



UNITED NATIONS  
*Office on Drugs and Crime*

**THEMATIC EVALUATION OF  
THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO  
AFGHANISTAN BY THE UNITED NATIONS  
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME**

**Volume 3  
Law Enforcement Programme**

**Independent Evaluation Unit**



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME  
Vienna

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Independent Evaluation Unit  
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## **Abbreviations and acronyms**

CNPA	Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CNTU	Counter-Narcotics Training Unit
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
TADOC	Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

## Summary

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has designed and implemented counter-narcotics law enforcement projects compatible with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy<sup>1</sup> and the National Drug Control Strategy<sup>2</sup> of the Government of Afghanistan, which are in accordance with agreements reached between Afghanistan and its international partners as defined in the Afghanistan Compact signed in London in February 2006.<sup>3</sup>

Afghanistan is severely dysfunctional and beset by problems relating to weaknesses in the central and provincial government and corruption at all levels. The country is in urgent need of redevelopment from its very foundations. Regrettably, the Government of Afghanistan has not always complied with agreements and commitments, including those laid out in the Compact.

Development has necessarily been slow and incremental and there are no guarantees of success. The insurgency has intensified its activities and opium production has continued to increase, confronting the Government of Afghanistan and its partners with two major problems as far as counter-narcotics policing is concerned: first, the need to establish and develop a professionally trained and competent police agency (which will take many years); and second, the need to respond, immediately and effectively, to the serious threat posed by the insurgency and the increasing amounts of opium being produced and exported. The law enforcement agencies of the Government of Afghanistan are ill-equipped to take such action.

UNODC has taken some positive steps to ensure that key people are aware of what needs to be done, but enduring and continuous international aid will be necessary for meaningful change to take place. Some sustainable elements of law enforcement do exist, such as the laboratory of the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), communication and other equipment provided to the Interdiction Unit of CNPA, training provided to officials of the Government of Afghanistan and software development. When these have been refined and fully developed, they should become an invaluable resource.

## Findings

Afghanistan has inadequate and insufficient counter-narcotics law enforcement capabilities to respond to the impact of the illicit drug trade.

Since UNODC alone cannot solve such law enforcement deficiencies, an improved strategy must be discussed urgently with the Government of Afghanistan and international partners. Such a strategy should also consider the establishment of

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<sup>1</sup> Afghanistan National Development Strategy (S/2006/105, annex); available at <http://www.ands.gov.af/main.asp>.

<sup>2</sup> National Drug Control Strategy; available at <http://www.mcn.gov.af/eng/downloads/documents/ndcs.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Afghanistan Compact launched at the London Conference on Afghanistan held on 31 January and 1 February 2006 (S/2006/90, annex); available at [http://www.unama-afg.org/news/\\_londonConf/\\_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf](http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf).

a mentoring programme, coordinated with key actors (the United States of America, the European Union and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)) that would bring together an adequate number of international mentors to address the current situation.

The development of a police force in Afghanistan has to be slow and incremental; setbacks should be expected and there is no guarantee that the outcome will reflect the wishes of the international community. The Afghanistan dilemma is likely to take many years to resolve. Although the work of building up the police service must be done thoroughly in order to reap long-term benefits, a much more immediate response is needed to deal with the current drug situation. In particular, significant international policing aid is essential if drug trafficking is to be reduced and eventually eliminated.

Some of the efforts made by UNODC have been frustrated by factors beyond the Office's control. It is important that such incidents are recorded and brought to the attention of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), international partners (United Nations agencies, especially UNAMA and bilateral donors) and UNODC headquarters in Vienna. There is little evidence that UNODC has done so in a formal or structured manner.

A focused strategy, adequately resourced and meticulously implemented, is required if security and prosperity are to be achieved in Afghanistan. Currently, it appears that some efforts within the donor community, as well as within the Government of Afghanistan, have been made without coordination and there is evidence that significant improvements in this regard could be made.

Strategies are frustrated regularly by corruption and weaknesses at high levels. Unless there is an absolute commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to confront and eliminate those problems, progress will be severely inhibited if not completely compromised. International partners and UNODC must continue to insist on the absolute integrity of the Government of Afghanistan. UNODC must use its influence with the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan and members of the international community to insist that the Government of Afghanistan address the presence of people suspected of unlawful activities within the executive branch.

It is vitally important to overcome any political disinclination to develop international cross-border cooperation, particularly between Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan.

It is important to give a great deal of attention to rebuilding the infrastructure of the country so that conditions improve and hope for a better future becomes a reality. In Afghanistan, it appears that, in part due to coercion by the Taliban, money has been spent by insurgents and drug dealers to align the interests of some farmers with their own, so that there is a willing cooperation in increasing opium poppy cultivation.

It is important to note that parallel programmes are being implemented with significant support from other agencies. Those programmes are not part of the UNODC initiative but in most instances dovetail what UNODC is promoting. Sometimes parallel investment has almost swamped UNODC efforts, and this must be considered when developing further law enforcement projects.

## **Recommendations for UNODC headquarters, the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and the international community**

*Open and honest Government.* UNODC, in partnership with UNAMA and international donors, should continue to make every effort to persuade the Government of Afghanistan to address corruption by implementing comprehensive remedial measures, providing technical support to the relevant agencies for ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption (General Assembly resolution 58/4, annex),<sup>4</sup> securing the support of all donors; and addressing parity of pay and conditions of service between the police and the army.

*Coordinated mentoring assistance.* UNODC should actively pursue the establishment of a coordinated mentoring programme to bring together an adequate number of international mentors to work with the police and customs officials, border guards and personnel in key ministries and agencies, while also advocating for a fully fledged international policing assistance to aid the border police and CNPA over the long term.

## **Recommendations for UNODC headquarters and the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan**

*Reform of the Ministry of the Interior and the police force.* UNODC should consider focusing more on normative work and join efforts with UNAMA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to reform the Ministry of the Interior and the police force.

*Partnership development.* UNODC should work in close collaboration with UNAMA to raise drug-related issues to the highest levels of the Government of Afghanistan. UNODC should consider requesting a seat on the JCMB and fill the drug liaison officer position within UNAMA promptly.

*Cross-border cooperation.* UNODC should further develop and nurture cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan to develop common efforts to counter narcotics and organized crime. UNODC has been diligent in promoting such cooperation but must redouble its efforts if success is to be achieved.

*Programme monitoring.* Consideration should be given to strengthening the programme monitoring function within UNODC by establishing a monitoring team to review the progress of projects. Providing such oversight and feedback to management could avert many problems.

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<sup>4</sup> In fact, ratification of the Convention against Corruption was rejected for the third time in March 2007 and sent back to the Ministry of Justice. The comments of the Judicial Committee in the National Assembly, which reviewed the Convention included “poor translation” as one of the reasons for rejecting the ratification. In this respect, UNODC, together with UNICRI, started a new project in September 2007 (after the evaluation team had completed its field mission) on Strengthening anti-corruption measures in Afghanistan (AFG/R86), with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the Supreme Court and of the Attorney General’s Office of ensuring the development of effective measures to fight corruption in Afghanistan and the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention and of assisting in strengthening of key legislation.

## **Recommendations for the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan**

*Police force transformation.* UNODC should actively encourage the transformation of the present police force into a police service by implementing a pilot project on building public confidence and establishing police school liaison programmes in order to encourage the public to cooperate with and support the police.

*Long-term programme planning.* UNODC should adopt a long-term programme strategy for developing a professionally trained and competent police agency and should consider making available a staff member for developing a long-term programme plan and building partnerships with relevant international actors in Afghanistan.

*Comprehensive training.* UNODC should take the lead in developing a comprehensive training plan on administrative and management skills, the gathering and analysis of intelligence, and welfare issues.

*Establishment of a national criminal record office.* Long-term plans should be made to establish a national criminal record office and a national fingerprint bureau. A consultant should be hired to advise on how to best establish and develop such facilities.

*Awareness-raising.* UNODC should increase public awareness about Afghanistan to help elicit more informed political and financial support from donors and create international awareness of the difficulties and challenges involved.

### **Postscript**

**The fieldwork for this evaluation was completed on the 24<sup>th</sup> of August 2007, and hence activities that have been undertaken after that date are not reflected in this report.**

**The evaluation team however acknowledges that, following the evaluation, a number of initiatives took place.**

## **I. Introduction to law enforcement projects**

### **A. Background and context**

1. This report is part of the Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which also includes four other thematic evaluations on alternative livelihoods, the rule of law, drug demand reduction and the illicit crop monitoring programme.
2. In the context of the overall UNODC country evaluation on Afghanistan, the brief was to look at those law enforcement projects specifically concerned with strengthening counter-narcotic law enforcement capability, limiting the availability of precursor chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin and strengthening border control and cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries.

### **B. Purpose and methodology of the evaluation**

3. The thematic evaluation aimed to assess the extent to which UNODC assistance has contributed to building the capacity of agencies of the Government of Afghanistan. To achieve that aim, the evaluator addressed important questions relating to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of activities, on the basis of which lessons were drawn and recommendations for improvements were made.
4. The evaluation was conducted by reading background documents, consulting the web pages of relevant organizations and agencies and carrying out extensive interviews with specialists at UNODC headquarters from 16 to 22 July 2007 and at the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan (from 23 July to 24 August 2007). Although a visit to border control posts was prevented by the deteriorating security situation, an extensive briefing (with many photographs) was given over the course of two days by a UNODC consultant in charge of border policing. All major counter-narcotic police agencies were visited and a significant number of staff members were interviewed both within the Government of Afghanistan, the police agencies (border police, Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Interdiction Unit of CNPA). Facilities such as the forensic science laboratory were also visited and some non-governmental organizations were consulted. In addition, several donors were consulted about their views and opinions. A complete list of the people interviewed is contained in annex I.

### **C. General statements about the drug problem in Afghanistan**

5. Afghanistan is a desperately poor country where trade in illicit drugs accounts for approximately 52 per cent of the gross domestic product.<sup>1</sup> Illiteracy is widespread, unemployment is high and, according to the World Bank, the estimated personal income of people not involved in the illicit drug trade is 200 United States

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Bank, *Afghanistan's Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy*, Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, eds. (2006).

dollars per year.<sup>2</sup> Afghanistan is blighted by a rising insurgency that is mainly located in the southern province of Helmand. There is increasing evidence, however, that Taliban hostilities are spreading, making it likely that they will continue to affect the country adversely. It is an unsafe working environment even for United Nations staff members, who started, at the end of July 2007, to be considered targets, particularly as hostages.

6. In Afghanistan, the infrastructure has been largely destroyed or disrupted and there are few income-generating activities. The problem is compounded by a poor standard of living for the average citizen and low life expectancy due to the privations of a harsh and barren country, an adverse climate and socio-political conditions that compel some people to resort to illicit drug production. In the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, it is stated that drugs subvert governance, while aid dependence may leave institutions weak. There are many examples to support that statement.

7. In 2006, Afghanistan produced 6,100 tons of opium (equivalent to approximately 610 tons of heroin).<sup>3</sup> Figures announced at the end of August 2007 indicated a significant increase (34 per cent) in opium production compared with the previous year, with 193,000 hectares under opium poppy cultivation (+17 per cent) resulting in the production of 8,200 tons of opium.<sup>4</sup> Such an increase represents an enormous social problem, for the abuse of opium derivatives is directly connected to three global issues:

(a) *Public health.* The spread of HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C and other blood-borne diseases, which have been classified by the World Health Organization as global pandemics;

(b) *Organized crime.* This includes, for example, trafficking in humans, arms smuggling and money-laundering. National police forces claim that between 50-70 per cent of crimes committed worldwide, including robberies and violent offences, are in some way drug related.<sup>5</sup>

(c) *International terrorism.* Only a few terrorist groups do not receive at least some of their funding from drug trafficking.

#### **D. Executing modality/management arrangements**

8. There was little evidence of regular and effective communication between the staff at the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and at UNODC headquarters in Vienna about projects, and neither the Country Office nor the various units and sections at headquarters initiated much contact. Although some staff based in Vienna visited the Country Office, the outcome of those visits were not recorded; several errors and omissions that led to unnecessary expenditure could have been avoided with better collaboration. Reports of independent specialists, for example

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan: Strategic Programme Framework 2006-2010 (September 2006).

<sup>3</sup> *World Drug Report 2007* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.XI.5).

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2007* (October 2007).

<sup>5</sup> Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, *2007 State of the Future* (World Federation of United Nations Associations, 2007).

on the CNPA laboratory and on intelligence capabilities, seem to have been ignored for months when urgent action was required. This situation is in urgent need of attention and UNODC might consider establishing a roving monitoring team, answerable to the Director of the Division for Operations of UNODC, to review the progress of all UNODC projects and ensure their efficient and effective implementation.

9. The present staffing structure is also not conducive to addressing the law enforcement issues comprehensively. For example, hired experts have worked in isolation or solely on certain projects. In a number of instances, experts have raised issues for management to take action that did not receive due attention. Taking timely corrective measures could have avoided setbacks. UNODC might consider hiring or assigning someone to develop a long-term plan for law enforcement activities in Afghanistan, building partnerships with relevant institutions, coordinating UNODC efforts, building donor relations, retaining institutional memory and securing expert support available at headquarters.

## **II. Analysis and major findings**

### **A. Policy and overall context**

10. In February 2006, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community signed the Afghanistan Compact,<sup>6</sup> which also established the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). JCMB is co-chaired by a senior official of the Government of Afghanistan appointed by the President of Afghanistan and by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan. Its purpose is to ensure overall strategic coordination in the implementation of the Compact. To date, there are many examples of how the Government of Afghanistan has not succeeded in its undertakings as listed in the Compact.

11. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has comparative advantages in terms of being able to influence policy, successfully established networks at the provincial level and actively pursue the reform of the Ministry of the Interior. However, UNODC is, to some extent, working in isolation and its visibility in the policy arena is low. Moreover, UNODC so far has not been able to utilize UNAMA to pursue its policy agenda and to work jointly to achieve the aims of the Afghanistan Compact. Regrettably, the position of UNODC drug liaison officer within UNAMA has been vacant for months.

12. The development of a police force in Afghanistan has to be slow and incremental; setbacks should be expected and there is no guarantee that the outcome will reflect the wishes of the international community. The Afghanistan dilemma is likely to take many years to resolve. Although the work of developing a professional police force must be done thoroughly in order to reap long-term benefits, immediate counter-narcotic responses are needed to deal with the increase in opium production and trafficking. That cannot be achieved by the Afghan police alone, and significant international policing aid is needed. Without such a response, the situation may be

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<sup>6</sup> S/2006/90, annex.

likened to concentrating on building an extension to a burning house. Both forms of action are necessary, but the latter is the more urgent one.

13. International policing interventions are essential for bringing about quick and meaningful change. While it would clearly be beneficial for Afghanistan to be assisted by professional officers from other countries through a large, international police assistance force, that is not a realistic proposition, at least at present, for the following reasons:

(a) A Standing Police Capacity unit was recently established within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat, based at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The role of the unit is to support United Nations peacekeeping missions and assist in policing functions, thus preparing the way for the deployment of other police teams. However, it is acknowledged that the capacity of the unit is limited in terms of identification and quick deployment, and that action may not happen in a short period of time;

(b) Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization already experience great difficulties in providing adequate levels of personnel to address the security situation in Afghanistan.

14. It is therefore doubtful whether the international community, given existing demands in other parts of the world, will support a proposal to establish an additional force of several hundred police officers.

15. UNODC might consider working closely with other key actors (such as the United States of America, the European Union and UNAMA) to establish a coordinated programme that would bring together an adequate number of international mentors to work with police, customs and border officers and with staff in key ministries and agencies.

16. UNODC and members of the international community are attempting to assist the Government of Afghanistan in establishing good governance, the rule of law and a coherent drug control strategy.<sup>7</sup> “For the Afghan state to be free of criminal influence concerted efforts must be made to improve its levels of integrity and to show that Afghan institutions can prosecute high-level organized crime figures.”<sup>8</sup> There is little evidence that such efforts are being made at present.

17. International assistance is inhibited and frustrated by weak central and regional government and by corruption. Leading officials in the Government and Parliament of Afghanistan are suspected of being involved in drug trafficking and money-laundering and of being members or supporters of organized criminal

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<sup>7</sup> Afghanistan Compact launched at the London Conference on Afghanistan held on 31 January and 1 February 2006 (S/2006/90, annex); Afghanistan National Development Strategy (S/2006/105, annex); National Drug Control Strategy; and Afghanistan: Strategic Programme Framework 2006-2010.

<sup>8</sup> Mark Shaw, “Drug trafficking and the development of organized crime in post-Taliban Afghanistan”, *Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter Narcotics Policy*, Doris Buddenberg and William Byrd, eds. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Bank, 2006) available at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21133060~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html?cid=1221>.

groups.<sup>9</sup> There is widespread mistrust both of and within the Government, and many Government ministries and institutions are viewed with suspicion and hostility. Law enforcement activities, the legitimate collection of revenue and the application of basic principles of justice and the rule of law are regularly frustrated by organized criminal groups operating freely within the Government. These conditions make progress difficult, if not impossible.

18. The problems are compounded by the constant turnover of staff caused by numerous factors, including the fact that staff members who have been trained and who have acquired commercially valuable skills such as English and computer competence leave for better salaries elsewhere. In the long term, those skills are not lost to the country, unless the people who have acquired them emigrate, but the movement of personnel away from where they are urgently required inhibits progress and development.

19. There is also evidence that people working for the Government of Afghanistan have hindered progress by ensuring that trained personnel were removed from their positions and sometimes falsely accused of incompetence or corruption, so that the whole training procedure had to be started again. In this regard, some of the efforts made by UNODC have been frustrated by factors beyond the Office's control. It is important that such incidents be recorded and brought to the attention of JCMB, international partners and UNODC headquarters in Vienna. There is little evidence that UNODC has done so in a formal or structured manner.

20. Time and skill are needed to create a trusted and respected police agency, as are committed, educated people who want to join the police force out of a sense of altruism and public service. Any public perception of the police force as corrupt and uncaring and as primarily answerable to and directed by an inadequate Government, instead of being caring and socially oriented, will be counterproductive. Given the current state of affairs, the public is not likely to cooperate much with the police. Part of the long-term solution is to create an understanding of common standards and values according to which corruption is not tolerated, and which are essential for cooperating effectively with international law enforcement partners. Without that type of policing, it will be difficult to develop public commitment to a sense of values, national pride and respect for government.

21. Quality of life issues also have a major impact on the lack of progress towards greater effectiveness. For example, a police officer on the border between Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran receives a salary of approximately \$70 per month and lives apart from his family in the most basic conditions without health insurance or pension rights. If he is killed or injured, his family receives no support. Such people are extremely vulnerable to corruption due to need, which is a major factor that must be addressed. With the right salary and under the right conditions, better qualified people could be recruited to undertake extremely difficult policing roles. That would improve continuity of service, inspire a sense of loyalty to the border police, possibly reduce the amount of corruption that arises from need and enhance professional competence. Under the Pay and Rank Reform initiative, the salaries of Afghan National Police officers have increased but they remain inadequate. The pressure that raising salaries would put on resources could

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<sup>9</sup> See, for example, David Macdonald, *Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales* (London, Pluto Press, 2007).

be minimized by eliminating so-called “ghost police officers” and by emphasizing quality over quantity (whereas the Government of Afghanistan has actually planned to increase the size of the police force from 62,000 to 82,000 officers).

22. It is also important to harmonize the pay received by officers of the Afghan National Army and of the police. Although ensuring such parity of pay was said to be under consideration, no plans for implementation, no mention of the disparity and little support for the police were included in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. The issue of adequate remuneration was, however, guaranteed in the Afghanistan Compact. The recently implemented Pay and Rank Reform initiative tried to match the salaries given to army and police officers by increasing the amount given to the latter, but the subsequent unilateral increase of the salary of army staff led to renewed problems.

23. Without investing in human capital, adequate pay, proper training and equipment, the instillation of pride in the job, self-esteem and adequate and continuous mentoring, little progress will be achieved.

24. Moreover, without a firm foundation and good building blocks, all initiatives will be less successful than they could and should be. If Afghanistan is to achieve security and prosperity and stand on its own as a viable democratic nation, it will require: a strong, honest Government; a thorough understanding of its problems and the possible remedies; determined and targeted investment; and a focused strategy that is adequately resourced and meticulously implemented.

25. Some efforts within the donor community have been and appear to still be uncoordinated. The representative of one major donor suggested that an international coordinator of projects and initiatives in the country should be appointed to avoid inconsistency, duplication, ensure value for money and synchronized progress. While this seems reasonable, JCMB is supposed to fulfil this role and perhaps a more structured approach by JCMB could achieve the same result. UNODC should bring the matter to the attention of the Board.

26. Donor fatigue is a possibility because some undertakings lag behind expectations and projections. Donor States expect to see a positive return on investments, and perhaps a better way of making progress would be for them to comply with agreed strategies and allocate funding appropriately to address identified needs in a structured manner, as UNODC has regularly informed them. Political realities and sensitivities have to be considered and taken into account, but investment that is fragmented, dissipated and out of sequence will achieve little.

27. Currently, the intended strategy for minimizing opium production, accepted by UNODC, is to gradually reduce opium poppy cultivation. In September 2006, 6 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan were reported to be free of opium, and opium production was reported to have fallen in 8 other provinces, mainly in the north.<sup>10</sup> In August 2007, 13 provinces were reported to be free of opium.<sup>11</sup> Plans have been made to enable more provinces to follow suit. That, however, means that UNODC and others will have to accept the fact that significant opium and heroin production will continue in the foreseeable future, perhaps for as long as a decade or more, and

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<sup>10</sup> *World Drug Report 2007* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.XI.5).

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2007* (October 2007).

that greater emphasis must be placed on demand reduction strategies in and outside of Afghanistan.

28. Those who comply with the targets of reduced opium production must see benefits from doing so; otherwise, both necessity and coercion will continue to influence their thinking. In a report prepared by the Offices of the Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense of the United States, it was noted that the preliminary goals for eradication in 2007 in Afghanistan were unrealistic.<sup>12</sup> The assessment team that authored the report had visited seven provinces in Afghanistan and also found “no realistic possibility of outspending economic incentives in the narcotics industry”. The information was based on statistics available as at 5 November 2006.

29. The huge profits generated by drug trafficking have created power bases for warlords, wealthy landowners and insurgents who continue to flaunt their ability to defy Government attempts to bring order and the rule of law to Afghanistan. For the general population, the result is high unemployment, widespread illiteracy, extreme poverty (and hunger verging on starvation in some areas), fear of reprisal for failing to obey warlords and powerful drug traffickers and disenchantment with a weak Government that appears to be unable to improve conditions. Inevitably, this leads some people to side with the most powerful and to oppose the possibility of a unified State. In Afghanistan it appears that, in part due to coercion by the Taliban, money has been spent by the insurgents and drug dealers to align the interests of some farmers with their own, and to bring them to cooperate in increasing opium poppy cultivation.

30. Thus, it is important to give a great deal of attention to rebuilding the infrastructure of the country so that living conditions improve and hope for a better future becomes a reality. As was noted in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, when poor communities perceive themselves to have been politically marginalized or economically forgotten, they are far more likely to suffer the resentment and alienation that drug lords and terrorists exploit.

31. Regrettably, Afghanistan has so far received much less economic aid per capita of population than other post-conflict areas.<sup>13</sup> International assistance will be required for many more years and that could be an expensive commitment if some of the donated money is misdirected or even stolen by corrupt administrators. That must not be allowed to affect the goodwill and generosity of donors or create uncertainty with regard to their continued support. Donors need to be convinced that there will be a return on investments, which need to be continuous and long-lasting, rather than insufficient and aimed at quick-fix solutions. UNODC must ensure that wasting and diversion of funds are reduced to a minimum so that donors remain confident that their money is being managed well.

32. There are signs that the Government of Afghanistan is attempting to address corruption by passing appropriate legislation and creating an independent anti-

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<sup>12</sup> United States of America, Department of State and Department of Defense, Offices of Inspectors General, *Inter-agency Assessment of the Counter-narcotics Program in Afghanistan* (Arlington, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., July 2007), available at <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/90165.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> Press Release from the Executive Director of UNODC, available at <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2006/unisnar969.html>.

corruption body, the General Administration of Anti-Bribery and Corruption (GAAC). However, this is a work in progress and it is too soon to tell whether this body will be successful or not. In particular, UNODC and the international community are concerned about the leadership of GAAC and have discussed such concerns with the Government of Afghanistan. In addition, the Government of Afghanistan signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (General Assembly resolution 58/4, annex) in 2004 but has not yet ratified it.<sup>14</sup> The ratification of the Convention by the Parliament would provide UNODC and the international community with a solid basis to convince the Government of Afghanistan to fight corruption.

33. UNODC has approved a new project<sup>15</sup> aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Supreme Court and of the Office of the Attorney General, ensuring the development of effective measures to fight corruption and the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention against Corruption, and assisting in strengthening key pieces of legislation. A review of existing national legislation will also be done in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which has a comprehensive programme on corruption. That alone, however, will not deal with the powerful people who have a negative influence on the Government of Afghanistan, so every effort must be made to persuade the Government to be strong-willed and determined in its initiatives against narcotic drugs and corruption. Such determination is vital to the long-term success of the country.

34. Notwithstanding the political differences that may have arisen between Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan (and that may arise in the future), the fight against drugs may be regarded as a politically neutral issue. Efforts to stem both the demand for and the supply of illicit drugs, and to provide adequate and appropriate treatment for persons dependent on drugs in Afghanistan and the surrounding area, will result in benefits for many countries. It is therefore important to develop international cross-border cooperation, as Afghanistan cannot achieve success without regional cooperation and long-term and coordinated international assistance. The relationship between the Governments of Afghanistan and Tajikistan is good<sup>16</sup> and stands as an example of what should be possible when there is political will. Although UNODC has been encouraging regional cooperation, progress has been slow for political reasons. Nevertheless, the Office should persist in pointing out the regional and global benefits that can result from such important joint counter-narcotic initiatives.

35. The strength of the United Nations lies in the trust that the public has in the Organization because it does not have an agenda in the same way that some individual countries do. However, it has been suggested that donor countries feel that they are unable to share confidential information with UNODC, for fear that it will become widely known. If there is any truth to this, then UNODC should take steps to restore trust in its ability to respect such confidentiality. Some

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<sup>14</sup> Ratification of the Convention against Corruption was rejected for the third time in March 2007 and sent back to the Ministry of Justice. The comments of the Judicial Committee in the National Assembly, which reviewed the Convention, included "poor translation" as one of the reasons for rejecting the ratification.

<sup>15</sup> AFG/R86.

<sup>16</sup> Based on discussions held with UNODC staff in Kabul during previous evaluation missions of the consultant to Tajikistan.

representatives of the international community have also expressed the view that UNODC does not assert its influence as much as it could. If there is any substance to that view, then UNODC needs to consider its response and adjust its position.

## **B. Law enforcement projects on counter-narcotic activities**

36. Six law enforcement projects are considered in this report but others are either being developed or are in progress. The main projects have been designed to comply with the strategy of the Government of Afghanistan for dealing with illicit drugs and drug-related crimes. The purpose of this report is not to evaluate those projects individually but, rather, to assess them all in the overall context of assistance to Afghanistan and to assess, as far as possible, their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, outcome/impact, sustainability and lessons learned.

### **General observations on the law enforcement projects**

37. Some of the projects have been developed with reasonable care, even if somewhat ambitiously, given the prevailing conditions in Afghanistan, and enough flexibility has been allowed to make adjustments where necessary. An early needs analysis was conducted by law enforcement professionals from UNODC headquarters. In cooperation with donors and the Government of Afghanistan, a phased development was recognized as necessary. The primary concern was to strengthen counter-narcotics law enforcement capacities in terms of improving professionalism, competence and awareness by providing organizational advice, equipment and training. Initially, such assistance was to be provided to officials based in Kabul and then extended to officials in key provinces and, eventually, to staff throughout Afghanistan.

38. Other projects have not been as carefully thought out. Moreover, the situation in Afghanistan, both in terms of security and the volume of drug production (and therefore in terms of assistance needed), deteriorated significantly since the preliminary UNODC assessments were made.

39. Parallel programmes are being implemented with significant support from other agencies. Although those programmes are not part of the UNODC initiative, in most instances, they dovetail what UNODC is promoting; sometimes parallel investment has almost swamped UNODC efforts.<sup>17</sup> In particular, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the United States has staff members and consultants (from the company Blackwater) actively participating in training, mentorship and operational activities, primarily with the Interdiction Unit of CNPA. More DEA officers and mentors are planned to be posted according to the *US Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan* published in August 2007.<sup>18</sup> The training, advice and guidance provided are clearly practical and valuable, appropriate to the mandate and purpose of the Interdiction Unit<sup>19</sup> and incrementally successful in guiding the Unit towards a higher standard of professionalism.

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<sup>17</sup> See information on project number TD/AFG/H10 in paras. 64-70.

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/90671.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> The Intervention Unit is designed to assist operations in which armed resistance is anticipated. Such resistance is confronted all too frequently and a competent response is required to avoid deaths or injuries and to ensure the security of the operations.

Regrettably, such mentoring is not available to all CNPA staff and there is great need for it to be extended.

40. The primary concern of all projects has been to create and strengthen capacity to suppress drug trafficking. In addition to imparting the basic skills necessary for good and efficient policing in this field, it was essential to raise intelligence capacity to international standards so as to eventually enable cross-border cooperation, encourage essential cross-border activities, provide the scientific and technical backup in terms of a forensic facility to analyse seized drugs and chemicals, enable officers to identify and interdict the vast amounts of precursor chemicals that are being imported into Afghanistan and, most importantly, support the establishment of a counter-narcotics training unit within the police academy of Afghanistan.

41. These projects are also essentially about creating professional awareness of the need for making progress towards a skilled and competent police force. The development of appropriate training and operational manuals, therefore, should not be neglected and consideration should be given to the eventual use of computer-based training, a method that has been successful elsewhere and that is useful for refresher training and distance-learning purposes. It should be pointed out that serious consideration was already given to introducing computer-based training in Afghanistan but that it was discounted by UNODC because many officers were illiterate and unable to use computers and as power supplies were unreliable in many police stations. However, every effort should be made to address problems of illiteracy and power supply so that such training may be offered in due course.

42. All the projects recognize the importance of laying a good foundation and of supplying solid building blocks for the development of competence compatible with international standards. Clearly, this cannot be achieved overnight (a quick-fix solution is impossible) but these initiatives have set the scene for gradual professional development. The information and experience gained from these projects should, however, be disseminated much more widely. While some progress is being made, much more needs to be done over many years.

43. Afghan police officers need exposure to international policing systems. This has been achieved in part by facilitating the attendance of some senior officers at regional and international meetings and at training sessions in neighbouring countries, but much more exposure is necessary and desirable at all levels of the police force, not only because it enhances mutual understanding and trust, but also because it creates an informal network of officers who are known to and trusted by one another. In turn, this reinforces the mechanisms for gathering and sharing intelligence and enhances operational capabilities across borders.

44. The appointment of Afghan drug liaison officers in appropriate countries is said to be under consideration. This would undoubtedly be a valuable tool in counter-narcotics law enforcement. Detailed and extensive joint training at a regional academy such as the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime supported by UNODC<sup>20</sup> and the Kunming Academy in China, would do much to enhance understanding of international policing issues and

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<sup>20</sup> See <http://www.tadoc.gov.tr/> and information on project number TURG36 on strengthening the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime.

consolidate the professional ability of officers who would then realize that they are part of an international team addressing global drug-related problems. UNODC should make every effort to extend such training possibilities as soon as political conditions allow.

**Strengthening of counter-narcotic law enforcement capacities in Afghanistan (AD/AFG/02/G38)**

45. The objectives of this project are:

- To ensure the establishment of operational headquarters and the creation of a fully equipped and well-trained intelligence unit within CNPA stations in Kabul and nine key provinces
- To ensure CNPA is capable of tackling drug trafficking and organized crime as an independent body within the Ministry of the Interior
- To ensure the promotion of cooperation between States in the region and worldwide

46. Some of those objectives have been achieved within the defined budget. The buildings for the CNPA facilities have been constructed or refurbished to a reasonable and acceptable standard and have been equipped as necessary. The project has been conducted reasonably efficiently by caring and professional UNODC staff members. In close coordination with relevant stakeholders, training has been provided in law enforcement techniques, radio communication, English, computer skills and precursor chemical identification and control. A basic national communication network has been designed and installed, although this is not adequate for the professional needs of CNPA. Officers have taken part in national, regional and international drug law enforcement meetings.

47. A basically equipped drug testing laboratory has been established on CNPA premises in Kabul and chemists have received basic training to enable them to carry out basic analyses. A report submitted to the UNODC Country Office in January 2007 describes the laboratory as having limited facilities that are inadequate, including for holding international scientific conventions. The report details the deficiencies of the laboratory and predicts that they may give rise to legal complications since seized drugs and chemicals cannot be tested accurately. Within CNPA, the laboratory appears to have been viewed as entirely satisfactory when this is far from being the case and when the possibility of making serious errors and of receiving complaints about the quality of evidence from prosecutors remains high. Discussions with the staff from the Laboratory and Scientific Section at UNODC headquarters revealed that the laboratory at CNPA was to be established in phases. The equipment proposed for phase one had been delivered and further equipment would be provided once the chemists had sufficient knowledge and confidence to manage cases with the equipment provided. However, there is no evidence that the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan has taken any measures to upgrade the laboratory or that it has consulted the appropriate specialists at headquarters when planning the establishment of the laboratory and the training courses for chemists. Ensuring effective communication between the Country Office and the Laboratory and Scientific Section and taking proactive measure to upgrade the laboratory and train the chemists could have avoided the deficiencies mentioned above.

48. In Kabul, CNPA is gradually becoming established as a competent, albeit small, organization able to carry out basic and limited operational policing functions, and to gather, record and analyse limited intelligence in a rudimentary way. It has also begun to conduct investigations at a level capable of assisting legal proceedings, although discussions with prosecutors have also pointed out the presence of serious deficiencies. Clearly, it is essential to continue providing training and mentoring guidance.

49. The CNPA Unit in Herat, which was visited during a field mission, is very small (25 men). Although it can be said that the terms and objectives of the project have been partially fulfilled, what has been delivered is inadequate for meeting the needs of the Unit. The deputy commander suggested that, in order to do the job effectively, he needed much more equipment, a larger budget and 300 officers. While it is true that all commanders say that they do not have enough money, resources and staff to do the job properly, in this case it was obvious that there was much accuracy in that complaint. Nonetheless, it has not been possible to verify exactly what is needed to enable the Unit to do the job effectively. A request was also made for sufficient funds to pay informants. UNODC might consider bringing this matter to the attention of the lead agency responsible for reforming the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the need to determine the appropriate size of CNPA at the provincial level.

50. It seems likely that similar drawbacks exist in other provinces, as communications are intermittent, resources are severely limited and what has been learned by some is not being put into practice by all officers. If the situation in Herat reflects what is happening in other locations, then the hope of having a substantial impact on the illicit drug trade, even by 2010, will be frustrated. While the problem is worsening, counter-narcotics policing is not receiving nearly enough support to be effective.

51. It is difficult to accurately measure progress because record-keeping and data collection procedures do not always meet acceptable standards and are, in some instances, superficial. Nevertheless, some progress is being made. An increase in arrests and seizures and in the dismantling of clandestine laboratories has been claimed, but records do not appear to be accurate and none were shown to demonstrate such claims. CNPA is not yet a competent and independent police agency, and much work remains to be done. In reality, the impact on major drug traffickers and organized criminal groups has been limited and the seizures have been small compared with the vast amounts of drugs produced.

52. Some influential criminals have been arrested, primarily because of the assistance of DEA. This has boosted morale and demonstrated what is possible if competence and professionalism increase. However, it is evident that many CNPA officers do not fully understand the concept of intelligence gathering, accurate recording and analysis and referral to other units and agencies. In fairness, the situation in Afghanistan does not encourage the proper gathering and recording of intelligence on a national basis; the lack of trust between the various ministries hinders the sharing of information and, as a result, intelligence is fragmented. This attitude is in part due to cultural reasons and in part due to concern that the sharing of sensitive and confidential information (sometimes involving major traffickers and even Government officials) will either lead to the information being leaked or to the operation being compromised. There is also fear of reprisals against those supplying

such sensitive information. There is also a suspicion that the accurate recording of intelligence has been thwarted. In addition, there appears to be little trust between officials from Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan, making cross-border cooperation extremely difficult.

53. At the initial stage of the project on the strengthening of counter-narcotic law enforcement agencies in Afghanistan (AFG/G38), UNODC headquarters made reference to the importance of developing basic intelligence systems (in the original needs assessment that led to the project) and insisted that that intelligence training was vital. During the project's implementation, the Country Office in Afghanistan should have identified and reported more vigorously the apparent deficiencies and stressed that without good intelligence and competent officers to administer it, it would not be possible for the police to perform well. A report prepared for the Country Office in December 2006 by intelligence mentors Boniface, Morgan and McFadden provided a damning indictment of the inadequacies of the CNPA system. Regrettably, little if anything appears to have been done to address those shortcomings, while the report should have been passed on to the law enforcement specialists at UNODC headquarters for guidance. Staff at the Country Office should in the future be more proactive in seeking in-house technical expertise to reassess deficiencies and undertake appropriate measures to address upcoming issues as early as possible.

54. There is a clear and urgent need for Afghan officials to be provided with more sophisticated and formal instruction in intelligence matters. Among the States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, training has been delivered at basic, intermediate and advanced levels by the Australian Federal Police through the UNODC project on the development of drug control operational procedures of law enforcement agencies in East Asia.<sup>21</sup> The provision of such training resulted in improved performance in operational policing and would be valuable to the Afghan National Police, CNPA and associated agencies, such as the customs police. Ideally training should be provided to officers from Afghanistan and neighbouring countries and should be complemented by joint practical exercises.

55. Further related matters require the establishment of a national criminal records office and a national fingerprint bureau. Consideration should also be given to establishing or upgrading a national criminal intelligence service. This would be invaluable not only in terms of counter-narcotics law enforcement, but also for other important areas such as fighting organized crime and countering terrorism. Although it is not realistic to expect these services to become available in the near future, it is important to prepare for future needs now. The seeds for future growth must be sown and an appropriate expert should be employed to examine how this could best be done.

56. Reference has already been made to the problems of illiteracy and of staff turnover. A related issue is the hiring of trained staff by other agencies anxious to secure the services of competent people. This problem needs to be addressed perhaps by ensuring that officers assigned to CNPA are required to stay for a minimum number of years.

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<sup>21</sup> AD/RAS/96/B65.

57. Quality-of-life issues (including parity of pay between the police and the army) are in need of urgent consideration. If overall improvement is to be achieved within the Afghan police and, specifically, within CNPA, then attention must also be given to the introduction of managerial and financial training as well as to improving literacy and computer skills. At the time of the evaluation, there was no evidence that police managers were particularly concerned with matters of general welfare, nor did they appear to regard staff development as important. There are no regular reports on qualifications or staff assessment reviews for officers and little attention appears to be given to career management and planning. These matters are essential and training should be given to address the deficiencies. Problems have been further compounded by the regular turnover of senior officers at the insistence of the Ministry, a practice that must be stopped in the interest of continuity and stability.

58. Translating any training into effective operational policing is a task that requires continuous mentoring (currently insufficiently available to CNPA officers) and refresher training, both of which have been difficult to achieve. UNODC staff members are aware of the problems and are striving to address them. It cannot be said that CNPA has achieved the status of a fully competent and capable agency able to tackle organized crime and drug trafficking. It is making a good attempt but its overall achievements are minimal, which means that the project objectives are not likely to be achieved as long as the identified shortcomings continue unresolved. Some senior CNPA officers even appear to be unaware of the major professional deficiencies that exist within their organization, although they recognize the need for improved staffing levels and additional equipment.

59. This lack of knowledge highlights the need for more full-time mentoring to bring CNPA to a satisfactory standard and for assistance by international police officers in the direction of some operations. A complete review of the allocation of staff to the counter-narcotic initiative is also necessary, as is an assessment of how international police officers and additional mentors may be employed.

60. For the Afghan National Police to gain operational independence would be a major breakthrough. Currently, all policing matters fall under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, who has the right to direct operations through his subordinates. While CNPA is an independent unit within the Afghan National Police, political control and interference is still possible. In the current context, however, operational independence is not a viable proposition. Ensuring police accountability to the law in operational matters is highly desirable and it is recommended that steps towards this goal be taken if they have not already been planned in the framework of the reform of the Ministry of the Interior.

61. While the current emphasis is on interdiction and major crimes, it must be remembered that it is equally important to develop a community policing approach, towards the majority of the population that is not involved in the illicit drug trade. Community policing would promote trust in the police and might lead people to provide better information to officers; in turn, that would help to strengthen counter-narcotic and other kinds of law enforcement capabilities. UNODC should take steps to encourage community policing, for example by establishing a pilot project with the aim of examining the most appropriate ways of achieving such a police force.

62. With regard to management-related issues, the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan should urgently pay attention to the fact that the project is making inadequate progress and that an urgent reassessment of the law enforcement response is necessary to address the worsening drug trafficking problem. It is not sufficient to continue with long-term plans while ignoring the crisis that the country is already facing. A twofold strategy is necessary.

63. There is also a need for better synergy between the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and UNODC headquarters in Vienna. This evaluation could not establish with certainty why the relationship is not as good as it should be, but such information could and should have been obtained before the project started. Comprehensive records of communication on project matters between the two offices should be kept in the Country Office and in relevant and recommended project diaries. The recent appointment of new personnel at the Country Office should help to improve matters in this sense. Perhaps consideration should also be given to appointing more law enforcement experts at headquarters to help with increasing demands.

#### **Drug law enforcement interdiction unit (TD/AFG/H10)**

64. The main objective of the project is to establish an operational pilot for a law enforcement interdiction unit to be trained, equipped and prepared to support other organs within CNPA. The Interdiction Unit is a sole resource of the Drug Law Enforcement Directorate and will be under the command of the Investigation and/or Intelligence Units, helping in potentially hostile areas of arrest, search and seizure.

65. Since it was established, the Interdiction Unit has developed well in terms of acquiring buildings and equipment. The building that it will house the Unit is excellent and, once finalized, will be a remarkably good facility by any standards. Vehicles, communication equipment and uniforms have been supplied in abundance and although the commander has expressed a wish for a more advanced communication system, the Interdiction Unit is able to conduct training sessions and develop well with what is available. Moreover, improvements are under consideration. The Unit has developed a good sense of *esprit de corps* and it has been given its own identification patch, which helps generate pride and bond the members together. The Unit has also received a great deal of investment in terms of buildings and equipment, mentoring, training and operational capacity provided by DEA (through the company Blackwater).

66. It will take some time for the Interdiction Unit to be able to operate independently but progress is being made, confidence is high and the future looks promising. Of course, there have been problems but none that could have been foreseen or that provided anything other than a good learning experience. A former DEA officer, now a mentor provided by Blackwater to the Unit commander, referred to the Unit's development in terms of three phases, the crawling phase, the walking phase and the running phase. In the mentor's view, the Unit had reached the advanced crawling phase. He was enthusiastic about the progress made and commented positively on the work being done and the keenness of Unit officers.

67. In terms of sustainability, the Unit's complex is so good and sophisticated that it will require a high level of long-term maintenance, which might become a problem in the future. However, the project receives substantial support from the

Government of the United States and it is doubtful that that Government will let its investment deteriorate. Satellite premises have been provided, outside the framework of the UNODC project, in five locations to meet the anticipated needs of the Unit in key operational areas. It remains to be seen how useful and effective they will prove to be.

68. There are plans to provide helicopters and training for pilots, again not by the UNODC project. These measures will enhance the Unit's operational capability.

69. Overall, there are serious doubts about whether the Interdiction Unit is capable of organizing its own intelligence system effectively. It is likely that the intelligence that has driven successful operations to date has been provided by DEA or external mentors. Intelligence gathering and recording remain major problems that must be addressed by the whole of the Afghan police service, as recommended.

70. In retrospect, UNODC could have left the development of the Interdiction Unit to the United States and used some of the project money for other matters. Clearly, UNODC should discuss with the Government of the United States the way forward in order to prevent the unnecessary duplication of effort. The matter of intelligence training is particularly important and discussions on this issue should take place to ensure that no conflict arises from the way in which DEA operates and the approach eventually adopted by UNODC.

#### **Regional cooperation in precursor chemical control between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, 2006-2009 (TD/AFG/I85)**

71. The objective of the project is to develop a comprehensive programme for controlling precursors.

72. The project strategy includes: enabling officers to identify precursor chemicals at the key points of entry into Afghanistan; developing regional and international information analysis and exchange systems designed to target and dismantle international criminal operations; building capacity in terms of training, providing necessary equipment along key border points; and establishing special mobile training teams to travel to important locations and provide appropriate training on precursor identification and control.

73. The original project was not as well designed as it might have been given that it was premised on unrealistic expectations for a country with fragile relationships with some of its immediate neighbours. The need to meet basic training needs was not anticipated; it was necessary to improve both English and computer competence skills before a precursor control unit could be established and a database could be created. This extra training took four months. The problem should have been identified before the project got under way.

74. Vehicles were provided without much consideration for how they would be maintained. The project aimed, among other things, to establish mobile teams. However, the international consultant overseeing the Unit discovered that both CNPA and customs officials already had mobile detection teams, so it was agreed that those teams would be trained in recognition and testing and provided with the necessary kits to help officers detect and identify precursor chemicals entering Afghanistan. This type of collaboration could probably have been identified in advance had the project been planned better.

75. Overall, the project seems to have been poorly designed with inadequate consultation with relevant parties. It is only because of the pragmatism of the international consultant that problems have been partially overcome, but the impact of what has been achieved so far has been questioned by some donors. Once more, appropriate consultation with headquarters might have prevented errors from occurring.

76. Most officers were unaware of the whole concept of precursor chemicals but, with determination, over 100 officers have been given basic training on the issue and the necessary knowledge is gradually spreading throughout CNPA and other agencies. However, discussions with a person charged with coordinating training sessions for customs officers indicated that Ministry personnel had deliberately obstructed training efforts, which had resulted in officers being assigned tasks very different from the ones for which they had been trained. That is indicative of the difficulties being confronted. There is also little evidence that the knowledge imparted has resulted in significant seizures of precursor chemicals, which are entering the country in large volumes. Although the number of seizures is increasing (see annex II), the overall volume remains limited compared with the amount of drugs produced in Afghanistan.

77. The Precursor Control Unit has been established as part of the Intelligence Unit. Work has begun on a database containing information on persons involved in trafficking precursor chemicals and on chemicals seized, with a view to possibly aiding backtracking investigations. Clearly, however, this is limited and records are inadequate and of little use in the current context. The need for intelligence training previously mentioned is therefore highly relevant for this unit. Given that there used to be an almost total lack of recorded knowledge of what had been seized (other than a general description of solids or liquids), some progress has been made: some officers are now capable of accurately identifying chemicals. An attempt has been made to build a foundation for the future but success is totally dependent on providing proper intelligence training and assistance in the correct procedures for keeping records and establishing a useful database. Effective cooperation with neighbouring countries is also important.

78. Existing problems are compounded by the fact that none of the States neighbouring Afghanistan has reported any seizures of precursor chemicals during the past seven years. Moreover, the origin of the seizures that have been made in Afghanistan is usually impossible to trace since containers have been changed, documents are usually inaccurate or deliberately misleading and there is insufficient international cooperation between States, making investigation either impossible or extremely difficult. In addition, there is a strong suspicion that corruption has made it easier for vast amounts of chemicals to enter the country. Despite that situation, in May 2006 26 tons of chemicals were seized, although no prosecution followed. Part of the problem is that CNPA headquarters are not notified of seizures in a timely fashion owing to a lack of proper communication and inter-agency cooperation. Prompted by UNODC, discussions have been held with the Deputy Minister of the Interior and the Director General of CNPA to address the problem; matters of timely reporting and investigation of seizures are said to be under discussion.

79. Progress on this project is good in parts but is nowhere near where it should be to achieve the original objective of sharing intelligence with regional and international partners that could lead to the arrest of major traffickers and the

dismantling of criminal organizations. No information was available on the effectiveness of the mobile units, but judging from the few seizures reported, it appears that the units have had little impact on a major problem. The consultant who supervised the project was aware of the shortcomings and diligent in his efforts to address a difficult situation. An example of the problems being faced was given in the town of Herat, Afghanistan, where it was stated that an officer who was a photographer was appointed, without any training, to identify precursor chemicals. That officer apparently does so by sniffing the drugs that are brought before him. The dangers of that malpractice and the officer's lack of appropriate training have escaped the notice of the local commander. That reflects poorly on the level of competence and management training.

80. With regard to other dimensions of this project, determined efforts are being made to translate some existing computer-based training programmes, currently used in Central Asian countries, into Dari and Pashtu.

81. Currently, clandestine laboratories are being destroyed on an ad hoc basis by CNPA. Sometimes, photographs are taken and samples and data are recorded; on many more occasions, such information is neither reported nor properly recorded. Although guidance has been issued by UNODC headquarters regarding the safe handling and disposal of chemicals, the information is not yet widely known and it is not always possible to comply with the guidance because of the remoteness of some locations and the difficulty of transporting unstable materials over difficult terrain. There are personal safety and ecological issues to be considered as well, for which appropriate training is necessary. One donor has suggested that it would be beneficial to provide regional incinerators, away from centres of population, where some chemicals and seized drugs might be destroyed. UNODC should examine the feasibility of this proposal and assess what kind of training officers would need to neutralize some of the chemicals before disposal.

82. The project coordinator was looking into the possibility of hiring an independent contractor to assess the volume of chemicals needed to prepare the illicit drugs leaving Afghanistan. In this way the relevance of any seizures might become more apparent.

83. At least one major donor commented that UNODC must identify ways of making this project more successful and that the Office should be much more proactive at the technical level. It would seem appropriate for experts from UNODC headquarters to visit Afghanistan to assess the extent of the problems and to make appropriate recommendations about how to improve the Precursor Control Unit's response to this problem.

#### **Strengthening Afghan-Iran drug border control and cross-border cooperation (TD/AFG/H16)**

84. The project aims to establish and equip border control posts along the border between Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, train personnel and introduce a basic criminal intelligence system to encourage cooperation on law enforcement issues and the sharing of information.

85. This project has been well supervised by the consultant hired by UNODC, who has a thorough knowledge of what is required, is fully aware of the problems and has the enthusiasm and determination to bring the project to a successful conclusion.

However, the project is beset by fundamental problems (identified earlier in this report), including unequal pay between the police and the army, extremely poor working and living conditions, poor quality of food, low levels of literacy and a lack of basic skills to help local staff carry out their work programme adequately and manage their own standards of living. Further training is necessary. All problems contribute to a high level of wastage and staff turnover: on average, a border police officer remains in his post about six months. Inevitably, this adds to costs in terms of recruiting, training and equipping additional personnel.

86. In an interview, senior border police officers spoke about the poor quality of the recruits they had to contend with. In their words, the border police force was not held in high regard, in part because it was obliged to recruit the least educated people from the poorest villages. Inevitably, the recruits had family connections with drug traffickers and therefore had no real incentive to act against them. Given also the appallingly substandard conditions in which they had to work, sometimes without adequate food, they stated that it was no surprise that the recruits had no motivation or pride in their jobs. Frequently, recruits did not have basic educational and physical standards and were simply hired to make up numbers. The senior officers interviewed acknowledged that they were nowhere near winning the battle against traffickers and appealed for more international aid. They gave a long list of problems, most of which are detailed in this report. The border police is unable to fight traffickers effectively for a variety of reasons, including bureaucratic delays and an apparent lack of willingness on the part of the Minister to address the mentioned difficulties.

87. As an example, all the recent monthly reports by the consultant hired by UNODC about conditions along the border refer to poor pay and its negative influence on the willingness of officers to continue in service. Officers are not only receiving a low basic wage but are also subject to serious and inexcusable payment delays; some have complained that they have not received a third of the payments due to them over a six-month period. A few of the officers who had been with the border police for three years also indicated that they were promised pay and benefits when they joined and that they were still waiting for them.

88. The food situation is a vital issue that adversely affects morale. It is of poor quality and officers only receive meat three times a week. The remainder of the time they receive mainly rice, whatever vegetables are available and fruit. This is not adequate to sustain active men who have demanding, stressful and dangerous jobs. In addition to these inadequate supplies, many officers do not have basic knowledge regarding hygiene and the proper storage of food, thus increasing the risk of sickness and, in turn, creating an additional burden for the border police.

89. Border police officers work long hours, have much higher casualty rates in some remote areas when compared with army officers and do not have the certainty that they will be cared for medically or evacuated if injured. If officers are forced to leave the service due to injury, they do not have access to health care or pension benefits. If they are killed in the line of duty, there is no pension provided for their dependants. Adequate remuneration for officers was promised in the Afghanistan Compact agreed in 2006 and continued reporting about this unacceptable situation must therefore be made by UNODC to the Government of Afghanistan, where ultimate responsibility lies.

90. Generators often stand idle because fuel that is only appropriate for vehicles is supplied. It is also alleged that the brigade has insufficient fuel allowance to enable vehicles to be used effectively. Without generators there is no power and without vehicle fuel, counter-narcotics activities are weakened. Repeated requests have been made to border police staff in Kabul and UNODC has asked for meetings with the border police commander in Herat and at the force's headquarters in Kabul to try to resolve this basic but vitally important matter, with no appropriate response so far.

91. It is clear that the border police requires the continuous assistance of international mentors, some of whom have been made available through private contractors such as DynCorps. In its Strategy for Afghanistan for 2007, the Government of the United States indicates an intention to supply more. UNODC has appointed an experienced consultant/adviser for the provinces of Herat and Nimroz to oversee the project and resolve some of the apparent problems. It is hoped that this appointment will move forward the implementation of the project and assist the border police to achieve basic levels of competence.

92. Currently, the border police is struggling with outdated administrative procedures and ineptitude, all of which contribute to hindering the aims and objectives of the project. All requests made for the problems to be remedied have been met with promises but no action. Although the Afghanistan National Development Strategy anticipates that all planning and training will come to fruition in 2010, there are serious doubts that that will be possible given the present rate of progress. In addition to training border police officers, it would seem appropriate to introduce administrative training and streamlining at border police headquarters and throughout CNPA. Unfortunately the present and growing crisis is such that Afghanistan and the rest of the world cannot wait until 2010 for more positive and effective action to be taken.

93. The project must also be considered in the context of the worsening security situation. During the last week of July 2007, insurgents attacked border posts and threatened to kill officers who did not walk out on their duties. Border police officers were reported to have abandoned one post but the insurgents were beaten back elsewhere.

94. It will not be possible for the border police to become a good and efficient counter-narcotics law enforcement agency so long as the conditions described above prevail. As a temporary solution, it is recommended that officers be trained so that they can maintain higher living standards, but the real need is for a total and urgent reform of the way that border police officers are recruited, paid, trained and treated. The goal of developing intelligence systems to enable the interdiction of traffickers has not been achieved for the reasons mentioned above.

95. There is a gaping hole along the border in the province of Nimroz, which is a key province and the main gateway for smuggling drugs out of Afghanistan and into the Islamic Republic of Iran. It has been estimated<sup>22</sup> that as much as 40 per cent of the illicit opium poppy crop leaves the country through that area, which is under the influence and control of insurgents. That is the main route used for smuggling narcotic drugs from Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan and Farah provinces (the most

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<sup>22</sup> See project document on the establishment of a regional centre for the Afghan border police in Nimroz Province (project AFG/J55).

important opium poppy cultivation and harvesting centres in Afghanistan) into the Islamic Republic of Iran and beyond. A significant amount of illicit drugs is thought to then pass straight into Iraq, a development that is likely to have a serious impact on the insurgency there. This matter needs urgent attention as it affects the stability of the whole region.

96. A new project on the establishment of a regional centre for the border police in Nimroz province (AFG/J55) has been approved. If this is to succeed, the problems identified regarding border police in existing border posts need to be dealt with urgently. Unless the border is properly policed, the Government of Afghanistan will lose huge amounts of revenue, corrupt practices will continue and massive quantities of illicit drugs produced in Afghanistan will enter the global market. Border policing is a matter that must be addressed in a professional manner so that the border police can eventually reach standards acceptable to the international community.

97. In the Executive Summary of the Doha II Conference on Border Management in Afghanistan, held in Doha on 27 and 28 February 2006, it was noted that “In order to meet these challenges, Afghanistan needs well-trained, well-equipped border and highway police forces that are able to cooperate with other national security authorities, as well as border police forces and security organs of its neighbours. Intra-Afghan cooperation between the border police, highway police, counter-terrorism police, counter-narcotics police and customs authorities, like cooperation with partners in neighbouring countries, must be close and institutionalized.” Compared with the reality, this statement is a dream that is far from being achievable.

#### **Support for a counter-narcotics training unit (AD/AFG/06/177)**

98. The objective of the project on providing support for a counter-narcotics training unit (AD/AFG/06/177) is to enhance the capacity of Afghan law enforcement officials and allied agencies involved in countering narcotics by establishing a permanent coordination and monitoring mechanism, coordinating all training efforts made by international partners.

99. The project began in January 2007 and is in the early stages of development. An initial needs assessment has been carried out in consultation with interested and relevant agencies, as a result of which the necessary equipment has been either acquired or ordered. The plan is to identify suitable people to act as “master trainers” and to assess training needs. The curricula will then be developed to meet the identified training needs and counter-narcotics training will be provided. A database of training courses and participants will be developed.

100. The consultant needed to oversee the project had not been selected at the time that this report was being prepared, nor had the position been re-advertised. Moreover, for reasons difficult to understand, the head of CNTU had not been appointed and had not begun preparing the training programme while the Interdiction Unit was under development so that training could commence immediately. No evidence was provided of any training programmes, whether completed or under development.

101. A major problem arose after the Government of Germany officially handed over the CNTU academy building to the Ministry of the Interior and CNPA in 2006.

An assessment of the new building identified significant but unanticipated shortcomings: in the building there were inadequate dining facilities and space for preparing and storing food, no laundry facilities for washing bed linen and uniforms, an inadequate septic system, insufficient toilets, inadequate classroom facilities and no external building security. It seems that, originally, it was expected that the building would accommodate fewer people than it eventually did, for the original intention was to incorporate CNTU into the Afghan police training academy.

102. A solution was found by UNODC after discussions with Government counterparts and stakeholders. It was agreed that the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) of the United States would renovate the building and rectify its shortcomings in the facilities. That work commenced in May 2007 and was still in progress in August 2007. The planned facilities look promising but it remains to be seen whether or not they will fulfil the needs and whether CNTU will function as planned.

103. The provision of joint training with other States would be highly desirable for the reasons already stated. Expressions of goodwill in this regard have been received from a number of sources, including China.

104. No satisfactory explanation has been given for the above-mentioned shortcomings in project design. Better needs assessment and closer consultation between UNODC and the Government of Germany should have taken place to avoid the errors from becoming apparent only once the building was handed over. However, it appears that the Government of Germany took primary responsibility for the building and no criticism is implied against UNODC.

#### **Support the operational capacities of CNPA (AD/AFG/07/J43)**

105. The objectives of the project to support the operational capacities of CNPA (AD/AFG/07/J43) are to effectively combat drug trafficking in Afghanistan by strengthening CNPA and to address normal sustainability problems associated with the development of police operations in a post-conflict country that has little or no Government revenue.

106. The plan was to construct a new CNPA building in Oruzgan and, presumably (it is not clear from the project document), to staff and equip it. In addition, consultants are to be recruited in the areas of administration and finance, radio communication and forensic science training. Following a project revision in August 2007, two new additional CNPA offices are to be built and equipped in Baghlan and Ghazni. Support in terms of organizational advice, equipment and training will be provided to the drug law enforcement unit in Kabul and to nine other key provincial CNPA offices, in addition to the three newly created provincial CNPA units.

107. The project appears to have been defined vaguely and seems to lack a specific declaration of intent with regard to the proposed improvements.

### III. Outcomes, impact and sustainability

#### A. Outcomes and impact

108. UNODC projects have created awareness among some CNPA officers and members of the Government of Afghanistan of what more must be achieved. That awareness must now be spread more widely and training must be given from the most basic of levels for officers to advance to a satisfactory standard. Without much greater international input into the counter-narcotics law enforcement strategy, the impact of UNODC will be diluted quickly because of the adverse circumstances in Afghanistan.

109. The number of drug seizures has increased steadily over the past five years: 149 in 2003; 369 in 2004; 483 in 2005; 476 in 2006; and 475 in the first half of 2007. The volume of narcotic drugs seized, however, dropped dramatically in 2006, while the volume of seizures of cannabis resin (hashish) increased in 2007 (see table 1). This might mean that trafficking in large volumes of illicit drugs has dropped, which is unlikely, or that law enforcement agencies are arresting small-scale traffickers. Further investigation and analysis of data are required to draw a firm conclusion. However, a negligible amount of illicit drugs was seized compared with the total amount produced in Afghanistan. Trends in drug seizures or arrests of drug traffickers (see table 2) should not, however, be the sole or the critical measure of programme performance.

Table 1  
Narcotic drugs seized, 2003-2007  
(Kilograms)

Type	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 (January-June)
Morphine	111	210	15	17	155
Heroin	977	1 406	5 121	4 133	1 425
Opium	2 171	17 689	46 307	12 027	17 157
Cannabis resin ("hashish")	10 269	74 002	36 513	24 095	45 451

Table 2  
Drug traffickers arrested, 2003-2007

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 (January-June)
Male	—	205	403	440	374
Female	—	19	6	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>376</b>

110. Some project elements may have a long-lasting effect but require serious efforts by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan. For example, the CNPA laboratory may have a long-lasting impact on drug interdiction and help bring drug traffickers to justice once it has been upgraded to meet international standards and once it has employed competent staff. Similarly, the CNPA in Kabul is gradually becoming a competent but small organization able to carry out basic operational

policing functions and to gather, record and analyse limited intelligence. It has also begun to conduct investigations at a level capable of justifying legal proceedings, although discussions with prosecutors have also pointed out the presence of many serious deficiencies.

111. The provision of appropriate training at the basic, intermediate and advanced levels is necessary to make the intelligence unit more effective. The whole of the Afghan police service would benefit from similar training and a major project would be necessary to achieve this. Training and the communications equipment provided as part of the development of an intelligence system to meet international standards are an essential first step. Such a system is fundamental to fighting drug trafficking and organized crime.

112. Very competent staff members that have been trained to the highest standards should be employed as “master trainers” in the counter-narcotic training unit to ensure long-term and continuous benefits in terms of improving standards.

113. There was little evidence of regular communication about projects between staff at the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and at UNODC headquarters in Vienna. This was a serious drawback and several errors and omissions may have been avoided had collaboration been better. Neither the Country Office nor the various specialist units at headquarters initiated communication, with the result that major errors occurred that led to unnecessary expenditure. Where independent specialist reports were prepared, for example on the CNPA laboratory and on intelligence capabilities, these went unread or ignored for months when urgent action was required. This situation is in urgent need of attention and UNODC might consider establishing a roving monitoring team, answerable to the Director of the Division of Operations of UNODC, to review the progress of all UNODC projects and ensure their efficient and effective implementation.

## **B. Sustainability**

114. It is difficult to assess sustainability in a country so beset with problems. It is believed that with the right political will success will follow in the long term, but if the insurgency continues the outcome is uncertain. UNODC has taken some positive steps to ensure that key people are aware of what needs to be done, but ongoing and continuous international aid to a strong and honest Government will be necessary for decades. Unless the current law enforcement strategy is reviewed and improved, sustainability will not be possible. If the immediate crisis is not addressed, the rest of the initiatives might become irrelevant.

115. However, some sustainable elements of the Law Enforcement Programme do exist, such as the development of the CNPA laboratory, communication and other equipment provided to the Interdiction Unit, training provided to officials of the Government of Afghanistan and software development. When these have been refined and fully developed, they should prove to be invaluable resources.

## **C. Major issues for consideration**

### **1. Afghanistan must be built up progressively from very basic levels**

116. It would be pointless to pretend that significant lessons have been learned from the implementation of the law enforcement projects considered in the present report. It is well known that Afghanistan is a post-conflict country with a continuing insurgency problem and that during the past 30 years there has been massive damage to the country's infrastructure, resulting in a loss of recorded data, professional people and expertise. This has reduced the country to the most elementary state. Afghanistan has also suffered from "brain drain", for many educated people have been either killed or forced by circumstance to leave the country. The educational system has been severely disrupted, a fact that has had a particularly adverse effect on the situation of women, and a whole generation of people has grown up in conditions of strife, more concerned with survival than development. Therefore, it cannot and must not be assumed that ordinary skills and competencies exist in the general population simply because some very talented people work for international organizations. There is often a complete absence of understanding of the ordinary abilities necessary that are taken for granted elsewhere.

117. As a result, many are unaware of what is necessary to help the country achieve a truly democratic and independent status. Afghanistan has been severely damaged and is in great need of education and nurturing to enable it to return even to its pre-conflict level. In law enforcement terms, many police officers are unaware of international policing standards and assistance must be given to enable them to raise Afghan policing standards to an acceptable level. Management skills are often non-existent and progress is frustrated by archaic and bureaucratic procedures. Training in management and administration should be introduced, starting at the basic levels and gradually advancing to higher levels of competence.

### **2. Counter-narcotics law enforcement policing in Afghanistan is inadequate**

118. Afghanistan is afflicted by the debilitating impact of the illicit drug trade but its law enforcement response is not sufficient to address this problem. A major reconsideration of the current strategy for countering drug trafficking in law enforcement terms is urgently required and serious thought must be given to creating a unified policing system with collective strategic thinking directed at addressing the drug problem. UNODC should promote this view both with the Government of Afghanistan and international partners, since the present strategy is having little impact and UNODC initiatives are insufficient on their own. At present, much of the law enforcement response is disproportionately skewed towards armed interdiction based on an inadequate intelligence system and is clearly not capable of achieving the major successes that are necessary to disrupt organized crime and major drug trafficking. While armed units are essential elements in the unstable and lawless conditions that prevail in Afghanistan, it is important for officers to be made aware that accurate intelligence can at times make it possible to avoid armed conflict. It is recommended that training be adjusted to emphasize that firepower should always be the last resort.

### **3. Major international policing aid is necessary**

119. Perhaps the main lesson learned is that it is unwise to be too ambitious when developing projects. Basic skills are necessary and must be thoroughly learned before sophisticated professional development may be contemplated. To immediately address the rapidly deteriorating situation, it is necessary to establish a closely coordinated mentoring programme involving the key actors (UNODC, the United States, the European Union, UNAMA etc.) to bring an adequate number of international mentors to work with police, customs and border officers and within key ministries and agencies.

### **4. Regional cooperation is essential**

120. Afghanistan was isolated for several decades and now needs regional cooperation and support, in addition to international donor aid. Although political considerations may frustrate ambition, it is nevertheless important for UNODC and the international community to find ways of overcoming political differences in the common interest of addressing a major global problem. A valuable UNODC initiative was the joint meeting of Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan, held in Vienna on 12 June 2007. The relationship between the three countries must be nurtured not only to successfully combat drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism, but also because it is important that neighbours know and trust one another. It is also necessary for cooperation to extend beyond the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, for the whole region is seriously affected by a common drug problem.

### **5. Funding for regional cooperation initiatives is inadequate**

121. It is a pity that donations for projects in the Islamic Republic of Iran did not materialize after that country was branded part of the so-called "axis of evil". For example, funding for the UNODC project entitled Integrated border control in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Phase I (IRN/I50) is reported to be \$1 million short. Similarly, a UNODC border control project in Pakistan is reported to be in need of financial support. Important recommendations were made on improving cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and other countries in 2004, but were not followed. A view was expressed that UNODC should establish an inter-State coordination unit to ensure that common projects are carried out in harmony. Such a unit could provide daily support in negotiations with national counterparts on the need to develop cooperation, mutual trust, joint training and a network of professionals who understand one another and are willing to work together to achieve a common goal. JCMB, which oversees international initiatives, should give high priority to ensuring that cross-border cooperation occurs on what may be regarded as a politically neutral issue of global importance. UNODC must also redouble its efforts to secure adequate funding for Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan so that progress may be made.

### **6. A trilateral ministerial agreement is needed**

122. Such an agreement would allow for a meeting of the revised Inter-Governmental Technical Committee, Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan to take place and address the question of bringing together drug law enforcement personnel. The Committee last met in June 2004 and this type of

collaboration should not be neglected. It is understood that the Islamic Republic of Iran is keen to host such a meeting and such a gesture of goodwill should be encouraged. UNODC must emphasize this fact to all international partners and encourage meetings of senior law enforcement officers.

#### **7. Donor coordination is poor**

123. Poor donor coordination is something that can be remedied quite easily. UNODC should take the lead in encouraging JCMB to change any unsatisfactory practices. The view was commonly expressed that too much emphasis was placed on results that could be seen, recorded and photographed rather than on ensuring appropriate education, training and mentoring. Donors and politicians need to be informed about the true conditions that prevail in Afghanistan so that clear understanding may guide their generosity. Media reports are selective and often sensational, and they seldom portray a complete and accurate picture of conditions and needs in the country. UNODC could cooperate with UNAMA in making informative films accurately portraying the conditions, needs and circumstances prevailing in Afghanistan. More specifically, every effort must be made to ensure that all partners and donors take a clear and consistent line with regard to their counter-narcotic projects.

#### **8. UNODC is respected and must use its influence**

124. UNODC is a relatively small organization with a small budget considering the needs of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it is respected and has influence that it should continue to use in drawing attention to the enormity of the crisis. There is no guarantee of success, but only a determined and properly coordinated initiative by the international community can help Afghanistan recognize the way forward and embark on the right course of action. UNODC should call on the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan to encourage JCMB to be more diligent in addressing the problems mentioned in this report. A written record should be made of every occasion when such a call is made and of when the issues are discussed with international partners. Such records should detail, for example, the subject matter, the people involved and any measures taken on each occasion.

#### **9. Inappropriate terminology**

125. The term "law enforcement" is probably inappropriate for the conditions prevailing in this country and it would be better simply to refer to "policing" since the term "law enforcement" gives the impression that enforcement is the major consideration when in the long term a police service (as opposed to a police force) for the benefit of the whole community is as important as enforcing laws. There is the impression that CNPA is a paramilitary organization; while it is true that the majority of its operations are of a paramilitary nature, it is wrong to establish in the public mind that all police agencies are a military arm of Government designed to enforce political will. Consideration should be given to changing the terminology currently in use.

## **IV. Recommendations**

### **A. Recommendations to UNODC headquarters, the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and the international community**

#### **Recommendation 1**

126. UNODC, in partnership with UNAMA and donors, should continue to make every effort to persuade the Government of Afghanistan to address corruption. So far, despite all the hard work and commitment directed at targeting the organizers behind the illicit drug trade, the impact of these efforts in the country has been marginal; it will remain so until openness, honesty, integrity and competence prevail at all levels of the administration. In order to do so, UNODC should consider the following steps to address this issue:

(a) Document how the Government of Afghanistan has not addressed or prevented corruption at the institutional level and reinforce policy advocacy through JCMB to influence the Government to take comprehensive remedial measures;

(b) Persuade the Government of Afghanistan to ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruption and provide appropriate technical support to the relevant agencies to support its effective implementation;

(c) Expand the UNODC portfolio through the development of innovative projects in fighting corruption in close consultation with the substantive unit based at headquarters and make a coordinated effort to secure the support of all donors;

(d) Resolve quality-of-life issues, particularly for the border police, by addressing parity of pay and conditions of service between the police and the army. UNODC must continue to pursue this aim vigorously with the Government of Afghanistan.

#### **Recommendation 2**

127. As an immediate step, UNODC should work closely with other key actors (such as the United States, the European Union and UNAMA) to find ways of introducing and financing a coordinated mentoring programme and of bringing an adequate number of mentors to work with police, customs and border officers within key ministries and agencies, while advocating for the long-term need for full-fledged international policing assistance to aid the border police and CNPA.

### **B. Recommendations to UNODC headquarters and the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan**

#### **Recommendation 3**

128. UNODC should consider focusing more on normative work and join efforts with UNAMA and UNDP to reform the Ministry of the Interior and the police force. Specifically, UNODC should:

(a) Adopt a comprehensive approach to a common problem and promote collective strategic planning to enable efficiency in counter-narcotics activities;

(b) Consider, with the international community, the establishment of an independent inspectorate, initially under the supervision of international overseers and later, when conditions allow, of locally appointed and politically independent inspectors;

(c) Promote the idea that all police agencies should be publicly accountable. It is recommended that annual reports be produced, not only to inform the various ministries but also for the public. These reports should be distributed widely, including to the media, so that trust and confidence in the police may be developed.

#### **Recommendation 4**

129. In order to achieve the benchmarks defined in the Afghanistan Compact, UNODC should work in close collaboration with UNAMA, which has a comparative advantage of policy influence and successfully established networks at the provincial level, to raise drug-related issues to the highest levels of the Government of Afghanistan. UNODC should also consider requesting a seat on the JCMB and filling the drug liaison officer position within UNAMA promptly.

#### **Recommendation 5**

130. UNODC should further develop and nurture cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan so that these and other States may cooperate in achieving a common goal. Joint training, meetings of senior law enforcement officers, regular meetings of relevant staff of different country offices to discuss and consider the way forward, are examples of some of the initial steps that could be taken. UNODC has been diligent in promoting such cooperation but must redouble its efforts if success is to be achieved.

#### **Recommendation 6**

131. Consideration should be given to strengthening the programme monitoring function within UNODC. It is suggested that a roving monitoring team perhaps answerable to the Director of the Division of Operations of UNODC should be established to review the progress of all projects and to ensure that they are correctly managed and implemented. Such oversight and feedback to management at the Country Office in Afghanistan could avert many problems.

#### **Recommendation 7**

132. It is recommended that UNODC headquarters should prepare an online database of previous evaluation recommendations that may be consulted whenever a project is being designed and that substantive units based at headquarters, including regional desks, should consult when reviewing any projects for approval.

### **C. Recommendations to the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan**

#### **Recommendation 8**

133. The UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan should actively encourage the transformation of the present police force into a police service rather than a law enforcement arm of the Government by encouraging the public to cooperate with

and support the police and by making efforts to generate public trust and respect for the entire police force in Afghanistan. Specifically, UNODC should:

(a) Implement a pilot project to examine the most effective ways of building public confidence in the police. In that regard, community policing should be seen as a necessity;

(b) Establish of a police-school liaison programme to enable students to learn about problems related to the drug trade and to discourage students from using drugs or becoming in any way involved with them. A CNPA commander in Herat spoke of being involved with 510 parent groups (shuras) and was keen to develop this proposal.

#### **Recommendation 9**

134. UNODC should adopt a long-term project strategy rather than rely on an approach that is fragmented and influenced by donors so that it may work strategically in developing a professionally trained and competent police agency. This will take many years to achieve. UNODC might consider dedicating a staff member to the development of a long-term programme plan, the building of partnerships with relevant institutions and donors, the coordination of UNODC efforts, the retaining of institutional memory and the securing of the expert support available through UNODC headquarters.

#### **Recommendation 10**

135. UNODC should take the lead in developing a comprehensive training plan in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan and relevant partners. Such a plan should address the following core issues: (a) intelligence gathering and analysis; (b) management and administration; and (c) welfare. All training courses should be tested and validated and consideration should be given to introducing certification in key training courses to ensure that trainees acquire desired levels of knowledge and skills. Progress in carrying out joint training courses, at internationally acceptable standards and with neighbouring States, should be encouraged and developed as soon as possible.

#### **Recommendation 11**

136. There is a need to make progress towards the establishment of a national criminal record office and a national fingerprint bureau. International consultants should be hired to advise on how such agencies could develop, also in conjunction with intelligence training. That would take many years but the ground should be prepared and models should be planned to assist the Afghan police in developing international standards of competence.

#### **Recommendation 12**

137. Although the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan is in charge of overall police training in the country, UNODC should consider advocating the need for training, keeping in mind the following issues, which would contribute substantially to raising the level of professionalism and trust between the police forces of different countries:

(a) *Management training.* A major project should target the urgent need for basic training in management and administration for officers in all police forces, starting at fundamental levels and gradually advancing to higher levels of competence;

(b) *Regional training centre.* Every effort should be made to establish and support a regional training centre where officers from countries directly affected by trafficking in drugs from Afghanistan should attend courses on a regular basis. Such a centre would bring benefits by fostering cooperation. The Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (currently supported by UNODC) is an obvious example of such a centre, but there may be others worth emulating, such as the Kunming Academy in China;

(c) *Training coordinator.* Each affected State should appoint a training coordinator. The appointed coordinators should meet regularly to discuss, design and update common training packages with international assistance from drug liaison officers or other mentors;

(d) *Training the trainers.* A cadre of officers capable of training others should be established so that officers in all provinces could benefit from ongoing training courses that utilize the latest information, collected from various sources. The trainers should meet regularly to assess progress, keep the training courses updated and prepare provincial trainers to carry on the work;

(e) *Joint training exercises.* A schedule of regular training sessions and exercises should be prepared to enable the appropriate officers to hone and advance their operational knowledge and skills. Close attention should be paid to those who attend to ensure that all officers benefit from ongoing training at agreed standards. Wherever possible this should involve joint training exercises with colleagues from other countries;

(f) *Crime scenes training.* The police would benefit from training courses given by officers who are experts in crime scenes. A case could be made for introducing such officers to each province, as this would assist with evidence and intelligence gathering, particularly at vehicle checkpoints. A specific training course could be designed through international partners to meet the needs of officers working in Afghanistan and in surrounding countries;

(g) *Continuation and refresher training courses.* These are essential for maintaining professional standards. Simulation exercises could be considered and implemented once basic competence has been established;

(h) *Other issues.* Training must be constantly reviewed and essential matters such as human rights, gender equality and professional integrity should be highlighted. Other, more practical, matters such as first aid training and hygiene are also essential and should not be overlooked;

(i) *Mentoring.* The delivery of this type of support throughout CNPA is vital and must be introduced as soon as possible.

### **Recommendation 13**

138. UNODC should take immediate remedial action to upgrade the CNPA laboratory and train staff to international and legal standards of competence.

Although the phased approach that has been adopted is appropriate for Afghanistan, it is important to develop a plan that clearly outlines the different phases and key targets, ensures a smooth transition from one phase to the next and secures appropriate technical and financial support. A scientific expert should then make a follow-up visit to assess how well the training has been implemented and whether previously reported deficiencies have been addressed.

#### **Recommendation 14**

139. In order to increase awareness about Afghanistan, UNODC should, in conjunction with UNAMA and/or international partners, examine the best way of informing international partners about the situation in Afghanistan, perhaps by preparing and distributing regular film updates that illustrate the immense problems faced by the country. That could help to achieve better informed political and financial support and create international awareness of the difficulties and challenges involved.

#### **Recommendation 15**

140. Although regular update reports are issued for some projects, a formal record of all projects should be kept. Such records would differ from existing regular reports in that they would be in the form of a continuous record, in one document, for the benefit of interested parties. Thus, an evaluator would only need to look through one document instead of having to also consult unrelated documents (some of which are mislaid). Such a document would also be better for the country representative, who could review changes and developments and assess progress more easily. Furthermore, it would provide a simple way for people other than project staff to keep abreast of achievements and potential problems.

#### **Recommendation 16**

141. Anticipating that the handling and disposal of precursor chemicals and seized drugs will become an environmental and public health problem, UNODC should:

- (a) Adapt its guidelines or protocol to the context of Afghanistan and ensure that such changes are implemented;
- (b) Assess different options for the disposal of precursor chemicals and seized drugs, including the establishment of incinerators in the region or at potential target spots;
- (c) Assess the need to train officers in neutralizing precursor chemicals before disposal.

## **V. Conclusions**

142. The law enforcement projects are clearly relevant to Afghanistan and have played an important part in helping the Government of Afghanistan identify the way forward. Foundations are being laid but the enormity of the problem requires immediate and urgent attention. Current policy is to follow a slow and steady course, ensuring that lessons have been fully understood and learned before attempting to advance to the next stage. Such consolidation is vital for building and

creating a successful and operationally efficient agency but time does not allow for the only reaction to be one of slowly developing and pulling together CNPA. Not nearly enough officers are being trained in the skills necessary to have a substantial impact on the illicit drug trade. The current law enforcement strategy is not working sufficiently well and needs to be reviewed. The police must be unified in its counter-narcotics activities. International police aid to the Government of Afghanistan must also be considered and mentoring activities must be expanded or the relevance of UNODC projects will be seriously diminished.

143. The law enforcement projects in Afghanistan have been partially useful. Awareness of what is necessary has been raised but, because of the state of the country and the many obstacles to progress, it is apparent that the projects are not achieving all of their stated aims. Good work has been done and some results have been achieved in pointing the way forward, but much more remains to be done before effectiveness can be claimed. UNODC needs to give thought to an improved strategy for law enforcement issues. Immediate action is required to deal with the worsening drug crisis and long-term development.

144. In terms of training, some progress has been made but in many instances there has also been an almost complete lack of understanding and awareness within CNPA of what is necessary in terms of enabling the counter-narcotics police forces to comply with international standards. Too few officers are being trained to suggest that the projects have resulted in overall efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, some of the ministers of the Government of Afghanistan do not appear determined to ensure successful progress.

145. The commitment of UNODC staff involved in law enforcement in Kabul has been commendable. Staff members have worked enthusiastically to achieve anticipated outcomes and have been unstinting and helpful in sharing information on the projects. There have been some successes and some shortfalls in terms of anticipated outcomes. However, this should be regarded less as failure and more as an important learning process during which professional skills have been enhanced, a common understanding of problems has been established and indicators for future training and development have been identified. All of these need to be refined but all staff members have a clear understanding of the difficult task that confronts them and approach it with enthusiasm. Nonetheless, there was little evidence of systematic and structured communication or coordination between relevant UNODC staff in Kabul and at headquarters in Vienna and, on occasion, it appeared that better contacts may have produced more appropriate results.

## **Annex I**

### **List of persons interviewed**

#### **Afghanistan**

##### **Ministry of Counter-Narcotics**

General Khodaidad, Minister (former Deputy Minister for Policy and Coordination)

A. Omari, Alternative Livelihoods Directorate

##### **Ministry of the Interior**

General Daud, Deputy Minister of Counter-Narcotics

##### **Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development**

A. Rhind

##### **Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan**

Colonel Ibrahim, Head of Intelligence Department

General Asef Jabar Khail, Head of National Interdiction Unit

Major Musbah, Acting Head, CNPA in Herat

Mohammad Naher, National Interdiction Unit

Nangyal, Officer-in-Charge, Precursor Control Unit

Lieutenant Colonel Nangyalai

Mohammed Younis Nazri, National Interdiction Unit

General Rahjoo, Deputy Head

Major Sayed Daud Shariti, Laboratory Head

General Shayesta Torabi, Director

Blackwater counterparts in the Counter-Narcotics Training Unit

##### **Judiciary**

Mohamad Eshaq Aloko, Deputy Attorney General for Investigation Affairs,  
Attorney General's Office

Abdul Salam Azimi, Chief Justice, Supreme Court

Bashir Alimad "Barikzoy" Fazley, General Director for Special Prosecution of  
Counter-Narcotics, Attorney General's Office

Abdul Malik Kamawi, Administrative General of Judiciary, Supreme Court

Colonel Safi, Commander of the Sixth Brigade, Afghanistan Border Police

Noor Mohammed, Head of Section, Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force

Timorshah Mohamad Stanezky, Deputy Attorney General for Counter-Narcotics Affairs, Attorney General's Office

## **Other Government entities**

### **Pakistan**

Brigadier Feroze Muhammad, Defence Attaché, Embassy in Kabul

### **United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

Tom Voase, First Secretary (law enforcement), Embassy in Kabul

### **United States of America**

Curt Maier, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

Kirk E. Meyer, Assistant Country Attaché, DEA

## **United Nations system**

### **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime**

#### *Vienna*

Gautam Babbar, Project Coordinator, Strategic Planning Unit

Doris Buddenberg, Senior Manager, Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (former Representative, UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan)

Sandeep Chawla, Chief, Policy Analysis and Research Branch

Stuart Gilman, Chief, Anti-Corruption Unit

Katharina Kayser, Programme Management Officer, Strategic Planning Unit

Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Chief, Europe and West/Central Asia Section

Timothy Lemay, Chief, Rule of Law Section

Andrea Mancini, Project Coordinator, Europe and West/Central Asia Section

Ian Munro, Chief, Anti-Organized Crime and Law Enforcement Unit

Barbara Remberg, Scientific Affairs Officer, Laboratory and Scientific Section

Saul Takahashi, Drug Control Officer, Convention Evaluation Section, International Narcotics Control Board

Brian Taylor, Chief, Anti-Trafficking Section

Uglješa Zvekić, Chief, Strategic Planning Unit

#### *Afghanistan*

Noor Ali, National Project Coordinator

Elisabeth Bayer, Deputy representative (Officer-in-Charge), former Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer, Europe and West/Central Asia Section, Vienna

Carla Ciavarella, Regional Programme Coordinator, South Eastern Europe Regional Project Office (former Head, Rule of Law Section, UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan)

Patrick Halewood, International Project Coordinator

Radifullah Hamid, National Project Coordinator

Jehanzeb Khan, International Programme Manager, Drug Demand Reduction

Mike Kijowski, Consultant

Joseph Kirincich, International Project Coordinator

Mohammed Naim, National Project Coordinator, Drug Demand Reduction

Eisa Nang, National Project Coordinator

Christina Oguz, Representative

Matteo Pasquali, International Project Expert, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Capacity-Building

Daud Saskai, National Project Coordinator

Alexandre Schmidt, Officer-in-Charge, UNODC Regional Office for the Russian Federation and Belarus (Deputy Representative, UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan)

Nazar Ahmad Shah, Senior National Programme Officer

Sayed Afzal Sherzad, National Project Coordinator

Temur Shah Sultani, National Project Coordinator

## **Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations**

### **Adam Smith International**

Richard Will, Team Leader, Support to Counter-Narcotics Institutions

### **European Commission**

Michael Alexander, Security Sector Reform, Delegation of the European Commission to Afghanistan

## Annex II

### Terms of reference

#### Thematic evaluation of the technical assistance provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

#### I. Background

1. UNODC has been actively supporting the Government of Afghanistan since the inception of the transitional State of Afghanistan in December 2001. It has been working in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations agencies and donors and has been expanding its secretarial role for the relevant ministries (Counter-Narcotics, Interior, Justice, Reconstruction and Rural Development and Public Health).

2. The London Conference adopted the “Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success”,<sup>a</sup> which outlines the priorities and goals for Afghanistan over the next five-year period (2006-2010) mutually agreed between the international community and the Government of Afghanistan. UNODC has developed a Strategic Programme Framework<sup>b</sup> which aims at supporting the Afghanistan Compact. The Strategic Programme Framework equally fits within the National Drug Control Strategy,<sup>c</sup> highlighting four national priorities for the three years (2006-2009). The first is to target the trafficker at the top end of the trade; the second is to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods; the third is to reduce the demand for illicit drugs and improve the treatment of problem drug users; and the final objective is to develop state institutions at the central and the provincial levels vital to the delivery of the narcotics control strategy.

3. Over the years UNODC has provided technical assistance and advice to the Government of Afghanistan through support under country or global projects in five thematic areas or programmes.<sup>d</sup>

*Anti-trafficking:* UNODC builds capacity of the criminal justice system, strengthening counter-narcotics law enforcement, limiting availability of chemicals used in illicit manufacturing of heroin and strengthening border control and cross-border cooperation. The total value of the ongoing and pipeline project is about \$23 million.

*Global challenges:* UNODC builds capacity of national and provincial governments, empowers communities for drug demand reduction and promotes alternative

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<sup>a</sup> Afghanistan Compact, launched at the London Conference on Afghanistan held on 31 January and 1 February 2006 (S/2006/90, annex), available at [http://www.unama-afg.org/news/\\_londonConf/\\_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf](http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf).

<sup>b</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan: Strategic Programme Framework 2006-2010 (September 2006).

<sup>c</sup> National Drug Control Strategy, an updated five-year policy for tackling the illicit drug problem (Kabul, January 2006).

<sup>d</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Programme in Afghanistan (February 2007).

livelihoods for drug control. Presently, assistance is provided through supporting seven ongoing and pipeline projects for a total value of about \$16 million.

*Rule of law:* UNODC promotes stable and viable criminal justice systems and combats the growing threats of transnational organized crime, corruption and trafficking in human beings. Presently there are eight ongoing and pipeline projects with a total value of about \$24 million.

*Terrorism prevention:* The Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC has been mandated by the General Assembly to provide counter-terrorism technical assistance to requesting Member States. In accordance with this mandate, a Global Project was launched with the main objective being to “support Member States in achieving a functional universal legal regime against terrorism in accordance with the principles of the rule of law”. The main activities are the provision of legal advisory services, training of criminal justice officials and assistance for the strengthening of institutional structures and mechanisms in Member States.

*Core programme: research and advocacy:* In order to promote the development and maintenance of a global network of illicit crop monitoring systems in the context of the crop elimination objective of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly devoted to countering the world drug problem together, UNODC has been providing overall coordination and direct technical support and supervision to the annual illicit crop surveys at the country level. Since 2000, the Government of Afghanistan, with the technical support of UNODC, has carried out an annual opium survey and has also carried out a number of rapid assessments. Along with illicit crop monitoring, other research and advocacy initiatives are also major inputs to building the capacity of the Government.

## **II. Purpose of the evaluation**

4. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess how UNODC development cooperation has built the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan in the main areas of UNODC interventions, namely research and analysis, law enforcement, rule of law, terrorism prevention, alternative livelihood and drug demand reduction. The evaluation will draw lessons learned and recommend improvements. At the same time, the evaluation will address the issue of what is the net value added of UNODC’s work and its strategic positioning. The evaluation will:

(a) Provide an assessment of the results achieved through UNODC support (project and non-project activities) and in partnership with other key development actors;

(b) Provide an analysis of how UNODC has positioned itself strategically to add value in response to national needs and changes in the UNODC thematic areas;

(c) Provide an assessment of design, coherence and focus of the country programme;

(d) Provide an analysis of to what extent activities and results are sustainable at their respective levels (communities, intermediate or higher level institutions) and connected to local, regional and national capacities or other forms of external support;

(e) Provide accountability to the UNODC management, Member States and donors;

(f) Based on the analyses of achievements and positioning above, present key findings, draw lessons and provide clear and forward-looking recommendations in order to suggest effective and realistic strategies by UNODC and partners towards intended results.

5. The present evaluation is conducted as part of the 2007 work plan of the Independent Evaluation Unit under in-depth thematic evaluations of UNODC. The Unit will work closely with the Europe and West/Central Asia Section, the Anti-Trafficking Section, the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit, the Global Challenges Section, the Rule of Law Section and the Research Analysis and Scientific Support Unit in Vienna and the Afghanistan Country Office during all phases of the exercise.

### **III. Scope of the evaluation**

6. The evaluation will undertake a comprehensive review of the UNODC Afghanistan Country Office programme portfolio and activities from 2001 until March 2007.

7. The evaluation will measure effects and impacts of the country programme, examine UNODC support to the Government of Afghanistan, assess programme performances and draw lessons and best practices. In addition, the evaluation will concentrate on whether and how UNODC support played a role in developing national capacity, enhancing national ownership, advocating and fostering an enabling policy environment and fostering partnership and coordination throughout the evaluation process.

8. For the purpose of this evaluation, UNODC activities will be grouped into the following categories:

- (a) Positioning of UNODC, policy and overall framework;
- (b) Research and analysis (illicit crop monitoring);
- (c) Law enforcement;
- (d) Rule of law, including terrorism prevention;
- (e) Alternative livelihood development;
- (f) Drug demand reduction.

9. The evaluation will answer the key questions outlined below in its final report. These questions remain generic, but are consistent with standard approaches to programme evaluation. There should be an element of flexibility, as the evaluation progresses, to adjust the evaluation's focus in response to changing circumstances.

10. The consultants selected to prepare the evaluation will be required to develop the specific evaluation questions in the areas mentioned above, based on the following generic questions.

11. The list of key questions follows the evaluation criteria of UNODC.

## **IV. Key evaluation questions**

### **A. Relevance**

**Has UNODC assistance been relevant to the needs and demands of Afghanistan to fight the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs, to monitor and report on production of illicit crops, to prevent terrorism and to strengthen the rule of law on its territory?**

(a) Are objectives of programmes and projects aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of the Government of Afghanistan, UNODC mandates and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and other policy and development frameworks?

(b) Are designs of programmes and projects technically sound? Are the programme and project objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to the achievements of the Strategic Programme Framework, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and other strategic instruments?

(c) Are response activities and implementation strategies appropriate for meeting stated objectives, with a focus on assessing programme and project elements directly related to capacity-building, coordination and subcontractor performance?

(d) Are UNODC assistance activities responsive to the country's needs? How well do the programme and project objectives reflect the specific nature of the problem and needs of the Government of Afghanistan?

(e) Does the Government at the national and local levels take the lead in developing and implementing frameworks and strategies within UNODC's mandated issues?

### **B. Effectiveness**

**Is UNODC's approach and assistance effective in enabling the Government of Afghanistan to fight the illicit drug menace, to establish rule of law and to monitor and report on production of illicit crops?**

(a) To what extent has the UNODC country programme contributed to the achievement of the Afghanistan Compact, the Strategic Programme Framework and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy? What are the reasons for the achievement and non-achievement of objectives?

(b) How is institutional capacity development at the national and subnational levels promoted so as to guarantee rights and provide services, including through strategy development, policy formulation and application, and data collection, analysis and utilization?

(c) To what extent have key skills (e.g. policy formulation, strategic or programme planning, management, analysis, knowledge management, etc.) and specific skills in thematic areas been enhanced?

(d) Have leadership skills been enhanced at the institutional and individual levels in order to drive integrated national (e.g. Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Strategic Programme Framework etc.) and subnational level agendas?

(e) Has there been any improvement in programming in terms of designing, addressing the country problem and producing results over the period under evaluation?

(f) Did integration (intra- and inter-thematic areas) take place while implementing different project activities?

(g) How are internal UNODC factors and constraints affecting effectiveness, including human resources, logistic support and the predictability and regularity of resources and flexibility of the budget?

(h) How are external factors (such as limited access to intervention sites, human resource constraints and the security situation etc.) having an impact on effectiveness?

(i) To what extent did policy and research support and influence the policy framework and intellectual approaches to elimination of illicit drug production and supply, and enhance Government capacity to formulate strategies and monitor drug production and supply?

(j) Is the illicit crop monitoring survey methodology technically sound and does it provide accurate and timely information to the Government and other Member States?

(k) Has UNODC developed the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan and institutions to undertake crop-monitoring surveys on their own?

## **C. Efficiency**

### **How efficient has the implementation of the UNODC programme and projects been?**

(a) Were alternative less costly intervention modalities considered in designing projects? Do they exist?

(b) Are there less costly methods which could achieve the same outcome or impact at the beneficiary level?

(c) To what extent has a transparent operating environment and accountability of Government been established?

(d) To what extent have partnerships been sought with other relevant actors (including United Nations agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?

(e) Is there effective coordination among the Government, UNODC and other implementing partners?

(f) Is the country human resource structure appropriate and efficient?

(g) Assess quality, timeliness, effectiveness and sustainability of management arrangements, technical inputs and assistance;

(h) Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by field and headquarters staff (administrative and managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?

(i) What are the potential challenges that may prevent the operations from producing intended results?

(j) How does illicit crop monitoring assistance enable the Government of Afghanistan to develop its capacity to monitor and report on production of opium poppy?

## **D. Outcome and impact**

### **What impact has UNODC assistance created in Afghanistan?**

(a) What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of interventions on people, institutions and the physical environment?

(b) Do the beneficiaries and other stakeholders affected by the intervention perceive the effect of the interventions on themselves?

(c) What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders, especially the Government of Afghanistan, implementing partners, other United Nations organizations and bilateral and multilateral donors, about the overall impact of UNODC's response activities?

## **E. Sustainability**

### **Are UNODC efforts in Afghanistan sustainable?**

(a) Does the national Government take the lead in developing and implementing frameworks and strategies for eradicating illicit drug production, trafficking in and consumption of illicit drugs, monitoring and reporting on production of illicit crops and strengthening the rule of law on its territory?

(b) Are the UNODC supported policies and strategic issues integrated into the key national development documents?

(c) What are the specific legal, policy and regulatory changes that incorporate issues of UNODC thematic areas?

(d) Do the project interventions have a potential for scaling up or replication?

(e) To what extent have the findings and recommendations from past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified?

(f) How has UNODC ensured that benefits from its assistance continue after UNODC assistance stops?

(g) How was sustainability built into the programme and projects?

## **F. Lessons learned and best practices**

### **Are there any lessons from UNODC involvement in Afghanistan?**

(a) Identify key lessons in the thematic areas of focus and lessons on positioning that can provide a useful basis for strengthening UNODC support to the country and for improving programme and project performances, results and effectiveness in the future;

(b) Through in-depth thematic assessment, present good practices (highlighting features to be considered as good practice) at the country level for learning and replication;

(c) Draw lessons from unintended results where possible.

## **V. Evaluation methodology**

12. The evaluation will take into consideration commonly agreed international evaluation norms and standards, including “Guiding principles for evaluation at UNODC”, “Standards of evaluation in the United Nations system”, “Norms for evaluation in the United Nations system” etc.

13. These evaluation terms of reference provide an overarching framework for the Afghanistan Country Technical Assistance evaluation, covering all UNODC areas of intervention in the country.

14. The Team Leader and team members of the evaluation are expected to assess the terms of reference and develop an evaluation framework with instruments to be discussed and agreed on by UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit. The evaluation framework should be flexible enough to accommodate any adjustment necessary due to the volatile political and security situation of Afghanistan and produce the best possible output.

15. The suggested key methods for the conduct of the evaluation will be, but should not be limited to, the following:

(a) A historical and contextual review of each of the thematic areas, e.g. the problem of illicit drugs in Afghanistan, as well as a review of any current special conditions in Afghanistan that require allowances to be made;

(b) A comprehensive desk review of external and internal policy, programme and project documents (including evaluation reports) relevant to UNODC assistance to Afghanistan. This will include a review of official documents, budgets, reports, websites and publications that deal with UNODC assistance to Afghanistan;

(c) Review the country programme and project planning, implementation and monitoring mechanisms;

(d) An extensive round of interviews and focus group discussions with the key stakeholders (Government, donors, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations organizations etc.) at both national and subnational levels and UNODC staff at headquarters and in the Afghanistan Country Office;

(e) Interviews of former representatives and former employees of UNODC (where possible) who can provide insights about some of the early challenges;

(f) Field visits to the selected project sites to gain first-hand information of the benefits received due to UNODC interventions;

(g) A survey among staff members of the UNODC Afghanistan Country Office involved in project implementation and project support.

16. The evaluation will be a participatory process that will give due importance to self-assessment by stakeholders involved in programme design and implementation. All information will, to the largest possible extent, be triangulated (use of three or more sources of information to verify and substantiate an assessment) and validated. Findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned should be clearly action-oriented and feed into major decision-making for future strategy and programme development.

17. The suggested selection criteria for field visits (one or more of the following criteria) are:

(a) The maturity of the programme, project or intervention within the country programme;

(b) The wealth of experience and the chances of generating interesting lessons;

(c) Strategic interest of the programme, project or intervention;

(d) Significant UNODC contribution, both financial and human resources.

## **VI. Evaluation team**

18. The evaluation will be carried out by a technical team of six international consultants and an Evaluation Officer of the Independent Evaluation Unit.

19. One of the consultants, who has demonstrated experience in development evaluation, the United Nations system and the specific area of alternative development, will be the Team Leader.

20. The five other consultants will be specialized in relation to specific thematic areas (one on law enforcement and prevention of drug trafficking, one on the rule of law, one on drug demand reduction and two on illicit crop monitoring).

### **A. Responsibilities and qualifications of the Team Leader**

21. The key responsibilities of the Team Leader include:

(a) Developing the evaluation framework with detailed methods, tools and techniques;

(b) Leading the evaluation process;

(c) Assigning responsibilities to team members;

(d) Ensuring adherence to the terms of reference and writing and disseminating reports;

(e) In addition, the Team Leader is responsible for evaluation of cross-cutting issues, such as alignment of the country programme with national, United Nations Development Assistance Framework and UNODC strategies, partnerships etc.

22. The qualifications required of the Team Leader are as follows:

(a) Preferably an advanced university degree in social science or other relevant discipline, with specialized training in areas such as evaluation, social statistics, quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis;

(b) Design and management of evaluation processes, including evaluation processes involving multiple stakeholders and post conflict situations;

(c) Policy planning and policy analysis;

(d) Social science research in alternative development;

(e) Previous work, research and evaluation experience in Afghanistan (desirable);

(f) Knowledge of the United Nations or international development organizations (preferable);

(g) Understanding of gender considerations;

(h) Fluency in English and excellent writing skills.

## **B. Responsibilities and qualifications of the consultants**

23. The key responsibilities of the team members are to:

(a) Support the evaluation Team Leader in developing evaluation methods and tools;

(b) Conduct evaluation of policy, strategy and interventions in their specific thematic area;

(c) Write the thematic area report and perform any other tasks given by the Team Leader.

24. The qualifications required of the team members are as follows:

(a) Preferably have an advanced university degree specific to the thematic area under evaluation or other relevant discipline. Specialized training in areas such as evaluation; quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis would be an asset;

(b) Must have experience in planning, programme management and evaluation of projects, programmes and policy in the broader rule of law sphere, including criminal justice systems;

(c) Previous work, research and evaluation experience in Afghanistan (desirable);

- (d) Knowledge of the United Nations or international development organizations (desirable);
- (e) Understanding of gender considerations;
- (f) Fluency in English and excellent writing skills.

25. The Evaluation Officers of the Independent Evaluation Unit will work as full members of the team and will bring to the team knowledge of country programme evaluation methodology and knowledge of UNODC’s operations and its thematic areas.

## VII. Management arrangements and deliverables

26. The Independent Evaluation Unit will manage the evaluation and ensure coordination and liaison with the relevant regional desk at headquarters. The Independent Evaluation Unit Task Manager, in consultation with the Chief of the Unit, will lead the process, in close consultation with the regional desk and the country management team (Representative and Evaluation Focal Person). The Chief of the Independent Evaluation Unit and the Task Manager will also ensure substantive supervision of all members of the evaluation team and determine the team composition.

27. The UNODC Country Office will play a lead role in dialogue and interaction with stakeholders on the findings and recommendations, support the evaluation team in liaison with the key partners and discussions with the team, and make available to the team all relevant material. The country office will provide support for logistics and planning.

28. The Independent Evaluation Unit will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the evaluation. These will include costs related to participation of the evaluation consultants and the staff members of the Unit and to any stakeholder workshops during the evaluation mission.

### A. Key deliverables

29. The evaluation team is expected to deliver key outputs shown in the table below.

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>Responsibilities</i>
An inception report containing an assessment of the terms of reference and a description of the final evaluation methodology and instruments	The Team Leader will be in charge of drafting the report, with inputs from the other four team members on their specific thematic area.
Draft reports of thematic evaluations	Each of the five team members will prepare a report covering his specific thematic area.
Final reports of thematic evaluations	Each of the five team members will prepare a report covering his specific thematic area.
Draft country assistance evaluation report	The Team Leader will be in charge of drafting the report, with inputs from the other four team members on their specific thematic area.

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>Responsibilities</i>
Final country assistance evaluation report	The Team Leader will be in charge of drafting the report, with inputs from the other four team members on their specific thematic area.

30. The evaluation team members will hold a feedback session and present the initial findings in a workshop format to the country management team after completion of the field mission in Afghanistan. The evaluation Task Manager and the Chief of the Independent Evaluation Unit will attend and participate in the presentation and feedback workshop.

31. Once the Team Leader submits the first draft evaluation report, the report will be examined by the Independent Evaluation Unit for quality and fulfilment of the terms of reference.

32. The Independent Evaluation Unit will organize a dissemination session to present the draft report at UNODC headquarters and to the Afghanistan Country Office and stakeholders for feedback, comments and any correction of potential errors or omissions.

33. The Team Leader will receive the comments of the Independent Evaluation Unit and UNODC programme staff and stakeholders and, subject to agreement with the comments made, will adjust the report accordingly and send the final report to the Independent Evaluation Unit.

## **B. Timetable and key milestones**

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Milestones</i>
March-May 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Circulation of the draft terms of reference to the relevant headquarters desk and Country Office for comments</li> </ul>
May-July 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finalization of terms of reference</li> <li>• Recruitment of consultants</li> <li>• Briefing on Afghanistan country programme at headquarters</li> <li>• Assessment of terms of reference and development of evaluation methodology, with appropriate instruments</li> </ul>
July-November 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Independent review by the evaluation team (headquarters and country mission)</li> <li>• Team Leader travels to London to meet the peer reviewer</li> </ul>
November-December 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Submission of draft report by the evaluation team</li> <li>• Briefing on draft evaluation findings and recommendations</li> <li>• Circulation of draft report for feedback</li> </ul>
February 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Submission of final report</li> </ul>

## **C. Payment**

34. The consultants will be issued a consultancy contract and paid in accordance with United Nations rules and procedures.

35. A lump sum payment will be made in three instalments:

(a) First payment will be made upon signing the contract (travel expenses and 75 per cent of daily subsistence allowance);

(b) Second payment (50 per cent of the consultancy fee and 25 per cent of daily subsistence allowance) will be made upon receipt of the draft report by the Independent Evaluation Unit;

(c) The third and final payment (50 per cent, i.e. remaining fee) will be made only after completion of the respective tasks and receipt of the final report and its clearance by the Independent Evaluation Unit.





UNITED NATIONS  
*Office on Drugs and Crime*

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