

Date: March 2006

TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Project Number AD/BRA/98/D34
Integrated National System for Information on Justice and Public
Security

Brazil

Report of the Evaluation Team

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Vienna

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Summary table of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations

<i>Findings: identified problems/issues</i>	<i>Supporting evidence/examples</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
1. Project Management – poor, no consistent Project Management methodology implemented.	No qualified project manager, or Project Management Office – PMO contracted for such work.	1. Implementation of Project Management Structure 2. Suitably qualified Project Manger appointed by the executing agency 3. Recognized project delivery program, including milestones etc
2. Financial resources – Not totally spent. Lack of information depicting systems acquisition.	Infoseg’s Executing and Implementing agencies were unable get and spend all the financial resources, due to over extended project finalization schedule . Infoseg’s officials do not provided detailed information on system (software/hardware) expenditures.	1. Accurate, detailed financial reporting to be made by all participating institutions 2. Implement mechanisms to carry out expenditures on time planned.
3. Module on Mercosur, Chile, Bolivia not implemented as planned	Lack of implementation of this module (feature) in the system. Only pilot implementation was done.	1. Finalize this important capability to the system.
4. Bureaucratic procedures events blocking project pace.	There was extreme delay in project course due to new governmental elections and project reviews.	1. Review or introduce procedures for maintaining international technical assistance projects going as planned.
5. Real time data base insertion lacking control mechanisms.	The Infoseg’s Director guarantees real time data base information insertion from all 27 Brazilian states, but did not demonstrate system mechanisms to prove it.	1. Include in software modules some mechanism to ensure real time data insertion into the system. 2. Visit some other states to collect sample information on this issue.
6. Lack of information on Infoseg’s ability to induce crime reduction	No precise statistics in place or in terms of arrangements do demonstrate Infoseg’s contribution to crime reduction.	1. Introduce some statistical mechanisms to demonstrate crime reduction after Infoseg’s introduction.
7. Shared resources – good use made of joint working practices	Resources (facilities) shared with project D32, which was cost effective.	1. Examine other projects to identify opportunities for sharing resources
8. Annual project reports – too brief and contained insufficient detail of progress and issues arising	Examination of annual reports revealed a lack of required information	1. Review current process 2. Consider introducing a more detailed annual review
9. Cross data base information distribution.	Information obtained by the integration of several data bases, as SINARM, RENAVAM, e RENACH.	1. As above, maintain control mechanisms to ensure real time data insertion in the data base.

2. a) Description of project and objectives

The continuous increase in the crime rate in Brazil (especially in large cities) has threatened Brazilian civil society. The lack of reliable data on criminality in Brazil makes it even more difficult for policy-makers to define new policies to reduce violence. In order to combat this trend, a National Public Security Plan was launched in 2000, which includes INFOSEG as one of its main components. In 2003, the elected administration launched the second National Public Security Plan, re-emphasizing the need of an integrated criminal data system to support the development of public policy. Since the end of 2000, INFOSEG has been undergoing a process of analysis to expand services rendered to all entities involved in public security. INFOSEG was re-launched in December 2004 based on a completely restructured technological platform. The project objective is to help to implement the National Integrated System of Information on Justice and Public Security (Infoseg), including exchange of this information with member countries of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile. In the pursuit of such objective, the Ministry of Justice – MJ, the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency - ABC, on behalf of the Brazilian Government and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC, agree in the project document which foresees activities financed with resources from the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

b) Major findings

Project Management – Was a consensus among project evaluators about the lack of a formal, effective project management structure in place throughout the duration of the program, or a contracted Project Management Office – PMO, to perform such a work. As a result a low implementation rate was performed, conducting the project to extend its time termination and not receiving financial resources previously allocated to the project.

Financial Management – The executing institution should have considered maintaining a more concise, accurate and timely record of the project's expenditure, mainly depicting hardware and software acquisition and development. An expenditure table was given to evaluators, but not describing what in truth was bought.

It was necessary to a complete assessment of spending, related to the chosen technology applied in the project.

The program spanned several years, got out of schedule, this way impeding the seizure of the entire allocated budget.

Data base real time information - The Infoseg's Director guarantees real time data base information insertion coming from all 27 Brazilian states, but did not demonstrate system mechanisms to prove it. To the entire success of this project, it is necessary an introduction of trustworthy data into the system, and in real time. System users working in remote Brazilian regions, as also in the state capitals, should trust in the system as an accurate information data base. To the evaluators were not demonstrated that some features were installed in the applications to satisfy this need. Also no internal INFOSEG procedures were presented indicating that it could be used as part of the system.

Module not totally implemented – Lack of implementation of an important system module related to data base integration with MERCOSUL, Chile and Bolivia. This system capability is part of the project strategies and should, at this point, be totally developed and operational. What was presented was the information that a pilot project implementation with 2 countries was performed.

Project Strategy – The strategy of cross data bases information distribution, together with the functionality of data base access by portable devices, were important functionalities introduced by the system. These capabilities will enrich the quality of police work, and deliver efficiency to police investigation. The applied technology is consistent with modern software applications and is flexible in case of system updates and when additional capabilities need to be introduced.

c) Lessons learned and best practices

The non existence of a formal management project structure in the implementing or executing agency was a significant factor that culminates in delays that occurred in the program. This was compounded by the lack of understanding in the regulations applicable to international technical assistance programs.

The essential ingredient for implementing successful projects is the attention to such topics as Time and Costs. This idea was totally in evidence in this project. Unfortunately, the

agencies and managers did not paid attention to that. As a result, the project time closure was not respected so, the amount of financial resources allocated was not received.

On the other hand, INFOSEG has been useful for Police officers, other Brazilian Security Organizations and the population. It will be linked to quality and efficiency, results of best practices.

d) Recommendations and Conclusions

Recommendations – 1) Participating institutions to international technical assistance programmes must appoint a suitably qualified project manager and have in place the structure to effectively manage the project. This should include a formal meeting structure, clear lines of communication and a recognised chain of command.

2) Accurate financial and time management should be kept by participating institutions and presented in a timely manner.

3) A review of existing procedures and processes within UNODC policy for the acquisition of equipment in international technical assistance projects.

4) A review of the criteria and content required for completion of annual project reports.

Conclusions – The project is seeking to develop and install an integrated national system for information on justice and public security. In its strategy to make available an integrated source for information from federal and regional databases, such as the National System of Arms (SINARM), the National Register of Motor Vehicles (RENAVAM), the National Register of Driving Licenses (RENACH) and its expansion to integrate criminal data bases from other neighbor countries of MERCOSUL, Chile and Bolivia, can be easily understood as successful. It also brought not only modernization to Brazilian Police, but a complete different way of work, education, and integration to the Federal, Military and Civil Police.

The information gather in the Infoseg system will be available for public prosecutors, the judiciary and other authorities and police forces. This information will be extremely useful for law enforcement and for federal and regional governments when defining policies of public security. At the present stage, other capabilities are still to be done and implemented in the systems modules, to terminate the system project as planned in its early stages.

Anyway the present framework can be considered successful and should be maintained its future expansion and development.

Further international cooperation should be a premise for future project development, expansion, and training for police officers and staff.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Context

1. The continuous increase in the crime rate in Brazil (especially in large cities) has threatened Brazilian civil society. The lack of reliable data on criminality in Brazil makes it even more difficult for policy-makers to define new policies to reduce violence. In order to combat this trend, a National Public Security Plan was launched in 2000, which includes INFOSEG as one of its main components. In 2003, the elected administration launched the second National Public Security Plan, re-emphasizing the need of an integrated criminal data system to support the development of public policy. Since the end of 2000, INFOSEG has been undergoing a process of analysis to expand services rendered to all entities involved in public security. Infoseg was re-launched in December 2004 based on a completely restructured technological platform.
2. Re-launched officially at 16/12/2004, the new INFOSEG's network started to integrate information on public security, justice and surveillance in all Brazilian territory. The network is compounded by the integration of several other data bases, distributed all over Brazilian states, and by Federal Institutions. Its aim is to provide information contained in any other data base that integrates this system, to users connected to this network.
3. The system, in its initial project, had its architecture, difficult to integrate to other state data bases, due to its utilization of proprietary technologies resulting in high implementation costs to the states, and obstructing information distribution and access to other technical devices. It could be only accessed by an intranet. It also had a precarious communication and power infra-structure.
4. Another factor that contributed to a non success of the initial project was the way information to the national index was inserted. In a manual way, data insertion was achieved, leaving the dispatch of data a responsibility of the states. As a result the system had a national index completely not updated, and so, not trusted by system users.
5. Due to the problems quoted above, the present SENASP (National Secretary of National Security), decided to implement a new structure to the project, adopting a new

architecture using standards of interoperation of the Electronic Government (e-ping) aimed to broaden information access by the use of portable devices, as Palm Top, cellular phones and devices in police vehicles. It also provided conditions to the development of modules for real time information access, turning the system trustworthy and efficient.

6. From the year 2004, the SENASP started to work with the philosophy of NETWORK and all necessary actions to the development of new solutions defined in the project framework were executed together with the states, Federal District, and Federal Institutions, in the way to integrate the modules of the new network in all country.
7. It was developed a central system module in the new platform, called “integrator module”, allowing basic data consulting from individuals and using phonetic research that improves data enquiries. Administration and Audit modules were reformulated too.
8. A module to update information in real time was released to the states, to initiate integration with the 27 state units of the federation starting from June 2004.
9. The states initiated its integration work of its data base in the updating module in real time, and in beginning of December 2004, 15 states were already integrated updating information in real time. Brazilian Federal Justice started its data base integration to the updating module. Today it is possible to achieve research in Brazilian Department of Justice;
10. System modules of the National Register of Driving Licenses (RENACH), the National Register of Motor Vehicles (RENAVAM), and National System of Arms (SINARM) also were migrated to new platform, strengthen the concept of new INFORSEG NETWORK;
11. The process to users gained access to the new NETWORK and the integration to consulting modules in the 27 units of the Brazilian federation are being conducted. Other system of relevance for the public security, justice and other institutions were being integrated to the new INFORSEG NETWORK. Besides Brazilian National Arm (SIGMA), Federal Income Taxes, and Brazilian judiciary authorities.
12. Infoseg's modules include data on drug trafficking, weapons and the organized crime. The module for drug trafficking will make available detailed information on groups of drug dealers, the routes they use and the drugs they traffic, as well as their modus operandi. Such a standard of research is beneficial and eliminates the impediments of slow bureaucratic processing.

13. Nowadays it is important to say that INFOSEG is working via Internet, allowing a better access to cross data base information, from any part of the world.
14. In technical terms the strategy of the project had one basic goal: The project seeks to develop and install an integrated national system for information on justice and public security, that is more than a simple database; its function is to make available an integrated source for information from federal and regional databases, and at a second stage be linked to MERCOSUL information system and other neighbouring countries, sharing information on drug trafficking and international crimes.
15. It was the view of the evaluators that the project strategy was concise and accurate in its description of the achievements sought and of the holistic aims linked to Projects D32, and D33,. i.e. an overall improvement and modernization of policing being delivered in Brazil. This is an important factor, as effective technology is key to achieving this end.

1.2. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

16. Project D34 has concluded and the purpose of this final evaluation is to identify lessons learnt in order to draw conclusions for the basis to institute improvements for future and other follow up activities that can be accomplished by measuring achievements, outcomes and impacts, both positive and negative of the project. The objective of the evaluation is to examine the mandate, strategy, objectives, relevance, effectiveness, results, impact, sustainability and added value of UNODC's actions.

1.3. Executing Modality/Management Arrangements

17. The Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, as the institution responsible for the coordination of the Federal Executive Power Modernization Programme and for the execution of the present project, hereinafter called “Executing Agency”;
18. The Ministry of Justice responsible for implementing the project, through the National Public Security Secretariat – SENASP as the executing agency responsible for carrying out the activities described in the present project document.
19. Brazilian Cooperation Agency hereinafter referred as “ABC”, as the institution responsible for the follow-up and evaluation of actions carried out within the framework of this project document.
20. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, hereinafter referred as “UNODC”, nominates its office in Brazil as the institution responsible for carrying out the activities described in the project document.
21. The new Infoseg project was the overall management responsibility of Mr. Odecio Carneiro. Several software outsourced companies were contracted since the beginning of the project, to work in the process of software development or just to provide consulting works. That said, the project was successfully implemented despite there being a number of shortfalls in the process by which this was achieved.

1.4. Scope of the Evaluation

22. The timeframe established to cover in the Evaluation is from September 1998 to September 2005. The Evaluation will analyze: a) The project concept and design; b) project implementation; c) outputs, outcomes and impact of the project. It will also ensure that lessons learnt from the project will be recorded and recommendations for the future and other follow-up activities will be made as appropriate.

1.5 Methodology

23. The evaluation team adopted a specific methodology for this final project evaluation, consisting of a detailed review of major documents attributed to the project, including annual, monitoring and budget reports. Personal interviews were conducted with all relevant parties to the project, including main stakeholders and beneficiaries. A site visit

was also made to Infoseg's facilities which included meeting with Mr. Odecio Carneiro and Mr. Paulo Gobbi, and key members of his staff, followed by an inspection of the installations. Practical demonstrations of the new features of the system and the use of the new technology to assist in this process were also demonstrated.

2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS

24. The success of this project was key to improving the quality of policing and public security, and arguably underpins all other projects, both now and in the future which are dedicated to improving the safety and security of Brazilian society. The technology tool provided to Brazilian security officers is paramount in the country's efforts to combat the ever rise in crime and the continual instances of violence that occur.
25. Analysis of the data coupled with information obtained through the examination of relevant reports, interviews, facilities inspection and meetings with key leaders was of assistance to the evaluators, to conclude on the achievements made under this project, as the following:
26. Project Strategy - The strategy of cross data bases information distribution, together with the functionality of data base access by portable devices, were important functionalities introduced by the system. These capabilities will enrich the quality of police work, and deliver efficiency to police investigation. The applied technology is consistent with modern software applications and is flexible in case of system updates and when additional capabilities need to be introduced. A relevant characteristic of the strategy of the applied technology deserves special attention. It is related to the way users can have access to the data bases. That is said, through small portable devices as Palm Tops, Cell Phones and in portable devices installed inside the police vehicles. It brings enormous readiness to access information. Not only the applied technology is relevant in this context, but greatly the concept of several integrated data bases providing truthful information for the police and to several governmental institutions inside Brazil and also for neighbour countries.
27. Financial Management – The budget for the project was set at US\$5,871.600 [five million, eight hundred and seventy one thousand and six hundred dollars], in view of such

a substantial sum of money the evaluators would have expected to see a detailed breakdown from the Infoseg's representatives, of how the money was spent, how much of it was spent. Instead, evaluators got only gross sums.

28. The executing institution should have considered maintaining a more concise, accurate and timely record of the project's expenditure, mainly depicting hardware and software acquisition and development. An expenditure table was given to evaluators, but not describing what in truth was bought. It was necessary to a complete assessment of spending, related to the chosen technology applied in the project
29. Project Management – A common theme throughout this and the other linked projects evaluated [D31, D32, and D33], was a lack of a generally recognised project management structure and procedure. It was known by the evaluators that Brazilian elections took place at a time when Infoseg was not finished yet. It suffered from the new government arrangements that brought more delays to the course of its development. As a result a low implementation rate was performed, leading the project to extend its time termination and not receiving financial resources previously allocated to it. In this context is obviously that a Project Management methodology or structure could smooth this problem.
30. It is difficult to assess progress over a period of some seven years [1998-2005] without this structure being in place. It is accepted that due to the Country's legislative requirements introduced in 2001, that it is forbidden to hire a project manager for International Technical Assistance projects where Brazilian money is being used. However, this should not have prevented a recognised system of project management being implemented.
31. Data base real time information - The Infoseg's Director guarantees real time data base information insertion coming from all 27 Brazilian states, but did not demonstrate system mechanisms to prove it. To the entire success of this project, it is necessary an introduction of trustworthy data into the system, and in real time. System users working in remote Brazilian regions, as also in the state capitals, should trust in the system as an accurate information data base. To the evaluators was not demonstrated that some features were installed in the applications to satisfy this need. Also no internal INFOSEG procedures were presented indicating that it could be used as part of the system. Ensuring

data integrity and accuracy brings credibility to the system, resulting in more usage and popularity among those users, and expecting more crime decreasing rate in the country.

32. Module not totally implemented – Lack of implementation of an important system module related to data base integration with MERCOSUL, Chile and Bolivia. This system capability is part of the project strategies and should, at this point, be totally developed and operational. To the evaluators, was informed that a pilot project implementation with 2 countries was performed. Having in mind the extent of this project it should, at this point, been accomplished all planned features.
33. Annual reports –A relevant issue that drew evaluators’ attention was the way intermediate reports were performed. They were too brief having in mind the importance, complexity, cost, extent and technology involved. The latter perhaps one of the most complex of all subjects in this project was treated superficially. From the very beginning was not explained why project leaders implemented some kind of technology or brands. It was accepted that proprietary technology and cost was denoted as one of those criteria to selected products. Anyway there is plenty of technology issues that could and should be explained. There was no technical and mainly economically data to compare.
34. Why was adopted Oracle? It was very known in the technological environment that this is a very expensive product to buy and to maintain its licenses. It should be noted that IBM DB2, Sybase and even Microsoft SQL Server can do the same as Oracle. This issue was completely not explained in the D33 project too. How about hardware choices and description?
35. Lastly It should be very well explained, after project revision, why in the second Infoseg’s stage of its development, those companies that worked previously did not continue in the second stage, as to know, PRODERGS and PRODESP.
36. All those subjects should be very well explained in those intermediate reports. This way evaluator could have a more accurate idea of the progress of the project and final evaluation could be much more effective, once the extent of all 4 project was too long. This opinion does not mean that intermediate reports should be very long written.

2.1. Overall Performance Assessment

37. The overall goal of the project was to build a National Integrated System of Information on Justice and Public Security, also called INFOSEG, including exchange of this information with member countries of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile.
38. The appropriateness of the project is without question. In a time when continuous increase in the crime rate in Brazil, progressively connected to illicit trans-national activities, reflects the destructive potential for Brazilian society due to the growth in criminal activity and its globalization.
39. This project is relevant when address an original concept of integrating various information data bases to provide readiness of information, to various Brazilian justice and security institution as also, to neighbour countries. Previously a police officer, for example, to collect data on a criminal, he/she should look for it, pooling several data bases related to each state. Infoseg brought the possibility to pool just an individual identification number - ID, to get data from he/she automatically through all integrated data bases. Analysing its design one can conclude how helpful It can be for Brazilian society, in trying to minimize the problem of escalating criminality.
40. The design of the project is based on modern IT/Telecom technology to drive intelligence to support police activities through selective processing of a large quantity of information. Nowadays it is possible to conclude on its efficiency and effectiveness, when its main data base is populated with more than 9.000.000 (nine million) data registers, compared to just 30.000 (thirty thousand) at the end of the year 2004.
41. Infoseg is to operate as a system for accessing the various databases of personal and criminal information that exist on the federal level, as well as those held in the states by the Public Security Secretariats.
42. It is necessary to reassure here the fact that Brazilian governmental elections that took place almost in the middle of the project activities, resulted in a more time extent to its development and brought more bureaucratic measures to it.
43. The extensive timeframe taken to develop such a project (1998 – 2006) was a negative point when analysing its overall performance, anyway, much was achieved in this period of time.

2.2. Attainment of the Objectives

44. The principal objective of the project was to “To implement an Integrated National System for Information on Justice and Public Security, including creation of a data base on drug traffickers with on-line connection to neighbouring countries (MERCOSUR, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia)”. It was done, as an attempt to provide efficiency and effectiveness to Justice and Security Institutions in Brazil. It was made through several steps by those involved organizations. Not everything was done, following the original plan, but anyway much has been accomplished along 1998 – 2006 years.
45. In the beginning, a very positive move was done, by scheduling meetings with authorities and representatives of several Brazilian Federal Justice and Security Officials from the various Brazilian states, in trying to explain what is in truth Infoseg, and how it could be implemented. It was an important action toward reaching those objectives.
46. Gradually the technical barriers were being eliminated, as for example, the problem of proprietary technology which impeded the other states in its acquisition. It was due to elevated costs, and lack of standardization in its information systems data bases, to quote some. The development of Information system modules for information integration, and its implementation throughout those 27 states of the federation was crucial to attain those objectives of the project.
47. Finally the Infoseg accessed via the Internet, was one more good step toward accomplishing the majority of those objectives.
48. An important objective of the project not totally achieved, was the integration with the various countries of MERCOSUL, Bolivia and Chile until now. What was done, as quoted before, was just a project pilot implementation linked two neighbour countries of South America. Effective system of law enforcement is a result of the process of achieving its overall objectives as planned. The evaluators felt that actions should be taken till its end, to attain its objectives and conclude the project.
49. An objective of this project was that by ensuring readiness of information to justice and police institutions this would effectively restrain the increase crime and violence in the country. Unfortunately this has not happened and at the present there appears to be no likelihood of it doing so.

50. One last observation related to “Attainment of Objectives” is related to an already quoted issue regarding the lack of mechanisms attached to the applications or even procedural (via police internal controls), ensuring data insertion into data bases, by all states. This issue is crucial to the credibility and success of the project. Evaluators got a positive answer from the project director Mr. Odecio Carneiro that data bases are populated online and in real time, even superficially demonstrated some modules showing some information, but evaluators could not conclude if in truth all Brazilian states are really populating data bases everyday, every hour as assured by the director.
51. However, what is important to say is that, through the overall achievements, police in Brazil and justice institution through the implementation of Infoseg are now far better prepared to investigate and deal with crime and violence.
52. The objective of integrating the networks and several data bases gave to justice and security Brazilian institutions ability, efficiency, readiness, in using sensitive information and also, integrating technical and operational knowledge of its users. This is aligned with the regulatory role of federal entities and has created a uniform expansion of capacity in all States with a reduction in costs through combining resources. The Infoseg uses have now access to a powerful tool to their daily work.

2.3. Achievement of Project Results

53. Result 1 – “State Systems of Criminal and Penitentiary Information”, database integrated, and the National Index (NI) consolidated including six states implemented with access to the NI, Module 2 developed, search made of information in states, and specifications prepared for the Module of Narco-traffic.
54. It was made through the analysis of the pilot phase performance, implementing network infra-structure in 6 states, developing procedures to modernize the National Index, and specifying and defining requirements of modules 2 and 7. From that it was established standards and procedures to initialize implementation of those modules in the states of Brazilian federation.
55. This result was achieved within the project budget and the timeframe allocated, although this may have been achieved in a shorter timescale.

56. Result 2 – “Integration of State Systems of Criminal and Penitentiary Information expanded with implementation of access to NI in six additional states, implementation of the Module-2: search of detailed information in the states already implanted, and development of the Module Narco-traffic”.
57. It was done through the implementation of the network equipment infrastructure in six more states, implementing Module 1(access to NI) in six more states and training user to operate the system, implementing the routine of modernization of the NI in 6 more states and the user’s training in the correct use of the system, to revise the network infrastructure and equipment. Implement the Module-2 (detailed access) in 8 states already implanted with the Module-1 and the user’s training in the correct use of the system, and finally to develop Module-7: Narco-traffic.
58. Result 3 – “The Integration of State Systems of Criminal and Penitentiary Information further expanded with implementation of the access to NI in six additional states, implementation of the Module-2: search of detailed information in the states already operational, implementation of the Narco-traffic Module in 9 (nine) states, and Implementation of the Narco-traffic Module in two (2) countries”.
59. It was done through implementation of the network infrastructure in 6 more states, implementing module 1, module 2, module Narco-traffic in 9 states 7 and implement the Module-7: Narco-traffic in 2 countries.
60. Here is worth to draw attention to the fact that “module 7 Narcotraffic in 2 countries” is not totally operational.
61. Result 4 – “The Integration of State Systems of Criminal and Penitentiary Information further expanded with access to the NI in six more states, implementation of the Module-2: search of detailed information in the states already implanted, implementation of the Module Narcotraffic in 6 (six) states, implementation of the Module Narcotraffic in 3 (three) countries, and implementation of the Electronic Mail in 20 (twenty) states.”
62. It was done through the implementation of modules quoted above in more countries and de development and implementation of electronic mail capability in 20 (twenty) states.
63. Here is necessary to quote that although those stages were correctly implemented as planned in the project timeframe was to long and it could be avoided with a better project management in place.

2.4. Implementation

64. It appeared to the evaluators that the project was implemented successfully, even having several obstacles to its overall implementation, as quoted previously in the item 2. “Analysis and Major Findings”. There was a detailed description of problems related to the lack of Project Management and Financial Management.
65. A relevant constraint observed in the project implementation was the impossibility to size all financial resources devoted for its development.
66. This is of particular relevance when considering that these resources could indeed provide much better quality to the project. Other constraining factors in the implementation of this project, was the extensive timeframe that lead to its finalization, in the view of the evaluators it was too long.
67. Positive factors could also be observed during the assessment of the implementation of the project, as presented by the Infoseg representatives. It was related to the way technology was brought to it. As told to evaluators present development was based on Java programming language platform, and using Linux as its main operating systems. This mean open and cheaper platforms

2.5. Institutional and Management Arrangements

68. Brazilian Cooperation Agency, also referred as “ABC”, as the institution responsible for the follow-up and evaluation of actions carried out within the framework of this project document.
69. The Ministry of Justice responsible for implementing the project, through the National Public Security Secretariat – SENASP as the executing agency responsible for carrying out the activities.
70. The Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, as the institution responsible for the coordination of the Federal Executive Power Modernization Programme was the Executing Agency. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, also referred as “UNODC”, nominates its office in Brazil as the institution responsible for carrying out the activities described in the Infoseg’s project.

71. The national Infoseg's director and responsible for the communication with other institutions was Mr. Odecio Carneiro, and also an Advisor from National Secretariat of Public Security – SENASP.
72. Here is appropriated to quote that, during evaluators assessment of all projects, it is to say; D31, D32, D33 and D34 that the role of Brazilian Cooperation Agency – ABC, seems to be very superficial. It is supposed to have a stronger role in controlling project deliverables.

3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

3.1. Outcomes

73. The purpose of the project in installing an integrated national system for information on justice and public security, combining several databases, made possible and available an integrated source of information from federal and regional databases, such as the National System of Arms (SINARM), the National Register of Motor Vehicles (RENAVAM), the National Register of Driving Licenses (RENACH) and other similar databases of justice and criminal information at the state level. This move brought quality for policing in Brazil. The Brazilian institutions in charge of the project, benefit much from UNODC assistance for project arrangements. One can think that UNODC brought more bureaucratic arrangements into the project, it can even be true in some way, but its guidance was positive to the achievements obtained until now.
74. In achieving this there are a number of notable factors that have contributed to the improvement in policing standards. Firstly, the integration of data and its readiness, and easiness to be accessed. The installation of modern communication and information technology has resulted in the introduction of a sophisticated and efficient method of doing policy enquiries. Lastly even not having yet statistics on Infoseg's ability to drop crime and violence rates in Brazil, its existence may bring good results in reducing those quoted figures and consequently improve standard of living in Brazil.
75. Through these outcomes the level and quality of work of the public security sector has improved which in turn has had a positive effect on Brazilian society's safety and their perception of the police that serve them.

3.2. Impacts

76. The implementation of this project has fundamentally changed the way justice and security institutions, consequently its personnel will work from now on. The comfortable way to access data, its readiness, will turn Infoseg the main tool to be used in a daily work basis.
77. The benefits have already been realised in an improved quality of policing being delivered to public and starting to create a culture of Infoseg as the main technology tool that police and justice institution can look for information.
78. At the long term this system can also evolve incorporating more capabilities to its technical framework, bringing more security and assurance in its daily use.
79. The assessment of impacts made the evaluators conclude that once Infoseg reaching overall success, it can bring a very positive impact in those involved institutions, learning to work together to develop future security projects.

3.3. Sustainability

80. On this issue one of the evaluators was not entirely convinced of SENASP ability to maintain the quality of Infoseg's service currently being delivered.
81. Infoseg Director Mr. Odecio Carneiro told the evaluators that an amount of 14.000.000 (fourteen million) reais is already reserved to maintain and develop more capabilities to the project. This sum comes from Brazilian National Security Fund, so guaranteed from the Federal Government.
82. Other way that can bring sustainability to the project is its ability to charge from its services, and this way even neighbouring countries can contribute to this end.
83. On balance it was the collective opinion of the evaluators that subject to effective management Infoseg, its resources sustainability and continued growth should be ensured.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1. Lessons Learned

84. Here once again, it is necessary to emphasize the non existence of a formal project management structure within the project, as one of those significant factors resulting in the delays that occurred in the implementing of the program. This was compounded by the lack of understanding on the part of their senior managers of existing Brazilian regulations applicable to international technical assistance programs.
85. In future projects it may be useful to formulate if not in the program document itself, but certainly as part of the implementation process the requirement for participating agencies to adopt a recognised management structure for ensuring effective project control. This lesson should have been identified and acted upon at an early stage of this project.
86. An important lesson learned is related to how elections and consequently the change of government, affected negatively the pace of the project. One can think that it will be always a normal issue impossible to avoid. Anyway some mechanisms should be implemented, perhaps by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC to mitigate those issues, to this UNODC should have a stronger role in project management. The intent is to minimize the negative impact of the government, once in its transition course.
87. Other case the evaluators felt relevant is that there was insufficient information readily available on the projects financial position and again for the future the discipline of participating organisations in preparing and maintaining accurate, timely accounting records should be emphasised at the outset. The annual reports show superficial information in a difficult way to evaluators, to conclude on its overall performance.
88. Lastly, one of the most common factors causing a lack of consistency between those in charge of the project at the Infoseg/SENASP headquarters and UNODC upper management was the poor communication that existed between them, not mention ABC. Few formal meeting structures existed to allow for exchanges of views or a regular update on the progress of the project. This was felt by evaluators when working at this report. Poor was Infoseg’s director responses to explain the claims and further information about the project development. This caused not only frustration from the evaluators, but also hampered the progress of this report conclusion.

4.2. Best Practices

89. International cooperation is the key to developing and third world countries. This is not a unique and will not be the only international cooperation project to be implemented in Brazil, but the institutions that started D31, D32, D33 and D34 projects should use all those experiences, positive and negative, acquired from its implementation, and use it constructively for future cooperation.
90. Other question is related to the role United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC, has at the present time. In the view of evaluators this agency should have a more powerful role in those projects analysed till here. It means that this agency should demand, require and postulate on a stronger basis. This emphasis could avoid government stalls to the project, once it is already known how Brazilian elections impacted negatively the pace of the project. This way UNODC could demand a rhythm and actions to avoid such interference.

4.3. Constraints

91. Project Management – The lack of a formally recognised structure to manage and implement the project adversely effected its smooth transition. It is accepted that due to legislative constraints it was not possible to employ an independent project manager.
92. Financial Management – There was a lack of up to date, accurate financial data available from the Federal Police on the spending throughout the project.
93. Communication – An evident lack of communication had existed between those responsible within the Federal Police Headquarters for the project and the senior management at the Academy.
94. Module not totally implemented – Lack of implementation of an important system module related to data base integration with MERCOSUL, Chile and Bolivia. This system capability is part of the project strategies and should, at this point, be totally developed and operational. To the evaluators, was informed that a pilot project implementation with 2 countries was performed. Having in mind the extent of this project it should, at this point, have accomplished all planned features.

95. Annual reports –A relevant issue that drew evaluators’ attention was the way intermediate reports were performed. They were too brief having in mind the importance, complexity, cost, extent and technology involved. The latter perhaps one of the most complex of all subjects in this project was treated superficially. From the very beginning was not explained why project leaders implemented some kind of technology or brands. It was accepted that proprietary technology and cost was denoted as one of those criteria to selected products. Anyway there is plenty of technology issues that could and should be explained. There was no technical and mainly economically data to compare.

5. Recommendations

5.1. Issues resolved during the evaluation

96. The total spend figures for the project were unable to be produced by the Federal Police and as previously stated in this report the issue was of concern to the evaluators. This was resolved and UNODC field office Brazil who were able to appraise the evaluators of the closing budget figures.
97. A question was raised by the evaluators regarding the use of information technology companies for the project and the process for their selection. This was established to have been carried out according to Brazilian regulations and the company was well versed in handling sensitive data.
98. The issue of the lack of a qualified project manager from outside the Federal Institutions was resolved by UNODC explaining Brazilian legislative restrictions preventing this from happening.

5.2. Actions/decisions recommended

99. Necessary better detailed description on why certain systems and brands were implemented and others not. This can bring disclosure to the project assessment in Brazil and abroad, once it is an international cooperation project.
100. Having in mind that evaluators had just one meeting with Infoseg’s representatives, in early February 2006 in Brasilia, it was appropriated that some further information could be obtained later, by phone or e-mail. After various attempts made by this evaluator, directly to Mr. Odecio Carneiro, Infoseg’s director, questioning some hardware and

software that were implemented, nothing was obtained. Until this report preparation no further information response from Infoseg's director has been obtained.

101. The project document should, in the evaluators view, have contained milestones for the delivery of each core component of the program. It is understood these details were in existence, however, we consider the inclusion of milestones in all project plans to be a fundamental part of the planning and implementation process.
102. Staff lacking experience in the field of project management. Evaluators noted the country's legislative constraints in this regard in that it is not permissible to retain the services of a project manager using national funds. One option for consideration would be for UNODC to utilise its own funds that have been allocated to a project to hire the services of a project assistant.
103. We recommend as a matter of course that institutions participating in international technical assistance projects formally agree their respective arrangements for managing the implementation and delivery of the project plan.
104. A more participating role from Brazilian Cooperation Agency – ABC in monitoring and as designated to its essence “evaluation of actions carried out within the framework of the project”.
105. Again, it was felt that standardised financial reporting should be a formal requirement contained within the project document placing each institution under an obligation to produce the information required on a regular basis.
106. The evaluators were afforded the opportunity of viewing a number of annual reports on the yearly progress of the project. These reports did not contain sufficient detail of the activities, financial expenditure, progress against objectives and other information which would allow an accurate assessment to be made of the position of the project to date.
107. The brevity of these reports was also of note and they were normally no more than a couple of pages in length; this may of course be the standard format for such reports by the UNODC. However it was felt that if this is the case then they are far too brief both in content and detail, and there should be a requirement for all international technical assistance programs to evaluate the progress of a project in a far more detailed, concise and comprehensive manner on an annual basis.
108. As a way of better assessment of the project, evaluators recommend interviews with police officers and users of the system, locally in the suburbs of the capital Brasilia and in

sample states, chosen occasionally during project evaluation. This measure could bring transparency and effective assessment, once evaluators could be better informed of what is going on, far from Infoseg's headquarters.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

109. To public security and justice institution ensure quality of their work, it is necessary training, tools, good weapons, and good security polices for their personnel. A tool that can bring to them quality assurance of their work, is doubtless Infoseg. The way Infoseg was planned, consequently it will bring better security standards to Brazilian population.
110. The aim of the Infoseg's project was to provide means to reduce violence, crime and drug traffic in Brazil. Brazilian public security and justice institutions, in cooperation with UNODC, made the use of modern technology, mainly in the field of IT/Telecom to achieve this end. The capabilities of the Infoseg system, enabling access to reliable information in an easy way, can become a referential project, even to other neighbour countries.
111. The project was capable to produce an information system with its functionalities specially tailored to fulfil the needs of Brazilian security and justice institutions. Infoseg is similar to an ordinary Internet data research tool, since it supplies detailed information on one subject from a given key word. On the other hand, the system capability of integrating several databases, and crossing information from one to another data repository, makes it possible, for example, for a police officer to get immediate information on a suspect by entering his/her name, nickname or ID into the search mechanism installed in the police vehicle to find out if there is an arrest warrant for the suspect. Also delivering information to Palm Tops or mobile phones. Evaluators could conclude on the effectiveness of the system in delivering overall trustworthy information to its users in an easy way.
112. Brazil due to its geographical extent and its boundaries in contacts to all South American countries, except with Chile and Equator, will remain a country affected by the trafficking of illicit drugs. Indeed, through this project an enhanced cooperation has been established with neighbouring Latin American countries in combating cross border criminality.

113. This project has been changing the way security and justice users work, not just by the technology in use, linking several databases throughout those 27 states of Brazilian federation, but also introducing a culture of integration and uniformity. It is well known in Brazil that each state government wants to have its own system and applications. Infoseg can this way be seen as a reference system to easy access the needed information, resulting in efficient services provided to the public.
114. Here is necessary to conclude that the lack of project management caused negative impacts on the development of this project. If some project management structure or methodology were in place, outputs of this project could reach much better levels. This negative experience need to be recorded to avoid again future mistakes.
115. In sum this project should be maintained and should undertake further developments and modernization, once its core is supported by state-of-the-art technology and it is known how high tech can turn to be obsolete and inadequate rapidly.
116. In conclusion, the evaluators believe this project has succeeded in modernising and improving the quality of law enforcement officers work in Brazil. This has been achieved by Infoseg's entire program.

Annex 1**UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME****PROJECT EVALUATION****TERMS OF REFERENCE****1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

Project Title: National Integrated System of Information on Justice and Police Security - **INFOSEG**

Project Number: D34

The continuous increase in the crime rate in Brazil, progressively connected to illicit trans-national activities, reflects the destructive potential for Brazilian society due to the growth in criminal activity and its globalization. This large-scale criminal association and the worsening of the crime rate can be especially noted in the big cities, in particular in densely populated urban areas where the State's presence is reduced and which have sprung up all over the country, notably in the last few years.

Another phenomenon noticed lately in the profile of criminal activities in Brazil is the transformation of crime into an activity with business characteristics, with a varied degree of sophistication in administrative management of the criminal groups. This may be observed in the hierarchical organization of such groups, in the segmentation of their activities, in their articulation with other criminal factions inside and outside the country, in the refinement of their *modus operandi*, in the detailed planning of simultaneous criminal operations in various states of the federation, in the infiltration of criminals within the repressive sector of the State, and in the co-opting of public agents into crime. It might be said that the present increase in criminality in the country derives both from the expansion of the criminal groups and the increased operative capacity of already established groups. There has also been a broadening of the spectrum of activities of organized crime and – as a result of the globalization of markets – an increase in the capacity to legalize profits obtained from illicit activities that take advantage of the excellent structure of services offered by the national banking system.

In the face of this challenge, the Brazilian Government, attentive to the growing threat of urban criminality and organized crime in the country and to the signs of weakening of the power of the State to provide society with security, has been developing a series of concrete actions to combat the criminal organizations. This strategy includes short- and long-term actions in the area of increasing the repressive capacity of the State, training and modernizing the police force, expanding the prison system, promoting respect for human rights, ensuring individual protection of the citizen, legislative actions, incentives and support for public organizations, greater organizational capacity for civil society, among others.

In this context the Ministry of Justice acknowledged the need to develop an Integrated National System of Information on Justice and Public Security (Infoseg) to centralize all the available information on justice in the country, as well as to make all this

information readily available to the State agents responsible for public security. Infoseg is to operate as a system for accessing the various databases of personal and criminal information that exist on the federal level, as well as those held in the states by the Public Security Secretariats.

Another characteristic of Infoseg - one common to control systems that make extensive use of information technology – is the existence of a module with the capacity to produce intelligence to support police activities through selective processing of a large quantity of information.

To help to implement this system, the Brazilian Government sought the cooperation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in order to permit articulating actions with other countries in the area of combating trans-national crime, as well as benefiting from international experiences that have proved successful in this area.

In the early phase of development, the Ministry of Justice contracted for this purpose the Data Processing Company of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (Procergs) and the Data Processing Company of the State of São Paulo (Prodesp). Procergs presented an initial project to evaluate and select the technology to be used, starting work in August 1996. A pilot-project was developed and implemented in January 1997, linking up Brasília, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo. After a period during which the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Police and other public-security organs of the two states made an assessment of the operational capacity of the system and the quality of the information made available, it was decided that the other states would be interlinked to the system.

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Annex 2

Organisations and places visited and persons met

Organizations

1. INFOSEG Facilities, Brasilia
2. Ministry Justice, Brasilia
3. UNODC Field Office, Brasilia
4. Federal Police, Brasilia
5. Civil Police, Brasilia

Persons

1. Mr. Odecio Carneiro, Director of Project Infoseg
2. Dr. Alciomar Goersch, Director of Project, Federal Police
3. Paulo Gobbi, Chief of Projects Division, Federal Police
4. Senior management of Projects Division, Federal Police
5. Reiner Pungs, Program Coordinator, UNODC Field Office, Brasilia
6. Marcelo Ottoni Durante, Coordinator Federal Police
7. Local officers, Civil Police Brasilia
8. Politec staff, Brasilia

Annex 3

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Project evaluation Summary assessment questionnaire

This questionnaire is to be filled out by the evaluator or evaluation team and to be submitted to backstopping office. A copy should be provided to the Senior Evaluation Officer, Division for Operations and Analysis. A separate questionnaire should be filled out for each project encompassed by the evaluation. The information provided must be fully congruent with the contents of the evaluation report.

The purpose of the questionnaire is to provide information for UNODC's evaluation database. The information will be used to establish evaluation profiles which should give a quick and correct overview of the evaluation of individual projects and programmes. It will also be used for the purpose of analyzing results across project evaluations to obtain a systematic picture of the overall performance of the Programme.

I. NUMBER AND TITLE OF PROJECT:

AD/.BRA/98/D34 "National Integrated System of Information on Justice and Police Security - **INFOSEG**"

II. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:

1. Please provide an assessment for all categories listed (including categories constituting headings) by ticking one of the boxes ranging from 0 to 5. The ratings from 0 to 5 are based on the following standard favor-to-disfavor scale:

- 5 - Outstanding, highly appropriate, much more than planned/expected, certain to materialize
- 4 - Very good, very appropriate, more than planned/expected, highly likely to materialize
- 3 - Good, appropriate, as planned/expected, likely to materialize
- 2 - Fair, less appropriate, less than planned/expected, less likely to materialize

- 1 - Unsatisfactory, not appropriate, far below plans/expectations, unlikely to materialize
- 0 - Cannot determine, not applicable

2. If a category has been significant (as a cause or effect) in relation to the overall quality and/or performance of the project please tick the “S” column (if significant) or the “H” column (if highly significant).

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
OVERALL QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT:							X	
I. PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN:								
1. Project document (overall clarity, logic and coherence).						X		
2. Identification/analysis of problem addressed by project:							X	
3. Project strategy (overall assessment):							X	
4. Drug control objective (s) (Appropriateness, obtainability):						X		
5. Immediate objective(s) (appropriateness, Obtainability):							X	
6. Achievement indicators:								
7. Base-line study/arrangements for base-line study:				X				
8. Outputs (compared to cost effective alternatives):						X		
9. Activities (compare to cost effective alternatives):						X		
10. Inputs (compared to cost effective alternatives):						X		
11. Executing modality and managerial arrangements:						X		
12. Identification and assessment of risks						X		
13. Prior obligations and prerequisites:						X		
14. Workplan/planned project duration:						X		
15. Budget:					X			

3

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION:								
1. Quality and timeliness of UNODC inputs:						X		
2. Quality and timeliness of Government inputs:						X		
3. Quality and timeliness of inputs by third parties:				X				
4. Equipment: *inappropriate in the sense of being premature and generous				X				
5. Advisory/training services:					X			
6. Project personnel:					X			
7. Sub-contracting:			X					
8. Management of project:				X				
9. Project workplans:						X		
10. Implementation of activities:						X		
11. Monitoring and backstopping by UNODC HQ:						X		
12. Monitoring and backstopping by UNODC field Office:						X		
13. Monitoring and backstopping by Executing Agency:					X			
14. Monitoring and backstopping by Government:					X			
15. Government fulfilment of prerequisites:						X		
III. PROJECT RESULTS:								
1. Timeliness of produced outputs;					X			
2. Quantity of produced outputs:						X		
3. Quality of produced outputs:							X	
4. Outcomes: achievement/likely achievement of immediate objective(s):							X	
5. Drug control impact achieved:						X		

	H	S	0	1	2	3	4	5
6. Drug control impact to be expected						X		
7. Likely sustainability of project results:						X		

3. If external factors had an impact on project performance please tick the appropriate boxes: external factors impeded: ___/ promoted: ___ project performance. The effect on project performance of this influence was significant: ___/ highly significant: _____. Please provide a short description of the nature of the external factor(s):

4. Did the evaluation recommend to:

- a) _____ abandon the project
- b) _____ continue/extend the project without modifications
- c) _____ continue/extend the project with minor modifications
- d) _____ continue/extend the project with some modifications
- e) _____ continue/extend the project with extensive modification
- f) X terminate the projects, as planned

(please tick the relevant category).

5. If a modification of the project was recommended did the evaluation recommend a revision of: the drug control objective(s): _____, the immediate objective(s): _____, the outputs: _____, the activities: _____ or the inputs: _____. Please tick as appropriate.

It is recommended that the project be redesigned into a new project.

6. If the evaluation recommended that the project or significant elements of it be replicate please tick as appropriate: yes: X / no: _____

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