Evaluation Report

Project Number AD/GLO/I05

The Paris Pact Initiative

Regional Coordination of Programme Development

for

Countries Affected by Afghan Heroin Trafficking

Report of the Independent Evaluator

Neil Bailey

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna

May 2006
CONTENTS

CONTENTS 1 - 3
LIST OF ACRONYMS 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 - 10

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Context

1.2. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

1.3. Executing Modality / Management Arrangements

1.4. Scope of the Evaluation

1.5. Evaluation Methodology

2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS

2.1. Overall performance assessment

2.2. Attainment of Objectives

2.3. Achievement of Programme/Project Results and outputs

2.4. Implementation

2.5. Institutional and Management Arrangements
3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS and SUSTAINABILITY

3.1. Outcomes

3.2. Impact

3.3. Sustainability

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1. Lessons Learned

4.2. Best Practices

4.3. Constraints

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Issues resolved during evaluation

5.2. Actions/decisions recommended

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Annexes

1. Terms of Reference for the Evaluation
2. Organisations and places visited and persons met
3. Evaluation Matrix
4. Project Document
5. Emerging Findings
**ACRONYMS USED IN THIS REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADAM</td>
<td>Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHTU</td>
<td>Anti-Human Trafficking Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOCLEU</td>
<td>Anti-Organised Crime and Law Enforcement Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAU</td>
<td>Central Analysis Unit, Regional Office for Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICC</td>
<td>Central Asian Regional Information &amp; Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNE</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWCAS</td>
<td>Europe, West and Central Asia Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANC</td>
<td>Foreign Anti Narcotic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Field Office(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEU</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Unit (UNODC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCB</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCGM</td>
<td>Policy Consultative Group Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDB</td>
<td>Partnership in Development Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLIS</td>
<td>Policing On Line Information System (OSCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Paris Pact Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFI</td>
<td>Project Financial Database (UNODC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCA</td>
<td>Regional Office for Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPOSEE</td>
<td>Regional Project Office for South East Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADOC</td>
<td>Turkish Academy against Drugs &amp; Organised Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Drugs &amp; Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disclaimer**

Independent Project Evaluations are scheduled and managed by the project managers and conducted by external independent evaluators. The role of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) in relation to independent project evaluations is one of quality assurance and support throughout the evaluation process, but IEU does not directly participate in or undertake independent project evaluations. It is, however, the responsibility of IEU to respond to the commitment of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in professionalizing the evaluation function and promoting a culture of evaluation within UNODC for the purposes of accountability and continuous learning and improvement.

Due to the disbandment of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) and the shortage of resources following its reinstatement, the IEU has been limited in its capacity to perform these functions for independent project evaluations to the degree anticipated. As a result, some independent evaluation reports posted may not be in full compliance with all IEU or UNEG guidelines. However, in order to support a transparent and learning environment, all evaluations received during this period have been posted and as an on-going process, IEU has begun re-implementing quality assurance processes and instituting guidelines for independent project evaluations as of January 2011.
# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## 1. Summary table of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings: identified problems/issues</th>
<th>Supporting evidence/examples</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Meetings convened under the auspices of the Paris Pact have become an essential component of the coordination arrangements in the region</td>
<td>Clear message from participating countries and international organisations</td>
<td>The Round Tables and Policy Consultative Group Meetings should continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Meetings are more effective, and more focussed if held in affected countries</td>
<td>Strong views expressed by donor countries to this effect, supported by observations at Round Table meeting in Dushanbe</td>
<td>The meetings should continue to be held in countries directly affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. UNODC has provided strong leadership and has coordinated project activities very effectively.</td>
<td>Clear message from participating countries and international organisations</td>
<td>The UNODC should continue to lead the overall coordination of the project, driven by a full time Project Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participants at Round Table meetings do not always possess the relevant practical experience to contribute effectively</td>
<td>Examination of reports, minutes and attendance lists confirmed this view, which had already been raised by UNODC Senior Managers.</td>
<td>The UNODC should exert as much influence as possible to persuade participant countries of the importance of attendees at Round Tables having the appropriate level of practical knowledge and experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ADAM Development and Support will have to be relocated in due course</td>
<td>Current location (Sofia) will not be supported by local UN infrastructure after Bulgaria joins the EU.</td>
<td>It would be too disruptive to relocate ADAM at this critical stage in its development, but the UNODC should give careful consideration to relocation within the next two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ADAM has not been promoted as effectively as required</td>
<td>Low visibility of ADAM outside of UNODC HQ and Sofia. Promotion of ROCA database has been very effective, and many partners in Central Asia believe that it is the Paris Pact Database.</td>
<td>ADAM should be promoted actively by the UNODC as the Paris Pact Database, and the roles of the ROCA database and ADAM should be the subject of detailed review. This should be conducted as a matter of urgency, before the two systems are allowed to develop further individually.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Partner organisations have started to accept the role of ADAM in determining assistance priorities. The decision of the OSCE to adopt ADAM as the database for their POLIS project is a positive and encouraging development. The UNODC should seek to persuade other organisations to follow suit, notably Interpol and the WCO. The UNODC should enter a dialogue with the European Commission, with a view to ensuring that all data in respect of assistance programmes and projects gathered from Member States is made available to ADAM or input directly.

8. ADAM could include details of Demand Reduction projects at minimal cost. Strong views from donor countries that inclusion of Demand Reduction projects in the ADAM database would enhance its value and relevance. The next stage of ADAM development should include an extension to cover Demand Reduction Assistance Projects.

9. If ADAM is to be successful, it needs to gain wider acceptance from the user community, and this requires clear and unambiguous guidance on use of the system. Clear message from interlocutors who had received guides or presentations on ADAM that these were too detailed, and unnecessarily complex. The UNODC should provide a clear and straightforward user guide, ideally available on line, but backed up with a CD ROM version for use in locations where internet access is slow or unreliable. This should be simple, and contain the minimum detail required for effective use of the system.

10. Reporting progress on Paris Pact activities is primarily through Round Table and Policy Consultative Group Meetings, with insufficient reporting between them. Lack of knowledge of current Paris Pact initiatives and progress evident during evaluation. This reporting should be supplemented by a quarterly report (prepared by the Project Coordinator) that included activities in respect of the Consultative Mechanism and ADAM, together with significant developments in projects and programmes in the affected countries.

2. Executive Summary

2.1 In May 2003, the Foreign Ministers of 55 countries seriously affected by the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan through Central and West Asia met in Paris. This was an important meeting, opened by the President of the French Republic, and provided a unique opportunity for the international community to establish a comprehensive, balanced and coordinated response to the threat posed by the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan. The statement issued at the end of this meeting created a pact (“The Paris Pact”) in which Ministers agreed “to combine their wills and their countries’ efforts to step up national
capabilities, develop regional partnerships and hence tackle all the aspects of this problem. This is an international security imperative.”

2.2 The project integrated the functions of previous UNODC projects in the region, and defined an initial project strategy for 2004-5, with three priorities:
(a) Strengthening of border controls in West and Central Asia
(b) Setting up of legal and institutional frameworks related to drug trafficking in key countries
(c) Improving regional cooperation in West and Central Asia, and among European countries

2.3 It was decided to concentrate on two principal areas during the project, which would meet the requirements of the Paris Pact Statement. These were:
(a) The establishment and support of an effective Consultative Mechanism, and
(b) The establishment and support of a computerised Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM)
These have remained the principal areas of activity to date, and it is against the objectives and outputs that underpin them that this evaluation has been conducted.

2.4 Against the backdrop of continuing, and latterly increasing, opium production in Afghanistan, the Paris Pact Initiative was both timely and appropriate. It presented a unique opportunity for practitioners and experts from source, transit and consumer countries to coordinate an effective response to the threat posed by illicit trafficking.

2.5 By concentrating on Law Enforcement and carefully maintaining the focus of the initiative on support to combat trafficking, it has ensured that the project remained relevant to the participants, and any alternative approach would have resulted in the limited resources available to the project being spread too thinly to be effective. (Consultative Mechanism)

2.6 The development of ADAM has been a key element of the project to date, and as with the consultative mechanism, it has concentrated on assisting and
supporting Law Enforcement, primarily by improving coordination of border control and law enforcement measures generally. This was in accordance with the Project Document, and has enabled development of the system to maintain a clear focus on supply side projects and assistance. In the future however, ADAM could be developed into an even more effective and useful tool if the database included details of all assistance programmes, including those in the Demand Reduction field. Extending the reach of ADAM in this way would not have an adverse effect on the project as a whole, as the additional costs in including details of Demand Reduction assistance would be minimal, and it might broaden acceptance of the database, especially amongst donor countries and organisations. (ADAM)

2.7 The project has been effective at improving coordination between beneficiary countries, and between beneficiary countries and donors. It appears to have been less effective improving coordination within the donor community, but this could change when ADAM is fully developed and operational.

2.8 Objective 1 “To provide analysis of drug problems and assistance needs at national and regional level”. The UNODC has produced reports containing a detailed analysis of drug problems, especially in Central Asia, where the brigading of resources into a Central Analysis Unit (CAU) within the Regional Office in Tashkent has enabled the production of high quality, and highly valued reports. The quality and comprehensive of the analysis has improved significantly, and although this cannot be credited solely to the Paris Pact Initiative, the improved cooperation and coordination that has resulted from the Consultative Mechanism has played a significant part, especially in the willingness of external partners to provide relevant data to the UNODC. In respect of the analysis of assistance needs, this objective has been met on a regional and national level, but will only be fully effective when all the relevant data is in one database (ADAM).

2.9 Objective 2 “To develop fully coordinated assistance strategies and launch related priority projects in the Paris Pact region”. The UNODC has a coordinated assistance strategy in place, and has clearly met this objective in
respect of UNODC projects. The coordination of external assistance strategies is less developed, and this part of the objective has therefore only been partly met. This is despite the clearly displayed enthusiasm and commitment apparent throughout the evaluation by UNODC staff and management. External partners need to display the same level of enthusiasm and commitment as the UNODC has shown, in order for this objective to be fully realised. The second half of this objective, to “launch related priority projects in the Paris Pact region” has been met, and there is ample evidence that priority projects have been launched by the UNODC and external partners in a coordinated manner.

2.10 There is ample evidence to demonstrate that information sharing on opiates trafficking from Afghanistan has been shared more freely, and several examples were presented to the last PCGM held in Vienna in December 2005. The two Joint Assessment Missions (To Tajikistan in 2004 and the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2005) have contributed significantly to overall knowledge of trafficking in the region, and have influenced future strategy and planning.

2.11 This ability to share information in a collaborative and non-confrontational way has helped countries develop and revise their national drug control strategies, based on the shared experiences of other participants, thus fulfilling one of the primary requirements set out in the Project Document. The enhanced analytical output published by the Central Analysis Unit in the UN Regional Office for Central Asia could not have been produced without the increased willingness to share information, especially between the priority countries.

2.12 The principal outcome of the Paris Pact Initiative is a clear acceptance of shared responsibility amongst participant countries and organisations, coupled with an acknowledgement of the coordinating role of the UNODC. There is a greater willingness for countries to acknowledge weaknesses in their controls and procedures, and to seek guidance from others.

2.13 The Consultative Mechanism (CM) established under the auspices of the Paris Pact is making a significant contribution to closer cooperation and coordination of assistance projects and activities in the countries affected by the
trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan. The success of this element of the Paris Pact owes much to the fact that an extremely diverse range of external organisations participate, all accepting that the UNODC has the overall responsibility for coordination. Such broad representation reinforces the *primus inter pares* role of the UNODC, and could be applied to other areas of UNODC business.

2.14. If the infrastructure supporting the CM was withdrawn and the Paris Pact project was to end, it is the view of all partners consulted during the evaluation that it would then be necessary to establish a new, and similar, structure to maintain the constructive dialogue that has blossomed within the Paris Pact fora. Taken together with the positive benefits that have flowed from the Pact, this makes a persuasive case for extending the Pact beyond October 2006.

2.15 Overall, the Paris Pact Project has been very successful in improving coordination and cooperation, especially between the UNODC and other International Organisations, and amongst recipient countries. Progress has been less marked in coordination amongst donor countries, but this should be rectified when ADAM is available to all registered users.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Context

1.1.1 The Paris Pact Initiative needs to be considered as part of a broader determination by the international community to tackle the threat of re-emerging illicit opium production in a spirit of partnership and co-operation. According to the latest estimates by UNODC, Afghanistan is the largest opium producing country in the world, accounting for over 87% of global output of the drug. The resolve of the international community to tackle this issue in a more effective way emerged alongside efforts to aid reconstruction in Afghanistan following the war in 2002, and should be viewed as a complementary strategy.

1.1.2 The UNODC and its predecessor agencies have a long history of involvement in West and Central Asia, the CIS Countries, the Balkan Routes and South Eastern Europe. In response to a request of the Dublin Group in 1991, the UNODC established a “Coordination Mechanism for Formulation and Delivery of Assistance Programmes to Eastern European and European CIS Countries” (RER/742). This programme operated from 1992 to 1999, was clearly valued by donor and beneficiary countries, and provided a framework for improved cooperation throughout the region affected by the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan. The UNODC continued a number of initiatives and established new projects in the period immediately following the closure of the Coordination Mechanism in 1999, but looking back at that period now, it is clear that there was a lacuna in respect of strategic coordination amongst the principal countries affected by the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan.
1.1.3 In May 2003, the Foreign Ministers of 55 countries seriously affected by the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan through Central and West Asia met in Paris. This was an important meeting, opened by the President of the French Republic, and provided a unique opportunity for the international community to establish a comprehensive, balanced and coordinated response to the threat posed by the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan. The statement issued at the end of this meeting created a pact (“The Paris Pact”) in which Ministers agreed “to combine their wills and their countries’ efforts to step up national capabilities, develop regional partnerships and hence tackle all the aspects of this problem. This is an international security imperative.”

1.1.4 One paragraph within the pact (§2.5) is reproduced verbatim here, since it is crucial to understanding the role of the UNODC in delivering it. “The pilot role of the UNODC in the fight against illicit drugs and drug addiction should be reinforced. Better synergy between the various initiatives is indispensable, and the UNODC should ensure the consistency of the policies implemented. In particular, it appears desirable that the actions undertaken in particular by the UNODC, the European Union and the OSCE aimed at Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the CIS and South West Asia should mutually complement and reinforce one another. In order to avoid duplicate projects, it appears necessary to reactivate a “clearing house” mechanism grouping together all technical assistance projects for the countries concerned that are part of the UNODC’s mandate. The UNODC should in particular encourage States to harmonise their legislation to facilitate simultaneous action in several countries and mutual legal assistance. The UNODC’s initiative to create a regional co-operation structure between the Central Asian countries should be supported.”

1.1.5 It was on the basis of this statement that the UNODC drafted a Project Document (AD/GLO/I05) entitled The Paris Pact Initiative – Regional Coordination of Programme Development for Countries Affected by Afghan Heroin Trafficking”. The Project Document is reproduced at Annex 4 of this Evaluation Report. The project integrated the functions of previous UNODC projects in the region, and defined an initial project strategy for 2004-5, with three priorities:
(a) Strengthening of border controls in West and Central Asia
(b) Setting up of legal and institutional frameworks related to drug trafficking in key countries
(c) Improving regional cooperation in West and Central Asia, and among European countries

1.1.6 This was an ambitious strategy, given the diverse nature of the region to be covered, and the limited funding ($1,144,700) available to deliver it. Those constraints were recognized, and it was decided to concentrate on two principal areas during the 2.5 years (30 months) life of the project, which would meet the requirements of the Paris Pact Statement. These were:

(a) The establishment and support of an effective Consultative Mechanism, and
(b) The establishment and support of a computerised Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM)

These have remained the principal areas of activity to date, and it is against the objectives and outputs that underpin them that this evaluation has been conducted.

1.1.7 Although the strategy was ambitious, it was also realistic, given the high level support for the initiative, and the previous success of the UNODC and its predecessor agencies in the affected region. The UNODC had an infrastructure in place (including Field Offices), together with the expertise and commitment to deliver against challenging objectives. There appears to have been some uncertainty at the outset as to whether the Paris Pact initiative was a process, in which case it could have been funded out of the UN General Purpose Fund, or a UNODC Project. It was ultimately determined that it was a UNODC project, and as a donor-led organisation this meant that the UNODC was totally reliant on donors coming forward to fund the project. Austria, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America agreed to contribute, and the initiative commenced formally in May 2004.

1.1.8 The Project Document clearly sets out a cohesive strategy, with realistic objectives and timelines, particularly in respect of ADAM development. Delivery of the Consultative Mechanism element is by the establishment of a series of regular meetings (“Expert Round Tables”) and Policy Group Consultative
Meetings, and the objectives understandably concentrate on the establishment of those (e.g. Output 1: The Paris Pact Consultative Mechanism is established at expert and policy levels), but it is the outcome of those meetings rather than the meetings themselves that are the true measure of the effectiveness of this element of the project. Despite that reservation, the Project Document is clear, and contains sufficient detail for the reader to understand the concept, means of delivery and resource requirements. The timeline is realistic, and undoubtedly based on UNODC’s previous extensive experience in the region.

1.1.9 It is clear from the statement made at the conclusion of the Paris meeting that the scope of the Paris Pact Initiative (PPI) extends far beyond the involvement of the UNODC. The PPI was envisaged as a strategy for a coordinated response by the international community to the threat posed by heroin trafficking from Afghanistan – and the UNODC was the body appointed *primus inter pares* (as first among equals) to implement it. This interpretation was clearly not shared by all partner agencies and participating countries, and the UNODC therefore had to be pragmatic when drafting the Project Document.

1.1.10 A clear distinction needs to be made at the outset between the strategy outlined in the Paris statement, which encompassed all activities in respect of the threat posed by heroin trafficking, and the Paris Pact project, which is confined to heroin supply measures. Other fora exist to deal with the Demand Reduction strategy, and the UNODC decided that the effectiveness of the project would be enhanced if it concentrated on Supply Side activity. It is the opinion of the Evaluator that this was the correct decision, and has enabled the project to maintain the clear focus and direction that is set out in the Project Document.

1.2 **Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation**

1.2.1 This evaluation seeks to identify lessons learned during the project, and areas for improvement. The project is due to terminate in October 2006, and this evaluation should help to inform the UNODC when it is considering whether to revise it or launch a new phase. It is therefore essential that the evaluation provides an objective assessment of the extent to which the project has attained its
objectives, with a realistic view on how they should be revised if the project were to continue beyond October 2006. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for this evaluation are reproduced at Annex 1 of this report.

1.2.2 The evaluation will also assess the extent to which the project has met the needs of stakeholders (beneficiary, donor countries and international organisations), and whether the strategy and organisational arrangements have facilitated delivery in the most effective way. Following the adoption of Resolution E/CN.7/200526 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which “encourages the UNODC to develop similar initiatives (similar to the Paris Pact Initiative) in other regions for countries affected by the transit of illicit drugs through their territories”, the evaluation will identify key prerequisites for replicability in other regions affected by drug trafficking.

1.3. Executing Modality/Management Arrangements

1.3.1 Overall execution and coordination of the project rests with the UNODC in Vienna, where the Project Coordinator is based, but with substantive elements provided to the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (Tashkent) and the UNODC Regional Project Office for South Eastern Europe (Sofia) for their implementation. Development of, and support to, the ADAM element of the project is delivered by the ADAM Project Coordinator, based in Sofia.

1.3.2 Based in UNODC in Vienna, the Project Coordinator is based in the Europe, West and Central Asia Section (EWCAS), which is within the Partnership in Development Branch (PDB) within the Division for Operations (DO).

1.3.3 This is a complex project that requires sustained coordination and monitoring if it is to be effective. The Project Coordinator took up his post in February 2005, and the universal view expressed throughout the evaluation was that since that time the project has moved forward in a far more cohesive way. Whilst these complimentary comments say much about the commitment and enthusiasm of the Project Coordinator, they can undoubtedly also be interpreted as a criticism of the UNODC for not appointing a Project Coordinator at the start of the project.
1.3.4 The UNODC has a number of key projects in the Paris Pact region, and the coordination of these various projects is as vital as the coordination of the Paris Pact project itself. The inevitable conclusion to be drawn following a detailed examination of all the relevant Project Documents is that the UNODC was right to assign overall management and coordination of this project (as outlined in paragraphs 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 above) to EWCAS. Whether the project should be coordinated from Vienna or elsewhere is a more complex issue, which is addressed in Section 2 of this report.

1.4. Scope of the Evaluation

1.4.1 This evaluation covers the period from the start of the project in May 2004 up to early April 2006, when the evaluation field trips took place. Although the Paris Pact covers 55 countries, the evaluation has concentrated on the delivery against objectives in respect of ‘Priority Countries’ identified by the Policy Consultative Group Meetings of 2003, 2004 and 2005 (i.e. South Eastern Europe, Islamic Republic of Iran, Central Asian countries, Russian Federation and Pakistan).

1.4.2 The thematic coverage of the evaluation is defined in the TOR as “coordination of counter narcotics enforcement, particularly on border control and law enforcement in the field of heroin traffic”. In accordance with the TOR, the evaluation has been divided into four distinct pillars: Results, Project Improvement, Testing the Theory, and Replicability. For each of these a key question and a series of sub questions have been posed. The detailed analysis that supports these key questions is to be found in the matrix of questions, information sources and methodology that is reproduced at Annex 3 of this Evaluation Report.

1.4.3 The scope of the evaluation is further refined in the TOR to include findings, lessons learned and recommendations in the following areas:
(a) An analysis of how efficiently programme planning and implementation has been carried out. This includes assessing the extent to which organisational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms used by UNODC support the achievement of the project’s objectives;
(b) Whether the expected results have been achieved, and if not, whether there has been some progress made towards their achievement;
(c) Whether the results and objectives were useful, relevant and attainable;
(d) Whether the project addresses the identified needs/problem (relevance);
(e) Whether the project contributes to a priority area or comparative advantage for UNODC; and
(f) Whether the project reflects result-based programming, management and monitoring.

1.4.4 These requirements are supplemented by three additional areas for analysis:
(a) Problems and constraints encountered during implementation;
(b) The role played by the field offices in the implementation of the project; and
(c) Capacity development in beneficiary countries.

The TOR concludes the scope definition by requesting that “Particular focus should be given to the assessment of the effectiveness, appropriateness and relevance of the project.”

1.4.5 There are two principal elements to the Paris Pact project, the Consultative Mechanism and the Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM). Although the evaluation has been carried out on the principle that the Paris Pact is an overarching project, with two complementary elements, it has been necessary on occasion to reach recommendations or conclusions that only apply to one of them. Where this is the case, a clear caveat appears alongside the appropriate recommendation or conclusion.

1.5. Methodology

1.5.1 The preliminary phase of the evaluation consisted of a thorough review of all documentation (over 100 documents in total) available to the UNODC. From that review, the primary source documents identified were the following:
(a) Project Document AD/GLO/I05
(b) Evaluation Terms of Reference
(c) Reports of the seven Expert Round Tables that have taken place since October 2003
1.5.2 This preliminary phase was supplemented by extensive open source research on the internet, and an analysis of historical reporting on Afghanistan and Central Asia from external sources (e.g. Europol, Interpol). From this initial phase a draft matrix of questions, information sources and methodology was prepared, for subsequent discussion with the Project Coordinator in the second phase.

1.5.3. The second phase of the evaluation was conducted at UNODC HQ in Vienna. This started with detailed discussions and analysis with the Project Coordinator and meetings with Senior Managers in the Partnership in Development Branch (PDB). Many secondary source documents, held in EWCAS were made available for detailed examination. The matrix of questions, information sources and methodology was finalised, and considered by the Independent Evaluation Unit before being copied to relevant parties (A copy is reproduced at Annex 3 of this Evaluation Report).

1.5.3 During this second phase, meetings were held with Representatives of the Paris Pact donors from the Permanent Missions to the United Nations (Vienna) and with Representatives of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations (Vienna) who attended the Paris Pact Consultative Group Meeting in December 2005. A meeting was also held with the Counsellor of the Turkish Permanent Mission, who had facilitated the Expert Round Table for South Eastern Europe held in Istanbul in October 2005.
1.5.4 A meeting was also held with a representative of the INCB Secretariat, with particular reference to the trafficking of precursors into Afghanistan. Information on complementary programmes was obtained principally from the examination of documents held in UNODC, but in respect of the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme, a meeting was held with the Senior Programme Coordinator from the Anti-Organised Crime and Law Enforcement Unit (AOCLEU). Meetings were also held with the Head of the UNODC IT Support Service, and one of his staff, in order to clarify a number of technical issues in respect of ADAM implementation. A comprehensive list of persons seen is reproduced in Annex 2 of this report.

1.5.4 At this stage, a review of all the available data was made, and a detailed analysis of the responses and information obtained to date conducted. Gaps in knowledge or understanding were identified that could be addressed in the next phase of the evaluation, which was to consist of field visits. Responses to questions in the matrix were compared with the data amassed during the desk review, and discrepancies identified that could be tested at a later stage.

1.5.5 The third phase of the evaluation consisted of three field visits. Firstly to the ADAM Office in Sofia (Regional Project Office for South Eastern Europe), and then to the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent, Uzbekistan (ROCA). These visits were followed by attendance at the Expert Round Table on cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on April 10th and 11th 2006.

2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS

2.1 Overall Performance Assessment

2.1.1 Against the backdrop of continuing, and latterly increasing, opium production in Afghanistan, the Paris Pact Initiative was both timely and appropriate. It presented a unique opportunity for practitioners and experts from source, transit and consumer countries to coordinate an effective response to the threat posed by illicit trafficking.

2.1.2 By concentrating on Law Enforcement and carefully maintaining the focus of
the initiative on support to combat trafficking, it has ensured that the project remained relevant to the participants, and any alternative approach would have resulted in the limited resources available to the project being spread too thinly to be effective. (Consultative Mechanism)

2.1.3 The development of ADAM has been a key element of the project to date, and as with the consultative mechanism, it has concentrated on assisting and supporting Law Enforcement. For the future however, ADAM may develop into an even more effective and useful tool if the database includes details of all assistance programmes, including those in the Demand Reduction field. Extending the reach of ADAM in this way would not have an adverse effect on the project as a whole, as the additional costs in including details of Demand Reduction assistance would be minimal, and it would probably broaden acceptance of the database, especially amongst donor countries and organisations. (ADAM)

2.1.4 The project has been effective at improving coordination between beneficiary countries, and between beneficiary countries and donors. It appears to have been less effective improving coordination within the donor community, but this could change when ADAM is fully developed and operational.

2.1.5 The design of the project is clear, and it appears to be well understood, but insufficient emphasis was placed on the need to promote and market the initiative, especially the ADAM element. The Evaluator attended a Foreign Anti Narcotic Community (FANC) meeting at the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent. Several of the attendees admitted that prior to receiving an invitation to participate in the evaluation, they had been unaware of the existence of ADAM.

2.2. Attainment of the Objectives

2.2.1 Objective 1 “To provide analysis of drug problems and assistance needs at national and regional level”. The UNODC has produced reports containing a detailed analysis of drug problems, especially in Central Asia, where the brigading of resources into a Central Analysis Unit (CAU) within the Regional Office in Tashkent has enabled the production of high quality, and highly valued reports. The quality and
comprehensive of the analysis has improved significantly, and although this cannot be credited solely to the Paris Pact Initiative, the improved cooperation and coordination that has resulted from the Consultative Mechanism has played a significant part, especially in the willingness of external partners to provide relevant data to the UNODC. In respect of the analysis of assistance needs, this objective has been met on a regional and national level, but will only be fully effective when all the relevant data is in one database (ADAM).

2.2.2 Objective 2 “To develop fully coordinated assistance strategies and launch related priority projects in the Paris Pact region”. The UNODC has a coordinated assistance strategy in place, and has clearly met this objective in respect of UNODC projects. The coordination of external assistance strategies is less developed, and this part of the objective has therefore only been partly met. This is despite the clearly displayed enthusiasm and commitment apparent throughout the evaluation by UNODC staff and management. External partners need to display the same level of enthusiasm and commitment as the UNODC has shown, in order for this objective to be fully realised. The second half of this objective, to “launch related priority projects in the Paris Pact region” has been met, and there is ample evidence that priority projects have been launched by the UNODC and external partners in a coordinated manner.

2.2.3 The overall goal of the project, to improve border controls, improve regional cooperation and set up legal and institutional frameworks is a continuing one. That there is clear improvement in all three areas reflects the priority placed on addressing heroin trafficking from Afghanistan by the UNODC and all partner agencies. The extent to which the Paris Pact has contributed to that overall goal is difficult, perhaps impossible to measure, but throughout the evaluation it was made clear that without the impetus provided by the Paris Pact, progress would have been far slower.

2.3. Achievement of Programme/Project Results

2.3.1. Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM)
2.3.1.1 The Paris Pact statement required UNODC to establish a ‘clearing house’ mechanism, to group together technical assistance projects in affected countries, thus avoiding duplication, and ensuring the most effective use of scarce donor resources. The Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM) is the proposed solution to this challenge, and development has been an integral element of, and fully funded by, the Paris Pact Project. ADAM was approved in 2003, and responsibility for coordination, management and delivery was delegated to the ADAM Project Coordinator, working from the Regional Project Office for South East Europe (RPOSEE) based in Sofia, Bulgaria. Although technically ADAM is a database, it is in fact an internet-based automated system for coordinating donor assistance. This will be achieved by an automated e-mail facility that will notify potential duplication in projects and assistance programmes. In order to function effectively, users must register on the system and maintain an updated e-mail address, and it is this automated notification that sets ADAM apart from simple database applications.

2.3.1.2 Development of the ADAM system has been within the ‘Counter Narcotic Law Enforcement’ thematic profile, although this appears to be based upon the UNODC’s own interpretation of the Paris Pact statement (especially §2.5 of the statement, reproduced in full at §1.1.4 of this report) which states that “the pilot role of the UNODC in the fight against illicit drugs and drug addiction should be reinforced. Better synergy between the various initiatives is indispensable, and the UNODC should ensure the consistency of the policies implemented.” It later states that “it appears necessary to reactivate a “clearing house” mechanism grouping together all technical assistance projects for the countries concerned that are part of the UNODC’s mandate.” Taking together these extracts could also be interpreted as requiring the ‘clearing house’ mechanism to cover all technical assistance, not restricting it to law enforcement assistance in isolation.

2.3.1.3 There are undoubtedly strong arguments for not dissipating the effectiveness of the Consultative Mechanism by widening it to cover Demand Reduction issues, and this issue is addressed elsewhere in this report. However, in respect of ADAM, there is no evidence that the inclusion of Demand Reduction projects in the database would reduce its effectiveness; in fact it would probably enhance it, as it would encourage currently reluctant donors to contribute data. The ‘pick lists’ within the
ADAM input screens are already populated with fields appropriate to Demand Reduction projects, and it was confirmed with the Director of the IT agency developing ADAM that additions to the ‘pick lists’ could be made at minimal cost. A common theme amongst the Permanent Representatives during meetings with them was that the worth of ADAM would be considerably enhanced by the inclusion of Demand Reduction projects, and it was suggested that this could also lead to other countries/organisations becoming donors in any extension of the project.

2.3.1.4 The objective for ADAM set out in Annex III of the Project Document (AD/GLO/I05) requires ADAM to provide Governments and Organisations with real-time information about assistance needs in recipient countries, assistance provided by donor countries and organisations, planned assistance and detailed information on past and ongoing projects, training or donated equipment. In order to deliver this objective, the Project Document sets out seven requirements that ADAM should meet, and my evaluation against each of these criterion appears below:

**Criterion 1**  It must be easy to use: ADAM operates in the ubiquitous Windows environment, and to anyone familiar with Windows applications, it is simple and straightforward to use. The Evaluator registered as a user, was allocated a password, and was able to explore the site easily. Menus and prompts are clear and unambiguous, and pick lists and tick boxes are well described and easy to grasp for the first time user. Less clear however was the ADAM User ‘Quick Guide’ which was far too detailed and confusing for anyone other than a regular Windows user. A number of criticisms were levelled at ADAM presentations which were also judged to be too detailed and not sufficiently user-friendly. A much better approach would be to prepare an online interactive User Guide (also available on CD ROM for use where internet connection speeds are poor), using a commercial package such as ‘Shockmedia’. The UN already uses this system for a number of training packages – a good example being the “Basic Security in the Field – Staff Safety, Health and Welfare” module. Despite this criticism of the ‘Quick Guide’, ADAM comfortably meets the ease of use criterion.

**Criterion 2**  It must be tightly tailored to needs: ADAM meets this criterion, as all the fields and pick lists closely follow the user requirement and specifications in the
Project Document. The ‘needs’ are those assessed by UNODC, as outlined above, these could be extended so that ADAM fields and pick lists covered all projects in the affected countries, including those in the Demand Reduction field. Overall, ADAM comfortably meets this criterion.

**Criterion 3** It must be reliable: ADAM is still in the Demonstration mode, and until live input from diverse remote locations is enabled, it is difficult to measure performance against this criterion. Nevertheless, both the Strategma Agency (responsible for system development) and the ADAM Project Office staff expressed confidence in the reliability of the system. Many other web-based applications are already operating satisfactorily in the region, and there is no reason to suggest that ADAM will be any less reliable – provided of course that the existing level of system support is maintained. There is therefore no reason to doubt that ADAM will meet this criterion.

**Criterion 4** It must be highly flexible in response to changes: ADAM uses a flexible and scalable client-server computing infrastructure. It is based on four main components; a database and file server, an internet and access control connected to the WWW, local workstations for database administrators and users based in UNODC HQ, and remote workstations used by donors, beneficiary governments and other international organisations. This infrastructure is sufficiently flexible to meet any anticipated changes, and it was confirmed with the Head of IT Services for the UNODC that if a new project was being established now, it would use similar architecture. ADAM therefore meets this criterion.

**Criterion 5** It must be easy to implement, maintain and update: Although there has been a short delay in implementation, this is not unusual with IT projects, and there is no cause for concern. Maintaining and updating the system should be relatively straightforward, since it uses proprietary open source products (widely used elsewhere in the region) and is web-based. ADAM meets this criterion.

**Criterion 6** It must be independent from hardware, operating systems and databases: The infrastructure and architecture described in the preceding paragraphs are tried and trusted, and there is no reason to believe that the system is overtly dependent on any
one element. ADAM meets this criterion.

**Criterion 7** It must be affordable: The budget allocated to ADAM within the Project Document (US$ 448,000, representing 44% of the total project budget) is marginally under spent. Given the general reduction in IT and communication costs as web-based technologies supplant earlier networks, this position is likely to remain, and costs could reduce further in line with global reductions in networking costs. ADAM therefore comfortably meets this criterion.

2.3.1.5 The RPOSEE in Sofia is responsible for ongoing projects, and ADAM currently accounts for 15-20% of the capacity within the office. Given the close proximity of the IT developer, and his commitment to the success of the project, this appears to be sufficient, and there is no evidence that the ADAM project requires significantly greater input through RPOSEE in terms of development, maintenance and support. However, in view of the poor response by external partners in respect of the nomination of ‘focal points’ consideration needs to be given to urgently establishing a more effective and consistent promotion of ADAM, hopefully leading to a greater realisation by external partners of the benefits. Additional promotion, including marketing the system and preparing an interactive tutorial (as proposed in the evaluation of Criteria 1 above) would not necessarily need to be carried out in Sofia, and could be included in a broader expansion of marketing the Paris Pact Initiative as a whole.

2.3.1.6 The existing ADAM demonstration database contains details of 360 CNE projects, across 16 countries. However, a search of the UNODC database for Central Asia (the ROCA database, www.dbroca.uz) reveals that of the 143 projects contained within it, less than 50% of them are currently recorded on ADAM (although it should be pointed out that this figure includes projects outside the CNE field). This ROCA database is described on its website as the “Paris Pact Central Asian Database”, and this will make it difficult to promote ADAM to partners in the region as the Paris Pact database. A plan to integrate ROCA data into ADAM is already being drawn up, but if and when this is achieved, the issue of promoting a single database (ADAM) to external partners will still present a significant challenge.
2.3.1.7 Measuring the effectiveness of ADAM during this demonstration phase is difficult, as is the determination of future Performance Indicators. In this respect, the ROCA database could point the way to future Performance Measurement, as it includes accurate and comprehensive statistical data on seizures in the region. It would be of great interest to donors, and a measure of reassurance to UNODC Senior Management, if the provision of assistance could be linked to seizures at border crossings. A high level of seizures at border crossings that are not receiving assistance through registered programmes would enable potential donors to target their assistance at those points where the impact would be greatest. An increase in seizures at border crossings that have received assistance, would reassure donors that their funds were enabling a genuine and sustained improvement in the effectiveness of interdiction. Any increase in seizures will not be directly proportional to the levels of assistance provided, and the issue of displacement would need to be taken into account, but the relationship between the two figures could nevertheless be a useful Performance Indicator in the future.

2.3.1.8 The clearly stated intention of the Paris Pact is that ADAM should become the primary database for assistance programmes throughout the region. A good example of this theory being converted into practice is the ‘Policing On Line Information System’ (POLIS) being developed by OSCE, and due to become operational in December 2006. One of the four elements in this programme was described in promotional material as a “Donor Assistance Mechanism”. This was promptly brought to the attention of the Project Coordinator by the ADAM Coordinator, and a series of meetings were held in Vienna with the OSCE. Through this consultation with OSCE it was agreed that the Donor Assistance element of POLIS will now be delivered through ADAM, and arrangements are being made for an Officer from OSCE to attend the ADAM Project Office in Sofia and input the relevant data to ADAM. This is a positive and encouraging development, reflects the strong partnership that has emerged between UNODC and OSCE, and could perhaps serve as a model for others to follow.

2.3.1.9 A key feature of ADAM is the automated e-mail system that advises of a potential cross over with a proposed or existing project. This was tested this with a hypothetical project that was input to the system. This is an innovative solution, and
gives ADAM significant ‘added value’ over other databases. In order to maximise the benefit it is essential that all Paris Pact countries and international organisations use the system as intended, and that registered users keep their details updated (especially e-mail addresses). Regrettably, there still appears to be reluctance on the part of many Paris Pact partners to establish focal points and actively input to the system, although this reluctance may be partially explained by the fact that full functionality has not been available during the development/demonstration phase. At the time of the evaluation, ADAM was about to become fully functional, but the Evaluator is not confident that this will of itself lead to an upsurge in registrations on the system without a fundamental new approach to promoting and marketing the system.

2.3.1.10 ADAM is a well designed and impressive system that could have a significant impact on the coordinated provision of assistance, and if successful could be considered as a model for similar initiatives elsewhere. Development needs to be completed, and the system operationally tested with remote users before this can be an unequivocal judgement. The level of commitment to ADAM by partners is absolutely critical – the full benefits will never be realised whilst contributing to the system is considered optional. If the promotion and marketing suggested is successful, and all the Paris Pact participants contribute as intended, ADAM has the potential to become a standard for coordination of assistance programmes around the world. It might be advisable for the UNODC to research the intellectual copyright issues in respect of ADAM, in the event that in future other organisations wish to adopt it.

2.3.1.11 The general lack of awareness in respect of ADAM, and the failure of many partners to contribute data to it, is a cause for concern, especially in view of the sterling efforts of the ADAM coordinator and the Project Coordinator to promote the system, and encourage its use. The promoting and marketing of the system recommended in this report should supplement, and not replace those efforts in the future.

2.3.2. The Consultative Mechanism

2.3.2.1 This element of the project was to be delivered through a series of three or four Operational/Expert Round Table meetings each year, and an annual Policy
Consultative Group Meeting (PCGM). The Round Table meetings were to be held in regions or countries particularly affected by heroin trafficking, and the profile of participants was clearly set out in Annex II of the Project Document: “Participants should be Technical Experts from affected countries, potential bi-lateral assistance contributors, donors and international/regional organizations with an enforcement mandate (WCO, Europol, ICPO-Interpol)” and then further defined the profile of participants: “Participants’ profile: Law enforcement experts; Drug enforcement strategy and interdiction specialists”. This tightly drawn requirement was designed to ensure that the Round Tables could maintain a strong operational focus, although of course the UNODC can only advise partner countries/organizations of the preferred background of participants.

2.3.2.2 Policy Consultative Group Meetings are intended to provide political coordination of action requirements proposed by Round Tables, and participants should be policy decision-makers. The participants profile is defined in the project document as “senior policy decision-making officials, including national drug control coordinators”. Participation at this level is intended to ensure that recommendations and action requirements arising from Round Tables are effectively coordinated, and that implementation is driven forward, but as with the Round Tables, the UNODC can only advise partner countries/organizations of the preferred background of participants.

2.3.2.3 A total of eight Expert Round Tables have been held, each addressing a specific issue. After the first two round tables that were held in Brussels, the Principal Issue on the agenda has been directly linked to the country/region hosting the Round Table. This change was welcomed by all those consulted during the evaluation, and it is widely believed that the Round Tables have been more focussed and effective as a result of it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date(s) Held</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Principal Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th September</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Balkan Route</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1 EXPERT ROUND TABLES 2003 to 2006
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>15th October 2003</td>
<td>Control over transit trafficking – Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27th-28th April 2004</td>
<td>Central Asian Border Control, Information Sharing and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24th-25th June 2004</td>
<td>Illicit Trafficking in Afghan Opiates through the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21st-22nd March 2005</td>
<td>Round Table for Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13th-14th September 2005</td>
<td>Round Table for the Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3rd-4th October 2005</td>
<td>Round Table for South Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10th-11th April 2006</td>
<td>Round Table on cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.2.4 Lists of those attending the Round Tables are available for all but the first meeting. Examination of these reveals a number of inconsistencies in the level of expert knowledge amongst participants. Detailed examination of the records of these meetings reveals that, not surprisingly, some of the most significant contributions to discussions have been made by those with the greatest operational experience or knowledge. Whilst it is acknowledged that the UNODC cannot dictate to partners who should attend, it is imperative that if Round Tables are to focus on improving operational coordination, representation should be considered more carefully by partner agencies/countries. This may be an appropriate topic for discussion at a forthcoming PCGM. There have been three PCGM meetings held since 2003, the first in Rome on November 21st 2003, and two in Vienna (12th October 2004 and 2nd December 2005). Representation at these meetings and the content of the agendas fully meet the criteria set out in the project document.
2.3.2.5 Preparations for Round Table and PCGM meetings are onerous, and despite host countries contributing to costs and logistics (for Round Tables), much of this burden falls to hard pressed UNODC staff. In Vienna and Tashkent the Evaluator was able to witness at first hand the intense activity that precedes a Round Table meeting, as staff prepared for the meeting in Dushanbe. There was little evidence of any significant contribution to this preparation by partner countries/organisations, and there appears to be a reliance on UNODC to suggest topics for the agenda and prepare all the necessary supporting papers. The dedication and commitment of the Project Coordinator and his assistant is particularly noteworthy, but the Paris Pact is intended to be a partnership, and others need to play a fuller part in it. This may also be an appropriate topic for discussion at a forthcoming PCGM.

2.3.2.6 The Round Tables have matured and developed over the 30 months since the first meeting in Brussels. At that first meeting, a decision was taken to focus on one specific country issue at the next meeting (control of transit trafficking through the Islamic Republic of Iran), and although that decision resulted in a much more focussed agenda for the next meeting, it was only when meetings switched to host countries, starting with the Tashkent meeting in April 2004, that the required operational focus, accompanied by sufficient detail to identify problems, is evident. At successive meetings, issues have been explored in greater depth and barriers to sharing information, including the acknowledgement of weaknesses in existing controls admitted more freely. As an example of this, prior to the Round Table for the Islamic Republic of Iran in September 2005, a Joint Assessment Mission on border control in the Islamic Republic of Iran was conducted, following on from recommendations made at the PCGM in October 2004. The comprehensive report of the Joint Assessment Mission was presented to the Round Table and recommendations discussed and agreed, which was a significant step forward and indicates how much progress has been made since the earlier Round Table meetings in 2003.

2.3.2.7 There is ample evidence to demonstrate that information sharing on opiates trafficking from Afghanistan has been shared more freely, and several examples were presented to the last PCGM held in Vienna in December 2005. The two Joint Assessment Missions (To Tajikistan in 2004 and the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2005)
have contributed significantly to overall knowledge of trafficking in the region, and have influenced future strategy and planning.

2.3.2.8 This ability to share information in a collaborative and non-confrontational way has helped countries develop and revise their national drug control strategies, based on the shared experiences of other participants, thus fulfilling one of the primary requirements set out in the Project Document. The enhanced analytical output published by the Central Analysis Unit in the UN Regional Office for Central Asia could not have been produced without the increased willingness to share information, especially between the priority countries. All the ongoing CNE projects listed in the latest (April 2006 edition) of the UNODC Project Portfolio for Central Asia are to an extent dependent on the continuing willingness of countries in the region to maintain the current levels of cooperation, and this would be far more difficult to sustain without the support of the Paris Pact infrastructure. This is especially important in respect of two key regional projects; Precursors Control in Central Asia (RER/E29) and Assistance in developing Controlled Delivery Techniques (RER/F43). This will also be vital in ensuring the success of the CNE pipeline projects proposed for the region.

2.3.2.9 The requirement for an increase in bilateral and multilateral projects and assistance has been realised, and although it is difficult to credit the Paris Pact alone with this, throughout the evaluation it was made clear that the Consultative Mechanism element of the Paris Pact has been a key factor. An evaluation usually seeks quantifiable factors and frequently relies upon them to support recommendations and conclusions. In the case of the Consultative Mechanism there are few readily available quantifiable factors, but a key unquantifiable factor that was mentioned frequently by donor and beneficiary countries was that the partnership approach of the Paris Pact had created an environment that was constructive and collaborative. If this is to be sustained, it is important that all participants consider themselves as partners working together for a common cause, and not split into ‘donor’ and ‘beneficiary’ groupings. The UNODC could assist in achieving this by not making that distinction when preparing reports on the Paris Pact Initiative, and by referring to all countries as ‘partner countries’. This proposal would not preclude the
UNODC from identifying countries that have donated directly to the project, which will be a continuing requirement for both the UNODC and the countries concerned.

2.4. Implementation

2.4.1 Implementation of the project has followed the outline contained within the project document, with significant responsibilities delegated to the UNODC Regional Office and (in respect of ADAM) the Regional Project Office for South Eastern Europe in Sofia (RPOSEE). ADAM development could in theory have been conducted from any UNODC location, but Sofia was chosen in order to build on an earlier proposal to establish an automated donor database that had originated there, and on some technical development that had been conducted under an earlier UNDP initiative. This established a firm base for the development of ADAM, and by using the existing knowledge and expertise of the system developer for that earlier project (STRATEGMA), costs have been well controlled, and within budget. The relationship between the RPOSEE and STRATEGMA is a constructive one, and their close local coordination of the project has been of considerable value.

2.4.2 The ADAM co-ordinator is not a full time position, and the role currently accounts for about 15 – 20% of the responsibilities of the Regional Project Coordinator for South Easter Europe. This balance appears to be about right, but would change if the system developer and ADAM coordinator were not co-located (The RPOSEE and STRATEGMA offices are only 300 metres apart).

2.4.3 In respect of ADAM development, the coordinator has, since May 2005, reported to the Paris Pact Coordinator based in UNODC HQ in Vienna. Despite the fact that the ADAM coordinator has a higher UNODC grading than the Paris Pact Coordinator, this arrangement has worked well.

2.4.4 In respect of the Consultative Mechanism, the Paris Pact Coordinator and UNODC Senior Management have driven forward implementation. Having seen at first hand the volume and complexity of Paris Pact requirements flowing into UNODC HQ, it is difficult to comprehend how the project was driven effectively in the period prior to the appointment of the Project Coordinator. During the evaluation,
several interlocutors wished to place on record their appreciation of the efforts of the Project Coordinator, and the significant improvement, especially in communication, that has been evident since his appointment.

2.4.5 The burden placed upon the coordinator and his assistant in preparing for Paris Pact meetings is onerous, and is unlikely to lessen in the short term unless external partners start to share this burden in a more constructive way. Currently additional tasks have been allocated to the coordinator, outside those of the Paris Pact, and it should be borne in mind that this may adversely affect his ability to implement any extension of the Paris Pact.

2.4.5 Implementation of the project has followed the requirements set out in the project document, and progress has been monitored closely by UNODC Senior Managers, who have regularly reaffirmed their commitment to the project. Implementation, and establishing a broader knowledge of the Paris Pact would with hindsight have been more easily achieved if the Project Coordinator had been appointed at the outset, rather than over a year into the project.

2.5. Institutional and Management Arrangements

2.5.1 Key to the management of this project was delegation of specific elements to Field Offices, which are the public face of the organisation to many partner countries. This is especially the case when countries are going through a period of dramatic and rapid change, as in the five Central Asian Republics. During the evaluation, it was possible to see at first hand how the Paris Pact is closely integrated into the Projects and Programmes managed through the Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent (ROCA). The project could not have progressed in Central Asia without the active involvement of the ROCA, and there is no doubt that integrating the Paris Pact into the portfolio of ROCA projects has benefited the other projects within it. A good example is the requirement to maintain a flow of seizure and arrest figures to the Central Analysis Unit and the ROCA database, together with details of current and planned assistance in the region; these roles complement each other and facilitate effective coordination.
2.5.2 The PCGM was envisaged as the primary forum to take forward recommendations from the Round Tables, and to maintain an ongoing policy level dialogue with the broad range of Paris Pact partners. Inevitably, participants at PCGMs change as post holders are rotated within their government departments or organisations, and given the long periods between PCGMs, maintaining the commitment and enthusiasm of partners can be difficult. Although the UNODC has tried to maintain communication with partners, a more structured and frequent reporting mechanism might maintain the impetus that was clearly evident when the project commenced. A quarterly update, directed at PCGM participants, highlighting progress over the preceding quarter, and gaps in assistance being provided would complement the data that will be available within ADAM.

2.5.3 Although the UNODC has managed and supported ADAM both at Headquarters and through RPOSEE, it would appear that the initial enthusiasm of partners has not been sustained. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn for the poor response to requests to nominate ‘focal points’, and the low visibility of ADAM outside of Vienna and Sofia. A quarterly update could also help address this problem, provided that there is meaningful progress to report.

3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

3.1. Outcomes

3.1.1 The principal outcome of the Paris Pact Initiative is a clear acceptance of shared responsibility amongst participant countries and organisations, coupled with an acknowledgement of the coordinating role of the UNODC. There is a greater willingness for countries to acknowledge weaknesses in their controls and procedures, and to seek guidance from others. This is particularly evident in Round Table meetings, where there is frank and constructive dialogue.

3.1.2 The ability of the UNODC to coordinate activities managed by other organisations has been a positive outcome, strengthening their authority, and ensuring that maximum benefit is derived from scarce donor resources.
3.2. Impacts

3.2.1 It is difficult to assess the impact of the Paris Pact Initiative in isolation. It needs to considered as part of a concerted effort by all participating countries and organisations, and is in many respects is merely the ‘glue’ that binds together the different strands of assistance. Without the ‘glue’, there is little doubt that assistance programmes and projects would have been less well coordinated, and correspondingly less effective.

3.2.2 The effects of the various assistance strands are making a real impact on heroin trafficking from Afghanistan, with improved and better coordinated law enforcement activity in a number of affected countries, although a lot more has to be done, and some problems appear intractable to the casual observer. Where the implementation of assistance projects has had an impact, for example in increased levels of interdiction, it may often be difficult to establish a direct link with a specific project, but considerably easier to link it to the broader Paris Pact ‘umbrella’ arrangements.

3.3. Sustainability

3.3.1 Improved coordination across such a diverse group of countries was always going to be challenging, and so it has proven to be. If the Paris Pact was to come to an end, and the meeting infrastructure was no longer supported, the benefits gained would be at least partially lost. Throughout the evaluation, the message in respect of the Round Tables was clear – if the Paris Pact structure was withdrawn and therefore could no longer support them, the meetings would have to be reconstituted within a different framework if the momentum generated was to be maintained. The Evaluator received neither suggestions as to what this different framework might be, nor suggestions for improvements to the present arrangements. It is therefore safe to conclude that the sustainability of the improved coordination arrangements is dependent on either a continuation of the Paris Pact or by its replacement with a new and as yet undefined structure. There appears to be little if any benefit in adopting the latter option.

3.3.2 After the current development programme is complete, ADAM would be
sustainable at minimal cost, provided that it receives an appropriate level of user support. It has the potential to become a system with global application for the UNODC, but if that potential is to be realised, development will need to be continuous. Whether the UNODC should continue to incur separate development and support costs in respect of ADAM and the ROCA database(s) is questionable. It is desirable that the ADAM database should in future include details of Demand Reduction assistance programmes/projects and related Interdiction results (as the ROCA database does), and the natural progression would be to bring together development of the two systems, or possibly integrate them into one database. This decision is one that UNODC Senior Managers will need to consider carefully, taking into account ‘Value for Money’ issues, and the level of direct oversight that the UNODC can provide. Since co-location is desirable, and the ROCA database needs to remain in Tashkent to maintain its regional focus, one logical option would be to base ADAM in Tashkent, or possibly in another UNODC Regional Office in a priority country. The present arrangements will have to be reviewed in any event, as Bulgaria accedes to the EU in 2007, and a UNDP/UNODC presence will not be maintained there beyond 2009.

3.3.3 Clearly the level of IT development and support currently available in Tashkent would not be sufficient to absorb ADAM development, particularly if further development towards a global system is anticipated. There would therefore need to be a switch in resource allocation between RPOSEE in Sofia and any alternative location proposed, but this decision would also be strongly influenced by the UNODC IT Support Service, in order to maintain a corporate approach to IT development.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1 Lessons Learned
4.1.1 The declaration of the Paris Pact in May 2003 was followed by a period of uncertainty for the UNODC, as there was no funding in place, but additional responsibilities had to be fulfilled immediately. It is to the considerable credit of the UNODC Senior Managers that Round Tables and ADAM development proceeded in advance of funding being made available and the appointment of the Project Coordinator, but it is now accepted that this was not an ideal arrangement. Although
there is agreement that it would have been preferable for funding and the appointment of the coordinator to have followed immediately after the Paris meeting, it is also acknowledged that such a perfect arrangement is only rarely achievable.

4.1.2 The development of the ROCA database was well advanced by the time that ADAM migrated from the theoretical to development phase, and although there is now closer collaboration between those tasked with developing the systems, ideally this should have occurred at an earlier stage. In respect of ROCA/ADAM coordination, this was especially difficult as they were being developed in different locations, both remote from the Project Coordinator.

4.2. Best Practices

4.2.1 The success of the Consultative Mechanism element of the Paris Pact owes much to the fact that an extremely diverse range of external organisations participate, all accepting that the UNODC has the overall responsibility for coordination. Such broad representation reinforces the *primus inter pares* role of the UNODC, and could be applied to other areas of UNODC business.

4.2.2 In any project or programme that involves coordination across national borders, the role of the Regional Office is pivotal to success, and it is difficult to envisage any project similar to the Paris Pact being delivered without the active participation commitment of the appropriate Regional Office that was evident in the ROCA in Tashkent.

4.3. Constraints

4.3.1 Few, if any constraints were identified during the evaluation, beyond the delay in funding and appointment of the Project Coordinator, referred to in paragraph 4.1.1 of this report. Overall the project has been managed within the timescales and budgets set out in the Project Document.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Issues resolved during the evaluation
5.1.1 There were only two significant issues resolved during the evaluation, both in respect of ADAM development. At the end of the field visit to the RPOSEE in Sofia, the Evaluator had some concerns about the creation of a duplicate assistance database in Tashkent (the ROCA database), but in discussion with staff in the Central Analysis Unit, it was clear that this problem had been recognised, and that steps were being taken to ensure that the appropriate records were converted for input into ADAM.

5.1.2 The other issue resolved was also in respect of duplication of the ADAM database. Having been shown a copy of the promotional material for the OSCE ‘POLIS’ project, the Evaluator had concerns that one of the UNODC’s partners was potentially undermining the principles that all Paris Pact partners had agreed. However, as described in paragraph 2.3.1.8 of this report, this had been recognised and remedial action taken.

5.2. Actions/decisions recommended

5.2.1 Meetings convened under the auspices of the Paris Pact have become an essential component of the coordination arrangements in the region, and both the Round Tables and Policy Consultative Group Meetings should continue.

5.2.2 The meetings should continue to be held in countries directly affected, but host country administrations should play a much more active role in the preparation of them, and this should include formulating the agenda.

5.2.3 The UNODC should continue to lead the overall coordination of the project, driven by a full time Project Coordinator, preferably without additional responsibilities. Consideration should be given to locating this post closer to the affected countries, and linking it more closely to the delivery of existing assistance projects and programmes. The ROCA in Tashkent would be the ideal location to coordinate all Paris Pact activities, including ADAM development and management in due course.

5.2.4 The UNODC should exert as much influence as possible to persuade participant
countries of the importance of attendees at Round Tables having the appropriate level of practical knowledge and experience. Broadening the scope of the Round Tables to encompass Demand Reduction programmes and projects would reduce their effectiveness and increase costs considerably. PCGM participation appears to be pitched at the right level, and this should be maintained.

5.2.5 The development of ADAM should continue, and a close liaison maintained with the UNODC IT Support Service in Vienna to ensure corporate compatibility. It would be too disruptive to relocate ADAM at this critical stage in its development, but the UNODC should give careful consideration to relocation within the next two years. If it were to be decided to coordinate all Paris Pact activities in the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia in Tashkent, consideration should be given to developing and supporting ADAM there.

5.2.6 ADAM should be promoted actively by the UNODC as the Paris Pact Database, and the roles of the ROCA database and ADAM should be the subject of detailed review. This should be conducted as a matter of urgency, before the two systems are allowed to develop further individually. A number of options should be considered, ranging from a complete integration of the two databases to a closer collaboration in respect of marketing and future development. Without wishing to prejudice the outcome of that review, the most logical step would appear to be to bring all Paris Pact activities together in one location, and if this were agreed the case for co-locating the coordinator there becomes even stronger (see recommendation at 5.2.3 above).

5.2.7 The decision of the OSCE (see 2.3.1.8 of this report) to adopt ADAM as the database for their POLIS project is a positive and encouraging development. The UNODC should seek to persuade other organisations to follow suit, notably Interpol and the WCO. The UNODC should enter a dialogue with the European Commission, with a view to ensuring that all data in respect of assistance programmes and projects gathered from Member States is made available to ADAM or input directly.

5.2.8 The next stage of ADAM development should include an extension to cover Demand Reduction Assistance Projects, and dependent on the outcome of the ROCA/ADAM database review (see recommendation at 5.2.6 above) should also link
data on projects to interdiction reporting gathered by ROCA and other Field Offices.

5.2.9 If ADAM is to be successful, it needs to gain acceptance from the user community, and this requires clear and unambiguous guidance on use of the system. The UNODC should provide a clear and straightforward user guide, ideally available on line, but backed up with a CD ROM version for use in locations where internet access is slow or unreliable. This should be simple, and contain the minimum detail required for effective use of the system.

5.2.10 Reporting progress on Paris Pact activities is through Round Table and Policy Consultative Group Meetings, supplemented by six-monthly and annual progress reports. In addition, reports are prepared twice each year for the Commission of Narcotic Drugs (sub commission on illicit drug traffic and related matters in the Near and Middle East), and progress is also reported twice each year to major donor meetings. Despite this wealth of briefing, knowledge of the Paris Pact Initiative and current developments within it is not getting through to many partner agencies and organisations. It is difficult to assess precisely where this breakdown in communication is occurring, but the likeliest explanation is that briefing material is not circulated widely enough after distribution by the UNODC. If this is the case, it could be addressed by the UNODC making it clear that briefing material should be distributed to interested parties, and perhaps by giving greater prominence within it to the Paris Pact Initiative.

5.2.11 The Evaluator also believes that there could be merit in considering the publication of a brief quarterly report (probably prepared by the Project Coordinator) that included activities in respect of the Consultative Mechanism and ADAM, together with significant developments in projects and programmes in the affected countries. This enhanced communication with partners would remind them of the importance of the initiative, and encourage them to contribute to projects that fill identified gaps in coverage. Although in theory, this is precisely the data that ADAM should provide, in practice policy makers are unlikely to log on to a computer to obtain this information, and are far more likely to respond to a report that is delivered to them. In order to achieve maximum impact, this report should be brief and clear, but should highlight specific areas of concern that are emerging (e.g. ineffective
coverage of a border crossing) in order that recipients can respond and consider supporting projects promptly. The distribution of this quarterly report would be determined by the UNODC, and it would therefore be possible to ensure that currently excluded parties received it.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

6.1 The Consultative Mechanism (CM) established under the auspices of the Paris Pact is making a significant contribution to closer cooperation and coordination of assistance projects and activities in the countries affected by the trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan.

6.2 If the infrastructure supporting the CM was withdrawn and the Paris Pact project was to end, it is the view of all partners consulted during the evaluation that it would then be necessary to establish a new, and similar, structure to maintain the constructive dialogue that has blossomed within the Paris Pact fora. Taken together with the positive benefits that have flowed from the Pact, this makes a persuasive case for extending the Pact beyond October 2006.

6.3 The ADAM system has been developed in accordance with the Project Document, and has fully met the seven criteria set out within Annex III of it. There has been slight slippage in the delivery timescale, but this is not significant. The evaluation supports the concept and design of ADAM, and concurs with the view that it offers a unique opportunity to provide donor and recipient countries with a real time assessment of assistance needs and priorities.

6.4 Overall, the Paris Pact Project has been very successful in improving coordination and cooperation, especially between the UNODC and other International Organisations, and amongst recipient countries. Progress has been less marked in coordination amongst donor countries, but this should be rectified when ADAM is available to all registered users.

6.5 The strong commitment by UNODC Senior Managers to the Paris Pact, especially in the early stages when funding was not in place and it was therefore not possible to
appoint a Project Coordinator, deserves particular mention. This early commitment and support was essential in order to maintain the momentum generated at the Paris meeting in May 2003.

6.6 The unique nature of the Paris Pact arrangements has enabled the UNODC to develop and lead the assistance strategy across a diverse region and has proven to be a very effective way of delivering coordinated and targeted assistance. There are a number of key factors that have enabled this success, which would need to be replicated if the UNODC was to consider a similar initiative in another region. These include:
   (a) High level political support at the outset
   (b) Acknowledgement of a common cause amongst participating countries and organisations
   (c) The ability to focus on a single identified source country (i.e. Afghanistan)
   (d) Existing support infrastructure (i.e. Established UNODC Regional Office(s))
   (e) Adequate and continuing funding
   (f) Acceptance by partners of the primus inter pares role of the UNODC
   (g) Commitment and determination by all UNODC managers and staff tasked with delivering against project objectives

It is doubtful if any similar project could be as successful unless all the above factors were present from inception.

Neil H Bailey
Independent Evaluator
May 2006