TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Project Title: Strengthening the legislative and institutional capacity of the juvenile justice system in Jordan

Project Number: FS/JOR/04/R56 and FS/JOR/05/S21

Thematic area: Juvenile Justice

Country: Jordan

Report of the Evaluation team

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AOHR</td>
<td>Arab Organisation for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDH</td>
<td>Terre des Homme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime</td>
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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. **Summary table of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations**

#### Summary table of findings, supporting evidence and recommendations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Findings: identified problems/issues</th>
<th>Supporting evidence/examples</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Programme directly benefited young people in conflict with the law.</td>
<td>Rehabilitation programmes and construction works implemented within the various centres, the automation of the Juvenile Court in Amman and the installation of audiovisual equipment at Zarqa First Instance Court.</td>
<td>Funding needs to be identified to enable this work to continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It brought Juvenile Justice into focus.</td>
<td>Specialist courts with specialist judges have been set up; Juvenile Justice has found a place in the curricula of relevant courses.</td>
<td>Specialist Courts should be set up in all areas not currently served (7 more Courts are needed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Programme developed a range of relevant training strategies</td>
<td>Multidisciplinary and specialised training programmes were implemented</td>
<td>Multidisciplinary and specialised training programmes must become a recognised part of inservice training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Four Training Manuals have been prepared.</td>
<td>Training manuals for (a) judges and magistrates, (b) police, (c) social workers and (d) lawyers have been piloted and printed.</td>
<td>The Manuals will need to be updated as soon as the new legislation is on the statute books. They will also need to be expanded to take into account “children in need” and “victims”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Draft Juvenile Justice Legislation has been prepared</td>
<td>The draft Bill is currently with the Legislative Bureau</td>
<td>Pressure needs to be kept on Parliament to ensure that the Bill gets on the Statute Books with as few alterations as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The time interval between conception and implementation was too long causing problems at the implementation stage.</td>
<td>Concept Paper written 2003 Programme launch 2005</td>
<td>The time interval between conception and implementation should be kept to a minimum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The reassessment was rushed</td>
<td>Problems were not identified</td>
<td>Assessment/reassessment should be thorough, involve all stakeholders and attempt to identify any potential problems or pitfalls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Roles were not clearly defined.</td>
<td>Some stakeholders were unclear about who was responsible for what.</td>
<td>Roles should always be clearly defined and agreed before the programme commences.</td>
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Executive Summary

The Juvenile Justice Reform Programme was a UNODC initiative which aimed at supporting national efforts to bring legal provisions into line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations Standards and Norms regarding the Administration of Justice and included measures to improve detention conditions and treatment of juveniles in detention, in line with the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their liberty.

The projects were formulated by UNODC upon the request of the Jordanian authorities - Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Justice - and on the basis of a needs assessment mission carried out by UNDP in 2003 as well as one follow-up mission undertaken in March 2005. The programme was initiated in July 2005 and will end its first phase in July 2007.

Phase one of the Programme comprised two projects. The first project was entitled “Strengthening the legislative and institutional capacity of the Juvenile Justice System in Jordan - R56” and was funded by the Government of Switzerland.

a) **Objective 1**: Reform of the national legislation pertaining to minors in conflict with the law, children at risk and victims.

b) **Objective 2**: Strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Social Development - Children and Youth Division within the Family, Women and Childhood Directorate - in performing its mandate on juvenile justice.

c) **Objective 3**: Strengthening the capacity of personnel dealing with children in conflict with the law, children at risk and victims (judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police officers and social workers) through training.

d) **Objective 4**: Reform the corrections’ system and detention conditions for minor offenders according to international standards.

e) **Objective 5**: Establishment of a Youth Care Service for children at risk, especially those at risk of re-offending, to increase the chances of reinsertion.

The second was entitled “Building the capacity of the Criminal Courts Systems in Jordan and especially the juvenile courts – S21” and was funded by the Government of the Netherlands.

a) **Objective 1 (S21)**: Improvement of the Juvenile case flow management;

b) **Objective 2 (S21)**: Capacity of the Ministry of Justice improved in order to contribute to the development and implementation of policies in the juvenile justice area based on international standards;

c) **Objectives 3 & 4 (S21)** to strengthen the capacity of court assessors/social workers (probation officers) to deal fairly and effectively with cases involving children in conflict with the law;

d) **Objective 5 (S21)**: Enhancing the capability of the three existing juvenile courts to process cases more effectively.
The Strengths of the Programme:

The Programme was both necessary and timely because the Government was ready and willing to focus on juvenile justice and moves were already afoot to bring the legislation into line with international standards. At this time juvenile justice, and young offenders, was a national priority. It brought juvenile justice into focus, not only to those in the criminal justice field but also to society at large.

It brought together all the various Government Departments, relevant agencies and NGOs, highlighted barriers to cooperation and identified the need to establish a communication network to maintain links tentatively forged.

It raised the awareness that all agencies must work together in the best interests of children and began the process of breaking down barriers. It put pressure on the various agencies to begin the change process.

The Programme has raised the profile of juvenile justice and has established an acceptance of the need for specialist courts and specialist personnel in the various disciplines (judges, social workers, probation officers, police officers).

In raising the profile of juvenile justice the programme has made it more likely that judges will agree to spend time in the juvenile courts rather than look for the earliest opportunity to get out of them.

Training strategies were devised comprising an extensive package of multidisciplinary and specialised training programmes for judges and prosecutors, social workers, lawyers and police officers and training curricula developed especially at the Judicial Institute of Jordan. The Programme has broadened the experience of and introduced a range of new ideas to the judges, prosecutors and members of the different disciplines who participated in the various seminars, workshops and study trips.

The Programme seems set to get juvenile justice on the curricula of the various university programmes focussing on children’s issues (law, social work, the police academy).

Four training manuals (for (a) judges and magistrates, (b) police, (c) social workers and (d)
lawyers) have been developed through the relevant national institutions. This kind of specialised technical manual is a new element in the Jordanian context. They have already been field-tested and have been well received by practitioners. The manuals will serve a dual purpose in providing reference books for practitioners and handbooks for trainees.

The Programme has directly benefited young people in conflict with the law through the quality of rehabilitation programmes introduced and construction works implemented within the various centres, the automation of the Juvenile Court in Amman and the installation of audiovisual equipment at Zarqa First Instance Court which will provide protection not only for juveniles in conflict with the law but also for children at risk.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the Programme is the Draft Juvenile Justice Legislation. The final product is a well-balanced document that is both vigilant and attentive to international norms and standards. The draft is specific on principles but flexible on procedures in order to allow a gradual introduction of specialist courts, for example, depending on the availability of resources. The thinking is that regulations can easily be changed as levels of expertise increase and more resources are made available without the need to rewrite the legislation. For this reason the Draft carefully avoids focussing on administrative procedures in the belief that these can be introduced as appropriate. The focus instead is on the strategic enforcement of rights through the legal process. The new Act will be able to work with minimum capacity without compromising on human rights issues. Pre-trial detention, which is currently over-used, will be limited to 2 weeks. If the child is not released or brought to trial in that time there is mandatory referral to a judge who will normally release the child on bail or under some kind of supervision. The Draft proposes raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility from 7 to 12. It promotes restorative principles with the focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment, the use of non-custodial measures to the extent possible and the complete separation of children and adults. The Draft grants judges more flexibility by providing them with a wider range of dispositions. This is a good piece of legislation which, if approved by Parliament in its present form, can act as a model for others in the region.
The Weaknesses of the Programme:

Much consultation had already taken place on the concept paper in late 2003/early 2004 i.e. quite a long time before the UNODC team responsible for implementing the project was appointed (July 2005 and September 2005). A reassessment of the project was carried out between September and December 2005 but pressure of time meant that consultation was not as thorough as it might have been and issues that would impact negatively on the project were not identified and dealt with before the project began. Many of the problems that arose appear to have had their origin in poor management of the implementation process.

There was a delay in sending the budget allocation for 2006 from the UNODC regional office/HQ. This delay created uncertainty with regard to what funds would be available for the planning of activities.

This was a complex project with an unusually large number of stakeholders, not all of whom felt fully engaged. The project document was vague in respect of roles and did not spell out who controlled what.

The lack of role clarity was further complicated by a rapid turnover of Government personnel that tended to undermine the sense of ownership or sense of continuity. Those coming newly into the project did not always feel bound by decisions taken earlier in the process.

Despite the difficulties, the consensus amongst respondents was that the objectives set for the programme as a whole and for the individual projects within it were, by and large, achieved.

Lessons Learned

Where lengthy delays occur between project design and implementation any reassessment of need should be thorough and detailed and should include full consultation with all stakeholders. Every effort should be made to ensure that all stakeholders have accepted ownership of the project and are committed to it. The project documentation should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders.
Best Practices

NGOs or other agencies chosen to implement a project should have expertise in that specific area of work. They should understand the customs and culture of the community within which they are working and, preferably, have previous experience of working there.

Recommendations

Future programmes should be more focussed. Preparation should be thorough and detailed. Time invested in carefully laying the groundwork for the programme will pay dividends later. All stakeholders should be involved from the design stage so that they can feel ownership of the programme. There should be more focus on coordination of, cooperation with and communication between the various stakeholders.

Where a number of donors are involved (as in this case - the Swiss Government, the Dutch Government and the European Commission) efforts should be made to have a more coordinated approach.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Context

The evaluation reviewed the Juvenile Justice Reform Programme in Jordan. Phase one of the Programme comprised two projects. The first project was entitled “Strengthening the legislative and institutional capacity of the Juvenile Justice System in Jordan - R56” and was funded by the Government of Switzerland. The second was entitled “Building the capacity of the Criminal Courts Systems in Jordan and especially the juvenile courts – S21” and was funded by the Government of the Netherlands. The Programme was initiated in Jordan in July 2005 and will end its first phase in July 2007.

The Programme was conceived, and a needs assessment mission undertaken, in 2003. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) in Jordan was involved in drafting the programme in consultation with UNICEF and other stakeholders. The expected starting date was April 2004. The date of signature was May 2004. A follow-up mission was undertaken in March 2005. Implementation began in May 2005 with the quest for staff. The project office opened in July 2005 when the National Coordinator was appointed. An International Coordinator was appointed in September 2005. A reassessment of the project was carried out between September and December 2005 in order to reshape some of the activities identified in both projects, but particularly in R56. The programme was officially launched on December 08, 2005. There was thus a lengthy time gap between the conceptualisation of the project and presentation of the concept paper and its implementation. Those who originally conceived the project had no part in its implementation.

1.2 Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation was to establish what the projects have achieved and if they have attained their objectives. The extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met as well as what has been achieved in terms of impact and sustainability have also been assessed.

The evaluation sought to draw lessons and best practices that can be used to improve project planning, design and management. These should be extremely valuable for UNODC to improve future projects in the region (e.g. Syria) and compare this experience with other UNODC projects in Lebanon and Egypt. The evaluation should also be of interest to the donors of the project, as these donors are envisaging funding additional projects in Jordan as well as other similar projects in the region.
The objective of the evaluation was to examine the mandate, strategies, objectives, relevance, effectiveness, results, impact, sustainability and added value of UNODC’s actions.

1.3. Executing Modality/Management Arrangements

The Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) has statutory responsibility in matters concerning disadvantaged children and expected that they would manage the project. The project introduced a concept, new in the context of UNDP funded projects, of a hands-on management approach by UNODC. MOSD was unhappy with this approach and never fully accepted it.

The reassessment carried out between September and December 2005 appears to have been rushed because of perceived time pressures and factors that would impact on implementation were not identified.

The UNODC assessment did not reveal that the European Commission had sponsored the Arab Organisation for Human Rights (AOHR) to review and update the 2002 Juvenile Justice legislation and had provided a budget of Euro 83,000 for this purpose. The MOSD did not bring this to the attention of UNODC until they received the final draft of the new legislation from UNODC’s General Working Group in June 2006. It is unclear why they chose to withhold this information while at the same time chairing the UNODC review.

This was a complex project with an unusually large number of stakeholders. The project document is vague in respect of roles and does not spell out who controls what.

1.4. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation reviewed the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the Programme activities from the beginning of the implementation until June 2007. It consists of one (1) comprehensive report which has been prepared in accordance with the “UNODC Standard Format and Guidelines for Evaluation Reports”.
1.5. Methodology

The evaluation methods consisted of the following:

- A document review which included most major documents, such as the project documents, progress and monitoring reports, terminal narrative reports, as well as assessments (desk study);
- Interviews with key players and interlocutors;
- Field visits to the key juvenile institutions;
- Drafting of final report.

The Head of the Juvenile Unit at MOSD cancelled a planned visit to the Unit without explanation and the Evaluation Team was told that he was not available for interview. The evaluation team did not have access to the children in the various centres to hear their views on the programme in general and the various activities in particular. It is understood that this was because of sensitivities on the part of the MOSD.

2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS

The Strengths of the Programme:

1) A national priority: The Government was committed to making juvenile justice a national priority.
2) The chosen target: The Government and society at large wanted something done about young offenders.
3) Timing – The intervention appeared to be coming at the right time in view of the Government’s commitment to tackling the problem of youth offending.
4) Partners – there was an acceptance amongst the various partners that there was a need to work together to find a solution to offending amongst children and young persons.
5) Training Manuals – there was a felt need amongst practitioners in the various disciplines for training manuals to assist them in their work.
6) Funding – The Governments of Switzerland and the Netherlands were willing to support the initiatives.

The Programme brought juvenile justice into focus, not only to those in the criminal justice field but also to society at large.
It brought together all the various Government Departments, relevant agencies and NGOs, highlighted barriers to cooperation and identified the need to establish a communication network to maintain links tentatively forged.

It raised the awareness that all agencies must work together in the best interests of children and began the process of breaking down barriers. It put pressure on the various agencies to begin the change process. Although this inevitably caused tension in the initial stages it will have long term benefits.

It raised the profile of juvenile justice and has established an acceptance of the need for specialist courts and specialist personnel in the various disciplines (judges, social workers, probation officers, police officers).

The Chairman of the Judicial Council reports that, in raising the profile of juvenile justice, the Programme has made it more likely that judges will agree to spend time in the juvenile courts rather than look for the earliest opportunity to get out of them.

The relevant training strategies used comprised an extensive package of multidisciplinary and specialised training programmes for judges and prosecutors, social workers, lawyers and police officers and training curricula developed especially at the Judicial Institute of Jordan. The Programme has broadened the experience of and introduced a range of new ideas to the judges, prosecutors and members of the different disciplines who participated in the various seminars, workshops and study trips.

Four training manuals (for (a) judges and magistrates, (b) police, (c) social workers and (d) lawyers) have been developed through the relevant national institutions. This kind of specialised technical manual is a new element in the Jordanian context. They have already been field-tested and have been well received by practitioners. The manuals will serve a dual purpose in providing reference books for practitioners and handbooks for trainees.

As a result of the Programme juvenile justice seems set for a place on the curricula of the various university courses focussing on children’s issues (law, social work, the police academy).

The Programme has directly benefited young people in conflict with the law through the quality of rehabilitation programmes introduced and construction works implemented within the various
centres, the automation of the Juvenile Court in Amman and the installation of audiovisual equipment at Zarqa First Instance Court which will provide protection not only for juveniles in conflict with the law but also for children at risk.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the Programme is the Draft Juvenile Justice Legislation. The final product is a well-balanced document that is both vigilant and attentive to international norms and standards. The draft is specific on principles but flexible on procedures in order to allow a gradual introduction of specialist courts, for example, depending on the availability of resources. The thinking is that regulations can easily be changed as levels of expertise increase and more resources are made available without the need to rewrite the legislation. For this reason the Draft carefully avoids focussing on administrative procedures in the belief that these can be introduced as appropriate. The focus instead is on the strategic enforcement of rights through the legal process. The new Act will be able to work with minimum capacity without compromising on human rights issues. Pre-trial detention, which is currently over-used, will be limited to 2 weeks. If the child is not released or brought to trial in that time there will be mandatory referral to a judge who will normally release the child on bail or under some kind of supervision. The Draft proposes raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility from 7 to 12. It promotes restorative principles with the focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment, the use of non-custodial measures to the extent possible and the complete separation of children and adults. The Draft grants judges more flexibility by providing them with a wider range of dispositions. This is a good piece of legislation which, if approved by Parliament in its present form, can act as a model for others in the region.

The Weaknesses of the Programme:

1) Delay – There was a long delay between conceptualisation and implementation.
2) Duplication – The UNODC Coordinators were unaware that a review of the legislation was already under way or that their Programme was duplicating work being sponsored by the European Commission.
3) Complexity – This was a complex programme with many partners calling for a coordinator with a high level of skill in this area.
4) Management - Management of the implementation process was weak.
5) Roles were not clearly defined – no one was sure who was responsible for what.
6) The rapid turnover of Government personnel caused disruption to the Programme.

Much consultation had already taken place on the concept paper in late 2003/early 2004 i.e. quite a
long time before the UNODC team responsible for implementing the project was appointed (July 2005 and September 2005). The news that UNODC would manage the project directly appears to have generated something of a turf war. This may have been partly at the root of some of the criticisms of UNODC’s management skills.

UNODC decided to involve the decision makers at the highest (Ministerial and Secretary General) level. This was the correct decision and was particularly appropriate in the case of MOSD which has, by law, a direct mandate over juvenile issues and no revision of law or issuance of regulations would be possible unless approved by the MOSD. Inviting MOSD to assume the chairmanship of the General Working Group (reviewing the legislation) was meant to fully engage the Ministry in the process and reinforce its sense of ownership of the draft law.

Unfortunately there was a rapid turnover of Government personnel throughout the life of the project. There was a change of Minister of Social Development in December 2005. The Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Development resigned in February 2006 and there was a 3-month delay in appointing a new Secretary General. The UNODC focal point in the Ministry of Justice was changed after a few months and a new Minister of Justice was appointed in December 2006. These Governmental changes tended to undermine the sense of ownership or sense of continuity, and those coming into the project did not always feel bound by decisions taken earlier in the process. They impacted also on communication between the various stakeholders resulting in misunderstandings and delays – particularly with regard to organising meetings.

There was a delay in sending the budget allocation for 2006 from the UNODC regional office/HQ. The first allocation, received in February 2006, was for the wrong amount. The second, revised, allocation was not received until June 2006. This delay created uncertainty with regard to what funds would be available for the planning of activities.

The uncertainty caused by institutional changes within Government combined with concerns over the budget allocation had a consequential delay on the implementation of the project activities and delayed the calling of the first meeting of the Steering Committee. This meeting was originally requested in November 2005 and eventually held on 11 July 2006.

And yet, despite the many difficulties, the consensus amongst respondents was that the objectives set for the programme as a whole and for the individual projects within it were, by and large, achieved.
2.1 Overall Performance Assessment

The Programme directly benefited young people in conflict with the law. Detention facilities and the treatment of juveniles in detention were improved. Juvenile Justice was brought into focus, not only for professionals, but also for the public at large. The Programme developed a range of relevant training strategies both specialist and multidisciplinary. Four Training Manuals have been prepared for (a) judges and magistrates, (b) police, (c) social workers and (d) lawyers. Draft Juvenile Justice Legislation has been prepared and is currently with the Legislative Bureau.

On the negative side, the reassessment of the project, the resetting of priorities and discussions with stakeholders appears to have been rushed. Roles were not clearly defined. UNODC’s “Hands-On Management Modality” was neither fully understood, nor fully accepted, by some stakeholders. It created resistance on the part of some of the institutions, particularly the MOSD, and generated a series of difficulties and challenges which were never fully resolved. However, while these difficulties and disagreements caused unnecessary headaches and may, to some extent, have eroded the element of “value-added”, all objectives were, by and large, achieved.

2.2. Attainment of the Objectives

The projects were formulated upon the request of the Jordanian authorities - Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Justice - and on the basis of a needs assessment mission carried out in 2003 as well as one follow-up mission undertaken in March 2005. The programme aimed at supporting national efforts to bring legal provisions into line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations Standards and Norms regarding the Administration of Justice and included measures to improve detention conditions and treatment of juveniles in detention, in line with the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their liberty.
a) **Objective 1:** A draft Bill has been prepared and is currently with the Legislative Bureau. Two reports on the institutionalisation of legal aid for juvenile offenders in Jordan have been prepared with a view to initiating the discussion process.

b) **Objective 2:** This objective is one of the most critical and important components of the project because it has great prospects for sustainability. The action plan encompasses specific recommendations related to the mandate, structure and organisation of the unit aimed at enhancing its role especially in the area of policy development. The Evaluation Team was disappointed, therefore, when a planned visit to the Juvenile Unit was cancelled without explanation. Neither was the Head of the Unit available for interview. Attempts by UNODC to have the visit and the meeting rescheduled were unsuccessful. Consequently the Evaluation Team cannot comment on progress towards the achievement of this objective. UNODC was unable to advise because they report similar experiences over the past two years during which they did not have proper access to staff or to the Head of the Unit. Their concerns in this matter are recorded in the Minutes of Steering Committee meetings.

c) **Objective 3:** Multidisciplinary and specialised training courses for professionals dealing with children at risk and in need of protection and those in conflict with the law were organised in all areas of the Kingdom. Most have been completed. Those outstanding will be completed in July (2007). Two Study Tours (to Lebanon and Switzerland) were organised. Four Training Manuals have been prepared for training purposes.

d) **Objective 4:** Construction work and refurbishment within 3 juvenile centres in Zarqa and Amman have been completed. Rehabilitation programmes were organised by Questscope and Terre des Homes (TDH) for children in 3 juvenile centres together with staff training programmes.

e) **Objective 5:** Rehabilitation and aftercare programmes were organised by the “Family Guidance and Awareness Centre (commonly known as the ‘Nadia Boushnac’) Organisation” for children in three Juvenile Centres and for children at risk. Staff training programmes were also organised. The Jordan River Foundation implemented a programme on family line support.
a) **Objective 1 (S21):** An assessment of case flow management and hard/soft filing systems has been conducted, an IT expert has been appointed, the establishment of a data base is underway and the automation of the Juvenile Court in Amman has been completed.

b) **Objective 2 (S21):** Discussions are ongoing on how to enhance the flow and sharing of information between Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Social Development.

c) **Objectives 3 & 4 (S21):** These objectives were taken together with Objective 3 of R56 (See “c” above).

d) **Objective 5 (S21):** Audiovisual equipment has been provided for the first instance court in Zarqa and workshops organised to brief staff in its use. Amendments to legislation have been introduced to allow courts to accept evidence presented in this way.

### 2.3. Achievement of Programme/Project Results

Objective 1 (R56) called for the drafting of new legislation. This objective took longer to achieve than anticipated for a number of reasons including the rapid turn over of Government personnel and difficulties organising meetings. One factor not yet covered was the fact that the various Government Departments, while agreeing in principle on the need for new legislation, had given no consideration to its implications. The National and International experts who had been appointed to oversee the preparation of the draft legislation spent two to three months bringing Government Departments up to a state of readiness. Another factor which caused delay was the failure of the MOSD to reveal the fact that AOHR was already involved in drafting new legislation at the time the UNODC initiative got under way. The MOSD did not bring this to the attention of UNODC until they received the final draft of the new legislation from UNODC’s General Working Group in June 2006. It is unclear why they chose to withhold this information while at the same time chairing the UNODC review. When this fact eventually came to light some five months were lost in efforts to reconcile the two drafts. The final draft was brought back to the Technical Committee for review and eventually presented to the Legislative Bureau some six months behind schedule.

The only other major delay concerned the Terre des Homme (TDH) staff-development programmes for social workers in 3 children’s centres. The MOSD was reluctant to grant permission for the project to begin apparently because of a bad experience with another NGO which had been working in the centres some time previously. Eventually the matter was resolved and the project completed satisfactorily. The rehabilitation programmes by the other NGOs were all completed on time as was the construction work and refurbishment within the 3 juvenile centres.
The four Training Manuals were prepared and field-tested and the study tours organised according to schedule. There were no untoward delays in the organisation and implementation of multidisciplinary and specialised training courses. The majority have been completed and those outstanding will be completed before the Programme ends (July 31, 2007).

It is unclear how many children benefited from the various projects but it is clear that the numbers were significant. For example Questscope reports that more than 400 children benefited from their projects while the projects in the Al-Khansa Centre catered for 64 girls.

80 judges and prosecutors and 90 police officers benefited from the specialist training courses while some 280 participants availed of the multi-disciplinary seminars.

Prior to the project interaction between the MOJ and MOSD was of a limited nature. There is now more direct contact and more cooperation – particularly following the revision of the legislation. This new relationship has further manifested itself in the cooperation over multidisciplinary training.

The Judicial Council reported that the performance of judges who had participated in training was better in the handling of issues like detention than it had been prior to the training.

The Judicial Institute reports that it has plans to place juvenile justice on the curriculum for trainee judges and also to include it as part of in-service training.

The MOJ has established a Directorate of Family Affairs to deal with issues such as Legal Aid, Human Rights and Family Matters. The Juvenile Department of this Directorate will deal with all aspects of juvenile justice. It is part of their strategy to have specialist panels to deal with juvenile cases. 3 Juvenile courts have been set up to date – 7 more are needed. The Directorate’s role will be to oversee these. Specialist rooms within these courts have been set aside to deal with Family Violence and juvenile affairs.

It is clear that these activities contributed to the attainment of the programme objectives. The evaluation team is confident that the results (including the seminars and workshops to be completed this month – July 2007) will have been achieved within the planned time frame and within the resources available to the Programme.
2.4. Implementation

Divergent views on the best way to manage the programme had a direct impact on implementation and slowed the process down.

The lack of role clarity meant that it was never quite clear who was responsible for what. The rapid turnover of personnel at Ministerial and Secretary General level tended to undermine the sense of ownership and sense of continuity, and those coming into the project did not always feel bound by decisions taken earlier in the process. Communication between the various stakeholders was difficult at times resulting in misunderstandings and delays – particularly with regard to organising meetings.

2.5. Institutional and Management Arrangements

United Nations and other organisations working in Jordan in the past followed the National Execution Modality “NEX” in partnering with government institutions. This system allows these institutions to have full control of the funds and management of projects. Stakeholders in the current project expected that UNODC would follow the same modality. UNODC, however, followed the “Hands-On Management Modality”. This approach was neither fully understood, nor fully accepted, by some stakeholders. It created resistance on the part of some of the institutions, particularly the MOSD, and generated a series of difficulties and challenges which were never fully resolved. Management arrangements appear to have been the weak point of this programme. The failure to clearly define roles meant that no one was quite sure who was responsible for what.

3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

3.1. Outcomes

The Minister of Social Development expressed his satisfaction with the progress which has taken place and looks forward to further involvement.

The Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Development believes that the new database will help to provide statistical indicators and link various interested agencies.

The Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice described the project as “significant and important” and said he hopes there will be a second cycle to build on the foundations laid.
The Chairman of the Judicial Council believes that the project has achieved many positive aspects.

The Director of the Judicial Institute described the seminars as “excellent and very useful” and said that the judges benefited a lot.

The Director of the Public Security Department said “the project had value for the police”.

The Head of the International Agencies and Commissions Division, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation said: “The project goals were beneficial and well intentioned. The workshops were good”.

UNICEF’s Project Officer said: “This was an important initiative and contributed a lot. The different components of the project contributed to one another and the objectives were largely achieved”.

Staff at the Usama Bin Zeid Juvenile Centre expressed their satisfaction at the provision of shelving in the kitchen and with their new food trolley. They said that the five computers would enable training to be given on computer skills.

The Director of the Al-Khansa Juvenile Centre said that the activities provided (Drama, Art, Music and Agriculture) had been very beneficial to the girls. The upgrading of the kitchen will allow cookery classes to begin.

3.2. Impacts

It is clear from 3.1 above that the programme has had many positive outcomes.

The kitchen upgrade in the Al-Khansa Centre and the provision of worktops, shelving and a food trolley, and the computers, in Usama Bin Zeid had an immediate impact with both staff and children expressing their satisfaction.

There was general consensus that the staff training programmes had been excellent. The Judicial Council, for example, noted that judges who attended training were now handling cases with more confidence.
The provision of the four Training Manuals was welcomed by all. It was generally agreed that they would provide an excellent training resource both for new recruits and for in-service training.

The Draft Legislation is a well-balanced document that is both vigilant and attentive to international norms and standards. The Draft is currently with the Legislative Bureau for consideration before being presented to Parliament.

There was general satisfaction that the programme had raised awareness of the issue of juvenile justice not only amongst practitioners but also amongst the general public.

Several respondents mentioned that the activities provided in the various children’s homes were excellent. However their completion left a void which will be difficult to fill. The Director of the Al-Khansa Juvenile Centre, for example, spoke of the “great buzz around the place” while the activities were ongoing but then suddenly it was all over. It is to be hoped that the MOSD, having witnessed the success of the pilot programmes will find the resources within their budget to incorporate them fully into the programmes of the various Centres.

3.3. Sustainability

Juvenile Justice is now clearly on the agenda at Government level and has a firm place in curriculum of the police academy. It is also anticipated that it will be given a substantive slot in the university curricula for law and social work.

The Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Council state their intention to move towards specialist juvenile courts with specialist judges.

The Public Security Department says that specialist units will be set up within all police stations staffed by police officers and social workers with specialist training in working with juveniles.

The MOSD has overall responsibility for matters appertaining to juveniles and consequently has the responsibility for making resources and funding available to guarantee sustainability. Clearly the resources available to MOSD are dependent on where juvenile justice fits into Government priorities. As already noted, the projects were formulated upon the request of the Jordanian authorities and the Government appears committed to prioritise juvenile justice at this time. All of these activities will need to be included in future budget allocations.
The Manuals for example will need to be updated as soon as the new legislation is on the statute books. They will also need to be expanded to take into account “children in need” and “victims”. Staff training programmes have raised expectations and funding needs to be identified to allow regular in-service training.

In a few instances work has stalled already because maintenance of the project has not been included in the budget. Newly-installed washroom facilities in Usama Bin Zeid Children’s Home are not being used because of the poor quality of the fittings. These will need to be replaced with more robust fittings before the young people are allowed access to them but this was not allowed for in the budget. It must be stressed that the choice of fittings in Usama Bin Zeid Children’s Home was the responsibility of the MOSD and not of UNODC. It is also MOSD’s responsibility to find the resources within their budget to ensure that the work begun by UNODC is completed satisfactorily. The problem is that no such allocation has been made at this time.

In a second instance, technology installed in one court to allow the recording of victim interviews is not being used because the prosecutor does not have facilities to view the tapes. Again this is outside UNODC’s remit and the MOJ must come up with a solution.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1. Lessons Learned

Problems appear to have arisen in the current project because of the time interval between the project design and its implementation. In future this time interval should be kept to a minimum. Where lengthy delays occur any reassessment of need should be thorough and detailed and should include full consultation with all stakeholders. The concept paper should be made available to all potential stakeholders who should then be fully involved in the project design. Every effort should be made to ensure that all stakeholders have accepted ownership of the project and are committed to it. The project documentation should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders.

It is anticipated that UNODC’s management approach will meet with less resistance in the future since the various institutions will have a better understanding of the concept.
4.2. Best Practices

The evaluation team believes that Questscope’s involvement in this programme provides an example of best practice.

UNODC rightly accepted that Questscope had expertise in this area of work. They also had experience of working in Jordan. They had previously organised a Mentoring programme sponsored by the World Bank. The UNODC project provided an opportunity to build on the earlier project. They knew how to avoid the pitfalls. They had already discussed the details of the project with other stakeholders. They sat, discussed and coordinated the project with TDH before starting and had devised a working plan. The fact that they were building on earlier experience helped to provide energy to the project.

Questscope believes that a major factor in the success of their project was that they spelt out their roles and those of UNODC before the project started. This helped to avoid conflict later on. They devised a work plan for the entire year. Everyone had ownership of the project. The Centre staff was also involved. Involving the Director and Site Managers from the beginning was critical. They presented their plan to UNODC. UNODC approved the plan and then left Questscope to get on with it.

4.3. Constraints

The project suffered from a number of constraints:

There was a lengthy time interval between design and implementation.

Those who designed the project played no part in its implementation.

The project began before staff was appointed and this put undue pressure on staff to get the project up and running.

This was a complex programme with many partners; roles were not clearly defined and communication was difficult.

The rapid turn-over of personnel at Ministerial and Secretary General Level within Government Departments disrupted continuity on both the Steering Committee and the Technical Committee,
undermined the concept of ‘ownership’ and increased the likelihood that new Committee members would not accept decisions taken earlier. There was also a lack of understanding on the part of some of the new members of the concepts underpinning the project.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Issues resolved during the evaluation

The only issue which came up during the evaluation was the unavailability of some of those scheduled to be interviewed. Three meetings were cancelled because the Minister of Justice, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the Head of the MOSD’s Juvenile Unit were unavailable. In view of the importance of the programme involving the MOSD’s Juvenile Unit the Evaluation Team was particularly disappointed when a planned visit to the Unit was cancelled without explanation. Attempts by UNODC to have the visit and the various meetings rescheduled were unsuccessful.

5.2. Actions/decisions recommended

All stakeholders should be involved from the design stage so that they can feel ownership of the programme.

There should be more focus on coordination – poor liaison between UNODC and MOSD had a major impact on the success of the programme.

Future programmes should be more focussed. The current project tried to cover too much. It would have been better to complement programmes already underway (such as the review of legislation, if it had been known about) rather than attempting to duplicate them.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

The Programme has raised the profile of juvenile justice and has established an acceptance of the need for specialist courts and specialist personnel in the various disciplines (judges, social workers, probation officers, police officers). It has raised the awareness of juvenile justice issues, not only to those in the criminal justice field but also to society at large. It brought together all the various Government Departments, relevant agencies and NGOs, highlighted barriers to cooperation and identified the need to establish a communication network to maintain links tentatively forged.
It raised the awareness that all agencies must work together in the best interests of children and began the process of breaking down barriers. It put pressure on the various agencies to begin the change process.

The draft Juvenile Justice Legislation is a well-balanced document that is both vigilant and attentive to international norms and standards. The Training Manuals have been met with universal approval. Participants speak highly of the specialised and multidisciplinary training courses and study trips. Construction and refurbishment work in the three Children’s Centres have met with the approval of staff and children while the rehabilitation programmes proved extremely popular with all those children who were lucky enough to participate.

Despite a number of constraints the overall momentum of the Programme ensured that all objectives were achieved.

Finally, on my own behalf and on behalf of my colleague Ms Widad Adas-Mahara, I would like to thank Sahar Rawas, National Project Coordinator, for organising the Evaluation Mission. She provided us with the necessary documentation. She arranged a very full and comprehensive itinerary which allowed us to meet with Ministers, Secretary Generals and other senior personnel in the various Government Departments and with representatives of UNDP, UNICEF and the various NGOs. We had the opportunity to visit key juvenile institutions. We are deeply grateful to all of those who took time out of their very busy schedule to meet with us. We sincerely appreciate the warmth of the welcome, the hospitality and the open and frank discussions. We hope this report does justice to the many contributions we received. But most of all we hope that it will advance the cause of juvenile justice in Jordan and assist UNODC to improve future projects in the region.

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