TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Project number: AD/MOZ/97/C47
Project title: “Capacity Building in Drug Control for the Government of Mozambique”
Thematic area: Drug Control – Law Enforcement
Country: Mozambique
Evaluator: UNODC ROSA self-evaluation with selected extracts from April 2002 independent evaluation mission undertaken by Mr. Derek A. Todd

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The need for the project: At the time of project design and implementation, there existed well-grounded concerns which, although not based on specific intelligence, served to confirm the project target area, i.e., Mozambique, as vulnerable to trafficking in drugs, and various contraband, which justified the need to develop the project. On this basis, the project was deemed justifiable. The amount of time allotted in the project document was also reasonable to attain the objectives, allowing for the usual degree of slippage. For the objectives indicated, the amount of funding was realistic.

• Project context: The project was complementary to other international donor assistance activities in the region (particularly UNODC projects in the region RAF/E06 – Tri-border Control, RAF/B81 – Seaports (I), RAF/G13 – Seaports (II) and SAF/978 – Police Training). It has formed the core activities regarding law enforcement capacity building in Mozambique as part of the UNODC programme of assistance in drug law enforcement to the region.

• Project preconditions: As part of the project design, relevant and reasonable prerequisites were put into place prior to project implementation.

• Project goals: The overall set of project objectives, outputs and activities were sound.

• Project outputs and activities: Most of the activities in the project have been carried out. The only remaining activity is the delivery and commissioning of forensic science equipment and materials which is scheduled to take place in January 2004.

• Training: The training manual prepared for the training of the DDUs is considered applicable with all of the relevant and recommended subjects included. Students obtained great benefit from their attendance of the course. The fact that the training was delivered in Spanish/Portuguese by trainers from the Spanish Guardia Civil and not in English greatly benefited the (Portuguese-language) course participants.

• Briefings to the donors: Diplomatic missions in Maputo – especially the Italian and EU (principal donors) and Spanish (implementing partner) missions - were regularly briefed on project progress. Further, regular briefings were also given to the Mini-Dublin Group in Maputo.

• Difficulties in measuring project success: In terms of process indicators (equipment delivered, law enforcement officers trained, etc.), the project accomplished all of its goals. However, the outcome indicators which reflect project impact were not established at the project’s outset and have been less easily obtainable, and where obtained, have not indicated significant progress.
• Project management by the Field Office: The project was managed by UNODC ROSA in Pretoria, with the appointment of a project coordinator based in Maputo. By having a project coordinator “on site”, the field office was better able to implement and monitor the project's implementation in a flexible and reasonably timely fashion which responded to the exigencies of the situation. The project coordinator, with assistance from the ROSA, developed a series of costed workplans which permitted the accurate tracking of outputs, activities and inputs. The project was regularly monitored through missions, consultations, evaluations, briefings and reports. Project changes were agreed by consensus among all parties and reflected in the project workplans.

• Overall conclusion: In summary, all except one of the activities in the final version of the project document have been fully carried out. In terms of training and equipment, it has met expectations, and one can only assume that limited success will follow. The real bar to success is the lack of reliable intelligence specifying exactly which drug trafficking routes are being used. Most of the information made available to an independent evaluator in April 2002 was anecdotal. There is no doubt that the project has strengthened the recipients’ ability to exercise better control over drug trafficking and general law enforcement. However, it is unclear what impact the project has had in actual drug interdiction terms. Perhaps the most significant lesson learnt is the need for full governmental counterpart resolve and support on a project whose nature is as sensitive as this one. This is deemed to be critical if the funding placed by the international donor community at the disposal of UNODC to render assistance to requesting UN Member States is to have greatest and most cost-effective impact.
INTRODUCTION

1. As indicated in the project document, this project – “Capacity Building in Drug Control for the Government of Mozambique” - AD/MOZ/97/C47 – aims to support the enhancement of institutional capacity for drug control in Mozambique. The project’s objectives were to: (a) assist in the implementation of newly developed national drug legislation in Mozambique, (b) strengthen law enforcement agencies, and (c) create an institutional capacity for drug analysis and identification.

CHAPTER I: PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN

A. Overall assessment

2. At the time of the project’s inception, the Government of Mozambique requested assistance in curbing the involvement of Mozambique in both importing and exporting, as well as to increase in-country seizures, of the four main illegal drugs of concern, namely cannabis/hashish, mandrax, heroin, and cocaine. Available statistics indicated the use of the country as a transit point of significant proportions. Mozambique was therefore considered to be a priority country for UNODC assistance in the sub-region.

3. In Mozambique, information received was that although there was limited cultivation of cannabis, the manufacturing of mandrax seemed to have started with laboratories producing the substance, many of which had been raided and closed down since 1995. Also, there was some anecdotal evidence of smuggling in precursor chemicals. The trafficking in illegal substances often appeared highly organized and of quite widespread proportions. Not only cannabis and methaqualone but also significant quantities of heroin, hashish and cocaine were seized in 1998. The latter three drugs appeared to be destined both for the South African market and for transshipment to Europe. In addition, MDMA and prescription drugs (diazepam) were found in small quantities.

4. Mozambique's extremely long and open coastline, together with a relatively weak screening capacity at the major ports, suggested that the country might be, or might still become, the most favored entry point in the region for bulk smuggling of illicit substances. (It is noted that under two separate projects RAF/E06, (capacity building at borders) and RAF/B81 (seaport interdiction), Mozambique has additionally benefited from UNODC assistance within the past three years.)

5. The above assessment led to the conclusion that at the time when the project was initiated, there were well-grounded concerns which, although not based on specific intelligence, served to confirm that Mozambique is vulnerable in terms of drug trafficking, drug abuse and transnational crime. The project was therefore deemed justifiable. The amount of time allotted in the project document was also reasonable to attain the objectives, allowing for the usual degree of slippage. For the objectives indicated, the amount of funding was realistic.
B. **Problem analysis, objectives and achievement indicators**

6. Prior to project implementation, the following major seizures were reported in Mozambique:
   - Hashish: Szczecin, Poland; La Junquera, Spain and Antwerp, Belgium - seizures of 4,450, 4,500 and 5,300 kg respectively in containers over a period of three months, all loaded in Nacala. Later, 40,000 kg seized in Maputo in May 1995. At the beginning of 1999, 12,000 kg were seized in Quissanga (Province of Cabo-Delgado) with 21 persons arrested.
   - Mandrax: 2.2 million tablets seized in Namaacha in the area bordering Swaziland, in a container bound for South Africa. Later, it was discovered that this was the only one of ten consignments sent from India to be intercepted.
   - Heroin: A seizure of 12 kg made at Lisbon airport on a flight from Maputo in 1995.
   - Cocaine: 5 seizures in one month, totalling around 15 kg, at Lisbon airport, from couriers in transit from Rio de Janeiro to Maputo in 1994.

7. In addition, there existed substantial informed belief and anecdotal evidence of the country being used to ship large quantities of drugs into and throughout the region.

8. The specific target areas of action which this project addressed were (a) implementation of legislation, (b) the strengthening of law enforcement capabilities, and (c) the development of forensic laboratory capacity.

9. At the time of the project’s inception, Mozambique already possessed an Anti-Drug Brigade which falls under the responsibility of the Criminal Investigation Directorate of the Commander-General of Police, but which required strengthening in terms of facilities, training and equipment to combat drugs effectively.

10. Moreover, based on expert advice delivered at the commencement of the project, it was suggested that specialised teams of law enforcement officers be set up in key cities throughout the country and trained and equipped to handle drug interdiction in their respective areas. Drug intelligence gathering techniques were also to be developed through international advisory assistance. Drug testing and analytical capabilities at the Forensic Science Laboratory were also to have been improved to complement the efforts expected from judicial and enforcement agencies.

11. It was intended that by the end of the project Mozambique’s drug legislation would be implemented and understood by judges, magistrates, court officials, prosecutors, defence attorneys and law enforcement officers. This would be accomplished through a training workshop to sensitise these officials.

12. In summary, it was envisaged that the project would ensure the existence of the minimum capacity required for effective drug control in the field of law enforcement and judicial systems.

13. One problem with the project design is that it lacked measurable outcome achievement indicators, and as a result, it is not possible to establish clearly the project’s impact.
14. The government of Mozambique and the project coordinator based in Maputo have provided UNODC with ad hoc data on seizures and arrests throughout the country. However, these have been irregular, and it has been difficult to establish a clear causal link between these occurrences and the outputs and impact of the project.

C. Outputs, activities and inputs

15. The project’s outputs, activities and inputs follow below:

16. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 1: By the year 2002, to ensure that the recently-updated national drug control legislation has been successfully implemented and expanded as appropriate.

   OUTPUT 1.1: Judges, magistrates, prosecutors, defenders, court and Ministry of Justice officials and law enforcement officials in the major drug entry/exit areas trained in and able to implement successfully the newly approved Mozambican drug legislation.

   Activities for 1.1: Mission of Legal Adviser to Mozambique to identify national constraints relating to the implementation of the approved drug laws and develop a programme of training to remedy any identified problems; Preparation by Legal Adviser of a costed workplan related to the identified training needs; Review by the Legal Adviser of the current legislation and provision of advice, as appropriate, on the need for complementary legislation pertaining to drug control; Organization of programmes for staff training; Development by the participants of a plan of action for the functioning of the responsible and relevant departments regarding the successful implementation of the new legislation.

17. Comment: This approach was sound, and UNODC did host a mission in 2000 by a Brazilian Expert, Mr. Ribeiro Costa. However, the mission was only partially successful in that Mr. Costa’s report and costed workplan were found not to be applicable to the situation in-country. UNODC ROSA therefore focussed on the training component of this output, and two training sessions were conducted for Judges, Prosecutors and Senior Police Officers. A total of 100 individuals were trained. The first was held in February/March 2001 and the second November/December 2002. The second training initiative, however, was sponsored by the project RAF/E13 because of funding difficulties experienced by MOZ/C47. The curriculum covered aspects such as combating drug abuse and trafficking: specifically, legislation, the penal code and investigation techniques. This aspect of project implementation was fully and properly implemented in terms of a set of activities which reached the intended recipients.

18. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 2: To ensure that by the end of the project the interdiction capacity of the drug law enforcement agencies is strengthened, at least in the three most important entry/exit points in the country -- Maputo, Beira and Nacala -- and that this capacity is capable of being developed further.

19. OUTPUT 2.1: UNODC office established in Maputo.

   Activities for 2.1: Recruit National Officer; Establish Office in UNDP Maputo; Purchase office equipment; Purchase project vehicle.

20. Comment: These activities were successfully completed by May 2000.
21. **OUTPUT 2.2**: Dedicated Drug Units (DDUs) established in at least three main entry/exit points in Mozambique.
   
   **Activities for 2.2:** Missions by Regional Drug Law Enforcement Adviser (RDLEA) for a needs-assessment and eventual provision of appropriate levels of drug control assistance to the identified target areas; to advise on the establishment of the DDUs; and to provide assistance to the authorities, at an initial stage, of intelligence gathering and case enquiry; Completion of the RDLEA’s report and the adoption of the recommendations in relation to this project, and the longer term; Preparation by the RDLEA of a costed workplan to achieve this objective; Secure agreement of Mozambican authorities to establish and staff (either by redeployment or post creation) of DDUs; Establishment of the DDUs.

22. **Comment:** This activity was successfully completed during 2000. No RDLEA was available to the project, but ROSA commissioned the services of a DLE expert who provided the necessary guidance to procure and deploy the equipment. The Ministry of Interior established 11 DDUs, one for each Province totaling 80 members (70 from the police and 10 from Customs).

23. **OUTPUT 2.3**: Necessary equipment provided to the DDUs to operate and support the normal functioning of these entities.
   
   **Activities for 2.3:** RDLEA selects units to receive equipment; Establish a time frame for sourcing and costing relevant equipment as per consultant's recommendations (e.g., vehicles, radio equipment and drug detection equipment); Purchase of equipment; Installation of equipment; Assessment of functioning of equipment; Follow-up mission by a short-term expert to backstop the project and advise on future developments.

24. **Comment:** This activity was successfully completed during 2000. The following were provided: prioritizing those from Maputo and Sofala provinces, as follows: 7 Vehicles with Radio Communications installed; 20 portable radios; 2 repeaters; 14 Cameras with zoom lenses; 14 Binoculars (night vision); 7 Video cameras; 30 Vehicle searching mirrors; 50 Drug Identification Kits and coloured films. However, it must be mentioned that the delivery of the vehicles and communications equipment took exceptionally long. The vehicles and communications equipment were delivered to the Maputo in 2000, but because of bureaucratic processes internal to the Mozambican government, actual delivery to the DDUs only occurred, with the help of UNDP Maputo, in 2002. The details of the causes of this delay are recounted in the Todd Report (independent evaluation) of April 2002.

25. **OUTPUT 2.4**: Training provided to DDUs in relevant areas of drug law enforcement.
   
   **Activities for 2.4:** Identification and sourcing of expertise to provide basic training courses; Establish time frame and costed workplan for training activities; Selection of drug law enforcement officers to be trained; Organization of venue; Delivery of courses; Evaluation of course.

26. **Comment:** This activity was successfully completed during 2001. In accordance with the agreement signed on January 25th, 2001, between the UNDP on behalf of UNODC and the Spanish Guardia Civil, three Drug Specialists were sent to Maputo to train 80 drug combat agents selected from the following Mozambican Institutions:
• Police of the Republic of Mozambique (70 agents)
• Mozambique Customs Authority (10 agents)
The agents were divided into three separate groups and the Spanish specialists conducted three consecutive courses (15 days for each group). The first course started on February 6th, 2001. The whole training was concluded on March 30th, 2001.

27. **OUTPUT 2.5:** Officers selected and trained as trainers.
   **Activities for 2.5:** Selection of candidates for train-the-trainer (TTT) fellowships outside Mozambique; Selection of training institution, course and duration; Preparation of timetable for training; Conduct of training; Evaluation of training conducted.

28. **Comment:** Because all of the DDU officers were trained by the Guardia Civil, this output was never further addressed. No requests for additional training of trainers were forthcoming from either the Government of Mozambique or the DDU staff.

29. **IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 3:** By the end of the project to strengthen national drug testing laboratories to effectively serve all agencies involved in drug control activities.
   **OUTPUT 3.1:** Drug testing laboratory(ies) established, equipped and officers trained.
   **Activities 3.1:** Fielding of a UNODC Laboratory Expert mission to assess on-site needs and logistical requirements of the laboratory(ies) selected for assistance; Preparation by UNODC Laboratory Expert of a costed workplan to achieve this output; Provision of fellowships for training of four drug analysts (two per laboratory) in analytical techniques for the identification and analysis of drugs seized and biological specimens requiring testing and analysis; Provision of laboratory equipment, analytical instruments, reagents and other materials; Provision of reference samples of drugs under international control; Provision of scientific reference documents, information materials and publications related to drug testing procedures and techniques.

30. **Comment:** It is envisaged that this activity will be successfully completed by the end of January 2004. A laboratory expert from UNODC in Vienna went on mission to Mozambique from 27 June to 4 July 2000.

a) Following the mission, a public bid was opened in order to select a building contractor to carry out the refurbishment of four identified rooms in the Forensic Lab. However, a problem arose due to the fact that the Government of Mozambique had not informed UNODC that they had made a prior request to the Government of France to refurbish those same rooms and that the latter were in the process of making arrangements to do so. As a result, four different rooms within the same complex had to be later identified for refurbishment and use as drug testing facilities by the project. In this regard, a coordination meeting took place on 18 July 2001 between the Mozambique Government (Minister of Interior), UNDP, UNODC and the French Embassy for a final decision.

b) As a result, after a shortlisting process, 10 local companies were invited to tender for the rehabilitation of the FSL premises. Six companies responded to the bid. The submission of the proposals deadline was October 23rd and potential bidders were instructed to deposit their bids at the UNDP Administrative Section. The bids were duly opened on November 1st in the presence of the bidders who chose to attend.
c) Following this, UNDP and UNODC, with the technical guidance of an independent local construction consulting firm, conducted the technical evaluation of the bids, and a company was selected according to agreed criteria.

d) On November 14th, a meeting of the UNDP Local Contract Committee was convened. The envisaged outcome of the LCC was to a) reach a decision regarding the selected tenderer for the physical upgrade of the premises, and b) make a decision regarding the tenderer for the provision of the equipment for the laboratory.

e) During the course of the LCC meeting, one of the participating members expressed his disagreement with the selection of the successful company. The LCC was therefore unable to reach a unanimous decision regarding either of the decisions that had to be made.

f) Nonetheless, UNDP Mozambique indicated that a final decision was expected to result in the refurbishment being initiated before year-end and the purchasing of the equipment to be done shortly thereafter.

g) Despite UNODC’s repeated efforts, this did not take place as planned. The allocation of a contractor for the physical upgrade was only made in March 2002, see paragraph 31. The purchasing of the equipment remained outstanding much longer for a variety of reasons outlines in paragraphs 32 and 33.

31. Following a meeting between the UNODC and the UNDP in Maputo on March 13th 2002 to finally resolve the matter of the outstanding laboratory refurbishment, it was decided that a new tender should be launched. This was done, following the same process outlined above, and a company named Coopyaka was awarded the tender by the UNDP Local Contract Committee. The contract was signed on June 12th. UNODC was informed that the refurbishments had been completed during the second week of July 2002.

32. Regarding the purchasing of the forensic science laboratory equipment, UNDP Mozambique’s Local Contracts Committee was also unable to reach consensus by the end of 2001 on the selection of a service provider for the provision of the equipment. This matter was also addressed at the above-mentioned meeting on 13th March 2002. However, despite this, the process did not start because of problems with the budgetary allocation by UNODC Vienna. In short, UNDP Mozambique cut the cheques to the vendors that were recommended to the Local Contracts Committee prior to the 2001 committee meeting. This action resulted in the money being recorded as spent, while as a matter of fact the purchase orders were never issued. This matter was only rectified in the financial reporting from UNDP New York to UNODC Vienna in April 2003. (See below for full details.)

33. Thus, only in April 2003 did ROSA receive a financial allotment for the purchase of the forensic equipment. Because of the amount of funds involved (total purchases of $70,000), UNDP Pretoria suggested that the purchase be done through a Local Contracts
Committee after going on tender. The tender bids closed on 3 June 2003. During June 2003, ROSA submitted a request for a LCC to be called by UNDP Pretoria. In its submission, ROSA evaluated all tender submissions and make recommendations as to the suggested service provider in accordance with UNDP tender guidelines. However, despite lengthy delays in awaiting feedback from UNDP Pretoria regarding the date for the LCC, none was received. In August, due to the absence of a response from UNDP Pretoria pertaining to a date for the LCC, despite ROSA’s repeated efforts to obtain one, and due to the fact that the tender bids were expiring, ROSA decided to break down the purchases to be made into appropriate components and to then obtain multiple quotations for these components. This was done, six companies provided quotations (both South African and Mozambican), and the purchases were made from a total of three suppliers. Delivery and commissioning is expected to be finalized during January 2004.

34. In December 2003, ROSA received a communication from UNDP Maputo indicating that contrary to previous reports, there were still some refurbishment matters outstanding regarding the forensic laboratory in Maputo. No specifics were mentioned in the communication from UNDP. In its communication, UNDP only indicates that the matter will be addressed as a matter of priority to ensure that delivery and installation of the equipment could indeed take place in January of 2004. ROSA responded by requesting more details, but were informed that the director of the laboratory was unavailable. At present, ROSA is still following up on the matter but is still awaiting further explanations from either the UNDP Maputo or the Director of the laboratory.

D. Executing modality and managerial arrangements

35. The project was executed by the UNODC Regional Office for Southern Africa, with assistance by an appointed project coordinator based in Maputo. This decision to localize responsibility in South Africa seems to have been a sound one, since the field office has been better able to manage, execute and monitor the project’s implementation in a flexible and timely fashion which responded to the exigencies of the project. The project developed a series of costed workplans which permitted the accurate tracking of outputs, activities and inputs.

36. The responsibility for financial transactions was allocated to UNDP Pretoria, although some payments were done by UNDP Maputo through specific authorizations by UNDP Pretoria. Problems caused by the manner in which certain financial transactions were made significantly delayed aspects of the project’s implementation, e.g., with respect to the purchasing of the laboratory equipment (see paragraphs 30-34).

CHAPTER II: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Overall assessment

37. By studying the various TPR meeting minutes, one is able to see that alterations to the project were well discussed and swiftly acted upon. Examples would be the removing of the train-the-trainers activity as well as the laboratory fellowships, due to changed circumstances and the fact that these outputs were no longer required. Such flexibility of
action is recognized as good practice and was duly recorded in the revised project workplans.

38. The appointment of a project coordinator based in Maputo greatly assisted in the facilitation of certain project activities, which led to project implementation being hands-on. The coordinator was in a better position to identify possible bottlenecks and challenges before they arose and to attempt to smooth the way for project activities.

B. Delivery of inputs

39. All inputs as envisaged (except for the final objective of purchasing and delivering the forensic science laboratory equipment, and unspecified matters relating to the laboratory refurbishment) have been implemented.

40. The Portuguese-language training manual prepared for the training course was considered excellent with all of the relevant and recommended subjects included. Throughout the evaluation process, it was established that the students obtained great benefit from their attendance at the various courses.

41. An additional benefit was the use of the Guardia Civil trainers who were easily able to communicate with their Portuguese-speaking participants.

42. All of the initial equipment delivered is in use and in good working order according to UNDP Mozambique.

43. With the final delivery of the last equipment, all original outputs and activities within the project document’s three key objectives will have been completed, and indeed exceeded.

C. Management and implementation of activities

44. The project workplans were current, having been regularly updated. Similarly, the project TPRs were held on a regular basis, and minutes fully described the proceedings. Regular written and oral consultations took place with all partners.

45. A mid-term evaluation by an independent consultant Derek Todd, was undertaken in April 2002.

46. Regarding the financial management of the project, the evaluator found that all project activities (as per the amended list of outputs) had been carried out.

D. Monitoring and backstopping

47. Throughout the project’s life-cycle, various regular monitoring missions were undertaken. These included the initial assessment mission, the mid-term evaluation (already referred to above), and various ad-hoc missions by either the ROSA Representative and/or Programme Manager (Drugs), or their designee. Semi-annual PPRs were compiled and shared with the governments, the donors and UNODC Vienna.
48. Specifically in relation to the mid-term evaluation, such documentation was extremely useful. In fact, the mid-term evaluation report reflected somewhat negatively on the Mozambican Government’s apparent political willingness to take concerted action to interdict drug trafficking in the country. (A copy of the document is available with UNODC Vienna.)

49. The diplomatic missions of Italy and the EU (donors) in Maputo were regularly briefed on project progress. Further briefings were also given to the Mini-Dublin Group in Maputo on project progress.

E. Circumstances affecting the project (prerequisites)

50. The commencement of the project was conditional upon the receipt of the assurance from the Government of Mozambique that adequate structures to absorb the activities of the project would be set up and maintained. The signature of the representative of the Government of Mozambique to this project document was to constitute the assurance required.

51. The following prerequisites were also required to be fulfilled by the Government of Mozambique:
   - The provision of minimum resources (budget, staff, premises, office equipment) for the Dedicated Drug Units formed so that the techniques learned can actually be implemented and maintained beyond the end of the project.
   - Officers selected for these units and/or for training should be retained in their posts for at least three years after completion of training, in particular those officers selected to become trainers.
   - The equipment provided by the project should be maintained in good working order and utilised for the purposes envisaged by the project.

52. The project document was signed into effect by the Government of Mozambique on 20 September 1999, hence enabling UNODC to go ahead with the implementation of the project.

53. However, during December of 1999, Mozambique experienced massive floods, and project implementation was delayed until the country could recover from the crisis. Project implementation effectively started in May 2000 with the appointment of the project coordinator.

54. According to the independent project evaluator, the prerequisites set out above, although seemingly easy to adhere to, did not sufficiently galvanize the political commitment of the Government of Mozambique to fully support the implementation of the project to the degree that (a) enabled assistance to contribute to drug interdiction outcomes, and (b) ensure sustainability. These matters were raised by the evaluator directly with the Minister of the Interior in June 2002. A response from the Minister to the Todd report was vigorously sought by UNODC. Finally, the Minister replied on 27 February 2003, indicating that “regarding the Report of the Evaluation Mission, we entirely agree with its content and recommendations and we are in the process of implementing most of
55. Mr. Todd pointed out that while Mozambique plays a key role in the international drug trafficking arena, it appeared unready to fully utilize the resources placed at its disposal by the international donor community to meet this challenge.

56. The establishment of the DDUs will help, but they need logistical and financial support from central government and additional assistance, in a measured fashion based upon demonstrable commitment, from the international community. Mr. Todd points out that the role of the DDUs needs to be advertised and their skills utilized. Much of this work should have been done by the Central Brigade, but it is felt that lack of motivation and leadership contributed to the current situation of lack of capacity by the DDUs to fulfill their duties and successfully interdict drug trafficking in the country.

CHAPTER III: PROJECT RESULTS

A. Outputs

57. Output 1 - Legal component: This objective was met, although not fully in accordance with the originally envisaged activities and outputs. In 2000, the legal expert, Dr. Ribeiro Costa, undertook a mission to Mozambique. After a review of the final report from the expert, it was decided to focus this component on training officials. Judges, prosecutors and senior police officers received training in matters related to combating drug trafficking, especially drug legislation, the Mozambican penal code and investigation techniques. The training curriculum was finalized by UNODC together with the training institution (CCFJ) in Mozambique. Two courses were held, the first in 2001 and the second in 2002 (this latter course with assistance from the US-funded judicial training project RAF/E13).

58. Output 2 - Establishment of project office: This objective was successfully met during mid-2000.

59. Output 3 – Establishment and equipping of DDUs: The DDUs were established early in 2000 by the Mozambican government. A total of 80 officers (70 police and 10 customs) received training in drug interdiction techniques as presented by the Guardia Civil. Various searching, communications and transport equipment were purchased in 2000 and delivered throughout 2001 and 2002. However, the capacity of the DDUs to effectively interdict drug trafficking remains debatable. In the Todd report of April 2002, various problems pertaining to the capacities of the DDUs were highlighted. Direct extracts from the Todd report pertaining to this output follow:

~ It is known that other units, particularly within police narcotics unit (PIC), are sometimes tasked directly by the National Director to deal with drugs issues. These instances are not made known to the Central DDU.

~ Customs, especially in those locations where the Crown Agents are situated, liaise directly with the Security Police. Generally, however, the Customs in the provinces
take no active role in drug control although they are mandated to do so. It was the view of the consultant that all aspects of drug control should be undertaken under the umbrella of the Central DDU Brigade.

~ In relation to this specific project, the consultant was concerned that despite a number of promises, the vehicles and communication were up to April 2002 being held by customs for bureaucratic reasons, a direct contravention of the signed project document. This equipment was finally released in August 2002 and have been allocated to the appropriate DDUs.

~ In addition, no funding has been made available for the maintenance and fuelling of the vehicles, again contrary to the agreement. No provision has been made for the security of the communication equipment yet to be delivered. Dedicated offices, equipped with furniture, secure cabinets and telephones are required for all units. Operational drugs intelligence will also be collected and available for all to see with the result that information will leak and corrupt activities will follow unless it can be securely stored.

~ A decision has been taken, contrary to the original recommendations of the consultant, to deploy DDUs to each province. In reality, they are spread too thinly and the equipment provided under the project is therefore insufficient. There are many examples which could be highlighted but the situation in Cabo Delgado best describes the reality. This large province which has an international border with Tanzania, two provincial borders and a large expanse of coastline and offshore islands will be covered by a staff of 3. One of the strange anomalies in this country is that the police, including the DDU staff, have access to telephones but they cannot contact their colleagues in Nampula who do not. Another example of difficulties encountered due to the deployment can be seen in Nampula Province. The Port of Nacala is seen as a key location and one member of staff is nominally deployed there. However, she has no living accommodation and can only work there on the occasions when she can live with friends because no financial provision has been made for a hotel or other suitable quarters.

~ There is no doubt that those trained under the project have acquired an adequate knowledge which would enable them to carry out their functions. Indeed, throughout the entire mission, the training was described as good but of too short duration. Their respective ability to seek and gather intelligence at provincial level is very good but for the reasons already mentioned, such information with a national or international component cannot be forwarded to the Central Brigade and therefore, no strategic planning takes place. The consultant is not even sure if this concept exists. Similarly, there is a danger, although not felt at present, that the lack of an ability to use the information collected due to the non-availability of transport and communications, may in the longer term result in apathy amongst the staff.

~ A number of the staff have previous experience in drug related operations and the consultant firmly believed that they are capable of good work in the future when they are adequately supported.
At the time of the evaluation, the consultant felt that it was for all components of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), prepared in July 2001, to function. There was simply no method by which information can be exchanged or intelligence acted upon. As additional examples of the functions of the Central Brigade, they are tasked to promote and stimulate actions against drug trafficking and abuse. There is no evidence of any such stimulation at present. They are tasked to support complex investigations but do not have the means. The provincial brigades are tasked to maintain a strict articulation with the National Brigade forwarding data, details of arrests etc. on a daily basis but they do not have that possibility. In some instances, information can only be exchanged by post.

The staff seemed competent in their knowledge of drugs legislation. However, case loads are extremely low for obvious reasons. It was interesting to note that in many of the briefings, statistics relating to arrests and ultimately prosecutions or convictions were given and there was often a significant disparity between them. As an example, in 2001, Tete Provincial DDU made 58 arrests although only 26 resulted in prosecution. When followed up by the consultant, the answer given simply was that after the case was prepared, the prosecutor took over and the officers were not informed of any reasons for the non-prosecution of cases.

The equipment provided and received at the time of the evaluation, were being used, particularly the cameras, and was being well looked after and kept secure in a number of diverse locations depending on the province. However, none of it was held in secure offices dedicated to the DDUs because these offices do not exist.

It was impossible at the time to review the levels of success of the DDUs which was one the main originally intended purposes of the mission. It is fair to say that they are well trained and clearly have the ability to gather good quality drugs intelligence. A common complaint is that they have no funding to pay for information of the highest value. They also do not have the ability at this time to activate this intelligence into operations and the consultant feels that their impact can only be gauged after they are initially equipped with radios and vehicles. That will show whether they have the ability to act upon their information, at least at provincial level. Whether they have the ability to operate jointly at national level is debatable due to the lack of means to communicate with each other.

The consultant did feel that once all of the equipment was deployed, success can follow. The will of the officers themselves to achieve success is gratifying. To that extent, the aims and objectives of the project will be partially met, especially at provincial level, but the lack of support both in financial and other logistical terms by the government counterparts have, to date, prevented the anticipated success, particularly in the national and international context.

It is believed that the consultant’s original recommendations to implement the project in two phases, initially in three locations at Maputo, Beira and Nampula, would have been the better option. Firstly, there would have been a more realistic deployment of equipment in the numbers required and secondly, the massive
problems highlighted during this mission could or may have been addressed before the implementation of phase 2.

~ The Minister of the Interior was made fully aware of all of the problems identified. Certainly, without the necessary counterpart financial back up by the Government, the impact of the project will be diminished greatly.

~ In a similar vein, there are many recommendations that the consultant could make which could take the form of a follow up project. Further training, additional equipment, the possible supply of tents and mobile phones, even assistance in the form of a planning strategy could all be proposed. But until the present situation is resolved, the recommendation would be that nothing further is done at this time in relation to future activities.

60. Output 4 – Forensic Science Laboratory: As previously explained, the refurbishment and supply of equipment to the FSL was greatly delayed due to a variety of reasons. A brief outline follows below:

~ The original four rooms identified under the project for upgrading to establish a drug testing capability in Maputo had also, unknown to UNODC, been earmarked for upgrading by the French mission in Mozambique. After discussions were held, the matter was amicably resolved, and an additional four rooms were allocated for upgrade by the project. However, these discussions delayed the process.

~ At the end of 2001, after the new four rooms for upgrade were selected, UNDP Maputo opened a tender bid for both the physical upgrade and the provision of equipment for the laboratory. However, when the bids were opened at the UNDP LCC, the meeting could not come to an agreement as to the preferred tender. This resulted in UNDP Maputo decided to re-advertise the bids in 2002.

~ However, at the time, the UNDP finance section in Maputo already issued cheques to the companies originally selected as the bidders for the equipment purchases. Due to the year-end reporting system of UNDP, the cheques were only cancelled in 2002 and an overexpenditure was therefore recorded under the project.

~ This matter resulted in the project being unable to incur expenditures towards the purchasing of the equipment pending final figures on the amount of funding available. This available balance was forwarded to ROSA only during April of 2003.

~ Shortly after April 2003, ROSA went out on tender via UNDP Pretoria requesting bids for the provision of the FSL equipment. The process ended on 3 June 2003. Thereafter, UNODC prepared supporting documentation and requested a sitting of a UNDP Local Contracts Committee. In August, after not receiving any feedback from UNDP, UNODC decided to break the purchases to be made into smaller components and to obtain quotations. (See also paragraph 33.)
The equipment was ordered in October 2003 and should be delivered and commissioned in January 2004.

In addition, as outlined in paragraph 34, UNDP Maputo has indicated that some matters regarding the completion of the refurbishment of the laboratory remains outstanding. UNDP Maputo has not responded to ROSA’s requests for additional information.

The final activity will be a short evaluation mission by a FSL expert to evaluate the equipment as well as to oversee the training.

C. Drug control objective

61. The overall analysis of the drug control situation remains similar to what obtained at the commencement of the project. It is known that drugs and other forms of contraband are smuggled into and through Mozambique, but all evidence is anecdotal for a variety of reasons. There exists no system for intelligence gathering and dissemination, resulting in investigations that are not intelligence driven. This project has increased the awareness of the problem of drug trafficking and has trained and equipped sufficient officers to make an impact. The DDU staff appear keen to achieve success and this project has given them that capability.

62. Available statistical information does not allow meaningful comparisons of before and after project implementation. Most of the information made available to the evaluator in April 2002 was based on informed beliefs and anecdotal evidence. It is suspected that the situation was much the same at the time the original pre-project assessment was made.

63. In summary, all except one of the activities in the final version of the project document have been fully carried out, and this final activity should be completed in early 2004. In terms of training and equipment, the project has met expectations and one can only assume that limited success will follow. The real bar to success is the lack of reliable intelligence specifying exactly which routes are being used.

64. There is no doubt that the project has strengthened the recipients’ ability to exercise better control over drug trafficking and general law enforcement. However, it is felt that it is simply too early to gauge the total impact of the project in interdiction terms.

D. Sustainability

65. Training: One of the prerequisites for training was that an official would have to remain at his/her current duty station for three years after undergoing training. However, this can be detrimental to the officer’s promotion prospects. This is an extremely difficult subject that must be thought through before a project is finalised. There are a number of factors which may assist, but none is foolproof. One method is to begin the training as early as possible in the project allowing a capacity for refresher training towards the end. Similarly, at least two courses can be held back in order that any units which have been particularly hard hit by transfers, resignations, promotions, etc. can be given the opportunity to increase their quota of trained personnel.
66. Equipment: In relation to the equipment, after initial problem with the release of the vehicles purchased, its safekeeping and use seems to be well regulated. Equipment provided by the project was found to be in good condition and, unless where otherwise stated in the Todd report, secured at the locations for which it was intended.

CHAPTER IV: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

67. In the main, there exists a lack of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination, and any success being achieved is only as a result of diligent work by the officers concerned.

68. In a number of areas, corruption is still seen as a major problem, and such activity, to the extent it exists, will clearly have a detrimental impact whatever measures are put in place.

CHAPTER V: RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Issues resolved during evaluation

69. No issues as such were resolved during the evaluation mission of April 2002. A full report was presented to the Minister of the Interior who indicated that an official response would follow. Only following repeated efforts by UNODC, including an in-person meeting with the UNODC Representative, did the Minister reply on 27 February 2003. In his reply, he stated that “regarding the Report of the Evaluation Mission, we entirely agree with its content and recommendations and we are in the process of implementing most of them…”.

70. The UNODC office in Pretoria also attempted to secure the good offices of the local members of the Mini-Dublin Group as well as of UNDP to bring the concerns about continued drug trafficking and the low level of official capacity – despite the project – to the attention of the relevant authorities.

B. Actions/decisions recommended:

71. That prior to further law enforcement assistance activities, the Government of Mozambique be requested to provide a full follow-up to the Todd report. (See paragraph 70.)

72. That should further projects and initiatives be considered in Mozambique, a full pre-project situational assessment be undertaken to enable the measurement of the project’s impact.

73. That law enforcement initiatives focus more on intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination as a way of easing the burden of limited human and other resources.

74. That the matter of corruption be addressed directly prior to any further direct assistance.
C. Project revisions

75. Not applicable. The project is ending.

CHAPTER VI: LESSONS LEARNED

76. There are a number of considerations which will no doubt have a considerable bearing on the success achievable in national capacity building projects in future.

77. The real problem continues to be the large scale, well orchestrated, smuggling activities of organized crime syndicates. They will use sophisticated methods to avoid detection. Every step will be taken by them to protect their investment. The best method available to the law enforcement agencies to combat this threat is through intelligence profiling. Consideration must therefore be given to the current situation in this respect. The Todd evaluation mission clearly showed that there is little evidence of such intelligence being made available to the DDUs or of their actively seeking to secure it using their own resources. The Todd Report recommended that in the future this issue should be discussed fully with the recipient countries before project plans and activities are agreed.

78. The Todd report also noted that the newly formed Dedicated Drugs Units (DDUs) were still at an embryonic stage and it would take some time before they are capable of generating the levels of intelligence required. They are however well aware of the problem, particularly in the vulnerable area around Ressano Garcia.

79. In view of the foregoing paragraphs, in the process of planning similar projects in the future, consideration should be given to the possibility that if the project is successful in achieving its aims, the smugglers are likely to disperse their activities to other parts of the country, and even neighbouring entry points. Some preventative measures should be put in place in an attempt to meet this threat should it arise.

80. Another area of concern which rises from projects such as this is the sustainability of the training.

81. Perhaps the most significant lesson learnt is the need for full governmental counterpart resolve and support on a project whose nature is as sensitive as this one. This is deemed to be critical if the funding placed by the international donor community at the disposal of UNODC to render assistance to requesting UN Member States is to have greatest and most cost effective impact.