In-depth Mid-Term evaluation of the

Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries

2011 – 2015

Independent Evaluation Unit
March 2015
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This publication has not been formally edited.
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<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Afghanistan Drug Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKT</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (initiative)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Alternative Livelihoods</td>
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<td>AML</td>
<td>Anti-money laundering</td>
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<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>ANF</td>
<td>Anti-Narcotics Force</td>
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<td>AOTP</td>
<td>Afghan Opiate Trade Programme</td>
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<td>APGML</td>
<td>Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering</td>
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<td>BLO</td>
<td>Border Liaison Office</td>
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<td>BOMCA</td>
<td>Border Management Programme Central Asia</td>
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<td>CARICC</td>
<td>Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measure</td>
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<td>CBT</td>
<td>Computer-based Training</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Container Control Programme</td>
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<td>CCPCJ</td>
<td>Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Communicable Disease Control</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Developmental Unit</td>
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<td>CFT</td>
<td>Countering financing of terrorism</td>
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<td>CNC</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Centre</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>Commission on Narcotic Drugs</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>COAFG</td>
<td>Country Office Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIRA</td>
<td>Country Office Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPAK</td>
<td>Country Office in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Programme</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Drug Demand Reduction</td>
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<td>DLO</td>
<td>Drug Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>DM</td>
<td>Division for Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Division for Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs</td>
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<td>DTA</td>
<td>Division for Treaty Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAG</td>
<td>Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>European Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWG</td>
<td>Expert Working Group</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>FCR</td>
<td>Full Cost Recovery</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Field Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPML</td>
<td>Global Programme against Money Laundering</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRMS</td>
<td>Human Resources Management Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>International Collaborative Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDE</td>
<td>In-Depth Evaluation</td>
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</table>
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRCCA United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTOC United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime
VCT Voluntary Counselling and Testing
WCO World Customs Organization

WHO WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The narcotics trade associated to the opiates emanating from Afghanistan is globally estimated to be worth in excess of USD 60 Billion\(^1\) a year. The magnitude of this illicit economy and the organized crime that profits from the proceeds poses not only a direct threat to the state of Afghanistan but to the wider geographical region. The transnational effects of drug trafficking, insurgency, instability, organized crime, corruption and associated social and public health problems related to narcotics are experienced (to varying degrees) in all the countries that border Afghanistan.

Through the Rainbow Strategy, UNODC encouraged the countries neighbouring Afghanistan to cooperate more widely in a coordinated manner to counter the effects of drug trafficking. Delivering along seven distinct but interrelated lines of operation, the Rainbow Strategy delivered many successful results. By 2011 there was a need to build upon the Rainbow Strategy. In response, UNODC developed the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (RP), as a means of establishing a more permanent mechanism for promoting regional cooperation.

The RP is a flexible and practical “vehicle” through which UNODC assists regional cooperation, in a selected number of substantive areas, to counter what is a regional phenomenon.

Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries do not represent a homogenous region. Considerable political and practical differences hinder their cooperation. The RP is, therefore, a platform that seeks to bring together nations, fostering dialogue, exploring common ground and proposing joint solutions to counter the effects of narcotics. The RP is one of the very few permanent platforms that provides mechanisms (forums), and means (staff and resources) in support of cross-border initiatives. The RP is an important element of UNODC’s Inter Regional Drug Control (IRDC) approach, which aims to develop a network of networks; by linking agencies and bodies in one country to intra-regional hubs and then beyond, to inter-regional and global networks. Increased regional cooperation is built on firm national foundations. These foundations, in turn, are supported by UNODC’s Country and Global Programmes (which provide actual capacity building). Where overlaps exist, they allow the RP to reinforce activities, by networking agencies, and transposing best practices from one country across the region. If the Country and Global Programmes build capacity, or the nodes of the network, then it is the RP that attempts to bind these nodes into a network. This process of binding is not automatic and it requires staff to build connections, to hold the disparate elements of the network together, until they mature.

\(^1\) UNODC Estimate. The figure is for narcotics coming from within Afghanistan and distribution within the wider region.
This in-depth mid-term evaluation was undertaken at mid-point of the RP implementation and it intended to assess achievements and provide recommendations to improve the performance for the remainder of the RP’s implementation. This evaluation utilized the findings from the mid-term evaluations of the country programmes for Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and also the evaluations of the Paris Pact Initiative (PPI), the Integrated Programming Approach, the Afghanistan cluster evaluations and other evaluations conducted within Central Asia. This report is drafted on the premise that readers are familiar with the aforementioned evaluations.

Findings

Design

In 2008 UNODC moved to an integrated programming approach. While the concept is widely understood, delivery is inconsistent; as mentioned in many other evaluations. The RP set out, from the start, to deliver an integrated programme; it was never a collection of projects that metamorphosed into a programme. As such, the RP would appear to be better than many of the CPs in terms of an integrated design perspective.

The RP does not provide assistance in all UNODC’s thematic areas. Given the regional context, the will of Member States and the prominence of Afghan opiates, it represents the art of the possible. The RP is sub-divided into four sub-programmes. These sub-programmes are logical and practical, in that they group complimentary activities together in an easily digestible format; more importantly Member States understand them.

Programme integration is most strongly seen between SP1 and SP2, where there are many complementary activities. In addition, many SP4 activities are linked to the other SPs, in terms of research, reporting and advocacy. There is still room for improvement, in particular integrating SP3 activities.

Though an institutional position within UNODC has not been adopted, in regards to the illicit economy debate, this represents an area for potential RP expansion. A regional approach could look to support border controls, monitoring the flow or people, material, narcotics and finances. At the same time, increased economic investment, community resilience, counter-corruption and anti-money laundering activities may also be required. Incorporating the illicit economy should not be viewed as a new activity, but as a cross cutting issue. Engaging RP Member States will require political buy-in, which requires research and advocacy before any new activities are proposed.

Although UNODC has corporately adopted a programming approach, it still possesses a “project mentality”. While edicts can and have been issued, internal change takes time and effort. UNODC should consider supporting any future change with a dedicated change management plan. This should include external and internal communication campaigns which seek to positively influence stakeholders by providing relevant information in the right format at the right time. Not only should this be taken forward as a corporate activity, but this recommendation should be incorporated as part of the RPs Theory of Change (ToC) exercise. This would allow the RP to understand what messages it should deliver, at what time, and in support of what activities, in order to gain the maximum influence.
Relevance

The RP is highly relevant, both internationally and regionally. Countless international accords relating to Afghanistan have stated that countering narcotics requires a regional approach. Yet there are few delivery mechanisms that promote regional cooperation or tackle what is the region’s largest source of insecurity. Regional solutions must not only be brokered, but nurtured, and supported; success will be uneven, and will take time. The RP aims to fill this space.

Based on the guidance notes developed by UNODC, the RP has taken steps to explicitly incorporate gender and human rights dimensions into its work. The initiatives taken (or about to be) by the RP in mainstreaming human rights and gender are encouraging and in line with institutional requirements.

Governance

The RP has two governance mechanisms; one political and one technical. Member State requests are considered and addressed at these forums, and stakeholders possess a real sense of ownership. Political oversight is gained via a high-level strategic Steering Committee. The Steering Committee is a unique mechanism that supports the activities of the RP by increasing programme ownership and providing political endorsement. The chance to provide political oversight is extremely helpful and greatly appreciated by the Member States.

At the political level, RP activities could be better coordinated with other UNODC delivery vehicles and external agencies. This evaluation recommends conducting a ToC exercise to ensure that RP outcomes are mapped to a single aim. This will ensure coherence in programming, and increase coordination and complementary activities with partners relative to time and outcomes.

Efficiency

Over the first 2.5 years of implementation, the RP has seen its budget increase from USD 20 million to USD 30 million. As of July 2014 only 51% of this budget has been secured, possibly signalling a fundraising challenge. Though the majority of donor respondents indicated they would either be definitely or probably contributing in the future, some donors stated that there was an unwillingness to commit more funding until previous funding tranches were either fully spent and/or adequately reported against.

Despite a good delivery rate the evaluation identified some challenges to the RP’s absorption capacity characterized by tight donor deadlines, a challenging security context and constraining internal rules and regulations; all of which hinder the RP’s ability to deliver. Regarding the latter and echoing the Country Evaluations of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the current evaluation recognized the following structural issues relating to internal systems and processes: human resources procedures, procurement, grants/Framework for the Engagement of External Parties (FEEP), delegation of authority.

Amongst a wealth of activity reporting sits the RP governance mechanism. Although Member States have ownership, the extent to which they can influence implementation is limited. Member States can agree on priorities, yet physical delivery can be slowed by UNODC internal process. Conversely, UNODC HQ may desire to advocate an issue through the political process but lacks the resources to do so as these “reside” in the field (i.e. the RP). For a programme that seeks to
promote political dialogue amongst Member States this appears to be a shortcoming. There should be a balance between the bottom-up approach of programming and the requirement for top-down political direction. Reporting should be driven by the decision maker’s requirements to receive timely and accurate information from which to make decisions, and in sufficient detail to issue meaningful direction. Existing structures should endure and could be reinforced by UNODC HQ ensuring coherence across its entire portfolio of activities and to assist the RP in monitoring strategic priorities. Likewise, UNODC HQ can facilitate efficient RP implementation by minimizing delays in authorising expenditures. This can only occur if there is closer working relationship between the RP and some units in HQ. While the RP can do more, it is incumbent on UNODC HQ to assist the RP to deliver. This should be seen as an opportunity to transfer political intent into tangible outcomes.

In delivering the RP, UNODC uses matrix management to coordinate staff activities and outputs. While local managers understand their staff and local requirements, they might not understand wider issues and strategic “drivers” of other UNODC initiatives. Hence the feeling, by some in UNODC HQ, that there is significant overlap between global, regional and country level activities. There is a requirement for UNODC HQ to own a master matrix and to ensure that it is managed efficiently. This matrix would assist in three areas, it would: indicate how effect is delivered; help UNODC HQ to see how global, regional and country level activities are coordinated; and, identify gaps, which could assist in prioritising activities and/or altering delivery mechanisms.

Many stakeholders referred to UNODC’s “silo mentality” which includes a culture where loyalty goes primarily to the funding source, rather than to the UNODC mandate. As a concrete example, the decentralisation of SP-level programme management functions to the field offices where SP Coordinators are located, experienced some “bumpy beginnings” (i.e. initial unwillingness to collaborate with and take on additional work from the RP) and collided with the primary loyalty to the funding source and field office.

The regional programming approach is the responsibility of the field representatives in the region and the management of UNODC in Vienna to achieve by adapting working practices. The adequacy of RP human resources was reported as problematic during interviews with less than one in three respondents believing that the RP’s human resources were adequate. A lack of corporate mobility and rotation, and cumbersome recruitment processes were quoted as some of the reasons behind the (i) delays in filling in the international posts; and (ii) challenges to attract and retain professionals to the region, in particular in Afghanistan. This issue of internal processes not being conducive to implementation in the field is an institutional challenge and has been flagged in the Afghanistan and Pakistan evaluations and the 2013 Audit report.

Many external stakeholders expressed reservations as to the RP communication and reporting mechanisms, stating that sometimes they did not meet their expectations. Though donor briefings are regularly organised in Vienna and Kabul, strong views were expressed about challenges to be communicated upfront rather than donors getting to know about them later, through other channels. The complexity of UNODC’s structure (i.e. RP, GLO, projects) and its reporting lines were confusing to partners, even to sister UN agencies. Many did not know who to address to interact within the organization.
Effectiveness

In many ways it is far too early to assess the RP’s impact. The changes it seeks to address are political and generational. The fact that the RP exists, that 8 diverse Member State have signed a document recognising that greater cooperation is required and that they have taken concrete steps to increase regional dialogue through this process, should be seen as a major achievement.

The RP needs longer to mature, to “find its feet”. A number of Member States have suggested that the RP should provide a longer term vision of increased regional cooperation and that it should be extended until at least 2019.

While the RP produces a raft of reporting, there appears to be limited understanding of what it actually does. The fact that the 2014 annual UNDOC report failed to recognise any of the most significant change examples compiled as part of this evaluation indicates that while the current reporting system exchanges vast amounts of data, there are limitations in the analysis of reports. Conducting a ToC exercise could assist the RP to understand what it needs to report and when. There are efficiencies to be made by compiling a master reporting matrix, not only for the RP, but also for UNODC HQ and donors. Reporting should be based on approved measures of effect, which should be achievable, realistic and quantifiable. Currently, reporting is activity based and there is limited assessment of effect or impact. If metrics can’t be found to measure effect, then a narrative format should be agreed upon and consistently applied.

The participation levels of Member States in RP activities differ and there is no one benchmark to gauge success. However, there have been a number of significant developments, such as: the Regional Intelligence Working Group on Precursor Chemicals, which provides a mechanism to inform Member States on the latest developments, share intelligence and conduct backtracking operations; and the Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (AKT) Initiative that developed greater legal cooperation and closer ties between Drug Control Agencies, Financial Investigative Units and General Prosecutors of the three participating nations. While activities under SP1 and SP2 appear to be well integrated, this is not the case for SP3. There are real differences between Member States, as to how they perceive the issues of HIV prevention and drug demand reduction. In this area, the RP needs to be more effective at advocating change and then supporting participating Member States.

Significant change through greater cooperation can only occur when the Member States and their respective agencies trust one another. The RP provides a means of trust building through dialogue and participation in regional events, by networking individuals in an attempt to increase regional connectivity. As a permanent platform, the RP promotes trust and is slowly building a regional network. While the aim is clear, the effect of this networking approach is difficult to determine.

As Afghanistan enters a decade of Transformation, the International Community will reorder its priorities and rebalance its efforts within the region. The importance of programmes outside Afghanistan, such as the RP, may increase, as the International Community seeks alternative avenues to counter the impact of narcotics emanating from Afghanistan, rather than providing direct support to Afghan authorities.

The majority of the RP donors do not have full embassy coverage across the entire geographical region and even those that do report varying degrees of influence. The fact that the RP can gain traction and reach beyond the ability of any single donor nation highlights UNODC’s
comparative advantage. Donors can benefit from diplomatic ties (limited to UNODC mandated areas) with all RP Member States at a fraction of the cost compared to establishing sections within their own Embassies. If the RP is envisaged as a “virtual embassy”, then its budget, of $30 million over 5 years, makes it a very cost effective mechanism for increasing regional cooperation.

The RP has a virtual staffing structure, one in which the staff are geographically dispersed and in many cases cost shared between programmes. This structure is not conducive to team work. Staff sharing, while appearing to be cost effective, often means that the RP loses out to an in-country owner. Virtual structures take time to nurture and require increased management oversight. Staff positions, especially SP coordinators are vital for invigorating the process. During the last 3 years, there have been long periods without SP coordinators and this has been detrimental to delivery. The problem lies with inefficiencies in the field and in UNODC HQ. Much is a product of UNODC’s own lengthy recruiting process. While the process exists for good reasons, it may not be conducive to the programming approach.

Partnerships

One of the most notable features of the RP is its ability to create dialogue within the neutral space of UNODC. The RP continues to build on successful country and global programmes; however it is clearly difficult to achieve homogeneity within such a large geographic area. A number of partner agencies and organisations in criminal justice and health expressed a desire for training and cooperation to ‘move up a level with enhanced expertise’. They also indicated that further consultation was required to design the next stage, as each country is at different stages and generic delivery is unsuitable.

A number of respondents interviewed recognise the need for ‘recalibration’ of all actors’ expectations, including UNODC for Afghanistan. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) acknowledges the primary importance of partnership with UNODC. Target agencies for RP policy dialogues are UNICEF, UNDPKO, UNDPA, UNDP, UNOHR, UNIDO, and UNHCR. Specific to SP3 are ILO, WHO, UNAIDS, for SP4 the World Bank. Increased jointly supportive inter-UN activity is underway between UNDP, UNAIDS and WHO particularly in the field of HIV/AIDS, with recognition that there are roles for the individual agencies to work together, which has not always been the case in the past.

Sustainability

In the Decade of Transformation the RP enables multilateral contribution to efforts to tackle narcotics and organised crime related to Afghan opium. There is an expressed desire amongst donors for the RP’s continuation for a number of reasons including encouraging regional stability and political presence in the post-Transition 2014 landscape. The RP’s true value of is its ability to generate relationships across borders, which have legacies of mistrust and political isolation. It may be that the informal networks are more sustainable than those that are formally created, as they are not rooted in agencies or national interest.

Although programme ownership and capacity is assumed by UNODC, delivery and effect is limited by high staff turn-over both internally and for partners. However, the continued ability of Member States to take effective action against transnational organised crime is dependent on
political will [as assessed within original programme risk] in maintaining the relevant agencies
and adoption of binding formal agreements to do so.

Conclusion

The only sustainable solution to countering the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan has to involve
all the countries that border Afghanistan. The RP is a permeant structure which lives and works
within Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, with the overall objective to promote and
support a regional approach. It builds on the successes of Country and Global Programmes, by
fostering dialogue and encouraging cooperation between 8 very different Member States. The fact
that all 8 Member States have agreed to a regional programme is proof of its worth.

The RP should be seen as a successful programme. While it is still in relatively early stages of
implementation, especially compared to the outcomes it seeks to achieve, it has many strengths,
which include:

- **High relevance** as it is based on the need of the Member States and it sets priorities
  based on their inputs as articulated during Technical Working Groups and the Steering
  Committee;

- **Flexibility** as it is responsive to Member State’s needs, with activities naturally grouped
  under four Sub Programmes so as to provide a unifying purpose and a programmatic
  approach, as opposed to a collection of individual projects;

- **Complementarity** as it provides additional resource which can reinforce Country and
  Global level initiatives and transpose activities from one Member State across the region.

On the converse the RP also has a number of weaknesses which include:

- The absence of long term vision or guidance to address what is at its core a political
  process (promoting cooperation);

- The inherent limitation of the RP as it is the product of Member States’ willingness to
  collaborate. The RP does not represent everything that needs to be achieved or done, but
  it is the result of what the “market can bear,” what Member States will currently sign up
  to;

- The lingering project mentality. Insufficient thought and resource was given to managing
  the change from projects to programming within UNODC at large. As there was and still
  is a need to break the project mentality of the staff, recipients and donors; this change
  process should have been accompanied by a change management plan ensuring full staff
  buy-in from the start. The absence of such change management plan may explain the
  “painful” birth of the RP;

- Shortfalls in staffing, particularly some Sub-Programme Coordinators posts, which
  hinders delivery.

Generating greater cooperation will take time and effort, there is no quick fix. The RP is starting
to find its feet and requires more time if it is to make an impact. Along with time, the critical
ingredient is people (staff), as they represent the binding force that is attempting to network the 8
Member States. This report highlights a number of areas where improvements can be made. The
vast majority are to structures and processes (the gearing that allows the RP to function), the
result of which should enable what are dedicated and experienced staff to improve their delivery, of what is a complex and challenging programme.
### SUMMARY MATRIX OF KEY FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Overall RP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Despite the progress achieved to date, the RP timeframe to achieve the planned objectives was ambitious. More time is required for the RP initiatives to achieve a significant change.</td>
<td>Document review.</td>
<td>1. To enable achievement of the planned objectives, UNODC should ensure continuity between the current Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (2011-2015) and the next phase (whatever the form of the next phase may be: extension or new programme).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although Member States and other stakeholders were consulted during its development, there were many UNODC staff who viewed the RP as an HQ/Vienna solution imposed top down on the field. This perception influenced the birth of the RP.</td>
<td>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
<td>31. When UNODC introduces change, a change-management plan should be included, which is supported by both internal and external communication plans and by Senior Management to alleviate potential barriers to implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RP design does not sequence activities and outcomes overtime. Implementation appears to be instantaneous and there is no sense of building on previous achievements, although some activities should be dependent on each other.</td>
<td>Document review.</td>
<td>4. The Regional Programme team should review the programme’s project document/logical framework in light of the findings of this evaluation. The review process should include a Theory of Change mapping exercise, building on previous achievements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despite the importance of the illicit economy debate in the region, an institutional position within UNODC has not been achieved.</td>
<td>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
<td>6. UNODC should adopt an institutional position about the illicit economy concept and then the Steering Committee could...</td>
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2 The general numbering order of the recommendations is preserved based on how they appear in the body of the report. In order to avoid confusion, this order is maintained for the matrix, thus explaining the “skipping” in the numbering sequence in the table.

3 A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

4 Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.
adopted yet and the current RP structure does not include the illicit economy as an outcome or activity per se.

The RP has two governance mechanisms; one political and one technical. While annual priorities are responsive to Member State requirements; annual priorities should also adhere to the RP’s higher level objectives. Strategic direction and policy guidance require clarification and monitoring in order to ensure coherence in the implementation of activities.

There is a need for strategic oversight of the Steering Committee’s recommendations. Their implementation is not prioritised; rather they are a list of recommendations devised in technical working groups without resource allocation. In addition, UNODC country, regional, thematic and global activities in the region are unevenly aligned.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Important Recommendations</th>
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<td><strong>Overall RP</strong></td>
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| Implementation of the mid-term evaluation recommendations will require time. At less than a year apart from the final evaluation, little progress in implementation will be witnessed. Therefore, there is no need to conduct a full-fledged final evaluation in 2015, especially if the RP is extended. |
| Document review, stakeholder interviews. |

| CP’s sub programmes are not aligned with the RP’s sub programmes. |
| Document review. |

| The RP has not fully integrated Human Rights & Gender perspectives within the programme. |
| Stakeholder interviews. |

|  | endorsement of illicit economy as an integral part of the RP. |
| 7. UNODC should pursue the approach by rolling out to the rest of the region (i.e. Central Asia) and ensure a common messaging within the UN family. |

| 9. RP management should ensure that UNODC country, regional global activities are aligned with SC recommendations before relevant activities commence. |

| 32. UNODC HQ to ensure coherence across its entire portfolio of activities and to assist the RP in monitoring strategic priorities. |
| Flagged as an institutional challenge in the Afghanistan and Pakistan evaluations as well as the 2013 Audit report, internal processes are not conducive to implementation in the field. | Country evaluations, survey, document review, stakeholder interviews. | 10. UNODC should be considering a corporate reflection as regards to its internal processes, considering the constraints imposed by being part of the UN Secretariat versus being an operational organization. |
| No one solution will fit all countries or all circumstances in terms of the practicalities of implementing the RP. In addition, the size of the region and the regional landscape adds to the challenge. Different approaches must be taken and this will take time and effort since it is an ongoing process. For the RP, this equates to staff (experts) and travel needs being adjusted accordingly. | Document review, stakeholder interviews. | 12. Re-examine the RP staff structures as per the table and body of the report and provide oversight mechanism to ensure their activities are properly coordinated. |
| A regional programming approach is the responsibility of the field representatives in the region as well as the management of UNODC in Vienna to materialise by adapting working practices. | Document review, stakeholder interviews. | 13. UNODC should revisit its reporting lines to consolidate a regional programming approach. |

**Sub-Programme 1**

| The SP1 coordinator’s post is shared with the ROCA LE coordinator’s post. The combined budget if these two segments is equivalent to the entire RP budget, yet the post is overseen by a single person. In addition this post has been gapped for over 6 months | Document review, stakeholder interviews. | 35. SP1 should have a dedicated full time LE representative. The SP 1 coordinator’s post should not be shared with the ROCA LE coordinator’s post. |
| SP 1 has successfully supported a number of regional LE initiatives but it has not developed any new ones. | Document review, stakeholder interviews. | 36. The RP should examine what other regional bodies can be established to assist cooperation amongst LE agencies. Possible avenues are AML, Forensics and Training. |
The key challenge for SP1 is promoting intelligence sharing amongst regional actors. This is about fostering trust, which is only possible amongst people and institutions that know and respect each other.

While SP has made progress towards achieving the objectives of outcomes 1 and 2, it has not been as successful in achieving results under outcome 3 - increased use of forensic evidence in investigating and prosecuting cross-border crimes.

**Sub-Programme 2**

Additional resources need to be devoted to attaining Output 4.1 (Facilitate the harmonization of legislative frameworks to enable international/regional cooperation in Criminal Matters).

**Sub-Programme 3**

Given the specialised HIV/AIDS related components of health related programmes within UNODC which impact specific disciplines, it would be beneficial to adopt health specific evaluation mechanisms and methodologies.

The rejection of globally accepted standards of epidemiological evidence for HIV/AIDS and the value of OST in prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission continues to generate difficulties for the RP, preventing proportionate scale-up of service provision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</strong></td>
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</table>

37. The RP should reconsider (in terms of resources) how it is going to develop trust as a means of increasing intelligence sharing.

38. The RP in conjunction with the COs/ROCA should review (in terms of placement) if the current laydown of LE SMEs best support intelligence sharing.

39. The RP should investigate the requirement for additional resources to be allocated toward outcome 3. If additional resources are not forthcoming, then the current SME in Afghanistan could be reassigned to the RP.

22. RP work plan to prioritise reviewing and updating RP countries’ laws and regulations so that these may be in line with the respective UN drugs, crime conventions.

30. UNODC to continue using health specific planning and evaluation methodologies, incorporating WHO guidance criteria for management and treatment of HIV/AIDS, and the use of health impact assessments in the longer term to establish more reliable results and outcome based data on programme success.

34. UNODC should enhance intra-UN and external agency advocacy and support for international best practice in harm reduction aligned to WHO and UNAIDS guidance.

The RP SP3 should continue advocacy for OST through exchange visits of policy makers and professionals to established OST sites, such as in I.R.Iran, in order to showcase the positive outcome of OST in preventing HIV among PWIDs and in prison settings.

**FAST activities (RP) have**

40. Continuous advocacy should
delivered promising early results yet need to be sustained. SP3 does not seem to be engaging strategically with existing programmes to achieve greater impact.

Document review, stakeholder questionnaire.

SP3 should foster enhanced strategic engagement with existing programmes in the area of drug dependence treatment.

Sub-Programme 4

The RP developed a Strategic Research Directions paper as a result of a consultative process involving all internal UNODC units addressing research; despite these consultation efforts, a majority of stakeholders assessed that the guidance and methodologies are sometimes not so clearly defined by RAB.

Stakeholder interviews.

28. Develop a Thematic Programme dedicated to research that would provide the necessary guidance and methodological standards.

Though a pilot component for the further decentralisation of the evaluation function was implemented, and COAFG expressed willingness to retain the function, the evaluation team found little evidence of reflection to learn from this experience, and appears to be a one off pilot with no continuity.

Document review, stakeholder interviews.

20. IEU to identify and communicate lessons learned from the pilot decentralised position to RP stakeholders, in order to inform relevant or related RP decisions.

These assertions and roles and responsibilities in regards to the continuation of the position were disputed. The Evaluation Team considers that what is ultimately important is to build upon the experience gained on this issue.

Having a dedicated outcome to monitoring, reporting and evaluation helped (i) raise the profile of these topics that are often disregarded by managers, and (ii) attract dedicated resources.

Document review, stakeholder interviews.

21. Building on lessons from this experience, the evaluation would recommend replicating a dedicated SP on research, monitoring, reporting and evaluation for other Regional Programmes.

Sub-programme 4 has been struggling with a lack of leadership, focus and continuity.

Document review, stakeholder interviews.

14. The evaluation would recommend having a dedicated SP4 Coordinator (by )
Successive SP4 Coordinators have had shared responsibilities with other units (IEU), other supporting tasks (reporting), other SPs (SP1) and more recently with other projects (AFGU04). As a result, there is still a gap in terms of how research is used for monitoring purposes and hence evaluation. Coordinator” is meant a person which attention would be undivided for SP4, not an additional resource person) that would focus on bridging the remaining gaps between research, monitoring and evaluation, in particular given the wide array of research activities in the region.

Little progress was witnessed directly as a result of the RP’s interventions with regards to availability of criminal justice (CJ), counter narcotics law enforcement (LE) and People Who Inject Drug (PWID) related data.

The evaluation found no evidence of monitoring and evaluation of the utilization of the research products and data.

The RP supported the objective of improved availability and comparability of drug use data across the region. In particular, a significant contribution was the creation of a network of drug survey experts – advancing an inter-regional approach.

In the absence of a mapping of the regional drug situation, which was meant to orient the overall RP strategy and priorities, the research agenda was to be lacking coordinated regional information.

The collaboration about the Drug Monitoring Platform (DMP) is in the process of being extended to the RP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall RP</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current system for hiring International Consultants to vacant posts or to conduct programmed work takes too long and results in many missed opportunities and delays in delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. As a means of reducing the time delay in hiring consultants, HRMS should delegate hiring to Field Offices. [see linkages with recommendation # 10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility in the region, especially to and from hardship duty stations, is an issue. The new</td>
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<tr>
<td>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. HRMS to ensure that the new Career Development and Mobility Framework sets time limitation for</td>
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</table>

23. SP4 should focus on those areas of CJ, drug use and LE for improved data availability, in particular by supporting the Coordination and Analysis Unit.

24. RAB to provide guidance on incorporating means to measure the impact and utilisation of research products and data.

25. RP to further facilitate the network of survey experts with the aim to share best practices and experiences that could benefit research and survey practices in their respective countries.

26. Undertake mapping of the regional drug situation in the second half of the programme implementation.

27. Continue the planned expansion of DMP to the RP.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Development and Mobility Framework may provide incentives for staff to go to the region.</th>
<th>serving in hardship duty stations.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The lack of outcome based reporting by UNODC was identified as a perennial source of donor frustration. Reporting challenges remain: (i) timeliness and (ii) level of details contained in such reports (too much output based versus strategic and outcome level), as well as the (iii) formats of APPR and SAPPR being too restrictive to capture any achievement beyond the logical framework and designed performance indicators.</td>
<td>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PMM development was halted by an executive decision in Vienna possibly linked to the upcoming shift to Umoja. As a result, current internal UNODC systems do not allow for monitoring against log-frames in a manner suitable for every-day management.</td>
<td>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While there is good communication between the RP and CPs/GLO, this dialogue normally takes place within SP thematic areas. The RP requires an additional level of coordination to ensure economy of effort between all RP and CP activities.</td>
<td>Stakeholder interviews, survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to the distances involved and the location of staff, there is a need for more efficient means of communication.</td>
<td>Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships with NGOs or media formed during advocacy events have not been consistently maintained despite eagerness of partners to follow through - missed opportunities were identified.</td>
<td>Stakeholder interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall external stakeholders expressed some reservations as to the RP communication and reporting, stating that sometimes it did not address their needs. The complexity of UNODC structure, vehicles (i.e. RP, GLO, Document review, stakeholder interviews.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. UNODC and the Regional Programme should improve its reporting framework by: 1) revising existing formats to capture achievements beyond the logical framework; 2) improving the monitoring data quality, especially at the outcome level; 3) developing a reporting deadlines calendar to ensure timeliness of contributions and submissions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Until new systems (Umoja) are up and running, the evaluation recommends re-starting the use of “smartsheets” (or other appropriate system) for monitoring the programme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Field Offices of the region to nominate a single Focal Point for improved CP-RP-GLO linkages.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Review options for an online medium for communication.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. The evaluation would recommend engaging in advocacy events only when a strategy to sustain the results of these events is clearly laid out.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>33. The Regional Programme should improve its approach to communicating with donors, national counterparts, UN agency partners, and internally (in terms of both frequency and quality) in order to continue sustaining its</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>projects) and reporting lines was often confusing to partners.</td>
<td>visibility and credibility in a strategic manner.</td>
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</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

Background and context

For the past decade, Afghanistan has accounted for an estimated 90 percent of global illicit opiates making it the largest world’s producer of opiates and heroin.\(^5\) In 2013, poppy cultivation reached record highs with 209,000 hectares cultivated resulting 5,500 tons of opium.\(^6\) The magnitude and scale of Afghanistan's opium economy are unprecedented and present a unique in global problem.\(^7\) This has not just impacted the state-building effort and related security, development and governance agenda in Afghanistan but also has significant consequences for the wider region. By fuelling local instability and insurgency, transnational organized crime and a public health crisis, poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates create multiple challenges for Afghanistan and beyond.

The West and Central Asia region is at the cross-roads of trafficking by the Southern, Northern and Balkan Routes. Trafficking of opiates occurs along diverse trajectories with a vast array of methods, though transport by road continues to be the most frequent for large quantities. Anecdotal information and seizure rates point to increasing trafficking from ports in Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan to Africa.\(^8\) Based on the most recent trafficking estimates available,\(^9\) in 2009 approximately 375 metric tons of heroin flowed from Afghanistan to the rest of the world.\(^10\) Approximately 160 metric tons of heroin are trafficked through Pakistan

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\(^7\) Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter Narcotics Policy, UNODC/World Bank, 2006
\(^9\) Likely to be updated with the upcoming launch of the RP-funded Southern Route Study.
\(^10\) World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
annually,\textsuperscript{11} where the value of the drug market is estimated at US$ 1.2 billion.\textsuperscript{12} 115 metric tons of heroin are estimated to flow into the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Turkey and Western Europe.\textsuperscript{13} The other route from Afghanistan is the northern route which channelled an estimated 90 metric tons of heroin – or around 25% of heroin leaving Afghanistan – on different paths through virtually all of the Central Asian States to the Russian Federation and beyond.\textsuperscript{14} Reports also indicate a growing importance of these northward trafficking routes of Afghan opiates flowing into China.\textsuperscript{15}

Narcotics and crime are part of a complex social and economic structure within the region and are interdependent. The illicit drug economy of West and Central Asia exists within a regional context of social deprivation and transformative demographics. A significant percentage of the population in the region lives below US$ 1 (Purchasing Power Parity) per day. Rates of population growth relative to the global average vary between high in the case of Pakistan to relatively low in some Central Asian Republics, but the region as a whole has a significant youth population.

The legacy of decades long conflict, as well as ongoing conflicts in the region, poses an overt challenge to law and order in the region. These threats range from transnational armed groups to local separatist movements. These have impacted regional economies and foreign direct investment tends to focus on just a few market sectors, making it difficult for governments to achieve broad-based development. These factors also drive regional governments’ national security agendas, and encourages them to focus primarily on internal security, despite the fact that greater mutual security would be realized through increased regional cooperation on issues such as countering the illicit drug trade.

While the quality of data on drug use within the region is mixed, a high prevalence of drug use is reported in Afghanistan (2.7%), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (2.7%) and Pakistan (1%) as well as Central Asia (0.8 per cent). Injecting Drug Use (IDU) is on the rise within the region. There is also one of the highest prevalence rates of HIV among people who inject drugs (PWID). This is driven primarily by incidence and prevalence rates of HIV among people who inject drugs in Pakistan (37.0 per cent) and Iran (Islamic Republic of) (15.1 per cent). Data also shows that rates of HIV and AIDS prevalence are much higher among prison inmates than the general population with the reported prevalence rate of HIV in the prison population at 15 per cent in Kyrgyzstan (37 times greater than in the general adult population).\textsuperscript{16}

Drug production, trade and use, has resulted in a booming illicit economy.\textsuperscript{17} Heroin alone generates around US$61 billion out of the total estimated US$68 billion of estimated revenue that opiates generate on the open market across the globe. Profits from heroin trafficking increase exponentially, as heroin is moved along trafficking routes. Criminal networks benefit by diluting heroin purity, controlling markets through stockpiling and from increasing street prices.\textsuperscript{18} Given

\textsuperscript{11} This reflects statistics on heroin flows from 2008. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
\textsuperscript{12} Examining the Dimensions, Scale and Dynamics of the Illegal Economy in Pakistan, SDPI/UNODC, 2012.
\textsuperscript{13} This reflects statistics on heroin flows from 2008. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
\textsuperscript{14} World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
\textsuperscript{15} World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
\textsuperscript{16} World Drug Report 2013, UNODC.
\textsuperscript{17} The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011, UNODC.
\textsuperscript{18} The farm-gate value of production in 2013 is SUS 0.95 billion. But the lion’s share of the opium poppy economy, US$ 2.99 billion (15% of GDP), goes to processors, traders, traffickers and exporters.
the region’s informal financial networks and the fact that formal banking institutions vary in the degree to which they are integrated into the international system, laundering of drug-related money is rife. The result is the fact that criminal justice systems find it difficult to identify and interdict illicit financial flows. These money flows distort national economies and in situations of weak governance, they become major sources of corruption, patronage and political power. An increasing number of sources indicate that as the 2014 Transition to Afghan Authorities approaches, and international aid to Afghanistan declines, that there will be an increasing reliance on the opium economy and other illicit activities.

The Transition to Afghan Authority at the end of 2014 will impact the political and security context across the entire region. In view of this, the report of the UN Secretary-General “on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications of international peace and security”\(^\text{19}\), and the UN Security Council Resolution (2096),\(^\text{20}\) stressed the continuing requirement for the UN to engage in Afghanistan. It also recognized the threat posed by the production, trade and trafficking of illicit drugs to international peace and stability in the region and the important role played by UNODC in this regard.

Afghanistan and the countries within the region are showing some political will and commitment to counter the illicit drugs trade. This is illustrated by not only in the endorsement of the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (RP) by all eight countries of the region but also a spate of regional initiatives launched in the last years which are owned by the countries themselves. The RP and its cross-border cooperation forms part of the 'peer pressure' required to increase risk within and across the borders in Afghanistan.

UNODC’s contribution to regional cooperation in counter-narcotics and, in particular its coordination role, has been recognized in many United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, Commission of Narcotic Drugs Resolutions\(^\text{21}\) and in successive Reports of the UN Secretary-General on Afghanistan. Similarly, UNODC’s lead role in facilitating cooperation in the region has been acknowledged by numerous International conferences.\(^\text{22}\) The London Conference on Afghanistan (28 January 2010) reiterated the importance of regional cooperation in countering the illicit narcotics trade and called for active participation and support from all stakeholders, and more specifically, UNODC. The Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan (July 2010) further reaffirmed the need for regional cooperation, centered around Afghanistan’s growing responsibility as a regional driver and consensus builder, to promote goals prescribed in the Kabul Process – a process which UNODC aims to support in the areas related to drugs and crime. The Istanbul Conference, which gave birth to Heart of Asia Process, where counter-narcotics were identified as one of the six priority regional Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Finally, the Third Paris Pact Ministerial Conference on Combatting Illicit Traffic in Opiates Originating in Afghanistan of February 2012 resulted in the identification of regional initiatives as one of the four areas identified for enhanced cooperation by Paris Pact partners.


\(^{20}\) UNSC 2096 of 19 March 2013.

\(^{21}\) The latest one being Resolution 53/5.

\(^{22}\) Including the 2003 Ministerial Conference on Drug Routes from Central Asia to Europe in Paris, the birthplace of the Paris Pact Initiative supported by UNODC.
Regional Programme Description

The Regional Programme (RP) forms the basis of UNODC’s approach towards counter-narcotics in West and Central Asia, especially within the context of the 2014 Transition. The RP is a strategic framework for UNODC’s engagement in the region and it is designed to provide a platform for better coordination and facilitation of counter-narcotics efforts across the region, bringing coherence to activities conducted by UNODC. The aim of the RP is to enhance counter-narcotics capacities across the region through better coordination and facilitation of regional cooperation as well as better allocation of resources and provision of technical assistance for regional cooperation by the international community to the countries of the region. The overall vision of this Regional Programme is that by the year 2014, the countries of the region and their institutions are substantially strengthened and working together cooperatively to counter the destabilizing impact of illicit drugs and crime. The overall vision of the RP is that by the year 2015, the countries of the region and their institutions are substantially strengthened and working together cooperatively to counter the destabilizing impact of illicit drugs and crime.

The RP has four Sub-Programmes (SP) each corresponding to a thematic focus identified during the course of consultation with the governments of the region and echoing the thematic foundation of the Country Programmes (CP) available in the region. See Figure I below.

Figure I. Regional Programme Structure

The RP governance mechanism is designed to ensure ownership by national governments and the realization of mutually agreed outcomes. A senior-level Steering Committee and expert-level Regional Task Forces introduce regional level policy dialogue and review processes that shape UNODC interventions across the region while ensuring accountability.

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23Regional Programme document endorsed by member countries 07/12/11.
The RP was extended to the end of 2015 from its initial duration of 2011 - 2014. This extension was part of a process to align its project lifecycles with those of the CPs of the region, which were also extended to the end of 2015. In addition, it was deemed prudent to maintain programmatic consistency over the Transition year and to review operational directions for 2016 onwards.

The RP was extended to the end of 2015 from its initial duration of 2011 - 2014. The budget of the RP is for $30 million US dollars of which $26.2 million has been or is expected to be funded. The breakdown per SP is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SP</th>
<th>Proposed Budget</th>
<th>Funded (or expected to be)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SP1</td>
<td>13.564</td>
<td>9.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP2</td>
<td>5.871</td>
<td>5.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP3</td>
<td>4.357</td>
<td>6.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>6.208</td>
<td>4.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.000</td>
<td>26.210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that the RP’s interventions are based upon the effectiveness of its building blocks – the Country Programmes and sub-regional and national projects of West and Central Asia. Dedicated support to regional cooperation is only an addition to the vast amount of other work that UNODC engages in with the individual countries of the region. Finally, the RP not only streamlines efforts at the country and regional levels, but it also functions alongside relevant global programmes within the region which is a fundamental principle behind the inter-regional drug control approach.

Evaluation Purpose and Scope

The in-depth mid-term evaluation of the RP has been carried out by a team of external evaluators supported by the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) in close cooperation with the RP Secretariat and the Regional Section for Europe, West and Central Asia (RSEWCA). The purpose of the evaluation is formative in nature as it is undertaken at mid-point of the RP implementation and it intends to assess achievements and provide recommendations to improve the performance for the remainder of the RP implementation, where needed.

Deriving from this overall purpose, the specific objectives of this evaluation are to:

- Contribute to organizational learning by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of UNODC in Afghanistan, in the West and Central Asia region, in the context of global initiatives and under each thematic area;
- Serve as a means to empower stakeholders, target groups, and other beneficiaries through a participatory approach;
- Contribute to accountability by assessing the achievements of UNODC in the region and the appropriateness of the utilisation of resources; measuring ownership, result-based orientation, cost-effectiveness and quality of UNODC services; and
- Contribute to decision-making in relation to UNODC strategic orientation and potential repositioning in the region and in thematic areas, in particular as regards to UNODC’s strategy towards the 2014 Transition.

This evaluation covers the four SPs of the RP within an overall evaluation of the RP. The exercise comprises of two tiers: at one level assessing the RP at a holistic level, and at another, looking into the specifics of the four Sub-Programmes individually. At the former, focus is placed on
governance arrangements, results-orientation, alignment with the RP and Thematic Programmes, as well as with Global Projects, and possibly coherence with other non UN led initiatives.

The RP evaluation utilizes the findings from the Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan mid-term evaluations and reinforces recommendations and approaches from missing angles or gaps where necessary. This was the reason why these three countries were not covered in the field missions of the evaluation. The guiding principle is not to duplicate but rather to approach the analysis from a wider perspective.

As a mid-term exercise, it covers the two years of RP implementation from January 2012 to April 2014.

Evaluation Methodology

Design

The evaluation was designed and conducted in compliance with the UNODC Evaluation Policy\(^\text{24}\), the Terms of Reference (TOR) and accepted international programme evaluation standards.

The UNODC Evaluation Policy set the overall framework that guided the work of the evaluation team. The policy stresses four key elements:

1. “Evaluations must be utilization-focused as a fundamental requirement for guaranteeing ownership by and addressing the needs of stakeholders in projects and programmes […]";

2. Evaluation is a learning tool, which is why the evaluation process needs to be transparent and consultative. Participation enhances learning, since the reflection of different interests, needs and perceptions empowers all parties involved;

3. Evaluations should lead to the timely incorporation of findings, recommendations and lessons into the policies, strategies and decision-making processes […]";

4. The independence, objectivity and impartiality of the evaluation process must be upheld at all times, as these qualities give credibility and legitimacy to evidence-based evaluation results.”

In order to comply with the policy requirements, the evaluation design:

- Identified the RP team as the Primary Intended User (PIU) of the evaluation;
- Deployed utilization-focused techniques by actively engaging the PIU in the identification of significant changes attributable to the RP (Most Significant Change) and in identifying solutions for overcoming the challenges they considered important. These methods increased the level of ownership of the key stakeholder. The evaluation team was a participant observer at the RP retreat held in Bishkek, actively engaging the PIU;
- The participatory nature of the evaluation during the retreat, combined with constant reminders by the evaluation team as to how they intended on using the information provided by the PIU, contributed to the transparency of the process. The evaluation team

\(^{24}\) UNODC Evaluation Policy, 2008.
also had a debriefing session with the RP Coordinator in which both substantive and process issues were addressed;

- The results of the evaluation sessions during the retreat and discussions around the SP theories of change have led to the RP team to consider making changes to the programme based on insights gained- thus already making progress in meeting the “timeliness” and “learning” standards set in the policy and

- The evaluation team has conducted the evaluation free of any interference and in compliance with relevant United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms & Standards25.

The terms of reference outlined the key aspects of the evaluation including the purpose, scope and indicative questions to be considered. A desk review was carried out by the evaluation team as part of the inception report preparation process. The materials reviewed were prioritised given the volume of documents available. Priority was given to: strategic/policy framework documents, programme and substantive documents (the majority per the respective SPs), and evaluations as listed in Annex III.

The desk review, combined with the lines of enquiry identified in the TOR, resulted in an Evaluation Matrix that contained both general RP and SP specific questions. The matrix served as the basis for developing the various data collection instruments.

Another tool used in the design of the evaluation was the ‘Theory of Change’ (TOC) model26. There are three advantages for developing a TOC as part of an evaluation: i) to facilitate a common understanding of the programme; ii) to help prioritize what should be evaluated and iii) to form the basis for generating questions for the Evaluation Matrix.

A TOC provides a visual representation of a causal link between outcomes which all converge on one final outcome (the programme goal); when reading a TOC map, an “if-then” logic must be used when moving along the causal pathway. The evaluation produced a very ‘high-level’ (helicopter view) TOC for the RP as a whole and four ‘mid-level’ view TOCs, one for each SP (see Annex VI-X).

It is important to note that the evaluation utilized the findings from the mid-term evaluations of the country programmes for Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and also the evaluations of the Paris Pact Initiative (PPI) (GLOK31), the Integrated Programming Approach, the Afghanistan cluster evaluations and other evaluations in Central Asia. The evaluation of the Afghan Opiates Trade Programme (GLOV20) was on-going during the same period of time. All of these informed the analysis of efficiency, relevance and effectiveness of the RP evaluation. Not only did this approach provide the evaluation team with additional evidence and perspectives from multiple sources, it also avoided duplication of efforts. This report is drafted on the premise that readers are familiar with the aforementioned evaluations.

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Data Collection Instruments

A variety of data collection instruments were designed in order to gather and triangulate evidence:

Surveys

Two different types of structured surveys were used containing closed and open ended questions. The surveys were:

- The “Questionnaire for the Evaluation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 2011-2015”, distributed online to key stakeholders in English and Russian (see Annex II) and sampling section for further details);
- Sub-programme specific survey (SP4) addressing specific substantive issues (see sampling section for further details) as needed.

The “Questionnaire for the Evaluation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 2011-2015” was distributed to 281 stakeholders (beneficiaries, donors, and UNODC staff). The response rate was 17% (48 individuals).

Checklist

An evaluation checklist (Annex V) based on the WHO-UNODC-UNAIDS technical guide on the comprehensive package of interventions for HIV prevention, treatment and care for people who inject drugs, and policy identification was used for the 8 countries in SP3. This guidance, developed to assist countries in setting targets for universal access for people who inject drugs (PWID), presents a comprehensive package of interventions for HIV prevention, treatment and care for people who inject drugs. This checklist replaced the original instrument which was to be used for estimating routine epidemiological data for drug treatment services and blood borne virus measurement, as the regional data was incomplete for purposes of comparison. The alternative checklist was developed as part of the evaluation of SP3 when it became apparent the data although planned for, had yet to be collected. Although other approaches could have been chosen, given the constraints, this instrument was selected.

The checklist focused on information alluded to in the document review but that was not readily accessible. An example of this is in the MOU [2012] between UNHCR and UNODC Iran which acknowledges that there is still little known about the HIV related risks and vulnerabilities of refugees who use drugs in Iran. The checklist was used to explore the data already held by UNODC Region Central Asia. The brief checklist comprises the standard data set used for national service planning and delivery.

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Semi-structured interview guides

The evaluators prepared interview guides based on the questions from the evaluation matrix. During the interviews, the evaluators probed topics not originally contained in the guides when considered relevant. Interviewees had the opportunity to address any topic they felt was not covered (sufficiently or at all).

Interviewees were asked to consent to the interview and assured as to the confidentiality of the process. They were informed that quotes could be used in the report but no identifiers would be provided. Any information requested by the interviewee to be handled as confidential was treated as such by the evaluators.

In the majority of cases, two team members were always present during interviews.

Participatory Observation

The RP Annual Team Retreat was held in Bishkek between the 10th and 12th of June 2014. The whole evaluation team attended the event, observing proceedings and engaging with participants during breaks or by asking questions for clarification purposes. Two 3 hour sessions during the retreat were devoted to the evaluation. During those sessions, the team facilitated various processes, as mentioned above, leading to the identification of a number of significant change examples and possible viable solutions to overcome the challenges facing the RP.

In addition to the retreat sessions, the evaluators took advantage of the presence of key informants (e.g. Field/Regional Representatives) to conduct interviews. The evaluation team also engaged retreat participants by setting up an anonymous comment space, asking attendees to answer: What does the RP mean to me?

After the conclusion of the retreat, the evaluation team met with RP management for a debriefing and addressed any concerns that arose.

Most Significant Change Template

Determining the effectiveness, or even the early signs of impact made, of a programme such as the RP, that is in the early stages of implementation, can be challenging. The evaluation team opted to use the Most Significant Change (MSC) method in order to overcome the problem.

Each member of the evaluation team facilitated an SP group MSC exercise during the RP retreat, ensuring consistency between the groups and obtaining a sufficient evidence base from which to derive related findings. Upon agreement as to the MSC findings that would be highlighted, focal points were given the responsibility to refine the examples. In order to do this and conduct a systematic collection of MSC data, a template for identifying and reporting the relevant examples was developed (Annex II).

Challenges-Solutions Template

In order to take full advantage of the retreat, the evaluation team developed the “RP Evaluation Recommendations Exercise” worksheet (Annex II) for engaging participants in identifying the
key challenges facing the RP and prompting the corresponding solutions. A similar exercise was conducted simultaneously by a separate group consisting of UNODC Country/Regional Representatives and Senior HQ staff present at the retreat; they used a similar prompt worksheet entitled “Regional Senior Management RP Evaluation Recommendations Exercise”. They were also provided with the preliminary results of the online survey to use as an input.

After completing the work, the team facilitated a plenary discussion regarding the merits and viability of the solutions proposed by both groups.

The RP decided to adopt some of the solutions they came up with during the discussion, thus achieving one of the goals sought by the utilization-focused approach. It is important to mention that the evaluation team took into consideration all the recommendations suggested by participants, though explained in advance, that these would be used as an input for team deliberations.

**Sampling Strategy**

A total of 331 individuals were identified as constituting the universe of the evaluation (see Annex XI). The selection of those individuals was based on them having a significant degree of involvement in the design, implementation, funding and/or governance of the RP.

All of these stakeholders were contacted and asked to answer questions as well as to comment on various dimensions of the RP as per the following breakdown:

- All were invited to complete the “Questionnaire for the Evaluation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 2011-2015” (of which 281 had valid contact information);
- A purposive sample of individuals was drawn from the list and were interviewed during the visits to Vienna and other field locations (39 individuals);
- 24 core programme staff, including Field Representatives, were engaged during the RP retreat held in the Kyrgyz Republic (see list in Annex IV);
- SP specific surveys/requests were sent to the respective coordinators, based on evaluation information needs.

**Field Visits**

It was not foreseen to visit all eight countries participating in the RP, as explained above; based on guidance from programme staff, scope, scale, budget and limitations of this evaluation, a purposive sampling strategy for field visits was drawn using five objective criteria for selection:

1. Presence and size of an UNODC office
2. Volume of Operations
3. Scope of Operations
4. Strategic Importance
5. Past evaluations

As a result, the evaluation team conducted the following visits:

1. Vienna, Austria from 25 to 30 May (full team);
2. Dushanbe, Tajikistan from 31 May to 3 June for SP1&2&4;
3. Tashkent, Uzbekistan from 4 to 8 June for SP1&4;
4. Astana, Kazakhstan from 4 to 8 June for SP3;
5. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan from 9 to 15 June (full team) for the RP retreat

Data Analysis

The evaluation findings were derived from a collective analytical effort whereby the team as a whole discussed the merits and significance of all the data collected. The criteria used to assess the data, as identified in the TOR, were: design, relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, partnerships, human rights mainstreaming, potential impact and lessons learned. Given the professional background and expertise present in the team, the evaluative judgments made are based on the evidence available coupled with an understanding of the institutional and regional context in which the RP operates.

The analysis process included: the cumulative review of qualitative data by each team member using a standardized aggregate data tracking sheet; team deliberations at key intervals when tentative findings were determined (or adjusted) based on analysis of new information; common statistical interpretation of the quantitative survey data and critique-based testing of most significant change examples. The various TOCs were used as a reference map in order to properly assess the value and contribution of the data being analysed.

Limitations

The timelines set for the evaluation were extremely challenging not only because of the amount of materials that had to be reviewed but also because they left hardly any time to address any data gaps that emerged during the process.

The team relied on the evaluations carried out of the various initiatives implemented by UNODC in the region. A summary matrix of findings and recommendations related to the RP (Annex XII) was extracted from the reports. The evaluation team is conscious as to the limitations of some of the evaluations, nonetheless, the insights they contain are valuable.

The Team Leader (also co-responsible for looking at SP2) did not accompany the rest of the team on the field missions to Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The team members covering SP1 (which has a natural link to SP2) and SP3 (who is co-responsible for SP2) covered SP2 issues on those occasions.

Meetings with government stakeholders in Uzbekistan were not held given scheduling conflicts.

The evaluation was delayed due to a lack of timely processing of payments of fees and DSA to the consultants on the part of UNODC. The consultants were forced to withhold submitting some of the deliverables until UNODC fulfilled its part of the contract. Once the issues were resolved, the evaluation was already months behind schedule and the evaluators had to find time to resume their work amidst new engagements.
II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Design

**Integrated Programming Approach.** In 2008 UNODC streamlined its strategic planning and implementation tools. It moved away from a project-based approach to an integrated programming approach; introducing both geographical (regional and national) and thematic programmes. The aim was to engage more effectively with other UN systems, at HQ and field level, in a more coherent, integrated and cost effective manner\(^{28}\). While thematic programmes are “top down”, regional programmes were meant to be “bottom up”. They were to be designed at the field level, and were to set clear objectives for the delivery of technical assistance. Regional programmes should be: aligned with the Paris Declaration\(^{29}\), promoting ownership; results focused, delivering over the long term; focused on transnational threats, delivering coordination of cross border responses and information exchanges; and responsive to the needs of the Member States.

**Integrated Programme in Practice.** While the concept of integrated programming is widely understood, delivery is inconsistent. The mid-term evaluations of the Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan CPs find that, although the move to integrated programming has improved delivery, there is still room for improvement; and that many activities continue to take place as stand-alone projects and there is a requirement for greater integration. There is institutional project memory that will take some time for Staff, recipients and Donors to break. The RP would appear to be better than many of the CPs. The RP set out, from the start, to deliver an integrated programme; it was never a collection of projects that metamorphosed into a programme. Integration is most strongly seen between SP1 and SP2, where there are many complementary activities; especially where Member States have a coordinated drug control strategy. One UNDOC staff member stated that the RP implemented SP1 and SP2 jointly; without differentiating between the SPs. This observation is further supported by the AKT initiative\(^{30}\) which firmly links law enforcement (LE) (SP1) capacity building and training, with judicial (SP2) training and financial investigation cooperation. In addition many SP4 activities are linked to the other SPs, in terms of research, reporting and advocacy. Even so there is still room for improvement as pointed out below. Though CPs and GLO have been delivering drug prevention and drug treatment for many years and there are some good examples of collaboration with SP3 and other SPs (e.g. SP3 and SP4 work closely together to undertake assessments of some selected drug treatment centres and of returnees’ and refugees’ health and social protection needs in select RP countries; SP3 and SP1 did collaborate to undertake training of senior law enforcement officials to enhance communication and engagement with drug users and other marginalized and vulnerable populations), SP 3 appears to be less integrated than other SPs into the RP structure due to a

\(^{28}\) UNODC Regional Programmes: a strategic planning and implementation tool.


\(^{30}\) The AKT Initiative. Tripartite agreement between Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Cooperation in Counter Narcotics and Border Management in Drug Control.
number of factors, which are: the relative time that UNODC has been delivering effect in this field (i.e. its Coordinator was only appointed in March 2014), UNODC is seen as primarily as drugs and crime by many Member States; and the fact that there is resistance to some drug demand reduction policies in some of the Member States.

**Country Programmes.** The Pakistan and Iran CPs were designed a year before the RP and do not match the RP’s structure. The Afghanistan CP was written, at broadly, the same time, and it broadly mirrors the RP’s structure. Internally, to UNODC, this does not matter; however, externally (amongst regional actors) it presents a slight presentational issue. Differing SP designations and structures appear to suggest differing approaches, when in fact there should be one consistent approach across the region. Future CP design should seek to mirror, where possible the RP structure. (Recommendation 5)

**Design Phase.** The RP was designed over a period of 18 months. A member of the IPB from Vienna facilitated the design phase, in conjunction with field operatives, and in consultation with a wide variety of stakeholders. Initial donor funding facilitated a series of field visits and workshops. This process greatly aided its design and should be considered as a good practice. The design, however, was not based on a theory of change. Had this methodology been used, it would have: highlighted where the requirement for greater integration between the SPs lay; indicated how activities should be sequenced; and demonstrated the fact that not all activities could implemented at the same rate or time. (Recommendation 4)

**Design in Practice.** In line with the programming guidelines, the design phase involved a number of thematic workshops. UNODC staff reported that the workshops were immensely useful in bringing together subject matter experts from across the region in a positive and mutually beneficial forum. The initial SP designs, emanating from these workshops, were considerably more ambitious than current SPs. Although general consensus on the way ahead was reached, the process of agreeing the final design was ultimately driven by what the “market” could bear. Finding a programme that all eight countries could agree to, meant that certain activities were not included. While some of the Central Asian States requested counter terrorism assistance, others did not wish the RP to deliver a counter terrorism outcome. To add to these challenges, the RP concept/design was not understood, nor was it supported by all UNODC staff. Some felt that the RP would compete with existing projects and divert funding from their work, and some blocked elements of the RPs development. The idea of HQ UNODC imposing a solution on the field was also resented in some quarters. While regional politics will always impact design, human factors could have been significantly reduced by utilising change management techniques and developing a corporate “One UNODC” approach. Had a change management plan been developed by HQ UNODC, many of the internal frictions could have been reduced. (Recommendation 31)

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31 A donation from Japan enabled UNODC staff to thoroughly scope the issue, engage Member States and design the RP. The ability to demonstrate that funds were available also provided leverage.

32 UNODC Staff who attended these workshops reported their satisfaction with the process during interviews.

33 Kyrgyzstan FIU mentioned that they required assistance with CT financial investigations. The use of financial investigation CBT modules that address these needs, without having a separate counter terrorism SP, and this would appear to be the most logical and practical solution to these types of issues.

34 COPAK Mid-Term evaluation highlights the fact that the Government of Pakistan does not want UNODC to deliver against counter terrorism outcome in the Pakistan Country Programme.
Sub-Programme Structure. UNODC\textsuperscript{35} states that in order to address the problem of counter-narcotics it requires an integrated approach, one which aims to identify and address all aspects of the drug and crime situation through advocacy in the policy arena and through implementation in the field. This approach includes efforts to counter the illicit drug economy, to strengthen the rule of law, provide alternative livelihoods targeting households dependent on illicit cultivation for survival, and assistance to people affected by drug use and dependence. The 2001 Bonn Accord\textsuperscript{36} urged regional organizations to cooperate not only in combatting illicit drugs, but in the provision of financial, material and technical resources for alternative livelihoods. The 2006 Afghan Compact\textsuperscript{37} lists the means by which the international community should assist Afghanistan, such as: increasing law enforcement and judicial capacity; eradicating illicit opiates; providing alternative livelihoods; counteracting corruption; and increasing regional cooperation.

The structure of the RP’s three main delivery sub-programmes and a supporting fourth (research, monitoring and evaluation) sub-programme mirrors many of the high level documents. The RP’s design breaks the overall CN objective into logical sub-programmes; with one exception. Whereas the higher level documents mention the illicit economy (listing alternative livelihoods and anti-corruption), neither of UNODC’s responses at the regional level (the Paris Pact Initiative and the RP) have dedicated outcomes comprehensively targeting the illicit economy\textsuperscript{38}. A number of donors and Member States\textsuperscript{39} indicated that they were supportive of expanding the counter narcotics debate to include the illicit economy. UNODC staff at many levels recognised the need to incorporate this theme within the RP and at the CP level\textsuperscript{40}. (Recommendation 6 and 7)

There are different options for including the illicit economy in the RP. Whichever option is taken, it is recommended that UNDOC’s role would be more one of advocacy and coordination in conjunction with other development agencies and regional bodies. This would require UNODC to clearly define what its role is, better coordinating activities with multiple partners and then remaining within its “lane”.

Duration of the Programme. Impacting the narcotics trade and delivering significant change within Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries is a generational task. Real success will only become apparent after tens of years, and is hardly likely to occur within the life time of a 3-4 year programme. There are many reasons for this, not least the scale of the problem and the time delay when dealing with multiple governments.

The RP was initially designed for 3 years, between Dec 2011 and Dec 2014. The end date coincided with the final phase of transition and the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan. The

\textsuperscript{36} Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions December 5, 2001, Annex III, Article 6.
\textsuperscript{37} Building on Success: the London Conference on Afghanistan, the Afghan Compact, 2006.
\textsuperscript{38} The Paris Pact Initiative’s four pillars are: strengthening and implementing regional initiatives; detecting and blocking financial flows linked to illicit traffic in opiates; preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals used in illicit opiates manufacturing in Afghanistan; and reducing drug abuse and dependence through a comprehensive approach.
\textsuperscript{39} A number of Member States expressed the view that only increased economic cooperation with Afghanistan could provide a viable solution to the narcotics problem. This required cross border trade initiatives coupled with better border control mechanisms.
\textsuperscript{40} This is also a finding of the Afghanistan CP mid-term self-evaluation.
fact that the RP was designed in 2010, when there was limited understanding of how transition would manifest itself, means that this end-date is understandable. Transition, however, was designed as a process occurring between 2011 and Dec 2014. It was designed to make way for a period of Afghan transformation; when Afghanistan and its neighbours would need a different (new) type of assistance. If this fact had been worked into the design, then Dec 2014 could/or should have been a mid-point, a time to reassess, rather than end the programme. Since its launch, the RP has received additional donor funding and has been extended until Dec 2015. Even with this extension there is insufficient time for the RP to deliver what it set out to achieve, but this extension does potentially provide additional time to reassess and redesign the programme in light of transition. Extending the RP was mentioned by some donors and Member States. These parties were generally of the opinion that the RP should continue as it was, but for longer. It is also interesting to note that the AKT initiative has formally requested the RP be extended until 2019\textsuperscript{41}. (Recommendation 1)

Regional Landscape (making the structure fit the problem). While UNODC, and the international community (IC), may see the issue of narcotics as regional, with Afghanistan as the epicentre, many of the neighbouring countries may not; in particular some aspects of addressing drugs, e.g. drug prevention and treatment, are not regional in nature. They firstly place themselves in the middle and their own perceived region; aligning themselves to countries which may differ from the RP’s makeup. There are major religious, language and culture differences between Member States. The legal systems differ markedly, and are based on differing belief systems and former colonial precedents. Member State’s centres of gravity and geo-political affiliations fluctuate. Despite these differences there is a consensus that only a regional approach will work. However, there are differing national perceptions, impact, commitment and participation. No single solution will fit all, and each agreement must be bespoke, brokered and by consensus. Before the RP, there was limited cooperation between Member States, so just brokering the RP as an agreement is a major achievement in itself. Due to differing geopolitical affiliations and national aims the RP’s end state may never be achieved. This does not mean that UNODC should not aspire toward this end state, but that there should be a series of waypoints from which to chart success, with a realisation that the next step will become even harder. This methodology would require an elongated time line and increased use of advocacy in support of the RP’s long term outcomes. Using the theory of change would assist in charting this process.

Initially the RP was headed by a coordinator based in COAFG. The head of COAFG was then appointed as the Regional representative, and this brought a degree of synergy to the programme\textsuperscript{42}. Three out of four\textsuperscript{43} SP coordinators were based in different country offices, and supporting staff were spread amongst the region; some on part time basis. Although this virtual structure is cost effective, it is difficult to comprehend and is difficult to manage for various reasons. While staff might meet at RP events, it is only those directly associated with the SP or a SP activity. The RP retreat is an annual event and even then there is not 100\% staff participation. The 2014 retreat was the first to which all country representatives had been invited. With the move of the Regional Programme Coordinator to Tashkent there needs to be a concerted effort to ensure that regional relationships are not negatively affected\textsuperscript{44}. Some UNDOC staff believe that greatest impact is achieved within Afghanistan, as it is the epicentre of the problem and more

\textsuperscript{41} Joint Statement of Ministers/head of anti-drug agencies on the issue of countering illegal drug trafficking, and assessment and forecast of the development of the narco-situation in the regional (Dushanbe, 20 Nov 2013).

\textsuperscript{42} The Afghanistan CP mid-term self-evaluation stated that positioning the CP and RP teams together has contributed to complementarity effect.

\textsuperscript{43} The SP3 Coordinator was not appointed until 2014.

\textsuperscript{44} This is also a finding from the Afghanistan CP mid-term self-evaluation.
importantly it is where the IC is concentrated. Conversely, security in Afghanistan makes implementation difficult and costly. Travel in and out of Afghanistan is restricted and it is easier and cheaper to traverse the region from elsewhere.\textsuperscript{45} This evaluation does not pass judgement on the best location for the RP, other than then to stress that it should be in a location from which it can maximise its regional reach and impact. Location, structure and working patterns are three separate but complementary means for maximising delivery and need to be carefully balanced. This being said, the new location, further from the international community may potentially require more travel in order to conduct the same number of meetings and potentially more staff to cover out of office time in order to make the process work efficiently.

No one solution will fit all countries or all circumstances; which means different approaches must be taken, and this will take time and effort. For the RP, this equates to staff (experts) and travel. The size of the region and regional landscape is also problematic, the tyranny of time and distance needs to be considered, as it reduces the staff and Member State’s ability to engage. (Recommendation 12)

**Measurement of Effect.** The 2006 Afghan Compact\textsuperscript{46} states that increased regional cooperation in relation to CN is measured by increased intelligence sharing which in turn leads to increased narcotics seizures, decreased opium production in hectares, and an increase in the number of laboratories dismantled. The economic section mentions increased border cooperation, as means to enhance trade, but fails to specify a measurement. The Paris Pact Initiative and Rainbow Strategy both utilise the Afghan Compact’s measures of effectiveness. This highlights the following issue relating to CN activities: success is only measured by seizures and hectares. While there is quantitative data to support these measures of effectiveness, this data only provides a snapshot in time and is not focused comprehensively across the CN spectrum. The 2014 RP retreat dedicated a session to reporting outcomes under SP1\textsuperscript{47} to highlight this issue. Understanding reporting weakness is only part of the problem, a solution must be found. Although the exact mechanism for reporting within SPs and across the RP is too detailed for this evaluation, it is recommended that resources available under SP4 be more widely used as a means to investigating and managing RP reporting. (Recommendation 16)

**Delivery and Reporting.** It was evident during the course of the evaluation that the RP meant different things to different people\textsuperscript{48}. Some staff expressed concerns that it added an additional layer of bureaucracy, competed for scarce resources with other projects and that it hindered cooperation. The majority of donors and Member States perceived no differences between CP, GLO and RP activities or UNODC offices, viewing UNODC as a homogenous grouping. The UNODC Headquarters’ view was that the RP may potentially duplicate CP and Global activities,

\textsuperscript{45} As noted in the inter-office memorandum “UNODC Preparedness in West and Central Asia towards the Afghanistan 2014 Transition Period and the Decade of Transformation (2015-2015) approved by the Executive Director on October 30, 2013.
\textsuperscript{46} Building on Success, the London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 January – 1 February 2006. \url{http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf}
\textsuperscript{47} SP 1 is the only SP that currently has a fully worked up set of performance indicators.
\textsuperscript{48} In response to “What does the RP mean to you?”, RP staff answered as follows: Over 50% stated that the RP was about communication. However, to what end differed markedly. 25% believed it was to enhance internal UNODC coordination, while 25% believed it was about increasing coordination between Member States. 10% believed the RP should take a regional policy lead and tell country offices what to do. 7% (equally) believed that the RP provided: greater regional cooperation; a drug free region; a bridge between existing UNODC projects; access to a large team of professionals; and a funding mechanism to attract donors.
and that there was a requirement for more oversight, and for the RP to lead and coordinate CP and GLO activities – a top down approach in a spirit of openness to build on (and not duplicate) what is already on-going and to report results transparently. Most field staff, however, viewed the RP as a supporting mechanism which filled the gaps in CPs and GLO; and that it promoted dialogue and coordinated regional events as an adjunct to other activities.

There are many overlaps between, global, regional, sub-regional and country activities. The RP realises this fact and has mapped all these overlaps as a means of ensuring coherence. The field reality is that it is often the same person who a single activity but for multiple owners. Observations during the course of the evaluation would suggest that there is limited duplication or competition between programmes. Instead there is considerable reporting overlap (see Efficiency paragraph), with one person reporting to multiple individuals. The RP’s virtual structure and differences as to how it is perceived has led to confused reporting space and frequent cases of over /multiple reporting. For example, many of the activities under SP2 are reported as RP, ROCA and Paris Pact. UNDOC’s donor driven implementation structure places a burden on staff to report what donor funds have achieved, where the reality is that activities are an amalgam of funding streams and that staff are spending a disproportional amount of time reporting as opposed to implementing\textsuperscript{49}. (Recommendation 16)

As snap shot of over reporting, the table below indicates the number of evaluations that will occur within the region, and of which the RP should be cognisant. However, there is insufficient time to digest this data and change the programme’s direction.

Table 1: Inter-linkages between the evaluation exercises in the West and Central Asia region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries</th>
<th>IDE mid-term (2014) and final evaluation (2015)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROCA projects – independent project evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(various timeframes)</td>
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</table>

In terms of the RP, conducting a final evaluation one year after the mid-term does not provide sufficient time for the RP to absorb observations and make changes. If the RP was extended for another 3-4 years then the final evaluation would occur in 4-5 years’ time. This would provide an opportunity for UNDOC to learn, digest and implement change based on observations. (Recommendation 3) Evaluations should be used more to shape design. There must be sufficient time between evaluation and design to allow sufficient time for findings and recommendations to be absorbed and incorporated into programmes.

\textsuperscript{49} The CP mid-term self-evaluation report for Afghanistan states that UNODC staff are concerned by the lack of clear institutional prioritization between the CP, RP and other vehicles, which creates funding and reporting competitiveness.
Human Rights and Gender. Based on the guidance notes developed by UNODC, the RP has taken steps to explicitly incorporate gender and human rights dimensions into its work. Recently, a Gender and Human Rights focal point has been appointed in the Strategic Planning Unit (SPU) and an RP position paper (currently in draft form) is being prepared to provide guidance to staff. Before these measures were taken, the RP had already been integrating gender and human rights perspectives in its work, for example:

- SP1 has aimed to improve, when relevant, the understanding and awareness of human rights obligations. Training courses supported by the RP adhere to international standards and incorporate human rights standards for law enforcement. A toolkit was developed in partnership with COPAK for law enforcement officers to engage with drugs addicts and other marginalized groups and workshops held to introduce it;

- SP2 was designed to promote better implementation of the international legal instruments against drugs and crime; provisions of the UNTOC, UNCAC and the drug conventions. SP2 uses those legal instruments (which have embedded human rights perspective) and the relevant UN/UNODC documents and guidelines when implementing activities;

- SP3 has identified a series of human rights deficiencies raised by donors, such as: people who use drugs in drug treatment centres being subjected to physical and mental abuse while in treatment centres; the discrimination of HIV positive people who inject drugs; and women not receiving adequate drug treatment or access to routine healthcare procedures. Work carried out under SP3 promotes agreement and adoption of international standards as a means to address these deficiencies;

- Under SP4, RP management is considering introducing a gender element into research initiatives, such as: whether or not women are disproportionately affected by narcotics-related violence; what are the dangers faced by children and women in relation to the illicit economy; and gender analyses in drug abuse assessments. Practical steps being considered include: incorporating gender analyses into future surveys and research work when relevant; and ways to improve gender parity / representation of women when holding workshops, meetings and technical training courses.

Although the RP does comply with vetting of participants when required to by a donor (i.e. the United States and the “Leahy vetting” obligation), it has yet to submit to SPU training participant lists as required within the "Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP). As a result of this evaluation, the RP was made aware of this requirement and has assigned an officer to look into the actions needed to adhere to the policy (by no means an easy task – since holding workshops involving eight countries is complex, often with participant names being provided only two days before the start of events). The initiatives taken (or about to be) by the RP in mainstreaming human rights and gender are encouraging and in line with institutional requirements. (Recommendation 8)

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51 This was part of collaboration between SP1 and SP3, addressing human rights issues.
Conclusion. Future programmes should be designed using the theory of change methodology. There should be a better understanding of what they are trying to achieve, how to achieve it and what to report. This would also ensure greater coherence between SPs, demonstrate how the RP supports other programmes, and provide a guide to sequencing activities over time. This requires up front research and a formal process for managing change. The RP’s design is generally sufficient to achieve its stated aims. However, there is an argument to be made for expanding its remit to include the illicit economy in conjunction with other implementing partners. The RP’s structure appears to be sound, but under resourced. While it may be more efficient (see section on efficiency) to have a larger staff and a more rigid structure, delivery of the RP, to date, has not been adversely effected. However, a lack of understanding about the RP and its virtual structure does create reporting overlaps and confusion. SP 4 should be utilised to assist the RP in its reporting. There is also a need to run an internal communication campaign supported by the Director of Operations aimed at explaining the RP to UNDOC staff at all levels (above and beyond the efforts that have already been made by the RP management) so that change is managed and actions are coordinated. Greatest effects are achieved when implementation is successful and everybody knows that implementation is successful; a careful combination of reality and perception.

Relevance

The production and trafficking of narcotics is detrimental to the health, wealth and security of Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries. Any plan to counter the effects of narcotics should be comprehensive and regionally focused. The RP is, therefore, highly relevant. It is one of the very few international mechanisms in place that has the remit, reach and ability to deliver a regionally focused response. It promotes dialogue between Member States and it provides technical assistance. It looks to spread best practice and to inform the policy debate. The RP builds and supports sub-regional networks, which over time can be linked more widely; feeding a network of networks. Critically the RP’s existence constantly reminds the international community, Member States and the development agencies of the need for a regional approach.

International Accords. Since 2001, one of the international community’s priorities has been to reduce the flow of illicit opiates from Afghanistan. There has been consistent recognition that narcotics affect more than just Afghanistan, and that any solution requires a regional approach. The 2001 Bonn Accord urged regional organizations to cooperate in combating the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs. The eighth principle of the Afghan Compact is increased regional cooperation. The international community reaffirmed its commitment to increased regional co-operation at the London Conference in 2010. While the International Conference on Afghanistan in Kabul, the same year, paved the way for the Kabul process which envisaged a growing role for Afghanistan within the region.

52 Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Special Advisor to the SRSG on Counter Narcotics. Regional Representative Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries. Introduction to the 2013 RP annual report.
53 Conclusion to the 2011 Bonn Conference, Paragraph 15.
54 Main body of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions December 5, 2001.
55 Ibis… Annex III, Article 6.
56 Building on Success: the London Conference on Afghanistan, the Afghan Compact, 2006.
57 Communiqué from the London Conference 2010.
58 Communiqué from the Kabul Conference 2010.
Despite the importance that the international community places on a regional approach, there are few organisations or mechanisms that actively engage Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries on a regional basis. There are fewer still that have a full time or permanent delivery mechanisms based within the region. UNODC and the RP are, therefore, unique in they provides a series of inter-connected permanently manned (country and regional) offices and a full time regional coordination mechanism. UNODC Mandate and Strategies. Afghanistan supplies 80 per cent of the world’s opium. The destabilising effect of narcotics has negative health, social and security consequences regionally and globally. As UNODC is mandated to make “the world safer from drugs, crime and terrorism”, Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries are the logical recipients of UNODC’s assistance. As such the RP is a central to UNODC’s achievement of its mandate.

UNODC’s contribution to regional cooperation is recognized in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1917 and successive reports of the UN Secretary General on Afghanistan. UNODC’s role in facilitating regional cooperation has been acknowledged at numerous international conferences, including the June 2009, G8 foreign ministers’ meeting which was held in association with their Afghan and Pakistani counterparts. This meeting reaffirmed the commitment to regional collaboration; and welcomed UNODC’s support.

The RP falls under the Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) for 2012 to 2015 and the Strategic Framework for 2010-11 and 2012-13. The RP accords with UNODC’s integrated programming approach and is highly relevant to UNODC’s Inter-regional drug control approach (IRDC) which seeks to build a network of networks from the sub-regional to global level. As such, the country programmes in conjunction with the RP play an important role in networking actors and agencies, and delivering greater coherence to the counter narcotics landscape.

Operational Delivery. It was the 2003 Paris meeting of 55 Foreign Ministers, that spawned the “Paris Pact”, an agreement which underscored the international communities common and shared responsibility toward assisting Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries to fight narcotics trafficking and the related social and health aspects. The first pillar of UNODC’s response, the Paris Pact Initiative, is strengthening and implementing regional initiatives. As a means of operationalising the Paris Pact Initiative, UNODC devised the ‘Rainbow Strategy’ a conceptual umbrella framework that aimed to implement priority actions raised during expert working groups. This strategy consisted of seven operational plans which sought to reduce the supply, trafficking and consumption of opiates originating from Afghanistan and the wider region. The Rainbow Strategy was pragmatic; it accepted that long-term engagement was required in order to build confidence and trust. The RP has now replaced the Rainbow Strategy as UNODC’s main delivery mechanism within the region. Instead of developing individual initiatives from Country

60 ECO is a regional mechanism which has a number of development strands. DOCCU and increasing linkages to the ECOPOL are the closest mechanism to the RP; but only for law enforcement/SP1 activities.
62 The UNODC’s Mission statement is……“to contribute to the achievement of security and justice for all by making the world safer from drugs, crime and terrorism.”
65 The Paris Pact is a Global response to the opiate threat. It comprises of 80 partners and include UNODC,
Offices, UNDOC (under the RP) now provides a full-time permanent mechanism for developing regional cooperation.

**Relevance to Country Programmes.** The mid-term evaluations of the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran Country Programmes report that their respective country programmes are relevant, given the scale of the problem and the various international accords. Each also reports that their CP is in line with and/or supports the RP’s outcomes. The COAFG mid-term self-evaluation states that the RP and the CP are both relevant and complementary and the programmes work well together, though there is room for more integration.

**Regional Effect.** UNODC has a comparative advantage when working in certain countries. It can convene meetings under the UN’s neutrality, provide technical assistance and in some cases build capacity that is beyond the means of many donors. For example some donors have limited diplomatic ties with Iran\(^{66}\) and some are unable to provide direct assistance\(^ {67}\). In the case of the Central Asian States, almost 50% of the RP’s donors do not have embassy coverage within the sub-region. And some, that do have diplomatic missions, commented that their bilateral relations were limited and unable to gain the traction that UNODC could\(^{68}\). Therefore, the UNDOC’s ability to develop diplomatic ties, encourage dialogue and deliver assistance exceeds many of its Member States’ unilateral capabilities. The RP can be viewed as a network of “virtual embassies”, with a particular focus countering the narcotics trade. The RP provides a regional means of linking country offices, the sum of which is greater than the individual parts.

Many of the RP countries have very real political differences. Tension exists along their borders and in some cases there are limited diplomatic ties. The RP is, therefore, highly relevant in the fact that it seeks to not only work within each of these countries (under a CP or via ROCA) but also to bring these countries together on a regular basis. The fact that all have signed up to the RP is an achievement in itself.

Although the RP Member States and IC have signed up to a regional approach, it is all too easy to lose focus and become consumed with national issues. The fact that UNODC has a full time regional body is highly relevant as it provides a constant reminder that any solution must be regional. Or, as one donor described it, “the importance of the RP is that there is an RP. When you deliver assistance in one country, you become fixated by country level detail and it is important to have something or somebody to remind you, to think and act regionally.”

**Conclusion.** The RP is highly relevant, both internationally and regionally\(^{69}\). Countless international accords relating to Afghanistan have stated that countering narcotics requires a regional approach. Yet there are few delivery mechanisms that promote regional cooperation or tackle what is the region’s largest source of insecurity. For regional solutions to work there is a requirement to generate regional dialogue, increase regional cooperation and to implement joint solutions. Not all Member States will want to cooperate with each other all of the time and levels of participation will alter depending on the prevailing political situation. Regional solutions must not only be brokered, but nurtured, and supported; success will be uneven, and will take time.

\(^{66}\) UK and USA share embassy space with other nations. Canada has no embassy in Iran.

\(^{67}\) Sanctions preclude many Member States from providing direct support or assistance to Iran.

\(^{68}\) In discussion with National Missions to Vienna, and Donors.

\(^{69}\) Minutes of the RP Steering Committee highlighted that the Regional Programme is one of the most efficient regional frameworks for facilitating regional cooperation in justice, research and analysis and law enforcement needed for drug control.
The UNODC’s Inter Regional Drug Control Approach seeks to develop and link sub-regional, regional and global networks. The RP, therefore, is one element of a much larger network, within which the UNODC seeks to achieve its mandate. Finally, stakeholders need to be constantly reminded that a regional approach is the correct one; it is the one that nations have signed up to and the only approach that is likely to succeed.

Governance

Introduction. The RP has two governance mechanisms; one political and one technical. Member State requests are considered and addressed at these forums, and stakeholders possess a real sense of ownership. This dual track oversight system is inclusive and should be considered a good practice. While annual priorities should be responsive to Member State requirements; annual priorities should also adhere to higher level accords. Strategic direction and policy guidance, though readily available, requires clarification and monitoring. There is role here for UNODC HQ to ensure coherence across its entire portfolio of activities and to assist the RP in monitoring strategic priorities. (Recommendation 32) This role could become part of the RP governance structure in the future and would do much to ensure coherence of delivery between overlapping programmes.

Steering Committee. Political oversight is gained via a high-level strategic Steering Committee. The Steering Committee is a unique mechanism that supports the activities of the RP by increasing programme ownership and providing political endorsement. Partner governments, UNODC and donors, jointly provide oversight and mutually-agreed programming direction. Steering Committee meetings are convened annually, for one and a half hours, in the margins of the CND. They are co-chaired by UNODC and one representative from the Member States. Participation is at the ministerial /head of Drug Control Agency level. In addition to providing oversight the Steering Committee endorses the recommendations from the Regional Task Forces. The extent to which the Steering Committee actually provides meaningful strategic direction is unclear. There are many other meetings and briefings occurring at the CND at the same time. The meetings are relatively short and the agenda is driven more by UNODC Staff than Member States. However, the chance to provide political oversight is extremely helpful and greatly appreciated by the Member States, and should be considered as good practice.

Annual Priorities. The Steering Committee output is an endorsed RP annual priority list. This is an extremely useful document, as it allows the RP to respond to the needs of the Member States and to adjust delivery, based on need. During the first year the focuses were: strengthening existing regional cooperation mechanisms; laying the groundwork for new areas of regional coordination and cooperation; and providing support to bilateral and trilateral coordination mechanisms. While these are very broad objectives they do provide a degree of strategic direction to the programme as a whole. This oversight and guidance mechanism is one of the positive effects of programming and is considerably more responsive than a project based approach. Due to the limited duration of the Steering Committee meetings much of the preliminary work is conducted at the technical level. Though valuable, in reality the annual priority list is just a list of

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70 Donors recommended that RP briefings did not take place in the margins of the CND as their staffs were very often unable to attend due to other meetings.

71 Regional Programme priorities for 2012: strategic areas of intervention and assistance 2012
activities that Task Forces want to conduct, rather than and set of resource prioritised activities across the RP.

**Task Force Working Groups.** Technical oversight is via Regional Task Forces, which consist of four expert-level working groups, each one focusing on a different sub-programme. Task Force Working Groups are convened on a rotational basis in each Member State and normally coincide with regional workshops or conferences. A Regional Task Force is co-chaired by UNODC and a representative from the Member States. A Task Force will meet at least once a year and will identify the requirement for regional cooperation and help resolve problems. These technical working groups, while hugely valuable, are limited in frequency and duration and provide a limited opportunity for participating states to truly influence the RP. While Member States perceive ownership, RP staff acknowledge that much of the subject matter discussed is initiated by UNODC. The phrase “pre-cooked” is used, which suggests that the substantive work has already been conducted and that the workshop is only required for formal ratification of at best pre-agreed ideas; or at worst UNODC ideas. UNODC staff state that the output of these meetings is more a list of activities than a true prioritisation of possible tasks. SP1\(^{72}\) does produce excellent annual guidance; SP 2 and SP 4 Working Groups have provided some useful guidance while SP 3 has provided limited guidance\(^{73}\). It should be noted that this observation is in direct correlation to number of staff allocated in support of each SP. Where positions are filled more is achieved. When positions are gapped less is produced.

**Strategic Adherence.** To what overall objective or aim RP priorities are guided is unclear. There is no standing body or overall strategic management document which guides the Steering Committee. While UNODC has a Strategic Framework, it only covers a two year period, and even the Medium Term Strategy does not over the life span of the current RP. In addition, the RP can be viewed as the operational arm of the Paris Pact Initiative (within Western and Central Asia) and could draw strategic guidance from this forum too. In reality the Steering Committee only has enough time to endorse or ratify the plans made by the Task Forces, which in turn are limited in their content. A senior RP manager stated that RP priorities and resources are driven more by the willingness of states to participate in activities than any other dynamic. The RP also uses incentives\(^ {74}\) such as agreeing to fund an activity in year one, but not in year two unless targets are met. While these dynamics are understandable, and desirable - as they demonstrate progress - they may not necessarily be the correct way to achieve greater regional cohesion or to achieve the international community’s desired effects. The issue is how do RP staff and the governance structures ensure they are adhering to strategic direction and coordinate their desired activities in conjunction with other UNODC delivery mechanisms and the UN agencies (Recommendation 9). UNODC delivers effect via matrix management.\(^ {75}\) The problems observed during the evaluation would suggest that there is no master matrix and very little top down guidance. The perception is that staff are expected to work it out and coordinate as best they can amongst themselves. The reality is a patchwork of success, built on personal contacts, rather than consistent effect delivered via a strategic plan. When questioned, very few staff at HQ/UNODC truly understood what the RP did and very few RP staff fully understood how HQ could assist them in the field. The recommendation above would, therefore, assist UNODC in formulating a

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72 SP 1 Task Force notes for 2012, 2013,2104.
73 The evaluation notes for the desk level review provided no SP 3 specific notes. Although SP 3 recommendations were included provided for the Steering Committee they were devised by UNODC staff.
74 Drug Liaison Officers (DLOs) funded by the RP will be reviewed in the coming year and if they are not utilised by their respective countries, effectively passing information, then their funding will be cut.
75 Multiple and parallel reporting lines.
master matrix so that activities could be charted and de-conflicted amongst all UNODC Programmes. The formation of this additional layer is not another reporting line, but a form of strategic direction down to the RP and the RP staff. This level of oversight would ensure that priorities are not just bottom up generated and resourced, but that they are top down endorsed and that delivery is correctly coordinated with Global and Country Programmes and if relevant the work of other UN Agencies.

Efficiency

- Financial resources

Over the first 2.5 years of implementation, the RP has seen its overall budget increase significantly, from an initial USD 20 million to USD 30 million. The funding sources are diversified between the current following donors\(^76\): Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,\(^77\) Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.

Up until July 2014, the total amount of funds secured since the start of RP implementation stood at USD 15.4 million (from an overall budget of USD 30 million), i.e. only 51% of the overall budget has been raised, possibly signalling a fundraising challenge. Though the majority of donor respondents to the online questionnaire (60%) indicated they would definitely (40%) and probably (20%) contribute funding in the future, some donors explained this state of affairs by their unwillingness to commit more funding until previous funding tranches provided are fully spent and adequately reported on. In addition, some expressed their concerns about delays in funding proposal materials to support the 2015 pledges. This being said, anticipated pledges from the European Union, which will be a first time donor to the RP, may close up this fundraising gap.

Notwithstanding this evidence, the large majority of UNODC staff (61%) responding to the evaluation online questionnaire considered that the RP financial resources are adequate to deliver the programme. This response rate should be taken with the caveat that the question did not specify what is meant by “financial

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\(^{76}\) Initial pledges from 2011 included the following donors: Italy, Japan, Norway, Russian Federation and Sweden.

\(^{77}\) Kazakhstan is the only beneficiary country contributing to the RP/SP3 to the amount of USD 125,000.
resources” (e.g. overall budget, total approved budget or funds secured).

Despite a fair delivery rate (74%)\(^78\), the evaluation captured some challenges to the RP’s absorption capacity characterized by tight donors’ deadlines for expenditure within challenging security contexts and constraining internal rules and regulations – all of which hinder the overall RP efficiency and capacity to deliver. Regarding the latter and echoing the Country Evaluations of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the current evaluation recognized the following structural issues relating to internal systems and processes: human resources procedures, procurement, grants/Framework for the Engagement of External Parties (FEEP), delegation of authority. In addition, insufficient consultation and little engagement of the field in the development and rolling out of key new regulatory initiatives have been similarly considered problematic – including the Full Cost Recovery (FCR) model and the FEEP. As stated by a respondent: “The risks of failure lie in-house”.

While the RP has benefited from some soft-earmarking funds, overall efficiency has been affected by the funding preferences of some donors (as also witnessed in the Country Evaluations of Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as the Integrated Programming Approach evaluation) which have resulted in the current RP portfolio as being skewed in favour of law enforcement activities (i.e. SP1 funding amounts to USD 7 million, while the other SPs funding do not exceed USD 3 million each). The reality of the donors’ environment (i.e. some providing little soft earmarking funds or multi-year pledges) and UNODC monitoring and reporting systems being project-based\(^79\), undermines the intra SPs and inter Regional, Global, Country Programmes and projects synergies. For example, Global and Country Programmes have segments that operate in many cases outside of the RP.

Though UNODC’s messaging is aligned with integrated programming and, as mentioned earlier, UNODC came a long way, the above puts to trial the very notion of integrated programming and fuels internal competition translating into what was qualified by many stakeholders as UNODC’s “silo mentality” as opposed to a “One UNODC” – meaning a working culture where loyalty often goes primarily to the funding source rather than to the UNODC mandate. As a concrete example, the decentralisation of SP-level programme management functions to the field offices where SP Coordinators are located experienced some “bumpy beginnings” (i.e. initial unwillingness to collaborate with and take on additional work from the RP) and collided with the primary loyalty to the funding source and field office\(^80\). To exemplify that integration working practices still have to be fully absorbed by UNODC staff, an evaluation interviewee pointed out that the “problem is not the lack of systems and processes, but rather the lack of adherence to these.”

To counter this latent culture, the importance of soft-earmarking and multi-year pledges has been highlighted to the ethos of the integrated programming approach by several evaluations (see the Country Evaluations of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Integrated Programming Approach evaluation).

\(^78\) Of the funds raised (USD 15,4 million), USD 11,3 million have been implemented, bringing the RP delivery rate to 74%.

\(^79\) Some donors are not satisfied with project based reporting and request reports on single pledges.

\(^80\) “Many of the SP Coordinators were on posts funded by other projects, and the work of SP coordination became additional workload to their existing responsibilities with varied reporting lines. There was also the issue of better distribution of responsibility across field offices in the region. While this was natural and necessary in a start-up phase of implementation, adding RP framework on to a field office presence that already included many regional/sub-regional work, the question of accountability and workload was raised”, RP Implementation Strategy, 2012
Similarly highlighted in the Country Evaluations of Pakistan and Afghanistan, another challenge with donors is the high cost of delivery – in addition to PSC (13%), the FCR model adds close to another 10% costs. There are major concerns in the region related to the implementation of the FCR - by transferring costs which were previously covered by PSC to projects, there is a perception that UNODC risks costing itself out of the market. Various donors expressed concerns as to what the consequences of switching to FCR may be; one mentioned that FCR “Might drive business away from UNODC” while another one stated that “It either increases the cost or decreases the outcomes”. On the other hand, some donors indicated possible long term positive effects, with one stating: “Under the current circumstances the FCR model is the only way to save the ability of UNODC to deliver technical assistance in a coordinated manner and save the supporting HQ infrastructure from collapse. (…) Indeed some negative impacts might be seen in a transition period. However, if implemented proportionally throughout the whole of the UNODC, it will end up in a more fair and transparent methods of cooperation in the field”.

Though overall results of the online questionnaire support a negative assessment of the implications of FCR (48%), when breaking down the questionnaire results by stakeholder group, it appears that concerns are coming from UNODC (73%) rather than from external partners.

Although some initiatives currently implemented by UNODC may be left exposed as a result of donor decisions due to FCR, the evaluation considers that the RP will probably not be adversely affected in the medium term. There are various reasons for this: i) the importance of the region to the international community; ii) UNODC’s comparative advantage (credibility) and expertise in the subject matter; iii) the RP’s alignment with relevant UNODC mandates; iv) the RP seeking to maximize synergies between various initiatives and increasing efficiencies so as to reduce costs and v) limited alternatives in terms of lead implementing organizations that can replace UNODC in the region.

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81 For the past few years, the funding trend for UNODC has been characterized by an increase in earmarked voluntary contributions (special purpose) while at the same time experiencing a decline in general purpose funds (GP). As numerous internal documents, evaluations and discussions at various fora have highlighted, this trend places considerable strains on the organization. As a donor to the RP stated, “UNODC is a victim of the architecture of expanding earmarking and dropping GP.” Pursuant to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) request (UNGA Resolution 62/208 of 2007) for the implementation of FCR and taking into account the principles on the issue identified by the UN Controller81, UNODC presented the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) the organization’s 2014-2015 Consolidated Budget. The budget was approved at the end of 2013.

82 The full cost recovery principle demands that all the costs that can be attributed to a specific intervention (programme or project) funded from extra-budgetary contributions, should be financed by this very same intervention. See memorandum (June 2012): “[…] that all costs that can be, either wholly or in part, directly attributed to an operation, programme or project financed from extra-budgetary contributions, should be financed by the relevant operation, programme or project. (See also “Guidance Note for Member States on Implementation of Full Cost Recovery”, UNODC, March 2014).
In light of the above mentioned challenges related to fundraising, absorption capacity, cost of delivery and integration, and considering the 2014 Transition and beyond, the RP needs to continue sustaining its visibility and credibility with the donor community in a strategic manner. Possibly, another approach to communicating with donors could be adopted (see external communication paragraph) (Recommendation 33).

- Human Resources

Supporting the idea that “[…] the RP is not just another parallel regional project to be added to the existing mix of interventions across the region but introduced as an overarching framework to bring greater coherence, it is necessary to align UNODC’s work across the region adapting to this new setting”\(^\text{83}\), which includes human resources. A regional programming approach is the responsibility of the field representatives in the region as well as the management of UNODC in Vienna to materialise by adapting working practices – in alignment with the 2012 RP Implementation Strategy some suggestions can be found in the below table (Recommendation 13).

Though the deployment logic of RP staff across the region was solid at design stage, some external partners expressed reservations as to how things will work out with the move of the RP Secretariat from Kabul to Tashkent. In addition to this recent movements of RP human resources from Kabul to Tashkent, the geographic ‘dispersion’ and vacant positions are perceived by some external partners as leading to political challenges, unresponsiveness to stakeholders’ information requirements and missed opportunities for efficiency\(^\text{84}\).

Yet the arguments in favour of the Secretariat’s move, as per the October 2013 inter-office memorandum\(^\text{85}\), are strong enough to warrant the change.

In light of the above, the evaluation considered the below parameters to assess the level of coherence of the representation functions relating to the RP in the region:

- Hierarchy coherence: the grades are conducive to clear authority hierarchy
- Titles coherence: titles are representative of the scope of responsibilities in relation to the RP

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\(^{83}\) Regional Programme Implementation Strategy, 2012. In September 2012, the RP developed an Implementation Strategy capturing the evolving lessons in programme management structures and practices to enable an efficient and effective implementation of an integrated regional approach. At the core of this Strategy was the need to align management structures and processes with the objectives of the RP. Although the diagnosis was accurate at the time and steps have been taken to address it, the RP still grapples with the following internal challenges unsupportive of an integrated approach: approving authorities, hierarchy structures and reporting lines (see paragraph on human resources), reporting overlaps (see paragraph on reporting).

\(^{84}\) Basing the RP Secretariat in Kabul was claimed to have resulted in efficiencies and streamlining of systems by benefiting the CP and RP operationally and substantively. Indeed, the RP and the CP AFG had combined some initiatives in the areas of Precursor Control, Alternative Livelihoods, Research, and Advocacy.

\(^{85}\) Inter-office memorandum “UNODC Preparedness in West and Central Asia towards the Afghanistan 2014 Transition Period and the Decade of Transformation (2015-2015) approved by the Executive Director on October 30, 2013
- Location coherence: locations are meaningful in relation to the scope of RP responsibilities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Reporting Line</th>
<th>RP related function as per 2012 Implementation Strategy and 2013 Inter-Office Memorandum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Regional Representative for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (COA FG)</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>HQ, Head of DO</td>
<td>“Primary responsibility for accountability to attain RP objectives and responsibility of strategic oversight for coordination of cross-regional activities across West and Central Asia”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Regional Representative for Central Asian countries (ROCA)</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>HQ, Head of IPB</td>
<td>Has an official role in the RP (“Deputy Regional Representative supporting the Regional Representative in RP implementation and coordination” as per October 2013 inter office memorandum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Should report on RP matters to Regional Representative for Afghanistan as per memo dated October 30, 201386</td>
<td>Should ensure that CA projects are aligned with and feed in the RP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Senior Programme Coordinator for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (RP)</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>Deputy Reg. Rep. (ROCA) and COA FG Reg. Rep. Kabul based Regional Rep. to clarify reporting lines responsibilities between Deputy Regional Rep. and RP Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>“Responsible for the overall implementation of RP activities (through overseeing the work of the Sub-Programme Coordinators), coordinating and facilitating concrete cross-regional work by linking field expertise and with HQ-based expertise of all Thematic Pillars of UNODC. Furthermore, the RP Coordinator ensures constant communication and coordination with all key stakeholders in the countries of the region as well as its partners in the international community (complementing the channel of communication between the Field Representatives and their counterparts, through communication with delegations in Vienna and donor capitals).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Country Representative for Pakistan (COPAK)</td>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>HQ, Head of IPB</td>
<td>No official role in the RP which is problematic. Should at least ensure that Pakistan CP is aligned with and feed into the RP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Representative for Iran (COIRA)</th>
<th>Teheran</th>
<th>HQ, Head of IPB</th>
<th>No official role in the RP which is problematic. Should at least ensure that Iran CP is aligned with and feed into the RP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief. RSEWCA/IPB</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>HQ, Head of IPB</td>
<td>‘Support related to financial management in pledge tracking and TCII segment management, resource planning and mobilization, reporting, and internal UNODC communications, particularly with the Office of the Executive Director (...) facilitative role at a strategic level as is appropriate for a programme of this complexity.’ Should also ensure connectivity with global, inter-regional, regional, sub-regional and national programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Office for Kyrgyzstan (POKGZ)</td>
<td>Bishkek</td>
<td>ROCA Reg. Rep.</td>
<td>No official role in the RP which is problematic. Should at least ensure that Kyrgyzstan CP is aligned with and feed into the RP.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Office for Tajikistan (POTJK)</td>
<td>Dushanbe</td>
<td>ROCA Reg. Rep.</td>
<td>No official role in the RP which is problematic. Should at least ensure that Tajikistan projects are aligned with and feed into the RP.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Law Enforcement Advisor and Sub-Programme 1 Coordinator</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>ROCA Reg. Rep. and RP Coordinator</td>
<td>Responsible for ‘achieving the results of the SP through development of SP work plan and ensuring its implementation including resource management for the respective SP. (...) Responsible for overall planning, financial management, project and budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role/Region</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Cooperation Advisor and Sub-Programme 2 Coordinator (POTJK)</td>
<td>Dushanbe</td>
<td>Responsible for “achieving the results of the SP through development of SP work plan and ensuring its implementation including resource management for the respective SP. (…) Responsible for overall planning, financial management, project and budget revisions and reporting. (…) Coordinate the overall action required by all relevant field offices and HQ to achieve RP objectives. (…) Have wide authority to move activities in their SP as long as they are approved as a part of the work plan at key intervals.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Programme 3 Coordinator (COIRA)</td>
<td>Teheran</td>
<td>Responsible for “achieving the results of the SP through development of SP work plan and ensuring its implementation including resource management for the respective SP. (…) Responsible for overall planning, financial management, project and budget revisions and reporting. (…) Coordinate the overall action required by all relevant field offices and HQ to achieve RP objectives. (…) Have wide authority to move activities in their SP as long as they are approved as a part of the work plan at key intervals.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research / Reporting Officer and Sub-Programme 4 Coordinator (COAFG)</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Responsible for “achieving the results of the SP through development of SP work plan and ensuring its implementation including resource management for the respective SP. (…) Responsible for overall planning, financial management, project and budget revisions and reporting. (…) Coordinate the overall action required by all relevant field offices and HQ to achieve RP objectives. (…) Have wide authority to move activities in their SP as long as they are approved as a part of the work plan at key intervals.”</td>
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**FINDINGS**

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31 (ROCA) “working under the overall guidance on policy matters and resource parameters set by the RP management and RP Coordinator in particular” revisions and reporting. (…) Coordinate the overall action required by all relevant field offices and HQ to achieve RP objectives. (…) Have wide authority to move activities in their SP as long as they are approved as a part of the work plan at key intervals.”

There should be separate LE advisors for both ROCA and the RP. Current combined budgets (ROCA LE and SP1) are approximately the same size as the RP’s budget, yet oversight is currently via a single person. (Recommendation 35)
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Though the adequacy of RP human resources for a programme of this scale came out as being problematic in interviews with the RP team, the evidence stemming from the online questionnaire doesn’t seem to fully support this conclusion. RP management attributes this perception to the extraordinary (yet untenable) level of effort the team has made and therefore other stakeholders do not view it as a problem. It was assessed by respectively 60% of the questionnaire respondents that the RP human resources are either adequate (30%) or partially adequate (30%) to deliver the programme. As an example of partial adequacy, however, the over-reliance on Country and Global Programme staff was highlighted, echoing the above analysis about the “bumpy beginnings” of the decentralised SP-level management. The RP has been discussing these challenges and is in the process of developing a revised staffing structure to respond to new realities. The evaluation would recommend maximising the strategic pull of existing human resources in the region instead of recruiting new - e.g. Afghanistan seems to have a pool of LE experts that could be further engaged in the RP; also there may be a need to have more substantive experts to engage at the political level rather than administrative support (Recommendation 12).

The lack of established corporate mobility and rotation policies (the new Career Development and Mobility Framework, based on GA resolution A/RES/68/265, was only communicated on 28 April 2014 with implementation expected not before 2017) and cumbersome recruitment processes are part of the reason behind the (i) delays in filling in the international posts (e.g. COA FG and ROCA Field Representative positions remained vacant for a while leaving a gap in leadership in the region), and (ii) challenges to attract and retain professionals to the region, in particular in Afghanistan (e.g. SP1 and 3 Coordinator positions were challenging to fill). This issue of internal processes not being conducive to implementation in the field is an institutional challenge and has been flagged in the Afghanistan and Pakistan evaluations as well as the 2013 Audit report. UNODC should be considering a corporate reflection as regards to its internal processes, considering the constraints imposed by being part of the UN Secretariat (Recommendation 10).

Though the new Career Development and Mobility Framework, is still being discussed and it is too early to anticipate or witness concrete and positive impact, it details minimum and maximum position occupancy limits based on hardship of duty station and staff will be able to express preferences for reassignment, however under the proposed scheme there will be no "return right" to the previous post. This new framework may provide incentives for staff to go to the region; however the evaluation would recommend giving particular attention to set time limitation for serving in hardship duty stations (Recommendation 15).

87 Duty stations with the D and E hardship classifications will have a minimum post occupancy of 1 year and a maximum of 3 years, opposed to 2 and 4 years, respectively, for B and C duty stations, and 2 and 7 years, respectively, for H and A duty stations.
Highlighted in the Country Evaluations of Pakistan and Afghanistan, working with countries where turnover of key and trained staff is high, results in the need for constant advocacy and sensitisation to build a rapport of trust and secure commitment to undertake policy and operational interventions.

- **External communication**

Overall, external stakeholders expressed some reservations as to the RP communication and reporting, stating that sometimes it did not address their information needs. Though donor briefings are regularly organised in Vienna and Kabul, strong views were expressed about challenges to be communicated upfront rather than donors getting to know about them through other channels. Donors could be more involved to finding solutions to overcome those challenges, e.g. CARICC deficiencies. In general, going beyond the constraints of mandated reporting systems, the RP should aim at a more targeted communication for its various stakeholders (donors, national counterparts and other partners). In this regard, the good communication practices of the Counter Piracy Programme were exemplified (Recommendation 33).

It was pointed out that the complexity of UNODC structure, vehicles (i.e. RP, GLO, projects) and reporting lines was often confusing to partners, even to sister UN agencies which would not know who to address to interact within the organization. The RP should find means to remedy such confusion to elicit more efficient interactions with partners (Recommendation 33).

- **RP monitoring**

The RP presented new challenges with respect to implementing and monitoring programmes across a large number of countries and substantive sectors. There was no tool or system that could adequately address this, so the RP set about developing one. Creation of the RP necessitated the development of a new tool called the Programme Management Module (PMM) to ensure effective oversight, coordination and reporting in the RP, between country programmes and with HQ in Vienna.

The RP developed two special tools to aid implementation and monitoring of its sub-programmes called the “Expense Monitoring System” (EMS) and the RP Portal (Smartsheet), based on systems developed in the Regional Office for Central Asia and the Country Office Pakistan. Both aimed at creating tools that could be used across the region, which would allow not only the monitoring of expenditure, but also tracking of progress against log frames on a day to day basis.

The pilot system was so promising that the idea arose to bring the utility of the EMS into a PROFI linked system, which could eventually be used world-wide by UNODC. This was important as the EMS was an excel-based system. The RP and Country Programme Afghanistan invested resources into the development then of a PROFI-based application called Programme Management Module (PMM) with the Information Technology Service (ITS). This tool (an application linked to PROFI) incorporated the functionality of the EMS as well as additional refinements. It was trialled in the RP sub-programmes and the Poppy Survey Project under the Afghanistan Country Programme. RP colleagues undertook the process of developing PMM frameworks designed with the aim of improving information flows, both internal and external.

Despite these positive developments, the PMM development was halted by an executive decision in Vienna possibly linked to the upcoming shift to Umoja. No detailed explanation for the suspension was given to RP and COAFG staff involved in its development. This is a significant lesson learned in terms of better communication as considerable time was spent developing this
tool with no end result. In addition, the further development and roll out of the EMS was halted as it was envisaged the PMM would supersede the original system. There needs to be better internal coordination as there are instances where certain actors are not aware of activities until later. This can result in missed opportunities or costly waste of resources.

Significant change that could have been brought about by these new frameworks included improved programme management. In addition, programmes are often critiqued for their information flows, messaging and lack of real-time exchanges. PMM provided the opportunity to achieve all of these with a one-stop shop option. Long term effects of better PMM frameworks for the RP would have been improved reporting, coordination between the various sub-programmes of the RP, information flow between the RP and HQ, and subsequently to donors to enable a more efficient and delivery focused RP.

Despite the above highlighted as a good practice, several shortcomings to the EMS were identified by the evaluation team. The system over-relies on manual inputs preventing real time information on use of funds and progress of results in the absence of the staff feeding it. Mainly output-based, the data fed against “non-adapted” performance indicators (not capturing qualitative information such as reasons for success or failure), does not allow for extraction of relevant and meaningful information required by stakeholders, such as donors and government counterparts. Finally, it is an Excel based system, which is not necessarily the best solution for a team spread over nine offices.

As a result of the above, current internal UNODC systems do not allow for monitoring against log-frames in a manner suitable for every-day management. Till new systems (Umoja) are up and running, the evaluation team would recommend re-starting any system ensuring monitoring of the programme (Recommendation 17).

A structural challenge to monitoring is often the lack of a single national authority responsible for collecting the data and reporting it as official, e.g. among various national LE agencies who possesses the official data to be fed in monitoring systems.

- Reporting

The evaluation identified tensions and reporting duplications as regards to attribution of achievements between CPs and RP. This is a structural issue due to existing systems. The evaluation team would recommend working with the Strategic Planning Unit to streamline reporting systems for no further duplications (Recommendation 16).

The reporting systems within UNODC are not standardised, e.g. the Programme Review Committee (PRC) only receives progress reports on an ad hoc basis with a wide quality variance. With the support of the RP Research and Reporting Officer the quality of reporting drastically improved. However, reporting challenges remain (i) timeliness and (ii) level of details contained in such reports (too much output based versus strategic and outcome level), as well as the (iii) formats of APPR and SAPPR being too restrictive to capture any achievement beyond the logical framework and designed performance indicators. The lack of outcome based reporting by UNODC was identified as a perennial source of donor frustration. The evaluation recommends UNODC to identify urgent solutions to overcome those reporting challenges, in particular revising formats to capture achievements beyond the logical framework (Recommendation 16).
Though another reporting challenge consists of the various donors reporting cycles and templates, the evaluation team believes this could be overcome through improvement of the monitoring data quality, especially at the outcome level, and development of a reporting deadlines calendar to ensure timeliness of contributions and submissions (Recommendation 16).

- Integration with other UNODC vehicles

UNODC has made important strides in promoting the integration of the various levels of interventions (country/regional/global), of which the RP is one example. As other evaluations have pointed out, this has led to increased efficiencies (and avoidance of duplication) in many cases. The migration from project-based implementation to integrated regional programme implementation provided a number of benefits including coherence and complementary of UNODC interventions within its mandated thematic areas. Thus, prior to the launch of the RP a number of projects operated in the region basing its activities on ‘method’ of interventions (e.g. training or I97 project); ‘substance’ of interventions (e.g. precursor control or E29 project); or ‘aspect’ of intervention (e.g. Container Control Programme or G80 programme). Despite clear benefits of these interventions, there was and still is in some instances space for overlapping/duplication, as, for example, a training could be conducted on interdiction of illicit precursors trafficked using containerized shipments by either of the above mentioned projects.

By bringing all the projects operating in one thematic area (such as law enforcement) and in one geographic region (such as West and Central Asia) under one umbrella – the RP strives to ensure coherence of UNODC interventions in the region.

The RP has made use of the Inter-Regional Drug Control Approach (IRDC) to promote cooperation beyond its geographic area of operations. One of the mechanisms in place to foster this process (within the IRDC context) is having regular inter-divisional meetings, though the caveats mentioned in the “In-depth Evaluation of the Regional Programme East Asia and the Pacific” must be kept in mind. Nonetheless, increased efficiencies in planning of existing programme activities were reported as a result of reviewing of work plans. By cross-checking activities through the formulation of a joint work plan, overlaps and duplications were identified in time. As an example of this, similar activities in anti-money laundering that were scheduled to be implemented by both the RP and the Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML) were merged into a common work-plan as a result. Another example is the coordination that took place between SP2 and the Global Programme for Strengthening the Capacities of Member States to Prevent and Combat Organized and Serious Crimes. Coordinating their efforts and resources resulted in the establishment of the Network of Prosecutors, exceeding the geographic scope originally foreseen by each programme. The RP has also used the IRDC in expanding MaReS (from the initial stages under TI) to form the Maritime Security Network involving TI members and willing states from other regions. Other examples of promoting synergies between regions, as per the IRDC, to which the RP contributed to include: i) the promotion of “Networking the Networks” in the area of exchange of criminal intelligence and coordination of operational responses and ii) optimizing the use of human and financial resources related to activities planned for improving Member States’ cooperation and regulatory compliance in the areas of money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Even though the RP had already started conducting activities jointly with other sub-regional and global projects for better synergies and efficiency, including those with E29, I97, G80, I85, K22 etc. the process of integration/merging of sub-regional projects with RP is also taking shape in parallel. The examples would include 1) absorption of F60 on Computer Based Training project within SP 1, where both the work plan and resources (human) of the regional project are now part
of the RP; and 2) merging of E29 work plan with the one of the RP, while the regional project itself will come to an end in 2014. Though some efforts to streamline the UNODC interventions in the region were undertaken - via, inter alia, incorporating various existing sub-regional implementation vehicles – there is still room for improvement.

Results of the evaluation questionnaire show where the coordination with Global Programmes is most efficient, i.e. with PPI, AOTP and Drug Prevention Programmes. Though 30% of donor respondents see an efficient coordination between the RP and PPI/AOTP supporting the overall assessment, 20% of them see no efficient cooperation with the other mentioned global programmes.

Sub-Programme 4:

The disparate UNODC vehicles delivering research activities in the region deserves being singled out as an example of the endeavours for better synergies and coherence. Before the RP,
coordination between the various UNODC research related vehicles was non-existent, i.e. there were unclear purposes, redundancies (e.g. both AOTP and the Paris Pact Initiative (PPI) focused on drug prices and seizure data), duplication of activities (e.g. both AOTP and RP delivered trainings about price and seizure data), no standardised methodologies (e.g. AOTP still uses qualitative methods while RP uses quantitative methods) leading to different data results (e.g. discrepancies between ARQ and PPI/AOTP data) and communication challenges (e.g. PPI Regional Liaison Officers (RLO) are not always informed of the RP activities, while RLO are sometimes being tasked without PPI being informed). This gets even more complicated as some Global Programmes have their own research agenda with segments in the region, e.g. GPML. A case in point was the collaboration between the RP and STASS on the study about firearms trafficking between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which materialised thanks to personal networks and contacts. Though personal networks can have a positive dimension, the RP and UNODC in general should favour institutional communication networks to personal networks (Recommendation 33).

Though some of the above challenges remain and integration between some vehicles happens mainly in terms of funds or expertise sharing, at the instigation of the RP a mapping exercise of research activities was recently undertaken in order to ensure better streamlining between all activities. In this process, the RP added value was one of coordination and convener; it provided an operational arm in the field to do so and contextualised information. The RP should ensure these positive efforts are sustained and learn from lessons of the past – i.e. SP4 suffered from inconsistent lead mainly due to its work-shared arrangement between research and evaluation, as well as the reinterpretation of the position as an RBM and reporting officer. The evaluation would recommend having a dedicated SP4 Coordinator that would focus on bridging the remaining gaps between research, monitoring and evaluation, in particular given the wide array of research activities in the region. (Recommendation 14).

As regards to integration between the RP and Country Programmes (CPs), except for Iran the majority of respondents agree that integration with the CPs of Afghanistan and Pakistan has happened. The RP, however, largely funded the CP Iran which had limited resources. When breaking down responses by stakeholder group, 60% of donor respondents agree that there is integration with CP Pakistan as well as with the CP Afghanistan, while 40% agree there is integration with Iran CPs. Only one donor “strongly disagreed” about the integration with the CP Afghanistan being integrated - no explanation was provided for this assessment though. Overall Government respondents are neutral or agree that there is integration with existing CPs. Especially in the case of the CP Afghanistan, 52% agree that integration happened, while 37% are neutral.

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GLOV20 Afghan Opiate Trade Project
GLO/K31 Paris Pact III
AFGU/04 Building Afghan Counter Narcotics Analytical Capacity for Evidence-Based Policy and Advocacy
AFGF98 Monitoring of opium production in Afghanistan
AFGK65: Sub-Programme 1.3: Counter-Narcotics Capacity Building

90 The Coordination and analysis Unit (CAU) located in Tashkent is funded from different projects: RP, PPI, UZBK23, AOTP.
Partnerships and cooperation

National Partnerships

The RP team has made impressive progress in extending the range of Government partners that it engages and works with in the course of the development and implementation as noted with the “Medal of Honour” awarded in 2014 by the Government of Tajikistan at the Third AKT meeting to the UNODC Regional Programme Coordinator and Senior Regional Cooperation Advisor for West and Central Asia in recognition of their role in its continuing success. This is also reflected in the strong appreciation expressed to the Evaluation Team by key stakeholders for the RP leadership and management in the field in a complex and not always harmonious region. Whist some counterpart governments have expressed concerns over lack of participatory programme design and implementation process by UNODC in general, some respondents in this evaluation stated the RP design process was more inclusive than customary.

Locating the RP coordinator for SP3 in Teheran, with the full support of the Iranian government, has led to sharing Iranian expertise gained in addressing the national epidemiology of HIV/AIDS. This is a notable achievement for the RP. Iran is globally recognised as a centre of excellence for rapid policy and service development for drug treatment and prevention, and is an exemplar partner. UNODC continues to engage directly with the I.R. of Iran which benefits the regional and international community. The COIRA\(^91\) midterm evaluation noted that ‘donors of the Country Programme (Japan, Norway, Germany and Sweden) expressed appreciation for the UNODC efforts in IR of Iran’ which was reiterated by several respondents in this evaluation.

The RP continues to build on successful country (i.e. Pakistan) and global programmes, however it is clearly difficult to achieve homogeneity with such a large geographic area. Whilst operational issues for example law enforcement are relatively straightforward, others such as harmonisation of legal systems and adoption of rights based approaches are not. Functioning within the legacy

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of cultural and historic sensitivities requires delicacy and skill which has been shown by the RP personnel. This includes cooperation within the CARICC and the Joint Planning Cell (JPC) partnership, the AKT Triangular Initiative and RP focal point facilitation of model MOUs between Tajikistan and I.R. Iran.

A number of partner agencies and organisations in criminal justice and health expressed a desire for training and cooperation to ‘move up a level with enhanced expertise’. They also indicated that further consultation is required to design the next stage of the process for recipients, as each country is at different stages and generic delivery is unsuitable. ‘One-off ‘UNODC events with lack of follow up training was repeatedly cited as an issue. Lack of technical expertise of some attendees in governance and policy was also found to be frustrating for others at seminars and events. This was also acknowledged as problematic by RP staff in that attendance selection is decided by recipient bodies.

International and regional partnerships

A number of respondents interviewed recognise the need for ‘recalibration’ of all actors’ expectations, including UNODC for Afghanistan in the Decade of Transition and Transformation. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) acknowledges the primary importance of partnership with UNODC. The following identified partners; EU, OSCE, OECD and NATO are all actively involved in funding or support the activities of SP1 and SP2.

SP3 supports the development of regional networks and linkages to strengthen drug and related HIV prevention, treatment and rehabilitation services. Of particular importance under Sub-Programme 3 is the exchange of best-practices among regional research and training centres. The aim is to strengthen capacities of healthcare and other professionals to deliver evidence-based drug dependence treatment and care (including pharmacological and psychosocial treatment, social and health services including HIV related prevention and care, and rehabilitation and reintegration services).

The majority of respondents (internal and external) indicated that the RP cumulative impact was greater than the sum of its component parts. As mentioned in the efficiency section, concerns were expressed that reporting and monitoring systems are increasingly restrictive thus limiting measurement to exclusively simplistic quantitative ProFi activity indicators. This is thought to omit unmeasurable and immeasurable outcomes in qualitative and cumulative quantitative value of the RP, which delivers more than component parts in terms of the influence it has.

UN Partnerships

Target agencies for RP policy dialogues are UNICEF, UNDPKO, UNDPA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNIDO, and UNHCR. Specific to SP3 are ILO, WHO, UNAIDS, for SP4 the World Bank.


93 Think global, act global. Confronting global factors that influence conflict and fragility' OECD [DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)] study, 2012.

94 UNAIDS and WHO will be involved in training and evaluation of drug treatment and related HIV prevention initiatives respectively. The training modules developed by WHO on drug treatment and rehabilitation,
Increased jointly supportive inter-UN activity is underway between UNDP, UNAIDS and WHO particularly in the field of HIV/AIDS, with recognition that there are roles for the individual agencies to work together, which has not always been the case in the past.

UNODC began making significant investments in HIV prevention, treatment, care and support from 2002 and is one of the 11 co-sponsors of UNAIDS with a specific mandate to work with people who inject drugs and people living and working in prisons and other closed settings as outlined in the UNAIDS Division of Labour Framework. In addition to the Division of Labour Framework that outlines the roles and responsibilities of each co-sponsor, joint bi-annual strategic objectives and work plans were developed by all co-sponsors between 2008-2012, these Unified Budgets and Work Plans were replaced in 2012 by more strategic, targeted and longer Unified Budget Results and Accountability Framework (UBRAF), that will end in 2015.

As regards to UNAIDS partnership in the region, UNAIDS was actively involved in implementing the seminar “From policy to practice: Responding comprehensively to drugs and HIV” in Astana. The training toolkits, information material and guides developed by UNODC/UNAIDS for prevention of HIV among PWIDs and in prison settings are regularly used by SP3. UNAIDS expertise will also be utilized in the evaluation of HIV prevention related interventions under SP3.

Several respondents spoke of a history of tension stemming from scepticism and mistrust between law enforcement and health professionals both within UNODC and externally.

A positive focus on vulnerable populations was recommended in the Pakistan evaluation in order to ensure prioritisation to less accessible and less popular groups. Humanitarian work is supported through liaising with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR working with Afghan IDPs, refugees and returnees to and from Iran and Pakistan.

The MOU signed by UNODC with UN Women [June 2011] recommended enhanced proactive cooperation with UNAIDS, in the context of the RP for priority groups for the next half activity, and that UNODC strengthen this relationship in addition to those with IOM, UNHCR, and UNICEF.

**Bilateral /Trilateral Partnerships**

One of the most notable features of the RP is its ability to create dialogue within the neutral space of UNODC ("The House", under the Blue Flag). Many respondents stated it was the unique comparative advantage of the UN which enabled ‘below the radar’ counterpart meetings, to generate a range of working and collaborative networks, leading to later more formal processes that was one of the resounding successes of the Regional Programme.

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95 Mid-Term In-depth Evaluation of the Country Programme Promoting the Rule of Law and Public Health in Pakistan [2010-2015], Independent Evaluation Unit, April 2014. UNODC

96 The provision of treatment and care for Afghan refugees in Iran was formalised in 2012 in an MOU between UNHCR and UNODC towards HIV prevention for the upgrading of Drop In centres and care services.
As mentioned above, the role of the RP was formally recognised by the Government of Tajikistan at the Third AKT meeting, SP1 being the impetus to the trilateral launch of the AKT Initiative strengthening cross border counter narcotics initiatives. Secondment of Drug Liaison Officers between AKT Member States Afghanistan and Tajikistan and, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan resulted in seizures of a range of illicit narcotics predominantly opium, hashish and heroin. The Maritime Cooperation initiative [MaReS], developed through the Triangular Initiative to interrupt large amounts of drugs and precursors being moved through seaports of Pakistan and Iran and development of joint operations between Iran and United Arab Emirates [UAE] is another example of success.

Certain activities under SP 1 and 2 focusing on the Specialized Counter-Narcotics Units (SCUs) were being coordinated with the Central Asia Counter Narcotics Initiative (CACI), though the RP has now re-directed funding from this towards into the AKT initiative and the AML / CFT work under SP2. One of the largest EU-UNDP assistance programmes is also underway in 5 Central Asian countries with the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA). Collaboration with the European Cooperation Organisation [ECO], as part of combatting cybercrime through the organisation of interregional workshops, is of note.

Under SP2 the establishment of cross border criminal justice agency cooperation within the region has led to the development of interregional awareness and expertise of international standards and shared training. The implementation of the CASH initiative has addressed illicit financial flows and introduction of best practice. Requests for and exchange of information have taken place between Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. A model bilateral MOU on AML/ CFT has been signed between 6 RP Member States with the AML Group of Experts established. Similarly, an MOU exists between UNHCR and UNODC in 2011 furthering joint cooperation on human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Under SP3, international standards and drug treatment protocols for drug use prevention, treatment and HIV prevention and delivery of training to professionals were introduced in the region. Awareness-raising continues with use of the UNODC International Standards of Drug Use Prevention. A significant innovation also includes the piloting and introduction into the national police training curriculum in Pakistan, of the Training Toolkit for Law Enforcement Agencies working with people who use drugs. Advocacy and seminars for policy makers have been held on the WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS nine comprehensive interventions for prevention of HIV among PWIDs and in prison settings. Development of networks for NGO drug treatment providers was enhanced with the Regional Conference in Teheran January 2014 followed by the Regional HIV/AIDS Conference in Kazakhstan in June 2014.

RP activity is also embedded within crosscutting activities such as national participation in Central Asian Drug Addiction Programme (CADAP) with cumulative benefit increasing with participation in other EU funded programmes. CADAP and the Network of Drug Demand Reduction Coordination Centres to be established under SP-3 will coordinate in designing and implementing regional trainings and researches in the area of drug treatment. The Colombo plan drug treatment programme has developed a number of training modules which will also be utilized after adaptation and translation.

Under SP4 with the development of the illicit economy approach, a partnership with the World Bank (WB) was developed (and one attempted with the International Monetary Fund), e.g., concept notes and research proposals were submitted in particular a concept paper for a joint
study with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assess the extent and scale of the macroeconomic impact of the drug trade in Afghanistan and its interconnections with the region.

**NGOs, Academic Institutions and Private Sector Partnerships**

Civil society engagement through the RP has been notable within the context of SP3. Further cooperation is to be encouraged as these would enable the better distribution of workloads and spread effects. UNODC partnerships across the RP play an important role in the advocacy of a ‘rights-based agenda’ with Civil Society organisations and bilateral partnerships.

There are no private donor sector partnerships pertinent to this evaluation, and no current academic linkages with the RP.

**Effectiveness**

The assessment of the effectiveness of the four sub-programmes was based on the performance indicators contained in the logframe and complemented by data collected in terms of most significant changes achieved to date.

**Sub-Programme 1: Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation**

The effectiveness of SP1 is mixed. Where already successful LE projects have been taken over by the RP, there has been integration and increased regional delivery. The examples of the regional intelligence working group on pre-cursor and CBT (see below) support this observation. RP funding and support has enabled both these activities to become far more successful than when they were just country or sub-regional projects.

While the RP has supported the LE portfolio of activities within the region, it has been less successful in initiating new activities under SP1. Due to a myriad of factors (many outside the control of RP) there has not been any real increase in regional intelligence sharing (the network approach) as many of the country level building blocks are not yet in place. The RP has supported the development of some bilateral / tri-lateral initiatives (such as AKT) and it is hoped that overtime these types of initiatives will be seen as successful and there will be increased cooperation between member states. However, many of the institutions required to increase cooperation, such as JPC and CARRIC, are not advancing as quickly as intended and beyond the RIWGP there have been no new initiatives involving all the Member States since the inception of the RP. The RP should examine what other regional bodies can be established to assist cooperation amongst LE agencies. (Recommendation 36) In response to this observation the RP is looking to start two new initiatives the Regional Working Group on Forensic Capacity and Drugs (RWGFD) and Regional Working Group on Law Enforcement Training (RWGLET).

The virtual staffing of the RP, which sees staff split between different countries and operating on a part-time basis, has not brought greater cohesion to the LE fraternity across the region. The current system relies more on personal contacts rather than a formal structure (see Efficiency Section above). As such, not all LE elements pull in the same direction. For example the international post in CARRIC does not work for, or report to the RP, despite the RP having a
vested interest in CARRIC. Despite the loss of the SP1 coordinator/senior ROCA LE advisor, the CARRIC staff member remained in place, this at a time when CARRIC has lost traction\(^{97}\) and was delivering very little. Had this post worked for the RP, it could have potentially\(^{98}\) been used to assist the RP or ROCA while the issues at CARRIC passed. The loss of the SP1 coordinator (and the delay in appointing a new advisor) meant that any early momentum attained under SP 1 has stalled. SP1 has a large budget and is the single biggest element of the RP, but it has very few full time staff (it shares a senior LE advisor with ROCA) to deliver its activities, travel regionally and develop new ideas/initiatives. Without significant reinvigoration (resources and staff) SP1 will continue to do what it already does well, but it will not fully achieve what it set out to deliver (Recommendation 35).

The key challenge for SP1 is promoting intelligence sharing amongst regional actors; this has to occur before there can be joint operations. The activity of sharing intelligence is more about fostering trust than purely building intelligence capacity and training. Trust is only possible amongst people and institutions that know and respect each other. Institutional capacity cannot be developed remotely, by an occasional consultation or study period. Trust takes time, people and resources all acting for a single aim. SP1 lacks people (the experts) in the field that can assist agencies to develop and grow, and above all build networks of trusted organisations and agents. If these networks lie at the heart of the IRDC, then UNODC must reconsider how it is going to develop trust as a means of increasing intelligence sharing. Trust is developed through close working relationships and mutual respect. Achieving this outcome will require additional resources, namely people (Recommendation 37).

While SP has made progress towards achieving the objectives of outcomes 1 and 2, it has not been as successful in achieving results under outcome 3 - increased use of forensic evidence in investigating and prosecuting cross-border crimes. There is a clear requirement for additional resources to be allocated to this outcome (possibly contractual). If additional resources are not forthcoming then the current SME in Afghanistan should be reassigned to the RP and clear priorities set (Recommendation 39).

While SP has made progress towards achieving the objectives of outcomes 1 and 2, it has not been as successful in achieving results under outcome 3 - increased use of forensic evidence in investigating and prosecuting cross-border crimes. The RP should investigate the requirement for additional resources to be allocated toward outcome 3. If additional resources are not forthcoming then the current SME in Afghanistan could be reassigned to the RP.

Annex VII contains the SP1 theory of change.

**Progress towards achievement of Outcome 1**

**Outcome 1: Enhanced regional cooperation and coordination to address transnational drug-related crimes**

\(^{97}\) The Director of CARRIC remained in his post beyond his agreed tenure and this was not accepted - or liked- by all Member States, and has led to the centre being marginalised. This was reported by UNODC Staff and corroborated in discussion with Member States.

\(^{98}\) The evaluation does not seek to pass judgement as to the location or role of the CARRIC post. This is merely an observation relating to the effectiveness of delivery. The fact that an organisation has kept vacant a senior regional post because it lacks the ability to reallocate resources from another UNODC activity that is under achieving is cause for concern.
SPI has led to some significant changes as a result of its activities; one of which is “The Regional Intelligence Working Group for Pre-Cursor Chemicals”.

Based on the Rainbow Strategy’s Red Paper, Op TARCET99 aimed to facilitate regional cooperation through the conduct of coordinated intelligence-led counter narcotic operations. The result was an annual law enforcement operation utilising CARICC100 for the operational coordination of law enforcement and border agencies from Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Conducted between 2008-11, Operation TARCET enhanced: regional cooperation; information exchanges between CARICC, JPC and National Contact Points (NCP); Mobile Detection Teams (MDTs) in the Central Asian Republics; and the credibility of the Precursor Control Unit (PCU) in Afghanistan101. However, its impact was transient.

Building on the successes of Operation TARCET the RP established a Regional Intelligence Working Group on Pre-Cursors (RIWGP)102. This working group is a permanent regional coordination structure that allows Member States to share intelligence relating to pre-cursor chemicals on a full time basis. In addition, the RP introduced a special operations working group to back track pre-cursor chemicals to their source country and possibly the industrial facility of origin.

The RIWG-P is significant for a number of reasons:

- The fact that all 8 RP Member States have signed the RP indicates a clear commitment to enhanced regional cooperation. This achievement cannot be underestimated. Before the RP, there were no permanent links between the law enforcement agencies of the Member States.

- Developing an annual operation took a considerable amount of time and staff effort. Since the RP emerged UNODC staff no longer have to visit each Member State to encourage participation; Member States are expected to stand by their commitment.

- The process is working; to date the RIWG-P has met on 6 occasions. This is a step change in commitment, and demonstrates the desire (if not the capability) to pass actionable intelligence and coordinate a regional response103.

- The back-tracking of precursor chemicals and the subsequent case study presentations have been well received by Member States. They practically demonstrate the complex

99 Targeted Anti-Trafficking Regional Communication Expertise and Training (TARCET).
100 The Central Asian Regional Intelligence Coordination Centre is based in Almaty. CARRIC is supported by UNODC who have a permanent international consultant attached to the centre.
103 At the RIWG-P 3rd -4th of Dec 2013, Mr. Mahmoud Bayat, from the Headquarters for Drug Control of the Islamic Republic of Iran, noted the requirement to intensify the exchange of intelligence between all parties concerned…. and the importance of CARICC and JPC as the regional communication hubs to exchange information in countering smuggling of precursor chemical. http://caricc.org/index.php/en/homepage/563-tehran-3-4-december-13-years
regional inter-linkages within criminal patronage networks (CPNs) and provide a suitable vehicle for demonstrating the benefits of greater regional intelligence sharing.

The passage of actionable intelligence requires agreements, mechanisms and above all trust\textsuperscript{104}. Over time, as mechanisms mature, trust will increase. Networks must grow organically. UNODC staff and Member States report that positive results often occur in the margins of working groups, when officials discuss issues with people they know and trust. Over time the passage of actionable intelligence will lead to joint operations, increased seizures and prosecutions. Precursor back tracking operations are incredibly powerful yet comparatively low cost and low risk. Coordinated with financial seizures and asset recovery they can have a disproportion effect compared to standard interdiction operations. This ability to link regional agencies and to tackle CPNs in a comprehensive manner lies at the heart of the IRDC approach.

Despite the RPs involvement and the change, from an annual operation, to a permanent working group there is little acknowledgement of these achievements outside of the region or the RP. UNODC’s annual report for 2014 continues to mention Operation TARCET as a major achievement and does not mention the RIWGP\textsuperscript{105}.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 2

Outcome 2: Enhanced counter-narcotics enforcement capacity through better coordinated training across the region

Another significant change attributable to SP1 is the results of the computer based training component. Launched in 2004, RER/F60 was a sub-regional computer based training project run from ROCA. The project initially used Russian language training modules, which over time were translated into Central Asian languages. The project was seen as a highly effective one within the Central Asian sub-region, and was greatly appreciated by the Member States\textsuperscript{106}. Previous evaluations\textsuperscript{107} had recommended the expansion of the project, the translation of modules into other languages (such as Dari) and the inclusion of national graphics as means of increasing its wider utility. In 2013 RER/F60 was due to end, there was a 40% funding shortfall and ROCA was unable to extend the project.

One element of outcome 2, of SP1, is support to regional training. The RP recognised that CBT has tremendous potential across the region, and in 2013 RER/F60 was taken into the RP sub-programme 1. Subsuming RER/F60 into the RP presented an opportunity for the RP to deliver: additional regional training; standardisation of training; and another means of increasing interoperability between regional partners. With RP support, RER/F60 was not only extended but expanded.

\textsuperscript{104} At the second Steering Group Meeting Deputy Minister Ahmadi praised the Regional Programme as a contributing factor for increasing level of trust and a confidence building measure between countries of the region.


\textsuperscript{107} RER/F60: Final Evaluation

In 2014, the Government of Tajikistan requested assistance from the UNODC. The request was for access to an Anti-Money Laundering module, to be run as computer based training. The RP is now able to use previously designed modules, update them, and provide assistance using pre-existing hardware to deliver this training. The CBT element of SP1 provides the basis of a low cost specialist training package which can be modified centrally and delivered via distributed means to any of the regional countries. The RP will allow UNODC to deliver Anti Money Laundering modules to not only Tajikistan but to RP countries, ensuring commonality of training. Not only this, but CBT can be used to provide training for many other areas under SP1 and SP2. A former senior RP manager stated that “the most significant thing the RP had done was to preserve the CBT project and to expand it regionally”.

CBT has enormous regional potential. The fact that the software and hardware have already been purchased means that it provides a cost effective and efficient training platform. Modules have already been designed and tested and can be exported, with relative ease, to the other regional countries. Maintaining a single database and updating lesson plans, as required, provides the ability to update lessons as new techniques and practices are developed. CBT also offers the means to respond to national training needs with relative ease. The fact that any new initiative can use pre-existing delivery mechanisms, reduces the start-up time and costs compared to delivering a new project. UNDOC can quickly and efficiently take a new product and deliver it across the region, maximising its use. CBT is a sustainable solution. Most Member States already have computer training suites and central servers from which to conduct training and run courses. There is a requirement for continuing training and train the trainer packages, to ensure that any new instruction techniques are conducted to UNDOC standards; this is low cost and easy to arrange.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 3

Outcome 3: Increased use of forensic evidence in investigating and prosecuting cross-border crimes

All RP countries have the capability to analyse chemicals in order to understand the nature of a substance, its purity, and its chemical signature. However, information sharing between Member States is extremely limited. Without a formal information exchange processes, written permission has to be granted. This is a laborious process which can take many months. In addition, scientific standards differ between Member States and if internationally approved verification standards are not met, then information potentially can’t be used as evidence within a second country. Laboratories in one Member State can exchange samples with another Member State, however, this process, governed by international protocols, is complex and time consuming.

In 2012, the RP commissioned a report investigating all the regional laboratories used for verifying narcotics. It examined current technics and made recommendations as to how these laboratories could improve in order to meet international standards. It concluded that many laboratories required additional resources, staff training and technical assistance if they were to

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At the second Steering Committee Minister Bayat, from Iran, reported favourably on the first regional computer based training on anti-money laundering, illegal financial flows and suspect cash transactions in Teheran 12 - 15 Feb 2012.
improve. Although a work plan for implementing these recommendations exists, to date, little concrete action has occurred.

Based on recommendations of the RIWGP, operational case meetings are convened with participation of relevant countries. These meetings use technical data, obtained from laboratories as their starting point. They then conduct back tracking investigations, which seeks to understand where pre-cursor chemicals originate from and ultimately provide intelligence for evidence based operations to be conducted in the source country. The very fact that these investigation cross borders require joint and multi-agency collaboration is an example of increased international cooperation and coordination.

Presently the outcome dedicated at improving and linking regional laboratories (SP1 outcome 3) remains aspirational and there has been no significant change. There are numerous reasons for this:

- there is reluctance amongst many Member States to participate any form of annual verification\textsuperscript{109};
- there are resource issues, such as lack of equipment and chemicals which hinder participation;
- there are technical challenges which require direct technical assistance;
- UNDOC lacks the manpower to assist. The RP is currently only able to utilize the services of one part time contracted subject matter expert;
- there is insufficient capacity to support this outcome from Headquarters, who recognise that this type of assistance requires direct field support\textsuperscript{110};
- and finally there has been insufficient time afforded to this outcome. The subject matter expert has been primarily focused on country programme for Afghanistan, assisting in the building of a new Afghan laboratory\textsuperscript{111}.

One of success stories that the RP uses, is a pre-cursor backtracking case that involved the seizure of 4 tonnes of Acetic Anhydride (AA) in Afghanistan. These chemicals were traced from Iran to China. Follow-on operations, mounted in China, resulted in the seizure of a further 40 tonnes of AA. This operation and the passage of information between countries was a major success. However, information gained in one laboratory cannot be used for prosecution purposes in another country unless the laboratory adheres to internationally accepted standards. In this case the Afghan laboratory results were not fully accepted by the Chinese authorities, who subsequently claimed that additional information, which may have allowed them to identify the manufacturer. This was a missed opportunity. While this may not be technically feasible\textsuperscript{112}, the

\textsuperscript{109} Currently the only regional country who participates in this verification process is Afghanistan. [https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/International_Collaborative_Exercises_ICE_2013_round_2_regional_report_Europe.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/International_Collaborative_Exercises_ICE_2013_round_2_regional_report_Europe.pdf)

\textsuperscript{110} In discussion with Senior UNODC Staff.

\textsuperscript{111} In discussion with Senior UNODC Field Staff.

\textsuperscript{112} Senior UNODC Staff in COAFG report that the Chinese claim, that valuable information was lost due to technical issues in the Afghan laboratory are unfounded. UNODC scientific experts believe that no additional
story does highlight the fact that increased regional cooperation provides the basis for evidence based operations to have the greatest effect, and that a lack of cooperation of participation in internationally accepted norms and standards, can potentially, lead to lost opportunities. This is why SP1 has an outcome dedicated to developing the capacity of regional forensic laboratories which is linked to the HQ Vienna run International Collaborative Exercise (ICE). Now that the Afghan laboratory has been formally opened, it is envisaged that the subject matter expert will be capable of providing technical assistance across the region. The additional funding that the RP has received and the extension until December 2015 should provide the time and resources required to reinvigorate this outcome. One priority task will be to promote the participation of Member States in the International Collaborative Exercise (ICE). UNODC statistics indicate that after three years of continuous participation in this process, Member State’s capabilities improve to the extent where they become more confident in the process and that their overall standards increase; as they don’t want to risk failure. Once the issues highlighted in the laboratory report are addressed then accredited laboratories can begin to participate in regional information sharing, which should contribute to a better understanding of heroin and precursor chemical distribution routes. This in turn, will provide the start points for forensically driven evidence-based investigations. For a modest amount of time and effort this outcome has the potential to enable regional intelligence sharing, assist law enforcement seizures, increase prosecutions and ultimately secure convictions through the provision of reliable, verifiable and admissible evidence.

Sub-Programme 2: International/Regional Cooperation in Legal Matters

Sub-Programme 2 aims to promote and enhance regional cooperation and coordination in fighting drugs, crime and terrorism by assisting RP countries in bringing their legal and institutional frameworks in closer compliance with the UN drugs and crime conventions. In this sense, the activities of SP2, in addition to complementing and/or supplementing those of other UNODC initiatives on these issues, have to be seen as a catalyst for achieving closer collaboration between participating countries.

The logical framework for SP2 identifies two outcomes, numbers 4 and 5, with three and two related outputs respectively. Annex VIII contains the SP2 theory of change.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 4

Outcome 4: Increased regional cooperation in narcotics-related criminal cases.

There has been an increase over the last decade in internal, regional and international cooperation on AML/CFT and narcotics related matters in RP participating countries. Prior to SP2, Central Authorities (on MLA/extradition) and FIUs from the region were recipients of capacity-building information could have been gained from the samples examined.

113 The ICE programme is aimed at helping drug testing laboratories worldwide to assess their own performance. As part of the programme, UNODC provides unknown test samples to participating laboratories for identification and analysis, authenticated reference samples to assist them; and an overall evaluation of their results.

114 In discussion with the senior UNODC staff from LSS.
assistance through the support of various partners (bi-lateral as well as from the World Bank and OSCE among others). Other UNODC projects have also been active on this issue in the region and their contribution has been important. The RP has played a complementary role, under Outcome 5, to those initiatives.

Stakeholders expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved through those efforts to date and consider that the added value of SP2 has been to forge yet closer ties between countries. Moreover, before the launch of SP2, there were few opportunities for face-to-face encounters between the principal actors since there were no regional networks comprised exclusively of participating RP countries with the aim to share information and exchange of best practices in criminal justice related matters. An important element driving the work of SP2 in this regard was to build trust between the key actors of the various countries. This contribution of the RP should not be undervalued though there is still more work to be done in order to “operationalize” the benefits of trust-building measures.

As part of the SP2 work plan, several technical workshops and meetings have been held. These events have led to: i) budding RP networks of judicial institutions and AML experts and linking them to various law enforcement entities, and ii) building trust and confidence among relevant agencies that provided additional avenues for sharing information, experiences and best practices and iii) additional capacity building. By promoting the establishment of these networks, SP2 has assisted the countries in the region by continuing to build their capacities to better address criminal matters as well as promote regional cooperation. The events were attended by representatives from the respective General Prosecutor Offices, Ministries of Justice, Financial Intelligence Units, Customs, Financial Police, Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Drug Control Agencies of the RP countries.

Some countries have reported that one of the benefits derived from activities under SP2 has been to identify gaps in their domestic legal frameworks. This is an area where the RP has planned to assist in a systematic manner so as to address deficiencies though it has yet to begin activities in this area to date (Recommendation 22). Nonetheless, it must be noted that a comparative study of the status of the RP countries with regards to Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition, Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism has been prepared. The study has been shared only with the relevant sections at UNODC/HQ and RP Field Offices in order to validate the information. Likewise, a series of assessment missions have been carried out under SP2 that have resulted in “Rapid Assessment Reports/Forms on AML/CFT” for the respective countries; these have also been shared with relevant sections at UNODC/HQ (including Paris Pact and GPML) for their use/data base.

An unintended consequence has been that the promotion of regional cooperation has also led to improved cooperation among relevant stakeholders within some countries. SP2 has made progress in delivering on the outputs for Outcome 4, though work needs to be done in terms of reviewing and updating RP countries’ laws and regulations so that these may be in line with the respective UN drugs and crime conventions.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 5

Outcome 5: Enhanced regional cooperation on illicit money flows related to narcotics cases.
The results obtained from the activities conducted under Outcome 4 feed in to those under Outcome 5. Through Sub-Programme 2, the "Criminal Assets Southern Hub (CASH) initiative was launched in January 2012 to enhance the capacity and regional cooperation on cross-border illicit money flows of the West and Central Asian countries, including the exchange of experiences and best practices on Anti Money Laundering/ Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) related matters.

Prior to SP2 activities, participating RP countries that were members of the Egmont Group and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EAG) used (and continue to do so) the mechanisms those platforms provided for exchanging information and signing MOUs on cooperation. Most of the FIUs of the region did not have regular bilateral or sub-regional meetings and were not in direct contact with each other to address AML related matters.

Under the RP, the CASH initiative has organized, to date, nine Regional FIU to FIU meetings and has facilitated the signing of five bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on AML/CFT (developed by the RP) between some participating countries. The latter has led to the exchange of information on “Suspicious Financial Transactions” (SFT) among countries in the region.

The Regional Programme countries have informed UNODC of at least 15 SFT requests which have been exchanged among the countries in the region (made possible by the MoUs signed under the CASH Initiative. For instance, Iran has sent 2 requests to Afghanistan containing information on more than 30 Afghan nationals suspected of being involved in SFTs in Iran (cash smuggling estimated between 2-3 million USD).

The events organized as well as the support provided by SP2 have led to improved FIU to FIU cooperation and promoted capacity building within the context of the RP. Where there was previously none (or minimal) interactions between some FIUs, there is now increased regional cooperation in AML related matters (including exchange of information on SFTs). By organizing the Regional FIU to FIU meetings, SP2 has complemented the work of other actors by continuing to raise awareness of the Regional Programme countries on the problems associated with money laundering and assisted them in identifying areas for regulatory improvements on AML/CFT. It has also supported RP countries in enhancing their capacity on AML/CFT vis-à-vis international standards.

In addition to the above, SP2, under its CASH Initiative, has contributed to the implementation of the Paris Pact recommendations on Illicit Financial Flows (and it’s Tashkent Questionnaire). Similarly, SP2 has also contributed to the implementation of the GPML mandate within the West and Central Asia region. This work has taken place in collaboration with both the Paris Pact Initiative and GPML as intended through the introduction of a regional programme approach.

The progress achieved under CASH Initiative has laid the foundations for consolidating the collaboration between participating states. The experience gained can be seen as an example of how cooperation on AML/CFT can be promoted- especially between countries which do not have enough legal basis for cooperation in AML or when particular circumstances complicate matters.

Sub-Programme 3: Prevention and Treatment of Addiction among Vulnerable Groups
Sub Programme 3 was developed from the PPI Drug Demand Reduction and HIV/AIDS programmes established since 1998, consolidated in the Rainbow Strategy and embedded within Country and Global work plans. Its activities contribute towards the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) target of working to reduce transmission of HIV among people who inject drugs by 50 per cent by 2015. The activities of SP3 also contribute to the GA target of achieving a significant reduction in the demand for drugs (Political Declaration 2009). Annex IX contains the SP3 theory of change.

The SP3 mandate is to promote international best practices in drug use prevention, treatment and related HIV prevention. SP3 work is line with drug conventions, UN General Assembly resolutions on provision of scientific evidence based voluntary drug treatment and rehabilitation services in community and in prison settings. Also, SP3 promotes and enhances capacity of RP countries to implement WHO, UNAIDS, UNODC 9 comprehensive interventions for prevention of HIV among PWIDS and in prison settings.

Within the United Nations Joint Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) UNODC as convening agency is responsible for addressing HIV prevention, treatment, care and support specifically among people who use drugs, and people living and working in prison settings. SP3 Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependence among Vulnerable Groups aims to enhance national capacity to provide scientific evidence based services, prevention interventions and treatment for drug dependence and HIV/AIDS.

The key development block for SP3 was its exclusion from the initial RP design and planning meetings. As late as 2010 the RP SP3 planning meetings in Iran (as substantive lead for good practice in the region) were attended mostly by representatives from the national department for Drug Control. Expert representatives from the Ministry of Health, HIV specialists, Communicable Disease Control (CDC) Iran and the Iranian National Centre for Addiction Studies (INCAS) Teheran University were not present. By 2012, SP3 was reportedly still a low priority, and PPI staff were asked to support it with visits and direction, e.g. initially PPI staff coordinated work on data with staff in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the SP3/SP4 treatment delivery and service mapping. However, as SP3 oversight was undertaken by UNODC staff without specialist health background, problems persisted. Additionally SP3 did not have internal advocacy at the same level of seniority as the other sub-programmes within UNODC.

The issue of staffing impacted on attainment and networking ability. Though a permanent SP3 Coordinator was only appointed in March 2014 after the programme passed midpoint, some important activities\(^{115}\) were undertaken under the lead of an interim Coordinator and two National Programme Officers before the appointment of the SP3 Coordinator.

\(^{115}\) In 2012: 1) A first-ever regional family skills-based training was held in Istanbul in 19-20 June with participation of all eight Regional Programme countries; 2) An expert working group on drug prevention met in Vienna on 8-9 October bringing together experts from the region and beyond; 3) The creation of the first-ever regional level directory of providers of expertise in drug demand reduction to facilitate contacts in the region and provide an overview of facilities and services available to vulnerable populations was prioritized as an initial deliverable under this outcome to inform subsequent interventions; 4) A meeting on quality standards of drug treatment was held in Istanbul on 15-16 November with the participation of 26 senior health managers representing drug dependence treatment services of the eight countries of the region; 5) Prevention of comprehensive HIV and drug use services in Afghan Refugee camps and returnees
In addition to the staffing difficulties, the general perception that drug prevention and use is not a UNODC priority in comparison to law enforcement, may explain the relatively less visibility of SP3 compared to other SPs. The evaluation found that there has been an operational emphasis on Counter-Narcotic activities over Drug Demand Reduction (DDR), which has contributed significantly to the delayed start-up of SP3, impeding programme development and impact. Hence, the refocusing of priorities on HIV and vulnerable groups in 2013 was welcomed.

The belated start-up and significant period without allocated staff for SP3, plus delays to implementation of the Drug Monitoring Platform essential for regional surveillance and health planning systems, have contributed to the lesser visibility and impacts of SP3 so far. It is evident in the evaluation that SP3 is perceived by respondents as weakened, as the fulltime coordinator was appointed more than two years after the RP commenced, in addition to disruption due to office relocation from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and finally Iran.

Regional distances were reported to impact effective coordination as does UNODC “territorialism” and unwillingness for some personnel to share meetings and activities. SP3 is still not fully embedded in some countries as other SPs, in part as it is not related to law enforcement activities where there is greater expertise in UNODC.

was undertaken. In Afghanistan: Two teams regularly provided drug prevention, treatment and care services (outreach, outpatient and residential) through qualified medical professionals expert in social work in two bordering provinces of Afghanistan (Herat and Nangarhar). In I.R. of Iran: 4 Drop-in Centres (DIC) were contracted in the cities of Mashhad, Varamin, and Shahr-e-Rey. In Pakistan: Two Drop-in Centres were established to provide comprehensive HIV prevention and care services to Afghan refugee drug users in Kot Chandana refugee camp, Mianwali, Punjab province and in Mera Kachori refugee camp, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

In 2013: 1) Two cycles of Families and Schools Together (FAST), an evidence-based family skills training programme, have been completed in two selected schools in Uzbekistan. 2) On 1-3 October 2013, the Regional Programme organised a seminar for policy makers on the International Standards of Drug Use Prevention. 3) The First Task Force meeting under Sub-Programme 3 of the Regional Programme on “Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependence Among Vulnerable Groups” was held on 3 October 2013 on the margins of the regional training. 4) Geographical mapping of health facilities providing drug dependence treatment in eight Regional Programme countries has been developed together with Paris Pact Research and Liaison Officer in Tashkent. 5) The toolkit to enhance the communication and engagement of law enforcement officials with drug users and other marginalized and/or vulnerable populations was launched in October 2013. Two national workshops were held in October-November 2013 in Pakistan. 6) A five-day training course was held in Tehran between 6 and 10 January for Afghan and Pakistan physicians on drug dependence treatment with six participants covered by the Iran Country Office in cooperation with the Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ). 7) Two training courses were organized for NGO staff on drug related HIV prevention among refugees. Around 60 participants were trained, the training courses were organized in collaboration with UNHCR, 8) The provision of comprehensive drug treatment and prevention as well as HIV prevention and care services activities continued in afghan refugee camps in I.R. Iran, and Pakistan region and for returnees to Afghanistan, assistance to these vulnerable groups has been prioritized and tailored.

UNODC’s preparedness towards 2014 and beyond in West and Central Asia
Afghanistan transition period and beyond: new challenging circumstances Drafted by A. Schmidt, Chief RSWCA with contributions of K. Gotoh, Chief IPB, and JL Lemahieu, Regional Representative Work in progress document, version 10 June 2013

Organisationally, ‘health’ is reported as diluted, as proportionally there are far fewer specialists in UNODC. However, the RP and SP3 remain strategically relevant within the UNODC global mandate on HIV/AIDS. Collective advocacy by UN agencies on Opioid Substitution is regarded as important by all respondents as
In the countries visited (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan), SP3 activities are now well in progress, aligned with global and country programmes working more closely together. Activities cited by respondents included: training of master trainers, training on treatment, prevention of drug addiction, technical cooperation with law enforcement bodies and police.

Based on interviewee responses, the uptake of UNODC Treatnet and treatment standards within health and correctional facilities was evident. However, the extent to which this is attributable to the RP is questionable since Global Programmes have been providing Treatnet trainings for many years prior to the activities of the Regional Programme. The RP delivered only one Treatnet related training on 10-12 November, 2014, Bishkek. Partner respondents noted RP engagement enhanced intra-governmental and ministerial cooperation and service alignment between agencies with shared responsibilities. However, ministerial respondents and NGOs requested increased level of training provision recognising the need for enhanced expertise in management of drug use and treatment options. Some respondents pointed out that project activities lost momentum upon handover to national authorities.

The RP has enabled NGO projects with a human rights and advocacy focus to provide and maintain services for hard to reach and treat populations, such as: i) in Kazakhstan, supporting a shelter which also provides comprehensive treatment services for drug dependence and HIV positive women and their children who do not have access to mainstream governmental services, and ii) in Kyrgyzstan, support for an NGO that also provides comprehensive services and legal support over refusal of access and treatment in government health facilities for people living with HIV. The main function of this Regional network of NGO is to identify areas which need training support and undertake research related to drug use and HIV in the RP countries.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 6

Outcome 6: Countries of the region provide comprehensive evidence-based drug prevention programmes.

We know from science that evidence-based prevention, particularly family-skills training, prevents all sorts of risky behaviours thus having also a positive effect with regard to preventing HIV and crime. UNODC Global Programme (GLOK01) conducted a series of seminars to improve the knowledge of policy makers on what is evidence-based drug prevention.

In line and building on the activities of GLOK01, the RP supported one such seminar on prevention, treatment and HIV/AIDS, as well as developing and translating related materials: The Regional Seminar in Almaty, Kazakhstan (2013) on "Prevention, Strategy and Policy Makers".

UNODC is identified as the key trusted agency that could address and support national agencies where historic mistrust between health and law enforcement agendas remains. Also on the human right of access to care and treatment for people who use drugs, within its extensive criminal justice and health related networks UNODC has operational influence that other agencies do not have.

118 Toolkit to enhance communication and engagement of law enforcement officials with drug users and other marginalized, diverse and/or vulnerable populations UNODC Country Office Pakistan Draft for Review, March 2013, Dr Nicholas Thomson.
119 Persons affected by drug addictions.
In parallel, the Family Skills and Training [FAST] initiative is an example of where the RP successfully took over activities from a Global Programme (GLOK01) due to lack of funding in the latter. FAST was initially piloted in the five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) by GLOK01, then expanded to IR Iran when the Country Programme was developed. The RP made it a truly regional strategy by supporting its expansion in the original countries, as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The original results of the pilots were positive: protective factors were strengthened in both parents and children and both with regard to drug use and violence prevention - results were published in scientific journals. Though it is too early to assess whether the component now supported by the RP will sustain the same results, the FAST experience improved the quality of drug prevention at the national level, and promoted drug prevention consistently at the regional level. This demonstrated that the RP can be effective in promoting effective drug use on the ground. In addition, it demonstrated it is possible to collect meaningful data even in the absence of baselines or in the context of too ambitious indicators.

Though encouraging, the above initiatives should not be one-time interventions. Continuous advocacy should be carried with RP countries to sustain, fund and expand FAST activities at the national and regional levels, possible plans for integration in the national education system could be developed (Recommendation 40).

A challenge under this outcome is that the projected targets set for reduction of prevalence rates in drug use, injecting drug use and HIV containment are set in some areas against zero baselines.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 7

Outcome 7: Increased capacity to deliver scientific evidence-based, drug dependence treatment and care services.

Within policy and advocacy activities aimed at improving the quality of care and treatment for people who use drugs, the RP has provided the legal and educational framework to develop national policy and establish service provision and introduced the UNODC Treatnet Quality Standards (2012)\(^{121}\) and Prevention Standards framework (2013)\(^{122}\). This includes the introduction of evidence informed interventions for opioid users in the penitentiary system of the I.R. Iran.

Unlike with drug prevention, with regard to drug dependence treatment there has been little commitment by the Regional Programme to really assist with improving capacity or services at national level. There seems to be some training delivered by the RP (i.e. Regional Training For Law Enforcement Officials To Enhance Communications and Engagement with Drug Users, And Other Marginalized, Diverse & Vulnerable Populations 25 - 27 November 2014, Tashkent, Uzbekistan) which appeared to be duplicating with the HIV/AIDS global programme. In light of the above, under this outcome, SP3 does not seem to be engaging strategically with existing programmes to achieve greater impact. SP3 should foster enhanced strategic engagement with existing programmes in the area of drug dependence treatment (Recommendation 41).

\(^{121}\) [http://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/treatnet_quality_standards.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/treatnet_quality_standards.pdf)

Despite significant activities undertaken by Global Programmes in the region, particularly in treatment, the region is lagging in agreement, uptake and implementation of activities owing to political instability. Challenges still remain as regards to the development and implementation of accepted interventions across all countries of the RP. This seems to indicate that a regional approach is less relevant in the case of drug prevention, treatment and HIV prevention, while approaches tailored to national needs and realities need to be applied.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 8

Outcome 8: Countries of the region provide HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care services to high risk populations.

The impact and importance in terms of quality of life years adjusted (QALYs) of the UNODC collective programmes cannot be underestimated. In Kazakhstan, engagement with the RP is reported to have brought higher status for the Republican Centre for Applied Research on Drug Addiction, through cooperation across ministries and the assistance of technical and epidemiological expertise. Access and treatment services also continue for refugees/returnees in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Respondents from Ministries of Health, Law Enforcement and NGO representatives reported participation in joint workshops on drug policy development, roundtables, training and sensitisation of law enforcement officers to people who use drugs, and coordination of educational meetings on management of addictions and HIV/AIDS over past three years. These efforts culminated in the Regional Conference “Comprehensive and multi-sectorial response to drug use in Central and Western Asia” 26-27 June 2014, in Astana, which launched ‘The World Drug Report 2014’.

A directory of regional Drug Treatment expertise, with mapping of facilities and areas to facilitate knowledge transfer is in progress. Continued advocacy in civil society and education of policy makers was evident with exchange visits and mentoring arrangements. In light of the above, the RP has enabled expansion of drug use treatment from exclusively specialist entities (located most frequently in Psychiatry and mental health services) into Primary Care services centres. The establishment of inter-regional centres of expertise is underway although delayed due to lack of efficient mapping of provision.

Several respondents at Ministerial level and one donor queried the basis for international evidence on drug treatment methods and further discussion is needed to explore acceptable alternatives to progress this further. This contention was acknowledged as known to be problematic by other respondents and pose a challenge moving forward.

SP3 activities, delivered through implementing NGOs, advocate for human rights and provide services in areas where HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment are problematic. The rejection of globally accepted standards of epidemiological evidence for HIV/AIDS and the value of OST in prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission continues to generate difficulties for UNODC, preventing proportionate scale-up of service provision with the majority of projects remaining in pilot phase after several years. Respondents stated that increased joint UN agency advocacy on this issue is essential. SP3 role is to undertake advocacy for OST at policy as well as professional level, e.g. in collaboration with UNAIDS and WHO, SP3 should undertake training of OST staff to provide them with international best practices. Study visits of policy makers and professional staff to well established OST interventions in the region could be beneficial in understanding the importance
of OST in HIV prevention among PWIDs. Collaboration between the RP and WHO would increase both capacity and extend programme lifetimes in order to address HIV/AIDS spreading into the general populations via high risk behaviours and drug use. This needs to be addressed with some urgency with further regional expert conferences and meetings such as UNODC meeting on HIV/AIDS held in Kazakhstan in June 2014, which convened law enforcement officials, CSOs and the health sector – the meeting was organised by the HIV regional project XCEA01 with collaboration of the RP.

Under this outcome, the challenge is the data gaps which undermine programme management or which have yet to be generated, rendering the SP3 targets on HIV/AIDS not feasible in many cases. The prevalence reduction targets should also be attributed to global interagency efforts on containment and not to a single agency. Some are also over-ambitious in that they are directly linked to national activity and service provision.

Sub-Programme 4: Trends and Impact

Observing that research and analysis was not feeding into operational counter-narcotics interventions, compromising evidence-based interventions, Sub-Programme 4 (SP4) on Trends and Impact aimed at enhancing trends analysis and impact monitoring capacity at the regional level, focusing on the 8 countries most immediately affected by the Afghan drug flow dynamics to “inform evidence-based policies and strategies”.

Building on a subsidiarity principle, the research capacity is developed at the national level through the various Country Programmes, while the research, monitoring, reporting and evaluation data is then collated and analysed at a regional level (by researchers and UNODC staff) and used as a basis for advocacy123 (by UNODC) to influence Government Counterparts’ policies and strategies, as well as UNODC’s strategy and priorities (see below graph).

123 Under Outcome 10, the following advocacy events were undertaken:

1) The Kabul Regional Event in December 2012 concluded with the adoption of a civic communiqué and announcement (by the Afghan Counter Narcotics Minister) of 12 December as the civic day for the people of the region uniting against drugs. There are several recommendations for follow-up action, including sister villages (TAJ/AFG cooperation) as well as a regional drug awareness celebrity network.

2) The seminar on “Challenges in addressing the illicit drugs problem in the context of withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014” organized by UNODC and UNRCCA on 23-24 April 2013.

3) The public awareness event supported by UNODC and organized by the Tajik Drug Control Agency (DCA) on 22 June 2013 in Kyrgyzstan.

4) On the UN International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June 2013, the UN General Assembly (GA) convened the thematic debate on “Drugs and Crime as a Threat to Development.” The session was attended by the Afghan Minister for Counter Narcotics who addressed the current state drug control in Afghanistan and highlighted progress made and the importance of multilateralism and regional approaches, including in mainstreaming drug control into development initiatives.
This overall objective works under the assumptions that (i) the government counterparts of the region have the capacity to provide the necessary base data for UNODC to analyse at the regional level; (ii) the government counterparts of the region are willing to provide the necessary base data for UNODC to analyse at the regional level; (iii) the data/evidence collected and analysed is relevant and timely for utilisation by the Governments.

Although this sub-programme contributed to improving the comparability, sharing and production of data, as well as devising and implementing an illicit economy approach, it has been struggling with a lack of leadership, focus, continuity and delays in receiving pledges. For instance, successive Coordinators have had shared responsibilities with other units (e.g. IEU), other supporting tasks (reporting), other SPs (SP1) and more recently with other projects (AFGU04). The evaluation would recommend having a dedicated SP4 Coordinator that would focus on bridging the remaining gaps between research, monitoring and evaluation, in particular given the wide array of research activities in the region (Recommendation 14).

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 9

Outcome 9: Improved availability and use of counter narcotics law enforcement, criminal justice and drug use information/data.

The data on drug use in the region is of varied quality and measured through different methodologies, which leads to challenges of comparability and accuracy. Importantly, it impacts the evidence-based policies of the region. By proposing a survey approach for West and Central Asia based on the lessons from the Drug Use Survey in Pakistan, the RP aimed at supporting the objective of improved availability and comparability of drug use data across the region.

Significant contributions through this initiative to date are 1) the provision of a platform to representatives of all the eight countries and additionally SAARC countries to participate in a workshop to share experiences and create a network of drug survey experts – advancing an inter-regional approach; 2) the presentation of the Pakistan survey model to the participating countries, which they can tailor according to their own country conditions. These advanced the inter-regional approach as members from the SAARC countries agreed to use the survey model in their upcoming drug use country surveys.

The evaluation recommends to further facilitate the network of survey experts with the aim to share best practices and experiences that could benefit research and survey practices in their respective countries (Recommendation 25).

As for availability of criminal justice (CJ), counter narcotics law enforcement (LE) and People Who Inject Drug (PWID) related data, little progress was witnessed directly as a result of the RP’s limited interventions in this area. In the future, SP4 should focus on those areas of CJ LE, and PWID for improved data availability, in particular by supporting the Coordination and Analysis Unit (see below) (Recommendation 23).
To feed into analysis for the World Drug Report (WDR), UNODC collects secondary quantitative data from Government Counterparts through its Annual Reporting Questionnaire (ARQ). As a result of the joint research activities between PPI/AOTP/RP in the region, the quality and validity of the ARQ data has improved, which is another achievement.

As regards to the improved use of data, the evaluation found no evidence of monitoring and evaluation of the utilization of the research products and data; neither there is any regular and systematic information as to the impact of research on regional policy – this is a wider UNODC issue for which the Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB) should give direction. UNODC only measures the visibility of the WDR through downloads, citations and online feedback questionnaire. There is certainly a missed opportunity in terms of better in-building RBM into research products. To measure whether publications are used for policy change, the evaluation would recommend interviewing a sample of users, in addition to the methods already used. (Recommendation 24)

The evaluation found that Member States are often confused as to the purpose of the various products emanating from these diverse research endeavours (i.e. WDR and other reports/studies from AOTP/PPI/RP). Also, discrepancies were identified between the ARQ and AOTP/PPI/RP data. Overall, UNODC would benefit from an improved communication as to the purpose of its research products. (Recommendation 33)

Despite positive achievements under Outcome 9 as mentioned above (i.e. the lessons from the Drug Use Survey in Pakistan are used for standardisation of data collection across the region), a major result was not achieved: the first output of Outcome 9 was supposed to produce an assessment of the current data situation in the region. The value of this assessment was to have collated analysis at the regional level rather than national fragmented research. On the basis of these findings the rest of the RP interventions were supposed to be designed. This output was unfortunately never delivered because the consultant hired did not supply the expected study. In the absence of a mapping of the regional drug situation, which was meant to orient the overall RP strategy and priorities, SP4 and other SPs priorities were determined on a yearly basis through the Task Force meetings and existing UNODC research activities, under the guidance of RAB, which defines the overall research approach and strategic vision. In particular, the RP developed a Strategic Research Directions paper as a result of a consultative process involving all internal UNODC units addressing research, such as DPA, RAB, SASS, STAS and Offices in the field. Despite these consultation efforts, a majority of stakeholders assessed that the methodologies are sometimes not so clearly defined by RAB. The evaluation would therefore recommend to develop a Thematic Programme dedicated to research that would provide the necessary guidance and methodological standards, e.g. defining quality and comparability of quantitative and qualitative data as well as of publications; determining systems to monitor the impact of research and capacity building. (Recommendation 28)
Determining the research agenda without coordinated regional information challenges the relevance of the current interventions and/or the utility of the mapping of the regional drug situation in the first place. Despite this, interviewees stressed that the mapping would still be a valuable exercise to undertake. The evaluation therefore recommends undertaking this mapping in the second half of the programme implementation. (Recommendation 26)

In SP4 endeavour at coordinating and facilitating regional cooperation, positive collaboration was identified with the Afghan Opiate Trade Project (AOTP - GLOV20, former GLOU34) and the Paris Pact Initiative (PPI) – respectively 39% and 57% of SP4-stakeholders assessed the coordination with AOTP and PPI as efficient. The former works closely with the latter in particular through the joint-funding of a Research and Liaison Officer (RLO) position within COA FG and COPAK (as well as additional staff in the provinces of the two countries). The AOTP programme staff is located in the field offices of the region and constitute a network of first hand researchers that should be enriching the details of the research undertaken at HQ. National AOTP staff is meant to support the global mandated data collection activities on CN in each country of the region and where they are located, ensure the compliance of Member States in sending the requested data. AOTP staff has been supporting with expertise the activities of SP4 and has helped define and promote standard methodology for data collection and analysis. The AOTP has also produced joint research products with the RP and carried out trainings that have been funded by the RP, i.e. Regional Northern Trafficking Route Workshop undertaken in CARICC/Almaty on 27-28 June 2012; joint study exploring the latest trend in the trafficking of Afghan opiates: the Southern Route. Through this last study, countries outside the RP acting as transit or destination countries were involved (e.g. Gulf States, Eastern and Western African countries, European countries), therefore advancing the inter-regional element which is taken further through the IRDC (see partnership section with SAARC countries).

Another example of effective coordination is through the Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) based in Tashkent in UNODC Regional Office in Central Asia. Though not as a direct result of the RP, CAU’s capabilities are unique in the region and emphasize the importance of synergies with other UNODC projects/initiatives such as the Regional Programmes and CARICC. The ongoing efforts of the CAU to process information helps provide a better picture of counter narcotics issues to improve the effectiveness of partnerships at the horizontal and vertical levels.

124 The Paris Pact and AOTP jointly funded Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) has also embarked on its first exploratory steps of cooperation with the COPAK M&E Officer to determine how the results of the COPAK M&E database may be mapped or linked in the future with the PPI and the RP activities and/or be replicated to other offices. 125 The RLO functions as a primary point of contact in the field on behalf of the Paris Pact Initiative for the four priority areas of the Vienna Declaration (cross-border cooperation, illicit financial flows, diversion of chemical precursors and drug demand reduction). The research work of the RLO in Pakistan is closely intertwined with multiple UNODC initiatives and multiple activities of Phase IV of GLOY09, which are the result of continuing integrated efforts between the Paris Pact and other sections/programmes: a) the production of factsheets and drug situation reports; b) support of activities under the research and Trends Analysis Branch and in contribution to global data collection activities; c) engagement in the Southern Route upcoming report together with the Statistics and Survey Section and SP4 of the RP SP4. RLO also provides day-to-day support to COPAK. Through the RLO’s position of being embedded into COPAK, this allows for the successful interaction with the Government on behalf of the PPI by fostering goodwill and follow-up on systematic Government counterpart participation in other substantive Paris Pact meetings on an annual basis. 126 It was originally established in 2003 to expand UNODC’s information and technical cooperation capacities. In response to the lack of baseline information in the region and as a proposed solution to integrate existing information from various stakeholders, the CAU’s functions were further expanded. Currently, the CAU is uniquely positioned to contribute to the implementation of ROCA projects, the design and improvement of a comprehensive system of centralized and easily accessible database for both internal and external use, provision of substantive input to research documents and valued reports and information gathering on various drug-related developments.
The CAU has multiplied the repertoire of tools available to the international community for the coordination and strategic orientation of assistance on drug-related matters through the piloting of several regional databases. These databases serve as an online information sharing and monitoring platform and were created as a response to multiple parties’ requests to improve donor cooperation and coordination in relation to drug control assistance projects and thus contribute to aid-effectiveness. As of 2011, the database includes an online mapping initiative entitled the Drug Monitoring Platform (DMP). The platform is a joint initiative between PPI and CAU (but not the RP) that provides up-to-date, detailed information about drug and precursor seizures, prices, drug purity information as well as information related to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan interlinked with air/dry-ports and drug treatment centres etc. within West and Central Asia in an interactive map. To encompass all research data in the region, it was reported that the collaboration about DMP is planned to be extended to the RP, in addition to PPI. The evaluation supports such initiative. (Recommendation 27)

The value of joint research activities between AOTP/PPI/RP also lies in collecting more recent data than the one collected through the ARQ - the ARQ data for the WDR is analysed and used two years after collection, while the data collected through the AOTP/PPI/RP could be used to inform and direct operations in a more instant manner. The extent to which this has actually happened is however uncertain.

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 10

Outcome 10: Enhanced understanding in the region of the linkages between narcotics and socio-economic development.

Historically, the counter-narcotics approach has been structured into demand and supply reduction by Governments as well as donors. Under Outcome 10, the RP was able to transform the conventional take on counter-narcotics by linking narcotics and socio-economic development through the so called ‘illicit economy debate’. The RP aimed at sensitizing (i) multilateral actors (including UN agencies) to incorporate the topic in their programme development and implementation; (ii) government counterparts so that they consider this angle in the development of their national programmes and strategies; and (iii) civil society so as to create a wider dialogue and come up with new and innovative solutions to counter-narcotics.

The role of the RP was crucial in taking the approach into the political arena through a series of awareness raising and advocacy events (i.e. the Cross-Border Conference on Drugs and Livelihoods, convened in Dushanbe in December 2013, the Herat Dialogue in October 2013, UNRCCA Conference in April 2013 and the Kabul Regional Event in December 2012). This was supplemented by position papers, also at the UN-wide level such as the Blue Sky Paper. Its success to date has been has been able to translate this vision onto external actors and structures within a short period of time: (i) the World Bank is coming up with an analytical piece based on RP-COAoFG proposal on a wider research which will be utilized at the London conference end 2014; (ii) the UNDAF 2015-19 has incorporated a dedicated output on the illicit economy on Pillar I on Equitable Economic Development.
There have been practical effects too. Another achievement under Outcome 10 is the community-based approach which stemmed from the above mentioned event (i.e. the Kabul Regional Event in December 2012\textsuperscript{127} and the Cross-Border Conference on Drugs and Livelihoods, convened in Dushanbe in December 2013) and resulted in the development of the concept of “sister villages”. This concept subsequently evolved into a joint Tajikistan and Afghanistan cross border cooperation for the first time at the local level on both sides of the border to enhance understanding of the linkages between counter narcotics and development. It brought together government officials, community leaders and aid providers from Afghanistan and Tajikistan. This led to the establishment of independent community-based CN Commissions at 4 locations in Badakhshan Province along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border to strengthen cooperation on drug issues and will likely be rolled out to other countries. Though this has great potential, the work of the Commissions should be monitored to ensure their sustainability.

However, given the scale and ambition of this illicit economy approach, it is too premature to talk of “most significant change” but it is one of the key elements of SP4 that has the potential to translate into something transformative for the region, UNODC, and counter-narcotics globally. It is also important to note that this is nothing that the RP can do in and of itself – it needs to work with the wider UN family first to come up with the same messaging and at this stage, this has not yet happened. The test case will need to be Afghanistan (given the scale of the problem) and depending on how it develops in the country, it can have the potential to transform the way all actors – including UNODC - approach the drugs and other forms of organized crime in the region. The evaluation recommends pursuing the approach by rolling out to the rest of the region and ensuring a common messaging within the UN family. (Recommendation 7)

Besides Afghanistan, the same impact at the advocacy level has not been witnessed in the other countries of the region. While some of it may be attributable to the different national contexts and perception of drugs trafficking being an Afghan-centric problem, there seems to be missed opportunities. At this stage, the RP should ensure that the illicit economy debate does not remain Afghan-centric and expand the discussion to the rest of the region - the catalyst for a change in thinking should be found for Central Asia countries. (Recommendation 6)

Supporting the above analysis, the majority of respondents to the online questionnaire either don’t know whether the illicit economy debate was absorbed within the RP (35%) or think it was only partially absorbed (34%). Breaking down by stakeholder group, 41% of Government respondents believe the illicit economy debate was only partially absorbed – no explanation supporting this assessment was provided. Finally, the majority of donors (60%), don’t know whether the illicit economy debate was absorbed within the RP. When looking at the SP4 stakeholders only, 48% of SP4 stakeholders responded that they assess the illicit economy debate as “partially” absorbed in the RP. 17% do not see it as absorbed, and only 13% see the illicit economy debate as absorbed within the RP.

\[\text{Q13. In your views, is the illicit economy debate absorbed within the RP?}\]

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partially</th>
<th>I don’t know</th>
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<td></td>
<td>22% (18)</td>
<td>9% (7)</td>
<td>34% (28)</td>
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* 82 total responses, 98% of submissions

\textsuperscript{127}The event concluded with the adoption of a civic communiqué and announcement by the Afghan Counter Narcotics Minister of 12 December as the civic day for the people of the region uniting against drugs.
Initially focused on alternative livelihoods and counter-narcotics mainstreaming into socio-economic development approaches, the RP leveraged its advocacy role under Outcome 10. Through its advocacy events\textsuperscript{128}, the RP provided an appropriate regional platform for advocacy of research products and data.

However, the sustainability strategy of these events is questionable. It was assessed that partnerships with NGOs or media formed during these advocacy events were not properly maintained despite eagerness of partners to follow through - missed opportunities were identified. The evaluation would recommend engaging in advocacy events only when a strategy to sustain the results of these events is clearly laid out. (Recommendation 29)

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 11

Outcome 11: Effective programme monitoring, reporting and evaluation.

Though the original design of SP4 was very ambitious - the idea of integration between research, monitoring, reporting and evaluation was very novel in UNODC (see design chapter), some achievements were witnessed but not to the degree of integration expected from the initial design.

Worth mentioning, however, that such dedicated outcome helped (i) raise the profile of these topics (monitoring, reporting and evaluation) that are often disregarded by managers, and (ii) attract dedicated resources. The evaluation would recommend replicating such structure for other Regional Programmes (Recommendation 21).

The data produced under Outcome 9 (research activities) did not inform monitoring as systematically as one would have expected. Research activities were undertaken in relative isolation from monitoring and reporting requirements, rendering impossible an effective monitoring and reporting in terms of enablers for impact measurement. For example, baseline data was not collected as recommended by the 2012 evaluability mission.

This being said, further to the evaluability mission, progress was made in terms of monitoring and reporting (see efficiency chapter for further details). Through the development of its monitoring tool (EMS), the RP identified the weaknesses of its performance indicators and challenges for data collection. This reflection process was positive and should be undertaken for any programme (Recommendation 21). A lesson to be learned in this regard is that no matter how theoretically perfect a monitoring framework is, as long as it’s not grounded in the realities of the countries there is a major risk for failure and being irrelevant. As for reporting, despite clear improvement

\textsuperscript{128} Under Outcome 10, the following events were organized: (i) the Kabul Regional Event in December 2012 (which concluded with the adoption of a civic communiqué and announcement by the Afghan Counter Narcotics Minister of 12 December as the civic day for the people of the region uniting against drugs - There are several recommendations for follow-up action, including sister villages (TAJ/AFG cooperation) as well as a regional drug awareness celebrity network; (ii) the seminar on “Challenges in addressing the illicit drugs problem in the context of withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014” organized by UNODC and UNRCCA on 23-24 April 2013; (iii) the public awareness event supported by UNODC and organized by the Tajik Drug Control Agency (DCA) on 22 June 2013 in Kyrgyzstan; (iv) On the UN International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June 2013, the UN General Assembly (GA) convened the thematic debate on “Drugs and Crime as a Threat to Development” - the session was attended by the Afghan Minister for Counter Narcotics who addressed the current state drug control in Afghanistan and highlighted progress made and the importance of multilateralism and regional approaches, including in mainstreaming drug control into development initiatives.
in the quality of reporting, it was mentioned by interviewees that reporting formats do not allow for capturing progress achieved beyond the logical framework, which is a significant limitation that should be remedied (Recommendation 16).

Programme monitoring, reporting and evaluation are also considered effective when used as inputs for planning and strategic reorientation. In this regard, evaluation was definitely used accordingly (see below), while there was no evidence that monitoring and reporting data were used for any planning purposes.

Under SP4, the Kabul based Evaluation Officer position was IEU’s pilot in implementing a decentralized evaluation function with the overall aim to strengthen the evaluation culture in the region and UNODC but also to enhance the results orientation and evaluability of the RP. Though there have been many positives emanating from this role in terms of learning (see below), challenges were identified as to the original design, expectation of independence and strategic vision of IEU.

Both the Office and Programme hosting the position have professed the usefulness of an RBM role to a small organization, which lacks expertise in this direction. One outcome of the decentralized function has been the improved quality of evaluations in the region. Another outcome has been that innovative approaches towards evaluations were made possible with the decentralized position in the field. The first “evaluation findings absorption workshop” was organized following the Pakistan evaluation and a uniquely designed self-evaluation of the Afghanistan CP took place – enabling incorporation of evaluation results into strategic planning. A third outcome has been the approach towards evaluations - programme managers are more aware of the process and the aim of evaluations and hence less resistant or troubled by it which contributes to strengthening the evaluation culture in the region.

Though a pilot for further decentralisation of the evaluation function, the evaluation team found little evidence of reflection to learn from this experience, e.g. absence of documents analysing and drawing lessons from the model which was to be a pilot. Despite COAFG willingness to retain such function, with the position vacated as of 1st August 2014 and no fundraising or vacancy yet issued, the future of such position remains very uncertain and seems a one off pilot with no continuity. Similar one off pilots were identified by the evaluation team in the region, i.e. the 2012 evaluability mission and the 2014 Afghanistan CP Self-Evaluation, which were not or are not planned for replication despite positive feedback from the end users. Some stakeholders felt that the model and its subsequent exiting were not sufficiently discussed, indicating a possible communication gap between IEU and its clients. IEU disputes those assertions vehemently, pointing out that relevant stakeholders were actively involved in discussions and informed on decisions. Roles and responsibilities in regards to the continuation of the position were also disputed. The Evaluation Team considers that what is ultimately important is to build upon the experience gained on this issue (Recommendation 20).

Highlighted in the Inter-Divisional Mission (IDM) to Afghanistan (29 September – 5 October 2012), the independence (i.e. independence of reporting lines as well as of substantive work) of the Evaluation Officer was identified as another issue (it was recommended the Evaluation Officer “would not be involved in the evaluation of her substantive work”). The latter was seriously compromised by the work-share arrangement that was implemented during the first year of posting and hindered the efficient use of human resources given that an HQ based Evaluation
Officer was nominated to fill the gaps where independence could be compromised. Reporting lines should also account for the independence of such position – which was not the case in the past – and be strictly with IEU. With such work-share and reporting arrangement the original position with inherent independence (mirroring an HQ-based Evaluation Officer) was not well-conceived. This is a lesson to be learned for any future decentralised evaluation position.

Accounting for the fact that the Evaluation Officer was geographically based away from the IEU team, regular interaction with the supervisor based in IEU/HQ did not materialise as expected. The Evaluation Officer had two missions to Vienna in 2012 and 2013. Due to competing workloads, none in 2014.

In light of the above, the Field would benefit much more from a rethinking of the design of the post, either pursuing the decentralisation of the evaluation function by giving the means to ensure independence or, by altering the TORs and reporting lines, this role could become two-fold - a results-based management role and research/analytical support to evaluations in the region (Recommendation 20).

Either way, the evaluation emphasizes the importance of reporting on this pilot experience (also against the recommendations of the IDM) to the field and the donors, as well as senior UNODC management, who were observing this test case with great interest.

**Sustainability**

In the Decade of Transformation 2015-2025 the RP enables multilateral contribution to efforts to tackle narcotics and organised crime related to Afghan opium. There is an expressed desire amongst donors for the RP’s continuation for a number of reasons including encouraging regional stability and political presence in the post-Transition 2014 landscape for Afghanistan.

A value of the RP is its ability to generate relationships across borders which have legacies of mistrust and political isolation. The creation of working networks, both formal and informal, should be considered as primary indicators of success of the programme and are more than the sum of output activities.

In terms of outcome measurement these relationships hold the key to future activity. It may be that the informal networks are more sustainable, as these are not rooted in agencies or national interest than those formally created, as personnel move through promotion and relocation processes and changes occur within political settings. SP1 and SP3 interview respondents stated that formal and informal contact was a good outcome of process in SP1 and SP3 interviews.

The continuation of RP activities until 2019 has been recommended in the “Joint Statement” which was adopted at the end of the “International Meeting of the Ministers/Heads of Counter Narcotics Agencies to combat drug trafficking- assessment and development of drug situation in the region” held on 29 November 2013 in Dushanbe. However UNODC personnel, implementing agencies and donors also consider future sustainability related to constraints of annual donor funding and staff contracts. National counterparts have established professional networks that, whilst they may not be sustainable in formal terms without either UNODC impetus or funding in the short term, may be sustainable in the long term.
Challenges for the RP include perceptions that a ‘couple of strategies are wishful thinking, not realistic’. Although eventual programme ownership and capacity is assumed by UNODC this is confounded by high staff turn-over both internally and for partners, and lack of commitment in some areas. UNODC should consider using alternative planning cycles that include options for programme handover/ completion and promote continuity for recipients. One respondent indicated that for the RP ‘the third challenge’ is to keep consistency that was missing in the prior initiative, The Rainbow Strategy.

However, the continued ability of Member States to take effective action against transnational organised crime is dependent on political will [as assessed within original programme risk] in maintaining the relevant agencies and adoption of binding formal agreements to do so. Under SP4 Promotion of the ‘Sister Villages’ and other sources of alternative livelihood within historic cross-border areas in Afghanistan/Pakistan and promotion of sustainable development show promise for the continuation of social networks that are not funding-dependent but based on cultural understanding and desire for mutual prosperity.

Examples of RP sub-programmes promoting sustainability include:

- The wide reaching educational components of SP2 and SP3 promote attitudinal change through advocacy for police, prosecutors, health and penal staff on alternatives to incarceration;
- The use of CBT methodology;
- Adoption of UNODC standards for prisoners;
- Harmonisation of principles and standards for prosecutors and prison authorities [SP2 and SP3];
- Through SP3 development and support of NGO consortia working across the spectrum of those who meet and treat people who use drugs, are implementing best practice in interventions using advocacy, police sensitisation and education on medical treatment to international standards;
- Access and care provision for PLHIV, being facilitated by UNODC partner agencies across the RP for those who are homeless owing to stigma, including refugee and returnees is also furthering understanding of the complexity of the issues of drug access, use and dependence;
- Under SP4 improved data collection, enhanced analysis and dissemination support the above activity and is generating discreet data sets for programme management, and increasingly enhanced reporting capacity for Member States and donors alike.

Other evaluations indicate that there is demonstrable partner commitment, but an inability to finance costly interventions that were started with significant UNODC capital outlay. There is lack of programme planning capacity at national level, or funding for recurrent costs, which impacts sustainability for recurrent costs on handover to national counterparts, (i.e. maintenance of overall capacity and funding).
Engendering meaningful ownership with key stakeholders is also stated to be problematic owing to movement of personnel at national level and UNODC and political direction with key programme contacts being moved from posts of influence when there are changes in Government.

As noted elsewhere and reiterated by several respondents, the political values of donors may not be reflected in the cultural and political histories of many of the recipient counterparts in differing jurisprudence and perceptions of national leadership, and this is an added dimension to the importance and sustainability of the RP within UN frameworks for stability in Central Asia.

Affecting financial commitment (in the broader UNODC context) is a donor bloc which has pushed for FCR; as a stakeholder stated: “UNODC needs to have cost effectiveness and transparency”, and thus favour outcome and results based measurement. UNODC reporting overall is reported to be ‘haphazard’ with donors stating they ‘will require the 2013 Report in order to write the 2014 pledge letter’.

Several interviewees indicated that UNODC needs to address sustainability in human resource management with some urgency. This was highlighted in the Joint Inspection Unit report\(^{129}\) (2010) which identified rapid expansion of UNODC since 2005 in normative and technical cooperation, with quadrupling of staff and operations, particularly in the field. It also highlighted lack of internal transparency of career progression. This has resulted in staff being left ‘stuck in hardship postings’ unaccompanied by family for periods far beyond the original time contracted, in some cases for periods of 5-10 years. The impact on UNODC field personnel has been deterioration of health to the extent that it was mentioned by several respondents as attributable to their working environment on identification at routine medical examinations.

Reported stressors included abnormal living and working conditions, excessive travelling and flying hours across the region, prolonged exposure to political violence and additional threats of working for UNODC. It would be worthwhile for UNODC to consider other sources of employment law (i.e. European Union) as a guide, even though the evaluation team is fully aware that UNODC is not required to do so (or subject to it).

These findings are not new to UNODC, in report of the Joint Inspection Unit ‘Review of management and administration in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) [2010] inspectors noted the impact of rapid expansion of UNODC activities in field presence and technical activities into ‘peace, security and development agendas’ within the UN system, in part attributed to seeking alternative funding sources by the agency. This was found to have impacted heavily on ‘coordination and support from the headquarters to the field, adequacy of administrative rules and procedures, etc.’ and noted that this ‘diluted the strategic vision and prioritisation functions’. Human Resources were flagged as problematic as UNOV /UNODC/HRMS were perhaps not sufficiently adapted to meet the profile of a specialised field agency. Recommendation 98 (p.24) noted that the highest degree of ‘compliance, transparency and communication’ of all human resource matters should be demonstrated within the organisation’.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation team used a SWOT analysis, in addition to the findings identified above, in order to derive a series of summative, high-level conclusions.

A SWOT analysis is useful when considering multiple factors and complex situations as it highlights issues that characterise and/or directly affect a programme; it leads naturally to recommendations, as these should look to build on strengths while addressing weaknesses, pointing out opportunities to exploit, while identifying risks.

Strengths

The RP should be seen as a successful programme. While it is still in relatively early stages of implementation, especially compared to the outcomes it seeks to achieve, it has many strengths, which should be capitalised on going forward:

- **In strategic terms, the major significance of the RP is the fact that it is operational.** The RP represents commitment from all 8 Member States to increasing regional cooperation. The RP provides UNODC with the legal basis to operate within and across 8 member states (i.e. without having to refer back to all 8, every time it needs to make a minor adjustment in its delivery profile);

- The RP is a manifestation of what the International Community has repeatedly stated was required, but has never really delivered. The RP is part of the overall regional approach in supporting Afghanistan; it delivers the ability to generate greater cooperation on issues relating to countering the effects of narcotics. It is not wholly the solution, but it definitely part of the solution;

- **The RP is highly relevant as it is based on the needs of the Member States** and it sets priorities based on their inputs as articulated during Technical Working Groups and the Steering Committee;

- **The RP is well designed.** It is a flexible tool that it responsive to Member State’s needs, with activities naturally grouped under Sub Programmes so as to provide a unifying purpose. It is a good example of the programming approach. It is not a collection of individual projects;

- **The RP fosters dialogue and political agreements.** It supports the Country and Global Programmes which deliver substantive assistance to countries. The RP has access to resources with which it can reinforce Country and Global level initiatives and transpose activities from one member state across the region;

- UNODC has representation in all the Member States and through the Country Offices it has the ability to deliver in all areas. It is the inter-linkages between the RP and the Country Programmes and Country Staff that provide a solid foundation in its ability to promote great regional cooperation. UNODC is not an outside organisation calling for greater cooperation. UNODC is a trusted partner working to assist each Member State while at the same time suggesting how to improve regional cooperation;
The RP has attracted donor pledges as what it offers appeals to the donor community. It is able to reach more countries and has more access than any single donor. UNODC is a seen as strong brand that is recognised as a market leader in what it delivers.

Weaknesses

On the converse the RP also has a number of weaknesses which include:

- **RP is misunderstood**, there is little consensus as to what it does, what is achieves and what it should do. While the Staff may understand, there is a constant need to explain themselves to other areas of UNODC and to external audiences;

- **UNODC has no longer term vision from which programmes can take a long term view** from which to benchmark progress. As such the RP’s time frame was limited to the end of the Transition period and not linked to World Banks decade of transformation;

- The actual RP programme is not everything that needs to be achieved or done, but is result of what the “market can bear,” what the Member States would sign up to. There is no longer term guidance to what could be achieved in the future. A 4-5 year cycle is too short to provide this long term view;

- **The RP’s design was not based on a Theory of Change**. Had it been then there would have been a sense of what could have been achieved over time. This would allow for better measures of effort to be elaborated and provide for as results based reporting;

- Insufficient thought and resource was given to managing the change from projects to programming. **There is a need to break the project mentality of the staff, recipients and donors.** There was also a need to ensure that the RP had full staff buy-in from the start. A lack of change management plan hindered this, and as such the birth of the RP could be explained as painful;

- **The RP is inundated with reporting**, but it receives little to no top-down guidance despite trying to fulfil a political role in a priority area;

- **The RP’s structure is too amorphous and confused.** The virtual staffing table which includes staff in 8 countries, many of whom are cost shared does not help team cohesion or deliver a unified product.

- **There is shortfall in staff**, particularly sub-programme coordinators posts which hinders delivery. The lack of a regional representative has not helped either. The net effect is reduced effectiveness and overtime the RPs relevance suffers as it is not seen to deliver;

- **The geographic spread of the RP countries and the time it takes to travel** between Member States reduces the effectiveness of staff. This is increased when there are less staff and those that remain have to travel more often;

- **UNODC’s brand is also a weakness, particularly in respect to health issues where it does not elicit the same support as it does with Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice**
There have been major institutional differences between UNODC and other UN bodies in this area and UNODC is often in competition with far larger organisations for health funding.

**Opportunities**

Although the future is unclear it does present a number of opportunities which should be exploited or capitalised.

- **Transformation decade presents an opportunity.** Neighbouring countries will have greater influence over events in Afghanistan. There is the prospect of increased trade and economic growth which will require Member States to have safe guards in place;

- **Post Transition Afghanistan will not be the same,** the International Community’s response will alter and the RP must be positioned to make the most of this change. A means to deliver the programme across the region, is positive;

- **UNODC should make more of its ability to access/reach/influence across the region,** beyond what any single donor nation can achieve. Member States understand the cost of maintaining embassy staff. Buying into UNODC’s structure should be sold as buying into a “virtual embassy”;

- While seizures may go up or down, so long as there are criminal gangs operating, then their influence will continue to affect Member States. The impact of the illicit narcotics economy requires Member States to have the means to tackle these complex transnational threats. This position could be used a starting point for future advocacy, an area where UNODC can add value, beyond directly targeting narcotics;

- **Other geopolitical events** will sharpen the International Community’s interest in the region. Other transnational threats such as the rise of IS and particularly the threat of returning jihadist will require regional cooperation. UNODC should position itself and the elements of the network it works with, as the means to combat more than just narcotics;

**Threats**

There are also a number of threats to the RP.

- **Security in Afghanistan will pose a threat** to UNODC’s ability to deliver assistance in the country. This will impact the RP, however, its effects can be mitigated so long as there is quick response and a plan on how the RP would operate minus Afghanistan- or with limited contact with Afghan Officials;

- There may be no transformation and Afghanistan slides backwards. Each Member State might take a very different view as to how they deal with an insecure Afghanistan which could jeopardise the notion of regional cooperation and the role of the RP. UNODC needs to have a clear idea as to how it would allocate resources to Country Programme vis-à-vis the RP and the role, if any, the RP would play;
- **Staffing level is already low.** If the RP is not sufficiently staffed then it is difficult for it to maintain any momentum. Its work is based on dialogue and trust building which cannot occur without staff. Although this is easily rectified by hiring the requisite number of staff, *concerns about FCR and UNODC internal inefficiencies hinder the process*;

- **The RP is not currently well understood.** There is confusion both internally and externally in regards to what it does and what it seeks to achieve. This can be overcome with the aid of communication plans supported by the Director of the Division of Operations, but this has to be resourced;

- **There is a risk that current UNODC procedures are unable to support programming as it was devised.** There is inflexibility in the system and even small revisions and alterations to the delivery profile require too much internal consultation and oversight. If the governance structure provides an opportunity for HQ UNODC to give direction and agree on priorities (in addition to Member States and Donors), then this should be useful. Once agreed these priorities can be enacted with the support of HQ UNODC.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

GENERAL

Finding: The RP is due to end in Dec 2015. However, despite the progress achieved to date, more time is required for RP initiatives to make a significant impact.

1. To enable achievement of the planned objectives, UNODC should ensure continuity between the current Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (2011-2015) and the next phase (whatever the form of the next phase may be: extension or new programme).

Finding: Implementation of the mid-term evaluation recommendations will require time. At less than a year apart from the final evaluation, little progress in implementation will be witnessed. Therefore, there is no need to conduct a full-fledged final evaluation in 2015, especially if the RP is extended.

2. UNODC should postpone the summative evaluation of the Regional Programme until the year before the end of the next phase.

3. Programme management should conduct an internal assessment of the implementation of the recommendations made by this mid-term evaluation by the end of the current RP.

DESIGN

Finding: RP design does not sequence activities and outcomes overtime. Implementation appears to be instantaneous and there is no sense of building on previous achievements, although some activities should be dependent on each other. There is a requirement for a road map from which to gauge progress.

4. The Regional Programme team should review the programme’s project document/logical framework in light of the findings of this evaluation. The review process should include a Theory of Change mapping exercise, building on previous achievements.

Finding: CP’s sub programmes are not aligned with the RPs sub programmes.
5. ROCA and regional CPs should be aligned to the RP, using the same sub programme structures/format as the regional programme.

Finding: Despite the importance of the illicit economy debate in the region, an institutional position within UNODC has not been adopted yet and the current RP structure does not include the illicit economy as an outcome or activity per se.

6. UNODC should adopt an institutional position about the illicit economy concept and then the Steering Committee could endorse the inclusion of illicit economy as an integral part of the RP. Options for its inclusion are: Illicit economy becomes a cross cutting issue (as there are links to counter narcotics, asset recovery, DDR and use of advocacy); UNODC supports the debate under SP 4, but does seek to alter RP structure or implementation; or the Illicit economy becomes a stand-alone SP.

7. UNODC should pursue the approach by rolling out to the rest of the region (i.e. Central Asia) and ensure a common messaging within the UN family.

Finding: RP has not fully integrated Human Rights & Gender perspectives within the programme.

8. Cognisant of the plan to create a Human Rights Monitoring Centre in Central Asia (following the recommendation from the CP Pakistan evaluation), the RP should allocate some resources into monitoring Human Rights compliance. While Country/Programme Offices will take the lead in monitoring Member State’s HR compliance, the RP should ensure that it understands national dynamics. The RP should advocate and support Member States to introduce legislation to include Human Rights & Gender due diligence on international standards and norms on Human Rights through ongoing regional forums.

Finding: The RP has two governance mechanisms; one political and one technical. While annual priorities are responsive to Member State requirements; annual priorities should also adhere to the RP’s higher level objectives. Strategic direction and policy guidance require clarification and monitoring in order to ensure coherence in the implementation of activities.

9. RP management should ensure that UNODC country, regional and global activities are aligned with SC recommendations before relevant activities commence.

EFFICIENCY

Finding: Flagged as an institutional challenge in the Afghanistan and Pakistan evaluations as well as the 2013 Audit report, internal processes are not conducive to implementation in the field.
10. UNODC should be considering a corporate reflection as regards to its internal processes, considering the constraints imposed by being part of the UN Secretariat versus being an operational organization.

Finding: The current system for hiring International Consultants to vacant posts or to conduct programmed work takes too long and results in many missed opportunities and delays in delivery.

11. Administrative processes for recruitment of international consultants should not take more than two months. As a means of reducing the time delay in hiring consultants, HRMS should delegate hiring to Field Offices.

Finding: No one solution will fit all countries or all circumstances in terms of the practicalities of implementing the RP; which mean different approaches must be taken and this will take time and effort since it is an ongoing process. For the RP, this equates to staff (experts) and travel needs being adjusted accordingly. The size of the region and regional landscape is also problematic, and distances need to be considered, as it reduces the staff and Member State’s ability to engage continuously.

12. Re-examine the RP staff structures as per the table and body of the report and provide oversight mechanism to ensure their activities are properly coordinated.

Finding: A regional programming approach is the responsibility of the field representatives in the region as well as the management of UNODC in Vienna to materialise by adapting working practices in alignment with the 2012 RP Implementation Strategy.

13. UNODC should revisit its reporting lines as follows to materialise a regional programming approach:

a. Regional Representative for Central Asian countries (ROCA) should report on RP matters to the Regional Representative for Afghanistan and ensure that CA projects are aligned with and feed into the RP;

b. Country Representatives for Pakistan and Iran (COPAK) should report on RP matters to the Regional Representative for Afghanistan and ensure that Pakistan CP is aligned with and feed into the RP;

c. Heads of Office should report on RP matters to the Regional Representative for Afghanistan;

d. Chief, RSEWCA/IPB should adopt a more official strategic role to ensure connectivity with global, inter-regional, regional, sub-regional and national programmes;
e. Regional Cooperation Advisor and Sub-Programme 2 Coordinator should be located in Islamabad.

Finding: Sub-programme 4 has been struggling with a lack of leadership, focus and continuity. Successive SP4 Coordinators have had shared responsibilities with other units (IEU), other supporting tasks (reporting), other SPs (SP1) and more recently with other projects (AFGU04). As a result, there is still a gap in terms of how research is used for monitoring purposes and hence evaluation.

14. The evaluation would recommend having a dedicated SP4 Coordinator (by “dedicated Coordinator” is meant a person which attention would be undivided for SP4, not an additional resource person) that would focus on bridging the remaining gaps between research, monitoring and evaluation, in particular given the wide array of research activities in the region.

Finding: The new Career Development and Mobility Framework may provide incentives for staff to go to the region.

15. HRMS to ensure that the new Career Development and Mobility Framework sets time limitation for serving in hardship duty stations.

Finding: As for reporting, despite clear improvement in the quality of reporting, it was mentioned by interviewees that reporting formats do not allow for capturing progress achieved beyond the logical framework, which is a significant limitation that should be remedied.

Reporting challenges remain (i) timeliness and (ii) level of details contained in such reports (too much output based versus strategic and outcome level), as well as the (iii) formats of APPR and SAPPR being too restrictive to capture any achievement beyond the logical framework and designed performance indicators. The lack of outcome based reporting by UNODC was identified as a perennial source of donor frustration.

16. UNODC and the Regional Programme should improve its reporting framework by:
   1) revising existing formats to capture achievements beyond the logical framework;
   2) improving the monitoring data quality, especially at the outcome level;
   3) developing a reporting deadlines calendar to ensure timeliness of contributions and submissions.

Finding: The PMM development was halted by an executive decision in Vienna possibly linked to the upcoming shift to Umoja. In addition, the further development and roll out of the EMS was halted as it was envisaged the PMM would supersede the original system. As a result, current internal UNODC systems do not allow for monitoring against log-frames in a manner suitable for every-day management.
17. Until new systems (Umoja) are up and running, the evaluation recommends re-starting the use of “smartsheets” for monitoring the programme.

Finding: While there is good communication between the RP and CPs/GLO, this dialogue normally takes place within SP thematic areas. The RP requires an additional level of coordination to ensure economy of effort between all RP and CP activities.

18. Field Offices of the region to nominate single Focal Points for improved CP-RP-GLO linkages.

Finding: Due to the distances involved and the location of staff, there is a need for more efficient means of communication.

19. Review options for an online medium for communication.

EFFECTIVENESS

Finding: Though a pilot component for the further decentralisation of the evaluation function was implemented, and COAFG expressed willingness to retain the function, the evaluation team found little evidence of reflection to learn from this experience, and appears to be a one off pilot with no continuity.

These assertions and roles and responsibilities in regards to the continuation of the position were disputed. The Evaluation Team considers that what is ultimately important is to build upon the experience gained on this issue.

20. IEU to identify and communicate lessons learned from the pilot decentralised position to RP stakeholders, in order to inform relevant or related RP decisions.

Finding: Having a dedicated outcome to monitoring, reporting and evaluation helped (i) raise the profile of these topics (monitoring, reporting and evaluation) that are often disregarded by managers, and (ii) attract dedicated resources.

21. Building on lessons from this experience, the evaluation would recommend having a dedicated outcome on monitoring, reporting and evaluation for other Regional Programmes.
Finding: Additional resources need to be devoted to attaining Output 4.1 (Facilitate the harmonization of legislative frameworks to enable international/regional cooperation in Criminal Matters).

22. RP work plan to prioritise reviewing and updating RP countries’ laws and regulations so that these may be in line with the respective UN drugs, crime conventions.

SP4

Finding: Little progress was witnessed directly as a result of the RP’s interventions with regards to availability of criminal justice (CJ), counter narcotics law enforcement (LE) and People Who Inject Drug (PWID) related data.

23. SP4 should focus on those areas of CJ, drug use and LE for improved data availability, in particular by supporting the Coordination and Analysis Unit.

Finding: As regards to the improved use of data, the evaluation found no evidence of monitoring and evaluation of the utilization of the research products and data; neither there is any regular and systematic information as to the impact of research on regional policy – this is a wider UNODC issue for which the Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB) should give direction. To measure whether publications are used for policy change, the evaluation would recommend interviewing a sample of users, in addition to the methods already used.

24. RAB to provide guidance on incorporating means to measure the impact and utilisation of research products and data, in particular, in the area of influencing policy.

Finding: By proposing a survey approach for West and Central Asia based on the lessons from the Drug Use Survey in Pakistan, the RP supported the objective of improved availability and comparability of drug use data across the region. In particular, a significant contribution was the creation of a network of drug survey experts – advancing an inter-regional approach.

25. The evaluation recommends that the RP further facilitate the network of survey experts with the aim to share best practices and experiences that could benefit research and survey practices in their respective countries.

Finding: In the absence of a mapping of the regional drug situation, which was meant to orient the overall RP strategy and priorities, SP4 and other SPs priorities were determined on a yearly basis through the Task Force meetings and existing UNODC research activities, under the guidance of RAB. Since the research agenda was determined without coordinated regional information, this challenges the relevance of the current interventions and/or the utility of the mapping of the
regional drug situation in the first place. However, interviewees stressed that the mapping would still be a valuable exercise to undertake.

26. **The evaluation therefore recommends undertaking this mapping in the second half of the programme implementation.**

**Finding:** As of 2011, the Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) database includes an online mapping initiative entitled the Drug Monitoring Platform (DMP). The platform is a joint initiative between PPI and CAU (but not the RP) that provides up-to-date, detailed information about drug and precursor seizures, prices, drug purity information as well as information related to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan interlinked with air/dry-ports and drug treatment centres etc. within West and Central Asia in an interactive map. The evaluation understands that the collaboration about DMP should be extended to the RP and supports such initiative.

27. **To encompass all research data in the region, continue the planned expansion of DMP to the RP.**

**Finding:** The RP developed a Strategic Research Directions paper as a result of a consultative process involving all internal UNODC units addressing research, such as DPA, RAB, SASS, STAS and Offices in the field. Despite these consultation efforts, a majority of stakeholders assessed that the methodologies are sometimes not so clearly defined by RAB.

28. **The evaluation would therefore recommend to develop a Thematic Programme dedicated to research that would provide the necessary guidance and methodological standards, e.g. defining quality and comparability of quantitative and qualitative data as well as of publications; determining systems to monitor the impact of research and capacity building.**

**SUSTAINABILITY**

**Finding:** Partnerships with NGOs or media formed during advocacy events have not been consistently maintained despite eagerness of partners to follow through - missed opportunities were identified.

29. **The evaluation would recommend engaging in advocacy events only when a strategy to sustain the results of these events is clearly laid out.**

**GENERAL**

**Finding:** Given the specialised HIV/AIDS related components of health related programmes within UNODC which impact specific disciplines from epidemiology, diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS and the human and stigmatised cost of infections related to drug dependence, it would
be beneficial for UNODC to adopt health specific evaluation mechanisms and methodologies. These could incorporate WHO guidance criteria for management and treatment of HIV/AIDS in the first instance, and the use of health impact assessments in the longer term to establish more reliable results and outcome based data on programme success.

30. UNODC to continue using health specific planning and evaluation methodologies, incorporating WHO guidance criteria for management and treatment of HIV/AIDS, and the use of health impact assessments in the longer term to establish more reliable results and outcome based data on programme success.

Finding: There were many who viewed the RP as a HQ Vienna solution imposed top down on the field although Member States and other stakeholders were consulted though perhaps not to the extent originally intended. This perception influenced the birth of the RP. Not all internal stakeholders believed in the programme, and some were unsupportive at best and unhelpful at worst. Organisations that change, should consider how they are going to manage change both internally to ensure staff buy-in, but also externally with partners and member states. Change requires more than a one off brief or information note.

31. When UNDOC introduces change, a change management plan should be included, which is supported by both internal and external communication plans and by Senior Management to alleviate potential barriers to implementation.

Finding: The RP has two governance mechanisms; one political and one technical. While annual priorities should be responsive to Member State requirements; annual priorities should also adhere to higher level accords. Strategic direction and policy guidance, though readily available, require clarification and monitoring.

32. UNODC HQ to ensure coherence across its entire portfolio of activities and to assist the RP in monitoring strategic priorities.

Finding: Overall external stakeholders expressed some reservations as to the RP communication and reporting, stating that sometimes it did not address their needs. Though donor briefings are regularly organised in Vienna and Kabul, strong views were expressed about challenges to be communicated upfront rather than donors getting to know about them through other channels (i.e. communication about CARICC related issues). The complexity of UNODC structure, vehicles (i.e. RP, GLO, projects) and reporting lines was often confusing to partners, even to sister UN agencies which would not know who to address to interact within the organization. The virtual staffing of the RP, which sees staff split between different countries and operating on a part-time basis, has not brought greater cohesion to the RP. The current system relies more on personal contacts rather than formal structure. For example, LE community in the region and the various UNODC research related vehicles. This gets even more complicated as some Global Programmes have their own agenda with segments in the region.
33. The Regional Programme should improve its approach to communicating with donors, national counterparts, UN agency partners, and internally (in terms of both frequency and quality) in order to continue sustaining its visibility and credibility in a strategic manner. Solutions include: 1) For donors, going beyond the constraints of mandated reporting systems, the RP should aim at a more targeted and systematic communication for example on the model of the Counter Piracy Programme; 2) The RP should find means to elicit more efficient interactions with other UN partners, e.g. by communicating the updated organigram on a regular basis and focal points for respective RP, GLO and other programmes in a country and 3) The RP and UNODC in general should favour institutional communication networks to personal networks.

**Finding:** The rejection of globally accepted standards of epidemiological evidence for HIV/AIDS and the value of OST in prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission continues to generate difficulties for the RP, preventing proportionate scale-up of service provision. Respondents stated that increased joint UN agency advocacy on this issue is essential.

34. UNODC should enhance intra-UN and external agency advocacy and support for international best practice in drug demand reduction aligned to WHO and UNAIDS guidance.

**Finding:** The SP1 coordinator’s post is shared with the ROCA LE coordinator’s post. The combined budget of these two segments is equivalent to the entire RP budget, yet the post is overseen by a single person. In addition this post has been gapped for over 6 months.

35. **SP1 should have a dedicated full time LE representative. The SP Coordinator’s post should not be shared with the ROCA LE Coordinator’s post.**

**Finding:** SP has successfully supported a number of regional LE initiatives but it has not developed any new ones.

36. The RP should examine what other regional bodies can be established to assist cooperation amongst LE agencies. Possible avenues are AML, Forensics and Training.

**Finding:** The key challenge for SP1 is promoting intelligence sharing amongst regional actors; a pre-requisite to joint operations. The activity of sharing intelligence is more about fostering trust than purely building intelligence capacity. Trust is only possible amongst people and institutions
that know and respect each other. Institutional capacity cannot be developed remotely, by an occasional consultation or study period. Trust takes time, people and resources, all acting toward a single aim.

37. The RP should reconsider how it is going to develop trust as a means of increasing intelligence sharing. Trust is developed through close working relationships and mutual respect. Achieving this outcome will require additional resources; primarily people.

38. The RP in conjunction with the COs/ROCA should review if the current laydown of LE SMEs supports greater intelligence sharing. The answer may lie in where an SME sits and/or works rather than the requirement for more staff.

Finding: While SP has made progress towards achieving the objectives of outcomes 1 and 2, it has not been as successful in achieving results under outcome 3 - increased use of forensic evidence in investigating and prosecuting cross-border crimes.

39. The RP should investigate the requirement for additional resources to be allocated toward outcome 3. If additional resources are not forthcoming then the current SME in Afghanistan could be reassigned to the RP.

Finding: FAST activities (RP) have delivered promising early results yet need to be sustained.

40. Continuous advocacy should be carried with RP countries to sustain, fund and expand FAST activities at the national and regional levels, possible plans for integration in the national education system could be developed.

Finding: SP3 does not seem to be engaging strategically with existing programmes to achieve greater impact.

41. SP3 should foster enhanced strategic engagement with existing programmes in the area of drug dependence treatment.
V. LESSONS LEARNED & GOOD PRACTICES

Lessons Learned

Efficiency

**Internal coordination and communication is critical to avoid wasting resources.**

The PMM development was halted by an executive decision in Vienna possibly linked to the upcoming shift to Umoja. No detailed explanation for the suspension was given to RP and COAFG staff involved in its development. This is a significant lesson learned in terms of better communication as considerable time was spent developing this tool with no end result. In addition, the further development and roll out of the EMS was halted as it was envisaged the PMM would supersede the original system. There needs to be better internal coordination as there are instances where certain actors are not aware of activities until later. This can result in missed opportunities or costly waste of resources.

**It is important to share information in a timely manner between stakeholders so as to facilitate planning, improve coordination and assess progress.**

The value to sharing relevant monitoring data and substantive information (including reports on all meetings, workshops and training) in a timely fashion with the RP management team, relative Regional Sections and programmes at Headquarters, UNODC Field Offices in the region, its national counterparts and donors has been recognized as critical. Apart from providing information necessary for decision-making, efficient information flow keeps stakeholders updated on what has been (and has yet to be) achieved. Proactively seeking feedback is a useful practice that leads to the RP having a better understanding of the priorities, needs and challenges of the countries in the region.

**In order to maintain momentum, there is a need for continuous follow-up to activities until the desired outcome is attained (or plans adjusted).**

The importance to the RP of striking a balance between the breadth of activities it supports and the capacity of all stakeholders to implement (absorb) the assistance has been identified fundamental to achieving results. Following-up on activities (from simple inquiries to follow-on events) not only helps build upon past actions (as per the TOC), it also can be used to assess whether stakeholders have encountered obstacles in relation to what may have been agreed to be done. Adjusting the follow-up activities accordingly, increases the likelihood of their utility.

**Taking advantage of intra-RP synergies leads to increased effectiveness.**
Being aware of possible synergies between SPs in terms of activities (above and beyond the collaboration between the RP-CP-GP and other regions too) can lead to increased programme efficiencies and mutually reinforcing interventions.

**Grounding the development of performance indicators in the realities of the countries leads to realistic monitoring systems.**

Through the development of its monitoring tool (EMS), the RP identified the weaknesses of its performance indicators and challenges for data collection. This reflection process was positive and should be undertaken for any programme since no matter how theoretically perfect a monitoring framework is, as long as the data collection against performance indicators is not tested in the field there is a major risk for failure and being irrelevant.

**Sufficient consideration should be given to the independence of evaluation functions deployed in the Field.**

With such work-share and reporting arrangement the original position with inherent independence (mirroring an HQ-based Evaluation Officer) was not well-conceived. This is a lesson to be learned for any future decentralised evaluation position.

**Good Practices**

- Having a participatory process for designing a programme not only increases the level of ownership by stakeholders but increases the likelihood that critical elements will not be excluded. Involving a member of the IPB from Vienna to lead the design phase of the RP, in conjunction with field operatives, and in consultation with a wide variety of stakeholders was positive. The availability of donor funding for this process is commendable;

- The RP’s dual governance mechanisms (one political and one technical) is conducive for increasing coherence and stakeholder of ownership.
ANNEX I.  TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

1. Introduction

This Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2011 – 2014 (“RP”) will undergo an in-depth mid-term evaluation between April and July 2014. This is a timely exercise as within the context of the 2014 Transition, the findings will inform UNODC’s strategy towards Afghanistan and the region in the next years.

This RP evaluation is a timely exercise as it will benefit from the findings of the mid-term evaluations of the three country programmes (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan). In addition, other independent evaluations in the region (including the Paris Pact evaluation, Afghanistan cluster evaluations and other evaluations in Central Asia) will also be considered and linked. Finally, the impact on the RP of various review processes that have been conducted in the last two years such as OIOS Audits (in Country Office Pakistan, Country Office Afghanistan and Regional Office for Central Asia) as well as the HQ Inter-Divisional Missions (IDM) will also be considered.

1.2 Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 2011-2015

The West and Central Asia region is affected by significant poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and illicit trafficking of opiates which create multiple challenges for countries of the region and beyond. The alarming growth in the abuse of illicit drugs in the region and beyond creates not only human misery for families and individuals but also a huge challenge for societies. While Afghanistan and the countries in the region are showing political will and commitment to counter the illicit drug problem with support from the international community, despite progress in some areas, limited resources and competing requirements and priorities mean that the challenges that the illicit drugs problem poses remain.

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130 Between 2005 and 2009, Afghanistan has accounted for about 90% of the worldwide annual opium production. Only in 2010 the percentage decreased to 75% due to a plant disease that affected poppies during the harvesting season. Following the decrease in 2010, potential opium production has in 2011 increased by 61%, to an estimated 5,800 metric tons. (UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011, 2011, p.2). Concerning opium production in the other countries of the region, between 2005 and 2010 Pakistan has produced between 40-50 metric tons of opium annually. Data on poppy plant seizures point also to opium poppy cultivation in Central Asian countries although there is no evidence of large-scale cultivations (see UNODC, World Drug Report 2011, 2011, p. 60).


132 Total opium poppy cultivation amounted to 123,000 hectares in 2010 which was 65 per cent increase compared to 2002 (although the figure of 2010 was a 36 per cent decrease when compared to the...
The solution to the Afghan drug problem lies in an integrated regional response and requires more dedicated contributions of the international community based on principles of shared responsibility. The RP is a strategic framework for UNODC’s engagement in the region and it is designed to provide a platform for better coordination and facilitation of counter-narcotics efforts across the region, bringing coherence to activities conducted by UNODC. The aim of the RP is to enhance counter-narcotics capacities across the region through better coordination and facilitation of regional cooperation as well as better allocation of the required resources and provision of technical assistances for regional cooperation by the international community to the countries of the region.\textsuperscript{133}

The overall vision of the RP is that by the year 2015, the countries of the region and their institutions are substantially strengthened and working together cooperatively to counter the destabilizing impact of illicit drugs and crime. The RP aims to define and strengthen linkages between various ongoing counter narcotics activities at the country/sub-regional/global levels. The approach is underpinned by integration and coherence to bring improvement in operational results by beneficiary agencies across the region.

The RP governance mechanism is designed to ensure ownership by national governments and the realization of mutually agreed outcomes. A senior-level Steering Committee and expert-level Regional Task Forces introduce regional level policy dialogue and review processes that shape UNODC interventions across the region while ensuring accountability.

The RP works closely with other regional and global initiatives and sits within a global architecture of programmes and responses to the counter-narcotics problem. UNODC’s contribution to regional cooperation in counter-narcotics and, in particular its coordination role, has been recognized in significant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, Commission of Narcotic Drugs Resolutions (latest one being Resolution 53/5) and in successive Reports of the UN Secretary-General on Afghanistan. Similarly, UNODC’s lead role in facilitating cooperation in the region has been acknowledged by numerous conferences.\textsuperscript{134} The London Conference on Afghanistan (28 January 2010) reiterated the importance of regional cooperation in countering the illicit narcotics trade and called for active participation and support from all stakeholders, and more specifically, UNODC. The Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan (July 2010) further reaffirmed the need for regional cooperation, centered around Afghanistan’s growing responsibility as a regional driver and consensus builder, to promote goals prescribed in

\textsuperscript{133} Regional Programme document endorsed by member countries 07/12/11

\textsuperscript{134} Including the 2003 Ministerial Conference on Drug Routes from Central Asia to Europe in Paris, the birthplace of the Paris Pact Initiative supported by UNODC.
the Kabul Process – a process which UNODC aims to support in the areas related to drugs and crime. The Istanbul Conference, which gave birth to Heart of Asia Process, where counter-narcotics has been identified as one of the six priority regional Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).\(^{135}\) Finally, the Third Paris Pact Ministerial Conference on Combating Illicit Traffic in Opiates Originating in Afghanistan of February 2012 resulted in the identification of regional initiatives as one of the four areas identified for enhanced cooperation by Paris Pact partners.

The RP is implemented with 4 Sub-Programmes each corresponding to thematic focus identified in the course of consultation with the governments of the region and echoing the thematic foundation of the Country Programmes available in the region\(^ {136} \). A summary of all the projects falling under the RP can be found in Annex 1.

The RP programme management structure is based on the decentralization of SP-level programme management functions to the field offices where SP Coordinators are located\(^ {137} \) – i.e., the strong and centralized lead of each SP by a qualified technical expert staff, backed by the concrete capacity of the field office in which the staff is located that will ensure programme management and monitoring function at the SP level more coherently.

\(^{135}\) The content of the relevant CBM is still a matter of consideration between the Istanbul Process partners.

\(^{136}\) Several of the outcomes indicated in this section are being partly addressed by UNODC’s activities at the country level, implemented through Country Programmes. The Regional Programme will build on these efforts and enhance impact by bringing greater coherence to implementation at the regional level.

\(^{137}\) The RP Coordinators are decentralized as follows: the SP1 Coordinator is located in Tashkent, the SP2 Coordinator is located in Dushanbe, the SP3 Coordinator is located in Tehran, and the SP4 Coordinator is located in Kabul. It was the intention of the RP to field the SP2 Coordinator in Islamabad after this post was initially placed in Dushanbe. The reason that this post has remained in Dushanbe was due to the fact that funding to UNODC in Tajikistan was reduced and the RP SP2 Coordinator has served for more than a year as Officer-in-Charge of the Programme Office for Tajikistan (POTAJ). Senior management decided to retain the post in Tajikistan until a new head of office is appointed and the intention to have a RP post in Pakistan remains.
The RP was extended to the end of 2015 from its initial duration of 2011 - 2014. This extension was part of a structured process to align its project lifecycles with those of the CPs of the region, which were also extended to the end of 2015. In addition, it was deemed prudent to maintain programmatic consistency over the Transition year and to review operational directions for 2016 onwards.

It is important to note that the RP’s interventions are based upon the effectiveness of its building blocks – the Country Programmes and sub-regional and national projects of West and Central Asia. Dedicated support to regional cooperation is only an addition to the vast amount of work UNODC engages with individual countries of the region. The RP was designed to add an additional means of support to the countries of the region, not to be prioritized over support to national-level responses. A healthy foundation at the country level is required to enable regional level action.

However, as some of the Country Programmes and sub-regional projects already in existence outside of Afghanistan have been created with the rationale of promoting regional cooperation while other regional initiatives lacked centralized supports, the solution was to be a flexible one – not a ‘one size fits all’ approach. It is important to also note that while there are structured and integrated country programmes in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan (the Southern Route for opiate trafficking), the situation in Central Asia (the Northern Route for opiate trafficking) is far more complex. In sum, the UNODC portfolio covers a number of national, sub-regional and global projects. Some of these are beyond the RP (the three Southern Caucasus states) and others have been running on different time frames and structures and are not naturally aligned to the RP. There have been some moves towards integration as two ROCA projects have been absorbed by the RP to make the structure more consistent - RER/F60 (CBT) and RER/E29 (precursors).
The RP not only streamlines efforts at the country and regional levels, but is also functioning within the context of relevant global tools, which is also a fundamental principle behind the inter-regional drug control approach. For instance, it is conceived as an operational arm of the Paris Pact Initiative (PPI). The PPI provides a strategic framework for policy and strategic level dialogue in order to identify future action areas and activities with potential to be developed and operationalized for counter-narcotics efforts by Paris Pact partners including UNODC under the Vienna Declaration. The RP is contributing to the achievement of the four pillars of the Vienna Declaration through various initiatives in each of its sub-programmes. Similarly, the RP works closely with the Afghanistan Opiate Trade Programme, the Container Control Programme, among others.

2. Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is formative in nature as it is undertaken at mid-point of the RP implementation and it intends to improve the performance for the remainder of the RP implementation.

Deriving from this overall purpose, the specific objectives of this evaluation are to:

• Contribute to accountability by assessing the achievements of UNODC in the region and the appropriateness of the utilization of resources; measure ownership, result-based orientation, efficiency and quality of UNODC services;

• Contribute to organizational learning by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of regional programming in West and Central Asia in the context of global initiatives (Inter-regional Drug Control Approach and Global Programmes) and describing best practices and innovations; and

• Contribute to decision-making in relation to (i) RP orientation for the remaining cycle of implementation and beyond and (ii) UNODC strategic orientation and potential repositioning in the countries, in the region and in thematic areas, in particular as regards to UNODC’s strategy towards the 2014 Transition.

3. Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will cover the four Sub-Programmes within an overall mid-term evaluation of the RP. As a mid-term evaluation exercise, it will cover the first two years of the implementation from 01 January 2012 to May 2014.

This RP evaluation exercise also comprises of two tiers: at one level assessing the RP at a holistic level focusing on, inter-alia: the political and strategic linkages with ongoing global and regional initiatives, buy-in by counterparts; and the effectiveness of the governance framework. The second level will look into the specifics of each Sub-Programme individually. The evaluation should also assess the overall role that UNODC plays in the region.
The evaluation will address the extent to which the Sub-Programmes contribute to the UNODC Thematic Programmes themselves (e.g. design, efficiency, appropriateness to/support to thematic objectives etc.) as well as the connections with the country/sub-regional and global programmes and projects in the region, this include the linkages with Central Asia.

The RP evaluation will utilize the findings from the mid-term evaluations of the Country Programmes for Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan\textsuperscript{138} to inform its analysis – all of which should have been completed by the start of the RP evaluation.

4. Evaluation criterion and questions

The evaluation will be guided by the below indicative questions. Please note that these are only indicative and will be further developed by the evaluation team as necessary.

- **Design**
  - Ownership. To what extent was the RP designed through consultative processes? To what extent was the decision to develop the RP based on clearly identified needs of government counterparts and priorities in UNODC mandate areas, and if so, what were they? How were counterparts identified and involved in identifying needs and priorities?
  - Results orientation. To what extent was the design of the RP results-oriented and evaluable? To what extent is the log frame of the RP a useful programme management tool and what are its linkages to the log-frames of the parallel country programmes and projects?
  - Integration. To what extent was the design of the RP in line with the integrated programming approach? To what extent was the RP design aligned with existing country/global/sub-regional programmes and projects in the region?

- **Relevance**
  - At RP level
    - Policy alignment. To what extent is the RP aligned with UNODC strategic tools (e.g. Strategic Framework, Medium Term Strategy and Thematic Programmes)? To what extent is the RP aligned with existing national policies and strategies of the member countries? To what extent is the RP in line with regional priorities and strategic areas of interest? To what extent is the illicit economy debate absorbed within the RP and complementary with existing interventions?
    - Programming. To what extent is the regional response to the Afghan drug problem through the RP relevant, considering other UNODC programmes and in

\textsuperscript{138} The initial findings of the mid-term self-evaluation
particular the Inter-Regional Drug Control Approach? Is the RP fulfilling its initial mandate?

- Comparative advantage. What is the RP comparative advantage? To what extent does the RP maximize the UNODC comparative advantage in the region?

- Continued relevance. To what extent was the RP flexible to respond to changing regional priorities or challenges, including those identified by Member States?

Integration. What is the relevance and appropriateness of the RP in light of the country/sub-regional/global programmes and projects (i.e. the Paris Pact Initiative and the Afghan Opiate Trade) as well as the inter-regional drug control approach?

Relevance (at SP level)
- How relevant is each Sub-Programme to the target groups in the WCA region’s needs and priorities?

Efficiency

- Integration. To what extent does the integrated programming approach enhanced efficiency/cost-efficiency of the RP? Did integration (between national, regional, inter-regional and thematic areas) take place while implementing different activities at different levels (IRDC, RP, CP, Global, sub-regional projects and national projects)? To what extent is there efficient communication and collaboration between the RP and Country Programmes? To what extent is there cooperation or overlapping with other existing UNODC programmes, such as the Paris Pact Initiative and the Afghan Opiate Trade?

- Cost-efficiency. What measures have been taken during the planning and implementation of the regional portfolio to ensure that resources are efficiently used? What are the consequences of Full Cost Recovery (FCR) and other Secretariat obligations upon the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the RP?

- Programme management. To what extent and in what ways has the organizational structure of UNODC, UNODC’s HQ based management, including UNODC’s financial and human resources management, been supporting RP’s operations? Are there any good practices or lessons learnt regarding efficiency, e.g. are certain aspects or arrangements of the portfolio particularly efficient or inefficient? To what extent has the RP helped support the streamlining of the project structures in Central Asia? To what extent have these impacted efficiency? To what extent result oriented monitoring and oversight mechanisms have been in place to correct deviations and enhance efficiency?

- To what extent do security considerations impact programme implementation?
Effectiveness

Effectiveness (at RP level)
• Results achievement. What progress has been made to the achievement of the RP outcomes (and outputs) based on evidence?
• Integration. To what degree has the RP supported the CPs and vice versa? To what extent has the RP supported the Global Programmes and vice versa? Has this resulted in better achievements and larger scope of interventions, e.g., enhanced reduction of opiate production and trafficking?
• Governance. How effective is the RP governance system in building and strengthening partnerships?
• Comparative advantage. What is the value-add of the RP in the West and Central Asia region?
• Future planning. To what extent would it be valuable for the RP to consider expanding its mandate beyond counter-narcotics?
• Recommendations implementation. To what extent has the RP been affected by the various review processes carried out within the region (i.e., OIOS audits and IDM)?

Effectiveness (at SP level)
• Results achievement. Have the sub-programmes of the RP made progress, vis-à-vis their objectives and results (outcomes and outputs considering relevant indicators)? To what extent have the sub-programmes of the RP contributed to enhancing regional and international cooperation within the four substantive areas?
• What are the challenges and opportunities for the RP interventions at the SP level in the future?

Sustainability

• Ownership. How has the ownership of key stakeholders in the country been sought and institutionalized? Are national and regional counterparts/international partners committed to continue working towards the RP objectives till the end of the programme and beyond?
• Regional context. To what extent will the 2014 Transition impact RP interventions and how has UNODC prepared for that? To what extent is UNODC transferring knowledge and activities to recipient countries, ensuring sustainability in light of the 2014 Transition? What are the prospects for sustainability of UNODC operations in WCA? How could they improve?
ANNEXES

❯ Partnerships

- Development and sustainability. How, and to what extent, was the RP conducive to the development of (existing and new) partnerships at the bilateral, regional and international level, including through initiatives such as the Istanbul Process?

- Regional. What role does UNODC play between the regional countries in terms of facilitating dialogue, promoting international standards and brokering opportunities for technical cooperation?

- Civil society. What roles did the RP play working with civil society organizations as well as academia and building partnerships with them?

- UN integration. To what extent has the RP been effective in developing partnerships with the wider UN family and other regional partners such as OSCE?

❯ Human rights mainstreaming

- To what extent have human rights principles been integrated into the delivery of technical assistance under the RP, bearing in mind local circumstances?

- Which groups benefited and which groups contributed to the interventions under review?

- To what extent were power relations among duty bearers and right holders changed as a result of UNODC interventions?

- How feasible is to have the RP as a means to introduce human rights (in LE) related standards for the whole region?

❯ Potential Impact

- To what extent is policy level impact being actuated by the RP?

- To what extent is the regional portfolio of interventions in the process of contributing, to long-term impact for its beneficiaries, target groups, communities involved, and institutions related to the programme?

- To what extent is UNODC portfolio of projects in the process of contributing to MDGS in the region?

❯ Innovation

- To what extent have interventions under the RP been innovative?
• To what extent have systems under the RP been innovative?
• What have been the costs and benefits of innovations under the RP?

Lessons learned

Lessons learned are a key component of any knowledge management system and they are important for continuously improving the performance of organizations like UNODC. Sometimes these lessons will be derived from success and sometimes they will be derived from areas where there is room for improvement.

The purpose of a lesson learnt is to see what works and what does not. Lessons can be success stories that should be repeated or they can be areas in which change towards improvement is to take place. They can offer advice on how to improve processes (how things were done) or products (outputs).

The evaluation report should focus on the most important lessons, especially those with wider applicability and those that have the following characteristics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHECKLIST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge can be applied to future activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting evidence is relevant: the more rigorous the evidence and the greater the triangulation of sources, the more meaningful the lesson is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation is concise and clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context is relevant for future activities in the area or can be adapted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear application domain and target users are defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggested practices and guiding actions are proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The “why” question is addressed.</td>
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This evaluation is interested to explore lessons learned in some key topics that are illustrated by the following questions:

a) What lessons can be learned from the implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the future?

139 Like recommendations, lessons learnt should be SMART and, in addition, clear, relevant, targeted and actionable
b) What best practices emerged from the implementation of the regional portfolio?

c) Can these best practices be realistically replicated?

d) What lessons can be drawn from unintended results?

e) What lessons can be drawn from the working arrangements with partners (global, regional, and national)?

f) What lessons can be drawn from the engagement with civil society and private sector stakeholders?

5. Evaluation methodology

This evaluation will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TORs and the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, structured interviews, as well as other sources to be established by the evaluators. These could be primary data coming from focus groups, questionnaires, surveys, or secondary data stemming from other entities.

The evaluation should involve multiple perspectives with a clear, views and assessments both within and outside the UNODC. *Special attention should be paid to triangulation of different sources and types of data and other information, types of methods and analysis to enhance reliability of the evaluation findings.* All evaluations of the United Nations system are guided by the *principles of human rights* and *gender equality*. Evaluation methods that are gender-sensitive and methods that explicitly address issues of marginalized, hard-to-reach and vulnerable populations are essential for conducting this evaluation. It is important that the evaluation assesses and determines the effects of outcomes and impacts (intended or unintended) in different types of duty bearers and right holders in disaggregated fashion with special consideration of the ones in most vulnerable positions.

As part of the desk review, which will lead to an Inception Report, the evaluators will use documents produced under the CP and RP, including Programme and Project Documents and work plans, reports of missions and activities, steering committee and task force meetings minutes, Semi Annual and Annual Progress Reports, research studies and reports, strategic documents, reports received from national counterparts as well as previous evaluation/audit exercises.

The evaluators will further elaborate on the evaluation methodology and further refine the evaluation questions in the Inception Report, determining thereby the exact focus and approach for the exercise, including developing the sampling strategy and identifying the sources and methods for data collection. The methodology should align with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards.

The *sampling strategy* will guarantee the highest degree of representation of the portfolio that the evaluation comprises, recognizing the limitations of the portfolio; the sample is to be representative of what is done by UNODC in the region.
The Evaluation Team is expected to deliver the Inception Report as one of the key deliverables prior to the field mission, and share it with the programme manager and the Independent Evaluation Unit for comments. The inception report should ensure that the stakeholders have a common understanding of how the evaluation will be conducted. The Evaluation Team is responsible for the development of the inception report before departing for field missions.

The evaluation will make use of structured interviews with: (i) Senior Management and selected staff at HQ in Vienna in particular from the regional and thematic branches; (ii) managers, national counterparts and officials who participated in the Programme Steering Committee(s); (iii) representatives of donor countries; and the (iv) RP Secretariat.

The evaluation team will develop a methodology to take advantage of (i) the Regional Programme Retreat (from 9 to 15 June 2014) which will bring together the geographically dispersed Regional Programme team into one location and would be used as a case study to evaluate the RP governance mechanism.

The RP evaluation will utilize the findings from the mid-term evaluations of the country programmes for Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, but also the evaluations of the Paris Pact Initiative (GLOK31), the Integrated Programming Approach, the Afghanistan cluster evaluations and other evaluations in Central Asia. It should be noted that the evaluation of the Afghan Opiates Trade Programme (GLOV20) will be ongoing during the same period of time. All of these should have been completed (or at least the initial findings identified) by the start of the RP evaluation – to inform its analysis of efficiency, relevance and effectiveness. As it will not be possible to visit all eight countries party to the RP, efforts will be made to solicit their inputs through surveys/questionnaires (to be elaborated in the inception report).

### 6. Timeframe and deliverables

RP evaluation will begin in May 2014 over a period of four months carried out by three international evaluation experts, and UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) staff member.

The evaluators will have the overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of all deliverables, as specified below:

- Manage the evaluation process and ensure that the deliverables are meeting quality standards as per UNODC and UNEG guidelines;
- Draft an Inception Report, containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools;
- Present preliminary evaluation findings and recommendations to internal and external key stakeholders;
- Draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and guidelines;
- Consider and include comments received from the various consultative processes (IEU, internal and external);

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- Finalize the evaluation report;
- Develop and present final evaluation results to stakeholders (location TBC); and
- Possibly develop and conduct an evaluation learning workshop to internal UNODC management (location TBC).

Following the desk review, the Evaluation Team will travel to Vienna to receive briefings and conduct first interviews at UNODC HQs. The field mission to Dushanbe, Astana, Tashkent and Bishkek is scheduled for May/June 2014 for a period of 3 weeks.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Involved/Location</th>
<th>Deliverables</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of the TOR</td>
<td>25th April</td>
<td>IEU/COAFG/Core learning partners</td>
<td>TORs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEU Selection and Hiring of Consultants</td>
<td>16th May</td>
<td>IEU/COAFG/HRMS</td>
<td>Contracts of consultants signed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Evaluation team undertakes desk review and prepares Inception report | 17th May - 23rd May | Evaluation team Home based/HQ Vienna | Inception report and Evaluation tools  
List of adapted questions                   |
| Evaluation team’s Mission to UNODC HQ       | 26th May – 30th May | Evaluation team UNODC/HQ;                   | Presentation/Debriefing                                                       |
| Evaluation team’s Field Missions            | 31th May - 15th June | Evaluation team Countries/Cities: Tajikistan/Dushanbe for SP1&2&4 (31 May-3June); Uzbekistan/Tashkent for SP1&4 (4-8 June); Kazakhstan/Astana for SP3 (4-8 June); Kyrgyzstan/Bishkek for retreat (9-15 June). | Presentations/Debriefings                                                    |
| Evaluation team Drafting of the evaluation report | 15th June-10th July | Evaluation team Home based                  | Draft evaluation report 1.0                                                   |
| IEU quality assessment                      | 11th July - 14th July | IEU/ HQ                                     | Quality assessment Sheet and comments                                         |
| Evaluation team addressing comments of IEU  | 15th July - 17th July | Evaluation team Home based                  | Draft Evaluation report 1.1                                                  |
| IEU submission to                           | 18th July - 31st | Country Offices/HQ                          | Comments and suggestions                                                     |
7. Evaluation team composition

The mid-term evaluation of the RP will be carried out by three International Independent Evaluation Experts identified by UNODC through a competitive selection process and cleared by IEU. The team (gender based and multicultural) will be composed of:

1. A team leader with background on evaluation and RBM;
2. Two Evaluation experts; and
3. A staff member from IEU.

Costs associated with the evaluators will be borne by the RP projects.

The experts shall act independently, in line with UNEG Ethical Guidelines and in their individual capacities and not as representatives of any government or organization that may present a conflict of interest. Members of the evaluation team must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the project under evaluation.

The consultants are contracted by UNODC. The qualifications and responsibilities for each team member are specified in the respective job descriptions attached to these Terms of Reference (Annex 2).
The main responsibilities of the evaluators for the evaluation exercise include:

- Coordinate the evaluation process;
- Carry out the desk review;
- Develop the inception report (including sample size and sampling technique);
- Draft the inception report and finalize evaluation methodology incorporating relevant comments;
- Implement quantitative tools and analyze data;
- Triangulate data and test rival explanations;
- Present the preliminary findings to UNODC management and CLPs—consider comments received from the audience;
- Draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy;
- Finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received;
- Ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled;
- Prepare PowerPoint presentation and present evaluation findings and recommendations;
- Possibly conduct a learning workshop with key internal UNODC interlocutors to absorb and advance evaluation findings and recommendations.

IEU staff will have the overall responsibility for the quality and timely delivery of all activities and reports, and for liaising with the UNODC units and Member States.

All evaluators will be contracted by UNODC and cannot have previous, current or foreseen involvement with any of the related activities of the RP that are under evaluation.

The evaluators will not act as representatives of any party, must remain independent and impartial, and should take into consideration local customs and religious beliefs.

8. Management of the evaluation process

Management Arrangements

The independent evaluation will be carried out following UNODC’s evaluation policy and UNEG Norms and Standards. The evaluation team will work closely with UNODC’s IEU.

Independent Evaluation Unit

The evaluation is managed by the IEU, which provides quality assurance through the provision of guidelines, formats, assistance, advice and clearance on key deliverables during the evaluation process. IEU further ensures that the evaluation conforms to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards.

In particular, the IEU guides the process of this evaluation, endorses the TOR, approves the selection of the proposed evaluation team and liaises closely with evaluators throughout the entire evaluation process. IEU comments on and approves the evaluation methodology and provides methodological support throughout the evaluation; IEU comments on the draft report, endorses the quality of the final report, supports the process of issuing a management response,
if needed, and participates in disseminating the final report to stakeholders within and outside of UNODC.

Although a staff from the IEU will be part of the evaluation team, the Evaluation Officer located in Kabul will support the evaluation process in terms of logistics and background information only. Mindful of the involvement in the RP of the Evaluation Officer located in Kabul, her involvement will be limited to avoid any potential conflict of interest.

a) Field Office

The RP Secretariat in Kabul is responsible for overlooking and supervising the evaluation process. The field office will provide all facilities including transportation, translation and office space, etc. While travelling in the region, the field offices in those selected countries will arrange and provide all support.

The Sub-Programme Coordinators will be responsible for the provision of desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the evaluation methodology, liaising with national counterparts for the meetings required as well as reviewing the draft report and developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations.

The respective regional UNODC Field Offices will provide support to the Evaluation Team before, during and after the field missions. The required support will include, for example, provision of assistance in setting up meetings with key informants and stakeholders in consultation with the Team Leader, supporting in all logistical matters (including local translation, in-country travel, security, and accommodation), making available all relevant project materials to the Evaluation Team, and arranging discussions with Field Office staff and the Evaluation Team.

b) Programme Manager

The RP Secretariat in Kabul is responsible for the provision of desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the evaluation methodology, informing CLPs – in particular government officials and other local partners – of their role, as well as reviewing the inception report, draft and final report, and developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations. Management will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluator including arranging the field missions. For the field missions, the evaluators liaise with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate. The RP Secretariat will also be responsible for drafting the management response if needed.

c) Core Learning Partners

Core Learning Partners Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers in consultation with IEU. Members of the CLP are selected from the key stakeholder groups, including UNODC management, mentors, beneficiaries, partner organizations and donor Member States. The CLPs are asked to comment on key steps of the evaluation and act as facilitators with respect to the dissemination and application of the results and other follow up action.

9. Payment modalities
The evaluators will be issued a consultancy contract and paid in accordance with United Nations rules and procedures. Payment will be made upon the receipt of the following deliverables:

1. Inception Report, containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools (in line with norms, tools and guidelines of IEU and to be cleared by IEU) – 20% of the consultancy fee.


3. Final Evaluation Report, including annexes, presentation and brief – 50% of the consultancy fee.

75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance, before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completed travel claim forms.

**10. Annexes**

Annex 1. Description of sub-programmes falling under the RP


Annex 3. List of background documents for the desk review

Annex 4. List of CLP Members (names and titles)
ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES, RETREAT INSTRUMENTS AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

**Interview Guide: UNODC**\(^{144}\)

**Introduction**: UNODC has asked us to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2011 – 2014. The evaluation is focusing on: 1) What have been the major achievements to date; 2) How the RP can be improved and 3) What lessons have been learned/good practices identified. In order to do this the evaluation team will interview a variety of stakeholders both at HQ and in the field. As part of the evaluation, your feedback on the regional program is very important.

Your feedback, whether positive or negative, will contribute to improve the RP and future UNODC initiatives. Your responses will be kept confidential. You do not have to answer a question if you do not wish to do so; we can stop the interview when you wish.

Only summaries and/or non-attributable quotes will be presented in the final Evaluation Report (any quotations being attributed to “a generic descriptive category”).

Thank you in advance for contributing to this evaluation.

**Background**

1. What is your involvement with the RP?

**Design**

2. Is the design of the RP technically sound?
3. What was the reason for the various programme revisions?
4. Does the RP need to make design changes?
5. Is a regional programming approach still relevant?

**Relevance**

6. Are the objectives of RP aligned with other regional initiatives and actors?

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\(^{144}\) This guide is indicative of the various interview guides that were designed for the different stakeholder groups.
Efficiency
7. How do internal UNODC factors affect efficiency?
8. How realistic were the RP’s timelines (2012-2015)?
9. How useful has the Expense Monitoring Mechanism (EMS) been?

Effectiveness
10. What has the RP achieved (outcomes)?

Sustainability
11. Are the RP’s efforts sustainable?

Partnerships
12. Are partners engaged and what level?

Gender & Human Rights Mainstreaming
13. To what extent were gender/human rights considered in the formulation of the RP?

Potential Impact
14. What is considered to be the difference the RP has made to date?

Innovation
15. To what extent have interventions under the RP been innovative?

Cross-cutting Issues
16. Are there any strategic/cross-cutting issues you would like to address?
   Transition
17. How will the 2014 transition affect regional programme?
   Illicit-economy debate
18. How does the RP try to influence the illicit economy debate?
   Inter-Regional Drug Approach
19. What role has the RP played in the Inter-regional Drug Approach?
   Security Challenges
20. How does the RP deal with the security challenges?
   Full cost recovery
21. What implications does the FCR model have on the RP?
   Good Practices
22. What good practices have been identified in the course of the life of the RP?
Shortcomings

23. Are there any deficiencies/challenges that the RP needs to overcome?
24. How have shortcomings been addressed?

Lessons Learned

25. Are there any lessons learned through the implementation of the RP that may be useful to others?

Recommendations

26. What would you recommend in terms of improving the RP?

Do you have any additional comments or suggestions?

THANK YOU!

The West and Central Asia region is affected by significant poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and illicit trafficking of opiates which create multiple challenges for countries of the region and beyond. The UNODC Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (RP AFG) is a strategic framework for UNODC’s engagement in the region and it is designed to provide a platform for better coordination and facilitation of counter-narcotics efforts across the region, bringing coherence to activities conducted by UNODC.

The Independent Evaluation Unit of UNODC is in the process of undertaking the in-depth mid-term independent evaluation of the RP AFG to assess the progress made by the RP since January 2012 in achieving its objectives and to inform future decision making.

As a stakeholder of the RP AFG, your views are very important to this evaluation. To this effect, the independent evaluation team would appreciate your assistance by completing this short questionnaire on the RP AFG. Although the evaluation team appreciates that some respondents will be interviewed in the near future, we would be grateful for your responses to this brief questionnaire in order to draw quantitative data.

Confidentiality
Your participation is anonymous which means that your responses cannot be traced back to you in any way. Your identity and/or organizational affiliation will not be revealed in reports, presentations, or articles and will not be recognizable to anyone.

Thank you very much for your participation!

Q1. What is your role with regards to the RP AFG? Tick the relevant boxes
UNODC staff
Government counterpart
Donor
UN agency partner
NGO partner

Q2. Which Sub- Programme (SP) are you part of or contributing to? Tick the relevant boxes
SP1 - Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation
SP2 - International/Regional Cooperation in Legal Matters
SP3 - Prevention and Treatment of Addiction Among Vulnerable Groups
SP4 - Trends and Impacts

Q3. Over the period of your involvement with the RP AFG, has your engagement with the Programme....
Greatly increased
Increased
Remained the same
Decreased
Greatly decreased

Q3.1 Please explain why:

Q4. Since January 2012, how effective has the RP AFG been in coordinating and facilitating regional cooperation?
Very good
Good
Acceptable
Poor
Very poor

Q4.1 Further comments:

Q5. Since January 2012, how effective has the RP AFG been in bringing coherence to activities conducted by UNODC?
Very good
Good
Acceptable
Poor
Very poor

**Q5.1 Further comments:**

**Q6. Since January 2012, how effective has the RP AFG been in allocating its resources to other UNODC projects/programmes of the region?**
Very good
Good
Acceptable
Poor
Very poor

**Q6.1 Further comments:**

**Q7. Since January 2012, how effective has the RP AFG been in providing technical assistance for regional cooperation?**
Very good
Good
Acceptable
Poor
Very poor

**Q7.1 Further comments:**

**Q8. Tick the boxes of the RP AFG roles you believe are being effectively delivered by the RP**
- Introduce new and innovative regional activities that complement UNODC country programmes and benefit RP member countries
- Complement coverage of UNODC global programmes
- Fill in gaps in UNODC country programmes in critical areas where needed
- None of the above
- Other, please specify

**Q8.1 Further comments:**

**Q9. In your views, did the existence of the RP AFG increase, decrease or didn’t make any difference for the overall UNODC effectiveness in the region?**
Increase
Decrease
Neither

**Q9.1 Further comments**

**Q10. In your views, how efficient do you find the RP governance system?**
Very good
Good
Acceptable
Poor
Very poor

**Q10.1 Why?**

**Q11. Do you consider that the RP human resources are adequate to deliver the programme?**
Yes
No
Partially
I don't know

**Q11.1 Please explain**
Q12. Do you consider that the RP financial resources are adequate to deliver the programme?
Yes
No
Partially
I don't know

Q12.1 Please explain

Q13. In your views, is the illicit economy debate absorbed within the RP?
Yes
No
Partially
I don't know

Q13.1 Please explain

Q14. Considering the Inter-Regional Drug Control Approach, is the regional response to the Afghan drug problem - through the RP - still relevant?
Yes
No
Partially
I don't know

Q14.1 Please explain

Q15. In your views, how efficient is the RP AFG preparation for the 2014 Transition?
Very good
Good
Acceptable
Poor
Very poor
I don't know

Q15.1 Please explain

Q16. Tick the boxes of the programmes with which the RP is coordinating efficiently in your views?
Legal Advisory Programme - GLO900
Container Control Programme - GLOG80
Paris Pact Initiative, Phase III & IV - GLOK31 & GLOY09
Afghan Opiate Trade Programme - GLOV20
Prevention of drug use, HIV/AIDS and crime among young people through family skills training programmes in low- and middle-income countries - GLOK01
Support to crime prevention and criminal justice reform - GLOT63
None of the above

Q16.1 Please explain why and list any other programme you believe the RP is coordinating efficiently with.

Q17. Would you consider that integration between the RP AFG and the below Country Programmes has happened? Tick the respective boxes.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Neutral   Agree   Strongly Agree
CP Pakistan
CP Iran
CP Afghanistan

Q17.1 Any further comment:

Q18. In your views, what would be the implications of the Full Cost Recovery model for the RP?
Positive
Negative
Both
Neither
I don’t know

Q18.1 Please explain.

Q19. Would you consider contributing funds to the RP in the future?
Definitely
Probably
Possibly
Unlikely
Never

Q19.1 Why?

Q20. How satisfied were you with the level of support you received from the RP?
Totally satisfied
Mostly satisfied
Acceptable
Mostly unsatisfied
Totally unsatisfied

Q20.1 Further comments
**RP Most Significant Change Example**

**Introduction**: This template will assist you in drafting the most significant change stories identified during the RP retreat. Remember to provide sufficient information so as to allow a reader that is not familiar with the RP to understand the significance of the story. Create a separate document for each story, aiming for a maximum of 800 words.

Please use:
- the third person narrative style;
- a 12-point Times New Roman font, single-spaced format;

| SP# | Story “title”:
|-----|-----------------
|     | Background/Context: (describe the situation before RP actions took place; +/- 200 words)
|     | 
|     | **RP Intervention**: (describe the actions the RP took that can be credited as having led to the significant change taking place; +/- 150 words)
|     | 
|     | **Significant Change**: (describe what change occurred, answering the “so what” question; +/- 400 words)
|     | 
|     | **Potential**: (describe the possible long term effects of the change; +/- 50 words)
RP Evaluation Recommendations Exercise

**Introduction:** As part of the utilization-focused evaluation approach adopted by the RP evaluation team, it is of critical importance to engage the key stakeholders (the “primary intended users” of the evaluation) at various stages of the evaluation. One of these is the generation of possible viable recommendations in order to provide a basis for discussion with the evaluators. Your perspectives on the RP are very important and the evaluation team will take into consideration your suggestions.

**Task:** Suggest viable recommendations based on your shared experiences and knowledge that can help improve the RP moving forward and overcome the challenges being faced. You will be asked to present the recommendations to the group.

- The recommendations must identify to whom they are addressed, and if possible, by when they should be implemented.
- The viability of the recommendations is important; if they are “challenging” but realistic, that is ok.
- Use bullet points
- If there is no consensus, then mention the differences

Please organize the recommendations under the headings found in the “Challenges Menu”, although you are free to add more categories.

**Challenges Menu**

**Conceptual**
- RP Design
  - Timeline of RP (ends 2015)
  - Political value of RP for UNODC positioning in region versus implementation value
  - Strategic approach (advocacy to leverage linkages between CN and development agenda; policy facilitation; technical expertise; sharing lessons)

**Administrative**
- Administrative processes
  - Recruitment
  - Fund realisation
  - Project revisions
- Staff structure and workload
- Financial & HR resources to enable delivery

**Implementation**
- RP-CP Coordination (also RP-CP-HQ)
o Management work flow
  o Communications
• Partnerships with other UN agencies, NGOs
• Diversity & complexity of region
  o Languages, legal traditions
  o Variety in capacity of CLPs
  o Managing expectations
  o Difficulties accessing data
• Monitoring & Reporting
  o Ability to demonstrate impact

Communication
• Internal
• External

Sustainability
• Sustainability of RP results

Cross-cutting Issues
• Transition 2014
• Illicit-economy debate
• Inter-Regional Drug Approach
• Security Challenges
• Full cost recovery
• Human Rights & Gender
ANNEX III.  DESK REVIEW LIST

- Regional Programme Document 2011-2014
- Approved project documents and project revisions
- Sub-Programme Work plans
- Semi, and Annual Project Progress Reports
- Minutes of the Task Force meetings
- Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings
- RP Strategic Priorities 2012
- RP Strategic Priorities 2013
- Donor Agreements
- Donor Reports
- Field assessment, monitoring reports, notes for the files, etc.
- Press releases
- Proposals/Concept notes
- National Drug Control Strategies/Policies – all eight RP countries
- Mission reports and other relevant documents
- AML Rapid Assessment Reports
- Meetings/trainings evaluation forms
- Regional Programme Implementation Strategy, August 2012
- Discussion Paper on Elements for the development of a UNODC enhanced integrated regional and inter-regional drug and crime control approach
- Regional Programme Baseline Report, Situation Analysis, February 2012
- Initial Assessment Report on the Capabilities of the Forensic Drugs Laboratories in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics
- Inter-regional Drug Control Approach
- Asia project evaluations
- IDM and audit reports in the region
- Illicit economy documentation
- Full cost recovery documentation
### ANNEX IV. PERSONS INTERVIEWED

**Vienna-based stakeholders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Title</th>
<th>Organization and Section</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Gilberto Gerra, Chief, Drug Prevention and Health Branch (DO/DHB)</td>
<td>(SP3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Fariba Soltani, Expert, HIV/AIDS Section, (DO/DHB/HAS)</td>
<td>(SP3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Irmgard Zeiler, Research Expert, Statistics and Surveys Section, (DPA/RAB/SASS)</td>
<td>(SP4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Janie Shelton, Consultant, Statistics and Surveys Section, (DPA/RAB/SASS)</td>
<td>(SP4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Janie Shelton, Consultant, Statistics and Surveys Section, (DPA/RAB/SASS)</td>
<td>(SP4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Alexandre Schmidt, Chief, Regional Section for Europe, West &amp; Central Asia and Representative for South Eastern Europe (DO/IPB/RSEWCA)</td>
<td>(all SP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Irka Kuleshnyk, Chief, Implementation Support Section I (DTA/TPB/ISS I)</td>
<td>(SP2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Angela Me, Chief, Research and Trend Analysis Branch, (DPA/RAB)</td>
<td>(SP4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Andrea Mancini, Programme Officer, West and Central Asia Team, (DO/IPB/RSEWCA/WCAT)</td>
<td>(all SP)</td>
<td>(Phone interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Anja Korenblik, Programme Management Officer, Studies and Threat Analysis Section, (DPA/RAB/STAS)</td>
<td>(SP4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Marie-Anne Menier, Paris Pact Coordinator, Paris Pact Programme/Coordination Unit (DO/IPB/PP)</td>
<td>(SP4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Francesca Massanello, Consultant, Paris Pact Coordination Unit, (DO/IPB/PP)</td>
<td>(SP4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dimitri Vlassis, Chief, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch (DTA/CEB)</td>
<td>(SP2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Brigitte Strobel-Shaw, Chief, Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Katharina Kayser, Chief, Independent Evaluation Unit (OED/IEU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Mission of Norway, Ms. Martina Osterhus, First Secretary, Mr. Kristian Oedegaard, Minister Counsellor</td>
<td>(SP 2 + 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Irka Kuleshnyk, Chief, Implementation Support Section I (DTA/TPB/ISS I)</td>
<td>(SP2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Oleksiy Feschenko, Programme Officer, Anti Money Laundering law Enforcement Adviser, Implementation Support Section (DTA/OCB/ISS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MID-TERM IN-DEPTH EVALUATION: REGIONAL PROGRAMME FOR AFGHANISTAN AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES (2011-2015)

Support Section (DTA/CEB/CSS) (SP2)
Ms. Candice Welsch, Chief, Implementation Support Section (DTA/CEB/ISS) (SP2)
Ms. Cecile Plunet, Programme Officer, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch (DTA/CEB) (SP2)

16:15 Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harry MacDonald, First Secretary (SP4)

Site visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shamsiddin Nurov</td>
<td>Head of the Department on Financial Monitoring of the National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karomatullo Jonmahmedov</td>
<td>Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deuty Head of the Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on Financial Monitoring of</td>
<td>the National Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the National Bank of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustam Nazarov</td>
<td>Director of the Drug Control Agency under the President of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahmonov Eraj</td>
<td>Head (Department of Combating Drug Trafficking &amp; Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qosimov Olimkhuja</td>
<td>Offences and Inquiries/Customs Service under the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makhmazoda Haydar</td>
<td>of the Republic of Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuhrat Mammadmurodov</td>
<td>Head (Department of Combating Drug Trafficking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Head (Department of Combating Customs Offences and Inquiries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Inspector (International Customs Cooperation Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azimjon Abruev</td>
<td>Senior Prosecutor of the General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saidrahim Jumaev</td>
<td>GPO Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdusami Dadobaev</td>
<td>Head of GPO International Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kazakhstan

<p>| Ms. Altyana Yeskalieva         | Director of the Republican Research Centre on Drug Addiction    |
| SP3 team                       | under the Ministry of Health (Pavlodar)                         |
| Ms. Aiman Belguzhanova         | Programme coordinator of NGO Umit (Karaganda)                   |
| Mr. Almas Kussainov           | Deputy Director of the Republican Centre on psychiatry,         |
| psychotherapy and necrology under the Ministry of Health       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Yelena Vaganova</td>
<td>Head of inter-agency coordination of the Counter narcotics Committee under MIA (Astana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Milsom</td>
<td>Senior Programme Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakhrulla Azamov</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAU team</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR Team</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement team</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice team</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Alymkulov &amp; Deputy Chairman State Service on Drug Control (SSDC)</td>
<td>State Service on Drug Control (SSDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Cesar Guedes</td>
<td>UNODC Representative, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX V. SUB PROGRAMME 3 CHECKLIST

Assessment of the comprehensive package of interventions for prevention of HIV/AIDS.\textsuperscript{145}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONAL OVERVIEW</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>POLICY OVERSIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The nine interventions in the comprehensive package delivered</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 : Needle and syringe programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 : Opioid substitution therapy and other drug dependence treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 : HIV testing and counselling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 : Antiretroviral therapy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 : Prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted infections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 : Condom programmes for people who inject drugs and their sexual partners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 : Targeted information, education and communication for people who inject drugs and their sexual partners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 : Vaccination, diagnosis and treatment of viral hepatitis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 : Prevention, diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX VI. RP THEORY OF CHANGE (HIGH-LEVEL VIEW)
ANNEX VII. SP1 THEORY OF CHANGE
ANNEX IX. SP3 THEORY OF CHANGE

Comprehensibility understanding of HIV & Blood borne virus (BBV) risks and transmission in society

Good understanding of associated HIV/AIDS risks with drug use

Good understanding of national picture of drug use in each RP country

Comprehensibility understanding of level of epidemiological evidence required for planning comprehensive drugs services

Mapping of drug use and service provision in localities

Good understanding of HIV/AIDS and other bloodborne viruses associated with drug injecting

Policy makers exposed to global evidence on good practice and services provision

Collection of good quality local data on HIV and other bloodborne viruses

Collection of good quality local data on drug use for decision making

Collection of good quality local data on HIV/AIDS incidence and prevalence rates

Education of policy makers on the risks of HIV/AIDS spread to and from drug users

Identification of need for comprehensive drug prevention programme

Adoption of UNODC STANDARDS

Support for comprehensive drug prevention programmes development

Agreement on need for a range of different treatment modalities

Agreement on evidence based Drug Treatment and Care Services Policy

Agreement on need to stop and reverse spread of HIV/AIDS in drug users and general population and policy directed towards this

Agreement on rights of drug users to access treatment unimpaired

Increase capacity to deliver comprehensive drug treatment services and prevent spread of drug related HIV/AIDS

Contribute to Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases

Begin to impact MDG 6: Target 7 now halved by 2015 & began to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS in regional programme member states
ANNEX X. SP4 THEORY OF CHANGE
Table 1: SP3 Evaluation questionnaire with partnership and policy target points for 8 RP nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIV/AIDS and associated risk control interventions N=8</th>
<th>Health Ministries</th>
<th>Criminal Ministries</th>
<th>Joint Health and Criminal Justice ministerial remit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Needle Syringe Programme</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opioid Substitution</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS Control responsible department</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiretroviral Therapy responsible department</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condom distribution</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/Awareness raising</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis B and C control responsible department</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis control responsible department</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Infections responsible department</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: SP3 Evaluation questionnaire national HIV/AIDS control provision policy points for 8 RP nations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIV/AIDS and associated risk control interventions (N=8)</th>
<th>Intervention Provided</th>
<th>Intervention Not Provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Needle Syringe Programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opioid Substitution</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS testing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antiretroviral Therapy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Condom distribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education/Awareness raising</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hepatitis B and C control</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis control</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Infections</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: The size of the HIV epidemic Data by country.**  
(Bold are Afghan refugee/returnee host countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RP member state</th>
<th>Number of people of all ages living with HIV [estimation parameters]</th>
<th>Number of people of all ages living with HIV [estimation parameters]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2600 [1100-7700]</td>
<td>4300 [1600-14,000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>42,000 [29,000-61,000]</td>
<td>71,000 [53,000-100,000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2900 [2000-4500]</td>
<td>8700 [6000-13,000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>27,000 [19,000-48,000]</td>
<td>87,000 [50,000-160,000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>5,600 [3700-9300]</td>
<td>12,000 [6900-24,000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>35,000 [27,000-47,000]</td>
<td>30,000 [23,000-40,000]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WHO Global Health Observatory Data Repository  
[Accessed 18/07/2014 at http://apps.who.int/gho/data/?theme=main&vid=22100]
ANNEX XII: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE RP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding or Recommendation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CP design is noteworthy as it transformed the UNODC-GOP partnership from implementing a series of relatively small ‘stand-alone’ projects to a more substantial and coherent programme of work enabling COPAK to be more flexible and responsive towards emerging needs and opportunities. For these reasons, it has served as a model for the development of similar integrated country and regional programmes (RP). This is particularly significant as, at the time, no detailed guidelines for moving from a project- to a programme-based approach existed.</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There are still disconnects between the RP and the CP, which are not dependent in terms of their implementation – to date the CP has been largely self-managed and self-sustained. While the RP provides resources to the CP and claims to (i) introduce new regional activities, (ii) complement coverage of global programmes, and (iii) fill in gaps in some CP thematic areas, there is a perception among COPAK staff that the RP is primarily a gap-filler. Part of the reason for this may be that there is no international decentralised RP management position in COPAK while this has taken place in some other Field Offices of the region. In addition, the linkages between the two programmes need to be better outlined in their respective M&amp;E systems.</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence shows that the CP has made progress in achieving its outcomes and increasing the quality of UNODC’s support to Pakistan. The CP has been instrumental in raising the profile of drug and crime issues in Pakistan through extensive capacity-building training and workshops, various roundtables and discussion platforms and evidence-based research and advocacy. Although there remains room for stronger integration, the effectiveness of the CP has also been somewhat enhanced through partnerships with other internal initiatives, e.g. with the RP, the Global Container Control Programme (CCP), the Paris Pact Initiative (PPI), the Afghan Opiate Trade Project (AOTP), the HIV/AIDS Prevention Programme, and the UNODC-World Health Organization (WHO) Programme on Drug Dependence Treatment and Care. These have provided additional channels for funding as well as expertise.</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPI has delivered technical assistance to several GOP agencies. Significant output achievements as verified through triangulation of sources were as follows: established 34 Computer-Based Training (CBT) e-Learning centres in Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) academies and institutions throughout Pakistan; provided necessary computer and ancillary equipment; delivered a core curriculum with an innovative culturally appropriate package of training modules for LEA academies; established a fully operational pilot Border Liaison Office (BLO) at the Torkham border post on the border</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with Afghanistan; drafted laws in line with the UN Model Laws against Trafficking in Persons/ Smuggling of Migrants (TIP/SOM) for GOP; advanced regional dialogue through the Triangular Initiative (TI), in partnership with the RP; and developed a voluntary code of conduct for industry to check diversion and illicit trade in precursor chemicals.

2. Over the next years following the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and the likely decline in development aid, the situation in Afghanistan will have implications for Pakistan.

2.a. UNODC (RP Secretariat, RSWCA, COPAK, COAFG, COIRA, ROCA) to lay out the various scenarios, implications and potential UNODC responses for each country of the region in the context of the post 2014 situation in Afghanistan.

2.b. COPAK in consultation with COAFG, COIRA and ROCA to align its strategic repositioning in light of the post 2014 situation with other Field Offices in the region, under the umbrella of the RP and considering the Inter-Regional Drug Control Approach.

3. Although COPAK was innovative in overcoming the challenges related to integrated programming, a stronger corporate response would have been instrumental towards efficient integration. Evidence shows that there were certain missed opportunities for synergies and integration of activities and systems at the global, regional and country programmes levels.

3. a. UNODC (OED, DO, DTA, DPA, DM, Field Offices) to further define integration between and within Global, Regional and Country Programmes at the management, systems and substance levels (roles and responsibilities), e.g. the RP should define and systematize its relationship with the CP to develop new regional activities, help complement coverage of Global Programmes in addition to its gap-filler role in order to multiply the benefits of the CP.

3. b. UNODC (IPB, COPAK, RP Secretariat) to standardise the collaboration between the Regional and the Country Programme at the operational level through appropriate systems (integrated RP-CP M&E systems) and processes of governance (reciprocal participation) and management (RP decentralised management to be located in COPAK and internal expert meetings across RP and CPs).

9. COPAK’s monitoring and evaluation systems (Smartsheet, FEBSys and IRSys) have been innovative compared to the systems available within UNODC. The Smartsheet system has been replicated in the region as well as used as a blue-print for a corporate system. Despite this, serious gaps exist in the form of linkages with global and regional programme, and systematic and comprehensive outcome and impact evaluation for all Capacity Building (CB) and training activities.

9. a. COPAK, RP Secretariat, HQ/IT to upgrade the CP monitoring and evaluation system and link it to the RP monitoring and evaluation system.

16. Under SP1, the following challenges were identified: porous borders with Afghanistan; increased illicit trafficking through the main transit routes; related transnational organized crime; geo-political instability; disjointed governance; difficult LEA collaboration due to different and overlapping mandates; low prioritization of drugs issues by national counterparts; poor communication between LEAs and laboratories; weak capacity and lack of willingness from laboratories to collaborate with UNODC which may lead in turn to question the prosecution; Weak capacities of border LEAs.

16. b. COPAK and RP Secretariat to enhance linkages between the CP and RP related to the Triangular Initiative.
25. Recommendations issued by Paris Pact expert working groups are meant to be operationalized by the RP and in turn the CPs in the region. This operational link is not clearly formalised. A major challenge for the Paris Pact Initiative lies in ensuring common understanding between Vienna and field-based government counterparts.

25. Coordination with Global Programmes:
   25. a. UNODC (Paris Pact Coordination Unit, GPML, RP Secretariat, COPAK) to undertake an analysis of the extent to which the CP is operationalizing the Paris Pact recommendations, including potential gaps.
   25. b. COPAK to continue to facilitate communication between the Paris Pact Coordination Unit and Pakistan national counterparts.
   25. c. COPAK and GPML to explore the feasibility of enhancing the Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Financing Terrorism capability within COPAK.

In terms of design, the evaluation looked into the CP as an integrated programme focusing on the national level and its linkages with the UNODC Global and Thematic Programmes, the RP and the Inter-Regional Drug Control Approach. The Evaluation Team assessed that although progress was made towards more integration between the CP and RP/Global Programmes, this integration is not utilised to its full potential. As for the newly developed Inter-Regional Drug Control Approach, the field needs to have stronger ownership.

The Paris Pact Initiative (Phase II - GLOJ33, Phase III - GLOK31 and Phase IV – GLOY09) allows Pakistan the opportunity to project regionally and internationally on counter-narcotics issues through its expert working group model as well as the more high-level annual Policy Consultative Group Meeting. Recommendations issued by Expert Working Groups (EWG) are meant to be operationalized by the RP and in turn the regional CPs. Since the end of Phase III/beginning of Phase IV of the Paris Pact project, the Paris Pact Coordination Unit and the RP have focused on improving synergies/cooperation which has most recently been demonstrated through a common ‘discussion paper’ detailing in particular which Paris Pact Expert recommendations have served as a policy/strategic guidance to identify future action areas and activities developed and operationalized under the aegis of the RP. The implementation of these activities has taken place in all RP countries including Pakistan. This being said and although several sources acknowledged that the CP is aligned with and responding to the Paris Pact recommendations (i.e. on cross border, precursors and financial flows), the Evaluation Team would welcome an analysis of the extent to which the CP is operationalizing the Paris Pact recommendations, including potential gaps (recommendation # 24).

Alignment of Country Programme with Regional Programme. The RP was launched in December 2011 and its design took into account the existing template of the Pakistan CP. Covering 8 countries – Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan - the RP was designed to “provide a platform for coordination and facilitation of counter-narcotics efforts across the region, covering activities conducted by UNODC countries of the region and international partners”. It therefore represents a framework for a wide approach to addressing issues of illicit trafficking, prevention and border management in a bid to set up mutually reinforcing mechanisms to address the issues identified in country programmes such as Pakistan’s.
The CP is aligned with the RP outcome and outputs. While the CP has a wider scope on the area of justice and development and the RP has a strong drug control focus, both programmes have been designed to be in harmony and contribute to the overall achievement of UNODC mandates. In February 2012, the IEU evaluability and results orientation mission determined, amongst other findings, that there was “a disconnect between the building blocks of the CP and RP” and there was “no clear results cascade linking country level initiatives with the RP outcomes”. Since then, there has been some movement towards better outlining the linkages between the RP and the CP. A matching of CP and RP outputs has taken place to demonstrate the interconnections between the two levels of work. While commendable, this is stand-alone and not embedded within the Smartsheet monitoring system that COPAK is utilizing and hence limited in day-to-day functionality (recommendations # 3 & 9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primarily due to the fact that the RP was designed after the CP, the CP has different outcomes and outputs that cover regional initiatives particularly on supply reduction. These include Outcome 3 on ‘Enhanced border management, including through cross-border collaboration’ as well as Output 1.5 on ‘Strengthened bilateral, regional and international arrangements for information sharing and coordinated operations.’ However, COPAK was involved in the RP design process and provided strategic inputs to the structure of the RP in order to minimize duplications and overlaps, including consultations with the government counterparts as well as organizing a mission for the RP Coordinator to meet with national counterparts in advance of the launch of the RP to secure national buy-in. For instance, this process resulted in the Triangular Initiative (TI) being subsumed under the RP in January 2012.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Overall, the logical frameworks in both the CP and RP seem heavy, implying a bureaucratic structure and, possibly, the need to satisfy/meet donor requirements in terms of reporting. In addition, the numerous outputs warrant extensive monitoring and resources to support it. It is important to note that the results cascade has not been captured at the indicator level and there has been no attempt to reconcile the means of verifications across the two programmes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In practice, although conceived as a “building block” the RP is perceived by key internal interlocutors as functioning primarily as a gap-filler, with fairly artificial integration for the following reasons:</td>
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<td>• Although the RP provides some resources to all SPs of the CP (since the start of the RP, the total funding from the RP to COPAK is about US$ 761,500), the CP has been largely self-managed and self-sustained - probably two of the main indicators of its success. The exception to this has been SP3 where the relative lack of donor pledges has been supplemented by RP funding. Overall, the self-sustainability of the CP may have affected the potential for integration (beyond utilisation of resources) with the RP.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The RP programme management structure is based on the decentralization of SP-level programme management functions to the field offices where SP Coordinators are located – i.e., the strong and centralized lead of each SP by a qualified technical expert staff, backed by the concrete capacity of the field office in which the staff is located that will ensure programme management and monitoring function at the SP level more coherently. In line with the principle of a structured distribution of responsibilities across field offices in the region, it was the intention of the RP to field the SP2 Coordinator in Islamabad after this post was initially placed in Dushanbe. This did not happen due to the fact that funding to UNODC in Tajikistan was reduced and the RP SP2 Coordinator has served for more than a year as Officer-In-Charge of the Programme Office for Tajikistan (POTAJ). Senior management decided to retain the post in Tajikistan until a new head of office is appointed and the intention to have a RP</td>
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post in Pakistan remains. Key UNODC interlocutors reflected on the need to have this position located in Pakistan as the most vulnerable country to trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan. In addition, a dedicated international RP Advisor would only add to the visibility of UNODC's work in the region and also afford more ownership by national counterparts.

- At this point, the collaboration between the RP and the CP takes place through the RP focal point in COPAK whose work-time is split between the CP and the RP. The primary role for the focal point is to channel communication between the two programmes as well as facilitate GOP participation in RP-funded events. While all indications suggest that this basic function is being carried out appropriately, a more structured and standardized approach towards collaboration would be beneficial in ensuring deeper integration and cross-fertilization between the two programmes.

- COPAK is using Smartsheet whereas the RP is piloting the UNODC ITS designed system PMM. Enhanced integration could be advanced by linking up the RP and CP M&E systems, which are presently stand-alone. It would be ideal for both programmes to use the same system (the argument would apply by extension to all RP countries) and this would allow better information exchange between the two teams and also lead to improved and integrated reporting.

- There is little communication about what other programmes (CPs and RP) are doing in the region. Information exchange takes place through individual contacts and the semi-annual and annual reports. While individual relationships between the two teams are critical to maintain, these need to be complemented by more structured means of information exchange (i.e. standardized M&E systems) so that key initiatives are not missed due to human oversight. The semi-annual and annual reports are post-fact and do not cross-reference each other's contributions to their respective outputs and outcomes sufficiently.

- There are no dedicated regional meetings of experts across Regional and Country Programmes. For cost-efficiency reasons, it was decided to conduct these in the margins of other planned RP events so that periodically UNODC experts from different field offices (and HQ) attend based on their relevance to the substantive area under discussion. However, the representation is often not inclusive of all concerned actors and without such structured discussion platforms for the experts, implementation strategies are not devised in an inclusive manner under both programmes.

In light of the above, the CP and RP are not inter-dependent in terms of their implementation, therefore the concept of “building block” does not seem to hold. UNODC should identify how the RP should multiply the benefits of the CP and formalise the RP-CP collaboration (recommendation # 3).

The CP needs to be contextualized within the hierarchy of UNODC strategic documents and in line with UNODC integrated programming approach. The programme falls under two Medium-Term Strategies (MTS) covering the period from 2008 to 2011 and from 2012 to 2015. In addition to the 4-year MTS, the programme falls under UNODC Strategic Frameworks for 2010-11 and 2012-13. Also, the CP is conceived as a building block of the RP.

Smartsheet: The Smartsheet system was fairly innovative and rolled-out in the region, through the RP (good cross-fertilisation), and used as a model for a UNODC-wide M&E system approved on 15 June 2013, called ProFi Project Management Module (PMM). Smartsheet is a web-based project management tool to monitor activities. It is used for managing regular implementation activities, producing internal and external...
reports, organising SP staff meetings, and ultimately managing information shared with HQ. In addition, the updates to Smartsheet are also reflected in the performance review of staff. Smartsheet was rolled out in the office through a series of dedicated training efforts targeted at Advisors, Outcome Managers and Associates. Smartsheet is also key in producing not only the SAPPs and APPs but also the considerable tailored reporting that is required by the multiple CP stakeholders (including through the PGC and TWG model).

The Smartsheet system has, however, the following shortcomings: it is not linked to ProFi (subject to errors and incomplete financial information), it does not measure the progress towards outcomes and impact (limited to an activity/output level management tool) and it does not capture qualitative information such as reasons for success or failure. Due to these shortcomings, the RP has outgrown the Smartsheet system. In the future, the Evaluation Team would recommend linking COPAK and RP systems (recommendation # 9).

Progress towards achievement of Outcome 1: Drug and precursor trafficking operations identified and acted upon.

Significant output achievements as verified through triangulation of sources were as follows: UNODC developed core and specialised LEA curricula and a basic human-rights based national curriculum for LEA staff on drug and precursor trafficking. A number of training courses for Border Liaison Office (BLO) staff were arranged and equipment was provided to facilitate interdictions. Awareness-raising workshops on precursors and the development of a voluntary code of conduct for industry to check diversion and illicit trade in precursor chemicals were organized and a DVD tool for precursor awareness and control was distributed to training facilities of law enforcement agencies at the federal and provincial levels, and key private pharmaceutical industry stakeholders. Importantly, the ANF Academy has been supported as a training centre of excellence through e-Learning, core curricula, as well as funded to implement a Drug Information System. Work under this Outcome has advanced Pakistan’s engagement under the TI (Output 1.5), although the TI has been subsumed under the RP.

(iii) Despite the absence of tangible outcomes, the existing cross-border collaboration between Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani officials should be considered effective as it brings together three countries that are frequently hostile to each other. Fostering networking between officials from the three countries may eventually lead to positive tangible outcomes at some later stage. Under the TI, unintended positive effects of these meetings were identified. In bringing Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran LEA together to enhance their existing capacities, trust was built and in turn the level of cooperation and coordination among participants was fostered. This is often not measured adequately and reported upon – probably as a result of the bifurcation of interventions under the CP and RP following the absorption of the TI under the RP - but should be considered as a major achievement.

The Evaluation Team identified the following areas for investment: monitoring of distribution of equipment and assessment of its utilisation by the laboratories (e.g. drug and precursors testing kits); and enhanced linkages with the CP and RP for the TI (recommendation # 16).

(ii) Some of the interventions under this outcome have been subsumed under the RP and hence an added impetus provided through the maritime trafficking initiative (MaRes) as well as the intelligence officials meetings of the TI countries. The MaRes initiative is especially commendable as the 2013 World Drug Report emphasized that a new maritime route going southwards from Afghanistan via ports in the Islamic

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<th>Progress towards achievement of Outcome 1: Drug and precursor trafficking operations identified and acted upon.</th>
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The Evaluation Team identified the following areas for investment: enhanced regional and inter-regional linkages especially utilizing the RP vehicle.

UNODC brokered the TI launched in June 2007, designed to strengthen drug control through information exchange and joint intelligence-led operations between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The TI now falls under the RP for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries and the additional resource support through the RP has provided an impetus to TI activities and helped broaden its focus.

- Drug and precursor trafficking: the CP’s ability to actuate impact in this area may be limited in and of itself. In 2013 opium cultivation and production hit record levels, resulting in a likely increase in trafficking through Pakistan. Interventions in Afghanistan – by UNODC and other actors – as well as through the RP will determine the impact under this area. This being said, the following CP outcomes may lead to small scale impact: if followed, the development of a voluntary code of practice on precursors may enhance coordination and information sharing amongst the business community and the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF); Knowledge and skills gained through the 34 CBT e-Learning centres provided the base for LEA personnel to be more effective in their work and in turn may lead to increased seizures and reduction of illicit trafficking.

- Border management: UNODC has strengthened the border management infrastructure through equipment and training as well as the establishment of a BLO. Any wider impact will only be realized through the development of strengthened structures on the other side of the border and the fostering of relationships between officials from the three countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. In that regard, working closely with other CPs and the RP will be critical.

Effectiveness: The CP has been effective as it has transformed UNODC presence in Pakistan and moved from a fragmented stand-alone project structure to a programmatic outcome driven approach. At the same time, effectiveness could have been enhanced by further integrating with the RP and Global Programmes.
## Findings and recommendations related to RP Afghanistan - IDE CP IRAN - DRAFT!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding or Recommendation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In sum, the overall objective has been achieved and there are many achievements at</td>
<td>vi</td>
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<tr>
<td>programme activity (output) level. It is very hard to measure impact at the outcome level</td>
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<td>with the current logframe: trends in drugs and crime (original objectives) or national</td>
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<tr>
<td>counterparts’ capacities (current sub-programme outcomes). Other important achievements</td>
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<td>are that each sub-programme includes international collaboration and that the Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme contributes directly to the UNODC Regional Programme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The design of the Country Programme is appropriate to the purpose, i.e. implementing a</td>
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<td>portfolio of support activities. However, for COIRA to achieve impact at the level of</td>
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<td>public policy and national strategies, a more focused portfolio and more emphasis on</td>
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<td>planning and follow up would be more appropriate. The Country Programme design is</td>
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<td>aligned with UNODC thematic programmes and the UNODC Regional Programme (which was</td>
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<td>designed after the Country Programme). The Country Programme is one of the first</td>
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<td>integrated UNODC programmes, and the integrated design enabled COIRA to be more</td>
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<td>flexible and responsive, e.g. linked activities or combined budgets across sub-</td>
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<tr>
<td>programmes. Despite the integrated design, sub-programmes are largely managed as</td>
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<td>separate projects, and the evaluation found opportunities for more synergy between and</td>
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<td>even within sub-programmes, e.g. linking transnational crime to drug control, and drug</td>
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<td>control with drug treatment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Country Programme is cost-effective, because it has been able to achieve many</td>
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<tr>
<td>outputs with a relatively small budget. Good practices regarding efficiency include joint</td>
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<td>implementation with the Regional Programme; contracting technical assistance instead of</td>
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<td>recruiting staff, and the systematic approach to innovative service package development</td>
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<td>in sub-programme 2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. COIRA to consider discontinuation of the Container Control Programme. The Global</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP and the Regional Programme could continue to invite IR of Iran to relevant events.</td>
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<td>(See also recommendation #2)</td>
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<td>11. COIRA to consider discontinuation ICE in the Country Programme. Global and Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme to invite national counterpart to relevant ICE activities. (See also</td>
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<td>recommendation #2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Insufficient progress on the Container Control Programme, due to lack of buy in from</td>
<td>xiv</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIRA to consider discontinuation of CCP in the Country Programme. Regional programme to</td>
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<tr>
<td>invite national counterpart to regional activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Insufficient progress on the ICE Programme, due to lack of interest of the</td>
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<tr>
<td>participating laboratories</td>
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<td>COIRA to consider discontinuation ICE in the Country Programme. Regional programme to</td>
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<td>invite national counterpart to regional ICE activities.</td>
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<td><em>(a) The Triangular Initiative between IR of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan was brokered</em></td>
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<td>and developed in 2007 by UNODC, and is a key platform for the Country Programme and IR of</td>
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<td>Iran. The Triangular Initiative approach is incremental and long-term to forge trust and</td>
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<td>improve cross border cooperation. Eight meetings were attended in 2011-2012: four for</td>
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<td>senior officials, two ministerial meetings, and two counter-narcotics officials meetings.</td>
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<td>The Triangular Initiative has been subsumed under the Regional Programme for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>and Neighbouring Countries and COIRA is effective in</td>
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ensuring Iran’s agreement on cooperating with the Regional Programme and was able to pave the way for Iran’s co-chairmanship of the Programme for 2013/2014. The Regional Programme has supplemented existing efforts under the Country Programme – going beyond the Triangular Initiative countries and IR of Iran to engage with countries in Central Asia.

(a) Joint Planning Cell (JPC) is an office in Tehran where Permanent Liaison Officers from IR of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan coordinate anti-trafficking efforts. In 2011, the Afghan PLO was stationed; in 2012 he left, the Pakistani PLO arrived. The Iranian PLO was stationed throughout, but has other commitments as well. Seven joint operations were successfully conducted between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan through JPC in 2011 and two series of joint operations were conducted between Afghanistan and Iran in 2012. In addition, message exchanges between the three countries have increased over the last two years. See Table 4 below.

(b) Intelligence support: UNODC provided three criminal intelligence manuals, and guidelines on the preparation and use of serious and organized crime threat assessments to ANP and Interpol in 2011. Thirty customs officers were trained in intelligence analysis in 2012. The Regional Programme has organized two Counter Narcotics Intelligence meetings bringing together Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. During these meetings, the participants shared information and intelligence on poppy cultivation, drug and precursor trafficking routes; and important groups/tribes involved in drug trafficking and heroin producing laboratories.

(d) Regional collaboration in drug demand reduction: UNODC organized a training on harm reduction and a study tour for NGOs from Afghanistan, with the support of the Iranian National Centre for Addiction Studies (INCAS). Also seven members of parliament from Kyrgyzstan visited IR Iran to observe drug treatment and harm reduction services, and proposed similar legislation after their return. UNODC also compiled a compendium of Iranian DDR institutions and national experts for the Regional Programme.

(b) “FIU to FIU programme”: The Country Programme (in certain cases, in collaboration with the Regional Programme) supported the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) through facilitation of a series of meetings and workshops. Meetings included: 1) international meetings with Brazil, Tajikistan, Slovenia FIU to sign MoUs; 2) meeting with Russian FIU to exchange bilateral Letters of Intent; 4) meetings with Polish Embassy and Ukraine FIU to pave the way for more structured collaboration, and 5) participation in “Triangular Meeting of the FIUs of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan”. Workshops included 1) a regional workshop on “Cooperation between FIUs” in central Asia; 4) an FIU workshop by international expert on “Anti Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism”; 3) training for financial institutions, professions on “Preventive and Administrative Measures on Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism”; 4) a workshop on “Methods and Techniques of Detection, Reporting, Analysis and Dissemination of Suspicious Transactions” for 92 officials from FIU, other financial institutions, and law enforcements agencies.

(c) Computer-based training course (CBT): The Country Programme supported the FIU to develop this training package, in collaboration with the Regional Programme, which allows for an efficient roll out of training for all relevant staff. Regional CBT courses have been held at the FIU with the support of the Regional Programme.
(e) Mutual Legal Assistance: The Country Programme supported the International Affairs Department of the Judiciary, which is the Central MLA Authority. The programme procured and translated UNODC software necessary to request international mutual legal assistance, and subsequently facilitated a number of trainings on MLA and the use of the software. Other activities were 1) a national meeting on “International Judicial Cooperation” for 50 law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges and senior officials from Interpol, MOJ, MFA and ICHTTO; 2) regional workshop on “International Cooperation in Criminal Matters” in Almaty, combined with a Triangular Meeting (Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – the “Justice-to-Justice programme”); and 3) distribution of Farsi editions of the UNCAC text to the Judiciary, law enforcement authorities and national financial entities. In collaboration with the UNODC Regional Programme, UNODC facilitated Iranian officials to attend the First General’s Prosecutors meeting in Vienna.

The regional aspects of the sub-programmes mentioned before, directly contribute to the respective sub-programmes of the UNODC Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries. Besides, by ensuring Iran’s agreement on cooperating with eight regional countries under the Regional Programme, the Country Programme was able to pave the way for IR of Iran’s co-chairmanship of the Regional Programme for 2013-2014 (see also 2.3, design).

Under Sub-Programme 1 on Illicit Trafficking and Border Management, the Regional Programme and the Country Programme have the strongest linkages. The Regional Programme has increased the momentum of activities under the Triangular Initiative by adding an additional support facility to law enforcement UNODC’s efforts. This has helped the Triangular Initiative morph into new directions including a maritime trafficking initiative, intelligence officers meetings, training academy linkages.

The IR of Iran is now engaging with Central Asia countries. In addition, the IR of Iran has become part of a regional precursors approach with the establishment of the Regional Intelligence Working Group. It has also allowed for increased collaboration in the area of forensics and Iran was able to participate with all 8 Regional Programme countries on a Regional Laboratory Meeting on Forensics in 2012.

Sub-programme 2: Drug demand reduction and HIV control also has regional collaboration elements. COIRA compiled a compendium of Iranian DDR institutions and national experts for the Regional Programme. Iranian officials attended the first-ever regional family skills-based training was held in Istanbul on in 2012 with participation of all eight Regional Programme countries A meeting on quality standards of drug treatment was held in Istanbul in 2012 with participation of 26 senior health managers representing drug dependence treatment services of the eight countries of the region. Lastly, UNODC contracted four drop-in centres in Tehran and Mashhad for provision of HIV control and care services to Afghan refugees under the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries.

Lastly, Sub-programme 3: Crime, Justice and Corruption and the Regional Programme also cooperate closely. This has yielded immediate results, which can be illustrated by the signature of the first Memorandum of Understanding on anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism between the heads of the FIUs of Iran and Tajikistan on 17 May. Iran participated in a Regional Workshop on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters in Vienna and hosted the first Regional Workshop on International Cooperation in Asset Recovery as well as two Regional Computer Based Trainings (CBT) on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism.

To assist Iran in acceding to/implementing UN drugs and crime conventions, COIRA and a Regional Cooperation Adviser of the Regional Programme organized a mission in
January 2012, to meet with relevant Iranian authorities and encourage Iranian counterparts to expedite the ratification of UNTOC.

The strong international focus of the Country Programme is relevant to the international dimensions of drug control and transnational crime and corruption. National counterparts appreciate the opportunities provided by the Country Programme to engage at regional and sub-regional level. The Country Programme is relevant to the UNODC Regional Programme for Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, because each sub-programme is conceptualized as part of the Triangular Initiative, Paris Pact Initiative and the Rainbow Strategy (which preceded the Regional Programme), and contains programme activities with a (sub)regional focus.

Regarding sub-programme 1, regional efforts are clearly relevant to the needs of DCHQ and other law enforcement bodies. Some of the current programme activities with a (sub)regional scope are arguably the comparative advantage of the Regional Programme, to be complemented by national level technical collaboration from the Country Programme.

The Country Programme and the UNODC “Regional Programme for Promoting Counter Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (2011-2014) are well aligned, although the Country Programme was designed a year before the Regional Programme. The Regional Programme has dedicated support to regional cooperation, as support to country-level interventions. The Regional Programme is designed to add additional means of support to the countries of the region. It is introduced as an overarching framework to bring greater coherence aligning UNODC’s work across the region adapting to this new setting. According to the Regional Programme implementation strategy, the logframes of the regional and country programmes are to be aligned in the course of the implementation.

Sub-programmes contain many regional support activities, for example, border control (TI, JPC); demand and harm reduction regional experience sharing; and international cooperation on MLA and AML. These international activities align well with the Regional Programme, although the regional sub-programmes are slightly different in order and content. For example, Outcome 1 of the Regional Programme (Enhanced regional cooperation and coordination to address transnational drug-related crimes) is mirrored by the Country Programme’s Outcome 1 (National capacities on border management, drugs, precursors and ATS interdiction improved through national, regional and international initiatives) and Outcome 2 (Organized crime drug networks and serious operatives identified and acted upon). Overlaps exist on the activities establishing linkages between the JPC and CARICC, TI activities and JPC operationalization.

This design issue is reflected to the matter of reporting on activities not funded by the Country Programme. For instance, the logframe has a number of indicators that relate to regional activities, which are being funded by the Regional Programme and other projects (for instance, the CCP). There is no differentiation in the logframe on this and neither consistently reflected in the reports reviewed. Given that the Country Programme was developed before the Regional Programme, this is an understandable issue. For the future, reporting on activities should be clear with respect to funding source.

It is to be expected that the ideal “results cascade” with national-level activities covered by the Country Programmes of the region and cross-border activities covered by the Regional Programme is not likely to be achieved during this phase of the Country Programme. This would require a design overhaul, which is not likely to be a productive use of scarce resources, and probably result in confusion for national counterparts (who do not necessarily differentiate between the national and regional dimension of UNODC efforts).
There is a Regional Programme Assistant based in Tehran, who coordinates programme activities. For example, in case of joint workshops and activities, both programmes have distinct financial commitment prior to the event and also report on the activity from their respective program point of view. The evaluation found that in some cases, the programmes supported each other’s activities financially and otherwise.

The linkages between Country and Regional Programme are not well articulated in the logical framework, which is due to the fact that the Regional Programme was developed after the Country Programme. The evaluation found few occasions of duplication of activity reporting, where activities funded by the Regional Programme are reported by the Country Programme, without indicating the source of funding or contribution towards mutually reinforcing Regional Programme outcomes. This included, under Sub-Programme 1, the Triangular Initiative meetings.

Joint regional-country activities. The evaluation found several examples of cost-savings through joint planning and implementation between the Regional Programme and the Country Programme, for example the “Regional Workshop on International Cooperation on Asset recovery”.

The Country Programme has been effective in building sub-regional partnership between IR of Iran counterparts, and their colleagues in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Building on the success of earlier projects, and with the support of the Regional Programme, the Country Programme has been able to achieve successes especially in Sub-programme 1, through the Triangular Initiative.

With the support of the Regional Programme and the Paris Pact Initiative, the Country Programme has also been effective in engaging Iranian counterparts in regional platforms, for example to co-chair the Regional Programme, but also numerous technical meetings and exposure visits.

Design. The Country Programme design is integrated, strong and sensible, as it follows standard UNODC national and regional programme design features: technical cooperation and international collaboration in support of drug supply interdiction; drug demand and harm reduction services; and support for compliance of international conventions in the area of crime and corruption.

10. COIRA to consider discontinuation of the Container Control Programme. Since investment in training and equipment, there has been insufficient progress on the container control programme to justify further investment. The Customs department is not responsive, and the programme does not seem the respond to a need. The Global CCP and the Regional Programme could continue to invite IR of Iran to relevant events. (See also recommendation #2)

11. COIRA to consider discontinuation of the International Collaborative Exercise (ICE). Despite repeat invitations, the relevant forensic laboratories have not been able or interested to participate in the ICE programme. Further investment of the Country Programme does not seem justified, as there is little evidence that this activity is needs based. The UNODC regional programme can continue to invite national counterpart to regional ICE activities. (See also recommendation #2)

13. UNODC to carry out a focused assessment of the Triangular Initiative with the perspectives of all three countries to identify opportunities and weaknesses. The Triangular Initiative is one of the building blocks of the Country Programme, as well as the Regional Programme, especially in the area of drug trafficking and border management. Despite many efforts and work of the Country Programme, operational impact has been insufficient. A joint assessment (including a SWOT analysis) by all relevant UNODC Programmes, and counterparts could explore barriers and ways forward.
### Findings and recommendations related to RP Afghanistan - PSE CP AFGHANISTAN (DRAFT 2014)

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<td>Alignment of Country Programme with other operational vehicles – RP and IRDC. The CP as well as the RP were drafted in two sets of documents: a strategic/political document and respective supporting project documents (the sub-programmes: AFG/K61 to K65, and RER/V07 to V10). The strategic document recollects all main elements of the sub-programmes, including consolidated budget and overall log-frame, however it does not have all the elements and details which are instead included into the sub-programmes/project documents (the documents that were subsequently signed by the line ministries). This programmatic formulation had no specific guidelines or format, yet was established by setting a praxis, which has been followed by other Country and Regional Programmes thereafter.</td>
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<td>CP, RP and IRDC are aligned and complementary in programmatic structures as they address different layers of UNODC assistance and aim to increase the impact of the different levels through reinforcement. The programme cycles of the RP and the CP are aligned and in certain SPs the integration is more apparent at the design stage than others. Given that the RP and the CP were launched at different times (December and June 2012 respectively), elements that were initially under the CP were absorbed by the RP, e.g. TI, cross border operations and refugees.</td>
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<td>According to internal assessment, the RP and the CP are both relevant and complementary and the programmes work well together. The CP provides capacity-building technical assistance at the national level whereas the RP provides a platform for cross-border cooperation in West and Central Asia, including, but not limited to, new initiatives that promote regional cooperation between the eight countries of the region and beyond, extending the coverage of global programmes in the region and supporting strategic activities at the country level that bolster cross border work. The RP has conducted a mapping exercise that aligns country, sub-regional, regional, inter-regional and global programmes including the Paris Pact Initiative and Istanbul Process to both harmonise UNODC’s work at the various levels and to improve coordination and impact. It is evident that positioning the CP and RP teams together in one office has contributed to this strong complementarity. COAFG has housed the RP Secretariat since October 2011. With the move of the Regional Programme Coordinator to Tashkent in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), there needs to be concerted efforts to ensure that this relationship is not negatively affected.</td>
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<td>Basing the RP Secretariat in Kabul has resulted in efficiencies and streamlining of systems as both programmes benefit each other operationally and substantively. RP and CP had combined some planned initiatives/activities (Precursor Control, AL, Research, Advocacy etc.) which allowed to achieve same results with less resources. RP Secretariate could also benefit from the existing infrastructure and resources made available by COAFG, thus no substantial investment was required by RP at the roll out stage. At the same time RP contributed substantially to cover overall operating costs (including for security) of the COAFG, thus decreasing the burden on CP in general and each of its components/SPs.</td>
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<td>(4) Programme management: COAFG jointly with RP invested in systems for programme management through PMM with ITS through the course of 2013.</td>
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In addition, as flagged in the COPAK In-depth Mid-Term Evaluation, better coordination with the offices in the region needs to be take place in order to prepare for the post 2014 situation and UNODC response through its operational vehicles (CPs, RP, IRDCA). Cleaner linkages with the Central Asia region, which are presently spread over a range of sub-regional and national projects should also be prioritized.

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In order to harmonize the CN research activities in Afghanistan and on the regional level, further collaboration and coordination is required among, U04, AOTP, PPI, RP SP4- and regional and other global research projects and initiatives.

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Cooperation with the Regional Programme: CP Output 2.1 (BLO) supports RP Outcome 3 (Coordination of border management initiatives among the countries in the region) through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLO) between Afghanistan and the neighboring countries. However, since the Outcome 3 of the RP has not been active, it has failed to provide support for the establishment of BLOs.

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Cooperation with other UNODC LE Programmes / border activities in the region: There are international project managers in charge of border issues only in COAxFG, which makes it challenging to develop cross-border and regional aspects of border activities. In the RP and it's outcome 3, the respective programme manager post has not been filled either.

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Other examples of strategic initiatives under the sub-programme that seek to have a larger impact on policy, coordination and seek to improve the genuine mainstreaming of appropriate AL approaches are: a) supporting agri-business missions between countries to boost trade linkages and alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan. The sub-programme supported a group of government officials and cotton growers and traders to travel to India and Pakistan to support market development, which has triggered greater international interest in Afghan cotton. b) supporting cross-border collaboration between government officials, community leaders and aid providers. The sub-programme joined with the RP to build such bridges between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, an activity that has triggered greater cooperation between stakeholders in these remote areas. c) supporting special projects for women. The sub-programme supports special projects to assist women in difficult circumstances and has demonstrated that women can lead community-based initiatives, with CN elements in remote areas of Afghanistan.

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j. The Cross-Border Conference on Drugs and Livelihoods, convened in Dushanbe in December 2013, Tajikistan, was co-organized by CP and RP. One of the outcomes of this conference was establishment of community-based CN Commissions at 4 locations in Badakhshan Province along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border.

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Regional relationships have been developed in close partnerships with the RP. These include the following:

- Civil society: For instance, the Cross-Border Conference on Drugs and Livelihoods, convened in Dushanbe in December 2013, Tajikistan, was co-organized by CP and RP. One of the outcomes of this conference was establishment of community-based CN Commissions at 4 locations in Badakhshan Province along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border.

- Triangular Initiative: It is having two Senior Official Meetings in directors level every year followed by the Ministerial level meeting at the 4th quarter of each year reviewing the progress and endorsing the recommendations of the Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs). Meanwhile, the CN intelligence officials do meet on CN intelligence cooperation among the TI member countries. By having the the Permanent Liaison Officers (PLOs) stationed in the Joint Planning Cell (JPC) in Teheran, the simultenous operations among the three countries are being planned which have resulted in seizures of drugs and arresting number of drug traffickers.

- AKT Initiative: For the drug...
control in a part of northern route, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is having trilateral cooperation in counter narcotics among others, CN related information exchange and intelligence led simultaneous operations. Likewise, under AKT, two Senior Officials Meeting followed by the ministerial meeting is being conducted every year among others to review the progress, the way forward and to endorse recommendations issued by the SOMs.

The CP needs to be contextualized within the hierarchy of UNODC strategic documents and in line with UNODC integrated programming approach. The programme falls under two Medium-Term Strategies (MTS) covering the period from 2008 to 2011 and from 2012 to 2015. In addition to the 4-year MTS, the programme falls under UNODC Strategic Frameworks for 2010-11 and 2012-13. Also, the CP is conceived as a building block of the RP.

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<th>Findings and recommendations related to RP Afghanistan - IDE Paris Pact Phase III (2012)</th>
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<td><strong>Finding or Recommendation</strong></td>
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<td>UNODC Project GLO K31 has four outcomes. Overall, the project has made good progress on all four outcomes since the beginning of Phase III. The potential synergies between the PPI, the Rainbow Strategy and UNODC’s Regional Programmes are very strong, but they have not yet been brought to bear sufficiently. While there would be a clear logical progression from the CND via the PPI to UNODC’s recently launched Regional Programmes, this link has not been clarified sufficiently. Respondents from all stakeholder groups called for a further evolution of the mutual connection between the Paris Pact and the two recently launched UNODC Regional Programmes on Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, and on South Eastern Europe.</td>
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<td>12. <strong>UNODC should strengthen the PPCU’s connection with other projects and the regional programmes.</strong></td>
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<td>MANAGEMENT RESPONSE: As per the recommendation of the independent evaluation, UNODC will ensure appropriate coordination among Paris Pact partners and all relevant UNODC specialist sections and programmes, in particular the Regional Programme of Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries and that of South Eastern Europe to maximize synergies and to avoid the duplication of efforts to the greatest extent possible.</td>
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<td>F) The connection between capitals/headquarters and the field, between policy-makers and experts, and between donors and priority countries, deserves to be clarified and strengthened, as one of the potential greatest benefits of the PPI.</td>
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<td>11. <strong>PPI partners should more consistently keep their experts in priority countries engaged in the PP process; and ensure follow-up and sustainability; 12. UNODC should strengthen the PPCU’s connection with other projects and the regional programmes to avoid overlaps and maximize synergies.</strong></td>
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The PPI and its concept are not integrated as fully into UNODC’s Regional Programmes as would be possible. The Paris Pact project is located within the Integrated Programme and Oversight Branch (IPB), and the Project Coordinator liaises with all relevant sections within UNODC and makes full use of the expertise available regarding drug demand reduction and drug supply reduction as well as research and analysis, as required by the Paris Pact. There are complementarities between the Paris Pact and other UNODC projects. NSAs located in UNODC field offices in 6 of 8 countries covered by the Reg. Programme for Afg. and Neighb. Countries and 2 of the 6 countries that are covered by the Reg. Programme for South Eastern Europe – have been working with Regional Programmes and other UNODC projects and programmes, including AOTP and the Container Control Programme.

The potential synergies between the PPI, the Rainbow Strategy and the Regional Programmes are very strong, but they have not been brought to bear sufficiently so far. While there would be a clear logical progression from the CND via the PPI to UNODC’s recently launched Regional Programmes, this link has not been clarified sufficiently. Respondents from all stakeholder groups called for a further evolution of the mutual connection between the Paris Pact and the two UNODC Regional Programmes (Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, and South-Eastern Europe).

According to respondents among priority countries, donors, and UNODC staff in other parts of the organisation, the Paris Pact has both served as the source of a strategic consensus on priority projects (in particular under the Rainbow Strategy, and more recently the regional programmes), and as a forum for other projects to present themselves to stakeholders (especially AOTP and the CCP). There is room to further develop and strengthen linkages between these priority projects and the Paris Pact in Phase IV.

In terms of design, the potential synergies between the PPI, the Rainbow Strategy and the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries are strong, but are yet to be fully brought to bear. There are encouraging signs that efforts in this direction are already under way, not least with the Regional Programmes for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, and for South Eastern Europe.

One of the factors hampering effectiveness was inconsistent or non-expertise-based participation in previous EWGs. Among the improvements cited, e.g. in connection with the two EWGs on precursors, was the opportunity to review progress since the previous meeting based on semi-structured briefings by participants. These steps towards more consistent and coherent follow-up deserve to be built upon and expanded. Linkages with UNODC’s operational vehicles (global and regional programmes) in this progress review mechanism could also be stronger.

The successful model of sharing NSAs with the Afghanistan Opium Trade Project (AOTP), the Container Control Programme, and recently the Regional Programmes should be pursued further. The cooperation with related projects and programmes (especially the regional programmes and AOTP) should be intensified and broadened. This will require at least an additional P post to facilitate and to strengthen the connection between headquarters and the field, as well as with partners and other projects in UNODC, as foreseen in Phase III.

(l) UNODC should strengthen the PPCU’s connection with other projects and the regional programmes.

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Findings and recommendations related to RP Afghanistan - Cluster Evaluation Afghanistan (2013)

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<td>This was to be devised so that it was intrinsically linked to the newly-approved Regional Programme comprising eight Central Asian countries: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. In December 2011 the Regional Programme was approved with permission to start that month. UNODC plans that by 2014 member countries will be “substantially strengthened and working together cooperatively to counter the destabilizing impact of illicit drugs and crime (UNODC Regional Programme, p. 5).</td>
<td>Part 1, p. 9</td>
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<td>The effectiveness of Regional Programme interventions is dependent upon the successful implementation of the Country Programme in a synergistic relationship where the Regional Programme adds a dedicated support facility to support regional cooperation initiatives, particularly focused towards confidence-building measures and jointly-organized activities in the region. The Regional Programme emphasizes law enforcement and legal matters, the latter with a focus on legislation as well as drug use and addiction. Alternative livelihoods, rather than a sub-programme in its own right, is dealt with under Sub-Programme 4, trends and impacts as a cross-cutting issue.</td>
<td>Part 1, p. 10</td>
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<td>Without these contributions by the projects under evaluation, it would have been impossible to create an effective Country Programme. Similarly, it would have also been impossible to set up the Regional Programme as quickly as it has been, especially one in which Afghanistan appears as one of the pivotal countries and where the Programme headquarters is located.</td>
<td>Part 1, p. 18</td>
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<td>Besides establishing a system within Afghanistan, through the new UNODC Regional Programme, UNODC can take the lead in exploring the sharing of intelligence with its regional neighbours. Although challenging, UNODC’s work on precursor chemicals (project I85) in which intelligence was shared internationally, shows how this can be done.</td>
<td>Part 1, p. 26</td>
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<td>UNODC is in a position, because of the niche area it has created involving multiple partners, to play the lead role in drawing up an overall intelligence plan. Through the Regional Programme, Progress made through support for Mobile Detection Teams and the Border Liaison Posts in building up trust, developing law enforcement networks, and training Afghan police, facilitates UNODC’s ability to develop a regional intelligence system with a focus on drug crimes.</td>
<td>Part 1, p. 29</td>
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<td>Although each LE project supported SFP outcomes, it was independent and designed to standalone. However, the LE Projects did coordinate their activities due to the dedication of the in-country staff. Funding and expertise from one Project was often used to support or reinforce another Project’s outcomes. The evaluation did not find examples of duplication of effort in fact it found examples were possible duplication had been avoided. This was due to the fact that all four projects were centrally managed by a competent senior member of staff. The design of Country Programme, and its interlinkages to the Regional Programme, indicates that COA is has learnt lessons from the implementation of the LE projects. The Country Programme appears to be a far more logical and simpler tool, which has been designed along thematic lines and is capable of altering delivery as the situation changes or when more resource become available.</td>
<td>Part 2, p. 13</td>
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The ability for a project to map progress via an IT system would be of considerable benefit to implementation staff and to those who monitor progress. The ability to log into a live document that could show each activity over time and highlight what has been achieved and where delays have occurred would be an excellent project management tool. The evaluator fully supports UNODC’s efforts to produce such a tool, piloted in COAFG for the Country and Regional Programmes, which is being developed by ITS. The ability for donors to access this database, or a public version, which could not only provide project data, but pictures and a few lines of text would also go a long way to addressing donors reporting requirements. Most donors do not require pages of text. They invariably deliver PowerPoint briefs containing pictures and bullet points and are hungry for products that fit this format. A reduced (twitter) type of reporting would not replace full periodic reports, but it should reduce the frequency and number of reports, in addition to being a suitable project management tool.

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The law enforcement sub-programme in the Country Programme offers opportunities which UNODC should exploit. The Country Programme has already earmarked activities that could take place; it now needs to seek funding or partners. These activities need to be undertaken in conjunction with Sub-Programme 1 of the Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation under the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries. These opportunities can only be exploited if other parties know and understand what the project and similar efforts across the region have delivered. UNODC should seek to increase its self-promotion and public awareness initiatives.

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The UNDOC’s regional efforts through both the Country and Regional Programme require elevating, so that other agencies with an interest in border and transnational issues understand what has been achieved and can expand on these successes. COAFG should examine its own public relations mechanisms and seek to increase its own self-promotion. Perhaps the biggest area for development is that of intelligence; its generation and exploitation. COAFG should focus on the development of intelligence within the CNPA, amongst other Afghan agencies and more widely across the region.

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Regional Afghanistan is vulnerable to events in neighboring countries, Iran and Pakistan in particular. Border closures can have dramatic consequences for implementation, leading to spiraling costs of imported concrete or fuel. Movement of Afghan citizens to and from Iran poses isolated but telling challenges for the criminal justice projects with (often involuntary) returnees being drug users and in some cases ending up in Afghan prisons.

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UNDOC, in its work in this Cluster, has introduced methodologies in reducing poppy cultivation pioneered through its work in Southeast Asia. UNODC has also introduced more profound and comprehensive (and gender balanced) drug treatment programmes that are new to Afghanistan (although these are beyond the scope of the Regional Programme). UNODC has strengthened MCN to where it is much better able to function on its own.

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### Findings and recommendations related to RP Afghanistan - IDE Integrated Programming Approach (GLOU46)

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<td>In 2010, the UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a Review of UNODC. In the Review it took note of the implementation of the integration of thematic and regional programmes driven by the Integrated Programming Approach (IPA) and highlighted some of the expected benefits of the approach, including: (a) Enhanced dialogue with Member States, which would lead to an increase in ownership via the involvement of regional actors at the drafting stage and their participation in the steering committees at the implementation stage. (b) The potential the IPA provided in terms of resource mobilization and softer earmarking at the programme rather than at single project level. (c) Increased administrative effectiveness by dealing with a number of management activities at the programme level. (d) The creation of a reinforced oversight framework in which headquarters and field offices would contribute to increased accountability.</td>
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<td>The IPA comprises two instruments – Thematic Programmes and Regional Programmes, which cover the broad range of UNODC mandates and activity areas both substantively and geographically. In order to support the approach, the Office undertook an internal &quot;realignment&quot; process in 2009, grouping the existing expertise under five Thematic Branches (i.e. Transnational Organized Crime, Corruption, Criminal Justice, Health, Terrorism) and created the Integrated Programming Branch. The realignment was intended to enable the Office acquire an integrated regional and thematic perspective, and achieve benefits in terms of improved linkages between UNODC policy, strategic planning, programmatic work, mobilization of resources, and partnerships with all relevant stakeholders. In addition to establishing six Thematic Programmes (TPs), since 2008, the Office has established seven Regional Programmes (RPs) and is in the process of developing two others. In 2010, the Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA) also proposed a realignment process (within that specific Division) to “bring it into consonance with the new approach of thematic clusters and integrated programming.” The DPA realignment focused on putting in place institutional arrangements that would make management of the “five sections, one unit and one office scattered across DPA” more feasible. It was expected that the consolidation of these sections, units and offices under three separate branches - Public Affairs and Policy Support; Research and trend Analysis and the NY Liaison Office, which would be led by D1 level staff would lead to a strengthened management structure and “enable systematic attention to the services provided by the three sections to the whole UNODC” and “facilitate internal coherence.”</td>
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<td>The IPA has provided UNODC with a range of policy and operational modalities (particularly the Thematic and Regional Programmes) that have allowed for a better reflection of UNODC stakeholder needs and priorities. Regional Programmes have provided an important mechanism for ensuring “ownership” of efforts to counter organized crime, illicit trafficking and other related phenomena. Although the degree of engagement of national and regional stakeholders at each stage of the process still differs from region to region, Steering Committees have been developed within some Regional Programmes to accompany and monitor implementation of the programmes. It is unclear at this stage whether these have been effective in sustaining ownership and ensuring mutual responsibility and accountability of results. The latter will however, be</td>
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assessed by the envisaged evaluations of the Regional Programmes. A better understanding of these arrangements and their impact would be of strategic use to UNODC, the UN system and the broader international community.

The Regional Programmes provide an important platform through which this work can be facilitated, although in certain middle-income settings, national counterparts have demonstrated a preference for working at the country rather than at the regional level. UNODC has demonstrated flexibility in this regard, and is currently developing new kinds of strategic partnerships at regional and country levels in which needs and priorities are jointly defined, and responsibility and accountability shared.

While there is broad awareness of the Integrated Programming Approach across UNODC, the evaluation found that due to funding imperatives most outreach related to the IPA was conducted externally with UNODC Member States as main targets. While a succinct overview of the vision, principles and objectives of the Regional Programming approach were laid out in several internal documents and reports of UNODC’s governing bodies (see Timeline in Annex IV), many interviewees contend that the IPA was not sufficiently defined and explained to all concerned, not least in terms of how to state or measure its outcomes and how it could absorb existing country and regional strategic programmatic frameworks. No specific benchmarks were actually established for the implementation of the IPA, making it difficult to establish basic indicators for evaluating or assessing implementation. Standards in relation to programme outcomes, outputs, indicators and activities are continuously subject to change and development, although UNODC’s operations manual has sought to address some of these challenges.

More coherence and integration between the global projects stemming from the Thematic Programmes and the Regional Programmes is still required as is a more effective and targeted human resources strategy that matches existing UNODC expertise with regional and country needs.

Significant progress has been made in the design of the Regional Programmes, although some still represent a collection of existing projects and initiatives. In some regions it has been more difficult to integrate pre-existing Country Programmes with the newer Regional Programmes. Integrating national and regional stakeholders into the design process, including in the collection and analysis of baseline data, is also of vital importance for ensuring the sustainability of these efforts in the mid- to longer term. While the Regional Programme design process includes these steps, context and availability of funding have been influential in determining whether they can be followed to the letter. Efforts to reconcile these issues are ongoing. For example, general criteria for the design of Regional Programmes are included in a proposed internal Programme Development and Review Process to be overseen by the Office’s internal Programme Review Committee. The proposed Review process is still in draft format and it is expected that it will integrate existing programme development processes overseen by the Inter Divisional Task Teams (IDTTs).

Second, the initial design and implementation of the Regional Programmes did not give due consideration to the core administrative and support functions that would be necessary to establish the type of regional presence required to implement the Regional Programmes. Many of these challenges have been raised time and time again in different audits and evaluations but there appears to be an important stumbling block preventing the implementation of useful remedies.
There is evidence that the IPA has met several of the objectives established in 2008. It has led to more coherence at the field level and to more policy, sector and programmatic interventions, particularly through the establishment of seven Regional Programmes (three more are currently being developed) and six Thematic Programmes. It has presented Member States and donors with a more coherent overview of what the UNODC can offer in terms of policy support and technical assistance. It has also opened up the possibility of engaging with regional entities and partner countries on a more strategic basis, and has allowed the Office to engage more strategically in international policy debates.

A series of OIOS and BOA audits, internal UNODC documents and reports, and interviews with staff have highlighted that impact assessment is one of the main challenges that the Office is facing today. Many of the audit recommendations are aimed at country-specific programming and efforts are being made to determine how best to approach and implement recommendations. At the same time, traditional approaches to impact or results monitoring and assessment are much more difficult to apply to complex cross-border, inter- and intra-regional programming of the type that UNODC is shifting towards. In this regard, certain consideration needs to be afforded to the fact that developing and monitoring impact indicators for cross-border, inter- and intra-regional programming purposes will require more effort, creativity and sophistication on the part of UNODC on the one hand (including through a strengthened strategic planning, research and analysis capacity), and increased investment of resources by donors and member states on the other. UNODC and its donors could make a significant contribution to on-going debates on cross-border monitoring and evaluation by investing resources in examining how results can be better measured and monitored in this field, also in the context of a UN system wide effort in this field.

Several challenges remain, including the question of whether the IPA goals and implementation mechanisms (particularly the Regional Programmes) established in 2008 remain a strategic priority of the Organization today or whether they should be modified on the basis of the current evaluation process (Phases I-III) and develop an invigorated corporate-wide integration policy, that also considers different global and regional realities.

(a) Along the lines of the 2012 UNODC Internal Report - Comparative Audit Analysis Report - Lessons learned and good practices from FO audits, UNODC senior management should initiate a process on the basis of this evaluation report, the evaluation of the first batch of Regional Programmes, and other relevant audits and evaluations, to discuss the findings with Field Representatives, relevant DO, DTA, DPA staff and the Governing Bodies.

In addition, some of the Regional Programmes still only represent a collection of existing projects and initiatives, leading only to tactical level results. In some regions, there appears to be competition (including for funds) between pre-existing Country Programmes and the newer Regional Programmes. Efforts to reconcile these issues are on-going.

2.3 As part of an invigorated integration strategy, the Office needs to place stronger emphasis on determining how to better monitor and assess the impact of the IPA at its different levels of implementation (policy/normative and operational) including through the development of ‘usable’ and realistic impact indicators. This will require a coherent and consistent decision on how UNODC sees its programmes – whether as operational tools, or as guiding frameworks for operations. The 2012 UNODC Internal Report - Comparative Audit Analysis Report - Lessons learned and good practices from FO audits should form the basis for this discussion. Further, the Office needs to place stronger emphasis on how the different Regional Programmes are coordinated and integrated in the regional landscape, as well as on the relationship between the IPA and the UNODC’s broader work in the region. A strategic framework with clear and agreed roles, responsibilities and accountabilities is required to ensure that the IPA is effectively integrated into the broader UNODC’s work in the region.

...
audits as well as the foreseen evaluations of the Regional Programmes can help shed light on the range of current mechanisms and tools currently being used to assess impact, and make further recommendations in light of the on-going internal discussions on results-based management and budgeting.

Regarding upstream policy and normative support, over the past five years in particular, UNODC has increased its visibility in these areas, and the IPA, particularly the Regional Programme framework, has helped promote strategic cross-border initiatives. Of particular relevance is UNODC’s inclusion as co-chair of the UN Task Force on Organized Crime and Trafficking established in NY, and its participation in a range of Security Council and General Assembly discussions and debates on topics that relate to its mandate.

(b) In light of the findings of the evaluations of the Regional Programmes, DO and DPA (or a new dedicated Unit as proposed in Recommendation # 1 above) should develop mechanisms to determine the impact of enhanced cooperation with/and integration of UNODC’s work within the UN system and broader international community, particularly in terms of helping meet the broader rule of law, peace, security and development goals at the country, regional and global levels. The evaluation of the Regional Programmes could provide initial insights into this process. UNODC could also use its position in the UN Task Force on Organized Crime and drug trafficking to also engage other UN bodies such as DPA, DPKO, UNDP and the World Bank in these processes.

(e) The foreseen evaluations of the Regional Programmes should focus on assessing the results of better integration with the UN Country and UNDG Regional Teams and the impact that the inclusion of UNODC mandated areas in UNDAFs, Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISFs) and other strategic planning frameworks applied in different contexts are having. In addition, given the fact that UN (and other) Political Missions are increasingly taking into account transnational phenomena in their areas of operation, the Regional Programme evaluations could also shed light on how UNODC is integrating its work with these operations, and provide an initial assessment of the perceived impact of this integration.

(f) The evaluations of the Regional Programmes should help shed light on whether the IPA has helped UNODC enhance relationships with civil society actors and ensure their voices are represented in the identification of priorities and in the design of Regional Programmes.

There is evidence that the IPA has met several of the goals established in 2008. It has led to more coherence at the field level and to more policy, sector and programmatic interventions, particularly through the establishment of seven Regional Programmes, two Country Programmes and five Thematic Programmes. It has opened up the possibility of engaging with regional entities and national governments on a more strategic basis and has allowed the Office to engage more strategically in international policy debates. Conversely, while UNODC has made important progress in these areas, structural weaknesses related to strategic planning, monitoring and assessing of results, weak knowledge management systems as well as limited research and analysis capacity, prevent the organization from building on its comparative advantages to provide effective support to member states, and serving as an authoritative voice in international policy debates.

(a) In addition to what is laid out in Point 1 above, the evaluations of the Regional Programmes should be used to identify why in some cases, the Regional Programmes have not been able to meet the specified goals of the IPA. The findings of these evaluations can help determine whether a different course of action is required,
including higher-level political dialogue, whether an injection of resources is required to get the programme back on track, or whether the Programme should be terminated.

It was assumed that the shift to regional programming and integration in general would generate increased financial support from donors who had been calling for both horizontal and vertical integration across UNODC’s normative and operational work. As a first step, a Global Project – GLOU46 – was established to secure soft-earmarked “seed funding” from particularly supportive donors for the initial implementation of the IPA and donor interest was rallied. A small group of donors have supported the integration process within UNODC and are also supporting the Organization’s efforts to attain more visibility and influence on the international policy stage. In general where donors have shown more flexibility, including through soft ear-marking, the results have been positive, at least at the process level. Despite the tabling for the first time of a corporate Fundraising Strategy, it remains unclear however, whether the overall integrated approach is sustainable in the longer term.

(a) The Organization has seen more involvement of member states in the development of programmes and the budgetary process. The development of some of the regional programmes, and innovative thematic programmes and other initiatives such as the Counter Piracy programme in East Africa are the result of some of these shifting relations between UNODC, its member states and donors. This engagement should be further strengthened through the implementation of the Organization’s first fundraising strategy adopted in April 2012 and the corresponding realignment of donor funding policies where necessary. At the same time, the Strategy remains somewhat broad and should be revised to ensure a clear “roadmap” on how to mobilize funds for the sustainability of Regional Programmes and other field operations.

While the Regional Programme framework has provided an important tool for ensuring ownership of efforts to counter organized crime, trafficking etc. the degree of engagement of national and regional stakeholders in each stage of the process, differs from region to region. Steering Committees have been developed within the framework of some of the Regional Programmes to accompany and monitor implementation of the programmes, but it is unclear whether these have been effective in sustaining ownership and ensuring mutual responsibility and accountability for results.

(c) The evaluations of the Regional Programmes can help determine how the IPA has helped enhance national ownership (through consultation with both governmental and non-governmental actors), which mechanisms have been put in place to ensure mutual responsibility and accountability for results and of equal, if not more importance, what the overall impact attainment of these goals has had on meeting i) the overall programme goals and ii) the Organization’s strategic priorities.

According to the documentation reviewed and the interviews conducted, the Regional Programmes are the vehicles through which the Thematic Programmes are implemented in the field. Flexibility in design of the Regional Programme was encouraged so as to allow local context determine priorities as much as possible, while also ensuring that a connection to UNODC’s Thematic Programmes. Field Representatives are encouraged to develop Regional Programmes through a bottom-up consultative approach across the region where they are developed and be aligned with priorities defined by regional counterparts. For this, a series of consultations should be held during the preparatory stage of each Regional Programme. Baseline data should be collected for analysis, in turn serving as the foundation of the programmes. For instance, the teams are expected to consult governments and other national stakeholders, regional organizations and so forth on the basis of the initial analytical phase, and integrate their efforts with regional
action plans, etc. At the same time, the sub-programmes of the Regional Programme would reflect the UNODC thematic priorities.

Determining how the Office’s Thematic and Regional Programmes can be better integrated remains an important challenge. While the IPA has helped reconcile some of these challenges, Thematic Programmes tend to function as stand-alone programmes supporting a range of global projects rather than ensuring systematic policy guidance for field operations (the original intent of the IPA). This is not necessarily a negative development, particularly considering the limited regular budget funding to cover the Office’s core normative/policy functions. The Thematic Branches need to raise funds to support their staff (XB) and can only do this by appending operational elements in the form of projects to the programmes. This situation however, lends to a perception that Regional and Thematic Programmes still have to compete for funding. It also lends itself to a perception that staffing requirements are not being met, especially at the field level. In this regard, Regional Programmes often face difficulties in recruiting expert thematic staff, with many suggesting that better use of resources would be made if staff at headquarters were to spend more time working at the regional level rather than “parachuting in” from time to time.

Adding to the above confusion is the fact that the Division of Policy, Research and Analysis (DPA) has remained largely isolated from the integration process. Although the reorganization driven by the introduction of the IPA helped overcome some existing challenges, UNODC’s research and analysis functions are not yet fully integrated with the Office’s normative and operational functions. This design flaw is felt most by field operations, not least because research and analysis should be an integral part of the Regional Programmes, and capacity transfer in this area a core aspect of effectiveness and sustainability.

Interestingly, in the cases where soft earmarked funding has been provided (particularly through the GLOU46 project) and used by Field Representatives to gather baseline data, there appears to have been more buy-in at the national and regional levels, at least in the development of the programme components. Some regions such as West Africa have included base-line data gathering as a core dimension of the actual Regional Programme, as the lack of baseline data on all dimensions of organized crime and trafficking in the region remains a significant challenge. This is a good practice. If followed through with adequate funding, and if national capacity is developed along the way, and resources are gradually invested in the continuous gathering and up-dating data as a means to inform public policy, it can possibly be implemented in other regions where baseline data is lacking. The draft programme development and approval process described above may examine the possibility of ensuring that baseline data and/or research and analysis remain a core part of regional and country programme development.

Underpinning many of the aforementioned design challenges is the fact that UNODC does not appear to have a coherent policy cycle, whereby policy guidance (i.e. the Thematic Programmes) are developed not solely on the basis of mandates accorded to UNODC and drafting led by headquarters, but also on the basis of monitoring and assessing the impact of policy implementation in the field, including through the Office’s field operations. Beyond the development of the thematic programme documents, dissemination of the latter appears weak, as is guidance and training on implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Funding constraints are an obvious
limitation; however, limited functional integration between the Thematic Programmes and Regional Programmes also poses an important obstacle. There appears to be limited space within the Office to discuss how existing policy is responding effectively to ongoing and emerging challenges on the ground, and good or innovative practices and experiences from field operations are not filtered up consistently through the Office. The absence of an effective knowledge management system that can collect these lessons for internal analysis and assessment only serves to exacerbate these problems. Moving forward, systems developed to collect lessons should be integrated into the existing IT infrastructure (i.e. the ProFi intranet).

As UNODC moves to evaluate its Regional Programmes, due consideration should be given to many of the issues already raised in a series of audits conducted by OIOS and X since 2009 regarding Programme and Project Design. An internal report gathered and analyzed the findings and recommendations of these audit reports and proposed several recommendations for moving forward and for capturing lessons.

The individual evaluations of the Regional Programmes set to take place during phase III of the overall IPA evaluation process will help shed light on how the Regional Programmes are being measured and against which criteria (the same process should be considered for the thematic programmes). Already at the national level, measuring results against broader goals such as rule of law, peace building, state building and/or development is an extremely complex endeavour that the UN and the broader international system are struggling to respond to. At the same time, UNODC faces M&E-related challenges that other UN and international entities do not face, as countering organized crime and illicit trafficking requires efforts that are developed on an intra- and inter-regional or even global scale and that must therefore be measured accordingly.

At the programmatic level, the Office is currently working to determine how to better align the various project and programme layers so as to allow for better monitoring and assessment of results and impact. This push stems from IPA design challenges, particularly the fact that the Regional Programmes were launched before the appropriate administrative and support functions were put in place to accompany implementation. This has meant that reporting has remained largely output-oriented, as the systems that are in place are not conducive to reporting on a broader programmatic and results basis. In order to surmount these challenges, some regional and country offices have designed innovative systems such as the Smart Sheet (implemented by UNODC Pakistan). However, administrative and finance staff in Vienna lament that while such ad-hoc systems are useful for Field Offices, as they allow for more programme-level reporting, they also create a significant amount of additional work since UNODC still has to report in accordance with UN and donor rules and procedures, which are more project oriented.

Regarding the involvement of national and regional stakeholders in programme monitoring and assessment of results and impact, interviews to date suggest that in some regions, the IPA has been effective in rallying the involvement of Member States in the design of the actual Regional Programmes from the outset. The establishment of steering committees in some regions to accompany implementation of the regional programme is also viewed as an important platform through which member states can participate on an equal footing in monitoring the implementation and making decisions related to the substance of the programmes. The draft revision of the Programme Review and Approval process mentioned above also lays strong emphasis on ownership – both internal and external – in the design phase of the programmes. Regional entities
and partner countries will be invited to participate in a Tripartite Review Process, and
their guidance and input will inform ongoing programme development and
implementation. The evaluations of the Regional Programmes will shed more light on
existing processes, and help determine the degree to which public policy is influenced
by (or can better influence) support provided by UNODC.

Based on the documentation reviewed and interviews conducted for the purpose of this
evaluation, the Division of Operations has endeavoured to ensure that Country
Programmes are embedded in the design of the Regional Programmes. This proved
more difficult when a Country Programme existed prior to the development of a
Regional Programme (e.g. Pakistan, Afghanistan), or when a host government is
reluctant to anchor the programme within a broader regional programmatic framework
(e.g. Brazil, Mexico). The design of the Regional Programme does, however, allow for
the establishment of selected country programmes under the broader Regional
Programme framework. For example, in West Africa, five National Integrated
Programmes (NIPs) have been developed within the framework of the Regional
Programme. Phase III of the evaluation process will allow for a better assessment of
alignment between Country, Regional and Thematic Programmes.

There is evidence in the documentation reviewed that the IPA has allowed for more
efficiency within the Office. In particular, mechanisms such as the GLOU46 project,
have allowed for a much more efficient use of resources (“value for money”), as in
some instances it released the seed funding needed to support the inception phase of
Regional Programmes.

Since the inception of the IPA, the Office has systematically highlighted the connection
between the rule of law and poverty reduction, and called on Member States and the
broader international community to devote greater attention to the joint pursuit of
justice, security and development. More recently, entities such as the World Bank,
UNDPKO and UNDPA as well as humanitarian, development and security experts have
been particularly advocating for the need to ensure greater links between development,
political and security strategies and actors, and are urging specialized agencies such as
UNODC to play a greater role in this regard. The UN Secretary-General echoed these
calls for greater integration of agendas in his Five Point Action Agenda, noting that in
order to respond to the heightened threat of organized crime, piracy and drug
trafficking, collective action needs to be mobilized along with new tools and
comprehensive regional and global strategies” which “will require integrating rule of
law, public health and human rights responses.” UNODC’s Regional Programmes have
served as an important platform for linking these agendas within and across borders,
although as noted in the 2011 World Development Report, significant efforts are still
required to fully enable bodies like UNODC to respond to the complex cross-border
challenges that impact on development and security today.

New development actors, including middle-income countries and emerging economies
are taking on more responsibility for efforts to counter organized crime, illicit
trafficking, corruption, terrorism etc. including through the funding of UNODC
operations, the development and strengthening of inter- and intra-regional and national
capacity, and the inclusion of related projects and initiatives in public policy
formulation and implementation. The Regional Programme provides an important
platform through which this work can be facilitated, although in certain settings,
national counterparts have demonstrated a preference for working at the country rather
than regional level. This reality has required UNODC to develop new kinds of strategic
partnerships in which needs and priorities are jointly defined, and responsibility and
accountability shared. In order to be effective, it will also require better integration with UNODC’s thematic, research and analytical expertise.

Regarding upstream policy and normative support, over the past five years in particular, UNODC has increased its role and visibility in international policy fora, and the IPA, particularly the Regional Programmes, have helped advocate for the ratification and implementation of the UN Conventions on TOC and Corruption, and increased regional cooperation and strategic cross-border initiatives. UNODC has also enhanced its efforts to integrate its work with the work of the broader UN and international community. Of particular relevance in this regard is its inclusion as co-chair with the UN Department of Political Affairs of the UN Task Force on Organized Crime and drug trafficking established by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) in NY, and its increased participation in a range of Security Council and General Assembly discussions and debates on topics that relate to its mandate.

The IPA has provided the organization with a range of policy (Thematic Programmes) and operational (Regional Programmes) modalities that have led to better cohesion across the Office and better reflection of UNODC stakeholder needs and priorities. According to the documentation reviewed, the Regional Programme has provided an effective mechanism for working simultaneously at the regional and country levels on core thematic areas which have been aligned as closely as possible with the 2008 Mid-Term Strategic Framework. The impact of this engagement is yet to be determined. The Regional Programmes are still at an early stage of implementation; however, the envisaged evaluations that will be conducted in Phase III of the current evaluation process will provide an in-depth insight into how the thematic and regional programmes are perceived to be responding to stakeholder needs and priorities.

Context also has a strong influence on the design of integrated Regional or Country Programmes. In regions such as West or East Africa where UNODC had a limited presence and impact prior to the inception of the IPA, the Regional Programme has allowed for the alignment of UNODC work with regional priorities, even if other complex challenges have emerged along the way. In others, such as East Asia and Pacific, where projects and initiatives already existed but were marked by fragmentation, limited ownership and declining funds, the Regional Programme, supported by flexible “seed funding” (provided via GLOU46) has allowed Field Representatives to bring existing work under a more coherent framework, leading to a gradual strengthening of relations with national and regional counterparts, better alignment of activities over time, and strengthened relations with donors. If managed properly, Regional Programmes can provide national and regional stakeholders the opportunity to examine existing initiatives and conduct joint exercises to determine what should be discontinued and what should be built upon in accordance with identified needs and priorities.

There is evidence that the IPA has led to more coherence at the field level and to more policy, sector and programmatic interventions, particularly the establishment of seven Regional Programmes and five Thematic Programmes. In some regions, there appears to be competition (including for funds) between pre-existing Country Programmes and the newer Regional Programmes. Efforts to reconcile this situation are on-going. (See also section on Partnerships and Cooperation below).
At the country level, the UN’s in-country coordination structure – the Resident Coordinator (RC) system has come a long way from one led primarily by UNDP to one that is more inclusive of the whole UN mandates. It is assumed that the IPA, particularly Regional Programmes, provide UNODC with an effective platform with which Field Offices can work with UN Regional and Country Teams to ensure that core issues such as corruption, organized crime and illicit trafficking as well as the violence spurred by many of these issues are considered part of broader UN system-wide regional or country strategies. As evidenced in interviews conducted for the purpose of this evaluation, some Field Representatives are working closely with Resident Coordinators and Country Teams to ensure that core UNODC mandated areas of work are injected into the UNDAF and/or (depending on the country), the Delivering as One processes. In some instances, country-level task forces on organized crime, trafficking or related issues have been or are in the process of being established. It is less clear however, how UNODC works under the Integrated Mission framework in settings where peace operations have been established; or how it works with UN Special Political Missions. In addition, the fact that most of these strategic planning frameworks are designed for country level operations rather than inter- or intra-regional operations remains an important impediment, which the UN and its international and regional partners have yet to resolve. UNODC’s Regional Programming provides a useful instrument in this regard, at least for intra-regional and cross border initiatives, not least because it also provides for the development of sub-programmes including Country Programmes, and given the right resources, Field Representatives could also work with Regional Development Groups and/or depending on the context, Regional Political Missions to enhance coordination, coherence and integration at that level.

As noted above, the IPA has led to a more effective alignment of functions at Headquarters, which in turn has led to more coherence at the field level and to more policy, sector and programmatic interventions, particularly through the establishment of seven Regional Programmes (three more are currently being developed) and six Thematic Programmes. The IPA has presented Member States and donors with a more coherent overview of what the UNODC can offer in terms of policy support and technical assistance. It has also opened up the possibility of engaging with regional entities and partner countries on a more strategic basis, and has allowed the Office to engage more strategically in international policy debates.

The evaluations of the Regional Programmes will provide a more in-depth assessment of how the IPA goals are being met in practice; however, it is evident through this evaluation that some structural weaknesses remain and that these impact on UNODC’s integration efforts. These include many of the challenges already mentioned in the 2010 JIU Review Report, and also hinge on ownership, implementation and oversight of policy and planning; integration of DPA functions across Divisions and Programmes; knowledge management systems; a weak funding base; and limited capacity and tools to effectively monitor and assess impact of the different IPA goals. Failure to address these problems will prevent the Office from building on its comparative advantages to provide more integrated and effective support to Member States, and serving as an authoritative voice in international policy debates.

In light of the findings of the evaluations of the Regional Programmes, DO and DPA (or a new dedicated Unit as proposed in Recommendation # 1 above) should develop mechanisms to determine the impact of enhanced cooperation with/ and integration of UNODC’s work within the UN system and broader international community, particularly in terms of helping meet the broader rule of law, peace, security and development goals at the country, regional and global levels. The evaluation of the
Regional Programmes could provide initial insights into this process. UNODC could also use its position in the UN Task Force on Organized Crime and drug trafficking to also engage other UN bodies such as DPA, DPKO, UNDP and the World Bank in these processes.

The Organization has seen more involvement of member states in the development of programmes and the budgetary process. The development of some the regional programmes, and innovative thematic programmes such as the Counter Piracy programme in East Africa are the result of some of these shifting relations between UNODC, its member states and donors. This engagement should be further strengthened through the implementation of the Organization’s first fundraising strategy adopted in April 2012, and the corresponding realignment of donor funding policies where necessary. At the same time, the Strategy remains somewhat broad and should be revised to ensure a clear “roadmap” on how to mobilize funds for the sustainability of Regional Programmes and other field operations.

**Findings and recommendations related to RP Afghanistan - IDE RP East Asia and the Pacific (2013)**

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<td>The RPF itself does not stipulate management arrangements in great detail. The RPF provides that “oversight and coordination of the overall programme will be the responsibility of the Representative of the UNODC Regional Centre, supported by the management team.” To date, it appears that, despite its best intentions, the RPF could not yet fully transition to a system where all sub-programmes are overseen by Programme Managers, projects are combined or “dovetailed” into a broader regional programme or all projects have become subsumed into their respective sub-programmes from a management perspective. Such a system is an important goal of the RPF, because it is the job of the Programme Managers “to ensure that the programme does not fall back into discrete projects which operate independently.”</td>
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<td>UNODC HQ-level leadership with respect to the RPF could also have been brought to bear upon the RPF to a greater degree than it was during 2009-2012. To date, meetings of the Inter-Divisional Task Teams (IDTT) at UNODC have largely existed for information sharing and have been mostly attended by junior level staff members. It is highly recommended that going-forward UNODC HQ strengthen the IDTT so that they can lend greater supervision and accountability to the Regional Programmes. The Regional Desk should reinforce the leadership role of the IDTT. IDTT should not be viewed as optional, but as a mandatory process to which parties are to contribute in a professional manner.</td>
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<td>The current treatment components of alternative development projects seem weak and isolated from the rest of UNODC’s demand reduction activities in the region. Existing drug dependence services in the region focus on opioid users and do not cater adequately to the specific needs of methamphetamine users. Governments are in need of workable solutions to deal with the growing methamphetamine problem. When designing the next regional programme, UNODC EAP should aim at creating comprehensive demand reduction model programmes, covering all areas, from discouraging initial use to reducing the negative health and social consequences of drug abuse. A closer cooperation with relevant regional organisations and mechanisms should be aimed at already during the design stage.</td>
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There is a culture of cooperation in the area of HIV/AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, both geographically and across sectors such as governments, UN organisations, civil society and individual experts. The next regional programme should continue to promote human rights as an essential element in preventing the spread of HIV. It should also aim at strengthening regional cooperation on HIV/AIDS and include all three of UNODC’s target groups. Interventions targeting ATS users should be developed. UNODC HQ should continue to deploy HIV advisers in the region, independent of specific country projects.

There is a relatively solid knowledge base for identifying needs and gaps. The baseline was set by the UNRTF and the knowledge base needs to be updated regularly. The capacity to collect and analyse data needs to be strengthened both on a country basis and regionally. The next regional programme should give priority to capacity building for data collection and analysis in the region through joint activities by the Drug Prevention and Health Branch and the Statistics and Survey Section at HQ. Information should cover all three of UNODC’s target groups (drug users, prisoners and people vulnerable to human trafficking). UNODC should also continue to contribute to global data collection activities related to HIV and injecting drug use.

A regional programme stretching over four years should have a better chance of ensuring sustainable results than individual projects with limited duration. This would require sustainable financing of activities within the RPF. While the financial situation in the Region has improved considerably since the inception of the RPF in 2009, the funding system of UNODC continues to limit the prospects of sustainable financing of the RPF. UNODC relies heavily on voluntary funding, which in most cases is earmarked. Funds go to where there is donor interest and not necessarily to where the priorities are, based on the needs of the countries in the region. Only a few donors have provided soft earmarked funds for the RPF.

The piloting of the first UNODC regional programme required the development of a number of new approaches in terms of management, M&E, and overall coordination. RCEAP developed a number of new innovative reporting tools that are now being used by other regional programmes—including its Dashboard platform that feeds real-time project-level financial data upwards linking to the RPF frameworks. RPF has also had a number of publications and begun to emphasize data collection to a greater extent. The RCEAP’s TOCTA update for East Asia and the Pacific (still technically in draft form as of December 2012, but expected to be officially published in 2013) is representative of RCEAP’s efforts to increase and make current its critical threat analysis.

While designed to include the East Asia and the Pacific Region, the RPF has never managed to service the Pacific to the same degree as it has serviced South East Asia.

UNODC should consider adjusting the geographic scope of the RPF either to reduce the number of countries included within the East Asia and Pacific Region under the RPF or subdivide the East Asia and Pacific Region into two or more separate regional programmes (i.e. South East Asia and the Pacific; or South East Asia, East Asia (China, Korea and Japan) and the Pacific.

While the Member States in the region were not involved in the design of the RPF, they are assigned the responsibility for delivering outputs and achieving outcomes at programme level. They are thus held responsible for results and indicators that they did not define or agree to. In addition, the performance indicators are problematic in many cases, either because they are too general or because there is limited capacity to collect good quality data. The RPF project documents have also tended to lack detailed risk analysis.
Future RPFs should be widely circulated to all Member States that are intended partners of the Regional Programme. The RPF project documents should contain detailed risk analysis. It must be possible to assess progress towards achievement of the RPF outcomes; based upon appropriate measurable targets and indicators, taking into account different national circumstances, capacities and levels of development, must therefore accompany the goals.

It is highly recommended that going-forward UNODC strengthen the Inter-Divisional Task Teams (IDTT)—so that they can lend greater supervision and accountability to the Regional Programmes. The Regional Desk should reinforce the leadership role of the IDTT. IDTT should not be viewed as optional, but as a mandatory process to which parties are to contribute in a professional manner.

UNODC Regional/Country Representatives under the RPF as the primary representatives of UNODC in the field should be funded from general purpose funds and not have to fundraise for their own contracts. UNODC HQ should clarify what are the respective obligations of HQ, Regional and Country Office managers with respect to the development of Regional Programmes and in particular the extent to which involvement of Member States and national partners is mandated.

UNODC should vigorously re-launch a Global “Legal Advisory Programme” so as to establish a Legal Advisor in each Regional Programme with a ToR that includes tracking legislative developments in each region and with principal reporting officer/focal point at HQ-level. It is felt that this would better position UNODC and the RPF EAP to influence national policies, regional policies and global policies.

When designing the next regional programme, UNODC EAP should aim at creating comprehensive demand reduction model programmes, covering all areas, from discouraging initial use to reducing the negative health and social consequences of drug abuse.

When designing the next regional programme, UNODC EAP and HQ should discuss the modalities of assistance with Member States in the region and potential donors, bearing in mind the on-going debate regarding aid to middle-income countries and the potential of South-South cooperation. A closer cooperation with relevant regional organisations and mechanisms should be aimed at already during the design stage.

The Regional Programmes are meant to be the main vehicle for translating the UNODC Strategy into regionally relevant actions. While the UNODC Strategy 2008-2011 and the RPF are constructed in different ways, the RPF is generally aligned with the content of the Strategy.

The Thematic Branches at HQ are intended to assist in the design of regional programmes and to provide policy guidance through their Thematic Programmes. HQ has developed six such programmes since 2008. They provide “a global operational framework as well as tools for use in delivery of technical assistance in their respective sectors, integrating the various components of the Office’s expertise in the areas of advocacy, trends and threat analysis, legislative and legal support, norm setting and technical assistance.”

The Evaluation Team is of the opinion that the Thematic Programmes in some instances could have contained more detailed situational or conflict analysis, region-specific notes and indicators. If the Thematic Programme documents were more robust and circulated to each region for the appending of a “Regional Note” then this would force the Regional Programmes to have a dialogue with the Thematic Branches at the outset and clearly articulate which parts of HQ normative policy applied to their region and which did not. UNODC might wish to consider revising the Thematic Programmes going
forward and in advance of the next round of regional programming, to incorporate more detailed situational and conflict analysis and circulating them to each Region for the appending of region-specific notes and/or indicators.

It is important to note that the Thematic Programme on Terrorism Prevention envisions the role of the regional offices as elaborating regional perspective jointly with the UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch in close cooperation with other entities. Regional programmes are also to take account of the national priorities of host-governments. In addition, it is stated that, “When these regional perspectives will have been adequately refined and established, they will subsequently be integrated in the thematic programme document, when it is revised.”

As noted above, the RPF EAP was designed as the first Regional programme based on the Integrated Programme Approach (IPA) and also at a time when the UNODC Bangkok office was in a state of near-collapse. Yet despite this fact, the RPF received no additional funding from HQ for Programme Support Unit (PSU) within RCEAP at the time of the RPF’s development despite the fact that there was a strong mandate for RCEAP to engage in aggressive fund-raising. This presented a challenge in scaling-up the programme, tracking projects and funds and maintaining the integrity of projects. A single staff member was funded to fulfill such functions at the RCEAP and there is clear evidence of an attempt to instill regular financial reporting, M&E, etc. Yet, as of 2012, funding for the “PSU” staff member was not secure. RPF thus chose to use a special project XSPJ18 (discussed below) for this purpose.

To date, it appears that despite its best intentions RPF has been unable to build sufficient momentum to fully transition to a system where all sub-programmes are overseen by Programme Managers, projects are combined or "dovetailed" into a broader regional programme or all projects have become subsumed into their respective sub-programmes from a management perspective. Rather, it seems that in many ways from an Oversight and Coordination perspective, the RPF never was able to advance beyond the stage that is described as an "interim" arrangement (i.e., that the overall programme coordination role be fulfilled by the Regional Representative supported by a small management team).

It is certainly clear, however, that RCEAP has used the RPF as a framework for implementing a number of regional projects and initiatives (i.e. PATROL project) that have managed to impact to varying degrees in many, if not all, of the 34 countries included in the RPF. Moreover, as the RPF was the first such Regional Programme of the new IPA generation undertaken by UNODC the mere fact of having such a framework, developed around which the RCEAP, UNODC, Members States and donors could coalesce and further integrate programming and funding, was in and of itself strategic.

Sustainability is closely linked to Government ownership, alignment with Member States’ own systems and capacities and the longevity of the cooperation. Therefore, both theoretically and practically, a regional programme stretching over four years should have a better chance of ensuring sustainable results than individual projects with limited duration. This would require sustainable financing of activities within the RPF. While the financial situation of the RC in Bangkok has improved considerably since 2009, the funding system of UNODC limits the prospects of sustainable financing of the RPF.
The piloting of the first UNODC regional programme required the development of a number of new approaches in terms of management, M&E, and overall coordination. RCEAP developed a number of new innovative reporting tools that are now being used by other regional programmes. For example, the Dashboard tool developed by RCEAP with UNODC HQ’s Business Intelligent Unit collects data across the organization. It is designed purely as a decision making support and reporting tool. While Dashboard provides an overview and can certainly not relied upon for certified financial statements, it offers a dynamic platform around which the UNODC Regional Representative can have conversations with Programme Managers in the field. Dashboard thus has served a valuable purpose under the RPF and perhaps could be transferred to other Regional Programmes.

Member States deserve to be involved at the earliest possible stage of RPF design. This is important not only to ensure ownership, but also to make sure that programming, outputs and indicators are properly scaled. Future RPFs should be widely circulated to all Member States that are intended beneficiaries of the Regional Programme. The RPF project documents should contain detailed risk analysis. It must be possible to assess progress towards achievement of the RPF outcomes; based upon appropriate measurable targets and indicators, taking into account different national circumstances, capacities and levels of development, must therefore accompany the goals. To this end, a sound monitoring system is essential to ensure effective implementation.

It is highly recommended that going-forward UNODC strengthen the Inter-Divisional Task Teams (IDTT)—so that they can lend greater supervision and accountability to the Regional Programmes. The Regional Desk should reinforce the leadership role of the IDTT. IDTT should not be viewed as optional, but as a mandatory process to which parties are to contribute in a professional manner.

UNODC Regional/Country Representatives under the RPF as the primary representatives of UNODC in the field should be funded from general purpose funds and not have to fundraise for their own contracts. UNODC HQ should clarify what are the respective obligations of HQ, Regional and Country Office managers with respect to the development of Regional Programmes and in particular the extent to which involvement of Member States and national partners is mandated.

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<th>Finding or Recommendation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation 1</td>
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<td>UNODC, through participation by and ownership of headquarters and field offices, should further focus on translating its corporate vision through fully integrating its functional areas and aligning its thematic and geographic programmes, and also factor in research data and threat assessments when determining where it should concentrate its competencies and operations. [paras. 40-41; 43-45; 47-48; 53-55 of the report]</td>
<td>OIOS UNODC evaluation, 27</td>
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<td>RCEAP’s regional programme contains a high number of indicators, many of which will not provide a robust measure of performance.</td>
<td>BoA RCEAP 2011, 4</td>
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53. The Board recommends that RCEAP prioritise its outcomes, outputs and activities with a view to reducing the total number of indicators. | BoA RCEAP 2011, 16

76. As shown in figure 5 below, UNODC launched in recent years regional and thematic planning initiatives. Supported by Member States, the ongoing thematic and regional programming is an attempt to reconcile numerous fragmented and sporadic projects into a more strategic and consolidated set of programmes. The Inspectors could perceive through their interviews and their review of programming documents a strong internal commitment and a proactive attitude to adjust the process and build it on lessons learned from programmes already designed. Some regional and thematic programmes are currently under development. | JIU 2010, 18

78. There are many benefits expected from the thematic and programmatic approach: (a) the enhanced dialogue with Member States therefore increasing ownership via the involvement of regional actors at the drafting stage and their participation in the steering committees at the implementation stage; (b) the potential for resource mobilization and softer earmarking done at the programme level rather than at single projects; (c) the increased administrative effectiveness by dealing with a number of management activities at the programme level, and (d) the creation of a reinforced oversight framework in which headquarters and field offices would contribute to increased accountability. | JIU 2010, 19