TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Project Number: AD/AFG/G24
Project Name: CAPACITY BUILDING FOR DRUG CONTROL:
Strengthening of the CND and Six Provincial Offices

Thematic area: Policy Support, Legislation and Advocacy
Country: Afghanistan

Report of the Independent Evaluation Consultant

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for

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

Kabul
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List of Acronyms

AIA  Afghan Interim Administration
AL  Alternative Livelihoods
ALWG  Alternative Livelihoods Working Group
CN  Counter Narcotics
CND  Counter Narcotics Directorate
DCCU  Drug Control Coordination Unit
INCB  International Narcotic Control Board
MCN  Ministry of Counter Narcotics
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
MRRD  Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development
MOSS  Minimum Operational Security Standard
NDCS  National Drug Control Strategy
PC  Project Coordinator
PO  Provincial Office
ProFi.  Programme and Financial Information Management System
SHCDC  State High Commission for Drug Control (SHCDC)
TOR  Terms of Reference
UK  United Kingdom
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNODCCP  United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (now UNODC)
UNOPS  United Nations Office for Project Services
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WB  World Bank

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SUMMARY

S1. Summary Description

The UNODC ‘Capacity Building for Drug Control – Strengthening of the CND and six regional offices’ Project AD/AFG/G24 (G24) was designed in 2002 as a two year project in the thematic area of policy support, legislation and advocacy. UNODC was the executing agency, with UNDP and UNOPS as associated agencies. Funding was disbursed for the UK, USA, Italy, France and Australia Governments.

G24 was to support the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in its commitment to comprehensively address the drugs problem in Afghanistan. Capacity building was required to establish a well-functioning Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) created under the National Security Council in October 2002 to replace the old State High Commission for Drug Control which was disbanded in June 2002.

The project was to provide assistance to CND HQ in Kabul and its six offices in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kandahar, Helmand, Herat, Balkh and Badakhshan to develop and implement a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). Support was to be given for organisation arrangements and operational support in terms of equipment, vehicles and communications. CND and its sub offices were to receive training in various sectors of drug control aimed at building up the capacity to coordinate all drug control activities in Afghanistan. G24 was also to facilitate the conduct of biennial international drug control coordination meetings and other seminars and conferences.

The key end-of-project expectations stated within the UNODC Project Document were that:

1. The Counter Narcotics Directorate and six provincial offices would be established and fully operational;
2. Staff of the CND would be trained in all areas of drug control;
3. A national drug control strategy would have been developed and under implementation;

S2. Major finding of the evaluation,

Context

The G24 Project was never a project in isolation and achievement of the expectations set was always to be dependent on the responsibilities, the authority, the leadership and the responses of others. As such, and given that many goal posts moved in the complex and volatile operational, institutional, security and political environment during the period 2002-04, no simple or clear answer as to the overall performance assessment of UNODC against these expectations can be given, as these often must to be qualified and assessed in context.

It has proved difficult to assess the actual success and achievements directly against the Achievement Indicators identified in the Project Document as plans were overcome by new donor or Government arrangements during implementation which necessitated G24 management and staff to rightly, either change direction, or switch priorities and focus. Some outputs and activities also range across many different issues and across widely differing local situations. This means that a single view on approach and achievement could be misleading.

Main Results

By the close of G24 operations the following can be said:

1. CND HQ had been established but was still far from being fully and independently operational.
2. CND has since achieved visibility and the status of Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN).
3. Although, a range of physical inputs under the project had been delivered and assigned – sometimes direct to either a UNODC or a CND Provincial Office and sometimes to CND in Kabul - the six CND provincial offices have to only varying degrees become established, equipped or operational.
4. The equipping and staffing of five UNODC Provincial Offices has been more successful.
5. Most senior CND HQ staff and some CND Provincial staff have been trained across a range of drug control areas.
6. A NDCS was approved in 2003 with some G24 input but its implementation was still patchy.
Constraints
G24 faced different constraints during implementation limiting the achievement of its objectives, namely:

- **Inappropriate Project Design:** The Project Document had unrealistic expectations; overambitious targets; and, gaps leading to poor and difficult management arrangements. Management also had to deal with transitions from one accounting system to another.
- **Difficulties in Recruitment:** both UNODC and CND faced hazardous and rapidly changing conditions and competitive markets for suitable staff.
- **Information Sharing:** Donor dominance and poor coordination made information on what others are doing difficult to access.
- **Unclear Roles:** Both CND and UNODC suffered from perceptions of their unclear roles.
- **A Volatile Political and Institutional Context:** G24 faced obstacles in a rapidly evolving and highly contested political and institutional environment of Counter Narcotics (CN).
- **Security and Mobility Issues:** An insecure environment in most of 2004 limited mobility to the Provinces, but also mobility of international consultants to work in Afghanistan.
- **Building Consensus:** Achieving a consensus on the Alternative Livelihoods concept and its strategies and programmes within the whole national development framework proved difficult.

Timing and Funding
G24 implementation start date was delayed as a revised Project Document had to be prepared. The time frame was also extended as further delays ensued. The project has nevertheless fulfilled its disbursement targets as illustrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project starting date:</th>
<th>Originally planned: April 2002</th>
<th>Actual: October 2002</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project operational completion date:</td>
<td>Originally planned: April 2004</td>
<td>Actual: February 2005 (final accounting closure end Dec 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget:</td>
<td></td>
<td>($)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Original Project Planned in 2002:</td>
<td>2,065,200</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Revised Project Planned in 2003:</td>
<td>2,066,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding Pledged Actual:</td>
<td>2,067,010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disbursements at Operational Completion (end 2005) Actual:</td>
<td>2,034,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance estimated at Close (end 2006) Planned:</td>
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Donors: UK, USA, Italy, France, Australia

Achievement of Objectives
G24’s primary Drug Control Objective was:

“To increase the capacity of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to effectively develop relevant and effective drug control policies, strategies and programmes for Afghanistan.”

Given the baseline existing in 2002, there can be little question from looking at resources delivered, training provided, assistance with institutional frameworks and the development of the NDCS, that an increase in capacity in all these stated areas has been achieved. This may not have been to the full extent or at a speed implied by the terminology as framed in the original Project Document. This represents the deficiencies in Project Design documents, rather than any form of failure in practice.

The complex and rapidly changing political, security, policy and institutional situations which prevailed are directly relevant to why G24 may not have achieved as much as some may have liked. It is also significant that G24 was just one small contribution amongst a number of on-going donor assistance programmes to the Drug Control sector to a problem that remains, and will remain, a major challenge for years to come.
The Immediate Objective was:

‘To develop an institutional capacity for drug control in Afghanistan’

Compared to the situation in 2002, there has been a noticeable improvement in the institutional capacity for drug control in Afghanistan. This is most evident at the national level, but less so at the Provincial level - which is where the Project had intended to have had a significant impact. This confirms that the speed of institutional capacity building is a much longer term process than implied by the expectations set in the original Project Document.

Evidence of progress includes the fact that CND began playing a lead role in:

a) the coordination and execution of a successful CN public information campaign (under the leadership of MCN Public Relations Unit);

b) the creation and chairing of consultative and technical working groups for CN (for each thematic area of drug control);

c) leading the way to a CN mainstreaming strategy, fully endorsed and supported by key donors, such as the World Bank, and relevant line ministries (e.g. Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Health, and Education); and

d) the coordination of the 2005 Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan.

Even at a provincial level there is some limited evidence that the training provided and the mainstreaming objectives being promoted to build coordination across agencies, institutions and sectors has a platform in some cases.

Stakeholder Views

The responses of the MCN, other donors and other stakeholders to UNODC’s role and assistance are, in the main, favourable. Senior staff in various arms of government all gained from training and exposure to the issues and how they can be dealt with. G24 has thus contributed to building important steps, inter-relationships and confidence for sustaining future operations, in spite of the difficulties and shortcomings G24 faced at the time.

S3. Lessons Learned And Best Practices

There are 22 main lessons which have been learnt from G24 which are listed in the main body of the report. Some are general lessons for UNODC and some are specific for UNODC, MCN and others within the context of drug control activities in Afghanistan. These lessons range across issues of: Project Design; Programming; Roles; Managing, Monitoring and Evaluation; and, Training. These should gain the attention of all concerned, particularly MCN, as this interface is critical to developing and benefiting from the learning by doing experience with capacity building that G24 characterised.

S4. Conclusions and Recommendations

Internal and external evaluation results emphasise the ongoing need to move capacity development out into the provinces and to clarify roles and responsibilities; to continue to build relations between the players; to undertake shared efforts which maximise the opportunities for complimentary roles and deriving the best comparative advantage; and, which empower and allow stakeholders locally and nationally to take the lead in drug control activities sooner, rather than later.

The following summary of recommendations has been drawn together by the evaluation process:

**Project Design**

- UNODC should examine the lessons learnt by G24 carefully to consider updating the ways in which Project Documents and Designs are planned and formulated, as the terminology used for G24 was inflexible, overambitious and not constructive for practical situations that management will often face. Thus, the lessons learnt will likely have wider applicability.

**Roles**

- UNODC assistance can include some help to assist MCN gain greater control in the decision-making process of drug control and empower it to take on a policy advocacy role that promotes a sound and balanced approach to CN.

- UNODC assistance, based on G24 experience, in the short and medium term can translate into: working jointly with MCN in: provincial capacity building for CN (UNODC G187 project);
developing a data base (UNODC G71 project); building monitoring indicators and processes for monitoring mainstreaming (UNODC G76); and design and commission of strategic and evaluative studies (e.g. the impact of eradication and provincial-based planning and implementation) (UNODC G76 and F98).

- UNODC-MCN relations, the roles and responsibilities of each party and the potential for cooperation and complementarities need to be clarified.
- The role of provincial offices must be clarified both for all concerned in CN activities.
- Roles need to be defined for MCN and Line Ministries within the NDCS.
- MCN must define their role for the Annual Surveys so the Monitoring and Surveying section can be provided with appropriate capacity building to support them in fulfilling this role.

**Programming**

- Future capacity building requires developing a provincial strategy and capacity-development plan for UNODC and MCN Provincial Offices to work together on strengthening coordination in the provinces and start undertaking a strategic advocacy and monitoring role.
- MCN needs UNODC to continue with guidance to support the ongoing restructuring process.
- The final structure should allow MCN to capitalize on what it can achieve best.
- MCN needs timely long term support to ensure the mainstreaming process continues as a Government-led approach with a MCN capacity to monitoring progress; including long term help to assist line ministries identify relevant, useful and reliable indicators and targets.
- Mentors placed within MCN would help provide qualitative information on how capacity building has happened, as well as being able to follow up on trainings that were attended by staff. Mentoring has worked well in other ministries.
- An opportunity was created by the 2005 Pakistan Study Tour to establish a long-term ‘mentoring and exchange program’ between Pakistan’s Ministry for Narcotics Control and Afghanistan’s MCN, as well as between Pakistan’s Anti Narcotics Force (ANF) and Afghanistan’s Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA). The resulting working relations will ultimately also contribute to strengthened international and cross-border cooperation.

**Managing, Monitoring and Evaluation**

- UNODC Finance Section training and the UN systems they use should be extended to integrate their role, skills and services into the management, auditing, monitoring and evaluation needs of Country Programming and operational projects. The Finance Section need to be seen to become an integral part of project management teams and team working to ensure that project operational objectives are met.
- UNODC should consider adding a lower level of data coding to voucher data entry to simplify and facilitate management, evaluation and audit.
- All UNODC capacity building projects should include proper systems within the institutions involved for managing the ongoing recording, monitoring, evaluating and following up on the delivery of physical and qualitative inputs and activities.
- To improve monitoring and evaluation of progress toward increased capacity, project documents should include milestones to assess progress towards improved capacity.
- UNODC should provide technical and mentoring support to MCN to develop monitoring mechanisms and undertake key monitoring tasks.

**Procurement**

- UNODC should, prior to future purchases, revise project documents to include a “right of use” clause to strengthen accountability over use of non-expendable equipment by government counterparts. The project staff should periodically monitor their use and verify their condition.

**Training**

- Future training in the centre or in the provinces at any level would benefit if a participatory skills assessment were made to allow staff the opportunity to suggest their own ideas on what capacity building activities they would like to see attended to.
- Various targeted areas may exist where ‘training of trainers’ could help speed up the capacity building in the Provinces. Here, training methods designed to embrace and emulate the positive blending of cultures at various levels would likely benefit the effectiveness of the training strategies and the uptake of ideas, knowledge and initiating practical action.

**Information Sharing**

- Methods for sharing AL information gathered to a larger audience should be developed in coordination with the media office of MCN.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Context

The Afghanistan State High Commission for Drug Control (SHCDC) was established in May 1990, and reconstituted in June 1993 to serve as the official agency for all drug control matters. When the Taliban took control of Kabul in September 1996, the State High Commission for Drug Control (SHCDC) continued to serve as a counterpart to United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (then UNODCCP, now UNODC).

At the provincial level, Drug Control Coordination Units (DCCUs) were established by UNODCCP in 1995 in Jalalabad under the ‘Afghanistan Drug Control and Rehabilitation Project’ and in Qandahar and Kabul (KDCCU) in 1997 under the ‘Capacity Building for Drug Control Project (AFG/97/C26). Additional units were set-up by the Taliban in Mazr-e-Sharif and Herat in 1999. The SHCDC and the provincial DCCUs became dysfunctional with the removal of the Taliban by October 2001.

With the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) a decree (No. 67) on 17 January 2002 banned the cultivation, production, processing, drug abuse and illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs. In February 2002, the AIA reactivated the SHCDC in Kabul as an inter-ministerial coordinating body for drug control measures. Debate about a future structure for drug control within the Government resulted in the creation of the Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) under the National Security Council. The SHCDC was disbanded in June 2002 and the CND took over responsibility for the coordination and monitoring of all drug control activities in October 2002. It is significant that the SHCDC and the CND co-existed de facto in the early stages of the G24 project for a longer period that just after June 2002.

According to the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS - first approved in 2003 and updated in January 2006), the objective of the CND was to implement the NDCS and to coordinate drug control activities throughout the government, its budget, and programmes. CND was responsible for liaising with concerned ministries and other government agencies, provincial administrations, drug control institutions of other countries, and representatives of the international community.

CND faced three transitional problems: First, in deciding how to absorb or replace the SHCDC resources; second, in articulating the specifics of their role and responsibilities in implementing the NDCS; third and, perhaps, more importantly, in gaining the authority and cooperation of other ministries and key players. In December 2005, the CND became the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) as a Directorate within the Ministry of Interior immediately prior to the closure of G24.

It can be expected that the institutional arrangements for Counter Narcotics (CN) will continue to be reorganised in the future.

Project Design and Strategy

The basic concept for the G24 project was to continue assistance to Afghanistan in building the national and provincial capacities to implement their developing drug control policies and measures. The G24 project was designed in April 2002, and began implementation in October of 2002. It was originally designed to assist the SHCDC in their capacity to:

1) Create legal and judicial frameworks in drug policy formation;
2) Strengthen their organizational arrangements;
3) Provide operational support; and,
4) Assist them to mainstream and integrate drug control into the programmes of other partners and assist in the continuing development of a National Strategy for Drug Control.

The changing institutional framework during 2002 meant the government institution responsible for G24 implementation would switch from the SHCDC to CND who had new ideas and needs. As a result, a revision of the project document became necessary. This was submitted in May 2003 with the following key changes made to the project:

- The objective and provisions for legal assistance were deleted, as this assistance had been taken on by the Legal Section at UNODC Vienna;
The main focus of project activities was placed on the organization and delivery of training in all areas of drug control for CND staff, both at Headquarters and in the provincial offices, as little or no expertise relevant to drug control operations was available within CND;

- After discussion between UNODC and the UK, US, and Iranian Governments, equipment originally planned to being supplied to CND HQ in Kabul would be provided primarily for use in the provincial offices;
- An Alternative Livelihoods (AL) Advisor was to be hired with additional funds from the UK; and,
- The project would facilitate the conduct of international drug control coordination meetings and other seminars and conferences.

The basic strategy was to assist the CND in building up their strategic and operational capacity, nationally and in the provinces, to take on a comprehensive approach to drug control problems and acknowledging that professional and financial resources and practical experience for such activities were still either limited or non-existent. The Project Document anticipated that by the end of G24:

- The Counter Narcotics Directorate and six provincial offices would be established and fully operational;
- Staff of the CND would be trained in all areas of drug control;
- A national drug control strategy would have been developed and under implementation;

Given that G24 was originally to be completed within just two years (April 2002 – April 2004), the objectives and targets for the expected ‘end-of-project’ situation set were ambitious and dependent on certain key assumptions; some were elucidated in the project design, but some were not.

The project document is, in the main, clear, logical and coherent. However, the planned time in which various objectives could have been achieved were entirely linked in the project design to the two year funding period. This did not distinguish adequately between the differing speeds at which the physical input objectives would be achieved when compared with the human and institutional achievements. The limitations this imposed on perceptions during and after implementation are important.

Both aspects highlighted in the last two paragraphs are discussed further in Section 2.1

1.2 Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is:

- To learn from the implementation of the G24 project and draw lessons which help identify best practices to improve future project planning, design and management of UNODC, Government and other donor drug control capacity building in Afghanistan.

The objectives set for the evaluation are to:

- Establish what the G24 project achieved;
- Examine if it attained its objectives successfully, effectively and efficiently;
- Assess the extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries were met; and
- Identify what has been achieved in terms of impact and sustainability.

1.3 Executing Modality/Management Arrangements

The G24 Project was executed by UNODC with the provision of administrative support coming from the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) for the procurement of equipment and other services and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for administrative support. The Project was implemented under the direct supervision of the UNODC Representative for Afghanistan, calling on UNDOC HQ technical and operational units, as required, for backstopping.

A Project Coordinator (PC) was to have been hired to be responsible for planning, supervision and monitoring for the project as a whole from its start. They were also to have provided day-to-day advisory support to the CND for its functioning and liaison with the provincial offices. They were to have focused, in particular, on supporting CND in their mainstreaming and coordinating functions. The CND was to have been further strengthened by the hiring of national experts to assist in training for each area of drug control expertise. The assessment of these arrangements is given in section 2.5.
1.4 Scope of the Evaluation

The Evaluation covers analysis of:

a) Project concept and design.
b) Objectives, outputs, inputs, activities, impact and sustainability.
c) Overall implementation process.
d) Lessons learned from the concept, design and implementation of the project.

The Evaluation provides specific assessment of:

- whether and how G24 contributed to a priority area or comparative advantage for UNODC;
- implementation problems identified by G24 and the means chosen to address them;
- the relevance and attainability of the objectives and of planned outputs, activities and inputs, as compared to other cost-effective alternatives, if/as available;
- the clarity, logic and coherence of G24;
- the quality and timeliness of inputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of activities carried out;
- whether results have been achieved, and if not, what progress has been made;
- the usefulness, impact and sustainability of results and outcomes and its contribution to human and institutional capacity building;
- how effectively/efficiently project planning and implementation was carried out within the overall organizational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms used by UNODC and the project partners;
- the lessons learned from the project (positive or negative); and
- the recommendations for concrete action that could to improve or rectify undesired future outcomes of follow up projects dealing with the same issues.

1.5 Methodology

This evaluation comprises professional review arising from two independent consultancy inputs. The first was undertaken in early 2005 and produced a draft report in February 2005. UNODC felt it necessary to engage a second review so that: it adequately complied with the Terms of Reference (TOR - see Annex 1) and the UNODC Standard Format and Guidelines for the Preparation of the Project Evaluation Reports (see Annex 2); and, also, it presented objective and constructive views to achieve the purpose and objectives of the Evaluation.

Difficulties in recruiting a suitable Consultant meant that this final work could not be completed until early 2006.

The second input did encompass all the findings of the first, but avoided duplication of work already satisfactorily completed. It did re-visit all aspects of the scope of work in order to assess any gaps. Together, the inputs of both reviews employed evaluation methods which included:

- Interviews with key staff who were familiar with the project from within UNODC and the now Ministry of Counter Narcotics (previously CND), other relevant Line Ministries, Donors and NGOs (see Annex 3);
- Meeting and interviews with other drug control bodies and institutions (see Annex 3);
- Document review; including all the available major project documents, progress and monitoring reports, terminal narrative reports, as well as assessments of activities, such as the study tours developed under the project (see Annex 4); and
- Preparation of final report.

Neither evaluation mission was able to travel to the provincial offices to review the field offices in person due to security restrictions and poor weather. Relevant information was gleaned from interviews and mission reports of those who had travelled to the field during the project.
2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS

2.1 Overall Performance Assessment

For various reasons it has proved difficult to assess the overall actual success and achievements directly against the Achievement Indicators identified in the Project Document. For example, some activities, as originally specified in the Project Document, were overcome by events and new donor or Government arrangements during implementation. This necessitated G24 management and staff to rightly, either change direction, or switch priorities and focus.

Similarly, some outputs and activities actually range across many different issues and across widely differing local situations. This means that a single view on approach and achievement could be misleading. Thus, it would be better to understand what happened for each particular issue in each particular location in order to gain a balanced view of events overall.

G24’s intended results were relevant and most of its outputs have been met, despite the difficulties faced. G24’s contributions can only be seen as just one small step in a longer term programme of ongoing capacity building.

Overall, future Project Design and Implementation arrangements need to embrace a greater understanding of and response to the complex and rapidly changing working context in Afghanistan.

Project Understanding
G24 was clearly titled as ‘Capacity Building for Drug Control’ but nowhere defined clearly what capacity building was. Therefore, this may have assumed a common understanding amongst the stakeholders of what capacity building might entail. The G24 PC developed, late in G24, with the CND and other stakeholders, the following definition:

“Capacity building is a continuing process. It is not just training, but rather a combination of factors and activities focused on the improvement of CND’s performance in relation to its mission, working environment and practical resources. To varying degrees, it includes the investment in equipment, personnel, information and communication strategies, and forging and strengthening relationships with relevant stakeholders”.

The Project Document provided a well balanced capacity-building strategy that included components to build both human skills and institutional capabilities in CND to address the challenges of drug control. It resourced process-oriented activities and the setting up of working groups to help establish coordination mechanisms; to promote a mainstreaming strategy; and, to establish inter-ministerial working relations through focal points and amongst the key international stakeholders.

In 2002-03 this clearly helped CND to establish its position whilst they first co-existed alongside the SHCDC and until the latter’s disbandment in June 2002 and then during a difficult transitional period when roles, responsibilities, staffing and resource needs where uncertain and lacked clarity. By maintaining support for a working group process from the outset G24 clearly improved the wider acceptance of CND amongst the main line ministries. This also helped CND’s develop its mission performance and lead to its metamorphosis into a Ministry as G24 came to a close.

Project Expectations
The key end-of-project expectations stated within the UNODC Project Document were that:

1. The Counter Narcotics Directorate and six provincial offices would be established and fully operational;
2. Staff of the CND would be trained in all areas of drug control;
3. A national drug control strategy would have been developed and under implementation;

The G24 Project was never a project in isolation that would have led to these expectations being achieved in its own right. Similarly, the role of UNODC within the project specifically, and within CN generally, could never have achieved these expectations directly through just their efforts of support. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) played and continues to play the lead role amongst the donors for CN in Afghanistan. UNODC role was to support, monitor and facilitate. As such, achievement of these expectations was dependent on the responsibilities, the authority, the leadership and the responses of others. As such, and given that many goal posts moved in the complex and volatile
operational, institutional, security and political environment during the period 2002-04, no simple or clear answer as to the overall performance assessment of UNODC against these expectations can be given, as these often must to be qualified and assessed in context.

By the close of G24 operations the following can be said:

1. CND HQ had been established but was still far from being fully and independently operational.
2. CND had achieved visibility and status as the Ministry of Counter Narcotics.
3. Although, a range of physical inputs under the project had been delivered and assigned – sometimes direct to either a UNODC or a CND Provincial Office and sometimes to CND in Kabul - the six CND provincial offices have to only varying degrees become established, equipped or operational.
4. The equipping and staffing of five UNODC Provincial Offices has been more successful.
5. Most senior CND HQ staff and some CND Provincial staff have been trained across a range of drug control areas.
6. A NDCS was approved in 2003 with some G24 input but its implementation was still patchy.

The specific assessment of results is summarised below.

**Project Timing**

The G24 Project time frame as originally planned and actual was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1 G24 Project Time Frames Planned and Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project starting date:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Originally planned: April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual: October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project completion date:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Originally planned: April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual: February 2005 (with final accounting closure end Dec 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The delays in the first instance result from the changing institutional relations as the SHCDC was superseded by the CND. The changing institutional, political and security situations, together with changing ideas within government and amongst the donors, necessitated a revision of the Project Design during mid 2003 which led to delays.

Further delays were caused by difficulties in recruiting early a suitable PC. Most persons interviewed regarded this fact to have left the G24 Project with a lack of adequate and consistent guidance and supervision until too late into the project’s implementation.

**Project Finances**

The G24 was successful in reaching its overall funding and disbursement targets, as indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2 G24 Project Total Disbursements Planned and Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total budget:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original Project Planned in 2002: 2,065,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Project Planned in 2003: 2,066,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Pledged Actual: 2,067,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements at Operational Completion (end 2005) Actual: 2,034,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance estimated at Project Close (end 2006) Planned: 1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors: UK, USA, Italy, France, Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During implementation the effectiveness of financial management was impacted the absence of a PC for several months at the beginning and in the middle of the project. This meant inconsistent supervision and guidance and that momentum was lost in programming activities and providing adequate follow up with CND and other players.
**Project Design Assumptions**

The Project Design gave no explicit assumptions underpinning the logic and coherence of its strategy and approach. With hindsight, a number might have been predictable, as follows, namely:

- UNODC would have the ability to recruit an international project coordinator and national experts before the project went operational;
- UNODC would be able to prioritise CND developing needs to allow these unknowns to be effectively dealt with early in the project (changing institutional frameworks to a great extent precluded this);
- The development of provincial capacities would be through the ‘co-existence’ of CND and UNODC offices/facilities – this assumption was soon overcome by events and has proved important to people’s perceptions of what the project eventually did and did not achieve; and
- CND’s uptake by of their responsibilities for coordination and monitoring functions - and the timely delivery of UNODC training to assist in this - would happen early enough in the project and across all provinces to create a sufficient opportunity to make them fully operational by project completion.

There was a further assumption, which was included in the Project Design as a ‘Prior Obligation and Prerequisite’, namely that there would be:

- Full cooperation of the Afghan administration and the provision of premises and salaried staff for the CND in Kabul, and the provision of premises and staff for the provincial offices.

The underlying assumption that CND would establish provincial offices and gain sufficient institutional authority, means and mechanisms to allow these offices to act as effective intermediaries with communities, other institutions and agencies, both at the national and provincial level, was critical to the Project Design logic. As it was, CND was not even then within a National Budgetary Framework. This, in turn, assumed the ready availability of staff and incentives to fill the posts to undertake these tasks and the required flow of Government resources to back the strategy. However, at the time of Project Design, this expectation was, with hindsight, also unreasonable to have included without some provision for G24 to manage a response if, in fact, the Afghan administration could not deliver the approach upon which the strategy and logic was based. As it was, CND budgets were financed direct by various donors and to varying degrees will continue to be so for many years to come.

**Risks to Project Design**

The Project Design explicitly stated four main risks which would affect the logic and coherence of its strategy and approach. These risks were:

a) Volatile security in some parts of the country could result in the suspension of planned CND activities.
b) Equipment and vehicles provided under the project could end up not being utilised for their intended purposes.
c) Staff of drug entities that received training under the project leave their respective services shortly after completion of training, and
d) Funds would become unavailability for the day-to-day running of the CND and its provincial office, as well as to pay staff salaries.

As events transpired all four of these risks, to some extent, influenced people’s response to and perceptions of G24 and affected its achievements. The way in which the Project Document was written effectively left these issues being independent of the main Project Design, but with no associated planning measures to manage them.

In this respect, G24 is not dissimilar to many project designs found worldwide. However, if Risk Management had been included, it would have provided both UNODC and the counterpart Government institutions and other collaborating agencies with greater flexibility of approach. It also would provide Country and Project Management with a more flexible planning system to accommodate changes which are generally inevitable and often predictable. In the case of Afghanistan during the Project period, the likelihood of this changing context was clearly predictable, even if the specific outcomes were not.
Achievements within the Project Time Frame
The Project Design did not distinguish in any explicit way between the differing rates of achievements in capacity building which commonly occur, namely:

1. The speed at which physical resources can be mobilised and dispersed.
   In this respect UN systems are well developed to deliver both funds and physical inputs (equipment, transport, study tours, training workshops, consultancies, etc). Significantly, these are also those elements of the project which are entirely within the responsibility, authority and ability of UNODC to deliver by themselves.

When compared to -
2. The speed at which tangible results can be achieved in human and institutional development (involving both establishing and improving the capabilities of individuals and teams, as well as institutional operations and partnerships), through other forms of capacity building support (i.e. training, advising, facilitating and sharing decision-making, monitoring and coordination)

In this respect, the project was a much needed, relevant and appropriate response to a situation where institutional mechanisms and means had been clearly identified as being weak and immature and in a political and institutional environment which was predictably complex and changing rapidly.

However, human and institutional capacity building is usually always known to be medium to long term operation. The speed of uptake of capacity building in G24 Project Design clearly assumed an immediacy of positive impacts which could also spawn rapid momentum for operational achievements very early on. Such an approach to designing and, thereby, managing project expectations necessarily diluted some of the logic and coherence of what the project staff and other partners and players would face during implementation.

Thus, the planned time target for achieving the expected results in this arena of human and institutional operations was clearly ambitious. As it was, the project time frame was extended to accommodate the changing situation. The targets also depended upon factors under the responsibility and authority of CND, and not UNODC. In this situation, what could reasonably have been achieved within a 2 year time frame would only have been some first steps towards full CND operational competence at a national and provincial scale. Therefore, the Project Design expectations set for human outcomes and achievements in operational capability can be regarded as having been unclear on a priori grounds.

The G24 Project clearly has assisted CND by delivering both physical inputs and human and institutional capacity building to HQ in Kabul and to varying degrees in its provincial offices. In the way that things have transpired, the G24 project has also developed the UNODC Provincial Offices. These to varying degrees are shared with CND or help facilitate CND provincial operations. This aspect is discussed further in Section 2.4.

G24 clearly succeeded in the provision of its training components. Study tours were regarded as very useful for providing a new perspective to CND staff. The monitoring and evaluation training was also regarded as especially helpful and repeat courses were requested so additional staff could attend. Donors also felt that CND had benefited from this form of well delivered capacity building.

G24 was also successful in using working groups from its inception to facilitate the participation of key stakeholders and to allow them to help determine and further the mainstreaming of drug control activities. This approach is now an essential part of the process being used by the MCN in the further refinement and implementation of the NDCS.

G24 management also worked closely and cooperatively throughout 2004-05 with international partners and line ministries' counterparts, particularly with the UK (the lead donor for drug control and supporter of MCN institutional development)

2.2 Attainment of the Objectives
The Objectives and Indicators, as given in the Project Document, were as follows:
Drug Control Objective: *To increase the capacity of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to effectively develop relevant and effective drug control policies, strategies and programmes for Afghanistan.*

Given the baseline existing in 2002, there can be little question from looking at resources delivered, training provided, assistance with institutional frameworks and the development of the NDCS, that an increase in capacity in all these stated areas has been achieved. This may not have been to the full extent or at a speed implied by the terminology as framed in the original Project Document. This represents the deficiencies in Project Design documents, rather than any form of failure in practice.

The complex and rapidly changing political, security, policy and institutional situations which prevailed are directly relevant to why G24 may not have achieved as much as some may have liked. It is also significant that G24 was just one small contribution amongst a number of on-going donor assistance programmes to the Drug Control sector to a problem that remains, and will remain, a major challenge for years to come.

Immediate Objective: *To develop an institutional capacity for drug control in Afghanistan*

There is also little question that, compared to the situation in 2002, there has been a noticeable improvement in the institutional capacity for drug control in Afghanistan. This is most evident at the national level, but less so at the Provincial level - which is where the Project had intended to have had a significant impact. This confirms that the speed of institutional capacity build is a much longer term process than implied by the expectations set in the original Project Document.

The lessons learnt and the need to continue with this assistance is in hand within the ongoing programming of UNODC and other donors. There is also now a Ministerial status and budgetary mechanism available to the CND as the new MCN. This authority did not exist during the implementation of G24. There is a strong sense that the MCN wishes to take a more pro-active stance in developing ownership of this process. This should be fully appreciated and supported in the future.

Evidence of progress during the Project period includes the fact that CND began playing a lead role in:

a) the coordination and execution of a successful CN public information campaign (under the leadership of MCN Public Relations Unit);
b) the creation and chairing of consultative and technical working groups for CN (for each thematic area of drug control);
c) leading the way to a CN mainstreaming strategy, fully endorsed and supported by key donors, such as the World Bank, and relevant line ministries (e.g. Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Health, and Education); and
d) the coordination of the 2005 Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan.

Even at a provincial level there is some limited evidence that the training provided and the mainstreaming objectives being promoted to build coordination across agencies, institutions and sectors has a platform in some cases.

Table 2.3 provides an assessment against indicators given in the original Project Document:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCORING KEY</th>
<th>1=fully achieved</th>
<th>2= partially achieved</th>
<th>3= limited achievement</th>
<th>4= nothing achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>COMMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The CND have the capacity to coordinate, monitor and evaluate drug control activities, to oversee the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In Kabul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The focus G24 gave to CND HQ had started, along with other donor inputs, to install the capacities intended. During G24, the SHCDC was superseded by the CND in 2002 and later given Ministerial status as the MCN in December 2004, retaining the mandate of key lead agency in the Afghanistan Government responsible for policy advice, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of drug control activities. It now chairs various coordination meetings, at both technical and cabinet-level and is increasingly seen playing a lead role in promoting CN activities. Further institutional changes can be expected as future political, Cabinet and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.3 Achievement of G24 Objectives Assessed by Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>COMMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary developments evolve. The upgrading in status and authority of CND into the MCN will continue to lead to further changes in the mandate, structure, staffing composition and levels, both in its HQ in Kabul and in the Provincial Offices (POs) and require increased capacity building initiatives to sustain the achievements of G24, which will ultimately overshadow some of the results achieved.</td>
<td>- In provinces 3</td>
<td>The delivery of G24 inputs to at least three of the six provinces has improved the capacity of UNODC more than CND. This is not to the detriment of evolving Drug Control activities in Afghanistan as these are, in any case, shared mandates/activities between the MCN, UNODC and others. The strengthening of provincial capacity remains a high priority for all to focus on. Five UNODC Provincial Offices are now fully operational but only limited equipment and technical support were provided to CND Provincial Offices mainly due to factors beyond the control of G24. Support was provided to CND Provincial Offices through purchase of equipment and delivery of some training and technical guidance. Overall, no major achievements were made in realizing this Output.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Achievement of Project Results

The results expected of the Project were expressed through the Outputs, Activities (as revised) and delivery of Inputs. These can be viewed in summary as follows:

Legal
The Output: ‘To ensure that Afghanistan has an adequate legal framework on drug control in conformity with existing international conventions’ was deleted after the first revision as legal assistance became provided directly to the Ministry of Justice by the Legal Section of UNODC Headquarters in Vienna. It is notable that during the G24 Project progress was made towards this output and which, in itself, contributed towards capacity building, as follows:

UNODC Afghanistan: Project AD/AFG/G24 - Terminal Evaluation Report. DRAFT. 30-Apr-07
• The Ministry of Justice, with support from UNODC legal section, drafted a new drug law, which was adopted by the President in October;
• The legal capacity in the field of narcotics was assessed;
• The Justice Reform portfolio of UNODC started in July with the appointment of the Chief Technical Advisor, Penitentiary Reform; and
• CND developed a legal section with the capacity to respond to requests from the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)

Annex 6 shows the original planning estimates and allocation of funding for inputs for capacity building prior to any needs assessment. It also tabulates the progress and successful delivery of activities and inputs as actually occurred.

Financial and Resource Assessment
The role or purpose of this evaluation was not to undertake a financial audit of UNODC or CND systems under G24. However, within the constraints of the time and data available, it has been possible to provide an overview of expenditures against the original UNODC budget headings. This allows the reader to gain an impression of where the project ended up, when compared to what was planned. It was not possible to gain a similar set of data that reflects CND finances at HQ or in the provinces.

Financial data for G24 at a higher level of budget headings are easy to access and assess within the Programme and Financial Information Management System (ProFi). This was introduced operationally within UNDCP in March 2001. It took until 2004 to progress UNODC Projects in Afghanistan fully onto the system. It was only in June of 2004 that the financial accounting adopted the Field Management Ledger System and moved out of the old manual accounting systems. As a result, day-to-day budgetary management at the time of G24 was weak. An UNODC audit mission prior to the operational completion of the project in early 2005 has led to the further refinement of these systems.

The ability to undertake a detailed financial evaluation is limited by the way that the G24 systems were then designed and used. At a detailed level of sub-budget line headings, it is difficult to call up data at for individual headings, either for Inputs and Activities, or as categories within Outputs. This is because the input of the primary voucher data and the ProFi system does not provide codes for this level of analysis. Furthermore, various changes and refinements to the Atlas budget coding system have also meant that items originally allocated under one code have been recoded later on. This means that direct comparisons from the Project Document to now must be adjusted for these changes. Finally, the monitoring systems used (mainly PC annual or terminal reports) do not record or separate out what was physically delivered to Kabul and what went to each province.

This means that any manager or evaluator must go through each voucher entry in archive to access appropriate data. Time for this level of analysis was not available to either G24 managers or evaluators. However, one extra level of coding in voucher data entry could easily remedy this deficiency.

It should be noted that budget headings analysis, as a means of evaluating technical and strategy achievements, may not be appropriate. For example, the budget lines 31-00 through 39-00 are all specifically for Training items. However, where the value of training is gained through the recruitment of an international expert these costs would appear in budget line 11-00 under Personnel. Thus, there is no easy means to cross tabulate data for the analysis of technical and programming issues.

Annex 7 shows the original budgetary and planning estimates and allocation of funding for inputs for capacity building prior to any of the planned needs assessment. It also tabulates the progress of expenditure under each budget line and how they were revised and re-allocated over time.

The various revisions to G24 and its timing allowed a disbursement of the original intended overall budget. Project management had to make some pragmatic decisions during implementation on how to re-allocate budgets to suit the circumstances that prevailed.

The overall budgetary expenditure patterns are summarized in Table 2.4 overleaf. Bearing in mind the limitation discussed above, it can be seen that the overall structure of the budgets was appropriate and that deviations with budget lines did not exceed seven per cent of the total.

The largest deviation was in the under-spend on equipment compared to that originally estimated. This original budget was reliant, itself, for its accuracy, on the later needs assessment and capacity for
uptake in the provinces. Given the limited achievements by CND to activate provincial offices and staffing this under-spend is understandable. These same reasons, together with the inconsistent presence of PCs, would explain the under-spend on sub-contracts.

The apparent under-spend on training is more to do with how training was actually delivered and the allocation of costs under the coding system, rather than a real shortfall in activity, as can be clearly seen from the results shown in Annex 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.4 G24 Project Budget Analysis Summary (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ORIGINALLY PLANNED</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Support Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACTUAL EXPENDITURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006 Plan</th>
<th>TOTAL SPEND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>38,561</td>
<td>136,983</td>
<td>299,567</td>
<td>54,266</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>538,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>12,729</td>
<td>20,905</td>
<td>54,568</td>
<td>20,659</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>113,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-contracts</td>
<td>63,554</td>
<td>100,136</td>
<td>54,233</td>
<td>-4,409</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>213,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>6,170</td>
<td>20,705</td>
<td>11,630</td>
<td>-8,882</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>98,313</td>
<td>536,484</td>
<td>-52,234</td>
<td>23,502</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>607,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>80,627</td>
<td>30,450</td>
<td>10,681</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>123,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2,887</td>
<td>58,112</td>
<td>45,891</td>
<td>36,692</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>151,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Sub-total</td>
<td>224,055</td>
<td>953,952</td>
<td>444,105</td>
<td>132,509</td>
<td>23,900</td>
<td>1,778,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Support Cost</td>
<td>29,101</td>
<td>124,013</td>
<td>57,733</td>
<td>17,226</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>232,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT TOTAL</td>
<td>253,156</td>
<td>1,077,965</td>
<td>501,838</td>
<td>149,735</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>2,011,194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is significant that costs increased significantly against the Miscellaneous, Premise and Personnel budgets. The UNODC audit mission in 2005 identified that overhead costs incurred by the Country Office were often arbitrarily allocated against projects which may explain some of these increases.

There is also a coding anomaly in 2004 which would entirely explain the change in Personnel costs and coincides with when the new finance systems were being installed in Kabul. However, UNODC provincial operations also go beyond the specific activities included under G24 and thus (as with many projects) provided some cross funding of other UNODC programme and project needs to occur. This is both rational and pragmatic as far as UNODC is concerned and also is rational for the Afghan administration, in as much as all these investment bolster capacities and delivery from UNODC for the country across UNODC’s mandate.

2.4 Implementation

Changes in Programming Priorities

Following the revised start of the project in October 2002, the first phase of project implementation (post October 2002) the initial attention was given to the setting-up of CND HQ office premises, purchase of equipment and their needs assessment. It was during 2002 and 2003 that UNODC HQ had to provide short term backstopping for the PC position with the inherent limitations that this presented...
Discussions in January 2003 between UNODC, UK, US and Iran, concerning the distribution of contributions to CND staff salaries, running costs and equipment needs, concluded that G24 should mainly provide equipment, such as IT and office equipment and furniture, to the Provincial Offices and focus on training to all CND staff, given the lack of drug control expertise available.

By June 2003, the needs assessment of CND in four of the six Provinces and for UNODC in five of the six provinces had been carried out as planned. Procurement and delivery of this equipment was mainly undertaken in 2003. However, the evaluation assessment indicated that what was delivered did not coincide precisely with the original needs assessment. Poor communication and hand over arrangements for the provincial CND office vehicles meant these were delivered to CND HQ, rather than to the Provinces. Also, in 2003 a series of activities for capacity building were delivered in Kabul as indicated in Annex 6.

UNODC management decided in 2003 to fund through G24 the creation of five UNODC Provincial Offices. It was still assumed then co-locating them with CND provincial offices would have facilitated continuous on-the-job training and technical assistance to CND and increased cooperation and saved costs. This assumption that UNODC and CND offices would co-exist was overcome by events.

The change in direction involved decisions within UNODC, the Government and from other donors and meant that a parallel development of UNODC and CND offices has transpired. This outcome, unfortunately, has led to a perception by some parties that UNODC capacity building in the provinces has been at the expense of building CND’s operational capability and capacity. This perception is not entirely without substance, but seems to have arisen for good reasons, as management faced it at the time. It also clear that physical, human and institutional capacity building activities were carried out under G24 for CND operations in most of the target provinces specified in the Project Document during 2003. The reasons for the change in direction seemed to have involved a series of factors as follows:

- The need for the required Minimal Operational Security Standard (MOSS) for UN operations apparently hampered CND and UNODC being able to work out of the same offices.
- UNODC’s mandate and operations go beyond those of CND and whatever the situation will require a minimum operational presence independent of CND to fulfil their role and mandate;
- UNODC’s concern over the unpredictable nature of CND’s operation at that time and how this might impact on other important UNODC projects and programmes;
- CND’s low capacity and difficulty in streamlining Provincial staffing after SHCDC disbanded;
- In some cases, CND’s involvement in the eradication process
- Donor revisions and restructuring from early 2004 made working with the CND Provincial Offices a second priority as attention focused on consolidating CND’s national role and credibility; and,
- Throughout 2004, increased security concerns associated with the elections and different eradication campaigns greatly limited mobility to the Provinces.

Finally, in mid 2004, UNODC management decided to establish UNODC Provincial Offices in the main separately from CND facilities and G24 resources were used to complete these arrangements. It should be noted that in Badakhshan, for example, coexistence of provincial UNODC and CND presence remains the situation today. Similar, there are a variety of directly linked UNODC-CND activities in some provinces, for example, in Nangarhar and Qandahar for awareness raising, coordination and monitoring activities.

Thus, by the end of January 2004, G24 was funding the rental and most running costs of five UNODC Provincial Offices, including the salary costs of their staff. Necessary furniture and equipment (including vehicles) for their functioning had also been provided in 2003. This inevitably led to a shift in strategy and funding focus. Thus, by the end of January 2004, the new PC found that only 36% of the total budget was available to plan for the implementation of other substantive planned activities.

Had coexistence remained valid as an assumption then it is possible that both UNODC and CND would have benefited more from G24. This argument may still remain valid today. As provincial priorities have become more important, UNODC’s role may have been weakened to assist CND Provincial Offices in a more central advisory capacity in such efforts as the Provincial Development Plans and Area-based
development initiatives. The proposed Project TD/AFG05/187- Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control is designed to following on from where G24 left off. It is a positive and strategic move that will to increase UNODC provincial cooperation with MCN POs.

Table 2.5 illustrates the office position prior to (as SHCDC was being superseded by CND) and after G24. CND presence then was difficult to define as the staff presence was uncertain or changing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nangarhar</th>
<th>Kandahar</th>
<th>Helmand</th>
<th>Herat</th>
<th>Balkh</th>
<th>Badakshan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offices before G24</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offices after G24</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In early 2004 with the arrival of the new PC G24 undertook a mentoring approach to promote clear understanding of the NDCS and acceptance of the mandate, role and responsibilities of CND; and in establishing and strengthening relations with cross-cutting institutions. Now that this PC was in post the delivery of the rest of the G24 activities gathered pace and the outputs are documented in Annex 6.

2.5 Institutional and Management Arrangements

Staffing
G24 was just one project in a large programme portfolio being managed by the Country Representative and Deputy Representative and without a Programme Manager. A PC was to have been hired to plan, supervise and monitor the project as a whole from its start. However, UNODC HQ backstopping was required to staff this position in the interim and until a suitable professional could be recruited. The first HQ backstopping only started in January 2003. A further interim replacement was made in the latter half of 2003. The PC’s post was not effectively filled until January 2004, by which time the originally intended project period was already coming to a close. Project operations continued under this PC until February 2005 when G24 became operationally complete.

The delay in setting up management arrangements and the extent of new people taking on this role in the period 2002-2004 led to changing ideas and management styles. The inconsistency in management provisions in the early stages of the G24 Project had a clear impact on G24 being able to deliver its components in a timely fashion and to achieve its stated objectives in some areas. Also, only backstopping Project Coordinators from HQ had prior UNODC experience and knowledge of UNODC’s policies, practices and procedures. The final PC engaged under UNOPS contracts did not.

The high turnover in overall staff, particularly within the SHCDC and CND frameworks, resulted in lack of continuity in what could be achieved efficiently and effectively. The number of staff in the Kabul office of CND at completion of G24 was approximately 67. The estimates for staff numbers in the field offices ranged from 80-140. CND had not been able to provide clarity on the roles and responsibilities of these staff and according to PC reports remained reluctant to let any staff go.

Overall, the required level of supervision could not be provided and the need for a more coherent management system was evident. However, in the prevailing situation, such circumstances probably could not have been easily avoided.

G24 also experience great difficulty in recruiting consultants to work in Afghanistan during 2004 which impacted on training activities.

Procurement
UNOPS procured non-expendable equipment and ownership was transferred to the government counterparts upon receipt. Transfers from UNOPS to UNODC and then to CND were, in some circumstances, not properly organised, coordinated with the recipient or recorded and with no follow up or monitoring to see if, in fact, CND were using them for the purposes intended. In one case, the delivery of vehicles intended for the CND Provincial Offices were delivered to the Crown Agents in Kabul, the UK Government Procurement Agency, who had no information on who they were for. Special garage space had to be cleared for them. They have since continued in use with MCN in Kabul.
In the absence of proper procurement files and the “handing over” certificates and systems at the time, it is impossible to confirm the completeness of the transfers of equipment, the hand over agreements and the extent to which the equipment was utilized for its intended purposes under G24.

This practice has been reviewed since within UODC and standardized electronic procurement registers, including a standardized format/text for hand-over forms to Government authorities introduced. A “right of use agreement” has been considered that would strengthen accountability over the use of the non-expendable equipment such that UNODC would maintain ownership until the end of a project and project staff would monitor their use and periodically verify their existence and proper maintenance.

Financial Management
As already indicated, a main shortcoming constraining G24 was the lack of adequate financial management and supervision. PCs did not, or could not, monitor the financial implementation of their projects. The Finance Section was responsible for recording transactions; maintaining the ProFI system and, in June 2004, implementing the FO Management Ledger system and monitoring financial implementation. However, information was not shared with the project and final decision-making, including authority on disbursement of funds, continued to occur without consultation or the involvement of the PC. This deficiency included the arbitrary allocation of sometime substantial overheads to the project without first clearing these general charges with the PC. As a result, PCs could not properly plan their activities nor, necessarily, were they able to explain all charges to G24. This led to a lack of coherence and direction in implementation, hampering gains made toward project objectives.

The charge allocation against various Atlas codes also varied from period to period. This distorted financial information and made it difficult, both then and now, to use financial implementation rates as a reliable indicator of whether G24 had made adequate progress in achieving its objectives.

Provisions have since been put in place for the Finance Section to provide details of monthly expenditures to the respective PCs and to establish a charge out policy. These reports highlight the funding status, funding allocation and expenditures incurred and include the immediate steps to be taken under each project.

The finance section has a three-fold direction of responsibilities:

- To fulfil the needs of the operational procurement and contracting
- To fulfil the needs of UN reporting and accounting
- To service the operational and management needs of the Country Office
- To facilitate easy management decision making and evaluation needs of projects

Still today the systems and training are heavily weighted to the first two responsibilities in the list above.

Project Records
G24 seemed to lack a proper filing system and did not maintain records in a standardized manner, especially with regard to procurement, construction and renovation costs and payments to implementing agencies through sub-contracts. Payment vouchers were available, but without linkages back through project records of needs assessments, deliveries, progress reports, financial and narrative reports, it was difficult to verify that payments were made for actual deliveries and performance. UNODC has started to install an electronic filing system since April 2005 to enable the sharing of information and to enable easy access to information from a centralized database.

UNODC-CND Relations
The G24 project was not a project in isolation and the perceptions of CND’s capacities involved other UNODC projects (within the wider portfolio) that were not involved per se in capacity building. Clearly, CND’s capacities to coordinate at that time were understood by all to be limited – therefore, the need for capacity building projects, such as G24.

The records indicate that the perception of CND’s poor capacity at that time led to some competitiveness and distrust. For example: a). in the outcomes in the provinces delivering the Annual Poppy Survey; and, b). where G24 inputs were interpreted to have effectively strengthened UNODC capacity with little progress in building CND capacities.
**CND ‘shared’ responsibility in contributing to capacity-building efforts**

The effectiveness of G24 results and its impacts depended on CND collaborating with constructive inputs and sharing of responsibility to ensure that the flow of project inputs led to expected outcomes being achieved. As CND capacities and systems were still in their formative era, it is not surprising that PC reported shortcomings in how CND’s contribution limited how effective G24 could be. On UNODC’s side, no provision and no effective systems were put in place to ensure adequate supervision or monitoring of CND’s follow up activities, or to track onward use of fund disbursements made.

PC reports also document how, in organising technical activities and training, MCN was not able to effectively share responsibilities and follow up, for example, in contacting line ministries and selecting focal points and candidates for training and establishing proper hiring procedures. This, in itself is a symptom of capacity building in its early stages and re-emphasises the need to have had more flexible provision built into project approaches and expectations.

CND senior staff also reported by the PCs to have became diverted into issues, such as the election process, thus leaving a management vacuum. Again, this should have been entirely predictable and understandable. This, approaches that encompass such eventualities should be built into capacity building and institution building activities through the management systems, its back up procedures and the monitoring and follow up processes.

As with many aid dependent scenarios, PC reports and earlier evaluation showed that the recipient government agency - with its own urgent priorities - was developing a culture that was quick to demand and expect assistance, whilst, at the same time, able to complain and to exert its growing authority.

**Donors Relations and Coordination Issues**

G24 was implemented in a collaborative context of diverse interests and varying priorities of other stakeholders concerned with drug control. These moving interests are sometimes fickle and conflicting. G24 experience clearly reports on the way in which it was impacted when trying to get some substantive activities implemented. For example, a Workshop and Strategic Study on mainstreaming had been planned under G24 but did not find the necessary support only to find that other donors took the initiative to deliver these very same activities.

G24 coordination with donors and other relevant agencies while, in the main, positive and complementary, did lack a strategic long term direction as was identified in an AREU report in 2002 and again PC reports. Both sources highlighted the need for action in the following areas:

- To bring strategic leadership and the coordination of alliances for drug control under one umbrella organization.

  Despite the fact that by the end of the G24 CND had achieved a ministerial status and mandate for the coordination of drug control (and despite the proliferation of working groups and meetings under its Chairmanship) decisions on strategies and funding disbursement, targeting and prioritization of CN activities remained the domain of lead donors.

- To increase the full participation, confidence, empowerment and ownership of coordination activities by the Afghan authorities, the role of international technical advisors at coordination meetings should be made less visible.

  The impact of this was to lead to a decrease in the level of participation of lower-tier ministries.

Also, G24 PC experience found that the pressures to support donors’ demands and priorities led to parallel processes of consultation and decision-making which favoured the political, rather than technical agenda, which, in itself, restricts coordination and decision making benefiting from greater transparency and information sharing. As in many countries, donors and UN agencies tend to share information late. The G24 project experience further suggests that donor’s publicly stated policies of multilateralism are not being put into practice. A further impact of such a culture, also identified by G24 PCs was that this encouraged stakeholder’s motivations to become competitive, rather than collaborative and complimentary.

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1 Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan. AREU Issues Paper Series by Nicholas Stockton. August 2002
3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

Outcomes

The capacity building outcomes, which G24 (and the longer term ongoing UNODC capacity building projects) has been wholly or partially associated with, can be summarised as follows:

- The Counter Narcotics Directorate in Kabul was established in 2003 and was upgraded to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics in December 2004.

G24 capacity and institution building measures helped CND retain the mandate of key ministry responsible for policy advice, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of drug control activities.

- A National Drug Control Strategy was developed and approved by the President on 19 May 2003 and some disjointed progress had been made towards its implementation.

Since G24 completion this has been further revised and endorsed by early 2006.

- Strengthened mechanisms were in place to coordinate national and international assistance provided to drug control through: (a) the establishment and/or revitalization of Consultative and Working Group Meetings, both at the technical and ministerial levels, under the Chairmanship of MCN. (b) Raised visibility and profile of CND/MCN, seen promoting the CN agenda, through its involvement in the organisation and participation of meetings, workshops and relevant donor conferences.

Under CND leadership and chairmanship, and with G24 technical support, Working Groups on Alternative Livelihoods, Demand Reduction and Treatment, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, and Information Campaign, met on a regular basis. This contributed to improved levels of planning, coordination and implementation of CN policies and programmes. All Working Groups reported to the CN Steering Group, since replaced by the Consultative Group and, at cabinet-level, the CN Sub-Group.

G24 had particularly supported the revitalization of the Alternative Livelihoods Working Group (ALWG) to assist CND promote further consensus on where and how to prioritise counter-narcotics interventions, and to link alternative livelihood interventions to overall development and poverty reduction programmes, whilst also in tandem with programmes of phased law enforcement.

In support of CND/MCN drug control coordination function, assistance was provided to the CND in organizing a series of meetings and workshops, closely liaising with relevant Ministries, UN agencies and donors, drafting and compiling background documents and speeches for the Director-General of the CND and the Representative of UNODC.

A number of main meetings and seminars were held with the support of G24 which strengthened institutional linkages and working relations among donor, development agencies and relevant government ministries.

CND staff commented favourably on the commitment shown by the Project Coordinators, and their support to strengthen visibility and credibility within coordination mechanisms.

- A CN mainstreaming definition was agreed to by a number of agencies and line ministries, under the leadership of CND and UNODC, and a pilot strategy was left being formulated and to be endorsed by key donors and line ministries.

G24 contributed to a CND-led Government proposed approach to ‘mainstreaming’ as the systematic incorporation of CN/AL objectives and analysis into development policies, strategies, programming and operations and sponsored workshops. The World Bank (WB) has since taken a lead role in mainstreaming and piloted implementation of a strategy into key national development programs, focusing first on the Education and Health Sectors.

The G24 experience suggested to the PC that the WB and other partners’ quick interest and endorsement of mainstreaming came out of a realisation that building in a systematic treatment of and action on the opium problem adds value and reduces risks to achieving development and security.
goals. Also, that by agreeing on a common approach to mainstreaming, this would assist the international community and the Afghan Government to take comprehensive and coordinated action to reduce and eventual curtail opium cultivation in Afghanistan and, thereby, strengthening their impact on the opium situation affecting the broader context.

The G24 PC also noted that, increasingly, both national and international partners were recognising the importance of the opium dimension. Mainstreaming of CN objectives and analysis also became the focus and agenda of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework.

- Scoping out a role for the MCN in monitoring the implementation of the NDCS and outlining a phased plan with short-term tasks for developing a monitoring system of the NDCS, under MCN management.

G24’s last consultancy and training initiative in early 2005 was on Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). This helped identify MCN’s potential role in monitoring. It also proposed a set of phased activities to help MCN set up a monitoring mechanism. This initiative built understanding and raised awareness of the relevance of M&E in relation to the NDCS within and between MCN, relevant line ministries and other agencies. The final report argued that MCN should position itself to fulfil a monitoring role that focuses exclusively on the broad strategic issues and where it can bring added-value to relevant ministries and international partners, namely:

- Engaging in advocacy and policy dialogue over the progress made with the Strategy, in relation to lessons learned and feedback into policy and strategy development.
- Early focusing on input monitoring (e.g. coordinating budgetary allocations) across the pillars.
- Monitoring of the Mainstreaming process.
- Working with line Ministries in developing relevant, useful and reliable indicators at the intermediate outputs and process levels.
- Commissioning independent evaluations and studies for intermediate and final assessments.

CND staff found the training provided in M&E particularly helpful.

- Targeted training of selected staff within MCN, UNODC and counterpart ministries has increased understanding of: a) the NDCS and its balanced CN approach, b) roles and responsibilities of different actors responsible for NDCS implementation, and c) has contributed to the strengthening of working relations and coordination among key CN focal points.

The Study Tours, particularly, created a valuable opportunity for senior staff from CND and key line ministries to learn about other countries’ CN models and experience and, thereby, to identify ways to improve Afghanistan’s institutional set-up and operations and make them more effective in progressing the implementation of the NDCS. The Study Tours were helpful in seeing “theory put into practice”.

- Five UNODC Provincial Offices became established and fully operational.

Whatever the original objectives and a difficulty to build CND capacity in the provinces, G24 improved facilities and capacities in Nangarhar and Kandahar) and created new facilities and capacities in Herat, Balkh and Badakhshan for the UNODC mandate in Drug Control, Criminal Justice and the Annual Poppy Surveys. These facilities are also of benefit to other programme/projects involving other Government Ministries, donors, NGOs and the media. Also, the AL database work under G24 provided a good start for UNODC to be an information resource and coordination mechanism.

Impacts

Positive

The impacts of G24 when evaluated overall and in context with the inevitable longer term requirements of capacity building in CN in Afghanistan can only be regarded as positive. Their scale in the longer term probably will be viewed historically as a small, but necessary, part of the steps towards a long term assistance and development programme for effective CN operations in Afghanistan.

The list of positive impacts can be summarised as:
• CND achieved its authority and status as a Ministry;
• Afghanistan has the first stages of a coherent NDCS under which implementation of CN activities can move forward;
• CND has gained wider visibility and a role in coordinating CN activities within many other wings of government and amongst other donor and NGO programmes;
• CND staff have experienced the theory and witnessed the practice of how many aspects of the prevailing international and regional approaches to CN strategies are made operational and as a result are more able and responsible to delivering the same in local circumstances; and
• UNODC capacity has been built in the provinces. This provides a solid platform from which UNODC can assist in future UNODC and other donor and NGO programmes to help MCN build its presence, authority, capabilities and capacities in the provinces in the years to come as it has been doing at the centre in the national arena.

Negative
There are G24 experiences that, in a perfect and responsive world, might have been avoided but which, in the actual circumstances in which G24 was implemented, were probably inevitable, namely:

• The standard format of Project Document in use to plan G24 has been found wanting in a number of respects. UNODC and others have the chance to adopt more flexible planning and management systems as a result of the lessons learnt.
• The usual turbulence and interplay between cooperation-competition; trust-distrust; smooth-chaotic operations; clarity-misunderstanding have each been experienced under G24 and affected all the agencies involved. It does mean that G24 has been perceived to have fallen down in some aspects and by some people;
• If UNODC and CND credibility and role was ever in question because of management shortcomings during G24, then the ongoing stream of complementary projects both in Kabul and the provinces will provide adequate means by which these issues can be rectified; and
• The lack of adequate means within and between UNODC, CND and other agencies to properly manage the transfers of capacity building resources and to maintain proper control over changing planning and operational priorities has been a good learning experience. Measures to deal with these have been either already taken on board by UNODC or sit as recommendations for consideration by UNODC, MCN and others.

Sustainability
Drug use and abuse and its illegal production and trafficking all create serious and costly law, order, health and human development issues both at home and abroad. The impact on sustainable lifestyles, communities and the shape of both local and national economies is very significant with Afghanistan a leading export nation and, when the impacts are taken in all their various local, national and international settings. The implications for sustainable development strategies and options for nations and local communities everywhere are dramatic, whoever the players may be. The scale of the illegal and official economic activity, national resources and aid programmes dedicated to narcotics are a major challenge which also significantly diverts focusing available skills and resources towards sustainable development and sustainable livelihoods.

G24, as a capacity building project, will only have contributed to lasting benefits only if it is seen as one step in a longer term programme of institutional and operational assistance to, uptake of and eventual takeover of drug control activities by the national and provincial staff of MCN.

G24’s contribution has been mainly to MCN HQ’s capabilities and capacities and establishing an UNODC operational presence in five provinces. These efforts are already part of ongoing UNODC and other donor programmes, particularly with the UK as the lead donor agency.

Sustaining the financing of these evolving capabilities - as implied current international expectations - will require ongoing medium to long term international funding. Self-sustaining national taxation and budgetary capabilities to finance drug control activities are still in their infancy and will face much competition from other National Budget holders. Therefore, appropriate national and provincial budgeting and other financing mechanisms by which to finance CN operations are not yet a priority programming issue but, eventually, will need establishing.
The G24 experience also confirms how important this wider setting is to take into account. To be sustainable, capacity-building programmes/projects cannot be planned or managed in isolation. They must be designed to be flexible, particularly when they have to be delivered alongside many other initiatives, responses and changing circumstances from all involved.

To sustain the positive results of G24 requires further UNODC assistance in capacity-building efforts. It also requires greater recognition of the long-term focus this needs and the closer coordination with other donors and, particularly, the UK/DFID programmes to ensure that efforts are complementary.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1 Lessons and Best Practices

The form of this report has been to draw lessons as the various sections have unfolded. These will not be repeated here as they are in any case listed in the Summary. The lessons, in the main, have a broad applicability beyond just the G24 project or even, necessarily, just capacity building or drug control. Each lesson drawn in one way or another and certainly collectively directly affect the outcomes, impacts and performance of projects/programmes.

**Project Design**

**Lesson 1:** To provide relevance in the volatile and complex context in Afghanistan, Project Designs need to provide for flexibility in the implementation approach. Although project revisions sometimes can be appropriate, the G24 Project illustrated how contextual changes forced UNODC staff to endorse working around and not strictly within the original Project Document prescriptions and timelines.

**Lesson 2:** In Project Design, UNODC should not raise expectations for outcomes that are not directly under their control or responsibility.

**Lesson 3:** In Project Design, UNODC should specifically qualify expectations of outcomes where these are to be delivered as part of a wider partnership of support to programme/project operations and where other parties are jointly or individually responsible for delivering expected outcomes.

**Lesson 4:** In Project Design, assumptions that institutional structures, political relations and security situations will remain stable for the duration of a project have often proved incorrect worldwide. This suggests that Project Design parameters should assume this changing context in the first instance and, thus, provide management with a more flexible means of accommodating such changes.

**Lesson 5:** Either, projects should not become operational unless and until the required senior management have been recruited and mobilised - interim back-stopping arrangements at this level are more likely to lead to additional implementation problems unless the back-stopping is translated into a permanent post for the duration of the project. It would always be better to have a late, but successful, project, rather than one which could potentially lose direction, credibility and, thus, confidence amongst the parties; or,

Project design must inherently provide for management systems and an approach which assumes difficulties in recruitment and/or a rapid turnover of staff on hazardous and hardship postings. Such systems are employed in some organisations, but are less used within the normal procedures of the UN and other aid agencies.

**Lesson 6:** Project Designs should be more explicit about the assumptions that underpin the logic and coherence of a Project’s strategy, approach and ability to deliver the project within its stated time frame. They should also provide the means for project management to deal with a deviation from that which is expected at Project Design.

**Lesson 7:** In Project Design, any item identified as an ‘Assumption’ or a ‘Risk’ should be incorporated specifically back into planning of the management of the project/programme. In doing so, it will help provide the managers and coordinators of a project with explicit thinking, a plan, the means, the resources and the tools to manage the assumptions (if they prove wrong) or the risks (if they actually occur).

**Lesson 8:** Project Designs should clearly distinguish between the differing rates of achievement possible between delivering physical inputs and human and institutional operational development and reflect these in the expected end-of-project situation.
Programming
Lesson 9: A clearer and shared understanding of what long term capacity building entails is always needed amongst the key players and stakeholders. This requires clarity on strategic goals and the institutional frameworks, mechanisms and operational means to increase the coherence and effectiveness of all CN-related capacity-building activities.

Lesson 10: Capacity-building support, effectiveness and impact would have been greater had UNODC supported capacity building explicitly under its original mandate and strategy, rather than just as one of a series of ‘isolated’ projects.

Lesson 11: UNODC and CND share the same effective mandate, even if UNODC’s responsibilities go beyond those of CND. As such, competitiveness or distrust over what happens at a provincial level is in no-one’s interests. Thus, G24 experience emphasises the need to strengthen cooperation and coordination between UNODC and MCN within a well-defined and agreed strategy and priorities.

Lesson 12: G24 experience confirms lessons from other countries and emphasises the need for UNODC and other donors to avoid feeding the development of aid dependent culture and to move to empowering and allowing the MCN to take full ownership over future programming and implementation as soon as possible.

Roles
Lesson 13: CND/MCN invested considerable efforts to gain credibility and respect from other line ministries and international counterparts. Even so, it will continue to be challenged with problems of acceptance and ownership and should aim to position itself where the most comparative advantage and collective value added can be gained.

Lesson 14: G24 experience suggests that UNODC is better placed than any other relevant agency to provide policy and advocacy support and assist in enhancing and empowering local capacities for self-sustained learning.

Lesson 15: The support from senior UNODC staff to ensure coherence of the decision making authority, for both programming and budgeting, proved essential for effective project implementation and performance, as well as to gain the political endorsement of relevant international partners and donors.

Managing, Monitoring and Evaluation
Lesson 16: To facilitate the work of project managers and mid-term or terminal audits or evaluations of Projects when one is interested in tracking various categories of Inputs or Outputs and relating these to the Projects Objectives and Activity achievement, means a lower level of coding is required.

Lesson 17: Projects with capacity building objectives must have explicit mechanisms and procedures by which project management can record, monitor, evaluate and follow up on the delivery and usefulness of project inputs and activities. The physical inputs are easy to establish such systems for. The qualitative outputs of training, process management, institution building and coordinating mainstreaming activities are less easy to formulate simple and standard systems.

Lesson 18: Where both UNODC, the CND and other donors wish to know what has been provided, to whom, when, where and how it is then legally owned and used, it must be an essential responsibility of project management within UNODC and CND to record, report on, monitor and conclude the hand over transactions and arrangements.

Lesson 19: All aspects of intra and inter-agency coordination proved vital under G24 to make the CN and mainstreaming agenda coherent.

Lesson 20: G24 experience showed that coordination needs a clearer and more strategic focus if it is to be effective. This requires proper consultation and a consensus amongst all key players and stakeholders, both nationally and internationally, on the direction and priorities to be taken in implementing the NDCS; assigning tasks and responsibilities; ensuring availability of resources; monitoring and evaluating the overall implementation; feeding lessons learned back into policy and strategy development; and, liaising with all relevant actors.

Training
Lesson 21: Many CND personnel are still gaining insight into and practical understanding of what capacity building means in practice. Differing institutional cultures do exist between historical approaches in Afghanistan and those variously brought in internationally. Ultimately, those involved at the training interface should share in a blending of these differing cultures. Gaining a sense of pride and ownership over the approach and results will be an important test of the sustainability of the international efforts.
Lesson 22: G24 experienced what it regarded as inappropriate selection of some staff by line Ministries to attend training. This stresses the need for training assessments to start from a baseline of skills assessment and participatory training needs assessment.

4.2 Constraints

The following summarised the main constraints faced by G24:

Inappropriate Project Design
As highlighted elsewhere, many of the constraints are inherent in the form of the Project Design and wording of the Project Document. They raised unrealistic expectations; set overambitious targets; and left gaps leading to poor and difficult management arrangement. The UNODC transitions from one accounting system to another added to the weakness that existed at the time of G24.

Recruitment
The difficulties in recruitment of both international and local staff in the face of hazardous conditions significantly restricted G24 achievements. Also, the competitive nature of the international and local markets for suitable staff was a factor that affected UNODC and CND equally.

Information Sharing
The overall programme for drug control in Afghanistan was donor driven with the UK as the lead agency in CN. This made it difficult to develop a coordinated approach without more information on what others are doing, especially in the area of AL. Under project AFG/G71, started in 2003, a database for this purpose was being developed but had made little progress during the framework of G24 and had yet to be piloted.

Unclear Roles for CND or UNODC
Both the CND and UNODC suffered from a lack of clarity on their role according to many interviewed. Yet, this is at odds with the role articulated in the NDCS, which also conform to the roles stated by those interviewed both in and out of MCN which were: strategy development, policy coordination, and monitoring. MCN also believe they should provide technical input in areas they are responsible for.

UNODC were seen as an agency to play an advisory and catalytic role with a targeted and strategic approach, where UNODC can act as a catalyst.

A Volatile Political and Institutional Context
The G24 project faced obstacles in the rapidly evolving and highly contested political and institutional environment, and the highly politicised nature of CN. Each changing scenario brought about new leadership, staff, visions, commitments and allegiances. It began in 2002 with the demise of the SHCDC, the creation by Presidential decree of the CND, followed by its upgrading to Ministerial status immediately before the G24 Project closure.

The prospect of a possible trebling in size of staff to over 600 personnel and the development of up to 12 provincial offices will take capacity building to another level beyond that faced by G24.

Security and Mobility Issues
An insecure environment characterised most of 2004 and greatly limited mobility to the Provinces, but also mobility of international consultants to work in Afghanistan. Also, drug control is not always seen as an attractive field. Initial plans to organize an M&E consultancy and training in early November 2004 had to be postponed. Various attempts to attract a mentor for MCN law enforcement section also failed, for lack of availability and interest by adequate candidates.

Building Consensus
A challenge faced by G24 remained in how to reach a consensus on the AL concept and incorporating commensurate strategies and programmes within the whole national development framework. Refocusing the AL approach and investments through national programmes, with a view to incorporate the opium dimension and maximise CN impact, is a more promising strategy than continuing with a series of scattered AL projects that, so far, have shown limited success.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Issues Resolved During the Evaluation

Being a Terminal Evaluation the results of the G24 Project Evaluation can only feed into future UNODC operations and projects. However, it does provide all the parties to the G24 with an overview of the G24 Project following its completion. It is also significant that the 12 months over which the two evaluation inputs were concluded has shown positive responses to lessons learned during the first stage of evaluation and further development of capacity building projects in Afghanistan.

5.2 Actions/Decisions Recommended

The following summary of recommendations has been drawn together by the evaluation process:

**Project Design**
- UNODC should examine the lessons learnt by G24 carefully to consider updating the ways in which Project Documents and Designs are planned and formulated as the terminology used for G24 was inflexible, overambitious and not constructive for practical situations that management will often face. Thus, the lessons learnt will likely have wider applicability.

**Roles**
- UNODC assistance can include some help to assist MCN gain greater control in the decision-making process of drug control and empower it to take on a policy advocacy role that promotes a sound and balanced approach to CN
- UNODC assistance based on G24 experience in the short and medium term can translate into: working jointly with MCN in: provincial capacity building for CN (UNODC G187 project); developing a data base (UNODC G71 project); building monitoring indicators and processes for monitoring mainstreaming (UNODC G76); and design and commission of strategic and evaluative studies (e.g. the impact of eradication and provincial-based planning and implementation) (UNODC G76 and F98).
- UNODC-MCN relations, the roles and responsibilities of each party and the potential for cooperation and complementarities need to be clarified.
- The role of provincial offices must be clarified both for all concerned in CN activities
- Roles need to be defined for MCN and Line Ministries within the National Drug Control Strategy.
- MCN needs to define what role they want to play in the Annual Surveys so the Monitoring and Surveying section can be provided with appropriate capacity building to support them in fulfilling this role.

**Programming**
- Future capacity building requires developing a provincial strategy and capacity-development plan for UNODC and MCN Provincial Offices to work together on strengthening coordination in the provinces and start undertaking a strategic advocacy and monitoring role.
- MCN needs UNODC to continue with guidance to support the ongoing restructuring process.
- The final structure should allow MCN to capitalize on what it can achieve best.
- MCN needs timely long term support to ensure the mainstreaming process continues as a Government-led approach with a MCN capacity to monitoring progress; including long term help to assist line ministries identify relevant, useful and reliable indicators and targets.
- Mentors placed within MCN would help provide qualitative information on how capacity building has happened, as well as being able to follow up on trainings that were attended by staff. Mentoring has worked well in other ministries. However, it relies on a technical subject as the base. It also relies on technical staff having time to teach on-the-job.
- An opportunity was created by the 2005 Pakistan Study Tour to establish a long-term ‘mentoring and exchange program’ between Pakistan’s Ministry for Narcotics Control and Afghanistan’s MCN, as well as between Pakistan’s Anti Narcotics Force (ANF) and Afghanistan’s Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA). The resulting working relations will ultimately also contribute to strengthened international and cross-border cooperation.

**Managing, Monitoring and Evaluation**
- UNODC Finance Section training and the UN systems they use should be extended to integrate their role, skills and services into the management, auditing, monitoring and evaluation needs of Country Programming and operational projects. The Finance Section need to be seen to become an integral part of project management teams and team working to ensure that project operational objectives are met.
• UNODC should consider adding a lower level of data coding to voucher data entry to simplify and facilitate management, evaluation and audit.
• All UNODC capacity building projects should include proper systems within the institutions involved for managing the ongoing recording, monitoring, evaluating and following up on the delivery of physical and qualitative inputs and activities.
• To improve monitoring and evaluation of progress toward increased capacity, project documents should include milestones to assess progress towards improved capacity.
• UNODC should provide technical and mentoring support to MCN to develop monitoring mechanisms and undertake key monitoring tasks.

**Procurement**
• UNODC should, prior to future purchases, revise project documents to include a “right of use” clause to strengthen accountability over use of non-expendable equipment by government counterparts. The project staff should periodically monitor their use and verify their condition.

**Training**
• Future training in the centre or in the provinces at any level would benefit if a participatory skills assessment were made to allow staff the opportunity to suggest their own ideas on what capacity building activities they would like to see attended to.
• Various targeted areas may exist where ‘training of trainers’ could help speed up the capacity building in the Provinces. Here, training methods designed to embrace and emulate the positive blending of cultures at various levels would likely benefit the effectiveness of the training strategies and the uptake of ideas, knowledge and initiating practical action.

**Information Sharing**
• Methods for sharing AL information gathered to a larger audience should be developed in coordination with the media office of MCN.

6. **OVERALL CONCLUSIONS**

The responses of the MCN, other donors and other stakeholders to UNODC’s role and assistance as expressed are, in the main, favourable. Senior staff in various arms of government all gained from training and exposure to the issues and how they can be dealt with. G24 has thus contributed to building important steps, inter-relationships and confidence for sustaining future operations, in spite of the difficulties and shortcomings G24 faced at the time.

Many lesson for project design and management have been learnt by UNODC and CND. These should be brought to the attention of all concerned, particularly MCN, as this interface is critical to developing and benefiting from the learning by doing experience with capacity building that G24 characterised.

Internal and external evaluation results also emphasise the ongoing need to clarify roles and responsibilities; to continue to build relations between the players; to undertake shared efforts which maximise the opportunities for complimentary roles and deriving the best comparative advantage; and, which empower and allow the stakeholders at a local and national level to take up the lead role in drug control activities sooner, rather than later.
Annex 1  Terms of Reference

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
IN-DEPTH PROJECT EVALUATION
TERMS OF REFERENCE for Final Evaluation of AFG/G24

Project Title:  Capacity Building for Drug Control - Strengthening of the CND and six provincial offices
Project Number:  AD/AFG/02/G24

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The G24 project (Capacity Building for Drug Control) was first elaborated in early 2002, after the Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA) had been put in place. At the time of drafting the project document, the Afghanistan State High Commission for Drug Control (SHCDC), established in May 1990, and reconstituted in June 1993 served as the main institution responsible for drug control matters within the government. The project was designed to build the capacity of the SHCDC. However, with the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in June 2002, discussions about a future structure for drug control within the Government resulted in the creation of the Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) under the National Security Council. The CND took over responsibility for the coordination and monitoring of all drug control activities in Afghanistan in October 2002. Following the creation of the CND the project focused its support towards the drug control capacity building of the CND together with other partners such as the UK as lead nation on counter narcotics in Afghanistan.

The G24 project was designed to support the drug control capacity need of the Afghan Government in its commitment to comprehensively address the drug problem in the country. Capacity building was essential to support the establishment of a well functioning Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) which was created under the National Security Council by decree of President Karzai of 7 October 2002. The specific goal of G24 project was to provide support to the establishment of the CND and its Provincial Offices, and to enhance/strengthen the institutional and operational capability of the CND at central and provincial levels, in order to enable the CND for planning, monitoring and evaluation of drug control assistance and related issues.

The G24 project provided assistance to CND Headquarters in Kabul and its satellite offices in the key provinces of Afghanistan. The support was provided in terms of organizational arrangements and operational support (equipment, vehicles, and communications) and training of the staff in the various sectors of drug control, with the aim to build up its capacity to coordinate all drug control activities in Afghanistan. The project also, along with other partners (UK Government and Afghan Line Ministries), provided significant support in the development of the Afghanistan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of this evaluation is to establish what the project has achieved and if the project has attained its objectives successfully, effectively and efficiently. The extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met as well as what has been achieved in terms of impact and sustainability will also be assessed.

The evaluation will seek to draw lessons and best practices that can be used to improve future project planning, design and management. These will be extremely valuable for UNODC to improve future planning in the field of drug control capacity building in Afghanistan. The evaluation will also be of interest to the donors of the project, as these donors are envisaged to fund additional projects in this field.

EVALUATION SCOPE

The Evaluator through reviewing of the project documents and achievements, visit to the project sites/relevant institutions and meetings will analyse the following:

(a) Project concept and design.
(b) Objectives, outputs, impact and sustainability.
(c) Overall implementation process.
(d) Lessons learned from the concept, design and implementation of the project.

(a) The Evaluator will analyse and indicate whether and how the project contributed to a priority area or comparative advantage for UNODC. He/she will review the problems identified by the project and the corresponding project strategy chosen in order to address them. The evaluation should also encompass an assessment of the relevance and attainability of the objectives and of planned outputs, activities and inputs, as compared to other cost-effective alternatives, if/as available. An analysis of the clarity, logic and coherence of the project should also be provided for.

(b) The Evaluation will indicate whether results have been achieved, and if not, whether there has been some progress made towards their achievement. It will assess the usefulness of results and outcomes and whether the
projects have created impact. This should also encompass the likely sustainability of results and benefits as well as the project’s contribution to human and institutional capacity building.

(c) The Evaluator will assess how effectively/efficiently project planning and implementation have been carried out, which includes assessing to which extent organizational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms used by UNODC support the projects. The Evaluator will analyse problems and constraints encountered during implementation as well as the quality and timeliness of inputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of activities carried out.

(d) The Evaluator will record lessons learned from the project (positive or negative) and make recommendations as appropriate. They should constitute proposals for concrete action that could be taken in the future to improve or rectify undesired outcomes. Recommendations may also be made in respect of issues related to the implementation and management of the project and follow up projects dealing with the same issues.

EVALUATION METHODS

The evaluation methods will include:

a) Document review; this will include all major documents, such as the project documents, progress and monitoring reports, terminal narrative reports, as well as assessments, manuals developed under the project etc. (desk study)
b) Visit to CND (now Ministry of Counter Narcotics) and other relevant Line Ministries and interviews with key staff;
c) Field visits to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics Provincial Directorates (to be identified).
d) Meeting and interviews with other drug control bodies and institutions
e) Drafting of final report.

EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND REQUIREMENTS

The project G24 is planned to be evaluated by a single International Expert (Evaluator) who has relevant skills for the task. The Evaluator will be recruited by the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the UNODC HQs on competitive basis and will travel to Afghanistan for the evaluation of the project. The Evaluator should have excellent knowledge in the capacity building of governmental institutions in the developing countries. Particular experience in drug control capacity building will be a great asset. Familiarity with the project implementation in the UN and possibly in UNODC will be an advantage. Experience in conducting evaluations is highly desirable. At least 10 years relevant professional experience is required. Post-graduate level education in a relevant area will be preferable. Excellent drafting and communication skills in English and knowledge of Afghanistan local languages would be an asset.

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

This evaluation will be a joint effort between the Evaluator and UNODC. As for substance, it is critical that the evaluation should be carried out independently by the Evaluator and he/she conducts a thorough evaluation covering all aspects of the project objectives, achievements, implementation and management. The Evaluator will have access to all relevant documents and the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan will provide the required support for the Evaluator during the evaluation.

The UNODC officials responsible for briefing of the Evaluator are:

UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan:
- Ms. Doris Buddenberg, Representative
- Mr. Alexandre Schmidt, Programme Management Officer
- Mr. Sayed Hassan, Sr. Programme Officer

UNODC Headquarter:
- Ms. Miwa Kato, EWCAS
- Independent Evaluation Unit if needed

Following recruitment, the Evaluator will make preparation in 2-3 days to undertake a mission to Afghanistan. While in Kabul the Evaluator will received a briefing from the relevant staff of the Country Office and a desk-review of the G24 documentations will be conducted by the Evaluator which will be followed by a visit to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and other Line Ministries for meetings and interviews. (7-8 days)

The Evaluator will also visit at least two Provincial Offices of the MCN. UNODC Country Office will organize the travel arrangements (5-6 days)

At the end of the field visits, meetings, interviews, etc. the Evaluator will prepare the draft report within 8-10 working days and submit it to the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan and UNODC HQs for the comments.
Time Frame & Tentative programme for the Evaluator:

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<tr>
<th>Programme &amp; Activity</th>
<th>Days Required</th>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation/travelling to Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Briefing by Country office staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desk-review of documentations</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meetings/interviews with MCN, relevant Line Ministries, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation of the draft report</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Returning home</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>After Termination of the Consultancy contract:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporating the UNODC comments in the report and preparing the final draft</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Working &amp; Travel Days</strong></td>
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**Note:** Detailed itinerary and programme will be prepared upon arrival and in consultation with Evaluator.

**Deliverables of the evaluation**

At the end of the evaluation mission, a debriefing meeting will be held at the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan and the Evaluator will present a summary of the evaluation’s findings and recommendations. Following the field visit and overall assessment the draft report will be submitted to UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan within 10 days, which will be subsequently share with UNODC HQs and the Government Counterpart (MCN) for the comments.

The Evaluator is obliged to follow the UNODC standard format and guidelines for the preparation of the project evaluation report. The TOR of the Evaluator and the UNODC Format and Guidelines for the Evaluation should be annexed to the report. Other annexes to the report should be kept to an absolute minimum. Only those annexes that save to demonstrate or clarify an issue related to a major finding should be included.

**Payment:**

The Evaluator will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures. The final payment will be made only after the acceptance of the final draft of the evaluation report by UNODC HQs and the Country Office for Afghanistan.

1. These guidelines are intended to assist the evaluation team in carrying out the evaluation and in elaborating the evaluation report.

General Approach of UNODC Evaluation

2. A UNODC evaluation is not scientific research. It is a selective investigation aimed at collecting and analyzing data, formulating conclusions and making recommendations of practical relevance to the operation of UNODC and its technical cooperation activities. The challenge is to cope with the constraints of limited time and information and still cover the terms of reference in an adequate manner. It is up to the evaluator or evaluation team to seek guidance from UNODC and to exercise its own judgement in order to strike the proper balance in allocating its resources to the various items of the terms of reference (TOR).

3. Evaluation is not fault finding, and evaluations are not aimed at attributing praise and blame to particular individuals or institutions. UNODC is primarily interested to learn about the factors that led to either success or failure of a particular activity, the results achieved and lessons, which can be applied in a wider context. The evaluation must therefore be service to the programme and management.

The Evaluation Report

4. The evaluation report should contain the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. It will be discussed by the parties to the project - usually at a tripartite review meeting - and will serve as a basis for decisions concerning the future of the project and/or other project and programme activities.

5. Although the structure of the report may be adapted to the particular circumstances of an evaluation exercise (for example, evaluation missions covering more than one project may at times be contained in a single report), evaluators should use the format given. Major headings should be retained but sub-headings may be added, as applicable to the evaluation exercise. Reference should be made to the relevant and applicable UNODC Programme and Project Design Guidelines and Formats will be helpful to the evaluator when preparing the report.

6. The main body of the report should not exceed 25 pages. Supporting information should be placed in annexes. Annexes should not exceed 15 pages. Information should only be included in the report if it is significantly affecting the analysis and serves to clarify issues. Rather than repeating information provided, use should be made of cross-references to annexes, to other parts of the report or documents used to obtain information. An acceptable referencing system must be used consistently throughout the report.

7. Attached is the standard format for evaluation reports, starting with a sample cover page and contents. The layout and order of contents should follow those in the guidelines. The report should be typed in 1 1/2 spacing and in the A-4 format. The report should be submitted in electronic format. Pages should be numbered consecutively with Arabic numerals. The numbers should appear, centred, at the top of the page. Paragraphs should be numbered.

COVER PAGE

Date:

TERMINAL (or MID TERM) EVALUATION REPORT

Project Number   Project title
Thematic area   Country

Report of the Evaluation team

Names, titles

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

Vienna
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**Annexes**

1. Terms of reference
2. Organizations and places visited and persons met
3. Summary assessment questionnaire
4. Relevant Materials
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S1. Summary of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations

Summary table of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings/identified problems/issues</th>
<th>Supporting evidence/examples</th>
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2. A concise summary of a maximum four pages of:
   a) Summary description of the project or programme evaluated including project objectives,
   b) the major finding of the evaluation,
   c) lessons learned and best practices, and
   d) the recommendations, conclusions and including implications to UNODC of the evaluation.

The executive summary will be used also for the web page. The summary should therefore be crisp and clear communicating the most important information about the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Evaluation reports written in a language other than English should have an English translation of the Executive Summary prepared by an official UN translator and cleared by the responsible UNODC backstopping office.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Context
Make a short, succinct summary of the overall project concept and design including an assessment of the project strategy, the planned time and resource availability and the clarity, logic and coherence of the project document.

1.2 Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation
The purpose of the evaluation must be clearly covered in this section. As an example the purpose of the evaluation may be to learn from the implementation experience so that performance, management and programme design may be improved. In other words why is the evaluation being carried out at this point in time. This section must also state the objectives of the evaluation. The objective of the evaluation is to examine the mandate, strategies, objectives, relevance, effectiveness, results, impact, sustainability and added value of UNODC’s actions.

1.3 Executing Modality/Management Arrangements
The section should briefly cover the implementation modalities, their appropriateness and effectiveness in delivering the programme/project. How the institutional and management arrangements impacted programme/project delivery.

1.4 Scope of the Evaluation
This is a brief summary of what the evaluation has covered as drawn from the TOR. This should clearly tell the reader what has been evaluated.

1.5 Methodology
This is a brief statement on the methods used to obtain/collect the data (e.g. secondary data, primary data from interviews, questionnaires etc) the approach and methods used to analyze the data (e.g. quantitative and qualitative analysis or any special tools used). This section is important as it provides the basis for the credibility of the evaluation results.

2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS
This section is the most important as it covers the analysis of data/information and articulates the major findings of the evaluation. This section of the report is the longest and most detailed. It should be based on facts. The other sections of the report draw from it and cross-reference to it.
2.1 Overall Performance Assessment
The overall performance assessment should clearly address the major evaluation issues of appropriateness, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the programme/project in meeting the needs or solving the problems. This overall assessment should include programme/project design.

2.2 Attainment of the Objectives
The report should show if and how the objectives have either been achieved or not. The attainment of objectives is important. Where all objectives have not been attained the report should show what progress has been made in achieving those objectives and how these contribute to the attainment of the overall goal of the programme/project. Where objectives have been fully met the report should still show how these are contributing to the attainment of the overall goal.

2.3 Achievement of Programme/Project Results
The report should indicate the extent to which the planned results are achieved and how their achievement contributes to the attainment of immediate objectives. The section should also show how these results have been achieved within the planned time frame and within the resources available to the programme/project.

2.4 Implementation
This part of the report should address how the implementation of the programme/project has been undertaken. Of particular importance is to show the operational plan has been implemented, noting any constraints, examining if and how the monitoring and backstopping was done during the implementation. This is done with a view of drawing lessons form this experience.

2.5 Institutional and Management Arrangements
The appropriateness of overall institutional and management arrangements and how these have impacted the implementation and delivery of programme/project. Also to be examined here are the coordination and collaboration arrangements with partners and other stakeholders. Further, the report should show what kind of backstopping the project had received from UNODC head quarters, field office or other relevant partners.

3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

3.1 Outcomes
The report should cover the outcomes of the program/project. Outcomes achieve the project purpose. It should be demonstrated here how the achievement of results and immediate objectives have made a difference either to the problem being addressed or to people's lives. Have the UNODC activities/interventions made a difference. What are the effects of interventions?

3.2 Impacts
This part of the report should show the ultimate changes brought about as a result of the programme or project. These are positive or negative long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

3.3 Sustainability
The aim of any programme/project is to deliver lasting benefits. This part of the report should deal with whether or not there is evidence that benefits will continue beyond the programme/project assistance funding. Whether the programme/project has created institutional and human capacity to sustain the benefits.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1 Lessons
A high priority should be given to lessons learned. This part of the report has to deal with those evaluation experiences/lessons based on the specific evaluation but that have broader applicability either to other programmes/projects or policies. Frequently lessons highlight strengths and weaknesses in preparation, design and implementation that affect performance, outcomes and impact. Lessons should refer to the findings or part of the report that they are based on. Lessons should not be stated as recommendations or written as observations, or a description. Lessons learned is defined as "knowledge derived from experience that is sufficiently well founded and can be generalized so that it has the potential to improve action".

4.2 Best Practices
The report should cover specific experiences that are considered best practices that are drawn from an evaluation that have a broader applicability to other activities of UNODC. The report should identify what worked well and how it can be replicated. Very often things or approaches that work in one situation are not made known to the rest of the organization and hence the benefits are not available to the other activities. This part of the report should identify those best practices so that they can be made known to UNODC as whole.
4.3. Constraints
The report should highlight major constraints and problems that have impacted the implementation and delivery of the programme/project. The aim here is to learn from these constraints and problems and hence avoid them or find solutions in order to improve performance.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS
This part of the report should provide clear and pragmatic recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality or efficiency of interventions. These could deal with how to better design programmes and projects in the future, reallocation of resources, management or policy changes. Recommendations should be linked to the conclusions.

5.1. Issues resolved during the evaluation
Many issues come up during an evaluation. Generally, many of the issues are resolved and decisions taken during and as result of the evaluation. This part of the report should provide a short resume of all such issues resolved during the evaluation. This is an important part of the report as it already demonstrates how evaluation results are being taken on board. These issues should not be included in the section below.

5.2. Actions/decisions recommended
The report should clearly show those major proposals/suggestions that are made and that are aimed at improving programme/project delivery, management or policy change. Some of these recommendations may urge management to make certain decisions or take certain actions.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
The report must draw overall conclusions based on all the above (findings, outcomes, lessons, recommendations etc). There must be a clear link between overall conclusions, findings and recommendations.
Annex 3  Organizations and Places Visited and Persons Met

Work Programme

20/02/06  Departure from UK
21/02/06  Arrival Dubai and departure for Kabul. Meetings UNODC
22/02/06  Review documents & data, meetings UNODC, British Embassy
23/02/06  Review documents & data, meetings UNODC
24/02/06  Review documents & data. Report drafting
25/02/06  Review documents & data. Report drafting
26/02/06  Review documents & data. Report drafting
27/02/06  Review financial documents & data. Meetings UNAMA/UNODC
28/02/06  Review financial documents & data. Meetings MCN
01/03/06  Review financial documents & data. Report drafting
02/03/06  Report drafting
03/03/06  Report drafting
04/03/06  Reporting drafting. Debrief UNODC
05/03/06  Depart to Dubai & London
06/03/06  Final report preparation

Persons Met

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doris Buddenberg, Representative</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Schmidt, Deputy Representative</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Ryan, Regional Coordinator</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Bayer, UNAMA/UNODC Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consuelo Cassarotto, Drug Control Advisor</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Will, Law Enforcement Regional Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nazar Ahmad Shah, National Project Coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carmen Colitti, Associate Expert</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madeline Carlson, UNV Drugs and Crime Officer</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adam Bouloukos, Former Deputy Representative</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Najibullah, Sr. Admin/Finance Assistant</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sehied Hassan, (ex-National Officer)</td>
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<td>MCN</td>
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<td>Dr. Ashraf Naseri, General Director Policy</td>
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<td>Dr. Mohd. Nabi Hussaini, Head of AL Section</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Raza, Deputy Head of Demand Reduction</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>David MacDonald, Demand Reduction Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ikramuddin, Head of Public Relations</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Hamill, Public Relations Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdul Khalil Teerzay, Head of Law Enforcement</td>
<td>X</td>
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Donors and Ministry Representatives

| Richard Ivers, First Secretary, Counter Narcotics, UK Embassy | X | X |
| David Radcliffe, Sr. Rural Livelihoods Advisor, DFID | X | |
| William Byrd, Sr. Economic Advisor, World Bank | X | |
| Michael Alexander, Counter Narcotics Advisor, European Commission | X | |
| Shanthini Dawson, Advisor, MRRD | X | |
| Pete Spink, Advisor, MRRD | X | |
| Heimo Posamentier, Livelihoods Advisor, GTZ | X | |

NGOs and Other Stakeholders

| Steve Mason, Program Grant Manager, Aga Khan Foundation | X | |
| Michael Bowers, Country Director, Mercy Corps International | X | |
| Phillippe Chabot, Program Officer, Mercy Corps International | X | |
| Tim Stewart, Agricultural Advisor, Mercy Corps International | X | |
| Penelope Anderson, Director of Programs, Mercy Corps International | X | |
| Adam Paine, Researcher, AREU | X | |
Annex 4 References

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UNODC, 2005

UNODC, January 2005

UNODC, January 2005

UNODC, February 2005

UNODC, June 2005
Audit of UNODC Country Office, Afghanistan (AE2005/366/01) Internal Audit Division II, Office of Internal Oversight Services, Vienna

UNODC, February 2006
### Annex 5  G24 Capacity Building Activity Analysis

**Output 1.1: The Counter Narcotics Directorate in Kabul is fully operational**

Activity Achievement Score: 1=Fully Achieved  2=Partially Achieved  3=No Achievement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>Recruit international Project Coordinator</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Project Coordinators were present between January-July 2003 and January 2004 to the project end. The gaps undoubtedly contributed to some objectives being only partially met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2</td>
<td>Recruit international AL Advisor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Work coverage later on was provided by G24 PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3</td>
<td>Assist the CND in Kabul in the development of Terms of Reference (Mandate), organizational chart/structure and its work plan.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PCs assisted CND in developing work plans for each section of the Kabul office, and articulating their role as outlined in the NDCS. A workshop on Development and Planning was held from May 29 to June 3, 2004 which assisted CND staff in outlining the key outputs for each section. CND presented this to other line ministries, international donors, and UN agencies. The perceptions of CND’s role remained unclear to many, despite the articulation at this workshop and in several documents. The UK continued efforts into developing CND’s organisational structure and later for the new ministry. They also planned for a large programme of institutional strengthening to CN institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4</td>
<td>Assist the CND to the development of a coherent national drug control strategy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PCs assisted CND in articulating their role as outlined in the National Drug Control Strategy. With the support of this project and inputs from other donors, particularly the UK, the NSDC continued to be developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.5</td>
<td>Assist the CND in the preparation of its annual budget and identify equipment and operational requirements to be financed by the project;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The CND at that time remained outside the National Development Budget and annual budgets were developed by international stakeholders, rather than by the CND. An evaluation was not done of the equipment needs for the headquarters office in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.6</td>
<td>Identify training needs of CND staff;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Some effort was made by both PCs to identify the training needs of the CND staff. However, the perception of CND staff is that they were not included in the process of determining training needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.7</td>
<td>Identify gaps in technical expertise at the CND, develop TOR for national temporary technical experts and recruit national experts accordingly;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>There was no systematic evaluation of the technical gaps and training needs of CND staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.8</td>
<td>Procure and deliver equipment as per identified requirement;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>An evaluation rapid survey indicated CND had adequate computers and communication equipment. Until staff levels are clarified in all offices it will be difficult to determine if they have an adequate level of equipment. Vehicles intended for the provincial offices remain in use in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.9</td>
<td>Deliver training as per identified requirement;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>While training in late April of 2003 covered technical aspects in a general way, no further trainings were done specifically for technical experts. This would have been an excellent opportunity for mentoring activities, which have been successful in other ministries, and are implied in the activity that calls for filling the gaps in expertise. It is not possible to determine if this activity was completed as there is no written or systematic methodology for the identification of these needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.10</td>
<td>Recruit consultants for drug law enforcement, drug demand reduction, alternative livelihoods and judicial reform to provide assistance in building up the capacity of the respective sections within the CND;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Because another UNODC AL activity was under discussion in early 2004 the position for an AL advisor was not filled and the activities covered for by the PC. A consultant was recruited to assist in the development of the mainstreaming strategy; this activity was interrupted by UNODC management. Other areas, such as law enforcement and judicial reform did not benefit from consultancies. Demand reduction and media departments had consultants placed by donors. There are many examples within ministries of consultants acting as mentors and helping ministry staff to follow the work plans and targets they have set for themselves, such as those set by CND in the May/June...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist the CND in undertaking one strategic study per year on specific drug-related subjects which can be used by the CND, other government departments and aid agencies to design and target their interventions (international consultants to be identified as required);</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No strategic studies were done under the G24 program. One planned study was proposed, however competing interests and agendas on mainstreaming issues caused the proposed study not to move forward. Another concern was financial – the current PC indicated that there were no funds available for this activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.11</td>
<td>Assist the CND in organizing regular working group meetings on institution building (chaired by the CND), international drugs coordination meetings and other meetings as required;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>One of the more successful activities under this project directly relates to Activity 1.1.13. With the support of UNODC, CND from 2003 began chairing and organizing working group meetings for the purpose of articulating the progress made towards the NDCS. A CN Working Group and an AL Working Group met somewhat sporadically. Stakeholders recognised the value of this capacity building, as CND staff slowly began taking a greater role in organizing and chairing these meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.12</td>
<td>Assist the CND to put in place mechanisms to facilitate coordination, monitoring and evaluation of national and international assistance provided to the drug control sector;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Two Study Tours, sponsored through G24, were very useful in familiarizing law enforcement agents to AL issues and approach within national and international development programmes. Technical advice was also provided in developing strategies for incorporating the approach and related investments within the National Development Framework. Technical support in the development of strategy papers on AL, provincial piloting and mainstreaming were provided by G24 management during 2004. Monitoring and evaluation has also been introduced to MCN staff, and the staff has absorbed the importance of this role. Feedback from MCN on the Monitoring and Evaluation workshop is very positive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1.1.13 | Provide support to the participation of the CND’s Directorate-General and other senior staff in relevant provincial and international meetings/conferences on drug control. | 1 | Provided technical support to CND’s Director General in various events, including:  
• Drug control conference in Moscow in 2003.  
• Consultative Group Standing Committee (24 February, Kabul)  
• Consultative Group Standing Committee (24 February, Kabul)  
• NSC Director’s mission to INCB meeting (Vienna)  
• Various Press briefings.  
• Afghanistan Development Forum (20-22 April, Kabul)  
Support also provided to senior staff in attending regional and international meetings, such as the participation at the 47th session of the Commission on Narcotics, held from March 15-18, 2004 in Vienna, Austria. |
| 1.1.14 | | | |
### Output 1.2: Provincial Offices established/strengthened in Nangarhar, Khandahar, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, and Badakshan Provinces.

**KEY:**
- Ng = Nangarhar
- Kh = Khandahar
- Hm = Helmand
- Hr = Herat
- Bl = Balkh
- Bd = Badakshan

**Activity Achievement Score:**
- 1 = Fully Achieved
- 2 = Partially Achieved
- 3 = Limited Achievement
- 4 = No achievement

<table>
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<th>No.</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ng  Kh  Hm  Hr  Bl  Bd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>Assess existing facilities in the provincial offices;</td>
<td>1  1  1  1  1  3</td>
<td>All assessment completed April-May 2003 of staff, equipment and operational needs with visits to Governors and NGOs, except Badakshan – cancelled, and Herat - cancelled due to security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>Based on 1.2.1, assist the CND in identifying specific needs in terms of equipment, training etc. for the establishment/strengthening of the provincial offices;</td>
<td>1  1  1  4  1  1</td>
<td>Needs assessment as above, with recommendations to CND for follow up in institutional needs, staffing, training and preparing TOR. Without clarity of which SHCDC staff would be used by CND a skills assessment was not possible at that time. Training needs not assessed as staff to be assigned by CND not clear or enough information available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3</td>
<td>Assist the provincial offices in the preparation of annual work plans;</td>
<td>1  2  3  1  1  1</td>
<td>Annual work plans prepared for all offices: an activity CND fully appreciated. No CND staff to deliver plan in some Provinces but no steps taken for follow up. CND could not articulate why. A mechanism is needed to help management use work plan as tool for better implementation and management and provide greater structure and direction to the ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.4</td>
<td>Procure operational equipment and vehicles to the provincial offices as per identified requirement;</td>
<td>2  2  2  2  2  1</td>
<td>Equipment and vehicles were procured for provincial offices, but equipment lists do not match equipment needs identified in earlier needs assessments. UK provided IT, computer &amp; telephone equipment to all offices, Aug. 2004. Vehicles delivered to CND HQ, not the provinces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.5</td>
<td>Deliver training plan as per needs identified above in conjunction with the training courses organized for the CND in Kabul;</td>
<td>2  2  4  2  2  2</td>
<td>HQ training in April 2003 did include some Provincial officers who, in one location (Jalalabad), ran a workshop for his staff. Overall, there was very limited delivery of this activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.6</td>
<td>Involve CND’s provincial offices in annual poppy surveys, drug abuse awareness campaigns, and needs assessments/programming missions to poppy growing areas;</td>
<td>1  1  4  2  2  2</td>
<td>Provincial SHCDC/CND involvement in annual poppy survey in 2002/03 variable and very limited in 2004 due, in part, to the pressure faced by UNODC to deliver a fast high quality product. In Nangarhar and Khandahar survey is a linked UNODC/CND activity, less so in other provinces. Working relationship between UNODC and CND deteriorated as high demands were placed on CND staff who produced little results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.7</td>
<td>Enter into agreement (sub-contract) for the understanding of specific activities such as drug awareness campaigns, provincial coordination meetings, assistance monitoring activities etc. based on the annual work plan and stating concrete outputs to be achieved within a given time frame, as well as the conditions and procedures for the release of funds.</td>
<td>1  1  3  2  2  2</td>
<td>Provincial offices in Nangarar and Khandahar are more capable. Only some CND provincial staff participate in coordination meetings but remain unclear as to their authority and mandate stressing the need to include Provincial staff in future mainstreaming efforts. Sub-agreements for specific activities were entered into in 2002-03, including awareness raising activities in Nangarar, Helmand, and Khandahar; the 2003 Farmer's Intentions Survey; support for setting up a “drugs library”; and, support for the Governor's meeting to promote the Presidential decree on the Opium Ban.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 6  G24 Capacity Building Input Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Planned Cost (US$)</th>
<th>Successfully Delivered</th>
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<td><strong>OUTPUT</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Training        | Support to be undertaken in conjunction with CND HQ (6 offices x USA$2,000 X 2 years) | 24,000             | • Workshop “Alternative Livelihoods: Drug Control and current Development Efforts in Afghanistan” (20 February 2003): UK/UNODC experts covered AL and drug demand reduction strategies and how to integrate into public investment programmes.  
• Training programme 21 April – 1 May 2003. Training provided an overview and increased knowledge and understanding of CND staff on all aspects of drug control, including AL, demand reduction, law enforcement, judicial reform and illicit crops monitoring. Training was facilitated by UNODC experts from UNODC Kabul and Vienna. Specialized training requirements for individual staff members were to be identified and organized.  
• Study Tour to Pakistan on coordination structures (December 2004)  
• Study Tour to Thailand on Alternative Development (December 2004)  
• Training on Principles of M&E and the Objectives of M&E in Relation to the NDCS (January-February 2005) |
| Equipment       | Vehicles, communications equipment, computers, printers, office furniture and office equipment as required. (for 2.1.2 No. 6 Provincial offices x US $100,000) | 200,000 600,000 | • First instalment of equipment delivered to CND Regional Offices in Qandahar and Nangarhar by June 2003. Further equipment procurement as per identified needs and delivered later with the procurement that developed the 5 UNODC offices.  
• CND Headquarters, two vehicles and furniture and other office equipment has been purchased. |
| Travel          |                                                                              | 100,000            | Ongoing throughout project                                                             |
| Sub-contract    | 2.1.1 Office renovation, immediate assistance to setting up the office 2.1.2 implementation of drug awareness campaigns (6 office x US $10,000 x 2 years) | 50,000 90,000 120,000 | • 6 awareness creation projects involving NGOs in NGR, QDR, HEL provinces.  
• 2003 Farmers’ Intentions Study.  
• Support provided to setting-up a “drugs” library in Presidential Palace.  
• Support provided to holding Governors meeting to promote the Presidential decree on the Opium Bam. |
| Training, workshops & meetings | Training: 4 courses @ US$44,500 x 2 years  
Workshops/Meetings: 5 workshops/ meetings @ US$5,000 | 36,000 30,000 | • CN Working Group Meetings (11 March and 18 June 2003): 11th March 2003 covered role of CND within Government; mechanisms of drug control coordination; TOR for Working Group; and monitoring impact of drug control in Public Investment Programmes. 18th June 2003 - the NDCS; Alternative Agricultural Livelihoods. Meetings of the Working Group held bi-monthly.  
• Alternative Livelihoods Working Group Meeting (20 April 2003): Co-chaired by the CND and UNODC and attended by representatives from relevant Ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and donors; included AL strategy; establishing reporting system by Ministries/agencies/donors to
CND on activities in opium poppy growing areas.
- Starting in Feb 2004, under the leadership and chairmanship of CND, and G24 technical support, Working Groups on Alternative Livelihoods, Demand Reduction and Treatment, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, and Information Campaign, met on a regular basis.
- International CN Conference (February 2004) which CND co-hosted, putting everybody (namely, President Karzai, relevant Afghan Ministers, 18 Governors, 32 Police Chiefs, UN agencies, NGO’s and one poppy farmer) on common platform to discuss and agree on the implementation of the NDCS, draft Action Plans on each key thematic area. Its most positive contributions was strengthened institutional linkages and working relations among donor, development agencies and relevant government ministries.

Other relevant meetings and conferences included:
- Commission on Narcotics Drugs (14-22 March 2004)
- Afghanistan Development Forum (20-22 April 2004)
- CND Development & Planning Week Workshop (29 May–3 June 2004)

G24 contributed to a CND-led Government approach to ‘mainstreaming’ as the systematic incorporation of CN/AL objectives and analysis into development policies, strategies, programming and operations and sponsored the following:
- Technical Workshop on “Counter Narcotics Mainstreaming and Conditionality” with selected members of the ALWG (23-24 June 2004).
- Follow-up mission to Jalalabad and presentation of draft report on Mainstreaming Strategy to key donors and stakeholders (August 2004).

| International Consultants | Preparation of 2 Strategic Studies, Travel/DSA/Fee (US$25,00 per study) | 50,000 |
|                          | Experts in drug demand reduction, law enforcement, alternative livelihoods, judicial reform (4 persons 1 month incl. DSA/Travel/Fee @ US$15,000) | 60,000 |

- One International consultant recruited for two-months in late 2003 to carry out a study on the institutional development of CND.
- One International consultant recruited in June and August 2004 to develop a strategy, mechanism and guidelines on CN mainstreaming.
- One International consultant in late 2004 worked closely with CND in developing a CN mainstreaming strategy and operational guidelines and a report prepared. An assessment visit to Jalalabad was conducted to explore existing coordination mechanisms for piloting implementation of the CN mainstreaming strategy in key provinces.

| Sub-contract | Data collection, data processing for 2 strategic studies (10 persons per study @ US$500/month x 1 month + 5 rented cars per study @ US$50/day x 1 month +1 data entry clerk per study @ US$500/month x 1 month) | 26,000 |

- A public awareness campaign was conducted in Qandahar and Nangarhar, Strategic Study #9 on farmers’ intentions in the 2002/03 planting season was published as a joint UNODC/CND publication, and press briefings were held at the CND.

| Total          | 552,000 | 834,000 |
### Annex 7 Project Budget Line Analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>BL</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Total Original Budget</th>
<th>Last Approved</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006 Plan</th>
<th>Total Revised</th>
<th>Projected Balance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-00</td>
<td>International Expert</td>
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<tr>
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Notes:
1. The Original Budget Line BL 16-00 for evaluation was redefined in the Atlas codes & ProFi into 11-50 but remains 12-00 in FO Project Summary Ledgers
2. Budget line 42-00 is shared between the UNODC and UNOPS/UNDP segment. These have been reallocated in this summary
3. Although the project operational closure was end Dec 2005, financial closure will be end Dec 2006 to accommodate the current final evaluation
4. The outstanding balances are as of the end Dec 2006

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