TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Project Number
AD/RER/01/F35

Project Title
STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITIES FOR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE IN SOUTH – EASTERN EUROPE

Thematic Area
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

Countries Involved
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, BULGARIA, CROATIA, FYR OF MACEDONIA, ROMANIA, SERBIA & MONTENEGRO, SLOVENIA.

Funding
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, HUNGARY AND THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN

Report of Roger Britton
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNDCP</td>
<td>United Nations Drug Control Programme</td>
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<td>RPO</td>
<td>Regional Project Office (Sofia)</td>
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<td>FOU</td>
<td>Field Operations Unit (Sofia)</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Project Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>NPO</td>
<td>National Project Officer</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
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<td>CIU</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>RIU</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Intelligence Officer</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>SaM</td>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland Hungary Assistance for Restructuring the Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISNIC</td>
<td>Criminal Information System for National and international Co-operation</td>
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<td>NDIC</td>
<td>National Drugs Intelligence Centre (Sofia)</td>
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<td>NDIU</td>
<td>National Drugs Intelligence Unit (Zagreb)</td>
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<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>IALEIA</td>
<td>International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force (BiH)</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission (BiH)</td>
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<td>NCIS</td>
<td>National Criminal Intelligence Service, UK</td>
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<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime Agency, UK</td>
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Disclaimer

Independent Project Evaluations are scheduled and managed by the project managers and conducted by external independent evaluators. The role of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) in relation to independent project evaluations is one of quality assurance and support throughout the evaluation process, but IEU does not directly participate in or undertake independent project evaluations. It is, however, the responsibility of IEU to respond to the commitment of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in professionalizing the evaluation function and promoting a culture of evaluation within UNODC for the purposes of accountability and continuous learning and improvement.

Due to the disbandment of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) and the shortage of resources following its reinstitution, the IEU has been limited in its capacity to perform these functions for independent project evaluations to the degree anticipated. As a result, some independent evaluation reports posted may not be in full compliance with all IEU or UNEG guidelines. However, in order to support a transparent and learning environment, all evaluations received during this period have been posted and as an on-going process, IEU has begun re-implementing quality assurance processes and instituting guidelines for independent project evaluations as of January 2011.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3.1 Criminal intelligence is widely recognised as an essential tool for law enforcement in the fight against serious and organised crime. Intelligence-led techniques are widely practiced throughout the EU and elsewhere in the developed world, and there are clear and widespread strategic and operational benefits to be gained from assisting the countries of South-Eastern Europe in the development of their criminal intelligence infrastructure. Project AD/RER/01/F35 – *Strengthening of Capacities for Collection and Analysis of Criminal Intelligence in South-eastern Europe* (hereafter referred to as Project F35) aimed to provide assistance in the development and upgrading of national capacities for collection and analysis of criminal intelligence. Seven countries in South-Eastern Europe were identified for Project F35, namely Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro (SaM), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Romania and Slovenia.

3.2 Six key objectives were identified to form the framework criteria for Project F35. They were as follows;

Objective 1: Establishment of a National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Objective 2: Establishment of a National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Objective 3: Expansion of the Criminal Intelligence System for National and International Co-operation (CISNIC) in Bulgaria, Romania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Objective 4: Strengthening of the National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in Croatia

Objective 5: Strengthening of the National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in Slovenia.

Objective 6: Professional Networking of Operational Intelligence Analysts and Development of a Coordinated and Sustainable Analytical Capacity in South-Eastern Europe

3.3 In setting the objectives, it was recognised that whilst certain requirements were mirrored in some or all of the countries involved, equally there was some specialised, country specific, assistance required in others areas to allow the overarching objectives of Project F35 to be realised. It was recognised that the criminal intelligence infrastructure in Croatia and Slovenia was already relatively advanced, but would benefit particularly from advanced training and equipment. Previous work on criminal intelligence had been carried out by UNDCP in Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM under a joint UNDCP-PHARE project (AD/RER/99/D41) which ran from 1999 until May 2002, and was involved in the strengthening of drug law enforcement capability in Bulgaria, Romania and the FYR of Macedonia. So project F35 was able to build upon the results already achieved by this previous project in these countries. The least developed of the participating countries in terms of
criminal intelligence capacity, were SaM and BiH – and it was recognised from the outset that these countries required more assistance than the other five.

3.4 The specific aims of the Project were to provide intelligence awareness training at the front line, multi-step training in criminal intelligence analysis at regional and national levels and where appropriate to complement these activities with the provision of computers, analytical software and electronic communication tools. Other planned activities included assistance in the identification of premises and the recruitment of suitable staff where necessary.

3.5 The project was launched in June 2002, effectively ended at the end of 2005 and was formally closed in December 2006.

3.6 A mid-term review was conducted by an officer from the UK National Criminal Intelligence Service, Phillip Powell, in June 2003. His report informed on progress and made a number of recommendations, most of which were implemented during the second half of the project. At that time he found the project to be largely achieving its objectives within budget and to the planned timescale. There were significant delays in Bulgaria and Slovenia due to the belated ratification of the project document in those countries, but, as is indicated in this report, considerable effort was made during the second half of the project to make up for lost time, and rapid progress was subsequently made in both countries. Specific reference was made at the mid-term stage to the effectiveness of the project management – from the Project Co-ordinator, to the National Project Officers and the designated Liaison Officers. This report endorses that assessment (see para 3.13 below).

3.7 This report is a final evaluation, the author also having worked until recently for the UK National Criminal Intelligence Service – providing continuity with the mid-term review. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide an external assessment of terminal progress in Project implementation and the impact of delivered assistance. The specific objective is to assess the progress in implementation of Project Objectives in terms of the quality of inputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities carried out under the auspices of the Project. The evaluator is also tasked with assessing the degree to which the Project has achieved UNODC Drug Control Objectives, assessing the likely sustainability of Project Results and making appropriate recommendations based on positive or negative impacts of the Project and commenting on any significant unexpected effects, whether of beneficial or detrimental character.

3.8 Prior to the start of Project F35 – the impact of intelligence led policing on the fight against organised crime in South East Europe was relatively limited. It is my assessment that at the conclusion of, and with major input from Project F35 – criminal intelligence now plays a significant role in Law Enforcement in all seven countries. Senior managers in all participating countries are now aware of and supportive of the principles of intelligence led policing and there are well equipped and staffed central and regional intelligence units in place in each country, with a large degree of connectivity between them. There have been significant results in terms of disruption of Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) and arrests of their members, due to unilateral, bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations resulting from intelligence. This project has helped to change the face of policing in the region, bringing it closer to the principles that were already widely accepted and practised in the EU and in other developed countries.

3.9 In addition to the direct impacts of the Project, it has in turn generated a number of other criminal intelligence related projects and activities in the region, many of which
are still ongoing (including some being project managed by the UNODC) and has left a firm foundation for the national agencies themselves to build upon.

3.10 In general terms, I believe that there is a tangible will in the region, within law enforcement and in particular its senior management, to continue with and build upon the activities carried out by the Project. This is being and will be supported by ongoing and future project work and assistance both within and outside the auspices of the UNODC.

3.11 However, verbal and ideological support doesn’t always translate into concrete financial and operational commitment, and there are areas of concern. One specific worry is the sustainability of analytical software tools such as i2 Analysts Notebook. In order to ensure that licences are renewed, as they must be on an annual basis, long term financial commitments are required on behalf of the governments of the participating countries. Limited funding to law enforcement in some of the countries may jeopardise this sustainability and the situation will need to be monitored by the international community, pressure applied on senior management and/or additional funding secured or alternative software solutions found.

3.12 Even where there is commitment from law enforcement, political factors can cause delays in the implementation of project objectives and dilution of impact due to reassignment of senior staff and unhelpful rivalry between law enforcement agencies. In this region, this is difficult either to factor in to project proposals or to avoid during implementation. High level lobbying by donors and by senior management of the implementing organisation can, however, help to minimise the disruptive effect of these issues.

3.13 Despite best efforts to ensure that officers trained under the auspices of the Project remained in active criminal intelligence roles, and that full use was made of those individuals who received training for trainers, there were cases where officers were moved to other positions such that the experience and knowledge gained under the Project was to a greater or lesser extent, lost. It is difficult to completely prevent the reassignment of staff in this way, but perhaps a more rigorous selection process could have been imposed, and greater emphasis placed on persuading senior and middle management of the importance of specialisation in this field of work within law enforcement agencies.

3.14 While important steps have been taken during the project towards greater cooperation and exchange of intelligence between the national law enforcement agencies in the region, there is much work still to be done on this. Integrity issues are recognised, but should not prevent this co-operation. Barriers of mistrust do still exist, as do legislative constraints – so time and effort is required to surmount these problems. International assistance in general, and the UNODC in particular, has a vital role to play here.

3.15 The Regional Project Coordinator has played a vital role in the continuous monitoring of this project. Having a Project Manager with a law enforcement background based within the region, with the capacity and commitment to regularly visit the participating countries and to liaise with law enforcement officers at all levels, was an essential part of the its success. Given the complexity of the Project and the great variation in the degree of development, the political and law enforcement structure and the specific needs of the participating countries, it is difficult to envisage how any alternative approach could have succeeded. Credit must also be given in the success of the Project to the role of the National Project Officers in BiH and FYROM, the Project Liaison Officers who were appointed from within national law enforcement
agencies in each country to provide points of contact for the Project Manager and the Project Steering Committee, which included representatives of the beneficiaries, the implementers and the donors.

3.16 Considerable effort was made to liaise with other national and international agencies and organisations and to support and encourage the development of bi-lateral relationships between them and the national agencies from individual participating countries. This was a constructive initiative, adds value to the work of the UNODC, and should be praised and encouraged.

3.17 It was recognised by the project management that some of the participating countries (notably Croatia) – which were relatively more advanced in the development of their criminal intelligence capacity - could as well as benefiting from the Project, also provide assistance in their own right to other participating countries. As well as benefiting other participating countries, this also reinforced the networking between the countries which was already being facilitated by the Project.

3.18 It also became evident during the project that due to the complexities of criminal intelligence techniques and the total sea change that is required in law enforcement thinking to completely embrace the principles of intelligence led policing – longer term, locally based expert advice would be greatly beneficial. Therefore during the course of the project the UNODC was and still is actively involved either in directly running projects involving the posting of in country advisors or in supporting similar projects. This has proved beneficial both to Project 35 and to UNODC activities in the region in general.

3.19 It is my opinion that there is a need for more capacity work in the region in the criminal intelligence field – particularly in areas such as human smuggling / trafficking and cocaine trafficking, for which limited international resources have so far been committed and for which there is evident need. Also more work needs to be done in developing the criminal intelligence infrastructure in the regional centres and at the BCPs. Moreover, despite the extensive program of training at all levels that was carried out under Project F35 – there is still training needed in all of the participating countries to develop fully functioning criminal intelligence systems that are networked and cascaded across the whole of their territory. Not only does the infrastructure need to be in place – but the principles of intelligence led policing have to be accepted across the board and every law enforcement officer has to be involved in the collection of criminal intelligence as well as being end users of intelligence product. The UNODC has an important potential role to play in these activities.

3.20 The overall conclusion of this evaluation is that Project F35 was a notable success. The current situation in the participating countries with regard to infrastructure, equipment, training and general awareness of criminal intelligence and the benefits of criminal led policing is significantly more advanced than it was at the start of the Project due directly to the activities carried out and the funding provided under the auspices of the Project.
INTRODUCTION

4.1 Background and Context

4.1.1 Intelligence-led law enforcement is recognised amongst law enforcement professionals as the most efficient methodology for the disruption of serious and organised crime. Transition to intelligence-led techniques through the strengthening and networking of criminal intelligence analysis is an accepted strategic objective of EU Member States. The aim of this Project was to provide assistance to then seven countries in South-Eastern Europe in the development and upgrading of national capacities for the collection, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence.

4.1.2 The Project followed on from a previous joint UNDP-PHARE project (AD/RER/99/D41) which ran from 1999 until May 2002, and was involved in the strengthening of drug law enforcement capability in Bulgaria, Romania and the FYR of Macedonia. The terminal evaluation of that project reported that its objectives were largely achieved but made a number of recommendations for further activities, some of which are embodied in the current project. Other capacity building activities in the region had been (and continue to be) carried out in the framework of EU twinning and by other organisations / agencies such as ICITAP, OSCE, UK NCIS, the Australian Federal Police and SIDA. The UNODC and the UNDCP in the past have and do co-ordinate their activities with these other donors.

4.1.3 The Project Document identified six key objectives to form the framework criteria for the Project (see Section 5). These objectives took into account the fact that at that time there was a wide variation in the degree of development of criminal intelligence systems and structures in the seven countries. It was recognised, therefore, that the activities carried out under the auspices of the Project needed to be tailored to the specific needs of each individual country, but at the same time it was understood that there were requirements mirrored in each country which provided scope for joint training, establishment of common guidelines etc. More detailed needs analyses were carried out as the Project progressed, allowing country specific work plans to be formulated.

4.1.4 Funding for the Project was provided by the governments of United Kingdom, Hungary and the Principality of Liechtenstein.

4.1.5 The specific aims of the Project were to provide intelligence awareness training at the front line, multi-step training in criminal intelligence analysis at regional and national levels and where appropriate to complement these activities with the provision of computers, analytical software and electronic communication tools. Other planned activities included assistance in the identification of premises and the recruitment of suitable staff where necessary.

4.1.6 The initial emphasis of the Project was on the development of intelligence units specifically for the investigation of serious drug trafficking. However, it became clear as the Project progressed that in some countries it was more appropriate that criminal intelligence units with responsibility for all forms of serious and organised crime be developed.

4.1.7 The Project was originally planned to commence in October 2001 and to last for 27 months (i.e. until the end of 2003). In the end the project was not operationally
launched until June 2002, effectively ended at the end of 2005 and was formally closed in December 2006. Due to delays in some of the participating countries with the ratification of the Project Document, acquisition of accommodation and other logistical factors and localised issues – it was agreed that the duration of the Project be extended in order that objectives could be met. The revised plan was to coincide its completion in December 2005 with the launching of UNODC Project FS/SCG/S29, which involved the posting of a Criminal Intelligence Advisor to the Ministries of Interior of Serbia and Montenegro. The aim was to formally complete F35 and launch S29 at a Regional Intelligence Conference in Belgrade. In the event, due to delays in recruiting the criminal intelligence expert for Project S29, the Regional Intelligence Conference was postponed and finally took place in Belgrade from 12-13 December 2006. The Conference included presentations about the achievements of the Project from all the participating countries as well as the formal donation of the Criminal Intelligence Training Manuals, which had been developed jointly by all the countries involved.

4.2 Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

4.2.1 The purpose of this evaluation is to provide an external assessment of terminal progress in Project implementation and the impact of delivered assistance.

4.2.2 The specific objective is to assess the progress in implementation of Project Objectives in terms of the quality of inputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities carried out under the auspices of the Project. The evaluator is also tasked with assessing the degree to which the Project has achieved UNODC Drug Control Objectives.

4.2.3 Other objectives of the evaluation are to assess the likely sustainability of Project Results, to make appropriate recommendations based on positive or negative impacts of the Project and to comment on any significant unexpected effects, whether of beneficial or detrimental character.

4.2.4 The Terms of Reference for this Evaluation are attached at Annex A.

4.3 Executing Modality / Management Arrangements

4.3.1 The execution of the Project was monitored by the Programme Steering Committee (PSC), which was a tri-partite body composed of representatives of the beneficiaries, the implementers and the donors. In practice it was comprised of senior law enforcement representatives involved in the Project from each of the participating countries, the appointed PLOs and NPOs and the Project Manager (see below), together with representatives of the Donors. The PSC met every 6 months for the first three years of the Project and thereafter every 12 months and was responsible for monitoring the outcome and impact of activities and ensuring that the objectives of the Project were being met. The members of the PSC also received regular reports from the Project Manager.

4.3.2 The Project Manager was Mark Stanley, the Regional Project Co-ordinator based at the UNDCP Field Operations Unit (FOU) which in 2002 became the UNODC Regional Project Office (RPO) for South East Europe in Sofia. He was responsible for the day to day implementation of the Project activities and the provision of regular reports to the PSC.

4.3.3 A further layer of support was provided by the establishment of a network of Project Liaison Officers (PLOs) in each of the participating countries, designated and funded
by the respective Ministries of Interior and of UNDCP National Project Officers (NPOs) in BiH and FYROM.

4.3.4 This was an extremely complicated Project to implement and manage. The enthusiasm, commitment and operational experience of the Project Manager, supported by the RPO, PSC, PLOs and NPOs has ensured that a consistently high standard of management and effective implementation of activities has been maintained throughout the duration of the Project.

4.4 Scope of the Evaluation

4.4.1 This evaluation is a selective investigation into the achievements of the Project and the degree to which its objectives were met. It includes conclusions and recommendations for follow up activities.

4.4.2 Due to the variation in the development of the criminal intelligence infrastructure and the differing specific needs of each participating country – parts of this report are divided into sub-sections to include specific comments on each country.

4.5 Methodology

4.5.1 All relevant documents connected to the Project – including Progress Reports, Activity Summaries, Work Plans, Training and Equipment Donation Summaries etc. were made available for the evaluation.

4.5.2 I visited the RPO in Sofia and was briefed by the Regional Project Co-ordinator (RPC) and also spoke to the UNODC Administrative Assistant who was involved in the Project throughout its duration.

4.5.3 I also attended the Regional Criminal Intelligence Conference in Belgrade on 12 – 13 December 2006, during which presentations were given by representatives of all of the countries who participated in the Project. During the Conference I had the opportunity to speak to the delegations from each country – which in most cases included the PLO and the PSC Representative.

4.5.4 A list of persons consulted, and the organisations / countries they represent, is attached at Annex B.
5. **ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS**

5.1 **Overall Performance Assessment**

5.1.1 As stated in the introduction, the Project followed on from a previous joint UNDCP-PHARE project (AD/RER/99/D41) which was involved in the strengthening of drug law enforcement capability (including criminal intelligence) in Bulgaria, Romania and the FYR of Macedonia. Amongst the recommendations in the Terminal Evaluation of that report was the following (inter alia):

> ‘National and regional co-operation is at best patchy. Some clear tensions exist in the roles and responsibilities of the agencies and this impacts the delivery of intelligence product. That in turn is reflected in achievement………. These concerns need to be addressed nationally and regionally, possibly through the creation of law enforcement support networks ……..’

5.1.2 It was recognised at the conclusion of Project D41 that there was scope for further assistance in the development of criminal intelligence capacities in the three countries participating in that project but also in the wider South East Europe region.

5.1.3 The key objectives and the degree to which they were achieved are outlined country by country in the next sub-section, but the overarching aim of the Project was to provide assistance for the strengthening and upgrading of national capacities for collection and analysis of criminal intelligence, primarily in support of major drug-related investigations. In order to achieve this, a broad support package was proposed, including intelligence awareness training at the front line and technical intelligence training at the national and regional level, together with the provision of equipment.

5.1.4 The overall assessment is that the Project has successfully combined bespoke training and equipment packages for all participating countries – with regional activities that have significantly enhanced the co-operation between law enforcement agencies in South East Europe. It was clear to me, from the interaction between the representatives of the participating countries at the aforementioned Regional Intelligence Conference in December 2006, that strong personal and professional relationships had been developed between the participating countries as a result of joint Project activities.

5.1.5 The development of intelligence led law enforcement is evidently benefiting the law enforcement agencies in the region, and the statistics provided about successful intelligence led operations bear testament to this. There is less direct evidence of regional intelligence operations, but it is my view that the level of regional co-operation developed by Project – which in itself was ground breaking – has laid a solid foundation for future joint working activities, and perhaps for future projects to build upon.

5.2 **Attainment of the Objectives**

5.2.1 The overarching purpose of the Project was to meet UNODC Drug Control Objectives; more specifically ‘To achieve measurable progress in the efficiency and effectiveness of European criminal investigations aimed at the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking and other criminal organisations’. The country by country summary in Section 6 of intelligence led operations directly related to
Project activities, which culminated in arrests and prosecutions, provides tangible evidence of the achievement of this Objective.

5.2.2 There were six immediate objectives, divided into three tracks, each with separate allocated funding and each with a specified duration. The Project Document was arranged in this way in order to provide for the possible situation whereby funding could not be obtained for the entire Project, in which case each track could be implemented in isolation, in order of priority. In the event that funding for the entire Project could be found, the three tracks could be run in parallel and could include activities which crossed over between them. The tracks and objectives were as follows:

**Track 1:** *Priority Establishment of National Drugs Intelligence Units in South-Eastern Europe*

Objective 1: Establishment of a National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Objective 2: Establishment of a National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Track 2:** *Regional Networking of Drugs Intelligence Analysts*

Objective 6: Professional Networking of Operational Intelligence Analysts and Development of a Coordinated and Sustainable Analytical Capacity in South-Eastern Europe

**Track 3:** *Expansion and Strengthening of Existing National Drugs Intelligence Units in South-Eastern Europe*

Objective 3: Expansion of the Criminal Intelligence System for National and International Co-operation (CISNIC) in Bulgaria, Romania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Objective 4: Strengthening of the National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in Croatia

Objective 5: Strengthening of the National Drugs Intelligence Capacity and Operational Analysis in Slovenia.

Track 1 was considered the highest priority, given the relative lack of development of criminal intelligence capacity in FRY and BiH. Track 2 was considered the second priority given the identified need for greater regional co-operation and co-ordination in this area of law enforcement and Track 3 was considered the lowest priority given the relatively advanced criminal intelligence infrastructure in Croatia and Slovenia and the previous work that had been done by UNDCP in Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM under Project D41. As it turned out, funding was secured for all 3 tracks, they were run in parallel and joint activities were carried out in accordance with the aims of the Project.

5.2.3 There follows a country by country assessment of the extent to which these objectives were achieved. Before the Project was actually started FRY was renamed as Serbia and Montenegro (in March 2003) and subsequently (in May 2006) the two countries became independent. Even before FRY ceased to exist, the Law Enforcement Agencies of the two Republics were autonomous and so Serbia and
Montenegro are treated separately for the purposes of this report. Republika Srpska is covered separately from the Federation of BiH because their Police and Customs Services operate more or less independently, and they received separate training and equipment under the Project. Although Kosovo was not a beneficiary of the project – given the specific role of the UN in the province - the Project did co-ordinate its activities with the activities of the UN and other international / national organisations there, and therefore it is also covered briefly under a separate heading.

5.2.4 This section contains a general overview of the degree to which Project objectives have been met. More specific activity results such as the number of personnel trained and impacts such as increases in drug detection rates, prosecutions etc. related directly to Projects activities are detailed later in the report.

5.2.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation)

The presence of UNMIBH, IPTF and ICITAP in BiH meant that a significant amount of work had taken place prior to the commencement of the Project. However, a number of shortcomings and inconsistencies in previous technical assistance in this field were identified. The Project attempted to assist in the setting up of properly functional criminal intelligence units at the Federation cantonal police centres and the headquarters in Sarajevo, and to install the necessary hardware and software to link the two levels. Some progress was made, but achieving full connectivity within the Federation and identifying / recruiting suitable staff was hampered by the need to co-ordinate with the aforementioned international organisations (and later with the EUPM which took over from UNMIBH and IPTF in 2003) and by the complexities of the political situation. And whilst awareness training has increased the knowledge of, and trust in the value of, criminal intelligence amongst senior officers, there is still some resistance and the aforementioned logistical constraints have limited the potential to implement the necessary changes to fully utilise the equipment and training provided by the Project. There are currently 91 police officers involved in criminal intelligence work throughout the 10 Cantons in the Federation, of which 10 are trained analysts. There have been problems with trained analysts and trainers being moved on to other areas of work. There are also problems of communication between the Cantonal Police and the recently established State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA). SIPA has its main office in Sarajevo and 4 regional offices – with a total of 30 staff involved in criminal intelligence – but there is mistrust and rivalry between the two, and little sharing of intelligence. Also SIPA have recruited some already trained analysts from the Cantonal Police. Good working relationships have been developed with colleagues from other participating countries, but these are mainly just on a personal level. Formal exchange of intelligence has been limited.

5.2.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska)

The political situation in Republika Srpska was less complicated and progress was made more quickly. The Project assisted in successfully installing a network system linking the analytical capabilities internally and at the regional level into the CIU. This greatly enhanced the functionality of the already established structure. Although full connectivity has not yet been achieved and the process of back record conversion has not yet been completed - significant progress has been made in terms of technical development and computerisation of existing data. Also a structured network of criminal intelligence officers has been set up, with the help of the Project in recruitment and training, so that there are 2 trained intelligence officers (IOs) at the Criminal Police headquarters in Banja Luka and 86 IOs based in the 5 regional Public Security Centres (PCSs). In general terms, the Project has facilitated the regular
exchange of intelligence and analytical products with Project partners and with law enforcement agencies from EU and other countries. Furthermore, the acceptance of senior police officers in the concept of intelligence led policing has developed, leading to an increase in the resources allocated – with positive operational outcomes.

5.2.7 Bulgaria

There was a delay in instigating Project activities in Bulgaria because the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior failed to fully ratify the Project document until April 2003, so very little could be done for the first 10 months. However, once the ratification had taken place, progress was rapid, and the foundation established by previous UNDCP activities was built upon. The National Drug Intelligence Centre had been established in Sofia in January 2000 and UNDCP had contributed significantly to its creation and development, by providing a modern computerised criminal intelligence system (CISNIC) and training for its operators and intelligence analysts under Project D41. Project F35 provided further technical training and awareness seminars for senior management, enhancing both capability and high level commitment to intelligence led policing in Bulgaria. Prior to 2003 there were 30 trained analysts in Bulgaria, compared to 160 on completion of the Project. Cascade training is carried out to new recruits, as a result of the training for trainers carried out under the auspices of the Project. The regular exchange of intelligence and analytical products with Project partners and with law enforcement agencies from EU and other countries has developed as a direct outcome of Project activities, and the commitment of senior police officers has led to an increase in the resources allocated to intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination – with positive consequences in terms of the number of analytical products, arrests and prosecutions.

5.2.8 Croatia

In Croatia there was already a well developed criminal intelligence system in place prior to the instigation of the Project. The Department of Criminal Intelligence Analytics was established in 2001 and there was a National Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) of the Criminal Police. There was strong senior management support for the principals and concepts of intelligence led policing and a committed and professional central intelligence unit. However, the Project was able to assist in providing IT equipment and 20 analytical software licences. The Project also funded a study trip to NCIS UK, which was an important factor in the realisation of the an EU sponsored Twinning Project between Croatia and NCIS UK, which was ratified in June 2003, commenced in September 2005 (after delays in recruiting an international consultant) and is still ongoing. There are now 60 trained analysts working at the central units and at 20 RIUs. For its part – Croatia provided invaluable support and assistance to the Project by hosting workshops and imparting knowledge of criminal intelligence to the other participating countries. Specific mention should be made at this stage of the work of Robert KOPAL, a senior analyst with the Croatian Police, who provided important input to workshops and training sessions. Particularly strong links were established between the NDIU and the CIU in Belgrade, and at the request of UNODC, the Croatian Ministry of Interior donated a copy of its own Criminal Intelligence System to its counterparts in Serbia and FYROM.

5.2.9 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The Project built upon activities previously carried out under Project D41, which assisted the FYROM Ministry of Interior in the setting up of a central CIU within the Sector for Illegal Drug Trafficking, which was part of the Criminal Police Department.
Some equipment and software was donated under Project D41 and this was augmented by further donations under F35. Technical and awareness training was also provided. As a result of the commitment of senior management to the value of criminal intelligence, largely as a result of the project, a complete new structure was introduced within the Criminal Police Department – with a Sector for Criminal Analysis established within the Department for Organised Crime. This Sector, which covers all forms of serious and organised crime, currently has 4 analysts, including the head of the Sector. Five RIOs have also been established with Project support.

In terms of regional activity - as a result of joint project activities and improved intelligence capacity – joint operations have taken place in the last two years with Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia as well as with Turkey, Greece, Austria, Italy, Germany and Czech Republic. Work is also in progress on the replacement of the CISNIC system by an integrated database for criminal intelligence.

### 5.2.10 Romania

In 2001 the Intelligence Analysis Office on Drugs was established in Bucharest with the assistance of UNDCP Project D41. Project F35 built on this foundation and assisted in the development of 5 key Regional Intelligence Units (RIUs) located within the Regional Centres for Combating Organised Crime. These were established in 2003, with further RIUs and Local Intelligence Units following in the next 3 years. Assistance was in the form of helping to identify suitable accommodation, donating hardware and software, training etc. Also 17 staff are currently being trained in ‘Intelligence Analysis’ at the Police Academy, benefiting from the training of trainers carried out under the Project. The project also built on the CISNIC system, by helping to develop a Central Analysis Management System (CAMAS) which consolidated 3 separate information systems which had previously been running parallel in Romania.

### 5.2.11 Slovenia

As for Bulgaria, there was a delay in instigating Project activities in Slovenia because the Slovenian Ministry of Interior failed to fully ratify the Project document until June 2003, so very little could be done for the first 12 months. However, it participated throughout in joint workshops and following the ratification, received training and computer equipment. Senior managers also participated in an awareness seminar. At the start of the project there were 2 trained criminal analysts in Slovenia. Now there are 28 – 7 based at the Organised Crime Section of the Criminal Investigation Directorate in Ljubljana and 21 at regional offices. Under the auspices of the project, 2 officers were trained as trainers at the TADOC centre in Ankara and a further 2 were trained in training for analysts. As a result of this, the Slovenian police have developed a 14 day course for the training of analysts. Also as a result of the Project there has been a significant increase in intelligence led operations leading to arrests and prosecutions and in joint working with Project partners and other countries in the region.

### 5.2.12 Serbia

Upon commencement of the project there was no criminal intelligence structure in place in either Serbia or Montenegro. The project provided vital assistance in the development of two separate criminal intelligence entities in Belgrade. Firstly the Criminal Intelligence Unit within Belgrade City Police, to which assistance was provided in the identification of suitable, dedicated accommodation and the funding of additional building works, refurbishment and equipment. The supply of equipment was co-funded by the project, the Serbian Ministry of Interior and the OSCE. Help
was also given with the design and implementation of an Organised Crime database in 2003. A core staff of eight was initially recruited for the CIU – composed of 5 field operatives and 3 IT specialists. Training at basic and advanced level was conducted. At the time of the closing of the project, there were 12 staff – 4 senior officers, 6 trained analysts, an IT specialist and a data input operative. A Criminal Intelligence Department was also established in the newly established (2002) Directorate for Combating Organised Crime (UBPOK), which was an independent department answerable directly to the Ministry of Interior, and not part of the Criminal Police Directorate. Again assistance was provided with refurbishment, equipment and training. At the time the project was concluded, there were 8 staff working at this unit, and again they were provided with both basic and advanced training. The competition between these two central units hampered the development of a co-ordinated criminal intelligence infrastructure, but there are now plans to set up a separate national level CIU under the Criminal Police but independent from Organised Crime Department (now renamed the Service for Combating Organised Crime – SBPOK). Under this new Unit will be RIUs in 27 regions, including Belgrade, where the City Police CIU will now become an RIU. Despite these previous internal problems, significant results have been achieved in the fight against organised crime, using criminal intelligence analysis techniques.

5.2.13 Montenegro

In Montenegro – progress was rather slower than in Serbia. Delays were caused by the fact that the introduction of the new Police Act, which included specific reference to intelligence led policing, was deferred and eventually came into operation in 2005. There were also problems with periodic wholesale changes in key law enforcement personnel reflecting political changes, which further disrupted the projects planned activities. That said, a small criminal intelligence unit was established in Podgorica in 2003 with 4 staff and a temporary IT specialist. There are now 20 trained analysts in Montenegro trained partly under the Project and partly by the OSCE. Four are based at the CIU in Podgorica and the remainder in 7 recently established RIUs around the country.

5.2.14 Kosovo

The Project Manager held several meetings with UN Law Enforcement staff and with representatives of the Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) in Pristina during the course of the project. The CIU is funded by the five QUINT nations and is headed and partially staffed by police officers and intelligence analysts recruited by the UK NCIS (part of SOCA since April 2006). Although no Project funding was provided for Kosovo, given that it was receiving separate funding from the UN and other Donors – Project activities in the criminal intelligence field were co-ordinated with law enforcement and particularly the CIU. Parallel training and assistance from other organisations was being carried out Kosovo during the course of the project. Representatives of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the Head of the CIU participated in the Regional Conference in Belgrade in December 2006 and a presentation from the KPS revealed that there have been significant developments in the field of criminal intelligence in Kosovo over the period of the project, paralleling developments in the participating countries, and that the systems in place are compatible with them. The Conference provided a platform for the KPS to express their willingness and ability to partake in joint activities and operations with participating countries, illustrating the benefits of the co-ordination and co-operation which had been nurtured by the Project.
5.3 Achievement of Project Results

5.3.1 There follows a list of planned results, together with an assessment on the extent to which they have been achieved and how their achievement has contributed to the attainment of the Project objectives. Generally all key results were fully and professionally achieved with the exception of some small shortfalls in numbers of trained officers due to political factors beyond the control of the Project management (see Section 4.1.6 above). The original Project budget was $2,230,000 and the eventual expenditure was $2,228,688 (i.e. $1,312 under budget). Of this total – the government of Hungary donated $69,477, the government of the Principality of Liechtenstein $20,000 and the remainder was donated by the UK government.

Result 1: A National Drug Intelligence Unit created alongside the structure of Interpol NCB in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and CIUs established in Belgrade and Podgorica; up to four RIUs established in Serbia and one in Montenegro

5.3.2 Serbia. Due to the reorganisation of the Criminal Police and the creation of an autonomous Department for Combating Organised Crime (UBPOK) – it was decided by the Serbian Ministry of Interior to create two separate CIUs in Belgrade, both with a mandate for general organised crime – not specifically drugs. The Project was obliged, therefore, to work within these constraints, but assisted in the creation of both units. The development of a national criminal intelligence infrastructure was hampered by the fact that the CIU in Belgrade Police Department had only a mandate for Belgrade and the UBPOK CIU was independent from the national Criminal Police. So there were no formal RIUs set up under the Project. However, the advice of the Project management team was influential in the development of the soon to be implemented new national criminal intelligence infrastructure – which will include a CIU in Belgrade and 27 RIUs (see paragraph 5.2.12 above).

5.3.3 Montenegro. A functional CIU has been established in Podgorica, again with a mandate for all forms of organised crime rather than just drugs. Due to frequent changes in personnel, and infrastructure, reflecting political changes – the development of a national infrastructure, and specifically the formal establishment of at least one RIU was delayed. However, 7 RIUs have recently been established and each one has at least one trained analyst in post.

Result 2: A National Drug Intelligence Unit created alongside the structure of Interpol NCB in BiH; up to four RIUs established at the priority Cantons in the Federation of BiH and three in the PSCs in Republika Srpska

5.3.4 Federation of BiH. For the reasons outlined in paragraph 5.2.5 above, there were a number of problems in the Federation of BiH related to the complex political situation, the Cantonal organisation of the police and the role of SIPA. However, there is a central intelligence capacity at the Federal Police Headquarters in Sarajevo – and separate small units exist for drugs and other forms of organised crime. And a very basic regional network has been set up, with RIUs existing in some form. However, more training, equipment and staff are required – plus some of the barriers to progress, caused by the aforementioned problems, need to be broken down.

5.3.5 Republika Srpska. A central and regional structure of IOs has been set up in Republika Srpska – with 2 based at the Criminal Police Headquarters in Banja Luka and 86 IOs based at the 5 PSCs, as follows: Banja Luka (34), Doboj (13), Bijelina
(16), East Sarajevo (16) and Trebinje (7). Again, due to the structure of the Ministry of Interior in Republika Srpska, the function of this network is to cover all forms of organised crime rather than specifically drugs. Whilst there are still problems in terms of exchange of intelligence within RS and with the Federation and Brcko District – some positive progress has been made.

**Result 3: National Drug Intelligence Units in Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM extended into key regional areas through provision of computer hardware and training of additional analysts; up to five RIUs established in each country**

5.3.6 **Bulgaria.** There are now 160 trained criminal intelligence personnel, distributed throughout the 28 regional and 4 central Police Directorates – with between 5 and 30 in each Directorate, as a direct result of training and training for trainers provided under the Project.

5.3.7 **Romania.** The 5 RIUs established in 2003 with the assistance of the Project were augmented in the same year by a further two centres funded by the Romanian Ministry of Interior. In 2004 a further 7 RIUs were established, with Romanian government funding, followed in 2006 by Units in all 42 Police Districts (or Counties). The initial 5 RIUs set up with Project assistance served as a blueprint for the remainder. In August 2005 the CIU was set up as part of a new, more comprehensive, criminal intelligence infrastructure. There are currently 27 analyst positions based at the CIU, with 3 at each of the 14 RIUs and 2 at each County Unit. In total, 259 police staff work in the field of Criminal Intelligence and they have all received training either directly from the Project or indirectly from trainers who had been trained under the Project.

5.3.8 **FYROM.** RIUs have been established in 5 of the 11 territorial units where the principle drug operations have been focussed. Each Unit has one dedicated IO. Equipment and software for these five regional offices was also donated under the Project, and technical training provided.

**Result 4: National Drug Intelligence Units in and RIUs supported in Slovenia and Croatia**

5.3.9 **Slovenia.** Support in the form of training, awareness seminars, workshops and the provision of equipment was provided under the Project to the Organised Crime Section of the Criminal Investigation Directorate in Ljubljana and to RIUs.

5.3.10 **Croatia.** Support in the form of the provision of IT equipment and software licences was provided under the Project to the National Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) of the Criminal Police.

**Result 5: 111 Law Enforcement Officers (Investigators) trained in the use of basic criminal intelligence analysis techniques to support their operational work**

5.3.11 The total number of Law Enforcement Officers trained under the Project in basic criminal analysis was 94 (65 in analysis and 29 in analysis/analysis visualisation software). An additional 44 officers were further trained as trainers in order to cascade these skills to others. (see table of training courses attached at Annex C).
Result 6: 32 Officers assigned to full analytical functions following advanced training in various analytical skills

5.3.12 The total number of Officers provided with advanced analytical training under the Project was 30 (see table of training courses attached at Annex C).

Result 7: Cascading to hundreds of front line officers the principles of the 4x4 intelligence grading system and the design of country specific paper version information reporting forms for transmission from the front line for either local or regional enhancement to useful intelligence

5.3.13 Training in the 4x4 intelligence grading system and assistance in the design of intelligence reporting forms was provided to all countries where not already established and notably to SaM and BiH. 350 front line officers were trained in SaM and over 500 in BiH. Similar training had previously been provided by the UNODC in Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM under project D41. Croatia and Slovenia had already developed their own 4x4 reporting systems, so assistance in this area was not required.

Result 8: Establishment of electronic communication links from the established regional intelligence units to the National Drugs Intelligence Unit for the efficient transmission and dissemination of drugs intelligence

5.3.14 Advice and assistance was provided, where required, in the establishment of electronic communication links between the CIUs and RIUs. The project greatly benefited from the highly professional services of Mr Luc GALLAY, IT consultant, who was responsible for conducting site surveys and assisting with the procurement, deployment and installation (including networking and configuration) of donated equipment, hardware and software. There have been some delays for the reasons outlined above – but in most of the participating countries electronic links do now exist between the CIUs and at least the RIUs which the Project helped to establish.

Result 9: Sustainability of new structures and work processes ensured through senior management awareness, international networking of criminal analysts and joint intelligence development projects

5.3.15 A total of 119 senior managers, including representatives from Serbia, Montenegro, BiH, Slovenia and Croatia, attended 3 day senior management awareness seminars. The course for 20 officers in Croatia was delivered by UK NCIS on behalf of the Project and was a direct follow up of the study trip to NCIS funded by the Project. From conversations with various representatives of participating countries, these courses are generally considered to have been crucial in the acceptance of the importance of intelligence led policing in general and the aims of the Project in particular.

5.3.16 Through various project activities, analysts from all the participating countries met regularly and developed close professional relationships as well as personal friendships. This in turn facilitated the development and successful outcome of a number of bi-lateral and multi-lateral intelligence led operations against criminal organisations in the region.
**Result 10:** National intelligence training curricula developed for use within the criminal police services and generally across multi-agency front line law enforcement to raise awareness and improve the flow of quality information available to intelligence analysts

5.3.17 During the course of the project, work was carried out on the production of a Criminal Intelligence Training Manual. Input was received from all the participating countries, and at the Regional Criminal Intelligence Conference in December 2006 - the English version of the Manual was presented to the representatives of all participating countries. Copies were also given to the representatives of the other countries who attended – such as Albania, Moldova and Turkey. The manual has also been translated into Serbian, Bulgarian and Slovenian.

5.4 **Implementation**

5.4.1 The UNODC RPO in Sofia has taken an extremely active role in the implementation of this Project. It has been assisted in this by the NPOs in BiH and FYROM and by the appointed PLOs in each country.

5.4.2 There have been constraints on the implementation of the operational plan, which have been covered in detail above. These included governmental intransigence, political changes, finding sufficient and/or suitable staff, changes in personnel (usually linked to politics), political complexities, rivalry within and between agencies and the involvement of other international organisations (specifically in BiH). However, given these constraints and taking into account the vast differences in the degree of development of criminal intelligence and in the political / organisational infrastructure between the participating countries, the achievements of this Project have been remarkable.

5.5 **Institutional and Management Arrangements**

5.5.1 Again the role of the RPO in Sofia in managing the Project has been pivotal. In terms of backstopping – the regular reporting and meetings with the PSC have ensured that the donors, the senior Law Enforcement management of the participating countries and UNODC Headquarters have been kept informed about the progress of the project throughout its duration. In addition, the Mid Term Evaluation by an independent officer from UK NCIS reported, with recommendations (which were largely implemented) provided another monitoring measure.
6. OUTCOMES, IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

6.1 Outcomes

6.1.1 The outcome of the project, in terms of the tangible results which have achieved the UNODC drugs overall objective of the project and specific objectives of the project, are again best dealt with country by country. Prior to the Regional Conference in December 2006, all the countries were asked to produce presentations, and as part of those presentations, participants were asked to provide information about the development in intelligence led policing and the number of successful investigations / operations directly or indirectly attributable to the work of the Project. The specific facts and figures quoted in this section are taken from those presentations and from my conversations with individual representatives.

6.1.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation)

During 2005 and 2006 – 620 criminal intelligence reports were produced, dealing with: violence, general security, economic and cyber crime, violation of civil rights, theft (all kinds), human trafficking / smuggling, drugs and underage crime. There were 48 cases which resulted in the identification and prosecution of members of organised criminal groups (OCGs) involved in kidnapping, murder, drugs, human trafficking / smuggling, car theft and general theft. A total of 45 kg of hard drugs and 23 kg of soft drugs were seized, and 6 OCGs involved in drug trafficking activities were disrupted. All these results were directly linked to the training and equipment delivered under Project F35.

6.1.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina (RS)

As a result of training and equipment provided by the Project, the total number of criminal intelligence reports produced in the RS increased from 6,415 in 2000 to 13,733 in 2003 and to 26,314 in 2006. From 2003 to March 2006, 11 OCGs producing and/or trafficking in drugs were disrupted. During the same period the following quantities of drugs were seized: 100kg of heroin, 1.4kg of cocaine, 4,904 ecstasy tablets, 11,380 cannabis plants and 1,095kg of marijuana.

6.1.4 Bulgaria

In Bulgaria – the disruption of 8 OCGs involved in drug trafficking was directly attributed to the work of the Project. These operations also led to the seizure of 3087kg of cocaine, 1250kg of heroin and 450kg of amphetamine tablets.

6.1.5 Croatia

In Croatia – the equipment and training provided by the Project has led to a significant increase in the number of intelligence led operations conducted by Law Enforcement. During the period 2003 to October 2006, the following quantities of drugs were seized: heroin – 306kg, cocaine – 380kg, hashish – 72kg, marihuana – 2026kg, amphetamines – 33kg and ecstasy tablets – 105,691.

6.1.6 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
In FYROM – a number of intelligence led operations took place both within the country and bi-laterally or multi-laterally with other countries in the region as a result of Project activities. During the period 2003 to October 2006, 12kg of cocaine, 606kg of heroin, 1466kg of marijuana and 955kg of hashish were seized by FYROM Law Enforcement.

6.1.7 Romania

No specific statistics are available from Romania, but the development of the criminal intelligence infrastructure throughout the country, with project assistance, has led to significant increases in the number of intelligence led operations, the number of prosecutions and the amount of drugs seized.

6.1.8 Slovenia

In Slovenia, intelligence based operations, mainly during the lifetime of project, have resulted in the dismantling of 21 major OCGs – 10 involved in organised immigration crime, 4 in drug trafficking and 7 in general crime. Since 1999, the following quantities of drugs have been seized in Slovenia – 483kg of heroin, 14kg of cocaine, 60,681 ecstasy tablets, 245kg of marihuana and 9,500kg of hashish. Most of these seizures can be directly or indirectly attributed to Project activities.

6.1.9 Serbia

In Serbia, a total of 500 cases were investigated using criminal intelligence techniques, and more than 2000 criminal intelligence reports were made. A large number of OCGs were disrupted, including those involved with drug trafficking, human smuggling / trafficking and organized financial crime. A total of 60 drug trafficking channels were cut, with more than 5 tons of various drugs seized. The latest seizure was of 125 kg of heroin on 07 December 2006. Also, as a result of joint activities between Serbian Law Enforcement and neighbouring countries, 1,300 kg of various drugs were seized in the region. A regional human smuggling operation which followed from an operational meeting in Belgrade, attended by representatives from Bosnia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and UNMIK, together with Italy and the UK, during which current intelligence was exchanged, resulted in the disruption of an OCG operating throughout the region and arrests in 5 countries. Cooperation continues with these countries in the field of human smuggling and also in drug smuggling and vehicle theft. Given that before the F35 Project began, there was no criminal intelligence infrastructure in Serbia, the connection with Project activities is clear.

6.1.10 Montenegro

In Montenegro, the number of criminal investigations which developed from intelligence products has increased from zero prior to the start of the Project to 403 in 2004, 1175 in 2005 and 1175 in the first 8 months of 2006.

6.2 Impact

6.2.1 Prior to the start of Project F35 – the impact of intelligence led policing on the fight against organised crime in South East Europe was relatively limited. Croatia and Slovenia were the most advanced in this area of work, but there was still a lack of equipment, hardware and software available in these countries for the collection, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence, and the number of law enforcement officers actively involved in criminal intelligence was limited. In
Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM – important developments had already been made in
the field of criminal intelligence, with the assistance of the UNODC under project
D41, but there were still significant shortfalls in terms of equipment, training and
infrastructure development. There was no criminal intelligence infrastructure in place
in SaM or BiH prior to the start of the project. There was also almost no regional
networking between analysts or joint intelligence activity between the participating
countries.

6.2.2 At the conclusion of, and with major input from Project F35 – criminal intelligence
now plays a significant role in Law Enforcement in all seven countries. Senior
managers in all participating countries are now aware of and supportive of the
principles of intelligence led policing and there are well equipped and staffed central
and regional intelligence units in place in each country, with a large degree of
connectivity between them. There have been significant results in terms of disruption
of OCGs and arrests of their members, due to unilateral, bi-lateral and multi-lateral
operations resulting from intelligence. The project has helped to change the face of
policing in the region, bringing it closer to the principles that were already widely
accepted and practised in the EU and in other developed countries.

6.3 Sustainability

6.3.1 The F35 Project has successfully strengthened and broadened the platform
established by UNDCP Project D41. In turn it has generated a number of other
criminal intelligence related projects and activities in the region, many of which are
still ongoing, and has left a firm foundation for the national agencies themselves to
build upon.

6.3.2 Examples of projects which have developed as a result of the this Project, and with
the involvement of the UNODC are the previously mentioned twinning project
between the Croatia MoI and UK NCIS, the posting of a British criminal intelligence
advisor to the MoI in FYROM and the roll out of criminal intelligence capacity to cover
each county in Romania. The Croatian twinning project stemmed from a study trip
organised under Project F35 and the FYROM and Romanian projects both
developed from proposals made by the RPO, with a view to building on the results
achieved by the Project.

6.3.3 Project F35 has also spawned a number of related UNODC projects. As already
mentioned Project S29, which started in August 2006, involves the posting of a
criminal intelligence expert as an advisor to the MoIs of Serbia and Montenegro.
Project XCE/S50, which is due to commence in April 2007, is a regional human
trafficking project for the 6 Western Balkan countries (5 of which participated in
Project F35) and has a substantial criminal intelligence element. And Project
BUL/J41, again due to commence shortly, involves the provision of criminal
intelligence equipment and training for Bulgarian Customs at 15 selected BCPs and
linking them to the centre.

6.3.4 Other international organisations operating in the region have introduced criminal
intelligence activities to their programs, following the lead of the UNODC – for
example the training of analysts by the OSCE in Montenegro and the provision of
supply of equipment and training by ICITAP in BiH, and these activities are ongoing.

6.3.5 It is worth mentioning at this stage that the UK government have been particularly
supportive of the criminal intelligence development projects in the region in general,
and the UNODC in particular, in this field of work. All the projects mentioned in
paragraphs 6.3.2 – 6.3.3 above were funded and/or participated in by the UK. During
the lifetime of Project F35, PSC meetings and workshops were regularly attended by British Embassy staff members from around the region, British Ambassadors and Political Officers lent their support and used their influence when required and organisations such as NCIS and West Yorkshire Police provided active support to the Project. There is every indication that this level of support will continue in the future, which will play a significant part in sustaining the benefits provided by this and other projects.

6.3.6 In general terms, there is a tangible will in the region, within law enforcement and in particular its senior management, to continue with and build upon the activities carried out by the Project. This will be supported by ongoing and future project work and assistance such as described above.

6.3.7 Notwithstanding senior management support, there are always financial constraints and one specific area of concern is the sustainability of analytical software tools such as i2 Analysts Notebook. In order to ensure that licences are renewed, as they must be on an annual basis, long term financial commitments are required on behalf of the governments of the participating countries. Limited funding to law enforcement in some of the countries may jeopardise this sustainability and the situation will need to be monitored, pressure applied on senior management and/or additional funding secured or alternative software solutions found.

6.3.8 Despite a generally positive situation both with regard to the sustaining of and building upon project benefits by the national law enforcement agencies, and the ongoing work of the UNODC and other international organisations – there is still a significant need for new capacity building projects in the future. Assistance is particularly necessary in countries such as BiH, which are still lagging behind the other countries in the region in this field and to Kosovo, where the Kosovo Police Force will take over more and more responsibility as the UN gradually withdraws.

6.3.9 There are also specific areas of cross border criminality which are prevalent in the region, which impact directly upon Western Europe and elsewhere, and in respect of which I believe future support and assistance are required in the field of intelligence. Examples of this are human trafficking (already recognised by the acceptance of and securing of funding for Project S50) and human smuggling – for which the region is significant source, transit and to an increasing degree destination. Also the trafficking in cocaine, which has previously been seen as a lower priority than the trafficking in heroin, for which the region has long been recognised as a major transit route. Increasingly cocaine is being transported in bulk into the region either directly or indirectly from South America (notably in container traffic directed at the Black Sea and Adriatic Sea ports), divided into smaller quantities and moved to Western Europe. There are intelligence gaps which need to be filled in respect of these activities, for which international support would be invaluable.

6.3.10 Finally, while important steps have been taken towards greater co-operation and exchange of intelligence between the national law enforcement agencies in the region, there is much work still to be done on this. Integrity issues are recognised, but should not prevent this co-operation. Barriers of mistrust do still exist, as do legislative constraints – so time and effort is required to surmount these problems and international assistance has a role to play here. For example one of the planned activities of Project S50 is to hold regular meetings between senior analysts from the 6 participating countries and to encourage the exchange of intelligence, and I see potential for more work in the future in this particular field.
7. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

7.1 Lessons

7.1.1 The RPO has played a vital role in the continuous monitoring of this project. Having a Project Manager with a law enforcement background based within the region, with the capacity and commitment to regularly visit the participating countries and to liaise with law enforcement officers at all levels, was an essential part of its success. Given the complexity of the Project and the great variation in the degree of development, the political and law enforcement structure and the specific needs of the participating countries, it is difficult to envisage how any alternative approach could have succeeded.

7.1.2 It was also essential for the monitoring process to have the NPOs in place in BiH and FYROM and to appoint PLOs from within national law enforcement agencies in each country to provide points of contact for the Project Manager.

7.1.3 The PSC, which included representatives of the beneficiaries, the implementers and the donors, was another valuable monitoring mechanism for the Project.

7.1.4 The active involvement of representatives of the main donor country (the UK) also proved to be a significant factor in the success of the Project, as they were able to exert high level pressure when necessary to encourage co-operation at the political level.

7.1.5 Despite best efforts to ensure that officers trained under the auspices of the Project remained in active criminal intelligence roles, and that full use was made of those individuals who received training for trainers, there were cases where officers were moved to other positions such that the experience and knowledge gained under the Project was to a greater or lesser extent, lost. It is difficult to completely prevent the reassignment of staff in this way, but perhaps a more rigorous selection process could have been imposed, and greater emphasis placed on persuading senior and middle management of the importance of specialisation in this field of work within law enforcement agencies.

7.1.6 Effort was made to support and encourage the development of bi-lateral relationships between law enforcement agencies such as UK NCIS, West Yorkshire Police, OSCE and ICITAP with the national agencies from individual participating countries, and to liaise generally with other national and international organisations with interests in the region, with positive results. This is a constructive initiative, adds value to the work of the UNODC and should be encouraged. There is a tendency for some national and international organisations involved in capacity building work to be reticent about sharing information about their activities and reluctant to work in liaison with counterparts involved in similar areas of work. The UNODC should be praised for its enlightened approach in this regard.

7.1.7 It was recognised early on in the project that some countries – notably Croatia - could not only benefit from the project but, because of their relatively advanced stage of development in criminal intelligence terms, could also provide assistance in their own right to other participating countries. As a result, Croatia provided invaluable support
and assistance to the Project by hosting workshops and imparting knowledge of
criminal intelligence to the other participating countries and also donated a copy of its
own Criminal Intelligence System to its counterparts in Serbia and FYROM. This
assistance reinforced the networking between the participating countries which was
already being facilitated by the Project.

7.2 Best Practice

7.2.2 The lessons learned that have been described in some detail above lead directly to
my suggestions for best practices in future UNODC projects.

7.2.3 That close ‘hands on’ management of similar projects should be provided by a
UNODC RPO based in the region within which the project is operating.

7.2.4 That there is merit in the appointment of PLOs in participating countries in the case of
regional projects.

7.2.5 That close liaison with other national and international organisations involved in
capacity building activities is beneficial to all parties.

7.2.6 That in the case of regional projects, every encouragement should be given to the
more advanced countries to take an active role in assisting those that are less
developed. Not only does this assist the Project Management in achieving their
objectives, but it also helps to build sustainable networks between countries,
particularly in the Balkans where there are understandably some tensions between
the former Yugoslavian countries.

7.3 Constraints

7.3.2 Again the constraints that have impacted upon implementation and delivery of the
project have been highlighted in previous sections. Many of these are beyond the
control of the implementing organisation, but it is worth drawing attention to them for
future reference.

7.3.3 Even where there is commitment from law enforcement, political factors can cause
delays in the implementation of project objectives and dilution of impact due to
reassignment of senior staff and unhelpful rivalry between law enforcement agencies.
In this region, this is difficult either to factor in to project proposals or to avoid during
implementation. High level lobbying by donors and by senior management of the
implementing organisation can, however, help to minimise the disruptive effect of
these issues.

7.3.4 In certain countries in the region – the influence of other international organisations is
significant – for example UNMIBH and subsequently EUPM in BiH and UNMIK in
Kosovo. On a less overarching political level but nonetheless relevant is the role of
organisations such as the OSCE, CAFAO, EAR and ICITAP. Liaison with these
organisations is essential, and if handled correctly can be constructive and beneficial
to all parties, but can also lead to delays in implementation whilst activities are co-
ordinated and efforts made to avoid duplication.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Issues resolved during the evaluation

8.1.1 The initial aim of the Project was specifically to enhance drugs intelligence capacity in the region, but it became clear during the course of the Project that in most of the participating countries it was more appropriate to concentrate on setting up more general criminal intelligence units and networks, dealing with all forms of serious and organised crime. This change of emphasis was apposite in the circumstances and still in keeping with the broad UNODC objectives. More specific drug related activities will and are following on from the Project.

8.1.2 It also became evident during the project that due to the complexities of criminal intelligence techniques and the total sea change that is required in law enforcement thinking to completely embrace the principles of intelligence led policing – longer term, locally based expert advice would be greatly beneficial. Therefore during the course of the project the UNODC was and still is actively involved either in directly running projects involving the posting of in country advisors or in supporting similar projects (see section 6.3 for details). This has proved beneficial both to Project 35 and to UNODC activities in the region in general.

8.2 Actions / decisions recommended

8.2.1 Project F35 has already spawned related projects to build on aspects of the work carried out under its umbrella and there is scope for further support and assistance in the future. There is a need for more specific capacity building work in the criminal intelligence field – particularly in areas such as human smuggling / trafficking and cocaine trafficking, for which limited international resources have so far been committed and for which there is evident need. Also more work needs to be done in developing the criminal intelligence infrastructure in the regional centres and at the BCPs.

8.2.2 In terms of specific countries / provinces in the region where support and assistance are particularly needed – BiH (both the Federation and RS) and Kosovo are clear examples. It is seemingly anomalous that in these countries international assistance is theoretically greater than in the other countries in the region – with the presence of the EUPM (and previously UNMIBH and IPTF) in BiH and UNMIK in Kosovo. However, in neither country / province is there a co-ordinated approach to the development of criminal intelligence infrastructures, and I see a clear role for the UNODC in bringing together all interested parties and taking a lead in the criminal intelligence field.

8.2.3 As previously mentioned there are possible sustainability problems in the renewal of expensive software licences. This situation should be monitored and steps taken where necessary to secure further external funding either to renew existing licences or to introduce alternative systems with less costly licence renewal implications.

8.2.4 Whilst an extensive program of training was carried out under Project F35, from awareness training of senior managers and basic training of front line officers to advanced training of analysts – there is still a great deal of training at all levels to do
in all of the participating countries to develop fully functioning criminal intelligence systems. Not only does the infrastructure need to be in place — in terms of fully equipped and electronically connected CIUs and RIUs, but the principles of intelligence led policing have to be accepted across the board and every law enforcement officer has to be involved in the collection of criminal intelligence as well as being end users of intelligence product. For this to happen — more training is required, and due to the scale of the operation — my recommendation would be to concentrate on a comprehensive program of training for specialist intelligence trainers so that training at all levels can be cascaded in each country in the region.

8.2.5 Consideration should be given to the signing of undertakings by senior management that officers given expensive advanced training should not be moved to other areas of work within an agreed timescale.

8.2.6 Delays in ratification of the Agreement Project Document in Bulgaria and Slovenia limited the involvement of these countries in the first part of the project. Significant progress was made after ratification, but in future higher level pressure should be put on governments from the outset to avoid such delays.

8.2.7 There are internal inter-agency communication and co-operation problems within all the participating countries, varying in significance and disruptiveness from country to country. The reason for this also varies — from basic inter-agency rivalry such as between SBPOK and the Belgrade Police in Serbia, to historical / cultural distrust such as exists between Customs and the Police in varying degrees in each country, to infrastructure problems such as between the Cantons in the BiH Federation, to political tensions such as between RS and the Federation in BiH or between Serbia and Kosovo. Having said this, when law enforcement officers are brought together in the common interest of improving their effectiveness and producing results, barriers can be broken down, and I see this is an important role for the UNODC either as a primary project objective or as a secondary benefit from other activities in the future.

8.2.8 Similarly there is mistrust and tension between the law enforcement agencies of the participating countries. The Project did an excellent job in developing informal relationships between those involved in the project from each country and bringing them together in workshops and training courses. Also, partly as a result of the establishment of those personal relationships during Project activities, some significant regional operations have taken place with concrete results. There is communication between the countries in the region at central, regional and particularly at local level — and this is slowly improving, with the assistance of this Project and others. And there is some bi-lateral exchange of criminal intelligence, which has led to some tangible results. What is still lacking is the infrastructure for regular bi-lateral and multi-lateral liaison, for the exchange of timely criminal intelligence between countries in the region and for organised cross-border and regional operational activities. In my opinion the UNODC has an important role, following on from regional projects such as F35 and D41, to continue to foster these relationships between law enforcement agencies in the region and to support and assist them in developing closer working relationships.
9. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

9.1 The Project has been a significant success. The current situation in the participating countries with regard to infrastructure, equipment, training and general awareness of criminal intelligence and the benefits of criminal led policing is significantly more advanced than it was at the start of the Project due directly to the activities carried out and the funding provided under the auspices of the project.

9.2 The main results and objectives have been achieved and whilst there have been slight shortfalls in certain areas, these were largely beyond the control of the Project Management.

9.3 The Project has had significant impacts in terms of intelligence led operational success both within the participating countries and as a result of bi-lateral and multi-lateral activities.

9.4 Substantial inroads have been made into improving the co-operation between law enforcement agencies both within the participating countries across national borders.

9.5 The project was implemented within budget.

9.6 Project management and the personnel and structures put in place to co-ordinate the activities in the seven participating countries were particularly effective.

9.7 Making use of the skills and experience of the more developed of the participating countries to participate in training personnel from the less advanced countries proved beneficial on two levels – both in terms of helping to deliver the ambitious training programme of the project and by reinforcing the objective of closer regional co-operation.

9.8 The decision to co-ordinate Project activities closely with the work being carried out by other international organisations was a wise one and has led to activities subsequently being carried out by such organisations as the OSCE and ICITAP being complimentary to rather than duplicating the work of the project.

9.9 The Project has directly or indirectly led the way to further capacity building activities in the field of criminal intelligence, either by encouraging the participating countries themselves to carry on from where the project left off, by inspiring other activities in the field such as the posting of international experts as advisors or by developing further UNODC projects to build on the achievements of F35.

9.10 The Project has demonstrated the importance of criminal intelligence and has been instrumental in the widespread acceptance in the region of the benefits of intelligence led law enforcement. Notwithstanding the further capacity building activities which have already stemmed from the Project, there is more work to be done before South-East Europe reaches it’s full potential to fight crime on it’s own territory and to provide strategic and operational intelligence to assist the law enforcement agencies of the EU and elsewhere in the global fight against major organised crime. It is my opinion that UNODC should lead this work in the future.