could be a basis for Government policy directives – **Achieved; quality moderate to high**
- 11) Networking between the relevant authorities of the Philippines and their counterparts in the international community will be encouraged, particularly in the area of exchange of information and best practices – **domestic achieved; quality moderate - international not achieved (nor provided for in required activities)**

## **B. Immediate Objectives**

Twenty-one of 28 Activities were achieved in full or part.

### IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 1.

To strengthen government agencies' knowledge of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organized crime, and to improve agency coordination

#### *Evaluation findings*

Two activities (1.1.1- desk review and 1.1.2 – rapid assessment report on trafficking) had been completed prior to the formal commencement of the Project. As discussed in PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION section II above, the establishment of and the representation on the IAEC was accomplished to a high level of achievement. However meetings (activity 1.2.2) were unsatisfactory. Activity 1.4.3 (creation and maintenance of NGO database) was completed, but there has apparently been no maintenance since its creation. Due to the relatively small number of social workers assigned to overseas missions, Activity 1.5.1 (a survey on training needs and the development of curriculum for consulate staff and social workers

fielded abroad) was prudently combined under one curriculum.

Knowledge within agencies and agency coordination was improved, however due to turnover, most current responsible officers within agencies who have carriage of trafficking matters are, in general, inexperienced and it appears that outputs, other than the training material for overseas consulate staff, are not routinely used.

#### IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 2.

To strengthen the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organized crime.

#### *Evaluation findings*

The first three activities (2.1.1 – coordination workshop; 2.2.1 – inventory of existing legislation; 2.2.2 production of a manual) - were completed with a high level of quality. The third activity however, was impeded by a lack of sufficient funds for widespread dissemination. This has been rectified with the reallocation of unspent funds (US\$5,5000) at the end of the Project.

The passage of the recent Anti-Trafficking Act 2003 however, will have implications for ongoing utility of the output. The intention for the manual, in part, was to provide a ‘stop-gap’ tool (use of existing instruments in the absence of a specific anti-trafficking law). Due to the length of time from its intended production date (June-Sept 2000) to its actual date of production and distribution (late 2002) and this date’s proximity to the passage of the new Act (May 2003), it may well require a new round of activity to be undertaken to update its content and to provide education on compliance with the new Act’s provisions (refer to sustainability below).

One activity (2.2.5 – preparation of advanced training material) was not completed. The

assessment report on the capacity of PCTC to collect trafficking-related data was initially deficient. Corrective action recommended by UNODC resulted in a satisfactory output. Difficulties which were identified were later addressed through supplementary reports by visiting overseas experts. The output was sufficiently instructive to result in a prudent recommendation that further UN funds not be provided until PCTC was able to demonstrate adequate capacity and efficiency. Follow-up activities to assist PCTC in achieving appropriate levels (a workshop for providing agencies and the PCTC in September 2001, and a field data gathering exercise in late 2002) were conducted, but outcomes of those activities were of low to moderate quality. The database is for all intents and purposes, not functional. In light of PCTC's request for additional funding, this output has 'saved' approximately \$200,000 being inappropriately allocated.

Institutional capacity to prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of trafficking has been strengthened, but only marginally. Desk officers for women and children have been located in all police stations, and they undergo trafficking familiarity training. An additional 455 law enforcement officers have undergone similar workshop training as occurred with the 300 Project participants under activity 2.2.4. Evaluation of the success of the training has not been conducted (E.G. retention of information gained) and there was no evidence provided by the government that there has been an improvement in practice. Specifically concerning prosecutions, informant agencies advise that there are remaining difficulties between the preparation of cases filed and subsequent prosecutions. Two areas in particular, were identified: failure of prosecutors to subpoena investigating officers and victims' primary concern to receive compensation (if received prior to trial, victim inevitably withdraws complaint). Phase two of the Coalitions in the Philippines might assist in redressing this problem.

### IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 3

To improve international cooperation in cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to transnational organized crime.

### *Evaluation findings*

The research component of the Project was very disappointing. Activity 3.1.3 (involvement of organised crime) was hampered by the unavailability of reliable data from the Philippines government. Activity 3.1.4 (Inventory of international/bilateral Philippines related agreements) was apparently never undertaken and other activities achieved poor results.

Italy was substituted for Hong Kong in the intended list of target countries for activities 3.1.2 and 3.1.7. UNICRI appropriately decided to produce separate reports for each of the destination countries (Italy, Japan, Malaysia), which supplemented the Australian case study (activity 3.1.3, which itself was also apparently truncated). The difficulties in locating and recruiting ‘trafficking victims’ in all studies decreased the value of the resulting reports. A summary/combined report of all studies has recently been published, in lieu of separate reports.

The activities and outputs attached to Immediate Objective 3 were research-oriented baseline studies. It is difficult to identify how they would have, of themselves, contributed to the achievement of the (international) aim. Indeed, it was possible that had the separate country reports identified ‘embarrassing’ state deficiencies or included controversial conclusions/recommendations (E.G. directly opposite to a ruling party policy), their publication in the short-term at least, could have contributed to *reduced* international cooperation. One element (the Rapid Assessment Report) is understood to have caused intra-Philippine embarrassment, only corrected with a last-minute addendum, *at the Report’s launch*.

### **C. Crime control objective**

The main objective “to improve criminal justice responses to trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to the involvement of organised criminal groups through strengthened national and regional/international policies and practices’ does not appear to have been achieved. While capacity building was marginally improved and knowledge of the problem increased, there is no evidence that prevention, investigation or prosecution practices have improved.

## **D. Other results**

The presence of the Project in the Philippines and the existence of the IAEC contributed to institutional awareness raising of the problem of trafficking in human beings. There is a majority view that the recent passage of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 2003 would not have been possible without the Project, through its visibility, the development of a Strategic Action Plan 2002-2004, and through members using the imprimatur of the Presidential Executive Orders establishing the IAEC and PCTC to drive momentum. A minority view is that the Act was achieved largely outside of the Project (and despite it).

## **E. Sustainability**

### **Institutional**

*Are any changes to current institutional arrangements envisioned?*

Yes. The new Act provides for a Council which supplants the IAEC. NAPOLCOM, NBI and PCTC are not represented. Tasks which are presently provided for under the Project have been reassigned.

*If changes are envisioned, to what extent and how, are the envisioned changes likely to impact on changes arising from the project continuing?*

Uncertain. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs) have not been developed and the excluded agencies might be included under these arrangements. Alternatively S21(i) provides for the new Council to co-opt other agencies as and when required.

### **Social**

*What are and to what extent are current social factors contributing to or detracting from the likelihood of benefits of the project continuing?*

The extreme poverty of the Philippines will remain a threat. Additionally (and associated with the poverty), there is a fundamental contradiction or competing national priority to encourage and facilitate domestic nationals working overseas.

*To what extent are current social factors likely to prevail in the short to medium term?*

High.

### **Political**

*What is the current level of political support for the project?*

High (for Phase 2)

*To what extent is the current level of political support for the project likely to prevail in the short to medium term?*

High (for Phase 2)

### **Managerial**

*To what extent are current managerial arrangements contributing to or detracting from the likelihood of benefits of the project continuing?*

The limited involvement of the IAEC and the outstripping of the capacity of the National Coordinator (due to competing priorities) are likely to continue in the short to medium term. However, the implementation of the new Act and its provision for a new Executive Council might overcome this.

*Are changes to the current managerial arrangements envisioned?*

The IAEC has apparently decided to continue regardless of the new Act (in contravention of its own earlier decision, and its own MOU with the government that it would exist for the life of the project only). If the new Council is established in the short-term, there may be some demarcation issues to be resolved.

*If changes are envisioned, to what extent and how, are the envisioned changes likely to impact on the benefits of the project continuing?*

The new Council, with the support of the new Act, might facilitate a higher likelihood of benefits continuing.

### **Financial viability**

*Are current financial arrangements appropriate for the objectives/tasks to be maintained?*

Project funds (Phase 1) have been exhausted, with several elements abandoned and/ or less than optimal. It is recommended in this evaluation that no further funds be advanced and that all activities be considered 'completed'.

### **Financial stability**

*To what extent are ongoing funds guaranteed or likely?*

Excluding Phase 2 funds, there is little likelihood that further funds will be forthcoming from donor countries for Phase 1 remnant activities. The new Act's provisions are uncertain – with one interpretation suggesting 'new' money for the initiatives envisioned, and another interpretation (the majority view) that the new initiatives are to be funded from reallocated resources within responsible agencies.

#### **IV. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS**

The Project was a Pilot. In the circumstances, perhaps the most valuable outcome to be expected was Lessons Learned, not necessarily the achievement of the three immediate objectives in chapter and verse. Pilots are designed and conducted to test a variety of factors, including implementation and management structures, and failures are to be expected. The relatively short timeframe set for the Project was always going to impose difficulties on the likelihood of delivery. In order to succeed, all of the elements would have to have fallen into place. The number of activities was beyond the capacity of the National Coordinator and the supporting secretariat to achieve (or could be reasonably expected to achieve). The limited involvement of the IAEC only added to the responsibilities of the National Coordinator and remote monitoring by UNODC in Vienna, supplemented by numerous missions, was difficult to sustain effectively. It is testimony to the perseverance of both the National Coordinator and UNODC that most activities/outputs were ultimately achieved, albeit overdue, and in many cases significantly overdue. There were casualties along the way however; the most significant of which was the quality of outcomes/ outputs. The passage of the new Act specifically addressing trafficking in humans is a major 'by-product' of the Project. An alternate Managerial/ Coordination/Monitoring framework is recommended for Phase 2.

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Issued resolved during evaluation

1. That PNP adopt a ‘train the trainer’ approach to its repeat workshops of ‘one-day training and awareness-raising programme’ to widen the potential recipient base;
2. That BI consider the inclusion of trafficking penalty warnings on incoming and outgoing foreign visitor immigration advisories (already included for domestic nationals).
3. That PCTC provide an outreach data collection service;
4. That PCTC acquire SPSS as a standard analytical tool for its data;
5. That PCTC develop a proposal for a fulltime 3 months ‘on site’ consultancy to manage the migration of its data to Oracle or SQL and to provide training;

### B. Actions/decisions recommended

6. That when identifying potential risks associated with similar projects, appropriate contingency plans be developed for their possible eventuality;
7. That if a similar Phase 1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere) realistic accounts of the relative negotiation skills and bargaining positions of recipient countries are undertaken when assessing their capacity to deliver;
8. That if a similar Phase 1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere), baseline studies be conducted to determine reliable estimates of the nature and extent of the problem of trafficking in human beings prior to decisions on the desirability of continuing;
9. That if a similar Phase 1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere), a *fulltime* local coordinator be appointed and funded;
10. That if a similar Phase 1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere), monitoring arrangements be strengthened;
11. That if a similar Phase 1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere),

direct funding of subcontracting agencies outside of the overarching local management structure (as occurred with ISDS and PCTC in this Project) be avoided;

12. That if a similar Phase 1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere), local cultural values/ practices concerning the appropriateness of management/ coordination structures be examined prior to their implementation;
13. That if a similar Phase1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere), funding procedures be examined to streamline clearance intervals;
14. That if a similar Phase 1 Project is considered for the region (or elsewhere), National Coordinators and IAEC equivalents be provided with UN standard templates for work plans, and monitoring schedules (and guidelines on their completion);
15. That consideration be given within UNODC/UNOPS to abandon the routine use of 'standard' clauses in Project documents and contracts when their use is obviously at odds with Project aims/ intentions.

### **C. Project revisions**

16. That this Phase of the Project be considered 'completed' and no further funds advanced;
17. That from a Project perspective, the IAEC consider its task complete;
18. That the IAEC provide the new Council established by the new Act with all documents in relation to Phase 1 to familiarise itself with achievements to date;
19. That if invited, UNODC provide the new Council with a personal briefing on Phase 1 which includes the results of this evaluation;
20. That the current uncertainty arising from the new Act on the roles of PCTC, NAPOLCOM and BNI in relation to Trafficking in Persons be resolved;
21. That the uncertainty concerning the future of the SGISM be resolved;
22. That the uncertainty over whether the new Act provisions for a central database within DILG is supplementary to that maintained by PCTC, be resolved;

23. That *regardless* of the outcome of recommendation 20 above PCTC urgently upgrade the functionality of its database;
24. That *depending on* the outcome of recommendation 22 above, participating agencies urgently provide PCTC with extant data on trafficking in human beings or in the event that a new database is established within DILG, participating agencies urgently provide DILG with extant and continuing data on trafficking in human beings;
25. That Phase 2 monitoring, management and local coordination arrangements be reviewed urgently; and in particular;
26. That a *fulltime* local coordinator be appointed and funded for Phase 2; and
27. That remote management/monitoring be avoided.

## VI. LESSONS LEARNED

### PROJECT-SPECIFIC

1. That high volume activity, integrated Projects which are compressed into relatively short timeframes are high risk. Despite appropriate identification of potential risks, without adequate contingency plans for their possible eventuality, an integrated Project can quickly fragment into a sequential log of 'tasks', with consequent loss of contributory/ compensatory momentum.

The Project was designed as an integrated menu of mutually reinforcing activities.

The failure of early activities to be delivered in a timely manner, combined with a failure for prerequisites and prior obligations to materialize as intended, resulted in a snowballing of delays and loss of the capacity of the National Coordinator to continue to devote the requisite commitment to the Project (given other obligations which had to be met). A short sharp high volume integrated concurrent activity project rapidly became a drawn out sequential process of 'getting to the end of the list' – refer to SECTION A III PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, overall; assessment, above.

2. That host countries/ particular agencies may not necessarily possess the negotiation skills and / or perception of the actual resources required, which would allow equal participation in the development of a more achievable Project model or more appropriate funding levels

Despite a considerable amount of (collaborative) design effort being devoted to the Project prior to its approval and implementation, competing/ complementary interests in the host country with varying levels of negotiation skills resulted in a compressed, high volume of activities which the host country knew would be

difficult to achieve– refer to Overall Assessment, section A, I PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN, above.

3. Notwithstanding lesson 1 above (or in addition to), that a host country's *bargaining position* relative to the UN/ Donor countries might be weak, contributing to a reluctance to negotiate a more achievable Project model (at the risk of losing the Project, and/ or receiving a lower level of funding).

The host country recognized that it could not accomplish its desired outcomes in anti-trafficking measures from internal resources (economic/ technical/research etc). An investment of US\$200,000 (to be matched with an equivalent internal 'in-kind) promised a US\$400,000 'buy' for very little domestic \$ commitment. It was a significant investment, which given the parlous economic state of the country, was 'too good to pass', regardless of its capacity to deliver – refer to Overall Assessment, section A, I PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN above.

4. That baseline studies which can result in more reliable estimates of the extent and nature of the over-riding 'problem' be conducted prior to commitment to a project of this scale, notwithstanding the general/ usual UN experience of funding provisions permitting such studies as part of wider projects.

Doubt exists in the mind of this evaluator on the legitimacy of the host country's claims on the prevalence of Trafficking in Filipinos. This conclusion is supported by earlier and subsequent studies conducted as part of the Project. Notwithstanding the availability of donor funds for a Philippines-specific Project, ultimately the UN's credibility is at stake, possibly jeopardizing future funding of similar projects elsewhere. No reliable figures which even approach the prevailing low estimates which the host government promulgates, have been

found. – refer to Problem Analysis, section B, I PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN above.

5. That commonly used/ accepted standards applying elsewhere for the development of supporting work plans/ monitoring vehicles, cannot be assumed to be understood and adhered to by host countries, and that guidance, including the provision of education on format and function, should be explored as part of project implementation.

The level of specificity which might usually be associated with work plans (E.G. tasks/ sub-tasks, responsible implementing agency/ responsible agency officer who has carriage/ milestone dates/ achievement indicators etc) was absent from this Project. Project ‘proposals’ which comprised little more than a narrative statements of intent (and only for a minority of activities), were used in their place. These proved unsatisfactory. Consideration might be given to providing host countries with templates (including guidelines for their use) to assist in their management endeavours – refer to section C, III PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, management and implementation above.

6. That there is no substitute for ‘on-the-ground’ vigilance.

The current project was characterized by remote monitoring through UNODC and UNICRI, assisted by a relatively high number of missions (8) at various stages, and this proved inadequate. – refer to section D, III PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, monitoring and backstopping section above.

7. That contract variations be documented and that variations be attached as Schedules to the contract as and when they occur.

The Project was ‘renegotiated’ numerous times during its course, involving

extensions of time, abandonment of activities and additions of supplementary activities. These variations were apparently agreed to via email, verbally, and in a minority of instances, by letters of exchange. While the changes were reflected in UNODC-prepared PPRs the apparent failure to provide the government with written confirmation contributed to confusion between the government and UNODC as to what had been agreed to. The lack of local documentary evidence impeded the evaluation's capacity to determine the completion, timeliness and quality of the Project overall and component elements therein – refer to section B I PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN, Achievement Indicators, and section C I PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN, outputs, activities and inputs, above.

#### EVALUATIONS GENERALLY

8. That detailed evaluations frameworks (as opposed to protocols) should be included as part of Project documents;

The absence of a detailed evaluation framework resulted in the Project not collecting required data from which success could be more accurately measured. At a more fundamental level, without such a framework neither the host country nor the UNODC could be sure what indicators would signal that the Project 'worked'. A 'first principles' underpinning of project development/management is that if you can't measure it – don't do it. That is, without appropriate measurement standards as part of the project plan, you can never be sure if the outcome has been beneficial or detrimental. *Post hoc* attempts to impose/ develop standards/ indicators is fraught with danger – refer to Limitations, section D, INTRODUCTION and achievement indicators, and section B, PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN, above).

9. That evaluations should commence within 3 months of completion of activities;

Overruns on the estimated duration of the project combined with responsible officer redeployment/resignations subsequently, resulted in unavailability of informants with direct knowledge of the Project, and among continuing informants, significant memory recall difficulties – refer to Limitations, section D, INTRODUCTION above).

## **Annex 1. Evaluation Terms of reference**

### **EVALUATION PURPOSE**

The evaluator will analyse: a) project concept and design; b) project implementation; and c) the outputs, outcomes and impact of the project. The evaluator will ensure that lessons learned from the project will be recorded and recommendations on possible follow-up activities will be made, as appropriate.

### **ASSIGNMENT**

#### **1. Project concept and design**

The evaluator will analyse the project concept and design with the focus of project elements directly related to trafficking in human beings. The evaluator will review the trafficking problem addressed by the project and the project strategy chosen for their implementation. The evaluation should encompass an assessment of the appropriateness and obtainability of objectives and of planned outputs, activities and inputs as compared to other cost-effective alternatives, if/as available. An evaluation of the executing modality and managerial arrangements will also be included. The evaluator will assess the appropriateness, quality and cost effectiveness of baseline studies and achievement indicators and review the work plan, planned duration of and budget for the project. Finally, an analysis of the clarity, logic and coherence of the project should also be provided for.

#### **2. Implementation**

The evaluator will assess the implementation of the project in terms of quality and timeliness of inputs and efficiency and effectiveness of activities carried out. Also, the effectiveness of management, as well as the quality and timeliness of monitoring and backstopping by all parties to the project, will be evaluated.

### 3. Project outputs, outcomes and impact

The evaluator assess the outputs, outcomes and impact achieved or expected to be achieved by the project as well as the likely sustainability of project results, where applicable. This should encompass an assessment of the achievement of the immediate objectives and the contribution to attaining the overall objective. If objectives other than the ones relating to trafficking in human beings are stated in the project document, the evaluator will also assess the achievement of these. However, care should be taken to prevent the evaluation from diverting attention to these objectives at the expense of the crime prevention and criminal justice focus. The evaluator will also assess if the project has had significant unexpected effects, whether of beneficial or detrimental character.

### 4. Recommendations

The evaluator will make recommendations as appropriate. They should constitute proposals for concrete action that could be taken in future to improve or rectify undesired outcomes. Recommendations may also be made in respect of issues related to the implementation of management of the project and follow up projects dealing with the same issues.

### 5. Lessons learned

The evaluator should record lessons learned from the project that are valid beyond the project itself.

## *DOCUMENTATION*

The following documentation related to the project will be provided as reference documents: the project document and substantive summary records of tripartite review meetings (particularly

meetings with the Interagency Executive Committee established under the project), as held, project performance evaluation reports, and relevant mission reports.

### *EVALUATION METHODOLOGY*

The evaluation methodology will be based on the following:

- desk review of all relevant documents available;
- interviews with participants, their supervisors and the clients in relevant agencies regarding impact of the programme, as well as with representatives of donor countries, as appropriate;
- a focus group or one-day workshop with participants of the project to discuss the impact of the programme. Preferably, this should be done in the context of a meeting of the Interagency Executive Committee.

### *OUTPUTS*

1. A mission report including the report of the interviews and output of one-day workshop above.
2. A completed summary evaluation questionnaire
3. A finalized project evaluation report on the project “Coalitions against trafficking in human beings in the Philippines” FS/PHI/00/R05, covering project concept and design, implementation, outputs, outcome and impact of the project, recommendations, and lessons learned.

### *WORK ARRANGEMENTS*

1. Responsibility for evaluation

As for the methodology and process, this evaluation will be a joint effort between the consultant, the GPAT programme manager and the national project coordinator. As for substance, it is critical that the consultant is independent and conducts a thorough evaluation covering both technical aspects of the project and also the management of the project itself.

## 2. Briefings, consultations and administrative support

The Officials responsible for briefing the evaluator are: Mr. Burkhard Dammann, Officer-in-charge, CICP Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings, Ms. Celia Leones, Commissioner, the Philippines and national project coordinator, Mr. Alberto Bradanini, Director, UNICRI and Ms. Alexis Aronowitz, consultant and former research coordinator at UNICRI. As required, the evaluator will further consult with the UNDP Office Manila, Mr. Winston Temple, UNDP Resident Representative and other UNDP staff, and the UNOPS Office Vienna, Mr. Hans Ulrich Hugo.

The consultant will have access to all relevant documents and staff who have worked on the project.

## **Annex 2. Organisations and places visited and persons met**

### **Organisations/sub-agencies (alphabetically)**

Australian Embassy – Immigration  
 (Australian) Department of Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA)  
 Australian Institute of Criminology  
 Bureau of Immigration (BI)  
 Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO).  
 Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)  
 Department of Labour and employment (DOLE)  
 Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)  
 Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)  
 Directorate For Police Community Relations (DFPCR – PNP)  
 Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines (Canberra, Australia)  
 National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)  
 National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)  
 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA –DOLE)  
 OUMWA (DFA)  
 Philippines Centre on Transnational Crime (PCTC)  
 Philippines National Police (PNP)  
 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)  
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  
 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)  
 United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)  
 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)  
 United States Embassy  
 University of Philippines (UP)  
 Violence Against Women & Children (VAWCD-NBI)

**Persons met (alphabetically)**

Ms Ma Elvira	Ador, OIC, Social Benefits Office- OWWA/DOLE
Ms Marivic	Alcober, NAPOLCOM
Capt Bong	Aliño, NBI
Psupt Tomas C	Apolinario-Deputy Director (Economic Crime)- PCTC
Ms Alexis	Aronowitz, formerly UNICRI (electronic)
Mr Mehdi	Bacha, Associate Expert, UNICRI (electronic)
Dir Alicia	Bonoan, Director, Programs and Projects Bureau-DSWD
Atty Corazon	Borbolla, Chief, Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch-POEA
Ms Myra	Burgos, Social Welfare III-DSWD
PSInsp Porfirio A	Calagan, Officer, Human Trafficking Desk-PCTC
Ms Donna Lynn A	Caparas, NAPOLCOM
PSSupt Lucas V	Cauton Jr , Dep Dir For Administration-PCTC
Psupt Vert T	Chavez, Deputy Director (Counter Terrorism)- PCTC
Ms Abeguel	Cordero, Researcher-Human Trafficking Desk-PCTC
Mr Stephen	Cutler, Legal Attache-US Embassy
Mr Burkhard	Dammann, UNODC
Ms Fiona	David, visiting international expert (Canberra)
Gen Ricardo	de Leon, Director, DPCR-PNP
Ms Judith	Dixon, visiting international expert (Melbourne)
Ms Cel	Duldulao, Political Affairs Assistant-US Embassy
Mr Hans	Hugo, UNOPS
Mr Richard	Konarski, National Manager, Fraud Control Section, (Australian) Commonwealth Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
Atty Edna	Lazaro, Principal Asst. on Human Rights and Trafficking in Persons -OUMWA-DFA
Ms Catherine	Maceda, Deputy Director, CFO and Chairman, Overseas Absentee Voting Secretariat-DFA

Dir Merliza	Makinano, Director, International Labor Affairs-DOLE
Dr Toni	Makkai, Director of Research (Canberra)
Mr David	Meisner, Customs Attache
Ms Martina	Mellis, regional UNDP (electronic)
Atty Edgardo	Mendoza, Chief Immigration Regulation Division- BI
Ms Myrna	Monsod, Secretary, VAWCD-NBI
PSupt Reynold E	Osia, Chief of Staff-PCTC
A Sec. Austere	Panadaro, DILG
Atty Pablo	Pardiñes, Executive Officer to the Office of the Deputy Director for Special Investigative Service, NBI
Ms Ritzie Ann	Queza, NAPOLCOM
Mr Dennis	Ramos, Investigator, Interpol-NBI
PSI Nelvin M	Ricohermoso, DPCR-PNP
Atty Golda	Roma OIC, Policy, Research and Planning Office-CFO
Ms Maria Lourdes M	Salcedo, Third Secretary and Vice Consul, Embassy of the Philippines (Canberra)
Ms Cherry C	Sampaga, NAPOLCOM
Comr Celia	Sanidad-Leones, NAPOLCOM
Ms Margie	Sariento, UN Office-DFA
Ms Lani	Sarmiento, Social Worker-DSWD
Ms Noemi y	Seltzer, Political Affairs Officer-US Embassy
Atty Angelica	Somera, Chief, Violence Against Women and Children Div. (VAWCD) NBI
Ms Molly	Stephenson, Assistant Cultural Affairs, US Embassy
Ms Rebecca	Tailby, visiting international expert (Canberra)
Ms Blandie	Teaño, NAPOLCOM
Prof Jorge	Tigno, Faculty Member, Pol Sci Dept , UP Diliman
PCI Ildebrandi	Usana, Family Child & Development-PNP
Ms Cherry Joy	Veniles, Technical Officer-CFO



National Crime Prevention Plan 2003  
 Progress report dated 24 October 2000  
 Progress report dated 28 February 2001  
 Progress report dated 24 April 2001  
 Progress report dated 15 December 2001  
 Progress report dated 20 June 2002  
 Project proposal, establishment of IAEC dated August 1999  
 Project Terminal Report  
 Summary Proceedings of a training workshop on the preparation of guidelines for cooperation  
 between prosecution and law enforcement agencies

Report: Completion of the DFA component on a curriculum for basic training for Foreign  
 Service officers

### **PCTC**

After activity report November 2002  
 Annual Accomplishment Report 2002  
 Contract, statement of work UNOPS/PCTC dated 24 June 2000  
 Database follow-up 2001 report  
 Data coding sheet  
 Database configuration  
 Database instruction manual  
 Database reports  
 Database staff function list  
 IT hardware inventory  
 Organisation chart  
 Progress/Update report dated May 31 2001  
 Report disposition  
 Report on Seminar workshop 12 September 2001  
 Report on Seminar workshop 20 July 2000

### **PHILIPPINES NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)**

Family Crime Prevention Program Project Happy document  
 Strategic Action Plan progress report  
 Strategies addressing Trafficking in Women and Children report  
 Project progress report dated 8 June 2001

### **SENIOR GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP**

Covenant adopting National Strategy dated 21 April 2003  
 National Strategy to address Trafficking in Persons and People Smuggling

**UNICRI**

Contract – UNICRI and ISDS

Correspondence – UNICRI and ISDS (n=4)

Draft report ‘A Survey on Trafficking and Smuggling in Human Beings From the Philippines and the Involvement of Organized Crime Groups: Examining the Experiences and Perspectives of Victims and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)’

Draft report ‘A cross-analysis Report into Smuggling and Trafficking between the Philippines and Australia’

Draft report ‘Trafficking of Filipino Women to Japan: Examining the Experiences and Perspectives of Victims and Government Experts’

Draft report ‘Trafficking of Filipino Women to Malaysia: Examining the Experiences and Perspectives of Victims, Governmental and NGO experts’

Draft report ‘Illegal Practices and Criminal Networks involved in the Smuggling of Filipinos to Italy’

Draft report ‘Trafficking in Human Beings from the Philippines: A survey of government experts and law enforcement case files’

Draft discussion paper ‘United Nations Organised Crime Assessment Survey: Japanese Yakusa.

Draft discussion paper. United Nations Transnational Organised Crime Assessment Survey: South East Asian Organised Crime (SEAOC) groups

Mission Report Manila, (1-11 September 2000)

Project Research Activities Final Report

Report on the Research Experts meeting 18-19 March, 2002

**UNODC**

Acknowledgment of US funding dated 15 January 2001

Correspondence UNODC/ US dated

- 18 July 2000

Briefing Note UNODC/G Holliday (US State dept) dated 12 July 2001

Budget revision justifications dated

- 2 April 2001

- 6 April 2001

Financial reconciliation, project funds

Inter-Office memoranda/Notes for file

Letter of Agreement (and general conditions) UNODC/UNOPS dated 4 February 2000

Project document FS/PHI/R05

Project document FS/PHI/01/R05

Project Progress Report (January-June 2000)

Project Progress Report (July-December 2000)

Project Progress report (January-June 2001)

Project Progress report (July-December 2001)

Project Progress Report (January-June 2002)  
Project Progress Report (July-December 2002)  
Rapid Assessment Report September 1999  
Mission Report, Manila (14 – 27 July 2000)  
Mission Report, Manila (1-10 Sept 2000), dated 12 September 2000  
Mission Report, Manila (31 May – 9 June 2001) dated 20 June 2001  
Mission Report, Manila, (9-14 September 2001) dated 5 October 2001  
Mission Report, Manila (16-21 March 2002) dated 25 March 2002  
Mission Report, Manila (27 March – 7 April 2000) dated 12 April 2000  
Mission Report, Manila (10 –14 September 2001)

### **UNOPS**

Progress payment authorisations dated

- 26 July 1999
- 29 May 2000
- 16 August 2001
- 24 September 2001
- 23 October 2001
- 25 July 2002

## **Annex 4. Evaluation Questions and Performance Indicators**

### **Objective 1.**

**To strengthen government agencies' knowledge of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organised crime, and to improve agency coordination.**

#### **Evaluation question 1a**

Was government agencies' knowledge of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organised crime strengthened?

#### **Evaluation question 1b**

Was government agency coordination improved?

#### **Evaluation question 1c**

To what extent were proposed activities likely to achieve Objective 1?

### **Output 1.1**

A rapid assessment study on smuggling and trafficking in human beings in the Philippines carried out and provided to the Government.

#### **Evaluation question 1.1a**

Was the rapid assessment study on smuggling and trafficking in human beings in the Philippines completed in a timely manner?

#### **Evaluation question 1.1b**

Was the rapid assessment study on smuggling and trafficking in human beings in the Philippines provided to government?

#### **Evaluation question 1.1c**

What is the government's view on the adequacy and appropriateness of the rapid assessment study on smuggling and trafficking in human beings in the Philippines?

**Activities 1.1**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
1.1.1	Conduct a desk review of trafficking in human beings, particularly on national and regional aspects.	UNICRI (AIC)	<b>June 2000</b>
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- completion of desk review</li> <li>- time taken and date of completion of desk review</li> <li>- adequacy of desk review</li> </ul>			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

1.1.2	Conduct an assessment mission and prepare a rapid assessment report on trafficking in human beings in the Philippines.	CICP UNICRI (AIC) Government	<b>June 2000</b>
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- completion of assessment mission</li> <li>- Date of completion of mission</li> <li>- completion of rapid assessment report</li> <li>- time taken and date of completion of assessment report</li> <li>- adequacy of assessment report</li> </ul>			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

### Inputs 1.1:

(1) Government:

- Relevant data and information on government agencies' activities
- Premises and local transportation

(1) CICP/UNICRI:

- 1 international consultant (1 w/m, 18 days DSA & Travel)
- 1 CICP staff (9 days DSA & Travel)
- 2 UNICRI staff (2x 14 days DSA & Travel)
- 1 UNICRI (AIC) staff (1 w/m, 13 days DSA & Travel)
- 1 UNICRI staff (4 days DSA & Travel to Vienna)
- 1 national consultant

#### Evaluation question 1.1.1

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

ODCCP/CICP/UNICRI/Government advice

#### Evaluation question 1.1.2

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

**Output 1.2**

A coordination mechanism (“Inter-Agency Executive Committee”-IAEC) for addressing trafficking in human beings in the Philippines supported, and related functions and procedures of Government agencies harmonized.

**Evaluation question 1.2a**

Was the IAEC established in a timely manner?

**Evaluation question 1.2b**

Is the IAEC supported?

**Evaluation question 1.2c**

Is the membership of the IAEC appropriate?

**Evaluation question 1.2d**

Were related functions of government agencies harmonised?

**Activities 1.2**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
1.2.1	Assist with the development of IAEC, based on a Memorandum of Agreement, including mandates, terms of reference, tasks, level of representation, agency responsibility and inputs, and prepare detailed IAEC work plans.	Project Coordinator/ Government (IAEC)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Adequacy of MOA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- mandates</li> <li>- TOR</li> <li>- Tasks</li> <li>- Level of representation</li> <li>- Agency responsibilities and inputs</li> </ul> Time taken and date of completion of detailed IAEC work plans Adequacy, appropriateness of detailed IAEC work plans			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

1.2.2	Carry out regular coordination meetings and monitoring of policy implementation by the member agencies of the IAEC.	Project Coordinator/ Government (IAEC)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Date of first meeting			
Number, frequency of and attendance at meetings			
Number, frequency and adequacy of monitoring activities			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

1.2.3	Prepare an analysis of anti-trafficking practices and procedures of relevant agencies and bodies. Draft and implement recommendations on improved cooperation.	Project Coordinator/ Government (IAEC)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Completion of analysis			
Time taken and date of completion of analysis			
Adequacy of analysis, including number of relevant agencies analysed			
Adequacy and appropriateness of recommendations			
Proportion of recommendations implemented			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

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**Inputs 1.2:**

## (1) Government:

- Regular participation of IAEC members in coordination meetings
- Information on Government agencies' activities

## (b) CICP:

- CICP staff (3times x 5days DSA & Travel)
- 1 national consultant (Project Coordinator) (6 w/m x 50%)
- Meetings cost: conference facilities, printing, and hospitality.

**Evaluation question 1.2.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

CICP/Government advice

**Evaluation question 1.2.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

### Output 1.3

Review, including recommendations on how to develop further, the Shared Government Information System (SGISM), particularly concerning information related to trafficking in human beings.

### Evaluation question 1.3

Was the review and recommendations on how to develop further the Shared Government Information System (SGISM), particularly concerning information related to trafficking in human beings completed in a timely manner?

### Activity 1.3

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
1.3.1	Prepare a review on the function of relevant SGISM databases, particularly related to trafficking in human beings, and recommendations on assistance in its further development and implementation.	CICP /Subcontractor	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Review completed			
Time taken and date of completion of review			
Adequacy, appropriateness of review			
Adequacy and appropriateness of recommendations			
Number of recommendations implemented			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

**Inputs 1.3:**

CICP:

- Selection of national institution and issuance of a subcontract, with the concurrence of the Philippine Government.

**Evaluation question 1.3.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

CICP/government advice

**Evaluation question 1.3.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

### Output 1.4

A database containing information from NGOs on trafficking in human beings, including organized criminal groups.

### Evaluation question 1.4

Was the database containing information from NGOs on trafficking in human beings, including organized criminal groups established in a timely manner?

### Activities 1.4

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
1.4.1	Organize meetings of experts (3 days, Metro Manila) to identify data and information from NGOs on the involvement of organized crime groups in trafficking practices, including preparation of a questionnaire for local NGOs.	UNICRI (AIC) /Subcontractor	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Meeting conducted Date of meeting Number of relevant agency experts attending Completion of questionnaire Time taken and date of finalisation of questionnaire Adequacy, appropriateness of questionnaire			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

1.4.2	Disseminate a questionnaire and analyse results.	UNICRI (AIC) /Subcontractor	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Time taken and date(s) of dissemination of questionnaire			
Number of relevant NGOs questionnaire disseminated to			
Proportion of relevant NGOs returning completed questionnaire			
Time taken and date of last questionnaire return			
Adequacy and appropriateness of analyses undertaken			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

1.4.3	Create and maintain a database to host the results of the NGO survey.	UNICRI (AIC) /Subcontractor	as of 2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Creation of database			
Time taken and date of creation of database			
Population of database			
Time taken and date of population of database			
Quality of database maintenance			

**Inputs 1.4:**

## UNICRI:

- Selection of national research institute and issuance of subcontract (purchase of computer and software)
- 1 UNICRI staff (5 days DSA & Travel)
- 1 AIC staff (5 days DSA & Travel)

**Evaluation question 1.4.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

UNICRI/Government advice

**Evaluation question 1.4.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

**Output 1.5**

A survey of training needs and development of a curriculum related to trafficking in human beings for consulate staff and social workers fielded abroad

**Evaluation question 1.5a**

Was the survey of training needs for consulate staff and social workers fielded abroad completed in a timely manner?

**Evaluation question 1.5b**

Were curricula for consulate staff and social workers fielded abroad, related to trafficking in human beings, developed in a timely manner?

**Activity 1.5**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
1.5.1	Prepare a survey on training needs and development of a curriculum related to trafficking in human beings for consulate staff and social workers fielded abroad	CICP /Government (DFA, DSWD, OWWA, POEA)	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Completion of survey Time taken and date of completion of survey Coverage, adequacy of survey Development of curriculum Time taken and date of completion of curriculum Adequacy, appropriateness of curriculum			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

**Inputs 1.5:**

(a) Government:

- Information on Government agencies' activities

(b) CICP:

- 1 national consultant (1.5 w/m)

**Evaluation question 1.5.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

CICP/Government advice

**Evaluation question 1.5.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

**OBJECTIVE 2**

**To strengthen the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organized crime.**

**Evaluation question 2a**

Was the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to *prevent* cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to organised crime, strengthened?

**Evaluation question 2b**

Was the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to *investigate* cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to organised crime, strengthened?

**Evaluation question 2c**

Was the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to *prosecute* cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to organised crime, strengthened?

**Evaluation question 2d**

To what extent were proposed activities likely to achieve objective 2?

**Output 2.1**

A workshop held with key prosecutors and law enforcement officers to formulate guidelines on investigation and prosecution of cases related to trafficking in human beings.

**Evaluation question 2.1a**

Was the workshop with key prosecutors and law enforcement officers conducted?

**Evaluation question 2.1b**

Were guidelines on *investigation* of cases related to trafficking in human beings developed in a timely manner?

**Evaluation question 2.1c**

Were guidelines on *prosecution* of cases related to trafficking in human beings developed in a timely manner?

**Activities 2.1**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
2.1.1	Organize a workshop with 5 prosecutors and 15 law enforcement officers to prepare guidelines for cooperation between prosecutors and law enforcement agencies and proposals for the establishment of a model coordination mechanism between prosecutors and law enforcement officers for cases on trafficking in human beings and related issues.	CICP/ Government (DOJ, PNP, POEA and other pertinent agencies)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
<p>Workshop conducted</p> <p>Date of workshop</p> <p>Number and appropriateness of prosecutors attending</p> <p>Number and appropriateness of law enforcement officers attending</p> <p>Preparation of guidelines</p> <p>Time taken and date of completion of guidelines</p> <p>Adequacy, appropriateness of cooperation guidelines</p> <p>Time taken and date(s) of dissemination of guidelines</p> <p>Coverage of guideline dissemination</p> <p>Proposals for model coordination mechanism completed</p> <p>Time taken and date of completion of model mechanism</p> <p>Adequacy, appropriateness of model mechanism</p>			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

**Inputs 2.1:**

(a) Government:

- Selection of participants in the workshop (officers)
- Conference/training facilities, travel/hospitality of local participants, national travel for consultants

(b) CICP:

- Group training cost

**Evaluation question 2.1.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

CICP/Government advice

**Evaluation question 2.1.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

**Output 2.2**

300 law enforcement officers trained on how better to investigate cases of trafficking in human beings, with a focus on the involvement of organized criminal groups.

***Evaluation question 2.2***

Were 300 law enforcement officers trained on how to better investigate cases of trafficking in human beings, with a focus on the involvement of organized criminal groups?

**Activities 2.2**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
2.2.1	Prepare an inventory of existing legislation and regulations with regard to criminal activities related to trafficking in human beings for training of law enforcement officers and prosecutors.	CICP, Government (DOJ)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Preparation of inventory			
Time taken and date of completion of inventory			
Completeness and accuracy of inventory			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

2.2.2	Based on 2.2.1, draft, reproduce and disseminate a manual on existing legislation and regulations for law enforcement officers and prosecutors.	CICP/ Project Coordinator, Government (DOJ, PNP)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Reproduction of manual			
Time taken and date of completion of manual			
Adequacy, appropriateness of manual			
Time taken and date(s) of manual dissemination			
Coverage of dissemination of manuals			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

2.2.3	Evaluate and prepare a report on the level of expertise of law enforcement agencies relative to trafficking in human beings, including existing curricula and training courses.	CICP/ Subcontractor, Government (DOJ, NBI, BI, PPSC, PNP)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Evaluation conducted			
Time taken and date of completion of evaluation			
Evaluation report prepared			
Time taken and date of completion of report			
Adequacy, appropriateness of report			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

2.2.4	Organize a basic one-day training and awareness-raising programme for 300 law enforcement officers from Metro Manila and the regions (6 days at 50 persons).	CICP/ Subcontractor/ Government (PNP, DOJ, PPSC)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Training and awareness program			
Date of program			
Number of metro law enforcement officers attending			
Adequacy, appropriateness of training			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

2.2.5	Prepare training material for an advanced training programme for law enforcement officers on organized crime aspects in trafficking in human beings.	CICP/ Subcontractor/ Government ( DOJ, PNP, PPSC)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Training material prepared			
Time taken and date of completion of training material			
Adequacy, appropriateness of materials			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

**Inputs 2.2:**

(a) Government:

- Selection of officers to participate in training programmes
- Provision of conference/training facilities, travel/hospitality of local participants, national travel for consultants

(b) CICP:

- 1 national consultant (2 w/m)
- Group training cost

***Evaluation question 2.2.1***

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

CICP/Government advice

**Evaluation question 2.2.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

**Output 2.3**

Assessment of the capacity of the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) for collecting trafficking related data and the need for external support.

**Evaluation question 2.3**

Was the assessment of the capacity of the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) for collecting trafficking related data and the need for external support completed in a timely manner?

**Activities 2.3**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
2.3.1	Assess the present stage of the establishment of the PCTC database on organized crime, particularly as it relates to trafficking in human beings and its potential function for data collection under the Global Programme Against Trafficking in Human Beings.	CICP /Government (PCTC)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
Performance indicators			
Assessment completed			
Time taken and date of completion of assessment			
Adequacy, appropriateness of assessment			
Conformity of the database with CICP's participating states' database			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

**Inputs 2.3:**

(a) Government:

- Information by PCTC on matters related to its database

(b) CICP

- Selection of institution and issuance of a subcontract, with the concurrence of the Philippine Government
- CICP staff member (5 days DSA plus Travel)

**Evaluation question 2.3.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

CICP/Government advice

**Evaluation question 2.3.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

**Output 2.4**

A report, including recommendations on how to improve the protection and support system for victims and witnesses of cases on trafficking in human beings, prepared and submitted to the Government.

**Evaluation question 2.4a**

Was a report and recommendations on how to improve the protection and support system for victims and witnesses of cases on trafficking in human beings, prepared in a timely manner?

**Evaluation question 2.4b**

Was the report submitted to government?

**Evaluation question 2.4c**

What is the government's view on the adequacy and appropriateness of the report?

**Activity 2.4**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
2.4.1	Conduct a study on the present state of victim/witness protection in cases of trafficking in human beings and prepare recommendations, including for the improvement of procedural provisions related to the protection of victims and witnesses.	CICP	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Study completed Time taken and date of completion of study Adequacy, appropriateness of report Adequacy, appropriateness of recommendations Number of recommendations implemented			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

**Inputs 2.4:**

## (a) CICP:

- 1 staff ( 10 days DSA plus Travel)
- 1 national consultant (2 w/m)

**Evaluation question 2.4.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

CICP/Government advice

**Evaluation question 2.4.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

**OBJECTIVE 3**

**To improve international cooperation in cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to transnational organized crime.**

**Evaluation question 3a**

Was international cooperation in cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to transnational organized crime improved?

**Evaluation question 3b**

To what extent were proposed activities likely to achieve Objective 3?

**Output 3.1**

A cross-analysis report on: a) interregional trafficking routes emanating from the Philippines; b) trafficking patterns; and c) the national/international institutional responses to this phenomenon, is prepared and provided to the Government.

**Evaluation question 3.1a**

Was the cross-national report on: a) interregional trafficking routes emanating from the Philippines; b) trafficking patterns; and c) the national/international institutional responses to this phenomenon prepared in a timely manner?

**Evaluation question 3.1b**

Was the cross-national report on: a) interregional trafficking routes emanating from the Philippines; b) trafficking patterns; and c) the national/international institutional responses to this phenomenon provided to government?

**Evaluation question 3.1c**

What is the government's view on the adequacy and appropriateness of the report?

**Activities 3.1**

No.	Activity	Responsibility	Time Frame
3.1.1	Organize a 3-day meeting of experts in Manila with a local research expert and three local experts from three destination countries: Japan, Malaysia and Hong Kong [-to be confirmed]. Prepare a precise list of data to be collected.	UNICRI/ subcontractor	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Meeting conducted  Date of meeting  Number and appropriateness of experts attending  ‘Precise list’ prepared  Time taken and date of completion of List  Adequacy, appropriateness of List			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

3.1.2	Collect governmental and NGO documentation in Japan, Malaysia and Hong Kong [-to be confirmed], on trafficking in human beings from the Philippines, focussing on the involvement of organized crime groups.	UNICRI Subcontractor	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Information collected			
Time taken and date of completion of collection			
Coverage, adequacy of information			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

3.1.3	Collect information on the involvement of organized crime in the smuggling and trafficking of Filipinos in Australia (AIC), and in Western Europe (UNICRI).	UNICRI	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Information collected			
Time taken and date of completion of collection			
Coverage, adequacy of information			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

3.1.4	Collect texts of international/multilateral/bilateral agreements related to the Philippines.	UNICRI / subcontractor Government (DFA)	2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Time taken and date of completion of collection			
Coverage of texts collected			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

3.1.5	Conduct in-depth interviews in the Philippines with key informants, mostly law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and foreign service officials on the main routes used by organized crime groups to traffic in persons.	UNICRI/ subcontractor	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicator</i>			
Time taken and date of completion of interviews			
Number, coverage, quality of interviews			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

3.1.6	Assess the capacity of IGOs and NGOs to respond to transnational criminal activities for each route; highlight gaps in effective responses and identify “best practices”.	UNICRI / subcontractor	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Assessment completed			
Time taken and date of completion of assessment			
Adequacy, appropriateness of assessment			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

3.1.7	Conduct a cross analysis of existing case studies and data provided by previous research activities under this project.	UNICRI/ subcontractor	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter 2000
<i>Performance indicators</i>			
Cross analysis completed			
Time taken and date of completion of cross analysis			
Adequacy, appropriateness of analyses undertaken			

June 2003 status			
Finalised, N.F.A.	Finalised - ongoing	Not completed	Abandoned

**Inputs 3.1:**

## (a) Government:

- Data and information on government agencies' activities
- Premises and local transportation

## (b) UNICRI:

- Selection of national research institute and issuance of subcontract
- Meetings of regional experts ( 3 international consultants, each, 1 w/m plus 3 days DSA & Travel)
- 1 UNICRI staff
- 1 UNICRI (AIC) staff

**Evaluation question 3.1.1**

Were inputs provided according to specifications?

*Performance indicators*

UNICRI/Government advice

**Evaluation question 3.1.2**

Were inputs appropriate for the proposed tasks?

*Performance indicator*

Evaluator judgement

## ADDITIONAL INPUTS

### National Project Coordination (NPC)

National project coordination comprised responsibility for the operational management of the project, and the day-to-day business of the project, including planning, initiating and managing project activities.

1. Operational management of the project according to the project document.

#### **Evaluation question NPC1**

Was national operational management in accord with the project document?

*Performance indicator*

Level of concordance

2. Selection, recruitment and supervision of local project administrative staff.

#### **Evaluation question NPC2**

Were the selection, recruitment and supervision of local project administrative staff efficient, effective and appropriate?

*Performance indicators*

Appropriateness of selection process and documentation

Level of local approval for process

Level of external (UN and international consultants) approval for process

3. Supervision and coordination of all local administrative matters, including setting up and running a local office for the project, and providing assistance to international consultants, as required.

#### **Evaluation question NPC3a**

Was the supervision and coordination all local administrative matters efficient, effective and appropriate?

*Performance indicators*

Level of local approval

Level of external (UN and international consultants) approval

#### **Evaluation question NPC3b**

Was the establishment of a local office for the project timely?

*Performance indicator*

Date of establishment

**Evaluation question NPC3c**

Was the day to day running of the local office efficient, effective and appropriate?

*Performance indicators*

Appropriate management practices employed

Appropriate staffing levels and qualifications

Level of local approval

Level of external (UN and international consultants) approval

**Evaluation question NPC3d**

Was the assistance to international consultants efficient, effective and appropriate?

*Performance indicator*

Level of international consultants' approval

4. Provision of administrative supervision and substantive input to the work of the IAEC, including its financial statements.

**Evaluation question NPC4**

Was administrative supervision and substantive input to, including into the IAEC's financial statements efficient, effective and appropriate?

*Performance indicator*

Level of IAEC approval

5. Liaison with Philippine institutions, relevant professionals in the criminal justice fields, and relevant national and international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

**Evaluation question NPC5a**

**Was the level of liaison with Philippines' institutions and relevant professionals in the criminal justice field appropriate?**

*Performance indicator*

Institutions', professionals' views

**Evaluation question NPC5b**

Was the level of liaison with international governmental and non-governmental agencies appropriate?

*Performance indicator*

National and International governmental and non-governmental agency views

6. Implementation of specific tasks of the project, as indicated in the project document.

**Evaluation question NPC6**

Were the specified tasks implemented in an appropriate and timely manner?

***Performance indicators***

Concordance with specifications

Completion dates

7. Prepare, update and regularly revise the project work plan in cooperation with ODCCP/CICP, UNICRI and UNOPS

**Evaluation question NPC7**

Were updates and revisions to the project work plan (undertaken in cooperation with ODCCP/CICP; UNICRI and UNOPS) completed efficiently, effectively and in a timely manner?

***Performance indicators***

Number of required updates/revisions submitted

Number submitted by due dates

Number submitted and accepted without further revision

8. Prepare and ensure timely submission of the Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) and any other required progress reports prepared by project personnel or experts, as required.

**Evaluation question NPC8**

Were submissions of the Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) and other progress reports appropriately prepared and submitted in an appropriate and timely manner?

***Performance indicator***

Number of required reports submitted

Number submitted by due dates

Number submitted and accepted without further revision

## **CICP/ODCCP and UNICRI (UN)**

CICP/ODCCP and UNICRI were to provide guidance and advice to the national project coordinator on all aspects of the assistance being provided and they were to monitor project implementation.

### **Evaluation question UN1**

Was the level of guidance and advice provided to the national coordinator timely and appropriate?

*Performance indicators*

National coordinator's views

CICP/ODCCP, UNICRI views

Adequacy of project documentation

Evaluator judgement

### **Evaluation question UN2**

Was the monitoring of project implementation by CICP/ODCCP and UNICRI effective and appropriate?

*Performance indicators*

National coordinator's views

CICP/ODCCP, UNICRI views

Adequacy of project documentation

Donor countries' views

Evaluator judgement



**Financial management (FM)**

The uniqueness of the project obviates conventional cost-effectiveness analyses. Accordingly, for the purpose of this evaluation, they have been replaced by measures of the timeliness and appropriateness of provision and disbursement of funds.

**Evaluation question FM1**

Were funds forwarded in a timely manner?

*Performance indicator*

Intervals between scheduled payments/payment requests and dates of receipt

**Evaluation question FM2**

Were received funds disbursed in an appropriate manner?

*Performance indicators*

Appropriate financial governance standards

Completeness/accuracy of financial records

**Evaluation question FM3**

Were disbursed funds within budget?

*Performance indicator*

Proportion of budgeted funds disbursed, by activity

## **Sustainability (S)**

Sustainability measures the likelihood of actual or expected benefits from the project continuing. In general, changes arising out of projects are intended to be ongoing, however future events, despite the level of project success achieved, might be outside the control of project managers. Accordingly, results of assessing sustainability do not necessarily reflect the quality and appropriateness of the design or management of the project to date.

Factors which are commonly identified as impacting on sustainability and evaluation questions arising are:

### **Institutional**

#### **Evaluation question S1**

To what extent are current institutional arrangements for the management, monitoring and future carriage of the project appropriate?

*Indicator*

Evaluator judgement

#### **Evaluation question S2**

Are any changes to current institutional arrangements envisioned?

Indicators

National project coordinator/IAEC advice

UNDCCP/CICP/UNICRI advice

#### **Evaluation question S3.**

If changes are envisioned, to what extent and how, are the envisioned changes likely to impact on changes arising from the project continuing?

*Indicator*

Evaluator judgement

### **Social**

#### **Evaluation question S4**

What are and to what extent are current social factors contributing to or detracting from the likelihood of benefits of the project continuing?

Indicators

National project coordinator/IAEC/local participants' advice

#### **Evaluation question S5**

To what extent are current social factors likely to prevail in the short to medium term?

*Indicator*

National project coordinator/IAEC/local participants' advice

## **Political**

### **Evaluation question S6**

What is the current level of political support for the project?

#### *Indicators*

National project coordinator/IAEC advice

Documentary evidence of support

### **Evaluation question S7**

To what extent is the current level of political support for the project likely to prevail in the short to medium term?

#### *Indicator*

National project coordinator/IAEC advice

## **Managerial**

### **Evaluation question S8**

To what extent are current managerial arrangements contributing to or detracting from the likelihood of benefits of the project continuing?

#### *Indicators*

National project coordinator/IAEC/local participants' advice

Evaluator judgement

### **Evaluation question S9**

Are changes to the current managerial arrangements envisioned?

#### *Indicator*

National project coordinator/IAEC advice

### **Evaluation question S10**

If changes are envisioned, to what extent and how, are the envisioned changes likely to impact on the benefits of the project continuing?

#### *Indicator*

Evaluator judgement

## **Financial viability**

### **Evaluation question S11**

Are current financial arrangements appropriate for the objectives/tasks to be maintained?

#### *Indicators*

National project coordinator/IAEC/local participants' advice

Evaluator judgement

## **Financial stability**

### **Evaluation question S12**

To what extent are ongoing funds guaranteed or likely?

*Indicator*

National project coordinator/IAEC/local participants' advice

UNDCCP/CICP/UNICRI advice

## Annex 5. Summary table of results

**Table 1: Achievements of activities/outputs Immediate objective 1.**

<b>Immediate objective: Strengthen government agencies' knowledge of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating crime, and to improve agency coordination</b>						
<b>Output: 1.1 Rapid assessment study</b>						
		<b>Achieved</b>	<b>On time</b>	<b>Over time</b>	<b>Grossly over time<sup>9</sup></b>	<b>Quality</b>
1.1.1	Desk review of trafficking	✓	✓			High
1.1.2	Rapid Assessment report	✓	✓			High
<b>Output 1.2: IAEC coordination mechanism</b>						
1.2.1	Establish IAEC	✓	✓			High
1.2.2	IAEC meetings	✓	✓			Low
1.2.3	Analysis of anti-trafficking agency practices	✓		✓		Moderate
<b>Output 1.3: Review and recommendations on development of SGISM</b>						
	Review SGISM	×				
<b>Output 1.4: Establishment of an NGO database</b>						
1.4.1	Meetings of NGOs, experts	✓		✓		High
1.4.2	Disseminate NGO q'naire	✓		✓		High
1.4.3	Creation, maintenance of NGO database	✓		✓		Moderate
<b>Output 1.5: Survey of training needs, development of curriculum, OS staff</b>						
1.5.1	Survey, curriculum	✓		✓		Moderate
<b>Summary measure: Immediate Objective achieved?</b>		✓		✓		Moderate

<sup>9</sup> From original timetable – extensions subsequently negotiated

**Table 2: Achievements of activities/outputs Immediate objective 2.**

<b>Immediate Objective: To strengthen institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to combating organised crime.</b>						
<b>Output 2.1: A workshop held with key prosecutors and law enforcement officers to formulate guidelines on investigation and prosecution of cases related to trafficking in human beings</b>						
		<b>Achieved</b>	<b>On time</b>	<b>Over time</b>	<b>Grossly over time<sup>10</sup></b>	<b>Quality</b>
2.1.1	Workshop, proposals for coordination	✓		✓		High
<b>Output 2.2: 300 law enforcement officers trained on how better to investigate cases of trafficking, with a focus on the involvement of organised crime</b>						
2.2.1	Inventory of existing legislation	✓		✓		High
2.2.2	Produce, disseminate manual	✓			✓	High
2.2.3	Evaluate, report levels of expertise of law enforcement agencies	½ ✓			✓	?
2.2.4	Workshop for 300 LAOs	✓			✓	High
2.2.5	Preparation of training material for advanced programme for LAOs	×				
<b>Output 2.3: Assessment of the capacity of the Philippine Center on Transnational crime (PCTC) for collecting trafficking related data and the need for external support</b>						
2.3.1	Assessment, report	✓			✓	Low, High <sup>11</sup>
<b>Output 2.4: A report, including recommendations on how to improve the protection and support for victims and witnesses of cases on trafficking in human beings, prepared and submitted to government</b>						
2.4.1	Study, report	✓		✓		High
<b>Supplementary activity: Workshop for government agencies/PCTC to develop common worksheet, mechanism for providing data</b>						
	Workshop, development of mechanism, MOU	✓	✓			Low

<sup>10</sup> Form original timetable – extensions subsequently negotiated

<sup>11</sup> Initial report from PCTC deficient, subsequent Rhomberg (UNODC), others High

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Supplementary activity: Field research collection of cases			
Collection of data. Enter on database	✓	✓	Moderate
Summary measure: Immediate objective achieved?	$\frac{1}{2}$ ✓	✓	Moderate

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**Table 3: Achievements of activities/outputs Immediate objective 3.**

<b>Immediate objective: to improve international cooperation in cases of trafficking in human beings, particularly as it relates to transnational organised crime</b>						
<b>Output 3.1: A cross-analysis report on a) inter-regional trafficking routes emanating from the Philippines; b) trafficking patterns; and c) the national/international institutional responses to this phenomenon, is prepared and provided to government</b>						
		<b>Achieved</b>	<b>On time</b>	<b>Over time</b>	<b>Grossly over time<sup>12</sup></b>	<b>Quality</b>
3.1.1	3-day international experts meeting	✓			✓	High
3.1.2	Collect Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong government, NGO documentation on trafficking	✓			✓	Low
3.1.3	Collect information on involvement of organised crime, Australia, Europe	✓			✓	Moderate
3.1.4	Collect texts of international/bilateral Philippines related agreements	×				
3.1.5	In-depth survey informants in Philippines on main trafficking routes	✓			✓	Moderate
3.1.6	Assess capacity of IGOs, NGOs to respond	×				
3.1.7	Conduct cross-analysis of case studies and data provided	✓			✓	Low
<b>Summary measure: Immediate objective achieved?</b>						
×						

<sup>12</sup> Form original timetable – Extensions subsequently negotiated

## Annex 6. Summary Assessment

### *United Nations International Drug Control Programme*

#### EVALUATION SUMMARY

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<b>Project title, number:</b>	Coalitions against trafficking in human beings in the Philippines FS/PHI/OO/RO5
<b>Thematic area:</b>	Capacity Building
<b>Region:</b>	Philippines
<b>Project budget:</b>	US\$219,231 (extended to US\$269,231)
<b>Project duration:</b>	6 months extended to 21 months
<b>Executing Agency:</b>	Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP)
<b>Associated agencies:</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS); United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
<b>Type of evaluation:</b>	Terminal Evaluation
<b>Date of evaluation:</b>	June 2003

#### **Project description**

The “Coalitions against Trafficking in Human Beings in the Philippines - Phase 1” was a demonstration project of the Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings. At the national level, the project aimed at improving the effectiveness of law enforcement functions and criminal justice responses. The capacity of government institutions - law enforcement and prosecution, in particular – was intended to be strengthened, e.g. through the support of a national coordination mechanism, specialized databases, training, awareness raising and closer cooperation between law enforcement agencies and prosecution. The project aimed at improving the existing level of information, providing a tool for better policy planning and action by assessing trafficking flows and the involvement of organized crime groups therein. At the regional and international levels, the project promoted cooperation among key agencies of countries of origin, transit and destination. The formulation of related policies and recommendations was expected to result in strengthening joint action against transnational organized criminal aspects of trafficking in human beings. The project was carried out in close cooperation with the relevant national institutions, international agencies and NGOs active in this area. It will be followed up by a 18-month project (‘Coalitions - Phase 2’).

Three immediate objectives, 11 outputs and 26 activities were to be completed in six months.

### **Information on the evaluation**

Mr Paul Williams, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia was engaged in May 2003 to conduct a terminal (process and outcome) evaluation. Referred to a triangulated convergent validity evaluation, it comprised a desk review, and a mission to Manila, the Philippines, involving a roundtable of participating agencies and meetings with key agency informants. Supplementary meetings were held with donor countries, international experts and UN personnel. The evaluation was completed between 1 and 30 June 2003.

### **Findings and conclusions**

#### **Concept and design**

The concept appropriately addressed national objectives and priorities in increasing knowledge about the trafficking problem, in preventing, investigating and prosecuting trafficking and traffickers, particularly as it relates to organised criminal groups, and in increasing intra-Philippines and Philippines/other country cooperation. Similarly, the concept was consistent with the Global Programme Against Trafficking. It was intended to complement (precede) a second Phase, which address victim support matters. However, design features (relatively short time frame, modest budget, too many activities/ outputs and remote management and monitoring) were deficient.

#### **Implementation**

Implementation was hampered from its inception, largely due to political and climatic upheaval (three changes in government, including a *coup d'état* and monsoon flooding), but also due to the inherent design flaws. National Coordination was provided on a part time basis and the number and range of intended activities was beyond what could be reasonably expected within the relatively short time frame. Extensions beyond six months (to nine, then 12, then 21 months) severely stretched local capacity, given other competing commitments.

#### **Results**

Ultimately, 2 of the three immediate objectives, 10 of the 11 outputs and 21 of 28 activities were achieved, albeit mostly overdue and of low to moderate quality. Sustainability is threatened by the country's entrenched poverty and funding capacity. The political climate is unclear, with the new Act excluding three agencies which were integral to this Project, and elections due in 2004.

#### **Recommendations and lessons learned**

Twenty-seven recommendations were made and nine lessons learned were documented. The twenty-seven recommendations included five resolved during the evaluation, ten concerned actions and/ or decisions relating to similar projects in the Philippines and/ or the region, and twelve were project-specific. Briefly, the principal recommendation was that this Phase be considered completed and no further funds be extended. Concerning management and monitoring more generally, principal recommendations centered on the need for full time local coordination, and for remote management and monitoring to be avoided. Lessons learned covered much the same territory, but also addressed need for greater cultural awareness of

negotiation and bargaining skills, and local (un)familiarity with standard work plan, report construction.

**Follow-up**

The imminent commencement of the Phase 2 Project demands an 'urgent' reassessment of attached coordination, management and monitoring provisions.

*United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*

**Project Evaluation  
Summary assessment questionnaire**

This questionnaire is to be filled out by the evaluator or evaluation team and to be submitted to backstopping office. A copy should be provided to the Senior Evaluation Officer, Division for Operations and Analysis. A separate questionnaire should be filled out for each project encompassed by the evaluation. The information provided must be fully congruent with the contents of the evaluation report.

The purpose of the questionnaire is to provide information for UNODC's evaluation database. The information will be used to establish evaluation profiles which should give a quick and correct overview of the evaluation of individual projects and programmes. It will also be used for the purpose of analysing results across project evaluations to obtain a systematic picture of the overall performance of the Programme.

I. NUMBER AND TITLE OF PROJECT:

**FS/PHI/00/R05                      Coalitions against trafficking in human beings in the Philippines**

II. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

1. Please provide an assessment for all categories listed (including categories constituting headings) by ticking one of the boxes ranging from 0 to 5. The ratings from 0 to 5 are based on the following standard favor-to-disfavor scale:

- 5 - Outstanding, highly appropriate, much more than planned/expected, certain to materialise
- 4 - Very good, very appropriate, more than planned/expected, highly likely to materialise
- 3 - Good appropriate, as planned/expected, likely to materialise
- 2 - Fair, less appropriate, less than planned/expected, less likely to materialise
- 1 - Unsatisfactory, not appropriate, far below plans/expectations, unlikely to materialise
- 0 - Cannot determine, not applicable

2. If a category has been significant (as a cause or effect) in relation to the overall quality and/or performance of the project please tick the "S" column (if significant) or the H

“column (if highly significant).

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
<b>OVERALL QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT</b>					✓			
<b>I. PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN<sup>13</sup></b>					✓			
1. Project document (overall clarity, logic and coherence)							✓	
2. Identification/analysis of problem addressed by project.						✓		
3. Project strategy (overall assessment) <sup>14</sup> .		✓			✓			
4. Crime control objective.						✓		
5. Immediate objective(s) (Appropriateness, Obtainability) <sup>15</sup> .						✓		
6. Achievement indicators. <sup>16</sup>	✓			✓				
7. Base-line study/arrangements for base-line study. <sup>17</sup>		✓			✓			
8. Outputs (compared to cost effective alternatives)						✓		
9. Activities (compared to cost effective alternatives) <sup>18</sup>					✓			
10. Inputs (compared to cost effective alternatives) <sup>19</sup> .					✓			
11. Executing modality and managerial arrangements. <sup>20</sup>	✓				✓			
12. Identification and assessment of risks <sup>21</sup> .	✓				✓			
13. Prior obligations and prerequisites. <sup>22</sup>		✓		✓				
14. Workplan/planned project duration <sup>23</sup> .	✓				✓			
15. Budget <sup>24</sup> .	✓				✓			

<sup>13</sup> Concept appropriate, design too ambitious

<sup>14</sup> Too many activities for budget, management arrangements

<sup>15</sup> Rating dragged down on ‘obtainability’ grounds

<sup>16</sup> Other than ‘timeframe due’, very little evidence of indicators

<sup>17</sup> Could have been conducted prior to commitment for overall project

<sup>18</sup> Too many within available duration, budget, management capacity

<sup>19</sup> Budget too low for range of activities

<sup>20</sup> Beyond capacity of local coordination structure for scale/scope of activities

<sup>21</sup> Risks identified, but no contingency plans for their eventuality evident

<sup>22</sup> Local coordination, IAEC prior obligations and prerequisites did not materialise in the manner intended

<sup>23</sup> Too many activities within available duration, absence of work plans for components

<sup>24</sup> Too many activities for available budget, ‘in-kind’ govt. contribution expected did not materialise to the extent envisioned

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
<b>II. Project Implementation:</b>	✓				✓			
1. Quality and timeliness of UNODC input <sup>25</sup>						✓		
2. Quality and timeliness of government inputs <sup>26</sup>	✓				✓			
3. Quality and timeliness of inputs by third parties <sup>27</sup>						✓		
4. Equipment *inappropriate in the sense of being premature and generous			✓					
5. Advisory/training services.						✓		
6. Project personnel.					✓			
7. Sub-contracting. <sup>28</sup>				✓				
8. Management of project. <sup>29</sup>					✓			
9. Project work plans. <sup>30</sup>	✓			✓				
10. Implementation activities. <sup>31</sup>						✓		
11. Monitoring and backstopping by UNODC HQ.					✓			
12. Monitoring and backstopping by UNOPS field office. <sup>32</sup>								
13. Monitoring and backstopping by executing agency. <sup>33</sup>					✓			
14. Monitoring and backstopping by government. <sup>34</sup>	✓			✓				
15. Government fulfilments.					✓			

<sup>25</sup> Too high reliance on veracity of govt. assessment of capacity, progress reports

<sup>26</sup> Beyond reasonable local coordination capacity, IAEC ineffective

<sup>27</sup> Refers to UNICRI

<sup>28</sup> Refers to PCTC subcontracting programming etc.

<sup>29</sup> Beyond reasonable capacity for scale/scope of activities

<sup>30</sup> Absence of work plans, those prepared not satisfactory

<sup>31</sup> Delays, appropriate standards not established early, carried through to execution

<sup>32</sup> No local UNOPS office/ no formal role

<sup>33</sup> 3 x changes to liaison personnel affected continuity, corporate knowledge

<sup>34</sup> Extreme levels of personnel turnover in IAEC, activity-specific agencies. Some evidence of intra-agency transfer of responsibility without satisfactory handover arrangements

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
<b>III. PROJECT RESULTS<sup>35</sup></b>					✓			
1. Timeliness of produced outputs <sup>36</sup>					✓			
2. Quantity of produced outputs. <sup>37</sup>						✓		
3. Quality of produced outputs. <sup>38</sup>					✓			
4. Outcome achievement/likely achievement of immediate objectives. <sup>39</sup>					✓			
5. Crime control impact achieved. <sup>40</sup>	✓			✓				
6. Crime control impact to be expected. <sup>41</sup>	✓				✓			
7. Likely sustainability of project results. <sup>42</sup>						✓		

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<sup>35</sup> Overall rating dragged down Research elements, + most elements missed timelines

<sup>36</sup> Almost all elements missed timelines

<sup>37</sup> Overall rating dragged down by Research elements

<sup>38</sup> Overall rating dragged down by Research elements

<sup>39</sup> Dragged down by Immediate Objective 3

<sup>40</sup> No evidence of reduction in Trafficking

<sup>41</sup> Threats will be highly significant impediments

<sup>42</sup> Will occur almost external to project

3. If external factors had an impact on project performance please tick the appropriate boxes: external factors impeded:   / promoted   project performance. The effect on project performance of this influence was significant:   / highly significant: . Please provide a short description of the nature of the external factor(s).

CFO withdrew from the project early in its implementation, and with like-minded agencies/individuals (some of which continued within the project), but external to the project, pursued other activities, resulting in the establishment of the Senior Government Working Group (which excluded NAPOLCOM – though NAPOLCOM attended meetings), in parallel to the IAEC, producing a National Strategy (which heavily ‘borrowed’ from the Strategic Plan, an output of the project), and culminating in the establishment of the Inter-Agency Council on Trafficking (which excludes NAPOLCOM, NBI and PCTC) under the new Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003. The Act prescribes project-like obligations on agencies.

The political upheavals and monsoon devastation greatly affected continuity.

4. Did the evaluation recommend to:
- a)  abandon the project
  - b)  continue/extend the project without modification
  - c)  continue/extend the project with minor modifications
  - d)  continue/extend the project with some modification
  - e)   continue/~~extend~~ the project (Phase 2) with extensive modification
  - f)  terminate the projects, as planned
5. If a modification of the project was recommended did the evaluation recommend a revision of: the crime control objective(s): \_\_\_\_\_, the immediate objective(s): \_\_\_\_\_, the outputs: \_\_\_\_\_, the activities: \_\_\_\_\_ or the inputs: \_\_\_\_\_ . Please tick as appropriate.

It is recommended that the project be redesigned into a new project.

Phase two should have a new local management and coordination structure and closer monitoring.

6. If the evaluation recommended that the project or significant elements of it be replicated please tick as appropriate: yes   / no .