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THEMATIC EVALUATION OF COUNTER-NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA

Independent Evaluation Unit

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
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Thematic Evaluation of Counter-Narcotics Enforcement in Central Asia

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The team would like to thank all who collaborated in the evaluation.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

BOMCA	Border Office Management for Central Asia
CADAP	Central Asia Drug Action Programme
CARICC	Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre
CNE	counter-narcotics enforcement
DCA	drug control agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SCDC	State Commission for Drug Control
UNDCP	United Nations International Drug Control Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Executive summary

Background

The programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Central Asia covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Counter-narcotics enforcement (CNE) is by far the largest operation and is considered strategically important to the region. CNE projects with varying objectives account for 85 per cent of the region's total portfolio and have been allocated a combined budget of about US\$ 40 million.

UNODC began its drug control activities in Central Asia in the mid-1980s. Regional cooperation was formally established through the signature of a memorandum of understanding between UNODC and the five countries in 1996; the Russian Federation and the Aga Khan Development Network signed the memorandum of understanding in 1998. In 2003, the Paris Pact was signed by 55 countries affected by Afghanistan's opiates economy. The Pact, with its regular high-level meetings, has facilitated a coordinated response by Central Asian countries to the threats posed by opiates originating in Afghanistan.

Purpose and objectives

CNE projects are ongoing operations that are expected to remain a primary area of intervention for UNODC in Central Asia in the future. The present thematic evaluation aims to assess UNODC activities in the region by establishing what the Office has achieved to date under the CNE objective and to identify lessons learned and best practices to improve future operations.

The stakeholders of this evaluation are: UNODC, the five Central Asian countries, donors and UNODC partners in CNE at the national, regional and international levels. It is hoped that project managers at headquarters and in the field will learn from the results of the evaluation so that they can make appropriate adjustments to the ongoing operations and shape the long-term operational strategy for the region.

Methodology

Three consultants with law enforcement experience were appointed and given a package of relevant documentation by the Independent Evaluation Unit of UNODC for comprehensive review. The consultants then attended a series of briefings at UNODC headquarters, where they met several staff members involved in the Central Asia programme and key donors. Field trips to each of the five Central Asian countries then took place, during which further research was conducted. The present report was subsequently compiled and collated by the team leader on the basis of the contributions and reports of the three consultants.

Limitations

The evaluation team was required to cover three broad issues: border control along the Afghan border; capacity-building of national institutions; and regional operational cooperation. In practice, it was difficult to compartmentalize the issues since some projects dealt with two or more of them at the same time.

In the case of Turkmenistan, the appointed consultant was unable to meet with any Government or law enforcement counterparts because the visit took place during a national holiday and the officials concerned were not available for interview.

Major findings and analyses

Regional cooperation projects

Project RER/F23 on drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence, information and data collection, analysis and exchange

In order to be effective, counter-narcotics strategies and intelligence-led approaches to drug interdiction must be based on principles of cooperation and information sharing. Without exception, the beneficiary agencies

felt that they did work in close cooperation with other national agencies. Donors, however, were equally certain that cooperation was limited and ineffective.

The original intention of promoting networking among national agencies under Project RER/F23 has not yet been achieved, but many agencies have received hardware that could, in the future, provide a basis for establishing connections. Unfortunately, substantial delays in creating the network might lead to the hardware becoming obsolete and the network impossible. Should this happen, it will have serious implications for the future development of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) (see below).

Project RER/H22 on the establishment of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre

This project will assist in establishing CARICC, which will act as a regional focal point for communication and facilitate the analysis and exchange, in “real time”, of operational information on cross-border crime. CARICC will also function as a centre for organizing and coordinating joint operations. Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation will participate with the five Central Asian countries.

A real concern is whether national law enforcement agencies have the capacity and are willing to share sensitive information through CARICC. The success of this major project is inextricably linked to the outcome of Project RER/F23. When Project RER/F23 started, the idea was to establish coordination mechanisms at the national level; as it became apparent that this could not be achieved within the time frame of the project, a decision was made to concentrate on strengthening existing national agencies. Although this was a pragmatic decision that should not be criticized, it is clear that without fully functioning national coordination mechanisms the prospect of effective regional coordination and sharing of operational intelligence through CARICC is remote.

Project RER/E29 on precursor control in Central Asia

The precursor control project appears to have had some success in contributing to the development of structures for licit controls. It was reported that legislation and structures are in place and working. Success in the interdiction of precursor chemicals, however, is a different matter: there is no information or intelligence on how precursors are entering Afghanistan and no precursor chemicals have been seized in the region for many years.

It is universally accepted that heroin production in Afghanistan requires enormous quantities of acetic anhydride, the principal precursor. Although acetic anhydride cannot legally be imported into Afghanistan, it is estimated that between 1,000 and 1,200 tons of this chemical were required in 2006 to sustain the level of heroin production. Numerous training sessions have taken place in all five Central Asian countries, during which an adequate amount of precursor test kits were supplied. To this extent, the project’s objectives have largely been met. Nonetheless, without intelligence on the flow of precursors into Afghanistan, it is difficult to judge the true effectiveness of this project.

Project RER/F60 on computer-based law enforcement in the member countries of the memorandum of understanding on subregional cooperation on drug control

Donors expressed disappointment in Project RER/F60 owing to a perceived delay in the preparation of software materials and the implementation of the project. Given that the computer-based training programme of UNODC has been successful elsewhere, there is no reason to believe that it will fail in Central Asia, although enthusiasm for it varies significantly throughout the region. While in Kazakhstan, for example, computer-based training is at the embryonic stage, in Turkmenistan many officers have received training and the evaluators saw several examples of well-equipped training suites in use.

Project RER/F43 on assistance in developing controlled delivery techniques

Controlled deliveries do take place, albeit rarely, and there is local experience on which to build. Any training or provision of equipment needs to be carefully tailored to the prevailing context and with an understanding of the operational risks involved. This may seem self-evident, but it was not apparent from the current state of project planning. Current approaches are insufficiently robust to support valid outcomes.

While the legal and procedural landscape was mapped by the initial assessment mission, the strategy for providing practical support for operational development under this project appears confused and impractical. Moreover, the evaluators believe that the project is being driven by demands for the latest technical equipment

rather than by the establishment of effective coordinating mechanisms. What cross-border coordination already exists falls largely within the network of security services and, if this project is to succeed, it must engage these agencies fully in future discussions, especially with regard to equipment and training.

Project XAC/I70 on drug control at airports

The project will reinforce drug control capacities at main airports in Central Asia, establish drug profiling units and provide training, equipment and renovation at the national and regional levels. Progress has been slower than anticipated, primarily owing to factors outside the control of UNODC. It has proved difficult to recruit the necessary experts and progress across the region has been uneven.

The success of integrated drug profiling units elsewhere indicates that, over time, this could be an extremely worthwhile project. In many of the projects within this programme, agencies appear unwilling to share intelligence. Although small in budgetary terms, this project could contribute to addressing this problem—albeit only within the area of airport control—and it therefore deserves continued encouragement and support.

National capacity-building projects

Project TAJ/H03 for a drug control agency in Tajikistan (phase II of TAJ/D65, 1999-2002)

UNODC support for the drug control agency (DCA) has resulted in a focus on drug control rather than on organized crime in general. Given the high levels of drug trafficking in the countries of Central Asia, that focus is understandable. A clear advantage of establishing the DCA is that staff cannot be diverted from counter-narcotics work.

Despite the coordinating function of the DCA, the national security service of Tajikistan remains responsible for intercepting cross-border activities and telephone communications and maintains relationships with similar services in other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Such functions and connections are especially relevant when dealing with controlled deliveries.

Overall, the project to establish the DCA in Tajikistan is a success. The evaluators saw first-hand how the techniques developed by the DCA with UNODC support are being used to counter-narcotics production and distribution. There is a strong case to be made for extending the range of techniques available to the DCA to enhance effectiveness further. While other agencies still play an active role in drug law enforcement, they acknowledge and accept the lead role of the DCA under the direction of the President.

Project KYR/G64 for a drug control agency in Kyrgyzstan

On the back of the success of the Tajik DCA project, a similar project was started in Kyrgyzstan in 2003. The creation of the DCA should have resulted in a better coordinated national approach to drug law enforcement, but there is little evidence that this has occurred. On the contrary, the project appears to have simply created an agency that competes with other, similar, bodies instead of having a clear and distinct overarching role.

Polygraphing appears to have been successful and its wider application (e.g. in recruiting for CARICC) should be carefully considered. The principal benefit of polygraphing is that it addresses and deters corruption. Consequently, it is an activity that could also be applied to the Tajik DCA.

Project UZB/H04 on a computer network for the prosecutor's office in Uzbekistan

This is a project with a clear and uncomplicated objective. Although it appears to have been concluded satisfactorily, it has yet to be evaluated by an independent body.

Border control projects

Project TAJ/E24 on strengthening control along the Tajik-Afghan border

On the basis of the one border post seen by the evaluators, the issue of whether to renovate the posts instead of replacing them with custom-built modular units needs to be urgently reconsidered. Although renovating existing structures is less expensive than supplying new modular units, the latter have the advantage of being equipped with modern sanitation facilities and electrical infrastructure. Moreover, the European Union's Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) and the United States of America, who provide bilateral assistance, prefer to replace buildings beyond repair with prefabricated modular units whenever possible.

Project TUK/F42 on strengthening border control in Turkmenistan

The principal objective of this project is to strengthen the capacity of Turkmen authorities to interdict the trafficking in drugs and precursors in specific areas along the Turkmen border with Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The project began in September 2003 and was expected to end in December 2005. Because of ongoing problems, however, it was extended until April 2006 and revised so as to focus on one location instead of four as originally planned. Not all the equipment has been provided yet.

It has not been easy to implement the project, mainly because all contacts with the Government must be made through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus denying UNODC staff members and donors the opportunity to contact law enforcement counterparts directly.

Project TKM/I78 on immediate assistance to Turkmenistan for strengthening activities at the Imam-nazar checkpoint on the Turkmen-Afghan border

The principal objectives of this project are to develop border infrastructure at the Imam-nazar checkpoint and to strengthen the border control capacity of law enforcement agencies. The project is in its infancy, with training needs still being assessed and focal points within the law enforcement bodies still being identified. The State Commission on Drug Control (SCDC) will act as the Government implementing agency and the head of this Commission will lead the project steering committee.

It is too early to make useful comments on or analyses of this project. It is hoped that the project will not encounter the same problems faced by Project TUK/F42 and that Government officials will be more forthcoming in arranging meetings and accelerating the decision-making process.

Project UZB/G28 on assistance to Uzbekistan for the resumption of activities at the Hayraton checkpoint on the Uzbek-Afghan border

The principal objectives of this project are to develop border infrastructure at the Hayraton checkpoint and to strengthen the border control capacity of concerned law enforcement bodies. This project has almost ended and only a few small issues still need to be resolved. It is a project with clear objectives, which focuses on one specific site for assistance.

Although the project has been completed in almost all its aspects and the Government of Uzbekistan appears to have met its commitments, it is not possible to truly measure the project's impact.

Other issues

Forensic laboratories

Forensic science capacity has been established in the DCAs in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the other countries, varying numbers of laboratories are attached to different agencies that claim to carry out work for each other. Each agency claims to need support and equipment. Diluting support across a number of different laboratories is counterproductive. Instead, support should be targeted at a central forensic laboratory for the country concerned, even if satellite laboratories (probably under DCA control) will still be needed in remote areas close to trafficking routes. The establishment of a central forensic laboratory would also encourage law enforcement agencies to forward their evidential samples to one point, thereby enhancing the development of skills, standardization and comparative research.

Drug and precursor test kits

One characteristic of the counter-narcotics strategy of UNODC has been the provision of large numbers of drug test kits. These kits were not seen at any of the locations visited, nor were any examples given of their use. Senior managers stated that drug test kits were not necessary since their officers were able to recognize opium, heroin and marijuana without them and, in any case, formal testing was undertaken in the forensic laboratory. The provision of drug test kits would, therefore, appear to be of limited value.

Experience with precursor chemicals is different. Officers are more likely to make mistakes when describing them and many do not have sufficient experience to identify them (most officers have never seen them). Precursor test kits were seen in the forensic laboratories of both DCAs and were said to be used for training purposes, but there is no evidence that their supply has had any impact on the interdiction of drugs or precursors.

Training

High staff turnover in the DCAs has meant that the benefits of training staff are soon lost. Some attempts have been made to retain trained staff members at the DCA so as to obtain sufficient return on the investment and contract terms aimed at keeping staff members in their posts are apparently under consideration. Turnover in other agencies is also high, with staff being rotated routinely.

Wherever possible, emphasis should be redirected to developing national (or regional) training capacity in key areas. The training programme needs to consider how it can achieve best value for both donors and beneficiaries. In a work environment and culture where staff turnover is high and where law enforcement officers are often rotated, direct training courses are a waste. The use of international experts to conduct such training is also extremely expensive since training needs to be continually repeated.

Proper training curricula need to be formulated and the results audited. Training courses should have feedback evaluation mechanisms to assess their effectiveness. Participation in courses should be certified and the names of successful participants documented.

Anti-corruption measures

The implications of corruption in the law enforcement community in the region were consistently raised both in project documentation and by those met during the evaluation mission. Several interlocutors identified corruption as a fundamental obstacle to effective drug interdiction. The DCAs have attempted to curtail corruption by introducing competitive recruitment procedures, increasing salaries and, in Kyrgyzstan, polygraph testing. Although corruption continues to be a significant issue across the region, these measures have undoubtedly assisted in mitigating its impact.

Role of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Central Asia

UNODC is one of many organizations providing support to CNE activities in the region, although under the provisions of the Paris Pact it is the primary coordinator. Nonetheless, the mission and positioning of UNODC in Central Asia would benefit from better definition.

In general, the evaluators received positive responses on the support given by UNODC headquarters in Vienna. Apart from delays in the procurement of equipment and difficulties in recruitment, no criticism was levelled at backstopping arrangements. Other than in Turkmenistan, the relationship between UNODC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) appeared to be mutually supportive. UNODC headquarters and the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia have developed an excellent working relationship.

The Regional Office for Central Asia is pivotal to the successful implementation of the entire programme. The procedures for monitoring project activities are effective and the Central Analysis Unit maintains a comprehensive overview of individual projects and programme delivery. The Regional Office also coordinates assistance provided by other international organizations and bilateral donors and enjoys a deserved high reputation throughout the region.

Outcomes

Any assistance provided to officials expected to interdict drugs and precursors at official border crossings or at isolated border posts can be said, at the very least, to make law enforcement bodies aware of the problem and to give them an insight into how the problem should be addressed. To that extent, UNODC projects have raised awareness of the problems caused by the production of opium and the trafficking in heroin from Afghanistan. However, the projects have only dealt with interdiction capability and have done very little to enhance investigative and intelligence-gathering techniques. Future projects should concentrate more on these aspects.

So far, there is little evidence to suggest that cooperation and coordination has been established between law enforcement agencies active in this field. In fact, evaluators witnessed a lack of cooperation in every one of the countries visited. It is too early to assess the changes that the DCAs will make to national capacity in drug interdiction. Political will and commitment will be instrumental to any continued success. While all interlocutors from the beneficiary agencies welcomed the positive effect of the DCAs, the actual impact made by them cannot be verified objectively. Several interviewees remarked that law enforcement agencies (including the DCA) were still targeting low-level couriers and dealers instead of targeting major traffickers. While this mentality persists, the scope for developing proper and effective cooperation is limited.

The impact of the precursor control project (Project RER/E29) has been almost completely limited to licit control measures. Without reliable intelligence on the routes through which precursors are trafficked to Afghanistan, it has not been possible to concentrate interdiction efforts at specific trafficking points. However, awareness of precursor trafficking has been raised through the training of officers and the distribution of precursor test kits under this project.

Project RER/F23 has not had the desired impact. The project has had to be adapted to the reality of the situation in Central Asia, where the principle of sharing intelligence between agencies has never been established. This has resulted in a strengthening of the individual agencies across the region but not of the linkages between them. The consequences of this extend far beyond coordination at the national level and will, unless addressed, have a significant impact on CARICC.

To summarize, the training and equipment provided by these projects have given recipients a basic grounding in drug interdiction techniques but are unlikely to achieve any higher objectives. Future actions should focus more on intelligence-led activities in support of major investigations into the many organized criminal groups clearly behind this drug trafficking phenomenon.

Overall, the contribution made by UNODC to CNE in the region is substantial. Awareness of drug trafficking has increased and law enforcement agencies are better prepared to respond to the threat posed. The degree of this impact, however, varies significantly across the region, largely owing to factors outside the control and influence of UNODC.

Sustainability

The benefit of equipment provided under projects such as these is only sustainable if the recipient countries have budgeted for spare parts, repair costs or fuel for vehicles. The evaluation team saw examples of derelict vehicles, which had been supplied under the projects but had never been repaired. In some cases, the vehicles provided were not appropriate to the terrain in which they were meant to operate.

Similarly, in at least two projects (including one on border control), UNODC has had to pay salary supplements to entice qualified staff members to join these agencies. These additional payments cannot be sustained over time and it is extremely unlikely that the host Government would be willing or, indeed, able to take over the responsibility. It is obvious that when these payments stop, the individuals concerned will no longer be motivated to continue.

The benefits of training are often lost when staff members are transferred or promoted or when they retire. The “train-the-trainer” concept, which has only been introduced relatively recently, is the way forward. Training can then be introduced on a clear needs basis and carried out on a much larger scale.

The decision to locate CARICC in Almaty, Kazakhstan, rather than in Tashkent will have a significant impact on the funding of the project. The costs involved cannot be sustained when project funding ceases.

In fact, none of the outcomes observed could survive the withdrawal of funding. The DCAs have been created from nothing but are likely to fail if they lose presidential patronage or salary supplements. The equipment provided will only last until it breaks down and investments made in training are being lost through staff turnover and rotation. The renovated buildings will remain, but they have no impact on drug interdiction. In sum, the evaluators have not seen any development that would lead to sustainability in CNE in the foreseeable future. Although UNODC may acknowledge this issue, it will be extremely difficult to address it effectively since it is such a large problem.

Lessons learned and best practices

UNODC was overambitious in believing that the projects could be achieved in the time frames originally envisaged. UNODC should not embark on projects of this scale without having secured sufficient funding at the outset. While embarking on projects without the required financial resources may reassure beneficiaries of UNODC's commitment, it can also lead to disappointments in terms of promised outcomes and beneficiary expectations and, therefore, to damage to the Office's reputation.

There are, however, some good practices to be commended. The establishment of project steering committees and working groups have helped when the project is under way. Close cooperation, where possible, with State drug control commissions or committees has also proved essential for the smooth running of these projects. Similarly, the existence of close working relationships with other international agencies—such as BOMCA and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—and with bilateral donors has avoided overlapping or duplication of effort.

Constraints

The evaluators believe that some project staff members do not fully understand the implications and subtleties of law enforcement issues. This has sometimes resulted in the wrong prioritization of activities. Since the law enforcement profession has become increasingly technical in recent years, UNODC must make sure that staff engaged in proposing, designing, developing and managing law enforcement projects have the necessary expertise and professional understanding to engage with counterparts in beneficiary countries.

Although all the Governments in Central Asia have signed the memorandum of understanding and the respective project documents, not all have contributed fully to the smooth execution of the projects.

A constraint evident throughout the region is the proliferation of law enforcement agencies receiving assistance through various projects. The establishment of DCAs has increased the number of national agencies since it has not eliminated any of the pre-existing agencies. If there were fewer national agencies in the region, UNODC support could be more focused and its scarce resources less thinly spread.

One overarching constraint is completely beyond the control of UNODC: the continued existence of practices from the Soviet era, in particular the use of arcane bureaucratic procedures at every step, from the signing of project documents to the delivery of project objectives. UNODC should not assume that the signature of memorandums of understanding is a genuine milestone in terms of project delivery.

Recommendations

The rationale informing these recommendations can be found in section V of the main report. Recommendations 1-5 are for urgent consideration.

Recommendation 1: UNODC should urgently review its decision to renovate border control posts on the Tajik-Afghan border. In view of the limited progress and substandard work seen at Baharak, the review should be made before work starts at any other border post. Should modular units provide accommodation of an acceptable standard within the objectives of the project, this should become the preferred solution.

Recommendation 2: An urgent and independent review should be undertaken of the effectiveness and future potential of the Tais Ontos software.

Recommendation 3: The basis for the controlled delivery outlined in Project RER/F43 should be reassessed in the light of existing practices.

Recommendation 4: No more drug test kits should be provided, unless a strong case is made for supplying them to a specific location. (This relates to drug test kits, while experience with precursor test kits is different).

Recommendation 5: The UNODC sub-office in Turkmenistan should deliver all the outstanding equipment outlined in Project TUK/F42 at the earliest opportunity and thus allow the final evaluation of the project to be completed.

Recommendation 6: In the light of the continuing refusal or inability of Turkmenistan to fully enter into its obligations as agreed in the signed memorandums of understanding and the project documents, UNODC should carefully consider whether to continue activities in the country.

Recommendation 7: Assistance and support should be targeted at those countries most in need and where the greatest impact can be made.

Recommendation 8: A central polygraphing capacity should be created as a regional resource or as part of a national anti-corruption commission in each Central Asian country. Separating this capacity from any particular agency would help examiners to remain objective and independent. Central polygraphing units could also serve different agencies or departments when necessary.

Recommendation 9: The anti-corruption measures introduced in the DCA projects should be extended and replicated.

Recommendation 10: Direct training should be avoided in favour of train-the-trainer programmes. In addition, a coordinated training curriculum based on a training needs analysis is urgently needed and should not be limited to criminal intelligence analysis.

Recommendation 11: UNODC support for forensic science capacity should be targeted at one coordinating laboratory per country.

Recommendation 12: UNODC project staff members should become more involved in site visits to ensure that the training and equipment provided is being used appropriately.

Recommendation 13: In developing some project strategies (such as the DCA), more attention should be paid to existing capacities and networks. In particular, opportunities for incorporating the national security services should be included in project strategies.

Recommendation 14: UNODC should ensure full funding before embarking upon projects based on training and the provision of equipment.

Recommendation 15: The value of operations on precursor interdiction in Central Asia (such as Operation Trans-shipment) should be carefully considered before being replicated.

Recommendation 16: Ideally, UNODC project staff members should have appropriate knowledge and experience relating to the subject of their project. If this level of knowledge and experience is lacking, they should receive relevant training.

Recommendation 17: Legal and procedural structures for sharing information should be established as a matter of priority.

Recommendation 18: Future UNODC projects in the region should support intelligence-led investigations of criminal groups involved in drug trafficking rather than simply enhance drug interdiction capability.

Conclusions

The UNODC programme in Central Asia has without doubt significantly enhanced CNE across the region in response to the continuing threat of trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan. Awareness of the issue has increased, the skills and professionalism of law enforcement staff have improved and two dedicated DCAs have been created. The training and equipment provided under the various projects have raised the level of CNE capacity and effectiveness in all five countries and created a firm foundation for the future. As a result, the programme should be considered a success. UNODC activities in the region should continue and the level of support increased.

The five Central Asian countries are diverse and need different things from the UNODC programme. Their economies are developing at different rates and their CNE infrastructures and levels of competence differ greatly, as does their willingness to embrace new thinking and accept radical changes to established working practices. These differences must be reflected in regional project design and national projects must be tailored to the specific requirements of the individual countries. This is not a region where one size fits all.

Time and again, this evaluation has stressed that future UNODC activities in the region should focus more on supporting intelligence-led investigation capabilities as opposed to dealing primarily with interdiction. This is not to suggest that past and current investments in interdiction have been useless, for there is no doubt that all who have worked on this issue have benefited from UNODC projects. Moreover, the regional and national projects contained in the overall programme have given each country a firm foundation from which they can now move forward to the next stage.

Afghanistan continues to be the focus of the CNE programme in Central Asia, which is why it might be useful to forge closer ties between UNODC programmes in Afghanistan and Central Asia. A logical next step would be for Afghan officials to become involved in the Paris Pact forums for which closer cooperation between the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia and the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan is a fundamental requirement.

Future UNODC activities in Central Asia are clearly dependent on maintaining at least the current level of funding. Hopefully, the positive findings of this evaluation, coupled with the implementation of the recommendations contained within it, will persuade existing and potential donor communities that investment in a future programme within the region would bring substantial benefits. Raised levels of CNE effectiveness in Central Asia have an impact far beyond the borders of the region and make a significant impact on the global fight against drug trafficking.

I. Introduction

A. Background

1. The original United Nations drug entities, the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the Secretariat and the secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board, worked from the 1950s to the early 1980s on international drug control treaties and drug related research. These separate agencies monitored the status of drugs and drug control in Member States and worked on drug treaty issues. In 1970, as worldwide heroin use grew, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control was formed to undertake small, grant-funded projects on demand reduction and anti-trafficking. The Fund was restructured and renamed the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in 1991. In 1997, UNDCP was merged with the Centre for International Crime Prevention to form the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. In 2002, the Office was reorganized and renamed the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

2. UNODC works to strengthen international action against drug production, trafficking and crime. The Office provides statistics on drugs and crime and helps Member States to draft legislation and train judicial officials. It carries out research and analysis to increase knowledge and understanding of drug and crime issues and to expand the evidence base for policy and operational decisions. It assists Member States in the ratification and implementation of international treaties and the development of domestic legislation on drugs, crime and terrorism and provides substantive services to the treaty-based and governing bodies. UNODC also manages field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counter the spread of illicit drugs, crime and terrorism.

3. In Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), UNODC addresses four thematic areas: (a) policy support, legislation and advocacy; (b) counter-narcotics enforcement (CNE); (c) drug abuse and HIV/AIDS prevention; and (d) countering organized crime, corruption and terrorism. Of these areas, CNE is by far the largest operation and is considered strategically important to the region. This evaluation addresses exclusively CNE activities and projects.

4. The CNE projects account for 85 per cent of the region's total portfolio and have been allocated a combined budget of about US\$ 40 million. Although multiple donors fund the CNE projects in the region, the Government of the United States of America is by far the largest donor.

5. The UNODC Strategic Programme Framework for Central Asia (2004-2007) identifies the "large-scale trafficking of Afghanistan-origin opium and heroin" as giving rise to major crime and drug control problems in the region, creating the most pressing problem faced by the Central Asian countries since their independence in 1991. Approximately one third of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan transits through the region to markets in the Russian Federation and Western Europe. The *World Drug Report 2005*¹ indicates that seizures of opiates in Central Asia increased by 33 per cent between 2002 and 2003, reaching a total of 7.1 metric tons. As outlined in the Strategic Programme Framework, the overall

¹ *World Drug Report 2005* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.XI.10). The report is available on the UNODC website (www.unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html).

objective of UNODC's CNE efforts in Central Asia is "to develop human and technical capacities within the Central Asian States in support of effective action to reduce trafficking".

6. The ongoing projects follow both regional and national approaches to achieve that objective. Regional projects attempt to address issues that cut across multiple countries (e.g. by strengthening criminal intelligence gathering and promoting operational coordination in the region), while national projects are designed to respond to the specific needs of individual countries (e.g. by establishing national drug control agencies (DCAs) and strengthening border control capabilities in countries neighbouring Afghanistan).

7. UNODC began its drug control activities in Central Asia in the mid-1980s. Regional cooperation was formally established through the signature of a memorandum of understanding between UNODC and the five countries in the region in 1996: the Russian Federation and the Aga Khan Development Network also signed the memorandum of understanding, in 1998.

8. In May 2003, the foreign ministers of 55 countries seriously affected by the trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan through Central and West Asia met in Paris. This was an important meeting, opened by the president of France, that provided a unique opportunity for the international community to establish a comprehensive, balanced and coordinated response to the threat posed by the trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan. The statement issued at the end of this meeting created a pact (known as the Paris Pact) by which ministers agreed "to combine their wills and their countries' efforts to step up national capabilities, develop regional partnerships and hence tackle all the aspects of this problem. This is an international security imperative." The document was signed by the representatives of all 55 countries affected by the Afghanistan opiates economy. The Paris Pact, with its regular high-level meetings, has become an important framework for facilitating a coordinated response, led by UNODC, to counter the threats posed by the presence of Afghan opiates in Central Asia.

B. Purpose of the evaluation

9. CNE projects are ongoing operations that are expected to remain a primary area of intervention for UNODC in Central Asia in the foreseeable future. The present thematic evaluation aims to assess UNODC activities in the region by establishing what the Office has achieved to date under the CNE objective and to identify lessons learned and best practices to improve future operations.

10. The stakeholders of this evaluation are: UNODC, the five Central Asian countries, donors and UNODC partners on CNE at the national, regional and international levels. It is hoped that project managers at headquarters and in the field will learn from the results of the evaluation so that they can make appropriate adjustments to ongoing projects and shape the long-term operational strategy for the region.

C. Scope of the evaluation

11. This evaluation reviews ongoing UNODC CNE projects in Central Asia. While many projects have been running for several years (some are in their second phase, others have been extended), other projects have been launched during the past two years. This evaluation focuses primarily on projects that have been operating for at least three years and whose implementation has largely been completed.

12. Each CNE project has been formulated separately over the past decade and each has its own objectives. All projects can, however, be classified into one of the following three sub-areas: control operations, principally along the Afghan border; national institution-building (including the establishment of DCAs); and regional operational cooperation mechanisms. These distinct topics are all intended to achieve the CNE objective.

D. Methodology

13. This evaluation was coordinated by the Independent Evaluation Unit at UNODC headquarters. The evaluation was conducted as part of the Unit's 2006 workplan on in-depth thematic evaluations of UNODC activities. The Unit worked closely with the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent and the Europe and West/Central Asia Section of the Division for Operations at UNODC headquarters in Vienna during all phases of the exercise.

14. Three consultants with law enforcement experience were appointed and a comprehensive package of relevant documentation was distributed to each of them for review.

15. Subsequently, the consultants attended a series of briefings that spanned three days at UNODC headquarters, where they met several staff members involved in the Central Asia programme and key donors.

16. Although it was unfortunately necessary to postpone the field research trip until mid-October, an itinerary was prepared involving visits to each of the five Central Asian countries. An representative of the Independent Evaluation Unit was present for the first half of the visit. The original plan of having all three consultants visit each country had to be abandoned because of logistical difficulties, especially with regard to obtaining visas. Instead, all team members first visited Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and then separated so that one consultant could visit one of the remaining countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan). Hence, all five countries were visited during the available time. Comprehensive notes were made by all three consultants and further research (principally by e-mail) with key interlocutors was conducted in the weeks following the field trips.

17. This report was compiled and collated by the team leader on the basis of the contributions and reports of the three consultants.

E. Limitations

18. The evaluation team was required to cover the following three areas:

- (a) Border control operations along the Afghan border (Projects TAJ/E24, TUK/F42, TKM/I78 and UZB/G28);
- (b) National institution capacity-building (Projects KYR/G64, TAJ/H03 and UZB/H04);
- (c) Regional operational cooperation (Projects RER/H22, RER/F23, RER/F43 and RER/E29).

19. In reality, several of the projects are interlinked and therefore difficult to treat separately. Examples of these crossovers are highlighted appropriately in the report. The fact that the consultants could only work together in two countries (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan)

before splitting up to deal with all aspects of the evaluation in the other three countries inevitably led to difficulties as the evaluation progressed.

20. In the case of Turkmenistan, the nominated consultant was unable to see any Government or law enforcement counterparts. The visit took place during a national holiday and the officials concerned were not prepared to find time for an interview. Therefore, the comments on that country have been gleaned from meetings with the donor community, the relative paperwork and local UNODC staff members. Finally, the border control issue could not be evaluated fully since only one border post—at Baharak in Tajikistan, on the Afghan border by the Amu-Darya river—was visited and inspected. A scheduled visit to an official border crossing between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan at the Friendship Bridge at Termez (UZB/G28) was cancelled when the evaluation team was denied access by the local authorities. Thus, the evaluators could not see how the training was conducted or how the equipment provided by the programme was being used in key border areas.

21. Owing to circumstances beyond the control of UNODC, the timetable for the field visits had to be postponed by one month. This led to many other changes to the original plans and, crucially, to the loss of those days set aside for the consultants to meet and discuss their findings. The consultants did not have the opportunity to reconvene after returning from Central Asia. Luckily, two of them live reasonably near to each other and could, therefore, collaborate on a daily basis in the preparation of the report.

II. Major findings and analyses

22. Although the programme—and, consequently, this evaluation—covers Central Asia as a region, the evaluation team became increasingly aware of the fact that the five Central Asian countries have progressed, in terms of institution-building and infrastructure development, at very different rates since the breakup of the Soviet Union. This led the team to question, for example, the relevance of giving financial support to Kazakhstan (given the country's new-found affluence) and to balk at the lack of cooperation and commitment from Turkmenistan.

23. The challenge of implementing projects in a region where even the most basic infrastructure is often lacking, where Government departments are slow to respond and where existing practice is rooted in a different understanding of priorities should not be underestimated. A regional approach must recognize the countries' differences in terms of culture, commitment, economy and position in the narcotics supply chain.

24. The conditions under which local law enforcement officers labour make any measure of success against drug trafficking remarkable and the dedication demonstrated by, for example, the agents of the Tajik DCA in carrying out their duties shows what can be achieved given the opportunity and appropriate support. Their willingness to adopt new structures and tactics gives grounds for optimism.

25. This evaluation concentrates on the 13 CNE projects listed in an annex to the terms of reference (shown in annex II of this report), together with a number of thematic areas not covered by a specific project. To assist the reader, the key findings and analysis regarding each of these 13 projects are set out in section II.A. The findings and analysis of other areas within the overall programme can be found in section II.B.

A. Findings and analyses by project

1. Regional cooperation projects

Project RER/F23 on drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence, information and data collection, analysis and exchange

26. The analysis of coordinated, collated and integrated information and intelligence can make a significant impact in counter-narcotics operations. Establishing such capacity at the national level is the aim of Project RER/F23 but, until this is achieved, regional cooperation (especially with regard to CARICC) is unlikely to succeed.

27. Analytical software called Tais Ontos has been adopted as the lynchpin of the regional information-sharing strategy (industrial standard software produced by I-2 and Xanalysis, Watson, was apparently eliminated at the initial stage because a Russian language version was not available). No user requirement has been seen but the evaluation team was assured that the software had been validated by the user community. Unfortunately, Tais Ontos software is based on an ORACLE format rather than on XML and is, therefore, likely to cause compatibility problems. The evaluation team was also told that agencies in the Russian Federation were now using different software. The developer of Tais Ontos, Avicomp, is now marketing a new version (called Ontos), but any replacement of Tais Ontos would entail further costs in terms of purchasing, licensing, installing and training.

28. Information technology projects are notoriously difficult to plan and implement. Thus, the decision to introduce common software with a common language was, apparently, sensible. However, most agencies already had databases populated with substantial quantities of data (for instance, the database of Kazakhstan's Ministry of the Interior has 150 million records and the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan uses a Russian database called Flint). There is no evidence that this was considered when developing the Tais Ontos solution. Moreover, more than one agency has stated that existing information cannot be migrated automatically to Tais Ontos because of technical incompatibility. As a result, most if not all agencies are wasting time and money by inserting data into both systems. At least one national agency has decided not to use Tais Ontos, stating a preference for I-2 (seen during visits abroad).

29. Some beneficiaries claim to have had technical problems with Tais Ontos. One agency reported that the software is unstable and loses links between objects. Another said it crashes. Two other agencies stated that the software was "challenging" to use. The DCAs, however, said they were happy with Tais Ontos. This may be because they appear to have more experience using it. The Tajik DCA analytical unit, in particular, stated that they had 30,000 entries in Tais Ontos. Nonetheless, there continues to be the risk that further problems will emerge as the software is used more extensively.

30. Additional challenges to intelligence flows and integration may be caused by the rumoured development of another criminal intelligence database managed by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. If that organization's database contains terrorism-related intelligence information only, this should not have any impact on the databases established by Project RER/F23 or CARICC, but this should be confirmed.

31. The introduction of computer equipment has improved the efficiency of some agencies (for instance, the Uzbek commission on precursor chemicals and the prosecutors' network), but this benefit will only last until the hardware and software become obsolete.

32. The original intention of networking national agencies under Project RER/F23 has not yet been achieved, but many agencies have received hardware that could provide the basis for establishing connections in the future. Unfortunately, substantial delays in creating the network might lead to the hardware becoming obsolete and the network impossible.

33. In addition, unless the agencies involved recognize the need to share their information, the provision of technology for that purpose will produce no practical benefits. At the time of the evaluation there were no common standards for information collection or sharing, nor any information-sharing protocols. No specific points of contact had been identified for such sharing. These fundamental requirements for an effective information-sharing network must be prioritized over the provision of equipment. All agencies stated that cooperation did take place but, in discussing details, it became evident that the level of such cooperation varied significantly, with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation being the most forthcoming partners. Kyrgyz officials said they were frustrated that there was no formal cooperation between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (although personal networks were used). Cooperation with Turkmenistan was said to be extremely limited.

34. While several training sessions have been held on the use of intelligence and on intelligence-led policing, there was little evidence of its introduction or awareness of its practical application (except perhaps among the staff of the Tajik DCA analysis unit). The true strength of intelligence-led policing lies in integrating information and analysis to direct and deploy resources at both the strategic and tactical levels. This basic principle seemed to be unknown. One manager stated that analysis meant the collation of performance statistics. Some of those questioned seemed to believe that intelligence-led activity meant solely acting on information on couriers provided by informants. Such information was, apparently, not pooled or collated with other intelligence (mainly, it was stated, because of a lack of trust and the failure of other agencies to share their information) and no examples were given of analysis being used to direct tactical operations.

35. Training under Project RER/F23 appears not to have had much effect. For example, the head of an analytical group working for an anti-drugs department within the Ministry of the Interior had no knowledge of analytical software, had never heard of Tais Ontos and did not know about link charts or other basic analytical techniques. This person had received no training in six years.

36. The project manager states that 70 persons in total have been trained across 23 agencies in the 5 countries (an average of 3 persons from each agency), but explained that the Tajik DCA was given priority. Although providing training to 70 persons requires considerable administrative coordination and effort, the impact across the 5 countries must be extremely low.

37. Training on criminal-related intelligence appears to be provided independently by experts from Austria, Hungary, the Russian Federation, Sweden and Turkey, with the additional but unconfirmed involvement of Germany and the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States. Austria, for example, has provided training to the State Border Protection Committee of Uzbekistan on analysis and, thoughtfully, distributed training materials in Russian. Unfortunately, the Uzbek agency does not have sufficient resources to

use these materials for internal training. The evaluation team received no information on how training is generally coordinated or on how any gaps in national capacity or in training curricula are assessed. It is also uncertain which training activities have been undertaken as part of UNODC programmes and which have not. Most beneficiaries do not know, nor do they make any distinction.

38. Training and development in strategic intelligence has not been addressed, but is expected to be included in the revised version of Project RER/F23. The Tajik DCA does, however, produce such analyses.

39. In order to share information securely with other offices and other agencies, a software called INTELLECT has been provided free of charge by the Swedish intelligence service. This software appears to have been created in-house by an expert who was retained to assist the project for another purpose. The rationale for deviating from the commercial off-the-shelf procurement standard may be justifiable in terms of value but concerns were expressed about the need for long-term technical support (especially after the developer retires from the Swedish service). Assurances were given, however, that this would not be a problem. It is not known whether there will be a cost implication for licensing and support at a later date. The evaluation team was assured that the software had been properly tested.

40. An effective counter-narcotics strategy and intelligence-led approach to drug interdiction must be based on cooperation and information sharing. Without exception, beneficiary agencies felt that they did cooperate closely with other national agencies (cross-border cooperation was a different issue). However, donor observers were equally certain that any cooperation that did exist was limited and ineffective. A closer inspection of these contrasting claims suggests that cooperation is indeed quite limited and that national agencies express a deep reticence about sharing information. Such reticence is in part due to a lack of trust and in part due to the need to get their own results. Indeed, the engendering of rivalry and competition in making seizures was highlighted as a major success of the Kyrgyz DCA.

Analysis

41. The original intention of networking national agencies under Project RER/F23 has not yet been achieved, but many agencies have received hardware that could provide a basis for establishing connections in the future. Unfortunately, substantial delays in creating the network might lead to the hardware becoming obsolete and the network impossible. Should this happen, it will have implications for the development of CARICC (see the following paragraphs).

Project RER/H22 on the establishment of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre

42. This project will assist in establishing CARICC, which will act as a regional focal point for communication and facilitate the analysis and exchange, in “real time”, of operational information on cross-border crime. CARICC will also function as a centre for organizing and coordinating joint operations. Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation will participate with the five Central Asian countries.

43. The four-year project was initially approved by the Programme and Project Committee of UNODC in December 2003. With approval from the Committee, the project was subsequently split into three phases. The launch of phase 1, originally intended for 1 September 2004, was delayed until early 2005. In this first phase the project team was

established and the preparatory work required for the creation of a new organization was done. Phase 2 will cover the renovation of the premises, the recruitment and selection of seconded national staff and the provision of equipment. Phase 3 will start only once CARICC is operational and will cover issues such as training and expert services.

44. Unfortunately, for reasons entirely out of UNODC's control, it has proved difficult to identify a suitable location and a specific building in which to base CARICC. Only in February 2006 was it finally agreed to establish CARICC in Almaty, Kazakhstan. While the taking of the decision is undoubtedly welcome, basing CARICC in Almaty will have serious consequences for future funding since Almaty is significantly more expensive than any of the other proposed locations (for example, rental costs in Almaty are fast approaching Western European levels).

45. A full-time project team has relocated from Tashkent to Almaty, Kazakhstan, although it is temporarily housed in the UNDP building since renovation work on the CARICC building has not started yet. Additionally, at the time of the evaluation, only Kazakhstan had signed the presidential letter required to legally safeguard exchanges of information. Given the long delays already encountered in this project, and with so much still to be achieved, it is easy to be pessimistic about it. However, the project team members are committed and enthusiastic, working under the capable leadership of an experienced law enforcement official. And, at long last, there are genuine signs of progress: it is likely that renovation of the CARICC building will start in 2007 and that the remaining participants will sign the necessary agreements enabling CARICC to become operational in late 2007 or early 2008.

46. The real concern, however, is whether national law enforcement agencies have the capacity and are willing to share sensitive information through CARICC. One of the most experienced European Union drug liaison officers based in Kazakhstan observed that in over three years in the country he had not seen or heard of one example of cross-agency cooperation and that the few isolated examples of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were the exception rather than the rule.

47. Throughout the evaluation, whenever the evaluators met drug liaison officers and members of the foreign anti-narcotics community, the message was clear and unequivocal: there are far too many law enforcement agencies competing in the region and intelligence sharing between them is virtually non-existent. In addition, national security services throughout the region maintain a tight grip on exchanges of international intelligence through an effective network that has been in place since the Soviet era.

48. Given this background, it is difficult to believe that CARICC will change such a situation or that sensitive operational information will be shared. Although there is no easy solution to the problem, there are a few steps that CARICC can take at this early stage to establish credibility and demonstrate integrity. The transparent selection of staff members, a strict (and enforced) code of conduct, integrity testing and polygraphing are some measures that should be considered, for they might help to persuade others that CARICC is a trustworthy organization. On their own, however, even these measures will not be sufficient to ensure that CARICC receives the operational intelligence that will be vital to its success over time. Political support will also be important in persuading Governments and agencies of the benefits of creating coordination mechanisms for information sharing at the national level. The task facing those developing CARICC is challenging. The evaluators believe that it could have been less daunting and had greater chances of success if the original objectives of

Project RER/F23 had been met and if national coordinating mechanisms had already been established.

Analysis

49. The success of this major project is inextricably linked to the outcome of Project RER/F23, which was originally intended to establish coordination mechanisms at the national level. As it became apparent that this could not be achieved within the established time frame, the decision was made to concentrate on strengthening existing national agencies. Although this was a pragmatic decision that should not be criticized in retrospect, it is clear that without fully functioning national coordination mechanisms the prospect of effective regional coordination and the sharing of operational intelligence through CARICC is remote.

50. There are striking parallels between this case and the creation of the Drugs Intelligence Unit of the European Police Office (Europol) in the early 1990s. In the case of that Unit, Europol member States were obliged to create national units that would act as conduits for all communication between Europol and individual member States. Before these national units were established and acknowledged by all law enforcement agencies, Europol was ineffective. In the European Union, the key issue was coordination among law enforcement agencies, while in Central Asia an added level of coordination is required since the national security services have a pivotal role in international relations and control many of the intelligence sources vital for international cooperation (e.g. telephone interception).

Project RER/E29 on precursor control in Central Asia

51. The precursor control project has had some success in contributing to the development of structures for licit controls. It was reported that legislation and structures were in place and working. In Uzbekistan (the only country in the region with a legitimate production of precursors), the Deputy Chair of the Licit Drugs Control Committee and Head of the Ministry of Health's forensic laboratory commented that the country had a national database on precursors (apparently only Mexico and Switzerland have a similar resource). Moreover, Uzbek authorities have produced a manual on the subject in Russian (funded by Project RER/E29) and conducted training for other agencies on precursor chemicals.

52. Success in the interdiction of precursor chemicals, however, is a different matter. There is no information on how precursors are entering Afghanistan, although a senior law enforcement adviser from the United States has claimed to have sensitive intelligence indicating that precursors are transiting the region. An adviser from Germany had similar, though not recent, intelligence. Despite these claims and the evaluators' belief that it is highly likely that precursors—especially acetic anhydride—are transiting the region, there have been no seizures of precursor chemicals in the region for many years.

53. Operation Trans-shipment has been mentioned as a milestone in Project RER/E29. This was a multilateral operation that targeted selected border points with the aim of interdicting precursor chemicals. In terms of coordination and awareness-raising, the operation might be considered a success, but no precursor chemicals were discovered. The fact that Operation Trans-shipment was apparently publicized in the media during the weeks leading up to the operation was also criticized.

54. The precursor control project needs to be refocused. Success has been achieved in terms of licit control, and training and awareness-raising remain important issues, but the

interdiction strand of the project is at a dead end. Without solid information on where to deploy officers, further operations would be a waste of effort.

Analysis

55. It is universally accepted that heroin production in Afghanistan requires enormous quantities of acetic anhydride, the principal precursor. A precursor control officer at UNODC headquarters estimated that between 1,000 and 1,200 tons of acetic anhydride were required in 2006 to sustain heroin production. Acetic anhydride is not imported legally into Afghanistan and UNODC has no intelligence on illicit flows of the chemical into Afghanistan, although it is universally accepted that it is highly likely that at least some of the acetic anhydride reaching Afghanistan transits Central Asia.

56. Although the Central Asian countries have introduced effective legislation to deal with the licit trade in acetic anhydride, no illicit seizures have been made since 1999 and there is no intelligence to suggest how acetic anhydride transits Central Asia. Ample training has been carried out in all five Central Asian countries, each of which has received adequate supplies of precursor test kits. To this extent, the project's objectives have largely been met.

57. Without intelligence indicating how precursors reach Afghanistan, it is difficult to judge the true effectiveness of this project. Three conclusions could be drawn. First, that acetic anhydride does not transit through Central Asia to Afghanistan (this option is considered unlikely by the evaluators). Second, that most officials employed at the border areas are still focusing on the detection of narcotics leaving Afghanistan instead of on the flow of precursors entering the country. Third, that the training and awareness provided by the project has been ineffective.

Project RER/F60 on computer-based drug law enforcement in the member countries of the memorandum of understanding on subregional cooperation on drug control

58. Donors expressed disappointment over Project RER/F60 owing to a perceived delay in preparing the software materials and practical implementation. It is not clear why it has taken so long to translate the existing materials. The cost of providing multiple computer-based training suites seems illogical. It is not known whether computer-based training really requires a special suite, but if equipment other than a computer is necessary, perhaps the programme needs a less sophisticated approach to suit the national context.

Analysis

59. The UNODC computer-based training programme has been successful elsewhere and there is no reason why this success cannot be replicated in Central Asia, even if enthusiasm for it varies significantly through the region. In Kazakhstan, for example, computer-based training is at the embryonic stage, while in other Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan, many officers have received such training. In fact, the evaluators saw several examples of well-equipped training suites in use.

Project RER/F43 on assistance in developing controlled delivery techniques

60. Controlled delivery is one of the principal tools for disrupting drug trafficking groups and can be domestic or international. Project RER/F43 aims to encourage the use of this technique throughout the region. An assessment mission was conducted and reported in May

2006 on the national legislation and arrangements for controlled deliveries. No other tangible outcomes have yet been achieved and a project revision was in preparation at the time of this evaluation.

61. Controlled deliveries do take place, albeit in very small numbers, and there is local experience on which to build. Any training or equipment that might be provided needs to be carefully tailored to the prevailing context, with an understanding of the operational risks involved. This may seem self-evident, but was not apparent from the current state of project planning.

62. The evaluation team was told that US\$ 1 million of the budget remained, US\$ 900,000 of which was earmarked for equipment. It is highly recommended that the advice of local law enforcement authorities be sought when choosing equipment, so that the purchases are appropriate to the existing national infrastructures, topography and current skill set. Equipment and training should also be targeted at those sites likely to reap the greatest benefits rather than distributed equally across the various countries. Current approaches (including the visiting of an equipment fair in Moscow) are insufficient to support valid outcomes.

Analysis

63. While the legal and procedural landscape has been mapped by the initial assessment mission, the strategy for practical support for operational development under this project appears confused and impractical. The evaluators' analysis of this project, although harsh, is based on the belief that the project is being driven by demands for the latest technical equipment rather than by the establishment of effective coordinating mechanisms. Any existing cross-border coordination is largely within the network of security services, so that if this project is to succeed, it must engage these agencies fully in future discussions, especially with regard to equipment and training.

Project XAC/I70 on drug control at airports

64. This is a relatively small project (US\$ 203,400) that is to be implemented over one year (2006-2007). The project will reinforce drug control capacities at main airports in Central Asia by establishing drug profiling units and reinforcing searching capacities in each airport. The project will provide national and regional training, equipment and renovation works. It will be implemented jointly by UNODC (which will provide training and technical support) and UNDP (which will provide equipment and carry out renovations).

65. The project aims:

- (a) To renovate five drug profiling units;
- (b) To provide equipment to the drug profiling units;
- (c) To train staff in profiling in five Central Asian airports;
- (d) To provide search and rummaging equipment to five Central Asian airports;
- (e) To train staff on search and rummaging techniques;
- (f) To enhance cooperation among airports in the region;
- (g) To enhance European Union visibility in each airport.

66. Progress has been slower than anticipated, primarily as a result of factors outside UNODC's control. It has proved difficult to recruit the necessary experts and progress across

the region has been varied. For example, it has been impossible to reach agreement on the creation of a drug profiling unit in Kazakhstan because the project did not take into account the vagaries of the Kazakh legal system: since the Ministry of the Interior does not participate in controls at airport checkpoints, customs officials could not agree to participation of the Ministry in an airport drug profiling unit. This issue has been raised with representatives of BOMCA and of the European Union's Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP), but has not yet been resolved. One suggestion was to switch funding to other CNE projects, perhaps to enhance interdiction capabilities at a Caspian Sea port or railway control point. While there is merit in this proposal, it would change the nature of the project significantly.

67. Despite the above reservations, this is a worthwhile and tightly focused project that deserves to succeed. It might be sensible, however, to exclude Kazakhstan from future planning and implementation. This project should be closely linked to Project RER/F23 to ensure that coordination of intelligence is not restricted to drug profiling units.

Analysis

68. The success of integrated drug profiling units elsewhere indicates that, given time, this could be an extremely worthwhile project despite the difficulties being encountered. A common thread that runs through many of the projects within this programme is the unwillingness of agencies to share intelligence. Although small in budgetary terms, this project could contribute to addressing that problem, albeit only in terms of airport control, and it therefore deserves continued encouragement and support.

2. National capacity-building projects

Project TAJ/H03 on a drug control agency in Tajikistan (phase II of TAJ/D65, 1999-2002)

69. The Tajik DCA was founded under Project TAJ/D65 (1999-2002) and developed in phase II of Project TAJ/H03 (2003-2007). It is not clear what the rationale was for creating a DCA in Tajikistan instead of supporting and refining the country's existing counter-narcotics structure.

70. Prior to the creation of the DCA in 1999, responsibility for drugs interdiction in Tajikistan lay with the Ministry of the Interior, the national security service, the border guard and the customs service, which had been coordinated, since 1996, by the SCDC. Reportedly, however, SCDC struggled to "exert the coordination functions it had to perform in the fields of its competence". One approach could have been to investigate why SCDC was underperforming and to seek to remedy the problems. In most other countries in Central Asia, the SCDC still acts as a coordinator (including on drug demand issues). In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the opinion was that the current systems performed well without the need for a DCA.

71. The DCA might have been established as a conscious attempt to build a new law enforcement organization untouched by the negative associations, reputation and allegations of corruption that affected other agencies. Whatever the intention, the DCA has received much support from UNODC, which means that efforts have specifically targeted drug control rather than organized crime in general. Given the predominance of drug trafficking in these countries, such a focus is understandable. A strong advantage of establishing the DCA is that staff members cannot be diverted away from counter-narcotics work. Other agencies involved

(the national security service, Ministry of the Interior, customs service and border guard) have multiple competencies and their drug units face distractions when priorities conflict. However, the DCA strategy did not capitalize on existing experience and the capacities of national agencies already involved in drug interdiction. As a result, existing cooperation networks have not been incorporated.

72. Despite the coordinating function of the DCA, the national security service of Tajikistan still retains responsibility for cross-border activity and telephone interception and it maintains relationships with similar services in other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Although such functions and connections are especially important when dealing with controlled deliveries, the national security service was not included in discussions on the DCA. This may have been because of concerns over that agency's other work responsibilities or because of its connections with the Russian Federation, but the disengagement of the security service may well have reduced the effectiveness of the counter-narcotics strategy. Consideration should be given to how the security service could be incorporated into the counter-narcotics strategy.

73. The present director of the Tajik DCA inspires confidence and appears to be a respected and able leader. Comments made by representatives of the national, donor and UNODC community support this impression. The fact that the director was replaced for several months (apparently for reasons of national politics) is unfortunate and illustrates the vulnerability of law enforcement agencies operating in this context. Currently, the DCA enjoys the patronage of the President (the director's business card reads: "Drug Control Agency of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan"), but it would be risky to rely on such sponsorship for the medium- and long-term sustainability of the agency.

74. The DCA has a forensic laboratory where drugs are identified and tested for purity. Such tests are not only done for the DCA but also for other agencies, on request. Any fingerprints found are transmitted electronically and checked against the Automated Fingerprint Identification System database of the Ministry of the Interior.

75. The small research and analysis unit of the Tajik DCA appears to be firmly established and to be developing satisfactorily. The staff members, who have been trained by Swedish experts under Project TAJ/HO3, have remained the same since 2005. They are able to produce link charts and telephone analyses (although telephone interceptions are conducted by the national security service). The unit is also using the Tais Ontos software provided under Project RER/F23 and has I-base analytical software. Additionally, the unit provides strategic analysis products based on open source material.

76. The drug sniffer dog centre appeared to be functioning and to be developing further. However, more than one donor expert suggested that sniffer dogs were not being deployed or used properly; one even suggested that the dogs were merely being used as "watchdogs". In addition, the evaluation team was informed that donors had suspended support pending a new Government approach since no national strategy on the use of sniffer dogs had even been adopted. An evaluator's observation of how a drug sniffer dog was being handled in Tashkent airport supports the view that the dogs are not being used effectively.

77. The southern region branch of the DCA appears to be lagging behind headquarters in Dushanbe. The acting head of the regional office and the deputy head of the DCA went to some lengths to stress the need for additional equipment. However, their requests also highlighted the project's lack of sustainability. Already, the southern office has three

inoperable Lada vehicles, originally provided by the project in 2000. Four out of seven mobile telephones provided by UNODC were also broken. The agency cannot afford to repair or replace these items, even though standard project terms transfer responsibility for maintenance of such equipment to the beneficiary.

78. Although official statistics do, indeed, show a dramatic increase in seizures for Tajikistan starting in 1999 (the year in which the presidential order on the DCA was signed), it is not clear whether this is objectively attributable to the DCA. For one thing, the trend actually starts in the period 1997-1998 and, although the DCA was officially formed in 1999, it would have needed time to really have an impact. The recorded increase could be due to any of the following factors: the return of the rule of law following the civil war that ended in 1996-1997, the new focus on heroin prompted by presidential attention, the positive influence of a rewards system for substantial seizures (paid through the DCA) or previous failures in collecting statistics. Moreover, any initial increase in seizures has been tempered by the fact that, after a peak in 2003, the quantity of drugs seized has actually tailed off despite an increase in opium production. While it could be argued that this is a consequence of the phased withdrawal of the Russian support for border control that began in 2004, the effect of such support appears not to be statistically significant pre-1999. Interestingly, the trends in opium seizures tend to mirror opium production with a one year time lag; they too have been dropping since 2003.

79. The DCA has not relied on the recruitment of new untrained staff to fill its ranks but, rather, has attracted experienced staff away from existing law enforcement agencies (almost all come from the police of the Ministry of the Interior). This has meant that more or less the same cadre of investigators are involved in drug control now as were before. Such a policy must have resulted in an initial weakening of the police's capacity, although this was denied by spokespersons at the Ministry. In the medium term, however, it has meant that more people have been eventually recruited into the fight against drugs. This suggests that there should now be significantly more persons deployed against and focusing on drug interdiction than before, but the seizures in recent years do not demonstrate increased benefits from the additional staff.

80. It is questionable whether the overall impact of the DCA on drug trafficking reflects the level of investment (Project TAJ/D65 was budgeted at US\$ 6,300,300 after it was reduced from US\$ 11,481,000; Project TAJ/HO3 was budgeted at US\$ 7,693,720 for 2007-2008). On the other hand, it is clear that, in terms of strategic objective number one of the Strategic Programme Framework (2004-2007), the DCA has increased capacity in terms of equipment and, to a limited extent, training.

81. The way in which other projects have been used to develop DCA capacity has also led to confusion and lack of transparency. For instance, Project RER/F23 on criminal intelligence, Project RER/E29 on precursor control, Project RER/F60 on computer-based training and Project RER/F43 on controlled delivery techniques all appear to have been used to expand and finance DCA capacity. Funding from Project TAJ/E24 (on border control) was also used to build an incinerator, to renovate and equip DCA laboratories at the national and provincial level and to support the renovation of the DCA drug sniffer dog centre.

Analysis

82. Overall, the project to establish the DCA in Tajikistan is a success. The evaluators saw first-hand how the techniques developed by the agency with UNODC support are being used

in the counter-narcotics sphere. There is a strong case to be made for extending the range of techniques available to the DCA to further enhance its effectiveness. Although the Tajik Government has passed the necessary legislation empowering the DCA to conduct telephone interception, currently it does not have the resources to do so and is reliant upon the security service for such support. In other respects, there has been an attempt to enhance the role of the DCA by entrusting it with national functions, such as forensic testing and drug detection by sniffer dogs. While other agencies still play an active role in drug law enforcement, they accept the lead agency role of the DCA, under the personal authority of the President.

83. The success referred to is most evident at the national level but needs to be replicated at a provincial level in the future. This replication must extend well beyond the provision of training and equipment and cover the culture and ethos of those in the DCA.

Project KYR/G64 on a drug control agency in Kyrgyzstan

84. On the back of the success of the Tajik DCA project, a similar project was started in Kyrgyzstan in 2003 (Project KYR/G64). The existing “law enforcement response to drug trafficking” prior to this has been described as consisting of a number of agencies “where unhelpful competition and inadequate coordination were often the norm”. There is no evidence of any change to this state of affairs, except that an additional agency is now in place. Indeed, “rivalry and competition” are quoted by law enforcement staff as being the main result of the DCA.

85. In Kyrgyzstan, a senior law enforcement adviser made the criticism that DCA project management staff were overly focused on the polygraph programme, to the detriment of the general development of the agency. This does not appear to be a fair comment. Whatever the other difficulties in delivering the project, the polygraph programme was financed by a separate donation of US\$ 100,000 provided by the United States. Although the polygraph programme was implemented under the auspices of Project KYR/G64, it was in essence a separate activity.

86. The concept of polygraphing is controversial and divergent academic views on its accuracy and reliability remain unresolved. Nonetheless, it is used extensively in American law enforcement organizations and has been well accepted by the authorities in Kyrgyzstan. Despite some concerns voiced by members of the Kyrgyz national security service and one member of the prosecutor’s office—about the relevance of the polygraph to the “Asian mindset” [sic]—most interlocutors considered it a useful tool in rooting out corruption and even in modifying the behaviour of those in other agencies who might wish one day to apply to join the DCA. Comments made in the midterm evaluation report concerning the high failure rate of polygraph tests with existing staff were adequately explained both by the staff of the polygraph unit and the director of the DCA (and are documented on page 6 of appendix II of the midterm evaluation report). In fairness, it should be remembered that 140 persons were recruited into the Kyrgyz DCA before the polygraph programme was established and, according to the information provided, the 49 failures registered have been reconciled.

87. Suggestions regarding an extension of the polygraph programme to other agencies is under consideration. How this could be achieved at the moment is unclear given that existing facilities have been incorporated and paid for by the DCA project. One way to extend polygraphing to other law enforcement agencies could be to create a separate central polygraphing unit (it has been suggested that this could be attached to the anti-corruption commission). This would, however, be costly and funding for the DCA project ended in

December 2006 (although a project revision is being prepared at the time of this assessment). Submitting the members of other agencies to polygraph tests would undoubtedly benefit law enforcement generally, but the DCA fund should not be used to cross-finance such an initiative. Although the two main polygraph operatives are nominally DCA staff, their salaries are paid separately. Whatever one's views on the accuracy and reliability of the polygraph test, it is one of the few practical interventions available to address or deter corrupt practices.

88. External events have caused considerable problems for the development of the DCA in Kyrgyzstan, not least of which was a civil war in 2005 and the underestimation of costs for the building's infrastructure. Operationally, there has been some encouraging success but at present the project is incomplete and its duration will need to be revised in order to ensure further progress and an acceptable return on investment.

Analysis

89. The creation of the DCA should have resulted in a better coordinated national approach to drug law enforcement. There is little evidence that this has occurred. On the contrary, the DCA appears to have simply created another competing agency, one that lacks a clear and distinct overarching role. One way to elevate the DCA would be to provide it with tools not available to other national agencies, for example telephone interception technology; this would increase the effectiveness of the DCA, currently seen as a benefit by other agencies. Polygraphing appears to have been successful and its wider application (e.g. in recruiting for CARICC) should be carefully considered. The principal benefit of polygraphing is that it achieves one of the few practical interventions available to address or deter corruption (this could also be said about the Tajik DCA).

Project UZB/H04 on a computer network for the prosecutor's office in Uzbekistan

90. This project aimed to provide computers to prosecutors, establish a network between different offices and set up a website for viewing legislation, statistics, treaties and other legal information. Although it has yet to be independently evaluated, the main donor for this project was very happy with the way in which it was implemented. It was a discrete project with a clear and uncomplicated objective. While this project has helped to improve the efficiency of the prosecutor's office, it was an infrastructure project aimed at developing basic administrative capacity and, as such, any contribution to the interdiction of drug traffickers is indirect.

Analysis

91. This project had a clear and uncomplicated objective. It appears to have been concluded satisfactorily, but has yet to be independently evaluated.

3. Border control projects

Project TAJ/E24 on strengthening control along the Tajik-Afghan border

92. The original objectives of this project were to assist the Government of Tajikistan and its law enforcement agencies at the most sensitive border control posts between Tajikistan and Afghanistan and at selected airports and railway stations in Tajikistan:

- (a) To improve their capacity to identify and intercept traffickers of illicit drugs;

- (b) To facilitate the storage and the destruction of drugs seized;
- (c) To promote more effective ways to analyse seized narcotic substances in established and fully-equipped forensic laboratories;
- (d) To ensure an effective operational impact in the use of drug sniffer dogs;
- (e) To take necessary steps allowing UNODC to reach an agreement between Russian and Tajik authorities on prerequisites for the implementation of the Border Control Programme.

93. This project commenced in 1999 but has been revised several times and has been extended until 2007. An additional revision document has been submitted requesting that the project be extended further to 2008. It is suggested that a decision regarding this proposed extension be delayed at this stage since future activities proposed are not in line with similar activities being carried out by other donors (BOMCA and the United States). Indeed, it might have been better to terminate the project at the time of the last revision and to have started a new project. Factors such as the withdrawal of the border guards of the Russian Federation have clearly affected the project. The value of the training and equipment already provided may have been lost and the decision to repair instead of replace damaged buildings should be reconsidered.

94. Over time, the priorities have become: improvement of the control capacities of units posted at the most sensitive areas of the Tajik-Afghan border, improvement of control capacities of customs and police officers at Dushanbe and Paxtaobod, Uzbekistan, railway stations, improvement of checking and control capacities of law enforcement entities working in Dushanbe and Khujand, Tajikistan, airports, establishment of a national forensic institute and three provincial laboratories (all under DCA control) to store, analyse and destroy drugs seized, and definition of a national policy for the use of drug sniffer dogs and the establishment of a national dog training centre in Tajikistan.

95. Good practice established at this time was the creation of an inter-agency working group comprising members from the relevant law enforcement bodies and from donors tasked to elaborate a border control and project implementation plan. This was the first example of a common approach in relation to international assistance. During 2004, a number of assessment missions were carried out and recommendations were made with the aim of strengthening coordination between the border guards of the Russian Federation and of Tajikistan and other interested law enforcement agencies from those countries, as well as from Afghanistan. Shortly after the missions took place, the Russian border guards withdrew. It was then considered necessary to carry out a further mission to consider the impact of their withdrawal. The project was revised and extended until March 2005 to carry out the necessary action.

96. Significant training activities followed and equipment was provided. The project was again revised and extended until June 2007. The budget was raised to US\$ 6,464,300, an increase of nearly US\$ 90,000 from the 1999 figure. This new revision brought about a new set of immediate objectives, as follows:

- (a) To develop and reinforce the required national legal instruments and institutional and administrative structures for a comprehensive border control system in Tajikistan;
- (b) To further strengthen the existing border control capacities through provision of relevant training and equipment;
- (c) To strengthen the border-control-related investigative and intelligence analysis capacities of border guards and of customs and other law enforcement units at selected

sectors of the Tajik-Afghan border and at some exit points, as well as to develop the inter-agency communication system;

(d) To establish the inter-agency mobile deployment teams as a step towards modernizing the border control system in the country;

(e) To develop cross-border cooperation between Tajik law enforcement agencies conducting drug control activities along the Tajik-Afghan border and their counterparts in Afghanistan;

(d) To upgrade forensic laboratory capacity for efficient cross-border drug control activities;

(e) To develop a national strategy in the use of drug sniffer dogs and to strengthen the national drug sniffer dog training centre.

97. Training and equipment continued to be provided into 2006 and a project revision document calling for an extension of the project until April 2008 has been prepared for consideration. The reasons given for this proposed extension are:

(a) The border posts along the Tajik-Afghan border will be renovated jointly with assistance from UNODC, BOMCA and the United States, with the work being effectively split into three distinct components;

(b) The mobile units have technically been established but not equipped. The police service still needs to develop rules and regulations for the implementation of the units, which will be created and operational no sooner than mid-2007;

(c) Assistance is being provided by other agencies and a level of coordination is needed;

(d) The Government of the United States, in cooperation with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is implementing a programme of installing Harris radio equipment to guarantee stable radio communication for all national law enforcement bodies nationwide. An extension is necessary for this to be completed;

(e) A national strategy for the creation of a drug sniffer dog training centre was signed in July 2006. However, the fact that some administrative and financial aspects still need to be finalized is delaying some project activities.

98. The proposed new objectives are:

(a) To develop and reinforce the required legal instruments and institutional and administrative structures for a comprehensive border control system;

(b) To further strengthen existing border control capacities by providing relevant training and equipment;

(c) To strengthen the border-control-related investigative and intelligence capacities of border guards and of customs and other law enforcement units at selected sectors of the Tajik-Afghan border and at some exit points, as well as to develop the inter-agency communication system;

(d) To establish inter-agency mobile deployment teams as a step towards modernizing the border control system in the country;

(e) To develop cross-border cooperation between Tajik bodies that conduct border control activities and their counterparts in Afghanistan;

(f) To upgrade forensic laboratory capacity for efficient cross-border drug control activities;

(g) To develop a national strategy in the use of drug sniffer dogs and to strengthen the national drug sniffer dog training centre.

99. A number of issues arise from this proposed extension, which does not have the support of the evaluation team. Concerning the renovation of border posts, UNODC is committed to the actual renovation of the buildings in their sphere of operations, many of which were badly damaged by the departing Russian border guards. Unfortunately, the one example seen by the team was during the visit to the Baharak border post, where the renovation done so far could best be described as extremely shoddy and substandard. For example, cheap wood was used for flooring which did not even reach the walls. The renovation had also been delayed significantly, partly owing to the remoteness of the location and the necessity to use a contractor from Dushanbe (a four-hour drive away). Additionally, all the equipment supplied by the project prior to the withdrawal of the Russian border guards was no longer there. While it is appreciated that renovating existing structures is less expensive than supplying new modular units, these have the advantage of being equipped with modern sanitation facilities and electrical infrastructure. Whenever possible, BOMCA and the United States, who provide the bilateral assistance, prefer to use prefabricated modular units to replace buildings that are too expensive to repair. Despite the acknowledged resistance of the Tajik authorities to accept modular units, the evaluators strongly believe that UNODC should fall into line with the other donors and supply the modular units whenever possible. It is argued that it was the border guard command who asked for renovation, but enquiries made of the other donors reveal that they too were asked for renovation assistance; nonetheless, they insisted on supplying the ready-fitted units whenever they considered this to be the more effective solution. The modular units provided by other donors are supplied on a turnkey basis and, despite the logistical challenge of transporting them over great distances, they can be delivered and become operationally effective much sooner than posts undergoing renovation. They also provide a much improved working environment for the staff based in them, thus enhancing the reputation of the donor organization. It is accepted that some of these border posts are very remote indeed, but the various project officers and managers should have found the time to make periodic visits to ensure that all of the equipment had been provided and that renovation work was of an acceptable standard. The work carried out at the one site visited during the evaluation (Baharak) was not of an acceptable standard and did not represent value for money.

100. Also of concern is the possibility that the project will pay hardship allowances to the staff of the mobile units when operational. Such payments cannot be sustained in the long term and are not supported by the evaluation team. Having seen the working and living conditions of the border guards at Baharak, it could be said that all deserve a hardship allowance.

101. Assistance is to be provided to upgrade further the capacity of the various laboratories but it is increasingly hard to imagine what kind of further assistance is required. The laboratories have been well equipped and the staff adequately trained.

102. Finally, although much good work has been done after some eight years of activity, a number of the objectives are simply being carried forward and the project has still only reached the stage of renovating buildings.

Analysis

103. This project was very ambitious from the outset and has remained so throughout its various revisions. The suggested future revision is also ambitious. The project is complicated and the team simply did not have the opportunity to make enough site visits to examine its impact thoroughly. Several overlapping areas were identified within the project. Its

involvement in the drug sniffer dog centre, the various forensic laboratory initiatives and the building and maintenance of a drug-burning incinerator, all of which fall within the responsibility of the DCA, begs the question of why these initiatives were not included in Project TAJ/H03.

104. Similarly, various pieces of computer equipment for networking purposes have been supplied to the intelligence and analytical sections of the customs service, to border guards and, in some cases, to the police service, despite the fact that Project RER/F23 on drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence, information and data collection, analysis and exchange was specifically created for that purpose.

105. The question of whether to renovate the border posts instead of replacing them with custom-built modular units needs to be urgently reconsidered on the basis of the one example seen by the evaluators.

106. One bright spot to emerge was the use of the train-the-trainer concept, albeit well into the lifetime of the project.

Project TUK/F42 on strengthening border control in Turkmenistan

107. This project began in September 2003 and was expected to terminate in December 2005. It was revised and extended until April 2006, but the provision of equipment has still not been completed. The total budget for the project is US\$ 1,100,100. The immediate objective is to strengthen the capacities of law enforcement agencies in Turkmenistan so that they are better able to interdict trafficking in drugs and precursors in specific areas along the border of Turkmenistan with Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

108. The main areas for assistance in Turkmenistan were shown as Mary, Tagtabazar, Sarakhs, Serhetabad and, partly, Imam-nazar. The requirements of the latter will now be catered to by Project TKM/I78.

109. This project has been beset with problems since its inception. The procurement of equipment has been extremely difficult for a number of reasons. Initially, the host Government changed its priorities with regard to its perceived needs. The procurement failed early in 2004 because UNDP provided little support as required by the agreement. The Government then made further amendments before procurement was attempted again. Despite the help of a procurement assistant from the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, UNDP did not finalize its processes before the bids expired. Further attempts were made through the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office, which, in turn, failed to find satisfactory bidders. The Regional Office was eventually able to finalize the procurement and deliver the outstanding equipment with support from the United Nations Office at Vienna at headquarters. Nonetheless, a number of large items were still outstanding at the time of the evaluation.

110. A failing in the UNODC recruitment process was highlighted: the project coordinator who was hired did not have the level of expertise claimed and found it difficult to manage the project. In mid-2005, his work performance declined substantially and a decision was taken to remove him from the project. A new coordinator was recruited and commenced work in mid-2006.

111. For reasons never explained, the project staff failed to implement the training programme required in the project objectives and appeared incapable of doing so. The programme was finalized in mid-2005 by an expert sent to Ashgabad. Additional training on passport and documentation control due to be held in December 2005 had to be cancelled when the trainer fell ill and became unavailable.

112. Despite the above, some training was carried out for Turkmen police and customs officers at Mary, Imam-baba and Sarakhs but little or no equipment was provided. The main focus of attention seems to have been Serhetabad and that is where the outstanding equipment is destined.

113. It must be stressed from the outset that the consultant was unable to meet any Government official or any law enforcement body during his visit. Any comments, therefore, derive from a series of meetings with donor country embassies, other international agencies, the project staff and documentation provided. Even before arriving in the country, the consultant was aware from sources in the other countries that any contact with Turkmen officials was at best slow and, in some cases, nonexistent. This was confirmed when speaking to officials in the various embassies in Ashgabad. It became apparent that the only official point of contact was through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would simply forward the application or request for a decision to the presidential apparatus. If it came at all, the reply would take considerable time. There is an SCDC, made up of members of law enforcement bodies, that meets with UNODC staff members and the representatives of other international agencies and the donor community, but it holds no decision-making power and it too submits everything to the presidential apparatus for consideration. Moreover, there was a consensus in the embassies that the Turkmen authorities do not readily admit to the existence of a drug problem and that they sometimes deliberately give out false information. Similarly, it was felt that the country was suspicious of international cooperation.

114. Most of the embassies enjoy a good relationship with the United Nations in general and with UNODC in particular. The embassy of Turkey, for example, has assisted by making the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime available for training. The Embassy of the Russian Federation has also provided trainers and training facilities and future training will be carried out in the Russian Federation under the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)-Russia Council. In the past, the Russian authorities have carried out joint operations with their Turkmen counterparts but nothing has happened in the last three years. On the question of precursor chemicals, the Russian authorities have asked for permission to inspect two chemical factories in the country but this request has been denied.

115. The United Kingdom, in collaboration with the project, has funded the building of a customs examination shed at Serhetabad, Turkmenistan, and is hosting English language training to staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the national security service, as well as to police and customs officers and border guards.

116. It is the view of the embassy of the United States that law enforcement bodies at the border area do not cooperate with each other and that there is a general lack of trust among all five Central Asian States.

117. With specific reference to Projects TUK/F42 and TKM/I78, the United States has direct funding contact with both. Staff within the embassy expressed concern at the lack of procurement for Project TUK/F42 and the fact that no funds had been spent in the past 20 months. Also, concern was expressed in relation to the overall cost of Project TKM/I78, a

situation that can be explained by reading about the progress of that project. What can be learned from this, of course, is that a number of agencies of the United States are involved in the funding process and that, occasionally, one group does not know what the other is doing.

118. OSCE is also active in the field and enjoys good cooperation with UNODC. OSCE has carried out training on basic drug identification and search techniques and intends to fund a study tour for six customs officers to the German-Swiss border. The main obstacle to success seems to be that Turkmenistan has no clearing body to coordinate activities effectively. BOMCA is involved in a project at the seaport of Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan, and the UNODC project coordinator has a project idea to supplement this activity by using the UNODC Global Container Control Programme.

119. UNDP admits there were many problems in the early days in relation to procurement and confirms the slow progress being made in contacting Government officials. Nonetheless, the United Nations is still seen as the best placed international agency in the country, with the Government showing the Organization the utmost respect.

120. Moving now to the actual project, many of the problems encountered have already been detailed in the findings shown. However, there are other matters of concern. A number of activities have clearly not been completed. Some training has been given to police and customs officers and to border guards at all of the named locations, but Serhetabad, Turkmenistan, appears to be the main recipient. The other named posts were each supplied with a selection of digital cameras, digital camcorders, voice recorders, computers and laser printers. In 2003, specialized equipment was made available to the forensic laboratory of the Ministry of the Interior.

121. The outstanding equipment consists of two water trucks, two fuel trucks, one UAZ jeep and one mobile service vehicle to carry search and detection equipment, a power generator, a power converter, a welding machine, drills, etc. The project has already supplied a bulldozer. This type of equipment also raises another issue worthy of consideration: having had the opportunity to visit the capital, Ashgabad, and having seen the large construction programme being undertaken there where the use of heavy machinery is required, the consultant questioned whether UNODC projects should be funding the type of equipment being provided under the project. The view is that the Government is more than capable of providing bulldozers and the like, allowing UNODC to concentrate specifically on drug and precursor detection equipment, communications and mobility issues.

Analysis

122. This project has met many problems, as already detailed. It must be brought to a conclusion very soon with the final delivery of the outstanding equipment. A number of activities have not been carried out with the main focus being directed to one location instead of four as originally planned. The consultant has not seen any revision document authorizing such a change of emphasis. However, UNODC staff members in Ashgabad assured the consultant that two documents—NV06/1056 and NV06/1313—for changing the emphasis of the project with the agreement of the Project Steering Committee did exist. The only document seen by the consultant extends the project to April 2006 to allow for final delivery and evaluation, but this has not happened.

123. It is obvious that it has not been easy to implement the project, mainly because the governmental standpoint requires all contact to be made through the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. This denies UNODC staff members and donors the right to make direct contact with law enforcement counterparts. The requirement that all official decisions can only be made through the presidential process also makes it impossible to get prompt responses. All requests for project staff visits to recipient sites must also follow the same process. There is no doubt that this thematic evaluation was seriously hampered by the consultant's inability to meet any official Government or law enforcement entity during the visit.

124. The question of what type of equipment UNODC should be providing is also a matter of concern and the problems with procurement must be examined and addressed as soon as possible.

Project TKM/I78 on immediate assistance to Turkmenistan for strengthening activities at the Imam-nazar checkpoint on the Turkmen-Afghan border

125. This project began in 2006 and has a total budget of US\$ 2,035,000. Although this might seem excessive for providing assistance for one border crossing point, explanations will follow.

126. The immediate objectives of the project are:

- (a) To develop border infrastructure at the Imam-nazar border checkpoint and strengthen the border control capacity of law enforcement agencies;
- (b) To facilitate effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination at the Imam-nazar checkpoint.

127. This project is still in its infancy, which is why assessments are still being made with regard to the kind of training needed and the beneficiaries of such training, among other issues. Direct focal points with law enforcement officials are being identified and working groups are also being established. The SCDC will act as the Government implementing agency and its head will lead the project steering committee.

128. The project is linked to a bilateral project of the United States aimed at upgrading five selected border points (including at Imam-nazar) at a cost of US\$ 2,800,000 each. The UNODC project intends to fund a shortfall in the project of the United States equal to US\$ 600,000. The remainder of the UNODC budget will be spent on training, equipment and administrative costs. It is interesting to note, however, that the official at the embassy of the United States responsible for allocating funds to Project TUK/F42 was unaware of this financial arrangement.

129. It can only be hoped that this project does not encounter the same difficulties faced in trying to administer Project TUK/F42.

Analysis

130. It is too early to make any useful comments or analyses on this project. Suffice it to say that hopefully the project officers will not encounter the problems faced by Project TUK/F42 and that Government officials will be more forthcoming in arranging meetings and accelerating the decision-making process.

Project UZB/G28 on assistance to Uzbekistan for the resumption of activities at the Hayraton checkpoint on the Uzbek-Afghan border

131. The immediate objectives of this project were:

- (a) To develop border infrastructure at the Hayraton border checkpoint and strengthen the border control capacity of the law enforcement bodies concerned;
- (b) To establish effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination at the Hayraton border checkpoint;
- (c) To promote cross-border cooperation on the Uzbek-Afghan border.

132. By and large, this project has been satisfactorily completed, with only a number of small issues still to be resolved (as will be explained in the following paragraphs).

133. The project has clear objectives and focuses on one specific site for assistance. It was originally scheduled to start in 2002, providing there was sufficient funding available. Funding later became available, so the project was launched in June 2003 and was aided throughout by a project steering group established in July 2003. The group included members of all the agencies concerned, the National Centre for Drug Control, border guards, customs officials, the Ministry of the Interior (police) and the national security service. The UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia also held two meetings during the project with representatives from other agencies of the United Nations, international organizations (the European Commission and OSCE) and other major donors. This coordination mechanism ensured there was no overlapping or duplication of efforts during the lifetime of the project.

134. The construction work carried out included the building of a platform for loading and unloading cargo from railway wagons and containers, of premises to accommodate power generators and of foundations for weighbridges, which also had to be installed. Other equipment provided included computers for the Customs Institute, the local national security service and the checkpoint itself. A range of basic detection and communication equipment was supplied, as was a power generator. Air conditioners, video control and security systems, X-ray machines, forklift trucks, a mobile radar system and two Niva Chevrolet cars completed the package. The equipment was supplied appropriately throughout the project and appears to be of a kind that one would expect to see provided.

135. At an early stage of the project, officers visited the Turkish-Bulgarian border crossing of Kapikule-Kapitan Andreevo to learn best practices in border control. Training that had begun in 2004 was also provided throughout the project. Customs officials and border guards were trained on “basic skills of risk assessment in processing transportation papers and documents”. Further training was given by the German Bundeskriminalamt (Federal criminal police service) on “searching cars, wagons and trucks” and on “precursor control”. In addition, 12 officers from all of the concerned agencies received training on “special techniques on fighting drug trafficking” at the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime. Officers went on a study tour to the Russian Federation to learn current Russian strategy, methodology and efforts in carrying out risk assessments and in profiling techniques.

136. In 2005, the training continued. Border guards were trained in the use of mobile radar equipment and 10 more officers received training at a Russian Federation advanced training academy on “specialized training for law enforcement officers on coordination of efforts in

drug fighting, organization of tactics of controlled delivery, criminal group infiltration, search techniques and the psychological aspects of identifying contraband”.

137. Only two issues remain to be resolved. The cabling work between the Uzbek and Afghan sides of the border has been completed but is not yet in use, and a heavy lifting crane described in the project that was considered inappropriate needs to be replaced by a crane attached to a truck.

Analysis

138. Although most aspects of the project have been completed, there is nothing to truly measure its impact. The aborted visit prevented the team from assessing the value of the training and the equipment provided by speaking to the recipients and observing staff members carry out their daily tasks. Nonetheless, the team did have an opportunity to speak briefly with the head of the customs service at Termez, Uzbekistan, who was able to confirm that most of the equipment was in place and that some of his staff had received training. Apparently, very few drug seizures are being made and those that are involve only small quantities of drugs that are mainly in the possession of people crossing the border on foot. No precursor chemical seizures have been made at this very busy border crossing. Perhaps traffickers do not use this crossing because of the secure environment, but it is simply not possible to know for sure. The Government of Uzbekistan appears to have fully met its commitments in relation to this project.

139. There is no evidence that the train-the-trainer concept has been used in this project and it is not known how many staff still in situ have received training. If this concept is not being applied, training is unsustainable.

140. There is no evidence at this stage that this project has enhanced the investigative capacity of border guards or customs officials.

B. Findings and analyses on other areas of the programme

141. Some of the topics that follow have already been mentioned in the previous section, but require further elaboration in the programme context. The principal objective of this evaluation is to examine the various projects and their respective impacts on the programme in general and whether the programme itself has met its targets. Each evaluator concentrated on one specific area of the programme, but there was clear overlap between many of the regional, national and border control projects. For example, both Project RER/E29 on precursor control in Central Asia and Project RER/F43 on assistance in developing controlled delivery techniques aim to have an impact on border control operations. Other examples are given in the following paragraphs.

1. Forensic laboratories

142. The scientific support unit at UNODC in Vienna was helpful in providing a schedule of support provided to Central Asia in recent years. Forensic science capacity has been established in the DCAs in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the other countries, various laboratories attached to different agencies claim to undertake different work from each other and each agency claims to need support and equipment. For instance, two forensic

laboratories visited in Uzbekistan directly requested the evaluation team for an X-ray spectrometer worth US\$ 100,000 (despite being told that this was not the purpose of the visit).

143. Diluting support across a number of different laboratories is counterproductive. Instead, support would be better targeted at one laboratory chosen as a central forensic laboratory for the country concerned, although it is accepted that there will still be a need in remote areas for satellite laboratories (probably under DCA control), close to trafficking routes. This could also encourage the law enforcement agencies of other ministries to forward their evidential samples to one point thereby enhancing skill development, standardization and comparative research. National Governments should be lobbied to create one central forensic laboratory to facilitate this.

144. Mention was made of a project of the European Union aimed at developing forensic science capacity in the region. An assessment of the training needs is to be subcontracted to UNODC, while the supply of equipment will be assigned to UNDP. The evaluators were informed that an international consultant recruited under the third phase of the CADAP project entitled “Support to forensic laboratory capacity in Central Asia” had undertaken the first phase of an assessment mission to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. After the final phase of the assessment mission to the rest of the Central Asian countries has been conducted in January 2007, recommendations will be made regarding the provision of equipment at selected forensic laboratories and on required training for forensic staff.

Analysis

145. UNODC has supported the development of a number of laboratories. This support would have been more effective if it had been targeted at laboratories within a single ministry that had a cross-agency remit.

2. Drug and precursor test kits

146. A persistent characteristic of UNODC’s counter-narcotics strategy has been the provision of large numbers of drug test kits (although Kazakhstan produces its own). These were not seen at any of the locations visited, nor were any examples given of their use. Indeed, the acting head of the DCA in the southern region of Tajikistan said he did not know where any drug test kits were (staff at the Osh office of the Kyrgyz DCA, however, stated that the kits are included in the operational field kits). On more than one occasion, senior managers stated that drug test kits were not necessary as their officers were able to recognize opium, heroin or marijuana without the need for formal testing and that, in any case, formal testing was done by the forensic laboratory. Thus, field officers need only to secure the evidence properly and do not need to test the substances themselves. Providing the drug test kits would, therefore, appear to be of limited value.

147. Experience with precursor chemicals is different. Officers are more likely to make mistakes when describing them and many do not have sufficient experience to identify them (most officers have never seen them). Precursor test kits were seen in the forensic laboratories of both DCAs and were said to be used for training purposes. The project officer suggested that some beneficiaries found the precursor kits difficult to use and advocated the production of a training DVD on how to use them. Such an initiative would be pure folly. In the words of one beneficiary (who seemed to find even the question surprising): “If you can read [the instructions] you can use them.” The suggestion made by the deputy head of the State Customs Service of Turkmenistan that the use of precursor test kits was hazardous was seen

by the evaluators as a feeble excuse—the kits are used widely around the world and UNODC would not supply them if there were any unacceptable risks associated with their use.

Analysis

148. The provision of these kits does not appear to have been monitored effectively but, rather, they have simply been distributed at the national level. There is no evidence that their supply has had any impact on drug or precursor interdiction.

3. Training

149. Training under UNODC projects has taken a number of different forms: study trips abroad; training courses in other countries; training courses run locally; and, latterly, train-the-trainer programmes. Training has also aimed to familiarize recipients with new concepts or practices; develop new skills; and explain how equipment or specialist tools should be used.

150. With regard to Tajikistan, comments were received that some trainers had been employed who were unfamiliar with the national situation and that the trainees did not understand the training as delivered. It was also stated that sometimes the level of content was not pitched appropriately. No formal analysis on training needs was provided to the assessment team for any of the projects.

151. High staff turnover in the DCAs also means that the benefits of having trained staff are soon lost. Some attempts have been made to retain trained staff at the agency in order to obtain sufficient return on the investment (for example, one of the commitments of the Government of Kyrgyzstan under the project was to ensure trained staff remained working in “drug control bodies for at least three years”). Contract terms aimed at binding staff to their posts are apparently under consideration but have been difficult to enforce in other parts of the world. Turnover in other agencies is also high, with staff being rotated as a matter of routine.

152. While it may be necessary to offer direct training in a restricted number of situations, best value suggests that, wherever possible, the emphasis should be redirected to developing national (or regional) training capacity in key areas (notably criminal intelligence and analysis). This advice was raised in the Terminal Evaluation Report on the Tajik DCA Project (Project TAJ/D65) in February 2005 and, more recently, in the Midterm Evaluation Report on the Kyrgyz DCA Project (Project KYR/G64), but does not seem to have been taken into account. Although some projects have mentioned an intention to introduce train-the-trainer programmes (for instance, the budget for Project KYR/G64 allocates US\$ 235,000 for such a purpose), this has not happened. This, despite the fact that a senior analyst in the Tajik DCA appears to be qualified to train his own staff. Well-trained staff members are a prerequisite for a capable and professional workforce. It may also be difficult to improve the situation given that beneficiaries now have an established expectation for international study trips.

Analysis

153. The training programme needs to consider how it can achieve best value both for the donors and for beneficiaries. In a work environment and culture that exhibits a high degree of staff turnover and where rotation of officers in law enforcement agencies is a matter of common policy, direct training courses are a waste. Bringing in external experts to conduct

such training is also an extremely expensive option given that training needs to be given continually.

154. Proper training curricula need to be formulated and the results audited. Training courses should include evaluation mechanisms to assess their effectiveness (apparently this only happened in initial Project RER/F23 courses). Participation in courses should be certified and the names of successful participants documented.

155. The subject matter of training sessions should be tailored to local needs. According to donor experts, more effort needs to be made to develop basic investigative skills, without which higher levels of training are useless. This may be an uncomfortable message to deliver to experienced law enforcement personnel in Central Asia. Officials from at least two of the agencies visited also complained that there were too many workshops and that these did not deliver any substantive benefit.

4. Anti-corruption measures

156. The implications of corruption in the region's law enforcement community were consistently raised both in project documentation and by those met during the evaluation mission. Members of the foreign anti-narcotics community, other liaison officers and experts all identified corruption as a fundamental obstacle to effective drug interdiction. The DCA concept has developed three strands of action that seek to curtail corruption among DCA agents:

- (a) Competitive recruitment procedures with independent oversight;
- (b) Salary enhancements paid through the project or bilaterally by the United States;
- (c) Polygraph (lie detector) testing, in Kyrgyzstan only.

These measures represent the only practical action taken to address corruption issues among law enforcement officers.

157. The introduction of competitive recruitment procedures that include the participation of international observers on the selection panel can be seen as a success. The DCAs in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the only law enforcement agencies that have adopted such procedures in their countries. They attempt to forestall the influence of personal and kinship networks in selection. There have, however, been allegations that some persons were asked to effectively "buy" their jobs. Where this has been detected, the culprits have been dismissed. As part of the recruitment procedure, the national security service is asked to conduct a background check on the candidate. The director of the DCA in Kyrgyzstan recognized that candidates are sometimes recruited into the DCA despite a negative report by the national security service, but claimed that this was because of a failure by the security service to substantiate its allegations.

158. On a number of occasions, senior officials explained that law enforcement officers were paid so little that they were "forced" to accept bribes to make ends meet. Salary enhancements have been introduced to remove the "need" for DCA officers to accept bribes or to participate in other criminal activities in order to feed their families. Despite this very positive effect, such payments are, unfortunately, contrary to the standard terms of reference of United Nations projects and will need to be phased out. Although pay differentials have eroded over time, salary supplements paid through the project have reportedly made employment with the DCA an attractive option. Even so, there have been staff retention issues

(63 per cent of staff members are said to have left between 1999 and 2005). The reasons for this have not been explained satisfactorily.

159. The third anti-corruption measure—the polygraph—aims to test the integrity of applicants to the agency and of existing staff members and is reviewed in greater detail above.

Analysis

160. Corruption continues to be a significant issue across the region. Some of the measures put in place have assisted in mitigating its impact.

5. Role of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Central Asia

161. UNODC is only one of many organizations providing support to CNE activities in the region, although under the provisions of the Paris Pact it has the primary coordination role. Nonetheless, the mission and positioning of UNODC as an entity in Central Asia would benefit from greater definition. The organization does not appear to distinguish between its role as the instigator of anti-drug and anti-crime projects, as a subcontractor for other agencies or organizations, and as a representative for bilateral donor activity. In particular, one representative for BOMCA/CADAP stated that the European Union was concerned about the UNODC “multi-agency trust fund” approach because it led to a lack of visibility for the donor.

162. It was stated by BOMCA-CADAP that, generally, technical support was good, although sometimes there seemed to be weak communication between field offices and the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia. It was stressed that field coordination by the Regional Office was good and that the donor was very happy with present arrangements, “especially after previous administrative problems were addressed”. However it was also stated that there appeared to be a lack of understanding of the requirements of the European Commission as a separate donor.

163. In general, the evaluators received positive responses in relation to the support from UNODC headquarters in Vienna. No criticism was levelled at backstopping arrangements, except for delays in the procurement of equipment and difficulties in recruitment. Other than in Turkmenistan, the relationship between UNODC and UNDP appeared to be mutually supportive. There is an excellent working relationship between headquarters and the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia.

164. The Regional Office for Central Asia is pivotal to the successful implementation of the entire project portfolio. The procedures for monitoring project activities are effective and the Central Analysis Unit in the Regional Office maintains a comprehensive overview of individual projects and programme delivery. The Regional Office also coordinates assistance provided by other international agencies and bilateral donors and enjoys a deserved high reputation throughout the region.

165. The way in which necessary equipment lists are established should be the result of an independent expert gap analysis rather than a negotiation with national authorities. Beneficiaries are not always best placed to understand their own development needs. While it should be recognized that national and professional pride plays a role in countries’ willingness to accept donor support, UNODC should occasionally be prescriptive rather than always seek a diplomatic consensus. At the same time, project design has to recognize the

extremely rudimentary facilities provided in some law enforcement agencies. Should computer equipment and networking be considered in offices that do not even have a telephone, facsimile machine or photocopier?

166. UNODC decision-making in this respect needs to be supported by proper gap analyses and needs assessments conducted independently of the local field staff by persons with the relevant professional skills and experience. Donor law enforcement experts repeatedly stated that the national authorities were keen to obtain the latest technology even when the need for such equipment was marginal.

167. General concerns were also voiced about the provision of equipment that could be misused or redirected to an inappropriate end-user. One example of such equipment is night vision apparatus, since it is clearly of benefit both to border officials and criminal organizations. One donor declined to provide the equipment requested, which was then provided by another bilateral donor. It was suggested that donors should agree on a political strategy for the region against which the provision of support could be assessed.

Analysis

168. It is generally accepted that UNODC has the primary coordination role in the region, but other organizations, especially those with significant funds available, seek disproportionate influence over the provision of assistance.

III. Outcomes, impacts and sustainability

A. Outcomes and impacts

169. Any assistance provided to staff expected to interdict drugs and precursors at official border crossings or isolated border posts can be said, at the very least, to make law enforcement bodies aware of the problem and give them an insight into how the problem should be addressed. To that extent, UNODC projects have indeed assisted in raising general awareness of the situation regarding the production and trafficking in opium and heroin from Afghanistan. However, the projects have only dealt with interdiction capability and have provided very little in the way of enhanced investigative and intelligence-gathering techniques. Future projects should concentrate more on that role.

170. Agencies must recognize the need to share information. Unfortunately, the evaluation team saw little evidence of this taking place. All agencies stated that cooperation took place but, in discussing details, it became evident that the level of such cooperation was extremely low. This is clearly limiting the impact of many of the projects.

171. The shortfall in the required budgets at the commencement of all of the border control projects clearly had a detrimental effect. Once they were fully funded, the projects did move forward and a number of activities took place. Of the three specific projects, only Project UZB/G28 can be said to have been satisfactorily concluded even if a small item of equipment is still outstanding. However, it is almost impossible to consider its impact since the evaluation team was denied the opportunity to visit the site, inspect the equipment, assess the training and generally observe how the border crossing operated. It can be argued that, since only small quantities of illicit drugs are being seized, the crossing has been made so secure that the traffickers use different routes to avoid this crossing. There is, however, no evidence to corroborate this.

172. Project TAJ/E24 is a very complicated project. It has been revised a number of times and yet another revision is currently being considered. Again, it is impossible to assess the project's impact since only one isolated border post was visited and that border post raised queries about the statements made by the post commander and the activities described in the project, among other issues. There is no doubt that all training and equipment provided before the withdrawal of the Russian border guards has been lost. Similarly, damage caused by the departing Russians has meant that even at this late stage the actual border posts themselves need to be renovated or replaced. Similarly, much of the training provided early on in the activities is considered wasted (border guards are chiefly young conscripts who serve less than 18 months in the field). It is only in comparatively recent times that the train-the-trainer concept has been employed, thus ensuring a level of sustainability. As mentioned previously, this project has not dealt solely with strengthening border control but included also the building of incinerators, support to forensic laboratories and the enhancement of a drug sniffer dog centre. All of these activities fall within the command of the DCA and can be considered relatively successful. However, it is questionable whether this project should have been funding such activities as opposed to focusing strictly on border control capabilities.

173. The evaluation team believes that the intention to further revise and extend this project should be carefully reconsidered. If the project is revised again, the project will have run for the best part of 10 years and this is not considered good practice. Since this is a major undertaking, the time might be right to end the project and start afresh with a new project. Certainly, it is highly recommended that UNODC seriously reconsider the decision to renovate existing border posts instead of supplying new, prefabricated modular units as other donors—namely BOMCA and the United States—providing the same border assistance are doing.

174. So far, there is little evidence to suggest that cooperation and coordination has been established between the law enforcement agencies tasked in this field. DCA personnel, for example, do not operate in the border areas, despite holding the lead role in the country. Some cooperation might exist at official border crossings but only in the remote areas. Seizures are normally made by border guards after a confrontation with traffickers, usually after an exchange of gunfire. There is no evidence of any further investigative measures and little to show that any of these operations were based on intelligence. This lack of cooperation was identified throughout the evaluation in every one of the countries visited.

175. Little can be added about the assistance being provided to Turkmenistan under Project TUK/F42. There is simply no evidence to assess its impact, despite assurances that seizures have increased. It will only be possible to gauge its impact once the project is completed. In any case, the consultant is not sure that heavy machinery for construction and road-making should even be provided.

176. The attitude of the Government of Turkmenistan also causes concern. There is ample evidence from both within and outside the country that cooperation with officials is difficult at best. It seems ridiculous that project staff (and indeed all embassies and other donors) have no direct access to their counterparts and that all contact must be made in writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, in turn, must pass everything to the presidential apparatus for decision-making. This slow and cumbersome process does not favour drug interdiction and investigation. Concern has already been expressed in relation to the type of equipment that is now being provided in view of the obvious affluence of the country.

177. To summarize, these projects—through the provision of training and equipment—will have given recipients a basic grounding in drug interdiction but are unlikely to achieve any higher objectives. Future activities should focus more on intelligence-led activities that support major investigations into the many organized criminal groups behind the drug trafficking phenomenon.

178. In order to consider the impact of the UNODC programme as a whole, the evaluation team prepared a trend analysis that compared national seizures with Afghan opium production. This analysis is based on figures provided in the *World Drug Report 2006*² and by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in the “Compendium on Drug Related Statistics 1996-2005”. The statistics and charts are reproduced in annex IV and are self-explanatory.

179. Trends in seizures, however, should be neither the sole nor the critical measure of programme performance. Increasing capacity does not necessarily lead to a more effective use of that capacity by the beneficiary and new initiatives cannot be expected to have an immediate effect.

180. It is too early to assess the changes that the DCAs will make to national capacity in drug interdiction. Political will and commitment will be instrumental to any continued success. While all interlocutors from the beneficiary agencies welcomed the positive effect of the DCAs, the actual impact made by them cannot be verified objectively. There are no baseline statistics on the number of operations previously conducted against drug traffickers by the competent national authorities and there are no reliable statistics on current activities. As a result, the only comparative measurement appears to be official statistics on drug seizures. The impact of the counter-narcotics programme cannot be judged solely on the basis of seizures made by the DCA but must take into account the seizures made by all law enforcement bodies, before and after the establishment of the DCA. Although the Tajik DCA is well established, no overall impact on drug interdiction appears to have been made so far. The Kyrgyz DCA is still in the process of becoming established and a judgement on impact cannot be made at this stage.

181. Several interviewees remarked that law enforcement agencies (including the DCA) were still targeting low-level couriers and dealers but not any major traffickers. This was explained as a desire to obtain quantitative results. The head of the Tajik national security service commented that “nobody thinks about how to work operationally” and one officer from the Ministry of the Interior in Kyrgyzstan referred to a short-term “Soviet-style” approach to productivity. Yet another interlocutor stated that it was impossible for them to share information with any competing agency when they were under pressure to show results. As long as this mentality persists, the scope for developing proper and effective cooperation is limited.

182. More than one agency reported that it had adopted American undercover techniques, but this appears to be more a matter of bilateral than United Nations-related influence. Many agencies asserted the need for more “flash money” (i.e. large amounts of cash used to tempt drug traffickers to sell drugs to undercover officers). At the moment, this is often provided through the DCA. Likewise, officers from different agencies stated that they needed many more funds for paying informants. There is already a fund for rewarding law enforcement officers through the DCA for large seizures. This may have helped in marketing the DCA, but

² *World Drug Report 2006* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.XI.10). The report is available on the UNODC website (www.unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html).

there are incumbent risks wherever large amounts of cash are involved. Such funds need close monitoring.

183. Concerns expressed by the senior law enforcement adviser from the United States about the progress of Project KYR/G64 for the establishment of the Kyrgyz DCA appear to have resulted in a bilateral intervention by the donor to address perceived training, organizational and management deficiencies. The United States has set performance targets and temporarily assigned a team of National Guard mentors; the deployment of two agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration to assist the DCA is anticipated. This involvement will have implications for any project revision. It demonstrates a strong sense of donor ownership but less confidence in UNODC management.

184. Project RER/F23 has not had the impact desired. The project has had to be adapted to the reality of the situation in Central Asia, where the principle of sharing intelligence between agencies has never been established. This has resulted in a strengthening of the individual agencies across the region but not of the linkages between them. The consequences of this extend far beyond coordination at the national level and will, unless addressed, have a significant impact on CARICC.

185. CARICC is an excellent concept and, if successful, could have a major impact on law enforcement cooperation throughout the region. In the light of the failure of Project RER/F23 to achieve the original project objective and to establish national coordination mechanisms, however, it is difficult to envisage how exactly operational intelligence will be shared through CARICC.

186. The impact of the project for controlling precursors has been almost completely limited to licit control measures. Without reliable intelligence indicating the routes over which precursors are trafficked to Afghanistan, it has been impossible to concentrate interdiction efforts at specific trafficking points. Nonetheless, awareness of precursor trafficking has been enhanced throughout the region by the provision of training and precursor test kits under this project.

187. Controlled deliveries currently take place in a number of Central Asian countries, usually under the control of each nation's security service. Although it would be unrealistic to expect this relatively new project to have had a significant impact, this evaluation has raised serious concerns about its direction and focus. If these issues are not addressed, there is little prospect of this project having any impact in the future.

188. While it might be worthwhile to create drug profiling units at Central Asian airports, it is not possible, at this early stage, to assess the likely impact of such a project.

189. Training has, from the outset, been at the core of many UNODC projects, clearly enhancing awareness throughout the law enforcement community. Unfortunately, much of the benefit of training delivered early in the projects has been lost owing to the high rates of staff turnover and other factors such as the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Tajik-Afghan border. More recently, the train-the-trainer concept has been adopted and this has already had a positive impact.

190. Computer-based training appears to have been embraced less enthusiastically in some parts of Central Asia than in other regions where it has been introduced. Nonetheless, it is clearly a worthwhile and ultimately beneficial project that will have an impact over time.

191. Assistance has been provided to a number of forensic laboratories, thus enhancing their capability and effectiveness. The evaluators saw the effectiveness of one of these laboratories, the DCA laboratory in Tajikistan, first-hand. Without the support of UNODC under this project, the laboratories would not have attained such a high level of competence.

192. The provision of drug test kits does not appear to have had much impact, other than perhaps by increasing the awareness of staff at locations where the kits were supplied. There is no doubt that the distribution of precursor test kits has raised awareness of precursors in general, although no seizures have been made.

193. Although the issue of corruption was raised repeatedly throughout the evaluation, the only preventative measure with a direct impact observed was the practice of polygraphing by the Kyrgyz DCA.

194. Overall, the contribution made by UNODC to counter-narcotics capacity in the region is substantial. Awareness of drug trafficking has increased and the provision of training and equipment has better prepared law enforcement agencies to counter the threat posed by drug trafficking. However, the degree of this impact varies significantly across the region, largely as a result of factors outside UNODC control and influence. For example, the funding made available in Kazakhstan through UNODC is insignificant relative to the strength of the economy, inevitably reducing the incidence of UNODC projects. In Turkmenistan, the intransigence of the principal interlocutors limits the effectiveness and impact of UNODC project work.

B. Sustainability

195. The benefit of equipment provided under projects such as these is only sustainable if the recipient countries have budgeted for spare parts, repair costs or fuel for vehicles if appropriate. The evaluation team saw examples of derelict vehicles that were supplied under the projects but which had never been repaired. In some cases, vehicles unsuited to the terrain in which they were to operate were provided.

196. Similarly, in at least two projects (including one on border control), UNODC has paid salary supplements to induce qualified individuals to join these enterprises. Again, this cannot be sustained over time, for it is obvious that when these payments stop, staff members will no longer be motivated to continue and it is extremely unlikely that the host Government will be willing or even able to meet these additional payments. And while it is true that the salary supplements paid to DCA staff members have had a positive impact on the level and quality of recruitment, they are limited to the timescale of the DCA projects.

197. Training too causes concern. For many of the activities in the border control projects, one-off training sessions have been provided by international experts. The benefit of this training is often lost when staff are transferred or promoted or when they retire. It is only in comparatively recent times that the train-the-trainer concept has been introduced and this must be the way forward. Training can then be given on the basis of need and on a much larger scale. In terms of border projects, for example, trainers could train staff located at every border post in the country, if necessary.

198. Another sustainability issue refers specifically to Project TAJ/E24 and the question of whether to renovate or rebuild selected border posts. The one building seen was of poor

quality and will remain substandard even after renovation. As already stated, the renovation work carried out so far is of extremely bad quality, making it likely that further renovation work will soon be required. This is not good practice. In order to ensure value for money, the adoption of use of prefabricated modular units should be endorsed, thus ensuring long-term sustainability. The modular units being supplied by other donors are complete with sanitation and electrical fittings and thus provide a much better working environment for staff who work in them.

199. None of the outcomes observed could survive the withdrawal of funding. The DCAs were created from scratch but are likely to fail if they lose presidential patronage or the salary supplements. Equipment provided will only last until it breaks down (as was seen in the southern region Tajik DCA office) and the Tais Ontos software is already outdated. Investments made in training are being lost through staff turnover and rotation. The renovated buildings will remain, but they have no impact on drug interdiction. Aspirations for the DCAs to be self-sufficient in three to five years are exceedingly optimistic. Nothing seen indicated any development that would lead to sustainability in CNE in the foreseeable future. It is accepted that even if UNODC acknowledges this issue, it will be extremely difficult for the organization to address the problem effectively, given its scale.

200. Some sustainable elements of the regional programme do exist. For example, there is the new legislation that has been adopted owing to the influence of UNODC, but, as mentioned by a donor representative, a “law is just a piece of paper” and its implementation requires the commitment of resources that only Kazakhstan (and perhaps Turkmenistan) can afford.

201. With regard to CARICC, it is clear that the decision to locate the centre in Almaty rather than in Tashkent will have a significant impact on the funding of the project. A large proportion of ongoing costs will go to providing accommodation for staff members seconded to CARICC. The cost of such accommodation in Almaty is already approaching Western European levels and cannot be sustained when project funding ceases.

202. The polygraphing initiative is presently unsustainable. Although the initial investment has established a working unit with polygraph machines, computers and two soundproof booths, the departure of any of the existing polygraph examiners or the expansion of the team of examiners would require recruitment followed by training in the United States, at high cost. In addition, staff are expected to be re-trained every two years. Without substantial funding from external sources, it is highly unlikely that the Kyrgyz Government could continue to support this initiative.

203. It is also unhealthy for any project to be dependent on one source of income. Policy changes by a single donor can have a direct impact and serious consequences on the viability of that project. It could prevent UNODC from meeting its obligations towards the beneficiary.

204. Given that economic development in the region is a long-term prospect, the only other possibility for sustainable counter-narcotics institutions would be to get funding from asset recovery. This option, however, is not likely to be viable for a number of years and will engender a new set of challenges if it is to be pursued fairly and with integrity. At the same time, for asset recovery to work, agencies will need to start targeting and arresting major drug traffickers who have assets worth recovering. Any significant dependence on asset recovery in the short term would be optimistic.

IV. Lessons learned, best practices and constraints

A. Lessons learned and best practices

205. It is felt that UNODC was overambitious in believing that the projects could be achieved in the time frames originally envisaged. This is borne out when one considers that Project TAJ/E24 was originally intended to start in 1999 and be completed by 2003. UNODC should not embark on projects of this scale without having sufficient funding at the outset. This lack of funding means that most projects soon require revision and, occasionally, that the original objective becomes unclear. While embarking on projects without the required financial resources may be helpful in reassuring a beneficiary of commitment, it can lead to the curtailment of promised outcomes and the inability to meet beneficiary expectations, with subsequent damage to UNODC's reputation. Starting a project without first having full funding was identified as the cause of problems in the Tajik DCA project.

206. In a similar vein, once adequate funding does become available, more thought should be given to avoiding the problems and poor practices encountered in previous projects before moving on to new ideas. For example, despite the problems encountered in Project TUK/F42, a new, similar project was produced (Project TKM/I78).

207. Allowing budgetary crossovers between projects is not considered good practice. From an evaluation standpoint, it is difficult to ascertain which specific equipment was supplied with funding from which project. There are a number of examples of this having happened, but one in particular comes to mind: computer equipment has been supplied by various projects to enhance inter-agency cooperation in the field of intelligence gathering and analysis but Project RER/F23 was designed specifically for this purpose.

208. There are, however, some good practices to be commended. The establishment of project steering committees and working groups, for example, which do help once the project is up and running. Close cooperation, where possible, with State drug control commissions or committees, is also essential for the smooth running of these projects.

209. Similarly, there is evidence of close relationships with other international agencies such as BOMCA and OSCE, as well as with bilateral donors, thus avoiding overlapping or duplication of effort. This, however, is fairly recent and there is little doubt that a degree of duplication has taken place in the past. This is confirmed by reviewing the training programmes carried out by other donors and through UNODC project activities.

210. The random audit performed on the Kyrgyz DCA by the programme officer that identified substantial misappropriation of fuel represents a promising practice in ensuring integrity and was mentioned favourably in the midterm project evaluation. Such an activity should be replicated in other project management practice.

B. Constraints

211. There have been some weaknesses in project design and some projects, as already mentioned, have been overly ambitious. Lack of funding at an early stage of the projects means that activities could not be carried out and that projects had to be revised as a matter of course. The evaluation team also genuinely believed that some project staff members do not fully understand the implications and subtleties of law enforcement issues, leading them to sometimes prioritize activities wrongly. For example, one person spoke with pride about the

alleged increase in seizures without fully understanding the need to investigate and dismantle the criminal groups involved.

212. The law enforcement profession has become increasingly technical in recent years. Now, more than ever, UNODC needs to make sure that staff members who propose, design, develop and manage law enforcement projects have the necessary expertise and professional understanding to engage with counterparts in beneficiary countries. It became apparent during the evaluation that when this expertise is lacking, it is difficult to control and direct the project adequately.

213. The UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia lacks an experienced, well-qualified law enforcement adviser capable of giving advice and expertise to those tasked to run the projects. The skills of those employed at the Anti-Trafficking Section at UNODC headquarters in Vienna could have been used on a more frequent basis.

214. Although all the Governments of Central Asian countries have signed the memorandum of understanding and the respective project documents, not all have fully contributed to the smooth execution of the projects. In Turkmenistan, for example, contact between UNODC and other agencies and embassies is insufficient and inadequate. Day to day communication is non-existent and unnecessary delays and obstacles are created by the requirement that all communication must be in writing and pass through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Once a project is up and running, UNODC staff should be able to make direct contact with their law enforcement counterparts and to make site visits without hindrance. Another example of intransigence by Turkmenistan was the refusal of key Government and law enforcement personnel to meet with the evaluation team during a four-day visit despite the fact that only one of these days was a national holiday. It was also established that there is little cooperation between Turkmenistan and the other Central Asian countries. This may well have a detrimental impact on UNODC regional projects, several of which have cross-border implications.

215. A constraint evident throughout the region is the proliferation of law enforcement agencies receiving assistance under various projects. The establishment of DCAs has simply increased the number of national agencies working alongside one another, although in Tajikistan the DCA has at least been recognized as having a lead-agency role. If there were fewer national agencies in the region, UNODC support could be more focused and scarce resources less thinly spread. If Project RER/F23 had fulfilled its original objectives, this constraint would have been lessened.

216. One matter of concern at this time is that the United States appears to be the main donor for all current and planned UNODC initiatives. Consequently, projects would flounder dramatically if the priorities of the Government of the United States changed. This is particularly important when considering that most planned future activities are inextricably linked to American bilateral initiatives.

217. There is another constraint that is completely beyond the control of UNODC: the fact that many Soviet-era practices survive in Central Asian countries, even after 16 years of independence. This manifests itself most clearly in the arcane bureaucratic procedures that need to be followed to progress from the signing of project documents to the delivery of project objectives. One interlocutor expressed the view that there is enthusiasm for signing memorandums of understanding and attending the subsequent photograph shoots, but that very little effort or commitment follows to advance project objectives. UNODC should not

fall into the trap of assuming that the signature of memorandums of understanding are genuine milestones in terms of project delivery. The CARICC project provides a striking example of the risks involved in making such assumptions.

V. Recommendations

A. Recommendations for immediate action

218. The following recommendations, with rationale where appropriate, are considered to require urgent consideration:

Recommendation 1. UNODC should urgently review its decision to renovate border control posts on the Tajik-Afghan border. In view of the limited progress and substandard work seen at Baharak, the review should be made before work starts at any other border post. Should the provision of modular units provide accommodation of an acceptable standard within the objectives of the project, this should become the preferred solution. The standard of renovation work seen during the evaluation was unacceptable. In the future, the alternative option of providing new modular units should be considered and if judged to be an effective and timely solution, implemented. Any objections by the beneficiaries should be firmly resisted.

Recommendation 2. An urgent and independent review should be undertaken of the effectiveness and future potential of Tais Ontos software. The technical problems that were reported are not unusual in any software development project, but Tais Ontos' incompatibility and the suggestion that it is already obsolete indicates that a reassessment is desirable. Any review should look at the costs and benefits of continued use of Tais Ontos.

Recommendation 3. The basis for controlled delivery outlined in Project RER/F43 should be reassessed in the light of existing practices. Training should be carried out locally and involve as many operational officers as possible. Equipment should be provided after the need for it has been evaluated by experts and should be suitable for local conditions. Moreover, it should be distributed to where it will have the greatest impact (instead of evenly throughout the countries).

Recommendation 4. No more drug test kits should be provided, unless a strong case is made for supplying them to a specific location. (This relates to drug test kits, while experience with precursor test kits is different). The kits distributed to date have had no impact, are claimed to be unnecessary by experienced investigators and clearly have not reached key Tajik and Afghan border posts.

Recommendation 5. The UNODC sub-office in Turkmenistan should deliver all the outstanding equipment outlined in Project TUK/F42 at the earliest opportunity and thus allow the final evaluation of the project to be completed. This is considered necessary to avoid facing the difficulties encountered during the implementation of this project again in the follow-up project at Imam-nazar.

B. Recommendations for the longer term

219. The following recommendations should be considered in the longer term:

Recommendation 6. In the light of the continuing refusal or inability of Turkmenistan to fully enter into its obligations as agreed in the signed memorandums of understanding and the project documents, UNODC should carefully consider whether to continue activities in the country. There is ample evidence that Turkmenistan does not fully cooperate with its Central Asian neighbours. It is also abundantly clear that it complicates its involvement with UNODC and other donors by denying interaction between counterparts. Moreover, given the affluence of Ashgabat, it could be argued that scarce UNODC funds could be better spent elsewhere. This assessment is based on the evaluators' findings in Turkmenistan and is supported by many interlocutors across the region.

Recommendation 7. Assistance and support should be targeted at those countries most in need and where the greatest impact can be made. Kazakhstan has no need for additional financial resources, although a strong case can be made for their inclusion in regional projects. As explained in the rationale for recommendation 6 above, Turkmenistan's lack of response and cooperation currently inhibits progress or interventions of any value.

Recommendation 8. A central polygraphing capacity should be created as a regional resource or as part of a national anti-corruption commission in each Central Asian country. Separating this capacity from any particular agency would help examiners to remain objective and independent. Central polygraphing units could also serve different agencies or departments when necessary. Polygraphing appears to have been successful in promoting integrity among law enforcement officers and has been widely accepted in Kyrgyzstan. It is one of the few practical interventions available to address or deter corruption.

Recommendation 9. The anti-corruption measures introduced in the DCA projects should be extended and replicated. These measures should include: (a) the competitive selection of recruits, with international observers; (b) salary enhancements (although these cannot be funded by UNODC, perhaps they could come from a bilateral donor); (c) polygraphing; and (d) the reinforcement of an internal investigations capability. These are practical contributions to improving the integrity of law enforcement agencies and have been shown to have real impact.

Recommendation 10. Direct training should be avoided in favour of train-the-trainer programmes. In addition, a coordinated training curriculum based on a training needs analysis is urgently needed and should not be limited to criminal intelligence analysis. The vast majority of training should be delivered locally with due consideration given to supporting national or regional training capacities. Current training provision has been inadequate and uncoordinated and direct training has limited value where there is such a high turnover and rotation of staff members. While intelligence-led policing has been given some prominence in project planning, the concept needs to be better explained.

Projects should incorporate training on basic investigation techniques and approaches. All observers highlighted the lack of such basic knowledge as a major deficiency in local law enforcement. All training should be audited and feedback evaluations and satisfaction surveys introduced so that training provision can be improved. Trainees should receive certificates and their details documented for future reference.

Recommendation 11. UNODC support for forensic science capacity should be targeted at one coordinating laboratory per country. Support should be given to encourage the nomination of a national coordinating laboratory for the country concerned, although it is

accepted that there will still be a need in remote areas for satellite laboratories (probably under DCA control), close to trafficking routes. This would help to establish common standards and excellence. If it is true that the European Union is preparing a project for forensic science in Central Asia, UNODC may, in the future, wish to withdraw from this area of work. Money from other projects should not be transferred to equip laboratories. Equipment should be funded as a separate project.

Recommendation 12. UNODC project staff members should become more involved in site visits to ensure that the training and equipment provided is being used appropriately. Random audits of materials and equipment supplied by UNODC projects should be incorporated into project management practice and procedures. Not only would this promote responsible and auditable use of such resources by the beneficiary, it would also increase donor confidence.

Recommendation 13. In developing some project strategies (such as the DCA), more attention should be paid to existing capacities and networks. In particular, opportunities for incorporating the national security services should be included in project strategies. National security services have already developed cross-border networks and are often the providers of telephone interception services. With regard to cross-border drug trafficking investigations, the DCAs should be provided with the resources necessary to fulfil this role.

Recommendation 14. UNODC should ensure full funding before embarking upon projects based on training and the provision of equipment. Throughout the evaluation, the difficulties posed by starting projects before full funding was in place were raised by both UNODC staff members and donors. Although starting a project without having ensured full funding first might be expedient and convince donors of UNODC commitment in the short term, it creates significant problems in the longer term and should be avoided whenever possible.

Recommendation 15. The value of operations on precursor interdiction in Central Asia (such as Operation Trans-shipment) should be carefully considered before being replicated. There is no intelligence to confirm that Central Asia is being used to supply Afghanistan with precursor chemicals. Nonetheless, the evaluators accept that it is highly likely that precursors transit the region. Training and awareness-raising on precursors are still important, but unsuccessful operations lead to a loss of credibility.

Recommendation 16. Ideally, UNODC project staff members should have appropriate knowledge and experience relating to the subject of their project. If this level of knowledge and experience is lacking, they should receive relevant training. The lack of relevant expertise can often lead to the provision of inappropriate training, as well as to the purchase of unnecessary and costly equipment.

Recommendation 17. Legal and procedural structures for sharing information should be established as a matter of priority. A proper user requirement for technical solutions is not possible without an understanding of how, when and why information will be used and protected. Such an understanding is crucial to the success of Project RER/F23 and, subsequently, to that of Project RER/H22 (on CARICC).

Recommendation 18. Future UNODC projects in the region should support intelligence-led investigations of criminal groups involved in drug trafficking rather than simply enhance drug interdiction capability. The emphasis on seizures encourages competition

rather than cooperation (a problem not confined to Central Asia). By supporting intelligence-led activities, the impact on drug trafficking groups is likely to be far greater. This will require a change in emphasis at the project design stage in the future to ensure that enhancing intelligence and investigative capabilities becomes a priority.

VI. Conclusions

220. The UNODC programme in Central Asia has, without doubt, significantly enhanced CNE across the region in response to the continuing threat of trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan. Awareness of the issue has been heightened, the skills and professionalism of enforcement staff have been improved and two dedicated DCAs have been created. Training and equipment provided under the various projects have raised the level of CNE capacity and effectiveness in all five countries and overall the programme should be considered a success, as it has created a firm foundation for the future.

221. With hindsight, it is clear that the time frames envisaged at the initial stages of the programme were too ambitious and failed to take fully into account the low levels of existing CNE effectiveness or the difficulties that would be encountered in raising them. After over a decade of UNODC activity in the region, there is still a lot to be achieved, but without continuing with an equal or an increased level of UNODC support, this will not be possible.

222. The five Central Asian countries are diverse and need different things from the UNODC programme. Their economies are developing at different rates, largely because of discrepancies in income from oil production. Their CNE infrastructures and levels of competence differ greatly, as does their willingness to embrace new thinking and accept radical changes to established working practices. These factors need to be reflected in regional and national project designs. This is not a region where one size fits all.

223. Finding funding for this ambitious programme will continue to be challenging and, in such circumstances, it would be better in the future to concentrate on a smaller number of fully funded projects rather than on a plethora of underfunded projects as was originally done for this programme. Without doubt, the proliferation of underfunded projects created difficulties in the early stages and, with hindsight, spreading the resources thinly was not the most effective way to achieve the desired outcomes.

224. This evaluation has repeatedly stressed the need for future UNODC activities in the region to focus more on supporting intelligence-led investigation capabilities instead of prioritizing interdiction. There needs to be less emphasis on seizures since this encourages competition rather than cooperation. This will require a change of emphasis at the project design stage to ensure that enhancing intelligence and investigative capabilities becomes the priority. The organized criminal groups that control trafficking across the region should become the principal targets of UNODC project-supported CNE activity, with significantly less emphasis being placed on interdicting consignments at border crossings.

225. This is not to suggest that past and current investments in interdiction have not been worthwhile. Without doubt, all of those tasked with interdicting drugs in their respective countries have benefited from UNODC projects, which—coupled with the regional and national projects contained in the overall programme—have given each country a firm foundation from which they can now move forward to the next stage. Other donors who have a specific border control support function, especially BOMCA, might be better placed to continue to support and develop interdiction capabilities.

226. The CNE projects within the current programme are, understandably, focused on the various law enforcement agencies in the region. However, insufficient account was taken of the role that the security services continued to have after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In all five countries, the security services have primacy with regard to telephone interception, international controlled deliveries and information sharing at the regional level. There are two options for future support: either to encourage the migration of these functions to conventional law enforcement agencies (especially to DCAs where they have been established) or, more realistically, to embrace fully the role of the security services and to develop national coordination mechanisms in which they are fully engaged. Such involvement would effectively deliver the principal objectives of Project RER/F23 and would consequently improve the prospects for a successful introduction of CARICC.

227. It is abundantly clear that if funding is withdrawn, only in Kazakhstan and, possibly, in Turkmenistan could the significant progress made to date be maintained. Simply put, the successes achieved so far can only be sustained by continued international support and this is likely to remain the situation for the foreseeable future. It therefore follows that the need for a fully funded UNODC programme will continue. There is a remote possibility that in the longer term asset recovery might become a viable source of funding for CNE development, but only if major traffickers with significant assets are convicted. If asset recovery were to become a distinct rather than a remote possibility, UNODC should consider what steps need to be taken with regard to the required legislative framework to bring this about in the longer term.

228. Afghanistan continues to be the focus of the CNE programme in Central Asia. When the current programme was created, it formed part of a “security belt” around Afghanistan and similar projects were introduced in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan to counter the threat posed by trafficking in opiates. The position has now changed dramatically: opium cultivation has increased and heroin production is now carried out on a massive scale in Afghanistan. It is probable that precursor chemicals necessary for that production are being trafficked through Central Asia. These changes need to be reflected in the future planning and development of UNODC activities in the region. Moreover, there is a strong case to be made for a closer linkage between the UNODC programmes in Afghanistan and Central Asia. For example, any intelligence gleaned from the successful dismantling of heroin laboratories in Afghanistan should be shared with staff working on the precursor control project as it might indicate the route taken by precursor chemicals through Central Asia.

229. Although some efforts have been made within the current programme to forge links between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries—through the creation of a communication link at Hayraton and the training of Afghan officials under one of the projects—more progress could be made. A logical step would be to involve Afghan officials in the Paris Pact forums, as would be their involvement in the controlled delivery project. Closer cooperation between the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia and the UNODC Country Office in Kabul is a fundamental requirement if progress is to be made in this area. The evaluators believe that the regional representative and senior staff members in the Regional Office would support closer ties with Kabul and that they appreciate the considerable benefits that would flow from them.

230. The situation in Afghanistan continues to be volatile and therefore unpredictable. Any future programme development or project design must remain sufficiently flexible to respond rapidly to any changes that might take place in Afghanistan, in the economic development in

the five Central Asian countries or to the trafficking routes. Such flexibility would be easier to incorporate into programme development if funding were spread among fewer projects.

231. Mention has already been made of the pivotal role that has been played by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in the successes achieved so far and to the expertise, enthusiasm and commitment that is evident within that office. Any future programme will also be dependent on the Regional Office maintaining the role of ensuring effective management and delivery. However, the evaluators believe that there is a significant gap between the strategic relationships forged and maintained by the Regional Representative and delivery against individual projects. Individual projects must be managed and coordinated more closely, especially those administered remotely from the Regional Office by the UNODC sub-offices in the region. It is our view that this gap could be bridged by re-establishing the senior law enforcement adviser role within the Regional Office. The person filling this role would work directly with the Regional Representative, be an experienced drug law enforcement officer fluent in the Russian language and have an up-to-date and in-depth knowledge of technical issues and the region.

232. Clearly, UNODC has to allocate resources according to the relative threat level in each region and it will always be difficult to assess precisely the proportion of opiates from Afghanistan that transit along the northern Central Asia routes as opposed to the western route through the Islamic Republic of Iran and the southern route through Pakistan. Whatever the proportion, however, interdiction, investigation and intelligence gathering in this diverse and challenging region can only reach the required level of effectiveness if support from UNODC and other donors continues. The coordinating role of UNODC, as envisaged under the Paris Pact, will continue to be vital to success in the region. This places UNODC in a unique position, among the international community, to identify gaps in assistance that it, as a major donor organization, can fill. This evaluation has confirmed that UNODC activities in the region cover both these roles effectively and has highlighted the need to continue beyond the expiration of the current programme.

233. Future UNODC activities in Central Asia will clearly be dependent on maintaining funding to at least the same level as hitherto. It is hoped that the positive findings of this evaluation, coupled with the implementation of its recommendations, will persuade existing and potential donor communities that investment in a future programme within the region will bring substantial benefits. Raised levels of CNE effectiveness in Central Asia have an impact far beyond the borders of the region and contribute to the global fight against drug trafficking.

Annex I

Terms of reference

I. Background

In Central Asia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and deals with four thematic areas: (a) policy support, legislation and advocacy; (b) counter-narcotics enforcement (CNE); (c) drug abuse and HIV/AIDS prevention; and (d) countering organized crime, corruption and terrorism. Of these areas, CNE is by far the largest operation and is considered strategically important to the region. CNE projects with varying objectives account for 85 per cent of the region's total portfolio and have a combined budget of about US\$ 40 million, which has been divided between 10 projects under this specific theme (see annex II for a list of CNE projects). Multiple donors fund the CNE projects in the region, with the United States of America being by far the largest donor and financing many of the operations.

The UNODC Strategic Programme Framework for Central Asia (2004-2007) identifies the "large-scale trafficking of Afghanistan-origin opium and heroin" as giving rise to major crime and drug control problems, creating the most pressing problem faced by the Central Asian countries since their independence in 1991. Approximately one third of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan transits through the region to the markets of the Russian Federation and Western Europe. The *World Drug Report 2005* indicates that seizures of opiates in Central Asia increased by 33 per cent between 2002 and 2003, reaching a total of 7.1 metric tons. As outlined in the Strategic Programme Framework, the overall objective of UNODC's CNE efforts in Central Asia is "to develop human and technical capacities within the Central Asian States in support of effective action to reduce trafficking."

The ongoing projects take both regional and national approaches to achieve that objective. Regional projects attempt to address issues that cut across multiple countries (e.g. by strengthening criminal intelligence and promoting operational coordination in the region), while national projects are designed to respond to the specific needs of individual countries (e.g. by establishing national drug control agencies and strengthening border control capabilities in countries neighbouring Afghanistan).

UNODC began its drug control activities in Central Asia in the mid-1980s. Regional cooperation was formally established through the signature of a memorandum of understanding between UNODC and the five countries in the region in 1996; the Russian Federation and the Aga Khan Development Network also signed the memorandum of understanding, in 1998. In 2003, the Paris Pact was signed by 55 countries affected by the Afghanistan opiates economy. The Pact, with its regular high-level meetings, has become an important framework for facilitating a coordinated response to counter the threats posed by the presence of Afghan opiates in Central Asia.

II. Purpose of the evaluation

CNE projects are ongoing operations that are expected to remain a primary area of intervention for UNODC in Central Asia in the foreseeable future. This thematic evaluation aims to assess UNODC activities in the region by establishing what the Office has achieved to date under the CNE objective and to identify lessons learned and best practices to improve future operations.

The stakeholders of this evaluation are: UNODC, the five Central Asian countries, donors and UNODC partners on CNE at the national, regional and international levels. It is hoped that project managers at headquarters and in the field will learn from the results of the evaluation so that they can make appropriate adjustments to ongoing operations and shape the long-term operational strategy for the region.

The present evaluation forms part of the 2006 workplan of the Independent Evaluation Unit on in-depth thematic evaluations of UNODC activities. The Unit will work closely with the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent and the Europe and West/Central Asia Section of the Division for Operations at UNODC headquarters in Vienna during all phases of the exercise.

III. Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will review ongoing UNODC CNE projects in Central Asia. While many projects have been running for several years (some are in their second phase, others have been extended), other projects have been launched during the past one to two years (see annex II). The evaluation will focus on reviewing projects that have been operating for at least three years and whose implementation has largely been completed. As noted in annex II, there are 10 such projects.

Each CNE project has been formulated separately over the past few years and each has its own objectives. All projects can, however, be classified into one of the following three sub-areas: border control operations along the Afghan border; national institution-building (including the establishment of drug control agencies); and regional operational cooperation mechanisms. These distinct topical areas are all intended to achieve the CNE objective.

The evaluation will review each of these areas by looking at the following projects:

- (a) Border control operations along the Afghan border: Projects TAJ/E24, TUK/F42 and UZB/G28;
- (b) National institution capacity-building: Projects KYR/G64, TAJ/H03 and UZB/H04;
- (c) Regional operational cooperation: Projects RER/H22, RER/F23, RER/F43 and RER/E29.

The present evaluation will, at the end of the exercise, produce one comprehensive report on the thematic evaluation of CNE operations in Central Asia. The report will be prepared in accordance with the UNODC “Standard Format and Guidelines for Evaluation Reports” and attempt to address the following major issues:

- (a) Overall assessment of the regional CNE programme (context and rationale):
 - (i) To what extent has the CNE programme in Central Asia been developed and implemented within the framework of existing UNODC strategic instruments such as the Strategic Programme Framework?
 - (ii) To what extent are the logic, concept and approaches underlying CNE operations in Central Asia appropriate and relevant to achieving UNODC objectives in the region and to local Government policies and objectives? What coordination and collaborating mechanisms exist, if any, with Afghanistan?

(iii) What intended results, supporting projects and activities, inputs and processes were required? What risks and assumptions were considered?

(b) Attainment of the CNE objectives:

- (i) To what extent has the programme achieved its intended objectives?
- (ii) What evidence is there that target countries have strengthened their national and regional capacities to counter drug trafficking?
- (iii) What evidence is there that national officers and personnel trained by the projects have improved their operational skills and knowledge, and that they have utilized them in their day-to-day assignments?
- (iv) Have the targeted countries (and groups) been reached as intended? Have their needs been met?

(c) Achievement of expected results and outputs:

- (i) What results and outputs were expected from the programme?
- (ii) Has the equipment provided by various projects (e.g. communication equipment, drug and precursor test kits for border operations, etc.) reached the targeted groups and been used as intended? Has it proven beneficial?
- (iii) Have the officers and personnel been trained as intended by the projects with capacity-building objectives?

(d) Implementation strategy (operational plan, monitoring and evaluation):

- (i) Has the CNE programme clearly identified specific target group(s) and measurable objectives in the programme document?
- (ii) To what extent have the programme implementation processes been effective and efficient in achieving the overall objective? Have the programme managers adapted to change by adjusting the programme design and direction whenever it has been deemed necessary?
- (iii) Have resources been mobilized and utilized efficiently?
- (iv) Is there an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor and assess the overall progress of the CNE programme? How have programme achievements and lessons learned been disseminated to the stakeholders?

(e) Institutional and management arrangements (backstopping and support mechanisms at UNODC headquarters, field offices, national Governments and other local counterparts):

- (i) What are the specific roles and responsibilities of staff at headquarters and in field offices, of staff working in beneficiary countries and regional networks, and of donors and other programme partners in implementing and managing the programme?
- (ii) Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by staff members in the field and at headquarters (administrative and managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?
- (iii) What are the potential challenges that may prevent the operations from achieving the intended results?

(f) Outcomes (immediate changes):

- (i) What immediate changes has the programme brought about in the region?
- (ii) Has any specific evidence been documented?

(g) Impacts (long-term effects):

- (i) What are the potential impacts of the programme?
- (ii) To what extent can the programme expect to have a positive impact based on programme results observed so far?

(h) Sustainability:

- (i) To what extent are current regional operations sustainable?
- (ii) What concrete actions or measures have been taken, or are required, to ensure the sustainability of national drug agencies, regional cooperation mechanisms and cross-border operations established or supported by the projects (e.g. structural, managerial and behavioural changes)? To what extent are the current remuneration arrangements (e.g. salaries, allowances) for staff members employed by those agencies appropriate?
- (iii) To what extent have the findings and recommendations from past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified (e.g. national agency staff attrition after having received training, lack of inter-agency communication within some Governments, corruption, challenges in establishing mutual trust between Central Asian countries to increase the level of intelligence exchange?)
- (iv) Is there adequate local commitment to support policy changes?

(i) Lessons learned and best practices:

- (i) What best practices have been documented during current operations? To what extent are they replicable to other regions with similar CNE objectives?
- (ii) What specific lessons can UNODC draw from the regional experiences?

(j) Recommendations and implications for UNODC:

- (i) On the basis of the present exercise, what specific recommendations on each of the major findings should Central Asia CNE managers in the field and at headquarters consider to improve their programmes?
- (ii) What are the implications for UNODC at the organizational level? Are there any issues that need to be addressed concerning similar CNE operations in other regions or countries neighbouring Afghanistan (e.g. Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran)?

IV. Methodology

At the beginning of the exercise, the evaluation team leader will develop a specific evaluation plan and methodology, including a design matrix of the exercise. The evaluation may include the following activities:

- (a) Desk reviews of relevant documents;

- (b) Field visits and interviews with key informants, including those from beneficiary countries, project staff and national focal persons, UNODC senior staff, donors and any other relevant personnel (person-to-person interviews or by telephone);
- (c) A survey of Member States, as appropriate;
- (d) Participatory observation and rapid appraisal.

V. Composition of the evaluation team

The Independent Evaluation Unit will form an independent evaluation team to carry out the evaluation. The team will be composed of three external consultants as evaluators with no prior involvement in the design and implementation of UNODC regional operations in Central Asia and of evaluation officers from the Unit. All team members will have expert knowledge and experience in counter-narcotics law enforcement, programme monitoring and evaluation, Central Asia and field operations of the United Nations.

One of the external consultants will serve as the team leader (lead consultant). He or she will provide direction in all tasks to be carried out by the team members. The team leader will also be charged with putting together a final, comprehensive evaluation report based on inputs to be made by the team members (see section VI.A, below, for the tasks of the consultants).

VI. Planning and implementation arrangements

The evaluation will begin its preparatory work in March 2006. The exercise should be completed by the end of 2006.

A. Tasks of the consultants

Each consultant will be assigned to work on specific tasks based on his or her background and expertise. The team leader (lead consultant) will be responsible for the preparation of a final comprehensive report that incorporates all major findings, lessons learned and recommendations based on inputs provided by the team members.

The team leader (lead consultant) will:

- (a) Review all background materials provided by the Independent Evaluation Unit, including UNODC operational strategy papers, the regional portfolio for Central Asia and CNE project-related documents (the team leader will request additional documents, as needed);
- (b) Develop an overall evaluation plan (e.g. design matrix), specific survey instruments and an interview protocol (guided interview templates), keeping in mind the objective of the exercise;
- (c) Attend a briefing with the Independent Evaluation Unit and UNODC staff in Vienna;
- (d) Coordinate the work of all team members during the exercise;
- (e) Set up meetings and interviews for carrying out field work with the assistance of UNODC staff members in the field;
- (f) Conduct field visits and prepare a field report on the topics assigned;
- (g) Attend a briefing in Vienna to present initial findings from the field work (to be determined);
- (h) Prepare a draft of the final comprehensive evaluation report on UNODC CNE activities in Central Asia incorporating inputs provided by all members of the

evaluation team and submit it to the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia and the Europe and West/Central Asia Section for initial comments (“draft zero”);

(i) Revise “draft zero” as needed. The document will be then circulated to all other relevant UNODC offices for comments (“draft one”);

(j) Revise “draft one” by incorporating feedback from UNODC offices and finalize the report.

The evaluation consultants will:

(a) Review all relevant background materials provided by the Independent Evaluation Unit;

(b) Review the evaluation plan and specific survey instruments to be developed by the team leader and provide comments and feedback with a view of reaching an agreement on the tools and instruments to be used in the exercise;

(c) Individually, make travel plans for field visits, set up meetings with key informants in advance, with assistance from UNODC field staff. Communicate closely with the team leader and the Independent Evaluation Unit on all plans and activities;

(d) Conduct field visits and interviews as assigned;

(e) Prepare field reports (and any other inputs that might be required by the team leader for the preparation of the final report) within two weeks of completing the field work;

(f) Review the draft report prepared by the team leader and provide comments and suggestions;

(g) Provide any additional assistance and input as requested by the team leader and the Independent Evaluation Unit.

B. Expected outputs from consultants

The following outputs are expected from the consultants:

(a) A detailed evaluation plan and specific evaluation instruments including interview guide templates (lead consultant);

(b) Individual field reports and profiles on specific themes assigned to them, as stipulated in the evaluation plan (all team members);

(c) A draft evaluation report (lead consultant, inputs provided by all team members);

(d) A final evaluation report that incorporates all comments and feedback on the draft report provided by UNODC peers (lead consultant).

C. Performance indicators

The performance of the consultants will be assessed based on the following criteria:

(a) The team leader will have produced an evaluation plan, instruments and a final report that is acceptable to the Chief of the Independent Evaluation Unit within the stipulated time frame and in accordance with UNODC evaluation guidelines;

(b) Each consultant will have contributed to the preparation of evaluation tools and instruments;

(c) Each consultant will have conducted a thorough desk review of the reference documents provided, prepared individual workplans and made travel arrangements for the assigned field work before conducting field visits;

- (d) Each consultant will have produced a report of a quality acceptable to the lead consultant and to the Chief of the Independent Evaluation Unit, in English, within the agreed time frame;
- (e) Each consultant will have contributed to the finalization of the report by providing specific comments and suggestions during the peer review process.

D. Qualifications of evaluators

External consultants will have either: (a) a minimum first-level university degree and a minimum of 12 years of relevant work experience; or (b) in lieu of a first-level university degree, a minimum of 15 years of professional experience in at least one of the following areas:

- (i) Law enforcement, cross-border operations (with knowledge of technical equipment for controlling borders, (e.g. radio communication, X-rays and other search tools and drug testing kits), customs, paramilitary operations;
- (ii) Institutional capacity-building, organizational management, training of law enforcement personnel;
- (iii) Programme management, monitoring and evaluation;
- (iii) Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

Preference will be given to candidates who have had prior experience with UNODC project evaluation in the area of drug law enforcement and capacity-building, or who have similar experiences with other regional or international organizations.

Annex II

Counter-narcotic enforcement projects in Central Asia

Project code	Title	Duration (reflects current project phase only)	Proposed budget (US\$)
Regional projects:			
RER/F23	Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence, information and data collection, analysis and exchange	3 years (2002-2006)	1,998,200
RER/H22	Establishment of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)	4 years (2004-2007) Phase I (2004-2005)	6,509,500 (Phase I: 953,700)
RER/E29	Precursor control in Central Asia	7 years (2000-2006)	2,740,000
RER/F60	Computer based drug law enforcement training in the member countries of the memorandum of understanding on subregional cooperation on drug control	2 years (2005-2007)	1,292,900
RER/F43	Assistance in developing controlled delivery techniques	2 years (2005-2006)	1,549,400
XAC/I70	Drug control at airports	1 year (2006-2007)	203,400
National projects:			
KYR/G64	Drug control agency in Kyrgyzstan	3 years (2003-2006)	6,296,500
TAJ/H03	Drug control agency in Tajikistan (phase II of TAJ/D65, 1999-2002)	4.5 years (2003-2007)	7,693,720
TAJ/E24	Strengthening control along the Tajik-Afghan border (initially 1999-2003, 2003-2005)	2.5 years (2005-2007)	6,464,300
TUK/F42	Strengthening border control in Turkmenistan	2 years (2003-2005) extended until 2006	1,100,100
UZB/G28	Assistance to Uzbekistan for the resumption of activities at the Hayraton checkpoint on the Uzbek-Afghan border	2.5 years (2003-2005)	2,060,900
UZB/H04	Computer network for the prosecutor's office in Uzbekistan	2 years (2003-2005)	700,000
TKM/I78	Immediate assistance to Turkmenistan for strengthening activities at Imam-nazar checkpoint at the Turkmen-Afghan border	2 years (2006-2008)	2,035,000

Source: UNODC Project Portfolio in Central Asia (October 2005 and April 2006).

Note: Operations for Project UZB/H04 have been completed by the time of writing (May 2006) and another project (Project TKM/I78) has been launched (2006-2008). In addition to the projects noted above, the following (pipeline projects) are being developed: Project KAZ/I76 on strengthening drug and related crime control measures at selected checkpoints in Kazakhstan; Project KGZ/I75 on joint multi-agency border teams on the Kyrgyz border; and Project KYR/S05 on strengthening judicial integrity and capacity in Kyrgyzstan.

Annex III

Persons met and sites visited

Uzbekistan

UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia, Tashkent

James Callahan	Resident Representative
Fakhrulla Azamov	National Project Officer
Babu Lal Soni	Project Coordinator
Arianna Natalini-Manfredi	Regional Project Expert
Odil Kurbanov	National Project Officer
Rakhima Mansurova	Associate Project Officer
Farkhad Sabirov	National Project Officer
Renat Menibaev	Administrative Assistant
Marks Khalmuratov	Programme Associate

Meeting in the Regional Office for Central Asia

Raffaele Ungaro	Drugs Liaison Officer, Embassy of Italy
Olivier Ordas	Police Attaché, Embassy of France
Gerhard A. Neurohr	German Federal Police, Embassy of Germany
David C. Allen	Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America
Ben Greenwood	Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Faik Aksu	Counsellor for Security, Embassy of Turkey

Other meetings in Uzbekistan

Dr. Sattar A. Atakhodjaev	Republican Centre of Forensic Expertise, Ministry of Justice
Dr. Ismatdjan K. Azizov	Head of Drug Department and Medical Equipment, Ministry of Health
Rustan Mansurov	Deputy Chairman, State Customs Committee
Sharifjou Egamberdier	Chief of Anti-Smuggling Unit, State Customs
Bakhodir Yunnsov	Head of Public Relations, State Customs
Kamel Dusmetov	Deputy Chairman, State Commission on Drug Control
Yusuf Djengaziev	Deputy Chief, Department for Combating Drug Circulation, Ministry of the Interior
Mr. Kholmiraev	Head of Analytical Department, Ministry of the Interior
Zafir Abdikadirov	Senior Officer, Ministry of the Interior
Colonel Ishankogaev	State Border Protection Committee
Mahsud Zakhidov	Analyst, State Border Protection Committee
Mr. Astemirov	National Security Committee
Pierre-Paul Antheunissens	Project Manager, BOMCA/CADAP
Alfya Musina	Country Manager, BOMCA/CADAP
Tulkin Radjabov	Senior Assistant, Security Programmes Coordinator, OSCE
Nodir Khudayberganov	National Project Officer, OSCE

Kazakhstan

Maria Dolgikh	Administrative Assistant, UNODC Astana
Isatai Sabetov	Deputy Chief (drugs), National Security Committee
Bukenbay Bishmanov	Centre for Forensic Science, Astana
Colonel Utezhah Borangaziev	Deputy Chief, Border Service of the National Security Committee, Astana
Kapizov Aidar	Chief, Border Partnership Division, Border Service of the National Security Committee, Astana
Rustam Rakhmatullin	Chief, Drugs Division, Border Service of the National Security Committee, Astana
Adilbek Utemisov	Chief, Department of Counter-Narcotics, Customs Central Committee, Astana
Sergei Kuzmenko	Deputy Chairman, Ministry of the Interior, Astana
Marat Mukanov	Deputy, Analytical Section, Ministry of the Interior, Astana
Ivan Dobrishin	Police Major, Ministry of the Interior, Astana
Tofik Murshudlu	Senior Project Coordinator, UNODC Almaty
Elbek Khodjaev	Project Officer, UNODC Almaty
Jean-Francois Puel	Police Liaison Officer, Embassy of France, Almaty
Martin Child	Third Secretary, Embassy of the United Kingdom, Almaty

Kyrgyzstan

Jenish Jakypov	Head of the Anti-Drug Squad, Ministry of the Interior
Sumar Nasiza	Head of International Relations, General Prosecutor's Office
Mr. Kalmatoviek	Head of Surveillance and Investigation, General Prosecutor's Office
Major Joldoshev	Deputy Chief, Drug Control Department, National Security Service
Robert Delcore	Senior Law Enforcement Adviser, United States
Colonel Rasulberdy Raimberdiev	Chief of DCA (Southern Region), Osh
Chubak Jumamaliev	Deputy Chief of Osh Police District, Ministry of the Interior
Colonel Boenov	First Deputy Chief, Osh Province, Ministry of Security
Colonel Chotkorgaev	First Deputy Chief, Osh City, Ministry of Security
Major Smanov	Chief, Counter-Drugs Department, Ministry of Security
General Noygobaref	Director, DCA (Bishkek)
Philip Pierce	Regional Coordinator, BOMCA/CADAP

UNODC

Victoria Chia	Project Coordinator
Bahtiar Mambetov	UNODC Officer and Polygraph Examiner

Tajikistan

Lt. General Azimov	Head of the Law
Lt. General Nazarov	Director, DCA

Colonel General Zukhurov	Chairman, State Border Protection Committee
Major General Gafarov	Deputy Minister, Ministry of Security
Major General Gadoev	General of Militia, Head of Drug Control Administration, Ministry of the Interior
Denver Fleming	Senior Law Enforcement Adviser, Department of Justice, Embassy of the United States
Thomas Hausberger	German Federal Police, Embassy of Germany
Peter Isaacs	BOMCA/CADAP
Suhrob Kaharov	Country Manager, BOMCA/CADAP
Nazira Boronshoeva	Deputy Country Manager, BOMCA/CADAP
Riccardo Lepri	Programme Coordinator, OSCE
Bernard Rouault	Political Officer, OSCE
William Paton	Resident Coordinator, United Nations
Margaret Belof	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the United Kingdom

UNODC Project Office Dushanbe

Yousuf Kurbanov	Project Manager
Christer Brannerud	Project Coordinator
Rasoul Rakhimov	Project Manager
Sergey Bozhko	Project Coordinator

In Tajikistan, a visit was made to the border guard post at Baharak, which is the subject of renovation and equipment provision under Project TAJ/E24. The facilities were inspected and a meeting took place with border guards Colonel Nabiev Khudoinazar, Commander for this and nine other posts in Shuroabad District, and Captain Saifuloev Abdullo, Commander at the Baharak outpost.

Turkmenistan

M. Rami Sayliman	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Turkey
Alexander I. Bulakhtin	Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation
Alexander Letoshnev	Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation
Carla A. Gonneville	Political-Economic Officer, Embassy of the United States
Chris Bowden	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the United Kingdom
Richard Young	Resident Coordinator, United Nations
Batyr Kurbanov	Country Manager, BOMCA/CADAP
Dr. Dieter Matthei	Political Officer, OSCE

UNODC Project Office, Ashgabat

Ercan Saka	Project Coordinator
Chary Atayev	National Project Officer

Annex IV

Narcotics seizures in Central Asia

Please note that the units used for measuring opium production and drug seizures are different. These charts are only designed to illustrate trends.

Table 1
Kazakh seizures and total Afghan opium production, 1996-2005




Table 2
Kyrgyz seizures and total Afghan opium production, 1996-2005




Table 3

Tajik seizures and total Afghan opium production, 1996-2005




Table 4

Turkmen seizures and total Afghan opium production, 1996-2005




Table 5
Uzbek seizures and total Afghan opium production, 1996-2005




Table 6

Reported heroin and opium seizures in Central Asia compared with overall production of opium in Afghanistan during the same period.

Reported seizures in Central Asia compared with opium production in Afghanistan		1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	1st 6 months of 2006
Opium produced (metric tons)		2 248.0	2 804.0	2 693.0	4 565.0	3 276.0	185.0	3 400.0	3 600.0	4 200.0	4 100.0	Unknown
Kazakhstan	Heroin seized (kg)	0.0	43.0	32.8	54.3	262.4	136.8	167.7	707.0	457.7	625.7	324.9
	Opium seized (kg)	501.5	1 000.0	314.2	170.2	136.0	36.2	13.6	192.5	352.8	668.9	228.2
Kyrgyzstan	Heroin seized (kg)	30.0	4.4	24.7	26.9	216.8	170.9	271.3	104.6	207.3	202.6	104.4
	Opium seized (kg)	1 489.7	1 639.5	171.9	151.2	1 405.2	469.2	109.3	45.7	317.5	116.5	50.3
Tajikistan	Heroin seized (kg)	6.4	60.0	271.5	708.8	1 882.9	4 239.1	3 958.2	5 600.3	4 794.1	2 344.6	1 216.3
	Opium seized (kg)	3 405.0	3 455.5	1 190.4	1 269.3	4 778.5	3 664.3	1 624.1	2 371.0	2 315.0	1 104.4	267.8
Turkmenistan	Heroin seized (kg)	89.2	1 948.6	495.0	240.0	200.0	71.0	400.0	80.5	266.0	180.8	140.5
	Opium seized (kg)	1 750.0	1 410.0	1 412.0	4 600.0	2 419.0	267.0	1 200.0	138.0	665.5	748.6	1 145.9
Uzbekistan	Heroin seized (kg)	18.5	70.3	252.7	324.8	675.0	466.6	256.3	336.4	591.8	466.8	326.8
	Opium seized (kg)	1 866.0	2 364.2	1 935.3	3 292.3	2 008.2	241.7	76.0	151.2	348.7	107.7	509.3

Source: Opium production figures come from the *World Drug Report 2006*, vol. II, p. 16. Seizure figures come from the "Compendium on Drug Related Statistics, 1996-2005".



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