Country Overview

**Land:** Indonesia is composed of 1700 islands over 1,811,569 km², and shares borders with Malaysia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea.

**Key threats:** Economic disparity is the major threat to Indonesia, followed by corruption, which seriously undermines governance and development. Rising intolerance and violent extremism are also emerging threats. In terms of transnational threats, environmental crime (illegal forestry and fishing), human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, money laundering and illicit drug trafficking also present significant challenges. The two primary illicit drugs present in Indonesia are synthetic methamphetamine and marijuana. There is no indication of significant domestic production of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) at the current time, with domestic consumption fuelled by trafficking into Indonesia from the Golden Triangle. The consumption of ATS is rising⁴ and there are reports of some internal production.³ Cyber-crime, piracy, terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization in prisons are emerging threats.⁴ Separatism and ethnic and religious tensions are considered by some analysts to have the potential to destabilize central institutions if backed by external actors⁵.

**UN Presence:** 24 agencies⁶, including the UNODC Programme Office Indonesia (POIDN) based in Jakarta.

**Government of Indonesia (GoI) engagement:** The Conference of State Parties of the UNTOC, Global Forum on Migration and Development, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Person and Related Transnational Crimes, signatory of the UNCAC, G20

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¹ UNODC Country Programme for Indonesia 2017-2019
Anti-Corruption Working Group (G20 ACWG), signatory to the three drug conventions\(^7\), member of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Special Assembly on the World Drug Problems, Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies for Asia Pacific, and ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters under UNODC framework.

**UNODC Country Programme (CP):** 2017-2020 and extended until 2021. The programme covers four sub-programmes (SP). These include Transnational Organized Crime, Anti-Corruption, Criminal Justice and Drugs and Health. These are aligned with the Regional Programme (RP) Southeast Asia as depicted in diagram 1.

**UNODC activities implemented between 2017-2020:** 175 activities across all four SPs.

**Budget:** The indicative budget was initially USD $16,740,900, as of April 2019, $7,507,236.02 USD or 44% had been raised.

**Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs):** 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17\(^8\) for Southeast Asia\(^9\). The CP was designed in 2016 after the launch of the SDGs in 2015. UNODC HQ mapping exercise\(^10\) and the UNODC tools and publications relevant to the SDGs document\(^11\) describe the SDGs which UNODC supports. The CP programme document (annex 6)\(^12\) also maps how the SPs will assist MS to achieve the SDGs. As shown in diagram 2, SP1 of the programme targets many of the SDGs, which corresponds to the Government of Indonesia (GOI)’s priorities.

The development of the CP began in August 2015 and was completed in September 2016. During this period, there wasn’t any UNODC organization-wide guidance on aligning and contributing to the SDGs. In this context, POIDN sought to align the sub-programmes and outcomes to SDGs and indicators as adopted by the GoI in its Mid-term Development Plan. POIDN reports its contributions into the UN Partnership for Development Framework (UNPDF), however, this has experienced some limitations. POIDN commenced reporting on the activity linkages to the relevant SDGs in their Smartsheets for 2018. However, this is not yet done systematically across all SPs and all outcomes. Furthermore, no analysis has yet been carried out on the actual contribution of UNODC’s activities to the SDGs.

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\(^7\) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 through Law No.8 of 1976; Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 through Law No.8 of 1996; Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 through Law No. 7 of 1997.

\(^8\) From ROSEAP monitoring platform on Smartsheets.


**Conflict sensitive programming**\(^{12}\): Conflict sensitivity programming was not a requirement for UNODC until the recent UN reform initiatives, that called for the integration of ‘do no harm’ into all programming to strengthen the peace and security pillar and achieve the agenda 2030.\(^{14}\) Conflict sensitive programming was, therefore, not conducted during the development of the CP. Although a situational analysis was conducted during the design phase it is unclear how information on conflict drivers (elections, economic disparity, conflicts, distrust in the governmental authorities etc…) is updated. While Indonesia is not a conflict zone, the country has been facing a rise in violent extremism\(^{15}\) and religious and ethnic disputes and have the potential to destabilize certain areas if there is undue external influence.\(^{16}\) The latest elections and recent demonstrations\(^{17}\) in the streets of Jakarta indicate the risk of discontent amongst certain spheres of society and the questioning of the current democratic system. In addition, the evaluation found that while some level of consultations was done with UN agencies, governmental authorities and some Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), these engagements did not fully comply with the ‘Do No Harm principle’ (DNH)\(^{18}\).

**Foundation of UNODC’s engagement with GoI:** UNODC applies and develops its programmes according to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which includes a set of principles that UN agencies should respect in order to strengthen the effectiveness of their programming. The evaluation team assessed how the CP complied or not with the principles using the grid in table 1:

\(\text{Diagram 2: SPs AND SDGs}\)

- **SP1 TOC**
  - SDG 8.7-8.8
  - SDG 10.1
  - SDG 14.2-14.4
  - SDG 15.2-15.5-15.7-15.7.c
  - SDG 16.2 16.4

- **SP2 ACC**
  - SDG 12.7
  - SDG 16.5

- **SP3 CJ**
  - SDG 16.1
  - SDG 16.b

- **SP4 D&H**
  - SDG 3.3-3.5

*Source: Evaluation team based on programme documents*

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\(^{12}\) **Conflict sensitivity** - refers to the ability of an organization to: understand the context in which it is operating, particularly intergroup relations; understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and act upon the understanding of these interactions, in order to avoid negative impacts. and maximize positive impacts.

\(^{13}\) **Conflict-sensitive programming** - involves close scrutiny of the operational context through regularly updating the conflict analysis, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the context.  


\(^{15}\) Reports of various IC and UN projects to include those of UNODC  

https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/indonesia

\(^{16}\) ASEAN research project  


\(^{17}\) https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/31/indonesia-set-independent-inquiry-jakarta-riots

\(^{18}\) Do No Harm (DNH) - Originated by CDA Collaborative (http://cdacollaborative.org/programs/do-noharm/)
While most principles of the Paris Declaration were respected, clearer definitions of the responsibility and the contribution of the GoI to the achievements of the programme objectives are unclear and remain undefined. As a result, success is largely the responsibility of POIDN’s implementation and engagement only, which may pose risks to sustainability.

Relevance and the design of the CP in Indonesia

The CP Indonesia followed a consultative process and was designed using lessons learned from prior UNODC engagements in Indonesia. The programme is aligned with the priorities of the Indonesian Government’s National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), Phases III and IV20 and with the UN Partnership for Development Framework 2016-2020 (UNPDF). According to the desk research and interviews, the outcomes of the UNPDF 2016-2020, jointly signed by the GoI and the United Nations (UN) in Indonesia, helped guide the implementation of UNODC’s work in the country. The design of the CP also took into consideration the Agenda 202521 for the ASEAN Community, in particular its focus on strengthening the security and political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paris Declaration Principles for Aid Effectiveness</th>
<th>UNODC CP Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Ownership by national governments of their development policies and strategies</td>
<td>This was present at the design phase and substantiated by interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Alignment of external support with the systems and procedures of country institutions</td>
<td>Designed and implemented in cooperation with the GoI National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Harmonization/ better coordination of donor support</td>
<td>Could be improved. Meetings with donors were not sufficiently coordinated, according to interviews. The Programme Governance Committee (PGC) does not invite donors, however this is at the request of government counterparts, to facilitate frank, open discussions. However, UNODC meets frequently with donors and minutes of PGC meetings could be shared with donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- Managing for development results</td>
<td>Governance structure in place to report to key counterparts. POIDN is an active member of the UNCT and frequently discusses with other relevant UN agencies opportunities for joint programming, however internal coordination within UNODC could be improved. The CP is also aligned with UNPDF 2016-202019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- Mutual Accountability for development results</td>
<td>Insufficiently defined. Level of responsibilities of UNODC is set in the Programme document and the governance structure, specifically on risk and mitigation measures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Evaluation team based on programme documents

While most principles of the Paris Declaration were respected, clearer definitions of the responsibility and the contribution of the GoI to the achievements of the programme objectives are unclear and remain undefined. As a result, success is largely the responsibility of POIDN’s implementation and engagement only, which may pose risks to sustainability.

19 United Nations Partnership for Development Framework
21 https://asean.org/asean-2025-at-a-glance/
stability of the members of ASEAN. Indonesia is vulnerable to many forms of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Trafficking is aided by the fact that Indonesia is a large archipelago and has numerous porous borders. Furthermore, while drug use has not risen over the last few years (0.6% of the total population aged 10-60 in 2015\(^{22}\)), the use of ATS has increased throughout Indonesia and the GoI has declared a ‘war on drugs’.

From the desk research and interviews, Indonesia is geo-strategically important in the region as one of the strong economies, geographically challenging (due to the numerous islands) and due to the mix of identified threats (as indicated above). Although, the CP addresses all of these threats to comply with the UNODC’s Mid-Term Strategy (2015\(^{23}\)) and the RBM standardized templates, only three out of four SPs attracted donors’ funding. SP1 and SP3 received the most funds (above 3 million each) while SP4 received less than a million dollars. SP2, which relates to corruption, was not directly funded via the CP but instead received a limited amount of funds from Norway via a stand-alone project funding on national anti-corruption work.

Lack of funding for corruption could be explained by the fact that Indonesia is a middle-income country, which limits local funding opportunities and RPs and Global Programmes (GPs) are in a better position to attract donor support. This underscores the need to ensure coordination of resource mobilisation between the global, regional and national offices.

The guiding structure for UNODC’s activities is the CP, which was approved and signed by the GoI in November 2016. According to interviews with beneficiaries, the CP is viewed more as a strategy rather than a programmatic tool. Similarly to the CP in Myanmar, it helps the government and donors understand the scope of UNODC’s work and how interventions are aligned with their priorities. However, there was no clear evidence to suggest that a separate ‘programme and logframe’ was required per se. In addition, the CP was designed without any theory of change (ToC). A ToC is helpful to identify activities, preliminary outcomes and pathways that are critical to achieving the long-term outcomes and results. However, the evaluation team found that it was not relevant, as in the RP\(^{24}\), to develop a ToC for the CP as a whole, but rather for each SP and possibly each outcome. For example, within the current CP, outcome 1.4 of the SP 1 has developed a narrative ToC. Indeed, the process of developing the ToC was found to be difficult as each SP implies different types of activities, external factors (negative and positive), different set of stakeholders, challenges and keys to success that help UNODC achieve (or not) its targets and its overarching outcomes. At the time it was designed, it was not yet common practice to use ToC within UNODC, thus the evaluation did not expect to find ToC for the CP. Despite this, a narrative ToC was developed for outcome 1.4, and can be considered a useful exercise. A graphic representation of the narrative ToC can be found at the end of this report.

In addition, the CP’s logical framework included limited baseline data and the targets are not always defined or measurable. Thus, the design of the CP allows for limited outcome level assessment as data is only collected at the output level and no meta-analysis is conducted at the outcome level. The interviews with donors and

\(^{22}\) CP Indonesia programme document

\(^{23}\) https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_54/4_CRP/CND-54-CRP4-V1181367-E.pdf

\(^{24}\) Refer to the RP evaluation report above.
UNODC staff members recognized that limitation, and that another monitoring framework and investment (time and staff) is required. The current CP design does not allow POIDN, ROSEAP nor the evaluation team to assess the CP’s long-term impacts. Some preliminary outcomes were observed in some of the SPs (refer to impact section below).

Effectiveness of the CP Indonesia

The CP Indonesia implemented 175 activities within the period covered by the evaluation data collection. These activities included workshops, training, missions and legal support, which reached 1556 people in 2017-2018. CP activities are reported by POIDN to ROSEAP in Bangkok where they are aggregated into Smartsheets. These activities are monitored at the output level and are not connected to any ToC, nor are they monitored through a systematic process or defined tools, with the exception of post-training questionnaires that are distributed after trainings. This explains the minimal reporting in relation to each output in the annual reports. According to post-training sheets and interviews with beneficiaries, training and mentoring were found to contribute to building capacity of the targeted institutions. The technical assistance offered on legal reforms in SP3 on Violent Extremist Prisoners (VEP), as an example, was highly valued by beneficiaries. UNODC has a special mandate that allows it to access prisons in most countries where it operates. It is often the only UN agency with such access and expertise. According to interviews with beneficiaries, partners and CSOs, UNODC was viewed as an expert, with a highly relevant mandate for Indonesia. For the other sectors within SP1, the focus on forest and wildlife trafficking is aligned with the UNPDF and the national strategy of GoI (2015-2020) and again UNDOC was viewed as professional and with relevant expertise. With respect to health and drug demand reduction, its access to law enforcement agencies and prisons represented UNODC’s added value in the midst of many other agencies and CSOs working in that space.

With regards to the type of activities proposed in Indonesia, and as seen in diagram 4 ‘Type of Activities Implemented by CP Indonesia 2017-2018’ and the ‘Activities Status on CP in Indonesia’, show that training is the main activity (37 in two years) delivered by UNODC in Indonesia, and that law enforcement officers are the main recipients. Training and workshops were found by the evaluation team to not be well defined in some cases. However, the desk review and interviews indicated that recipients were generally satisfied with the level of expertise provided during capacity building activities (training) and information sessions (workshops). However, some respondents mentioned that some training should be repeated and be longer in duration to foster both change in the beneficiaries’ behaviour and generate greater institutional memory for sustainability and longer-term impact. As explained in the ToC of outcome 1.1 and outcome 1.4, for instance, the key objective is to ‘close the gap between actual performance and the desired performance of the individuals and institutions

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25 The data for 2019 was not yet available on smartsheets.
26 Data taken from ROSEAP Smartsheet database for activities reporting.
involved in ensuring criminal justice responses to forest crime in Indonesia ...’. The ToC of outcome 1.4 puts the emphasis on the ownership, sustainability of the national beneficiaries and that UNODC ‘promotes’ capacity building rather than ‘does it’. While the ToC was developed, the pathways to get from actual performance to designed performance and the keys to success were not identified. In addition, staff attrition in counterpart agencies was one of the key challenges mentioned by most stakeholders as posing a significant challenge to achieving sustainability of capacity building activities. Training of Trainers and on-line courses were developed to try to address this problem, however, the length and the frequency of the capacity building activities remain a concern to most stakeholders. Mentoring was, however, well appreciated and seen as effective when it was conducted.

The level of completion of the activities planned within the CP was 69%, as seen in diagram 5 below ‘Level of completion of Activities of CP Indonesia 2017-2018’). Stakeholders were satisfied with the level of activities implemented but did not track the effectiveness of UNODC nor that of the other agencies. According to interviews, UNODC was responsive to requests to organize meetings to understand progress or address any challenge or issue that the MFA or the BAPPENAS (the Ministry of National Development Planning) as key implementing partners may have. However, the ability of POIDN to respond to ad hoc requests has been limited since the implementation of Umoja. Other agencies reported that UNODC often offered too much support and that they were only able to engage with UNODC approximately once a month, as they had other international partners to work with. It is positive but shows that UNODC might be trying to do too much in some areas.

The CP of Indonesia’s governance structure is organized around a bi-annual Programme Governance Committee (PGC) and four Technical Working Groups, one for each of the SPs. In addition, ‘ad hoc’ meetings are regularly organized with the implementing partners of the GoI in order to inform them of upcoming UNODC activities, report on progress and resolve any issues. Avoiding duplication of activities amongst UNODC programmes, other UN agencies or other agencies operating in Indonesia is a priority for the GoI. Having a country focused strategy amongst all the UN agencies is critical for the GoI, in addition to a regional plan of action. The CP document was signed by the GoI and acts as a reference. According to interviews, some level of dissatisfaction was expressed when unplanned activities took place without prior notice, or when communiques were not directed through the right governmental institutions and came directly from UNODC’s offices outside of Indonesia, such as from UNODC HQ.

The coordination between UNODC GPs, the RP and the POIDN was not always as it should be, in order to obtain the authorization of the GoI in due time and inform the government of upcoming activities. The local presence of UNODC through their office in Jakarta is critical for regular face to face engagement with the authorities and the effectiveness of the implementation of the activities. A strategy that defines engagement is paramount for the GoI to authorize any UN agency to implement activities on its territory. However, the CP’s programme document is more of a strategy with a vision, a set of activities but without targets and indicators. It is a quasi-business plan or business strategy that sets the goals and how to get there, but it lacks the proper definition of the ‘services’ (the activities) and how UNODC will achieve the set goals. Although Indonesia has a UNPDF, according to interviews, the GoI would welcome an integrated strategy for all the UN agencies operating in Indonesia that is more detailed with what each agency will do and report on and that
shows coordination. The UN reforms might give the opportunity to UNODC to work with the UNCT and the GoI to discuss the future strategic framework under which UNODC and other UN agencies will operate and create a more effective and actionable framework. It is, however, irrelevant to speak of the CP, RP and GPs in relation to stakeholder perceptions as UNODC is generally seen as a single organization and not separate programmes. Most beneficiaries are not familiar with the programmatic structures that are in place to provide the activities that meet their needs and expectations.

One of the key limitations that arose with regards to the CP and the way UNODC operates in the country, is the inflexibility of changing participants due to last minute circumstances. Based on interviews and desk research, these limitations are due to numerous factors, including visa processing, tedious procurement (Umoja) processes, and donors’ requests for the type of beneficiaries (sector and senior-ship level).

Finally, with respect to UNODC’s positioning, most stakeholders were satisfied and viewed UNODC as a key expert in its field. However, greater engagement with private sector and civil society actors in Indonesia was suggested by beneficiaries. Further institutional strengthening was requested to build the administrations’ staff and institutional capacity. Training modules were also not always sufficiently customized to the beneficiary agency or entity. Overall, stakeholders were satisfied and found capacity building activities ‘interesting, engaging and relevant to their daily work’. Overall, POIDN was found to be relatively effective but delays due to Umoja, staff turnover, recruitment processes, as well as unfunded activities are products of UNODC’s current operating model and the way CPs and RPs are structured. As this report represents a mid-term evaluation, many activities have yet to be implemented. However, it was possible to observe some results at the output level as shown in box 1 below:

**BOX 1: RESULTS AT THE OUTPUT LEVEL**

**Examples of results at the output level observed across the four SPs in Indonesia**

- **SP3 on criminal justice:**
  - Gap analysis on Violent Extremist Prisoners (VEP) national regulation and framework in order to develop a national strategy in line with international guidelines and the GOI’s national action plan on countering violent extremism;
  - Convened a national action plan working group to draft the national action plan on management of VEPs;
  - Training delivered to Densus members, BNPT Staff, Indonesia’s National Police Mobile Brigade, Heads of prisons, Prison security guards, rehabilitation staff and inmate’s prison guardians;

- **SP1 on TOC and Illicit trafficking:**
  - Conducted trainings of trainers to prepare frontline staff on trafficking in women and in children;

- **SP4 on Drugs & Health:**
  - UNODC supported Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) in developing a Practical Handbook for prison staff on the implementation of HIV-AIDS services for prison inmates in Indonesia;
  - Capacity building for drug treatment professionals on Treatnet module D “management of drug dependent treatment services’;
  - Policy Dialogues to strengthen gender-responsive HIV services for women who use drugs conducted in 5 cities across the country.

**Source: Evaluation team analysis based on programme documents**

**Efficiency of the CP**

The funds received for the CP at the time of the evaluation totalled USD $7,507,236 and focused predominantly on SP1 and SP 3 (diagram 3 ‘Funded SPs 2017-2018’), which reflects donors’ priorities for the region. SP4 received $686,435 to work on cross-cutting themes related to drug demand reduction. Beneficiaries commented that the activities were not just donor-driven but also responding to their priorities.
Funding for individual outcomes within SPs is also uneven. SP1 received funding in support of the wildlife outcome while other outcomes within SP1 are yet to be funded. SP2 received limited funding through a project outside of the CP and other UNODC GPs focused on anti-corruption also operate in Indonesia. SP3 mainly received funding for outcome 1 on terrorism prevention in prison settings.

The implementation rate of 69% as seen in diagram 6 (‘Completed vs Cancelled Activities 2017-2018’) was perceived as satisfactory by stakeholders. Others considered the inflexibility of UNODC as an issue in coordinating and planning their activities. Furthermore, while donors were generally satisfied with the implementation rate of the activities, they would prefer to be informed of upcoming events with sufficient time to plan travel. Indeed, this was one of the key grievances, along with the general financial reports that offer few details on how funds are disbursed. Solutions were found between UNODC offices, including Indonesia, to share internal budgets vs disbursements reports along with the bi-annual or annual reports. This was well-received and appreciated.

Finally, with respect to efficiency, the staffing plan for the CP for Indonesia had foreseen international experts for each of the technical working groups, programme managers and accountants across the different SPs. Currently, there is one international staff member who is the country programme office manager, with all others being national staff members. The level and type of earmarked funding did not allow the recruitment of international experts to join the SPs. As a result, there is a close coordination between Bangkok thematic experts and the CP Office in Indonesia. The presence of international experts in coordination meetings with the government was considered crucial, together with all UN agencies present in Indonesia. With the UN reforms and UNODC requiring a greater presence in strategic countries, the Office in Indonesia is missing international staff to help the office strengthen UNODC’s presence and positioning. The Surge team proposed by UNODC HQ, deploys international experts in strategic locations to boost UNODC’s positioning or fill positions of missing thematic experts for a duration of 3 months. The Surge team is a temporary solution for the countries, but was considered as an interesting solution to solve some of UNODC’s staffing constraints and increase its local presence. Overall, the level of activities implemented across the CP (complete vs delayed), the level of funds raised, the financial review of Umoja’s financial reports, interviews and the desk review concluded that the degree of efficiency of the CP was satisfactory, but the analysis was done at the SP level rather than at the CP level. Funds and activities are raised and implemented at the SP level and so is reporting.

Sustainability and Impact

Most UNODC reporting is at the activity level and there is little meta-analysis at the outcome level. The CP logframe did not provide a suitable tool for reporting officers to understand the pathways, connectors and different factors that could help them assess the impact of the CP. As mentioned by multiple stakeholders working together within a more integrated framework should help generate greater sustainability and provide better indicators. Changes to laws are long-term changes. Some changes in behaviours amongst frontline officers were reported in post-training questionnaires. However, the evaluation could not verify this with

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27 [https://www.un.or.id/who-we-are](https://www.un.or.id/who-we-are)
28 This affirmation could not be assessed by the evaluation team as they could not meet the same officers who had received the training. Furthermore, no meta-analysis of training feedback forms had been affected. As a result, this observation is just made on basis of interviews with only a few stakeholders.
front-line officers or amongst the population. The UN reforms advocate that ‘the efforts of the many are what counts in long-term strategic frameworks’. Such mapping was absent from UNODC’s CP design and it did not try to understand its contribution amongst UN and other agencies. The nexus between peace, security and development is crucial for generating long-term stability and prosperity. The CP does not identify or articulate these interlinkages, although POIDN has developed ToT and published and translated manuals and handbooks on the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization. Ownership of capacity building and other objectives are at the centre of the CP’s SPs and are expressed in the ToC of the SP outcomes 1.1 and 1.4. POIDN requires better tools for monitoring impact and ownership as their pre-training and post-training sheets are not sufficient to assess the long-term behavioural changes. Furthermore, while exit strategies are mentioned in the ToCs for outcome 1.1 and outcome 1.4 of SP1, they do not explain specific roles and responsibilities. The CP document does not have an exit strategy. As a middle-income country and a member of the G20, Indonesia has the ability to co-fund or fund certain activities. This ability is not uniform across countries in the region due to departmental budgetary issues. However, this strengthens the ownership and the sustainability of the objectives sought after in the CP and the SPs.

**BOX 2: HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND**

**HR&G and Leave No One Behind:** Interviews, observations and the desk review confirmed that human rights (HR) were presented in all workshops and presentations. HR were mentioned from the start of the CP document and the desk review and interviews confirmed that HR were integrated in all capacity-building activities, but not in sufficient detail. Interlocutors mentioned that HR were introduced as being part of the UNODC’s mandate, but no further discussion on the activities’ connection to HR was done in most trainings. HR are a critical issue in Indonesia, especially with regards to fair trial rights, prison conditions, police violence and the death penalty. Overall, the CP is considered to have not sufficiently emphasized HR while it was satisfactory on gender issues.

While gender was mentioned, according to interviews, there was no evidence of applying the principle of ‘Leave No One Behind’. Disaggregated data is reported as of 2018 for some of the SPs of the CP Indonesia, but it was not systematically done before 2018. Not all outputs had disaggregated data relating to beneficiaries, as observed in the annual reports and Smartsheets. Gender was observed as being well-promoted both at the policy level and in capacity-building activities. The ratio of female to male officers or governmental representatives for activities was observed as fair and efforts to promote gender equity were confirmed (desk review and interviews).

Further effort could be assigned at the design phase to collect baseline data, connect the activities to the relevant SDGs and disaggregate data and conduct meta-analyses. UNODC was seen as having succeeded in raising gender mainstreaming and equity dialogue with GoI.

*Source: Evaluation team analysis*

Cooperation and partnerships

UNODC cooperates closely with the GoI and other international agencies such as UNCT, INTERPOL, FAO, WWF, OECD, UNDP, UN Women, IOM, ILO, World Customs Organization, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNICRI and FAO. Thus, collaboration amongst UN agencies was found to be commonplace. Joint programming whereby UNODC and another agency are co-managers and receive the funds divided according to their respective tasks and costs was not commonplace. POIDN cooperates closely with ROSEAP in Bangkok, but less so with UNODC HQ in Vienna. While communications are more difficult due to the time-zone difference, coordination amongst thematic departments at HQ and POIDN can be improved.

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29 [https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform](https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform)

Conclusions

Indonesia is a regional economic hub and has the largest population in the region. It is critical for fighting transnational organized crime, in setting an example to address corruption, trafficking in goods and in persons. Governmental counterparts were found to be engaged and dedicated to strengthening their institutions with POIDN’s support. A local presence has proven to be essential if UNODC wants to work and engage with governmental institutions. The UNODC CP was organized around four SPs, with SP1 and SP3 receiving the most funds. The allocation of funds clearly shows the priority of donors. Elements of the RP and other UNODC GPs do provide other activities in Indonesia which ensures that more than the CP is implemented. All activities, whether through the RP, CP or GPs are presented and confirmed by the GoI and the PGC. A strategic framework is required to work within Indonesia, with the government and as a UN agency. However, the CP per se did not prove to be to most effective framework as many outputs had yet to be implemented.

Considering that this evaluation covers a period of two years, the level of activities implemented and their quality were found to be satisfactory. Some delays in implementing the activities occurred but, when possible, they were postponed until the following year.

Finally, stakeholders were not aware whether activities were under the auspices of the CP, GPs or RP. This was considered irrelevant provided they corresponded to their own strategic plan and they were informed of the activities. Despite the mechanism for implementing activities, the individual activities are coordinated within the overall objectives of UNODC in the country and are approved by the GoI. Stakeholders do not see the difference between the various UNODC programming tools and would prefer to have one document which indicates what UNODC is delivering across the region which also informs MS as to the level of interaction at country level when required. This is critical for future programming as the CP design and amendments are time consuming for the thematic experts; time that could be used in implementing activities, monitoring and engaging with other agencies and stakeholders.

Recommendations

- ROSEAP and POIDN should review within the next year the CP’s strategic vision in the design of the next strategic framework by redefining the services offered and continue aligning with MS and the donors’ priorities.
- POIDN with ROSEAP thematic experts should draft a ToC for each outcome of each SP and include judgment criteria to identify successful outcomes relative to criminal justice, drugs and health and transnational organized crime.
- POIDN with ROSEAP should seek to strengthen UNODC’s office expert base, ensuring relevant and balanced expertise at both the international and national levels.
- ROSEAP and POIDN should increase visibility and engagement with other UN agencies for more joint programming and coordination (possible areas of joint programming in SP1 and SP3 and SP4), through UNCT or the new arrangements developed by the UN reforms.
- ROSEAP and POIDN should, as of now, ensure the application of UNODC Gender and Human Rights Guidelines in the programming and implementation of activities, as well as the collection of disaggregated data. POIDN should ensure that Gender, HR and Leave No One Behind are well understood by the programme staff and key experts in line with UNODC’s guidelines and do an initial quality control on the delivery of the trainings and workshops. External support could be considered for training and integrating HR and a gender strategy within trainings, workshops and mentoring materials.
- ROSEAP and POIDN should apply Do No harm Principles (conflict sensitivity programming) during the design phase and throughout implementation of the next CP.

31 All the recommendations are aimed at the POIND Country Manager supported by ROSEAP.
Theory of Change for Outcome 1.4 of SP1 of the CP Indonesia

Sphere of influence

Preliminary outcomes
- Risks assessed of new programme target areas; National measures of improved timber analysis for LE; Equipped LE for timber analysis
- Inter-agency cooperation & opened procedures on combating forest crime; increased number of forest crime cases detected and investigated
- Improved capabilities amongst LE & relevant agencies; Increased transparency & accountability
- Number of barefoot investigators under MoLEs' community based forest protection programme. Number of forest crime cases detected & reports; community satisfaction with LE agencies

Preliminary outcomes

Out 1 Operational strategies and support systems of the Directorate General of Law Enforcement, Ministry of Environment and Forestry, strengthened
- Empowering and strengthening of local ownership recognising the role of citizens and development partners
- New structure and decision-making processes for LE
- Legal framework is not enacted & becomes a front for ongoing corruption

Out 2 Inter-agency cooperation at national level and in target areas strengthened
- Reg Platforms, LE, Border control, judiciary
- Workshops, TA on legal reforms, dissemination, mentoring

Out 3 Capacity developed amongst law enforcement officers for improved response to forest crime
- UNODC, LE, PPATK, KPK, Farmers, Customs, AGO, Forest services, CSOs

Out 4 Community groups and CSOs in supporting compliance of forest crime legislation and regulations strengthened
- Criminal Justice responses on forest crime (illegal logging and encroachment strengthened

Source: Evaluation team analysis