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TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

AD/RAF/99/E06 Capacity Building Against Drug Trafficking
and Organized Crime in Southeastern Africa

Thematic area: Drug Control – Law Enforcement

Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The need for the project: At the time when the project was initiated, there were well-grounded concerns which, although not based on specific intelligence, served to confirm the project target area as vulnerable to trafficking in drugs, vehicles and illicit firearms. The project was therefore justified. The amount of time allotted in the project document was also reasonable to attain the objectives, allowing for the usual degree of slippage. The amount of funding deemed relevant, was, for the objectives indicated also realistic. (Para 14.)

Project context: The project was complementary of other international donor assistance activities in the region (Para 12). It has formed one effective arm of the UNODC programme of assistance in drug law enforcement to the region. It can serve as a solid basis for additional UNODC border control projects in this region.

Project preconditions: As part of the project design, relevant and reasonable prerequisites were put into place prior to project implementation (Paras 44-48 and 73).

Project goals: The overall set of project objectives, outputs and activities were sound. However, the evaluator feels that during implementation this objective (Phase II, Obj. 1) should have received priority over the objective under Phase I, Objective 2 (Paras 20-28).

Project outputs and activities: All of the activities in the final version of the project have been carried out. In terms of training and equipment, it has exceeded expectation and the evaluator now feels that limited success will follow (Para 69).

Training: The training manual prepared for the training courses is considered excellent with all of the relevant and recommended subjects included. Throughout the evaluation it was established that the students obtained great benefit from their attendance at the various courses. Every student spoken to agreed that he/she was now better prepared to carry out their respective duties. It was originally intended to train 90 members of staff from all agencies working in the border posts (i.e., police, customs and immigration) receive the training. By project end, a total of 148 had done so. This aspect of the project can only be described as a total success in terms of quality and quantity (Para 35).

Sequencing of specialized equipment delivery: The evaluator nonetheless believes that the specialized equipment should have been delivered after the training modules were delivered. This would have allowed the officials to have a better understanding regarding what use such equipment could be put towards. An impression that the evaluator formulated having studied the relevant documentation on file is that the reason why the original equipment was provided so early in the project life was possibly because field office was under pressure to begin to show implementation (as represented in expensive equipment expenditures) as soon as possible following project approval (Paras 50-51; 69).

Briefings of the donors: Diplomatic missions of Italy (donor) in Pretoria and

Maputo appear to have been regularly briefed on project progress. Further briefings were also given to the Mini-Dublin Group in Maputo and Pretoria on project progress (Para 43).

Difficulties in measuring project success: The project design lacks measurable achievement indicators and as a result, it is not possible to establish a definite success level (Paras 17, 52-55, 69, and 86). Although not an intrinsic part of the project design, the Field did make attempts to gather this statistical evidence, but failed due to governments' not having this type of data. Thus, despite recorded efforts of the Field Office to secure information from both the border posts and police HQ in the three countries, little information exists to directly tie the work of the project to any successes which may have occurred as a result of its operation (Para 18). Accordingly, the evaluator has no comparable data on the 'before' or the 'after' situation. Nonetheless, it is fair for the evaluator to reflect that during his visits to the designated border posts, feedback would indicate that increased success is being achieved in a number of areas, but particularly in the recovery of stolen vehicles (one of the project aims).

Project management by the Field Office: The decision to localize executing responsibility to the field office of UNODC was sound, since the field office was better able to manage, execute and monitor the project's implementation in a flexible and timely fashion which responded to the exigencies of the situation. The project developed a series of costed workplans which permitted the accurate tracking of outputs, activities and inputs (Para 29). The project was regularly monitored through missions, consultations, evaluations, briefings and reports. (Paras 41-43). Project changes were agreed by consensus among all parties (Para 58). Sensible handling of project funds resulted in the project being able to deliver considerably more activities than originally planned (Paras 53 and 63). The evaluator feels that the project has been managed efficiently by the Field Office (Paras 30-33; 39-40).

Counter-measures on the open borders: In the process of planning similar projects in the future, consideration should be given to the possibility that if the project is successful in achieving its aims, the smugglers are likely to disperse their activities to other parts of the open border line. Some preventative measures should be put in place in an attempt to meet this threat should it arise. It may be for example that regular patrolling can take place aided by communication equipment linked to the official border post or some other back up group (Paras 16 and 87).

Overall conclusion: There is much to commend this project and with the modifications referred to, it could be used as a model for similar cross border projects in other parts of the world (Para 89).

INTRODUCTION

1. As indicated in the project document, this project – AD/RAF/99/E06 “Capacity Building Against Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in Southeastern Africa” – aims to strengthen the individual and combined capacities of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland to combat illicit drug smuggling and organized crime in their joint border areas. The means which the project envisions using to accomplish this are to improve the capacities of law

enforcement agencies and prosecutors in South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland to deal with these problems; particularly those involving illicit trafficking in drugs, firearms and motor vehicles in the three countries. The intention was that by the end of the project, the recipient countries would be better able to deal with the foregoing problems, and significant improvements would have been achieved in the interdiction rates of cross-border drug trafficking and related crime.

2. In order fulfil the Terms of Reference for the evaluation (**Annex 1**) the Consultant, **Derek A. Todd**, a Drug Law Enforcement Consultant from the United Kingdom, carried out a thorough review of the project documentation and files and, between 10th and 20th February 2003 also undertook a site monitoring mission to most of the border control posts assisted by the project whose target area is delimited largely by the area surrounding Swaziland. The purpose was to evaluate the status of attainment of project objectives contained in project.
3. During the first stage of the mission, the consultant was accompanied throughout by **Ms. Chantel Marais**, National Programme Officer from the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Pretoria, South Africa. Following the initial steps of report preparation, the consultant then attended the Tri Partite Review meeting at Kosibay, South Africa, where presentations were made by the participating countries (Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland), UNODC and the consultant before the evaluation report was finalised.
4. Also in attendance at these meetings were **Mr. Gary Lewis**, Programme Manager for Drugs, UNODC, the aforementioned **Ms. Chantel Marais** and **Mr. J. Brito da Cunha**, Project Co-ordinator, UNODC, Mozambique.
5. The border posts visited by the Consultant were almost all of those which had, in September 1999 and subsequently, been jointly selected by the three countries to receive assistance and UNODC. These represented, at the time, the most vulnerable points open to drug trafficking and organised crime activity.
6. It is also relevant at this stage to point out that during these visits, as part of the project's final activities, the FO took the opportunity to deliver the final consignment of project equipment such as vehicle searching mirrors, magnifying table lamps, magnifying glasses, ultra violet document scanners, heavy duty torches, gloves and drug identification booklets (the latter funded under a separate UNODC project). In some cases, this delivery was the first and only deployment of basic detection equipment under the project. This, of necessity, will have an impact on the evaluation process. Certain items of equipment were deployed under the project in areas not visited by the evaluator.

CHAPTER I: PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN

A. Overall assessment

7. At the time of its inception, the three countries involved in the project requested assistance in terms of curbing cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen vehicles and firearms between the three countries.
8. In the case of **Mozambique**, information received was that although there was limited cultivation of cannabis, the manufacturing of mandrax seemed to have started with laboratories producing the substance many of which had been raided and closed down since

1995. Also there was some anecdotal evidence of smuggling in precursor chemicals. The trafficking in illegal substances appeared often highly organized and of quite widespread proportions. Not only cannabis and methaqualone but also significant quantities of heroin, hashish and cocaine were seized in 1998. The latter three drugs appeared to be destined both for the South African market and for transshipment to Europe. In addition, MDMA and prescription drugs (diazepam) were found in small quantities. Mozambique's extremely long and open coastline, together with weak screening capacity at the major ports, suggested that the country might be, or might still become, the most favoured entry point in the region for bulk smuggling of illicit substances. (It is noted that under two separate projects MOZ/C47 (national capacity building) and RAF/B81 (seaport interdiction) Mozambique has benefited from UNODC assistance within the past three years.)

9. At that time, **Swaziland** reported an increase in organized crime, concentrated particularly on cross-border car theft, armed robberies, illegal firearm trade, and the drugs traffic. Crime syndicates consisting of South African, Mozambican, Nigerian and Swazi nationals were reported to be in operation. Smuggling of stolen vehicles and drugs occurred both via established border posts and at illegal crossing points between Swaziland and Mozambique. Trafficking in illicit substances seemed at that stage to have been on the increase. Swaziland's existing weak anti-drug legislation (some dating back to 1922), limited enforcement resources, a relatively open society, and a developed economic infrastructure all contributed to Swaziland serving as a trafficking hub. Relatively large quantities of cannabis are seized each year, or destroyed while under cultivation. For example, under Operation Motokwane in 1999 an amount of approximately 65 Ha were destroyed, a relatively large area for a country so small. At the time of the project's development, a new and increasing problem for the Swazi authorities was the routing of large quantities of methaqualone (mandrax) overland from Mozambique through its territory and into South Africa.
10. In **South Africa**, at the time it appeared the country's reintegration into the international community since the end of apartheid was bringing with it an increased vulnerability to illicit drug trafficking and consumption. The quality of air and sea travel connections via South Africa to many parts of the world was (and remains) such that South Africa offered drug traffickers opportunities which had not existed earlier. In addition, with its sophisticated and diversified economy -- including a first world infrastructure existing along widespread and severe poverty -- the country offered an attractive consumer market in the subcontinent.
11. Much of the above trafficking information, however, would seem to have been (and still to a large extent is) based on assumptions, rather than specific intelligence. There is no doubt that drugs and other forms of contraband are actually crossing the borders, but there exists very little specific evidence to highlight the vulnerable areas.
12. To the extent of the above, the project was complementary in that it aimed to increase the interdiction capabilities at the official border posts between the three countries. In addition, the project also complemented other ongoing UN national and regional projects. In Mozambique, the UNODC at that time was running a national project to train and equip Dedicated Drug Units (DDUs) (MOZ/C47) and another project which benefited Maputo as well as other regional seaports (RAF/B81 later extended into RAF/G13); the British Crown Agents were also assisting in the modernization of the Mozambican customs service and the Spanish Guardia Civil had embarked upon a training package, among other things, for the benefit of the Mozambican police service. In Swaziland, the UNODC was in the process of launching a separate capacity building project in the area of drug law enforcement (SWA/C13) which ultimately did not get off the ground due to the Swaziland government's

not passing the prerequisite legislation. South Africa had at the time a capacity building project for law enforcement, SAF/978, which addressed training needs in drug law enforcement.

13. Since the project's inception, the UNODC has realised the need for additional support to border control in that region. Currently the project RAF/F85 (Countermeasures against Illicit Drug Trafficking and Cross-Border Crime along Southern and East African Land Borders) is awaiting signature by participating governments. Once signed, the project will assist selected border posts some of which have been supported under RAF/E06. In addition, UNODC has drafted a regional border control project which is considered to be pipeline and currently awaiting approval from UNDCP Vienna. These initiatives will build on the basis provided by RAF/E06.
14. The above assessment would conclude that at the time when the project was initiated, there were well-grounded concerns which, although not based on specific intelligence, served to confirm the project target area as vulnerable to trafficking in drugs, vehicles and illicit firearms. The project was therefore justified. The amount of time allotted in the project document was also reasonable to attain the objectives, allowing for the usual degree of slippage. The amount of funding deemed relevant, was, for the objectives indicated also realistic.

B. Problem analysis, objectives and achievement indicators

15. As indicated, the analysis which underpinned the justification for the project seems to have been on informed speculation rather than statistical proof. However, even when the Consultant visited the project sites and spoke with the key counterparts, little of a statistical nature could be forthcoming even at this stage. Based on the Consultant's experience and assessment of international and regional trafficking trends, it is likely that official border posts are being used for trafficking and the project does address this matter.
16. However, there exists a lack of attention to the open-border line which it would seem (according to anecdotal responses from interviewees) is currently a significant transfer point for trafficking. From a review of the documentation surrounding the initial Tripartite meeting which launched the project and from which the first project workplan emerged, it is clear that the matter of the open border was considered. However, the participants at that meeting (September 1999) considered that the project did not possess the level of resources required to tackle the open borders. In addition, this was (at least in South Africa) a matter which falls under the control of the South African National Defence Force.
17. One key problem with the project design is that it lacks measurable achievement indicators and as a result, it is not possible to establish a definite success rate. The project's drug control objective states the following: "...to increase the interdiction of illicitly produced narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, precursors and other crime-related materials trafficked across the borders of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland...". The implication is that seizures and arrests related to drug trafficking and the smuggling of illegal firearms and stolen vehicles will be used to measure success.
18. The participating governments have been unable to produce statistical information in relation to an increase or decrease in seizures and arrests in the project area. Although not an intrinsic part of the project design, the Field Office did make attempts to gather this statistical evidence, but failed due to governments not having this type of data. Thus, despite recorded

efforts of the Field Office to secure information from both the border posts and police HQ in the three countries, little information exists to directly tie the work of the project to any successes which may have occurred as a result of its operation.

19. While on mission, the evaluator also requested statistics and data from relevant counterparts, but this was never forthcoming in a useable format. For example, it is known that large seizures of many different types of drugs are made in-country in South Africa, but there is no information available to the evaluator which would show whether these seizures were of drugs which crossed the vulnerable posts within this project's designated area.

C. Outputs, activities and inputs

20. The project's outputs, activities and inputs are:

21. PHASE 1:

Immediate Objective I: To assess the extent of cross-border drug trafficking and other criminal activities (e.g. trafficking in drugs, firearms and motor vehicles) in the general area shared by the three governments.

Output 1: Full Assessment Report containing recommendations for Phase II, including final budget and revised workplan

Activities for 1: Recruit consultant, conduct assessment mission, organize workshop and review findings of the consultant and reach agreements with recipient governments on how to proceed with implementation of phase II.

22. Evaluator's comment: This approach was sound and according to the evaluator, the best (and only) method of establishing such a project. Through this approach, UNODC managed to facilitate participating governments "taking ownership" of the project.

23. Immediate Objective 2: Strengthen communications among the three recipient governments

Output 2: Initial equipment requirements identified and met

Activities for 2: Consult with three governments on immediate equipment needs, identify pressing local technical training requirements (equipment utilization), procure relevant equipment and training activities.

24. Evaluator's comment: This approach, in general, was sound according to the evaluator. However, the evaluator would wish to address the following issues. The well articulated training plans established as a result of the project steering committee is considered excellent practise, even although it meant that the actual training did not start for some time. As a result of this, it was incorrect in the view of the evaluator to purchase and distribute specialized equipment before the border officials received training. This led to an under-utilization of equipment provided, because border officials did not know how to use equipment, and because of the lack of training at that time, did not know what they were supposed to be looking for in the first place.

25. PHASE II:

Immediate Objective I: To increase the seizures of illicit drugs and other crime-related materials made by law enforcement agencies in the project target areas of the three countries.

Output 1: Specialized border control teams / task forces established and members trained in, and equipped for profiling, surveillance, interdiction and other advanced investigation techniques.

Activities for 1: Select of candidates for border control teams/task forces, identify specific training and equipment needs for these teams, design specific training manuals for cross-border cooperation in project region, select officers for training/study tours, select training sites, courses, duration and timetable, conduct training, initial review of status of regulatory mechanism for precursor chemical control, conduct in-country seminars and training activities to identify deficiencies in precursor chemical control regimes and develop means of improving the regulatory mechanisms and systems, develop and implement standard operating procedures in respect of precursor chemicals, select units to receive equipment, cost and source equipment to be procured, procure, provide and install equipment, mid-term review of impact of training, other project activities and operating procedures.

26. Evaluator's comment: This approach, was sound. However, the evaluator feels that during implementation this objective (Phase II, Obj. 1) should have received priority over the objective under Phase I, Objective 2.

27. Immediate Objective 2: Strengthen the enabling legal and institutional framework to support operational cross-border cooperation.

Output 2: Clear and mutually recognized procedures and administrative rules in place that facilitate inter-agency and sub-regional cooperation among law enforcement and judicial authorities.

Activities 2: Organize and convene a sub-regional workshop involving senior law enforcement and prosecution officials, identify required national changes or bilateral agreements, draft new standard operating procedures at national level, organize and convene a sub-regional meeting (after mid-term review) to review legal process.

28. Evaluator's comment: This approach was apparently sound. At the planning stage, there was a perceived need for this objective, but during the project's cycle, it was agreed by all parties that this subject was better met by a separate UNODC project (RAF/E13), and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO). A consensus was reached to delete this objective.

D. Executing modality and managerial arrangements

29. The project was executed by UNODC (then UNDCP) in South Africa, with responsibility for financial transactions allocated to UNDP Pretoria. This decision to localize seems to have been a sound one, since the field office was better able to manage, execute and monitor the project's implementation in a flexible and timely fashion which responded to the exigencies of the situation. The project developed a series of costed workplans which permitted the accurate tracking of outputs, activities and inputs.

CHAPTER II: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Overall assessment

30. The evaluator's overall impression of the implementation of the project document is that outcomes and objectives were achieved effectively and efficiently within the constraints in terms of the limitations as described above (i.e. lack of supporting data and general hearsay).
31. By studying the various TPR meeting minutes, the evaluator was able to see that alterations to the project were well discussed and swiftly acted upon. Examples would be the inclusion of precursor chemical monitoring training, which was later again deleted and the acknowledgment that the legal component was better dealt with elsewhere. Such flexibility of action is recognized as good practise.
32. In normal circumstances for projects of this size and magnitude, the evaluator would have expected to have seen a project coordinator in place. The field office apparently decided not to appoint a fulltime project coordinator. However, this has not had a detrimental effect on the project in general other than the possibility that issues such as data could have been more actively pursued. That said, the evaluator feels the project has been managed efficiently.
33. As result of this efficiency, in terms of training and equipment provided, the project was able to exceed all expectations. Prudent cost savings, in particular, led to more funding being made available. The provision of the latest equipment which the evaluator feels adds much to the project is a direct result of this capable management as is the fact that more border officials were trained than originally planned.

B. Delivery of inputs

34. All inputs as envisaged (except for Phase II, Objective 2) have been implemented to a greater capacity than originally expected.
35. The training manual prepared for the training courses is considered excellent with all of the relevant and recommended subjects included and throughout the evaluation process, it was established that the students obtained great benefit from their attendance at the various courses. Some claim, although not confirmed, that they are already achieving success as a direct result of the training. Every student spoken to agreed that he/she was now better prepared to carry out their respective duties. It was originally intended to train 90 members of staff from all agencies working in the border posts (i.e., police, customs and immigration) receive the training. By project end, a total of **148** had done so. Unfortunately, a number have since been promoted, have left the service or have been transferred and the exact number still in post cannot be verified. Nevertheless, this aspect of the project can only be described as a total success in terms of quality and quantity.
36. An additional benefit was the use of local trainers who have knowledge of the area and were able to adapt the training to suit the local conditions and was more cost effective.
37. All of the initial equipment delivered was found to be in use and in good working order although it must again be emphasised that not all of the posts were visited. The project-

supplied equipment at the larger entry points, particularly the sea and air ports of South Africa (see Annexes 4 & 5) was not seen.

38. With the final delivery of the latest equipment, all original outputs and activities within the project document's three key objectives have been completed, and indeed exceeded. Credit for this must rest with the UNODC personnel responsible for the management and implementation of the project.

C. Management and implementation of activities

39. The evaluator assessed the project workplans which were found to be current, having been regularly updated. Similarly, the minutes of the TPRs were inspected. These meetings were held on a regular basis and minutes fully described the proceedings. Documents were provided supporting the evaluator's opinion that regular written and oral consultations took place with all three participating governments. A mid-term evaluation by Consultant Chris Serfontein was undertaken in November 2001 prior to the holding of the TPR in Maputo.
40. Regarding the financial management of the project, the evaluator found that all project activities (as per the amended list of outputs) have been carried out, as well as selected additional activities, such as more equipment and training sessions. In addition, the project funding remaining at present is approximately \$20,000 which the project management has indicated will be used for final ad-hoc assistance in the project area, as per the decisions taken at the final TPR review meeting on 17 February in Kosibay, South Africa.

D. Monitoring and backstopping

41. Throughout the project's life-cycle various regular monitoring missions were undertaken. These included the initial assessment mission, the mid-term evaluation (already referred to above), and various ad-hoc missions by either the Programme Manager (Drugs), or his designee. UNODC staff also opened or closed all training sessions (8 in total). Bi-annual PPRs, examined by the evaluator, were compiled and shared with the governments, the donor and UNODC Vienna.
42. Specifically in relation to the mid-term evaluation, such documentation was extremely useful for this evaluator for comparison purposes.
43. Having studied other documents in the project file, the evaluator is able to state that the diplomatic missions of Italy (donor) in Pretoria and Maputo were regularly briefed on project progress. Further briefings were also given to the Mini-Dublin Group in Maputo and Pretoria on project progress.

E. Circumstances affecting the project (prerequisites)

44. The commencement of the project was conditional upon the receipt of the assurance from the recipient governments that adequate structures to absorb the activities of the project would be set up and maintained. Before the start of the project's second phase, Government representatives were to sign a Letter of Agreement (LOA) regarding this project document and their participation in the project, which constituted the assurances required. Implementation of the second phase would only start after these prerequisites had been met.
45. These LOAs were signed by Swaziland in September 1999, and by Mozambique and South

Africa in July 2000, hence enabling UNODC to go ahead with the implementation of Phase 2.

46. The following prerequisites were also required to be fulfilled by the recipient governments:
(a.) Officers selected for these units and/or for training should be retained in their posts for at least three years after completion of training; (b.) The equipment provided by the project should be maintained in good working order, and utilised at the locations for the purposes as specified in the assessment mission called for in Phase 1; and (c.) Designation of national focal point for project implementation .
47. In terms of (a.) above, it is the view of the evaluator that this is an extremely difficult prerequisite to adhere to (further comment will be made in see Chapter III, Issue E, which follows later in this report). Regarding (b.), although this prerequisite seems a sensible approach, the reality of the project is that from the offset the more sophisticated equipment (deployed in South Africa) would have been better deployed in more sterile working environments, such as airports and seaports. In fact, the South African authorities did deploy some of this equipment to locations outside the designated project area and this equipment has not been seen by the evaluator. As if to underscore the point, at the final TPR (17 February 2003), the South African presentation indicated that the SAPS' Border Police were in the process of conducting a review of the disposition of operational equipment provided by all foreign donors and noted their intention to redeploy selected equipment (likely to include the sophisticated UNODC equipment) away from the land border posts to locations better suited for its use. In the case of Swaziland, full adherence to this prerequisite can be reported. Mozambique received equipment only during the week of the evaluator's mission and therefore no comment can be put forward, except to say that the TPR meeting of December 2001 had earlier taken the decision that Mozambique would volunteer not to request sophisticated equipment under this project as it was already receiving considerable equipment under MOZ/C47. The focal points referred to in point (c.) have been identified by both Swaziland and South Africa. Mozambique did not comply at the time, nor have they done so since. To overcome this, UNODC field office utilised the services of the project coordinator (MOZ/C47) based in Maputo to liaise and make the necessary representations through their National Drugs Committee (GCPCD).
48. The project document was signed during August 1999 by UNODC. However, the actual implementation of activities only commenced in each respective country once the LOAs had been signed, thus adhering to good practise.

CHAPTER III: PROJECT RESULTS

A. Outputs

49. The evaluator takes the view that those officials who have received training under this project are now much better equipped to carry out their functions. The training not only equipped officials with technical knowledge such as document verification, profiling, etc., but also introduced aspects such customer care which greatly enhanced service provided.
50. The equipment originally provided would have been better suited for use after the training had been delivered. Items such as radios and fax machines the evaluator would always support, but the more sophisticated equipment such as fibre scopes and infrared cameras need specialist training in their use and maintenance, which was not provided nor (other than the

routine up-front training by the equipment supplier) was it part of the original project planning. (It is noteworthy, however, that the South African Border Police are in the process of developing a customized course for their operational staff who use this equipment. This course will form part of their own training curriculum and will be funded by SAPS.) The evaluator nonetheless believes that the specialized equipment should have been delivered after the training modules were delivered. This would have allowed the officials to have a better understanding regarding what use such equipment could be put towards. It is felt that the more basic equipment recently supplied (which was not part of the original project planning but which resulted from cost savings) is more user-friendly and likely to significantly enhance success in interdiction.

51. An impression that the evaluator formulated having studied the relevant documentation on file is that the reason why the original equipment was provided so early in the project life was possibly because field office was under pressure to begin to show implementation (as represented in expensive equipment expenditures) as soon as possible following project approval. Once the Letter of Agreement was signed by Swaziland the communications equipment was bought for Swaziland (even though the actual commissioning of this equipment did not occur due to problems with the contractor, Serec Radio, until the middle of 2000). Similarly, in South Africa, soon after the Letter of Agreement had been signed in July 2000, the sophisticated search equipment was bought and delivered even though the process of developing a training curriculum and course modules was only then getting underway.
52. There are no achievement indicators available to the evaluator. UNODC have repeatedly requested the recipient countries to provide details of arrests and seizures which would assist the evaluation process, but to date this has not materialized. Accordingly, the evaluator has no comparable data on the 'before' or the 'after' situation. It is fair for the evaluator to reflect that during his visits to the designated border posts, feedback would indicate that increased success is being achieved in a number of areas, but particularly in the recovery of stolen vehicles (one of the project aims).
53. However, the evaluator is still concerned about the lack of specific intelligence in relation to the trafficking of contraband through the official border points. Diligent questioning of suspects arrested "in-country" should unearth the specific points of entry. It is the evaluator's view that more tangible intelligence must be available before similar projects are embarked upon in the future.
54. A further consideration for future projects should be the management of the complete borderline in the sense that if success is achieved at the official border post, the traffickers will disperse their activities to the open-border areas.

B. Immediate objective(s) (Outcomes)

55. Should one rely on the anecdotal information received during the visit, the evaluator would have to say that the immediate objectives of the project were attained. This is particularly true in relation to recovery of stolen vehicles. In some instances, as much as a quadruple success rate is reported since training commenced. However, in light of the non-availability of statistical data it is extremely difficult to corroborate this view.

Phase 2

56. **Immediate Objective 1** aimed at increasing the seizures of illicit drugs and other crime

related materials made by law enforcement agencies in the project target areas of the three countries. **Output 1** required that specialised border control teams/task forces be established with members trained in, and equipped for profiling, surveillance, interdiction and other advanced investigation techniques.

57. **Immediate Objective 2** aimed to strengthen the enabling legal and institutional framework to support operational cross-border co-operation. **Output 2** required clear and mutually recognised procedures and administrative rules in place that facilitate inter-agency and subregional co-operation among law enforcement and judicial authorities.
58. During the lifetime of the project, changes to a number of initial agreements/activities were agreed by consensus by the participating parties. In addition, a Training Steering Committee comprising representatives from Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa and UNODC was set up to identify the real training needs and the components necessary for the curriculum. Regular meetings were held until the curriculum was finalised and modules developed. Another feature of the training package was its flexibility. Following a decision in December 2001 to include precursors in a module, after a few courses, it was decided that the precursor chemical component was simply too far advanced for the students at that time and was dropped from the course. On another occasion, “customer care” was included. Although training did not start until July 2001, this flexible approach is very much supported. Initially, only 5 sites (10 border posts) were to receive training (as per minutes of first Steering Committee meeting of September 1999).
59. The deployment telecommunications equipment in Swaziland began in 1999. The deployment of sophisticated searching equipment began in August 2000 and indeed, the equipment originally envisaged in the project was distributed by November of that year, some 8 months before the training began.
60. By the end of 2001, 56 border officials had received training and a further six joint border posts had been identified for inclusion in an expanded training package.
61. One further major change to the project took place at the TPR Meeting in November 2001, when it was decided, again, by consensus, to drop **Immediate Objective 2 - legal and institutional framework for cross border co-operation** from the project as its aims were deemed capable of being better achieved through the auspices of SARPCCO, the body responsible for such activities in the region.
62. During 2002, a further 92 officials were trained and additional (typically smaller) posts were included, making 28 in total. Additional training manuals were also printed which enabled one to be issued per student with an additional five being made available to each post.
63. During the lifetime of the project, a number of factors released finance for other uses. First, as mentioned, the finances were well managed well and training venues were selected on a cost-effective basis, while nonetheless paying heed to trainee comfort and teacher-student ratios. This was entirely the result of the efficient work of the National Programme Assistant (later Programme Officer), who, by spending time searching cost-effective venues, enabled savings to be made. A decision was also taken not to hire a Project Coordinator for this project. ROSA considered that the project could be effectively run by the Programme Manager (Drugs) and a National Programme Assistant. During the course of the project, the

latter officer appears to have been encouraged to become more involved in the actual management of the project as part of her career advancement process and has, by all accounts acquitted herself well on this project. This progression became more formalized upon her being promoted to the post of National Programme Officer. Suffice it to say that this allowed ROSA to maintain direct control over the project, and what would otherwise have been salary costs could be ploughed back into the project.

In addition, the TPR of December 2001, at which all parties were present, took the decision that Mozambique should receive no equipment as many of their needs were being met under national project AD/MOZ/99/C47.

Finally, the depreciation of the SA Rand vis-à-vis the US Dollar made more Rand-denominated purchases possible.

64. The net result of all this was to permit the purchase of other training and basic equipment. As indicated, it is still nonetheless too early to assess the impact of the equipment. Mozambican posts also benefited from this additional equipment. Suffice it to say that the evaluator totally agrees with the purchased items.

C. Drug control objective

65. The overall analysis of the drug control situation remains the same as at the commencement of the project. It is known that drugs and other forms of contraband are smuggled across the borders of the three countries but it is not known with any certainty the ratio vis-a-vis border post or border line. This project has increased the awareness of the problem in the border posts and has trained and equipped sufficient officers to make an impact should their particular post be used. The staff are keen to achieve success and this project has given them that capability. The distribution of the 2003 Logo Index will allow most officers, for the first time, an opportunity to recognise the drugs they are likely to face. However, if they are faced by sophisticated concealments, some of which are described in the training manual, it is unlikely that detections will be made. Most posts simply do not have the more expensive but necessary equipment such as fork lift trucks and sophisticated detection aids. Indeed, few of the posts are designed for proper vehicle examination. The project will have no impact on the open border line.
66. Available statistical information simply does not allow the evaluator the opportunity to make meaningful comparisons of *before* and *after* project implementation. During discussions with UNODC personnel, it was established that repeated requests had been made for the respective countries' seizure statistics for 2002 prior to the evaluator's arrival but none had been made available in a useable format in relation to the project. However, in a number of posts, it was stated that the seizure of stolen cars had increased as a direct result of the training received.
67. Each agency within the posts knows its own specific tasks although in most cases, they work as a team. Standard operating procedures do exist. Accordingly, each post now has staff who specialise in specific subjects as per the training received. The subjects taught were as follows:-
1. Profiling
 2. Questioning techniques
 3. Document verification (persons)
 4. Document verification (goods)

5. Searching methodology and concealment techniques (persons and containers)
 6. Risk assessment of suspect vehicles and searching (vehicles)
 7. Identification of narcotics
 8. Handling of exhibits
 9. Introduction to controlled delivered techniques.
68. Again, it must be remembered that the equipment designed to assist in documentation examination has only just been delivered and at this stage, success cannot be quantified. The additional equipment referred to has now been delivered to every post in South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique within the designated area. In respect of drug related operations, few have experience because they have not been, in general terms, making significant seizures. Drugs or for that matter, criminal intelligence is not available at the posts visited although it is fair to say that the intelligence unit in Swaziland supported by the project is providing drug related information. Awareness of drug legislation is not considered high and any seizures that are made are normally taken over by a specialised unit.
69. In summary, all of the activities in the final version of the project have been carried out. In terms of training and equipment, it has exceeded expectation and the evaluator now feels that limited success will follow. The real bar to success is the total lack of intelligence specifying exactly which routes are being used. It is not expected that current operational issues should be forwarded to the border posts for many reasons including the possibility of corruption. However, when seizures are made in country, normally the investigation will unearth the method of concealment and entry into the country and this should be passed retrospectively to the border post concerned. In addition, methods of concealment should be passed to all border posts. Most of the information made available to the evaluator is based on speculation and assumption. It is suspected that the situation was exactly the same at the time the original pre project assessment was made. The project is also likely to have had a greater impact if the more basic equipment now *in situ* had formed an early part of the project's activities. Similarly, the evaluator believes it was mistake to deliver the original equipment, particularly the fibre scopes, infra red cameras and other drug detecting equipment, in any event, before the training schedule commenced. In addition, sophisticated equipment such as the NDS 2000 is really far too advanced for untrained officers at a border post. Even with training, it is believed that such equipment is better utilised in a sterile environment such as an airport. From the evaluator's knowledge of UN procedures, it may simply have been that all parties concerned wished to see activity in the project and there was a perceived need to be seen to spend money in a particular financial year. This practice should be looked at closely and the overall situation of the project considered before such decisions are made. As a matter of principle, equipment, especially items with a level of sophistication, should never be deployed until after the training.
70. There is no doubt that the project has strengthened the recipients' ability to exercise better control at the land border posts in the three countries. However, it is felt by the evaluator that it is simply too early to gauge the total impact of the project in interdiction terms. The final training was only carried out in late 2002 and the basic equipment which is likely to add significantly to the capability of the staff has only been delivered.
71. Nevertheless, the project has been well managed with the flexibility shown during its implementation adding to the overall benefit of the recipients.

D. Other results

72. In addition to the extra training and equipment provided, as already mentioned, the following additional matters should be mentioned:

Customs have reported a general increase in their efficiency in revenue collection (i.e. sugar and cigarettes);

A better customer service attitude has been adopted;

There is clear evidence of good cooperation and consultation between all parties on sides of the respective borders;

The building up of self-esteem among officers deployed to these, sometimes obscure and remote, border posts by the simple provision of an attendance certificate following the training package; and

Sadly, corrupt activities among officials are still reported as being an impediment to success.

E. Sustainability

73. **Training:** One of the prerequisites for training was that an official would have to remain at his/her current duty station for three years after undergoing training. However, this can be detrimental to the officer's promotion prospects. This is an extremely difficult subject that must be thought through before a project is finalised. There are a number of factors which may assist but none is foolproof.

One method is to begin the training as early as possible in the project allowing a capacity for refresher training towards the end. Similarly, at least two courses can be held back in order that any posts which have been particularly hard hit by transfers, resignations, promotions etc. can be given the opportunity to increase their quota of trained personnel.

A series of "train the trainers" courses are also an obvious method by which trained officers can be replaced. However, if this option is chosen, it is essential firstly that the selected officer indicates a clear interest in being (or becoming) a trainer and can demonstrate a desire to train others. Those randomly selected for this task seldom maintain their interest over a period of time. Moreover, it is crucial that his/her superior officers recognise this additional role and make him/her available when necessary. However, in this particular case, this concept may not be feasible because of the relatively low baseline skills available in this region.

74. **Equipment:** In relation to the equipment, its safekeeping and use seems to be well regulated and found to be in good condition and, unless where otherwise stated, is located at the locations for which it was intended. Little maintenance is required and there is no reason why the evaluator's original findings can not be replicated in the future.

CHAPTER IV: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

75. In the main, all posts visited were well controlled. However, all suffer from a lack of intelligence and any success being achieved is as a result of diligent work by the officers concerned. Indeed, most of the posts themselves are not conducive to interdiction work. There are few sterile areas for searching, no vehicle inspection facilities and any effort to

unload and thoroughly search a truck for example is only likely to lead to traffic congestion in the post itself. In many instances, vehicles approaching or entering a post has sufficient time and space to turn round if the driver sees diligent searching methods being employed in the post. For that reason, it is always a better practice if the designated searching area can be located out of view of the main post area. Many posts have suffered from a lack of even the most basic detection equipment and the consultant has no doubt that the deliveries made during the mission will have an impact. The ultra violet scanners and the magnifying glasses will be of great assistance to immigration officials while the remainder will assist both police and customs in searching vehicles. Similarly, the drug logo index recently published (as part of the project SAF/978) will give all parties an idea of what the main psychotropic drugs likely to cross the border will look like. There are few examples of such seizures but the consultant does take the view that traffickers will use vehicle concealments to convey their illicit goods through the official border posts. Heavy trucks carrying timber and sugar cane were regularly seen. These vehicles would provide ample opportunity to hide large shipments of drugs but the reality is that they are seldom checked and no equipment which could assist in that process is available.

76. From the border posts, there is no intelligence to suggest that drugs are transiting through the posts, the general view being that open border areas are utilised. Little or no seizures are being made. However, in the past, it is unlikely that any vehicular concealments would have been discovered in any event but a combination of the training and equipment should enhance that capability. Again, in the consultants view, the basic equipment recently delivered will set in motion the notion of searching the undersides of vehicles etc. and the availability of the fibre scopes at designated posts will enhance that capability such unusual features be discovered.
77. In a number of areas, corruption is still seen as a major problem and such activity, if it exists, will clearly have a detrimental impact whatever measures are put in place.
78. The evaluator accepts that he only visited a cross section of the border posts which benefited from the project and during the assessment process which follows, will make assumptions that all are of similar capacity.

CHAPTER V: RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Issues resolved during evaluation

79. No issues as such were resolved during the evaluation mission, since it was a final evaluation. The mission focussed more on an evaluation of the implementation and the lessons learnt. However, at the terminal TPR held on 17 February 2003, the evaluator did provide his provisional findings and offered guidance in the use of the final remaining \$20,000 which is left under this project. This funding will be utilised for visual analysis training for Swaziland's Crime Intelligence Unit and further basic training of Mozambican officials together with the translation of the training manuals into Portuguese.

B. Actions/decisions recommended

80. See Chapter IV.

C. Project revisions

81. Not applicable. The project is ending.

CHAPTER VI: LESSONS LEARNED

82. There are a number of other considerations which will no doubt have a considerable bearing on the success achievable in cross border controls, both in the fixed posts and open border line. There are likely to be two main groupings of smugglers. Firstly, there will be relatively small time criminals who take the opportunity to regularly smuggle small items/quantities as they have done over a long period of time. It is felt that these individuals are now much more vulnerable to detection as a direct result of this project. However, the real problem to be faced is the large scale, well orchestrated, smuggling activities of organised crime syndicates. They will use sophisticated methods to avoid detection. Every step will be taken by them to protect their investment. The best method available to the law enforcement agencies to combat this threat is through intelligence profiling. Consideration must therefore be given to the current situation in this respect. The evaluation mission clearly showed that there is little evidence of such intelligence being made available to the border posts. It would be the recommendation of the evaluator that in future similar projects, this matter should be discussed fully with the recipient countries before project plans and activities are agreed.
83. The evaluator has reasonably detailed knowledge of the drug control situation in Mozambique. The newly formed Dedicated Drugs Units (DDUs) are still at an embryonic stage and it will take some time before they are capable of generating the levels of intelligence required. They are however well aware of the problem, particularly in the vulnerable area around Ressano Garcia.
84. In Swaziland, the criminal intelligence unit is operational although it has not yet reached full capacity. It can however already create its own intelligence packages which are brought up to operational level before being handed over to operational teams for action. Some success has already been achieved.
85. It is suspected that the situation in South Africa is different from the other two countries. It is assumed by the evaluator that good quality intelligence is available to the various Organised Crime Units within the South African Police Service (SAPS), the assumption being based on the substantial seizures being made in the inland areas of the country.
86. It is not known whether seizures made inland are investigated to the extent that the point of entry into the country is identified. It is the evaluator's view that such information should be sought and at least the method and details of concealment should be shared with the Border Police in the control posts. This does not happen at present.
87. In view of the foregoing paragraphs, in the process of planning similar projects in the future, consideration should be given to the possibility that if the project is successful in achieving its aims, the smugglers are likely to disperse their activities to other parts of the open border line. Some preventative measures should be put in place in an attempt to meet this threat should it arise. It may be for example that regular patrolling can take place aided by communication equipment linked to the official border post or some other back up group.
88. Another area of concern which rises from projects such as this is the sustainability of the

training. This has already been addressed under Chapter III, Issue E.

89. All of that said, there is much to commend this project and with the modifications referred to, it could be used as a model for similar cross border projects in other parts of the world.



UNITED NATIONS
Office on Drugs and Crime

ANNEX 1

**TERMS OF REFERENCE
Law Enforcement Consultant**

- Project:** AD/RAF/99/E06 – Capacity Building Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Southeastern Africa
- Expert Services:** Mission to evaluate status of attainment of project objectives (*Noting that objective 2 was deleted at the project TPR of 26 November 2001*).
- Duration of Mission:** 10 working days
- Mission Site:** Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland
- Direct Supervision:** ODC South Africa

TASKS

Based upon an assessment of the drug trafficking threat to Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa, the expert will review existing documentation and costed workplan plus undertake visits to selected project target sites and finally consult with relevant government counterparts in order to evaluate progress made under the project to date in respect of project objectives.

The principal output will be a final evaluation report regarding the status of attainment of the objectives which will include:

- a) overall analysis of the drug control situation across the borders of the three countries in the project target area concerned with respect to drug trafficking law enforcement countermeasures
- b) extent to which project objectives are still relevant
- c) extent to which the project's objective has been met by the implementation of the outputs identified
- d) extent of actual implementation of those outputs in terms of the recommended course to follow as per the Scholes Report (September 1999) and subsequent discussions of the Project Steering Committee and at Project Tri-Partite Reviews (TPR)
- e) recommendations for stakeholders to follow up with either on a separate basis following project end or to be included in the context of drafting future projects or interventions in the same area.

Matters for the mission to focus on will therefore include:

1. A quantitative assessment of “process” indicators (e.g. number of persons trained or amount of equipment delivered) and “outcome” indicators (e.g. increased numbers of seizures or persons arrested for trafficking or dealing) which could lead to a conclusion that the overall drug control objectives of the project have or have not been met.
2. A qualitative assessment of the current (versus previous) status of readiness of the various government departments responsible for border interdiction at the project target sites, including:
 - current breakdown of responsibility among different drug law enforcement organizations regarding responsibility for drug law enforcement operations;
 - skills and knowledge levels (e.g. in drug ID, profiling, searches, interviewing document inspection etc); experience of drug-related operations;
 - extent and functioning of standard operating procedures;
 - the use of intelligence gathering as part of the standard operating procedures;
 - extent of awareness of drug control legislation;
 - current caseload of drug-related investigations and status of processing.
3. Evaluate the operational procedures based upon the training received by personnel at the border posts benefiting from this project.
4. Evaluate deployment status of equipment procured, in terms of daily operational use, effectiveness and need for additional training.

The Consultant will also be expected to participate in meetings with Government counterparts and other stakeholders at the end of the mission, in order to de-brief on the findings of his/her assessment / evaluation.

Qualifications Required:

- I. At least 15 years of law enforcement experience, which would include specializations in combating illicit drug trafficking, international organized crime, and the planning and conceptualization of cross-border operations.
- II. Sound knowledge of legal, structural and institutional frameworks required for the successful conduct of national and sub-regional law enforcement operations in counter-narcotics or against organized crime, or both.
- III. Knowledge of the law enforcement systems in South/Southeastern Africa (gained through practical operational or review work in this area) would be a distinct asset.
- IV. Proficiency in English, including a proven ability to draft at a professional level in that language.

RAF/E06
Mission by Law Enforcement Expert
DEREK TODD

Full Mission Programme

Day 1: Sunday, 9 February 2003	
AM	Arrival in South Africa
PM	Travel to Pretoria
Day 2: Monday, 10 February 2003	
08:15	Collection at hotel
08:30 - 11:15	Briefing at UNODC
11:30	Depart
15:30	Arrive at Jeppesreef (Handover of equipment to Jeppesreef, Waverley, Matsamo and Lunatsi)
17:00	Depart for Komatipoort
18:30	Arrive at Komatipoort
Day 3: Tuesday, 11 February 2003	
07:45	Depart for Lebombo/Ressano Garcia
08:00-08:45	Meetings at Lebombo (and handover of equipment)
09:00-09:45	Meetings at Resanno Garcia (and handover of equipment)
10:00	Depart for Bordergate/Mananga
11:00-11:30	Drive through visit and hand over of equipment at Bordergate/Mananga
11:30	Depart for Lomahasha/Namaacha
12:30	Arrive at Lomahasha/Namaacha
12:30-13:45	Meetings at Lomahasha (and handover of equipment)
13:45-14:30	Meetings at Namaacha (and handover of equipment)
14:30	Depart for Ezulwini
16:30	Arrive at Ezulwini
Day 4: Wednesday, 12 February 2003	
07:30	Depart for Mbabane
08:30-11:00	Meetings in Mbabane
13:00	Depart for Oshoek/Ngwenya
14:30-15:45	Meetings at Ngwenya (and handover of equipment to Ngwenya and Bulembu)
15:45-16:30	Meetings at Oshoek (and handover of equipment to Oshoek and Josefsdal)
16:30	Depart for Amsterdam
18:30	Arrive at Amsterdam
Day 5: Thursday, 13 February 2003	
08:00	Depart for Nerston
09:00	Arrive at Nerston (Handover of equipment to Nerston, Bothashoop, Emahlatini, Sandlane, Sicunisa and Gege)
09:30	Depart for Pretoria
14:30	Arrive in Pretoria
Day 6: Friday, 14 February 2003	
08:30	Collection to UNODC offices
Full day	Consultations and drafting of preliminary mission report

Day 7: Saturday, 15 February 2003	
Full day	Finalization of mission report
Day 8: Sunday, 16 February 2003	
08:00	Departure to Kosibay
12:00	Arrival at Mahamba (handover of equipment to Mahamba both sides)
12:30	Depart for Onverwacht
14:00	Arrive at Onverwacht (handover of equipment to Onverwacht and Salitje)
14:30	Depart for Golela
15:30	Arrive at Golela (handover of equipment to Golela and Lavumisa)
16:00	Depart for Kosibay
18:30	Arrive at Kosibay
Day 9: Monday, 17 February 2003	
Full day	Attend meeting, present report
Day 10: Tuesday, 18 February 2003	
12:00	Depart for Pretoria
20:00	Arrive in Pretoria
Day 11: Wednesday, 19 February 2003	
Full day	Debriefing at UNODC Pretoria
Day 12: Thursday, 20 February 2003	
Full day	Debriefing at UNODC Pretoria
PM	Depart for UK

LIST OF PERSONS MET

Lebombo Border Post - South Africa	Captain Nyambi, Border Police Inspector Swannepoel, Border Police. Mr. Rommy Maseko, Customs Mr. Van Grass, Immigration
Met Mozambican officials from at Ressano Garcia at above post	Reginaldo Macano, Immigration Manual Henriques Carlos, Immigration Felix Namburete Matsimbe, Frontier Police Abdul Remane, Police Fernando Parruque, Customs
Lomahasha (Swazi) and Namaacha (Moz) Joint Meeting - Mozambican officials	Musa Nsibandze, Mozambican Customs Isaac Mkhweli, Police Elphas S. Zulu, Police Loao Hunguana, G.C.P.C.D A. Gregorio Uamusse, Frontier Police Maria Diogo Jose, Immigration F. Amaral, Frontier Police Nyoriate Toueas Bills, Frontier Police Dade Sumail, Immigration Miguel A. Nhinana, Immigration Egidio Inocencio, Customs Daniel Chabana, Customs Milton Maleine, Customs
Swaziland officials	Simon F. Dlamini, Immigration Eduardo A. Chipocosso, Frontier Police Jerome S. Ndlangamandla, Head of Drugs Unit
Matsapa International Airport, Swaziland	Inspector Solomon Maphusa, Police David Dicalaca, Customs
Criminal Intelligence Unit, Swaziland	Inspector Joseph Bembe
Ngwenya, Swaziland	Sandile Kunene, Customs Richard Ndlangamandla, Police Donald Matsebula, Customs Philemon Shongwe, Immigration Dolly J. Shelembe, Police David Sibauyoiu, Customs
Oshoek, South Africa	Captain Kobus Scholtz, Border Police Supt. Thys Ludolf, Border Police, Area Head, Mpumalanga Province

At UNODC Office

Supt. Andre Vreugdenburg, Border Police,
Captain Skolla Scholtz, SAPS (Trainer)

Kosibay, South Africa

Supt. Andre Vreugdenburg, Border Police
Supt. Willie Meiring, Area Head, Border Police,
North Kwazulu Natal Province.
Captain Skolla Scholtz

Participants at TPR Meeting held at Kosibay, South Africa with contact numbers ..

South Africa	Supt. Meiring as above	0828006707
	Supt. Vreugdenburg	0824984544
	Captain Scholtz	0124218298/0828095536
Mozambique	Antonio Valerio Nandanga, G.C.P.C.D	082894460
	Rogemio Ricardo Bembele, Immigration	082419623
	Di Stefano Xavier Honwana, Immigration	082 877590
	Audne Gregorio Uamusse, Frontier Police	082395132
	Remulo Romeu Sousa, Customs	082319763
	Algy Abdul Remane Osman, Customs	0925882893197
	Fernando Fortuno Jaime, National Brigades For drug control	082449167
Swaziland	Jerome Ndlangamandla, Head of Drugs Unit	09268 6048430/4044941
	Simon Dlamini, Immigration	09268 4042941
	Patrick Dlamini, Police	09268 4424337
	Maria-Assunta L. Dlamini, Head border posts and immigration	092684042501-5 (Ext. 222)
	Philemon Shongwe, Immigration	09268 - 4424425
	Albert S. Mlosa, Customs	09268-2370006
	Sandile C. Kunene, Customs	09268-4047586 09268-4040774 (Fax)
UNODC, Pretoria	Gary Lewis, Programme Manager (Drugs)	09-27-82-780-9351
	Chantel Marais, Nat'l Prog. Officer	09-27-12-342-2424
	Joao Brito Da Cunha, National Project	09-258-82-321786
	Co-ordinator, Mozambique	09-258-1-499040 (Fax)
Evaluator	Derek A. Todd, ex British Police	44 - 1784 -243662 derek@datodd.freemove.co.uk

[o.uk](http://www.datodd.co.uk)



UNITED NATIONS
Office on Drugs and Crime

RAF/E06 – Tri-Border Project (Swaziland: Training & Equipment)

Cost: US\$600,000. Started in 1999. Due to be completed in November 2002. Objective: To increase seizures of illicit drugs and other crime-related materials by law enforcement agencies in the project area, and areas of toxic substance, South Africa and Swaziland. To strengthen the national legal and institutional framework to support operational cross-border cooperation. Execution: CP Southern Africa, GoY Yemen, I roundtrip, age of 1es: Central C.: bio'l for the fln:., entio. and Fight Against Drug Abuse (Mozambique), Sow African Probe Service, Police Drug., Umt (SwilZiland).



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
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Training Course III
(17-23 November 2001) Border control training conducted at
Namaacha. 10 trainees from Lomashaba border post attended.


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


RAF/R06 – Tri-National Project (Mozambique)

Cost: US\$600,000. Started in 1999. Due to be completed in November 2002. Objective: To increase the effectiveness of illicit drugs and other crime-related material by law enforcement agencies in the project target areas of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland. To strengthen the enabling legal and institutional framework to support operational OIOS-border-cooperation. Executive: UNDCP Southern Africa. Go/Cmnetti counterpart agencies: Central Cabinet (for the Prevention and Fight Against Drug Abuse of Mozambique), South African Police Service, Police Demographic Unit (Swaziland).

Training Course IV

(26 Jan-1 Feb 2002) Border control training conducted at Komapoort. 10 trainees from Ressano Garcia border post attended.



Training Course VI
 (17-23 November 2001) Border control training conducted at Namaacha. 6 trainees from Namaacha border post attended.

Training Course VII
 (29 June-5 July 2002) Border control training at Komapoort. 10 trainees from Ressano Garcia, Lebombo and Omo border posts attended.

Training Course V
 (8-17 March 2002) Border control training at Komapoort. 3 trainees from Ressano Garcia and 2 from Head Quarters attended.

UNITED NATIONS Office on Drugs and Crime

RAF/E06 – Tri-Border Project (South Africa: Training & Equipment)

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
Waverley Border Post
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RAF/E06 – Tri-Border Project (South Africa: Airports)

Cost: US\$600,000. Started in 1999. Due to be completed in November 2002. Objective: To increase seizures of illicit drugs and other crime-related material by law enforcement agencies in the project area; of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland. To strengthen the enabling legal and institutional framework to support operational cross-border cooperation. Execution: UNDCP Southern Africa. Government counterpart agencies: Central Cabinet for the Prevention and Fight Against Drug Abuse (Mozambique), South African Police Service, Police Drugs Unit (Swaziland).

Johannesburg International Airport
NDS 1000 intelligent detection system.

Border Police Training Unit
Digital camera, Notebook Laptop, Windows
98, MS Office XP Professional, portable
printer, powerpoint projector.



Durban International Airport
NOS 2000 intelligent detection system,
Olympus infrared telephoto camera.

EVALUATOR'S NOTES FROM MEETINGS AND VISITS

This section will briefly elaborate on the visits made and the persons met. With the exception of the first briefing meeting, a full list of persons met can be found at **Annex 3** at the rear of the report. Maps portraying all of the border posts encompassed within the project can be found at **Annex 4**.

Monday, 10th February, 2003.

The consultant was briefed at UNODC Regional Office in Pretoria before departure by **Mr. Rob Boone, the Representative**, the aforementioned **Mr. Gary Lewis** and **Ms. Chantel Marais**.

The mission then travelled by road to the only site visit of the day, **Jeppesreef** border post on the South African/Swaziland border. The arrival was unannounced. The consultant was pleased to note several features of good practice. En route, border patrols were noted by the roadside keeping observation on the open border line. Within the border post, a number of pedestrians and vehicles were in transit in both directions. Casual observations showed that the post was well controlled and regulated. Two vehicles, travelling in opposite directions, were in the process of being searched by police on one hand and Customs officials on the other. No official meetings were scheduled for this visit other than that related to the official handing over of equipment. However, both the local South African commander and his Swazi counterpart, during this handover process, expressed the view that the post was most likely used for drug trafficking and other forms of smuggling but there was no specific corroborative intelligence. There was clearly a good working relationship between the two officers and both were extremely complimentary of the training that had been received under the project forecasting that now their respective staff members knew what to do and what they were looking for in interdiction terms, success would soon follow. There is no doubt in the mind of the consultant that the latest equipment provided will be of great assistance to the users.

Tuesday, 11th February, 2003.

The first visit of the day was to the border post at **Lebombo (SA)** and **Ressano Garcia (Mozambique)**. At Lebombo, the consultant had the opportunity to inspect a fibrescope and infra red telescopic camera supplied previously under the project and found both pieces to be well maintained and regularly in use. Safe keeping was under the direct control of the police commander. It was stated that this post was used for all types of smuggling from Mozambique to South Africa. It was claimed that in recent months, seizures had been made of mandrax tablets, cocaine in dosage units and cannabis. No documentation was provided to support this. Two real problems, not covered by the project, were highlighted. The use of the open border areas for smuggling was well known and although SANDF patrols regularly covered the area, the area was too vast for effective law enforcement preventative measures. During the visit, the mission had the opportunity to see about 30 people detained overnight by the SANDF attempting to illegally enter South Africa actually being deported back to Mozambique, the country of origin. The second area of concern was the railway line between Mozambique and South Africa. The South African Immigration Department is obliged to send staff to Komatipoort, the station nearest to the

border post to check the documentation of passengers entering from Mozambique. On the incoming train, an average of 90 passengers disembark and many are able to escape any control measures and simply disappear into the town.

Again, the training received was described as first class and the immigration officer at the meeting stated that now, a much larger percentage of false passports and documentation was being detected and the provision of the ultra violet scanner could only improve the situation. In addition, again as a result of the training, at least four stolen cars were being detected monthly whereas before, the rate was about one per month.

During a walk through of the facilities, control measures were in place and it was established that the post would be upgraded by the building of a vehicle search shed which was apparently in the planning stages.

Co-operation with their Mozambican counterparts was described as good with regular official meetings being in place. However, it was felt that a lack of expertise on the Mozambican side did have a slightly negative effect on control measures.

The Lebombo post also benefitted from their own national intelligence sources and trafficking intelligence emanating from Mozambique tended to be passed to the post directly through the auspices of the SA Police Liaison officer in Maputo.

The meeting with the Mozambican officials from **Ressano Garcia** also highlighted the quality of the training received. The main view expressed was that their increased awareness had forced the smugglers to use the open border more often. That said, no drug seizures have ever been made at the post according to those spoken to.

Co-operation was described as good and they did not identify the railway line as a problem. Mozambican customs officials apparently carry out checks at Komatipoort Station on the South African side.

The mission then left and travelled to Swaziland entering the country at **Border gate(SA)/Mananga(Swazi)**. Again, no official meetings were arranged but good control practices were observed. During informal discussions on both sides, it was apparent that it was suspected that drugs may transit through the post but no seizures had been made. Again, the open border was considered more vulnerable.

The final visit of the day was to the border post at **Lomahasha (Swazi)/Namaacha (Moz)**. This was a joint meeting held at the Lomahasha side. Both sides again complemented the training component although some observations were made that the course was of too short duration and could have contained more specialised drugs material. The general theme however was that the staff now knew what they were supposed to do and the equipment provided could only enhance that capability. However, no drugs have been seized on the Mozambican side while the Swazi officials have seized 25,000 mandrax tablets and a small quantity of cocaine in 2002. **Since the site visit, more detailed information has been received regarding the mandrax seizure. In fact, the final count of tablets amounted to 50,000 but after analysis, only 4,909 were confirmed as mandrax.** No written confirmation of these seizures was available at the time of the visit. Both sides did report an increase in the seizure of stolen cars as a direct result of the training which was one of the

target objectives of the project.

Training manuals provided under the project were visible on each side of the border and officers who did not receive the training nevertheless have the opportunity of reading the methodology.

At Lomahasha, HF/VHF communication equipment provided previously in the project was inspected and found to be well maintained and in regular use.

Wednesday, 12th February, 2003.

The first visit of the morning was with officers posted to **Matsapa International Airport**, Swaziland. Time did not allow a visit to inspect the airport facilities but it was established that on average, three international flights take place each day. Under the project, a base radio set together with 10 handhelds were provided and found to be in good working order and regular use. Apparently, an x-ray machine has recently been installed (not project) but staff need to be trained in its use. No person from the airport received training.

It was established that one seizure of 10 cannabis blocks had been seized from the suitcase of a Dutch male traveller. It is suspected that the airport may be used frequently by traffickers but lack of training and detection equipment will be a bar to success.

The next visit was to the **Criminal Intelligence Unit** which had been supplied by a computer and ancillary equipment under the project. Included in the software provided was Analyst Notebook. The system was inspected and found to be well maintained and in regular use. Training is required in one facet of the Notebook use but this is in hand and will shortly be completed under the project.

Intelligence gathering was discussed and it was established that machinery was in place for intelligence gathering at each police office and border post. However, not all anecdotal intelligence, arrests, seizures etc., were forwarded. Similarly, this unit could not supply details of suspected cannabis cultivation sites nor could it supply full details of eradication efforts even though this information is available with the Narcotics Unit (as per the draft annual report for 2002).

The unit does however have good work practices. Intelligence patterns are build up and expanded upon by the unit before delivery to operational teams. Intelligence, not yet supported by seizures, suggests that drugs are being hidden in vehicle concealments but in the main, these vehicles cross the border via unofficial routes.

The mission then travelled to the **Ngwenya (Swazi)/Oshoek (SA)** post. At Ngwenya, communication equipment together with a fax machine supplied under the project were inspected and found to be in good working order. It was reported that cannabis is seized, mainly from passengers luggage, about 2/3 times per month but no written confirmation was available. A similar amount of stolen cars were seized each month. A number of the people present had received training under the project and all reported its excellence. However, a need was stressed for more training and, during discussion, it emerged that a total of 20 officers had been trained from Ngwenya and neighbouring smaller posts. Now, only 8 of the trainees were still in place. The sustainability of training problems such as this are a constant

problem and further comment will be made later in the report. However, the training manuals distributed during the courses were still available within the posts.

Co-operation with their SA counterparts was described as good and information is exchanged. All different agencies within the post work together.

This was a busy post and although all transit procedures were being carried out correctly in relation to people, there was no evidence of vehicle searching taking place

The post at Oshoek is currently under reconstruction and therefore somewhat chaotic. Again, all transit procedures were being followed but little evidence of vehicle searching. Training was again described as excellent although at least one senior officer felt he would have benefitted from a follow-up briefing with his counterparts some time later. Again, the consultant will revert to this topic later in the report. In addition, due to the lack of the English language of the Mozambican participants, it was felt that some of the benefit of exchanging views with colleagues was lost. The main priority at this post is stolen vehicles and success is being achieved. It is estimated that between 10/15 per month are being recovered but no documentary proof of this was provided. However, if this is true, one of the project objectives is being met with success. The view was expressed that drugs do not transit through the post and are actually moved across the open border some 15 kms away. One new trend appears to be the smuggling of out of date South African medicine into Swaziland and Mozambique where it is re-bottled and sold at much cheaper prices.

Another possible, and likely, method of drug trafficking was by light aircraft. There are at least 50 uncontrolled landing strips in the area.

When questioned about the ratio of success being achieved by intelligence as opposed to strict interdiction methods by the staff, it was learned that only 2% of success is from intelligence sources. It is the view of the consultant that because of this factor, the importance of the training and the subsequent delivery of ancillary equipment takes on even greater relevance. Without this aspect, the officers would have little capacity to detect contraband.

Co-operation between the different agencies within the post and cross border was described as good although it was felt that corruption still has a detrimental effect.

Thursday, 13th February, 2003.

En route to Pretoria, a visit was made to **Nerston (SA)** border post to deliver equipment. Equipment was also handed over to officials from the Swaziland side **Sandlane**. Informal discussions with both sides more or less corroborated what the mission had seen and been told during other visits. Drugs were not being seized and it was strongly suspected that the open border line was being used. In that particular area, the terrain in places was very conducive to such smuggling activities.

Friday, 14th February, 2003.

The consultant had the opportunity to discuss training issues with Captain Skolla Scholtz, SAPS Border Police, who is the person responsible under the project for the

preparation of the programme and its delivery to the students. In the view of the consultant, the use of local experts is of great value for two reasons. Firstly, it is cost effective compared to the use of international trainers and secondly, local trainers have the relevant knowledge not only in training terms but they have a much better knowledge of the geographic areas in which the students work. In addition, a number of trafficking scenarios were discussed which may have impacted on this project and will certainly have an impact on future activity, especially if it can be confirmed that much of the smuggling takes place over the open border areas.

Statistical data emanating from the SAPS Border Police was discussed but as it also covered areas like the sea and air ports of the country, it did not help in establishing any impact

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Project evaluation Summary assessment questionnaire

This questionnaire is to be filled out by the evaluator or evaluation team and to be submitted to backstopping office. A copy should be provided to the Senior Evaluation Officer, Division for Operations and Analysis. A separate questionnaire should be filled out for each project encompassed by the evaluation. The information provided must be fully congruent with the contents of the evaluation report.

The purpose of the questionnaire is to provide information for UNODC's evaluation database. The information will be used to establish evaluation profiles which should give a quick and correct overview of the evaluation of individual projects and programmes. It will also be used for the purpose of analyzing results across project evaluations to obtain a systematic picture of the overall performance of the Programme.

I. NUMBER AND TITLE OF PROJECT

AD/.RAF/99/E06

**Capacity Building Against Drug Trafficking
and Organized Crime in Southeastern Africa**

II. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:

1. Please provide an assessment for all categories listed (including categories constituting headings) by ticking one of the boxes ranging from 0 to 5. The ratings from 0 to 5 are based on the following standard favor-to-disfavor scale:

- 5 - Outstanding, highly appropriate, much more than planned/expected, certain to materialize
- 4 - Very good, very appropriate, more than planned/expected, highly likely to materialize
- 3 - Good, appropriate, as planned/expected, likely to materialize
- 2 - Fair, less appropriate, less than planned/expected, less likely to materialize
- 1 - Unsatisfactory, not appropriate, far below plans/expectations, unlikely to materialize
- 0 - Cannot determine, not applicable

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION:	X							X
1. Quality and timeliness of UNODC inputs:							X	
2. Quality and timeliness of Government inputs:					X			
3. Quality and timeliness of inputs by third parties:			X					
4. Equipment: *inappropriate in the sense of being premature and generous				X				
5. Advisory/training services:							X	
6. Project personnel:			X					
7. Sub-contracting:			X					
8. Management of project:								X
9. Project workplans:							X	
10. Implementation of activities:							X	
11. Monitoring and backstopping by UNODC HQ:			X					
12. Monitoring and backstopping by UNODC field Office:								X
13. Monitoring and backstopping by Executing Agency:								X
14. Monitoring and backstopping by Government:					X			
15. Government fulfilment of prerequisites:						X		
III. PROJECT RESULTS:						X		
1. Timeliness of produced outputs;					X			
2. Quantity of produced outputs:							X	
3. Quality of produced outputs:							X	
4. Outcomes: achievement/likely achievement of immediate objective(s):						X		
5. Drug control impact achieved:						X		

4

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
6. Drug control impact to be expected		X				X		
7. Likely sustainability of project results:		X				X		

3. If external factors had an impact on project performance please tick the appropriate boxes: external factors impeded: ___/ promoted: ___ project performance. The effect on project performance of this influence was significant: ___/ highly significant: _____. Please provide a short description of the nature of the external factor(s):

4. Did the evaluation recommend to:

- a) _____ abandon the project
- b) _____ continue/extend the project without modifications
- c) _____ continue/extend the project with minor modifications
- d) _____ continue/extend the project with some modifications
- e) _____ continue/extend the project with extensive modification
- f) X terminate the projects, as planned

(please tick the relevant category).

5. ~~If a modification of the project was recommended did the evaluation recommend a revision of: the drug control objective(s): _____, the immediate objective(s): _____, the outputs: _____, the activities: _____ or the inputs: _____, Please tick as appropriate.~~

It is recommended that the project be redesigned into a new project.

6. If the evaluation recommended that the project or significant elements of it be replicate please tick as appropriate: yes: X / no: _____

Yes, only selective parts. See full Todd report.