ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

Country Overview

MAP 1: MYANMAR AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Source: United Nations Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

Land: Myanmar is the second largest country in Southeast Asia with a total land area of 676,578 km2. It shares borders with the People's Republic of China, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Thailand, Bangladesh and India.

Key transnational organized crimes: Opium/heroin production and trafficking (second largest producer after Afghanistan[1]), methamphetamines production[2], human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, wildlife trafficking[3] and money laundering.

UN Presence: 22 agencies,[4] with UNODC present in the Programme Office for Myanmar, (POMYA), in Yangoon and in Southern Shan State.

UNODC Country Programme (CP): 2014-2017, extended to 31 December 2021[5]. Focused on three funded sub-programmes (SPs), which are aligned to the RP, as shown in diagram 1. SP1 on Transnational Organized Crime did not receive any donor funding and SP5 on Alternative Livelihoods was subject to a separate independent evaluation in 2018[6].

UNODC activities implemented between 2014-2019: 495 across SPs 2,3,4 funded by the CP. Some activities associated to SP1 were funded via the RP[7].

UNODC CP Budget: the indicative budget was $42,000,000 of which $22,221,661 had been raised[8].

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[1] https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2019/Myanmar_Opium_Survey_2018_web.pdf

[2] UNODC Global SMART Programme https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/smart.html

https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2019/Myanmar_Opium_Survey_2018_web.pdf

[3] http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Report_Myanmar_Country_Report_BTI_2018.pdf;

file:///Users/EM/Downloads/Myanmar%20-%20Overview%20of%20Corruption%20[U4%20Anti-Corruption%20Resource%20Centre%20Expert%20Answer].pdf; UNODC Programme Document for Country Programme Myanmar SP3, SP4, SP4.

[4] https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/portal-document/Myanmar_UNDAF.pdf

[5] Awaiting final approval for extension by the Programme Governance Committee of the UNODC Country Programme Myanmar

[6] https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/MMRZ39_mid-term_Independent_Project_Evaluation_August_2018.pdf

[7] ROSEAP Smartsheets.

[8] ROSEAP Smartsheets as of May 2019.

Design

The UNODC CP in Myanmar was designed through a consultative and participatory process. The guiding structure for UNODC's activities in Myanmar has been the CP, which was approved and signed by the Government of Myanmar (GoM) in 2014 for an initial 3-year-period ending in 2017. However, it has since been extended through 31 December 2021[9]. The CP is structured into five SPs, which include the following:

- SP1: Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking
- SP2: Anti-corruption
- SP3: Criminal Justice
- SP4: Drugs and Health
- SP5: Sustainable Livelihoods and Development

DIAGRAM 1: ALIGNBMENT OF MYANMAR CP AND RP FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

CP Myanmar
- SP2 Anti-Corruption
- SP3 Criminal Justice
- SP4 Drugs & Health

RP SEA
- SP2 Anti-Corruption
- SP4 Criminal Justice
- SP5 Drugs & Health

Source: Evaluation team based on programme documents

SPs 1-4 are aligned with both the Regional Programme (RP) for Southeast Asia (2014-2021) as well as the UNODC Strategic Framework 2014-2015[10] and the Mid-Term Strategy 2015. SP5 represents UNODC work that has specific relevance in Myanmar in terms of Alternative Development.

While Myanmar does not yet have a signed UNDAF, the CP was aligned with the UN Transition Strategy and POMYA was involved in the development of the Myanmar UNDAF for 2018-2022.

Working in Myanmar and conducting activities in the country requires extensive consultation and approval from the national government, including at least six months to approve and sign a formal document. These requirements were confirmed by multiple stakeholders, including national government counterparts as well as the minutes of the Programme Governance Committee (PGC) meetings. The CP was developed via a consultative process which considered the needs and requirements of the counterparts. POMYA has regular consultations with government counterparts and other stakeholders through both formal and informal settings, ensuring that the CP is relevant to government counterparts, donors and other stakeholders. The evaluation found that consultations with Civil Society Organizations (CSO) were not conducted as part of the design and involvement of CSOs in the work of the CP and POMYA is limited.

During the development of the CP, POMYA made significant use of a variety of UNODC reports and research including the UNODC Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (TOCTA)[11] for East Asia and the Pacific and reporting from the Global Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and Trends (SMART) programme. References to other UN entities, international organizations and CSOs were used throughout the CP. The majority of the research and evidence incorporated was used to understand the situation in the country and to develop an appropriate response. Stakeholders across the board noted the value of UNODC research. While the CP does identify lessons learned from the

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[9] Awaiting final approval for extension by the Programme Governance Committee of the UNODC Country Programme Myanmar

[10] https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_55/E-CN7-2012-CRP2_V1251319_E.pdf

[11] https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf

implementation and evaluation of past regional and country programming, the details of how these lessons learned were utilized and applied in the development of the CP is unclear.

The CP included a results and monitoring framework at the outcome level with performance indicators assigned to each outcome. While the body of the CP includes outputs for each outcome, it was not designed with a full logical framework including outputs and activities or a Theory of Change (ToC) identifying results pathways. Rather, logical frameworks have been developed at the SP level to include outcomes, outputs and activities, along with indicators and targets. Activity and output level results are tracked using Smartsheet, a parallel planning and monitoring web-based software system outside of Umoja. SP and CP results at the outcome level are reported in semi-annual and annual progress performance reports and additional donor reports. There is little M&E capacity at ROSEAP and POMYA does not have dedicated funding to recruit M&E staff. ROSEAP has created a single post through combined project funds. This post gathers the data from all SPs across the region.

The CP was developed prior to UNODC's use of ToC. The evaluation team found that in many cases outcomes and outputs were not clear or easily measurable. In addition, very few of the indicators included baseline or target information. In several cases, the lack of baseline and target data was related to unfunded outcomes, such as in SP1. In other cases, this work had just not been done. The research and ToC developed for SP5 of the CP is an exemplary example of how to address the identified issues and incorporate them into UNODC's work.

Overall, the lack of a ToC and the limited baseline and target data at the SP level created difficulty in assessing the long-term contribution of UNODC's work in Myanmar.

While a ToC is useful in identifying activities, preliminary outcomes and pathways that achieve long-term results, the evaluation team found that given the function of the CP, a ToC at level of the CP was not necessary. It would be more useful to develop a ToC for each SP, as it is the SP that represents the programmatic work. In some SPs with multiple outcomes, the evaluation team suggests the drafting of ToC for each outcome. Each SP implies different types of activities, external factors (negative and positive), different sets of stakeholders, challenges and the keys to success that help UNODC achieve (or not) its targets and its overarching outcomes.

Interviews with donors and UNODC staff members recognized the limitation of not having a clear ToC and acknowledged that development of a ToC would require a different monitoring framework and additional investment of time and staff. The design of the current CP does not provide a framework for the assessment of long-term impacts. Some preliminary outcomes were, however, observed in some of the SPs, which are discussed in more detail later in this report.

Conflict Sensitive Programming

While conflict sensitive programming has been broadly implemented by UN entities working in conflict and post-conflict settings, it has not been required or common practice for UNODC programming. Recently, through the UN reform initiatives and more specifically the 2018 SG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace[12], as well increased donor interest, there has been direction to apply the concept more widely within the UN, UN Country Teams and specifically the UN Development Assistance Frameworks[13] (UNDAF). The UN reform initiatives call for the integration of 'do no harm' principles into all programming to strengthen the peace and security pillar and achieve the agenda 2030.[14] Given that

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12 The SG Report can be found at:
    https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peace building_and_sustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e_1.pdf
13 The UN reform initiatives have also updated the UNDAFs to the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation
    Frameworks (UNSDCF)
14 The SG Report can be found at:

these have been recent developments, the CP Myanmar was not developed within the framework of conflict sensitive and 'do no harm' programming but this will be relevant and necessary in future UNODC programming in Myanmar.

Despite the original CP not including conflict sensitive programming, POMYA has to some extent moved towards implementation of the SPs with this in mind. The specific context and environment in Myanmar created increased interest and need for conflict sensitive, 'do no harm' programming and the respective situational analysis and stakeholder mapping are regularly conducted by POMYA. The evaluation team learned that in addition to the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM) that took place in 2018 addressing the whole of the UN, a UNODC specific conflict impact assessment on Anti-Corruption activities was commissioned by Sweden in 2017. This assessment identified five recommendations for the POMYA Office and an action plan has been developed to address these issues. The implementation of the recommendations has included increased engagement with the Anti-Corruption Commission and CSOs. In addition, in 2017 POMYA received specific funding to implement conflict sensitive programming and all personnel in POMYA received training in conflict sensitivity. Guidelines and methodologies[15] in conflict sensitivity programming state that conflict analysis should be carried out at least once a year when operating in a context such as in Myanmar. Understanding the changing dynamics and environment in Myanmar through conflict sensitive programming can help adapt programming accordingly and allows the programme the flexibility to respond.

One option for POMYA to consider is the Fragile State Principles (FSP)[16]. Although they were not a requirement for UNODC[17] to take into consideration when the CP was designed, they are highly relevant for UNODC in Myanmar. Such principles are used as best practices by OECD and other UN agencies in order to strengthen beneficiary member states. They are also highly relevant to address programmatic issues that focus on the nexus of development and peace, required by the UN reforms. Myanmar has been in conflict for decades, and while democratic elections have taken place since 2011, the state and its institutions' legitimacy remain fragile[18]. According to interviews and the desk research, these principles could be useful when developing a programme, engaging with stakeholders, designing activities, raising funds and monitoring activities. Below is an analysis of POMYA's current compliance with these principles.

TABLE 1: FRAGILITY FRAMEWORK GRID ASSESSMENT[19]

Myanmar UNODC CP 2014-2019	Yes	No	Comment
1. Take context as the starting point	X		Situational analysis done but not regular conflict analysis
2. Ensure all activities do no harm		X	
3. Focus on state building as the central objective	X		UNODC's mandate
4. Prioritise prevention		X	Some activities on Trafficking in Persons (TiP)/Smuggling of Migrants (SoM) but not UNODC's main focus

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https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peace building_and_sustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e_1.pdf

15 https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peacebuilding_and_s ustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e_1.pdf

16 http://www.oecd.org/countries/afghanistan/aboutthefragilestatesprinciples.htm

https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Myanmar-Report-final.pdf

17 https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peacebuilding_and_s ustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e_1.pdf

18 UN Special Envoy statement on Myanmar https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13727.doc.htm

19 OECD's 10 fragile state principles that were defined to help policy, development and humanitarian assistance to be designed and implemented in fragile states. http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/the10fragilestatesprinciples.htm

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives	X	Not sufficiently
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies	X	Not sufficiently
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts	X	CP signed by the central authorities; no UNDAF signed yet; could improve on regular situation and conflict analyses.
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors	X	Agrees, and UNODC attends UNCT, thematic working and coordination group and is viewed as an expert agency. However, it has been raised that the UNODC in-country political level is not always appropriate to participate in high level agreements and be considered a lead agency.
9. Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance	X	UNODC requires time to develop a CP and get it approved. it cannot act fast nor can it guarantee long-term presence as it is highly dependent on donor funding.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion ("aid orphans")	NA	UNODC's key beneficiaries are MS

Source: Evaluation team analysis

Sustainable Development Goals

The CP was developed prior to the formal adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This has meant that the SDGs were not included in the original CP and as such and the logical framework for the CP does not include SDG indicators or allocate them to specific outcomes. The CP and POMYA has been required to be flexible in its implementation to ensure alignment with the SDGs and more recently with the UN reforms. The work of UNODC in the Region[20] and by extension the CP, is aligned with SDGs 3,5,9,10,11,16 and 17. At the corporate level, UNODC has conducted a mapping exercise[21] and developed tools and publications to identify the SDGs UNODC theoretically supports, including through field activities. ROSEAP has undertaken a similar exercise for the region. While not included in the original design of the CP, the CP has been adapted and now includes reporting on SDGs in progress reporting, including the Annual Programme Progress Report (APPR). Guidance and tools provided at the corporate level to track the contribution of UNODC to the achievement of the SDGs, including at the national level, is represented by narratives and SDG stories. Despite this reporting, the evaluation team did not find any evidence of guidance or reporting using the specific SDG indicators or a synthesis clearly representing UNODC contribution to SDG achievements.

Without aggregating the information or conducting a meta-analysis aligned with the specific SDGs and indicators, it is difficult to understand the specific contribution of UNODC to supporting MS in achieving the SDGs. As a result, while the mandate and the activities clearly support MS progress towards achieving the SDGs, further monitoring and data analysis is required to effectively conclude the linkages between UNODC's programming and the achievement SDGs in Myanmar.

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20 https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/sustainable-development-goals.html

21https://www.unodc.org/documents/SDGs/UNODC_tools_and_publications_relevant_to_the_Sustainable_Development_Goals_-_December_2018.pdf

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

Relevance

The CP was and remains highly relevant to the context of Myanmar as it shares large borders with China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh and transnational organized crime routes depart from or transit through Myanmar. Myanmar is geo-strategically important and its stability and prosperity are key requisites for countering transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and counterterrorism in the region.

The consultative process and contextual information used to develop and implement the CP, including regular meetings of the Programme Governance Committee (PGC), helped ensure that the CP as well as associated SPs and activities were relevant and met identified needs of the counterparts. Through interviews, desk research and observation the evaluation found that UNODC's mandate and expertise is highly relevant to Myanmar and its assistance is appreciated and valued.

Through a media analysis the evaluation found that UNODC is regularly cited in the local and international media as experts on drug and crime issues in the region as well as highlighting the work of the organization in the country. UNODC is well respected by stakeholders in the country as well as the region. Several stakeholders mentioned UNODC as having an advantage by being able to work with counterparts such as the police and in settings such as prisons that other entities are not able to access. One example of this is SP2 on anti-corruption which represented the first UN programme on corruption in the country, despite the clear need to address the issue. The ability for UNODC to work in this area can be attributed to their reputation and ability to work with the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).

While all SPs and related activities were found to be relevant to stakeholder needs and the specific context in Myanmar and donors acknowledged the important work of POMYA in the country, not all SPs were able to bring in funding. Although SP1 was not funded at the national level, activities related to SP1 were implemented in Myanmar through the RP and Global Programmes (GP) such as the Global Programme for Combating Wildlife and Forest Crime. Through a combination of activities under the CP SPs, the RP and various GPs, the evaluation found that UNODC has been able to respond to the drug and crime related needs of Myanmar. It should be noted however, that stakeholders do not differentiate between RP, CP or GP activities but see the activities as those of the organization.

While the relevance, quality and importance of UNODC's work is readily acknowledged, it is not viewed as a leading agency and is not perceived as playing a leading role in coordinating efforts across the different UN Country Team (UNCT) working groups. Given the strategic relevance of Myanmar in relation to drug production and trafficking in Southeast Asia, the evaluation found that partners, recipients and other UN agencies expected a greater UNODC presence than is currently provided.

The ability of POMYA to participate in and contribute to the larger UN context in Myanmar has expanded since the start of the CP in 2014. The UNODC presence in Myanmar has expanded significantly and is one of the fastest growing UNODC field offices. At the time of writing this report, POMYA consisted of two locations with a total of 88 staff members. This has allowed POMYA to regularly attend UNCT meetings and contribute to many different coordination groups[22]. Despite this increase in UNCT involvement and increased UNODC presence in the country, only two of the 88 staff are Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Professional Staff. The remaining staff holds a variety of contracts including national staff and consultants. In addition, the specific context of Myanmar often requires a quite senior level participation to gain traction that is not currently present in Myanmar. This situation poses a risk for UNODC visibility, stakeholder relationships and institutional knowledge.

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22 UNCT, Human Rights Theme Group, Cooperation Partner Group, RoL coordination group, PSEA, UN Gender Theme Group, Gender Equality & Women's Development, PFM and Anti Group (UNDP) - corruption Group, Gender Based Violence Coordination Working Group, UN Gender Theme Group and some selected Rakhine theme group

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

One related difficulty faced by POMYA is the lack of UNODC corporate guidance on the structure and responsibilities of Country or Programme Offices. UNODC does not have guidance or standard requirements for offices (Regional, Country, Programme or Project) or RPs or CPs. Without this type of guidance and support it is difficult for POMYA to ensure UNODC visibility through timely and adequate responses and participation in various forums.

When necessary, POMYA is supported by ROSEAP to contribute at high level events and meetings. In addition, the technical support from UNODC HQ Thematic Sections and the Regional Section were appreciated, as POMYA has only one programme manager (P4), one international expert (P3), three international consultants[23], as well as local staff members who do not have expertise across all the SPs. Hence, support from ROSEAP and UNODC HQ was valued.

However, the evaluation found[24] that in order to gain traction with the central GoM, local government officials and the UNCT, a local, senior-level and permanent in-country presence is essential; *ad hoc* support alone from Bangkok or elsewhere does not gain the same level of local engagement and ownership of the intervention. This finding is important for POMYA, ROSEAP and UNODC HQ to consider when raising funds in order to consolidate its long-term presence, with regards to the UN reforms and its strategic positioning in the region.

The unique mandate of the organization as well as sometimes limited in country presence is a contributing factor to the lesser role of UNODC. The challenge for UNODC is how to implement its broad mandate with a small team of international staff, while at the same time meeting an increasing demand for support from local stakeholders (CSOs and governmental bodies). This is not only the case in Myanmar but is the situation in general for UNODC.

In summary, the evaluation found the CP Myanmar is relevant to needs and priorities of national stakeholders as well as the donor community. With appropriate staffing and resources there is a room for POMYA to advance the visibility and leadership of UNODC as a partner in Myanmar.

Effectiveness and Impact

As addressed earlier, the CP for Myanmar includes a results framework at the outcome level but doesn't include the activities or outputs which would be required to achieve the outcomes. It also lacks a ToC expressing results pathways. For this reason, the CP serves as a strategic document rather than a programmatic document. The evaluation found that while having a strategic document that identifies the overarching UNODC work plan and results framework that is relevant and required by national counterparts, the current format of the CP has little added value as a programmatic tool. The stakeholders' key concerns are for UNODC's services to be aligned with the country's priorities and approved by the relevant governmental bodies.

Programming occurs at the SP level with each SP developed into a project document with a logical framework. The logical frameworks include the activities and outputs required for each outcome which can then be implemented once funding is received. While the logical framework is sequenced with activities and outputs required to achieve identified outcomes, funding may be received for only specific activities thus jeopardizing the causal pathway identified in the logical framework. A ToC would be useful in clarifying the linkages between the activities, outputs and outcomes. The evaluation team has reconstructed the ToC for SP2 on anti-corruption as an example. The ToC can be found at the end of this report.

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23 SP5 international consultants are not included in this analysis as another separate evaluation of SP5 was conducted in 2018. This number only refers to medium to long-term international consultants and not ad hoc consultants that might be recruited on short term assignments.

24 Interviews with beneficiaries, UNODC, UN RC, governmental officials, and CSOs, minutes from PGC meetings.

Despite these challenges, the evaluation team found results at all levels, including activities, outputs and outcomes.

DIAGRAM 2: NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES PLANNED

Number of Activities Planned Per Type - Implemented for SP2 on Anti-Corruption in Myanmar 2017-2018

Source: Evaluation team based on data from ROSEAP Smartsheets

Since the first quarter of 2015, POMYA implemented 495 activities across three SPs included in the CP and SP1 under the RP (SP5[25] not covered in this evaluation). These activities are reported to POMYA and ROSEAP in Bangkok where they are aggregated into 'Smartsheets', a web-based project management platform. The activities conducted include workshops, survey, training, mentorship, mission and report document (example seen in diagram 2 'Number of Activities Planned Per Type - Implemented for SP2 in Myanmar 2017-2018). While these activities are monitored and reported in various progress reports along with output and outcome

narratives, there is not always a clear linkage between specific activities and the longer-term outcome results. POMYA does conduct post-training questionnaires that are distributed after trainings to monitor the relevance and uptake of training and capacity development. However, follow up surveys and an aggregate analysis thereof would be helpful to understand and verify any outcome level results on capacity building from individual trainings. Despite this monitoring gap, a high level of activities (495) was implemented and according to interviews with governmental bodies and law enforcement agencies, they were satisfied with the level of support, engagement and technical expertise offered by UNODC.

DIAGRAM 3: ACTIVITIES STATUS ON ANTI-CORRUPTION

Activities Status 2017-2018 of SP2 on Anti-Corruption in Myanmar

- Completed
- Cancelled
- Delayed

Source: Evaluation team based on data from ROSEAP Smartsheets

According to post-training sheets and interviews with beneficiaries, workshops and mentorships especially were found to help raise awareness on the different topics and contributed to building capabilities of the targeted institutions (e.g. on anti-corruption, detection and investigation of corruption cases - as per UNCAC first cycle recommendations). The technical assistance offered on legal reforms (e.g. revisions of laws or integration of the UNCAC first cycle recommendations) was highly valued by beneficiaries. With respect to anti-corruption delivered within SP2, while other agencies (like UNDP) also cooperate with the ACC and other governmental agencies, UNODC was found by the evaluation team to be viewed as the expert in that field and their contribution helped design the ACC strategy for anti-corruption[26] and supported the ACC with developing a work plan implementing the ACC anti-corruption strategy. With regards to

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25 Sub-programme 5 on Sustainable Livelihoods and Development was evaluated separately in 2018 and can be found at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/MMRZ39_mid-term_Independent_Project_Evaluation_August_2018.pdf
26 https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/what-we-do/anti-corruption/topics/12-supporting-myanmar-in-developing-a-national-anti-corruption-strategy-and-action-plan.html

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

the completion rate of activities, SP2 achieved 59%[27] implementation as seen in diagram 3 on 'Activities Status 2017-2018 of SP2 in Myanmar'. For the other sectors on criminal justice and health and drug demand reduction especially, the space is crowded with many other agencies and it is therefore more difficult for UNODC to stand out (according to interviews with beneficiaries, donors and CSOs).

With regards to the type of outputs included in the CP, workshops are the main activities delivered by UNODC in Myanmar (Diagram 2: Number of Activities Planned Per Type - Implemented for SP2 in Myanmar 2017-2018).

Although these types of activities are common across all SPs of the RP, CP and GPs in Southeast Asia, as seen in the RP evaluation report[28], the evaluation team found that the difference between training and workshops was not well defined. Depending on the recipients, a workshop could be an awareness-raising session or encompass capacity-building on technical issues. Training is essentially a capacity-building activity, however this depends on what SP organizes the session since they may range from one to three days and may be accompanied by mentoring/mentorship[29]. As a result, as activities were not always well defined, it is more difficult to understand what success factors can help achieve the targets. The lack of clarity around the difference in activities was found to hinder the effective management of stakeholders' expectations. For instance, workshops can be associated by stakeholders with capacity building when in fact UNODC's workshops are information sessions to raise awareness on specific topics. Thus 'workshops' are different from 'capacity building' activities that entail mentoring and longer trainings for behavioural change or institutional strengthening.

BOX 1: OUTPUT LEVEL RESULTS ACHIEVED BY UNODC IN MYANMAR

Examples of results at the output level observed across the three SPs

The below examples are results that form part of the building blocks of the SPs in the CP. With respect to normative technical support, the contribution analysis is easier to make because of UNODC's renown legal expertise and mandate. It is also easier to observe reforms and new laws than capacity building related outcomes and changed behaviors.

- SP 4 2.2 Launch of a new national drug control policy based on a human-centered and evidence-based approaches.
- SP4 .2.2 Myanmar is the first country to adopt UNGASS framework at a national level.
- SP4 2.2 Launch Standard Operating Procedures for Prison Health Care.
- SP2 1.2 4th amendment of the Anti-Corruption Law approved by Parliament.
- SP2 1.2 40,000 copies of teachers' handbook on education programme for promoting integrity.
- SP2 1.3 Symposium on Enhance Accountability to Prevent Corruption.
- SP3 2.1 Trainings of frontline officers on police response to violence against women.
- SP3 2.1 A police reform plan 'an Overview of Policing in Myanmar and Recommendations for Reform.'
- Sp3 3.1 Revision of the 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotic Substance Law from a punitive to a public health approach (approved February 2018).

Source: Evaluation team based on data from ROSEAP Smartsheets

According to interviews and the desk research, donors were generally satisfied with the level of reporting emanating from Myanmar. Some SPs (anti-corruption in particular) were reported in more detail than others in their description of activities. Further analysis at the output and (especially) outcome levels was requested by donors in order to better understand how the activities are helping to achieve overarching objectives. The evaluation team reviewed the donor reports, logframes and

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[27] Smartsheet is the data collection software used by ROSEAP to consolidate in one location all activities taking place in the region through CPs, RP and GPs.

[28] In the main body of the evaluation report.

[29] Both terms are used by POMYA and beneficiaries.

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

combined with interviews, and found that some preliminary results at the outcome level could be observed across the SPs (as seen in the table 2 below). The most evident and observable preliminary outcome-level results were on legal reforms and legal strengthening. Outcomes such as SP4 outcome 3[30] or 4 were partially achieved as some of the outputs had yet to be implemented[31].

TABLE 2: OUTCOMES OF CP MYANMAR – ACHIEVED VS YET TO BE ACHIEVED

SPs of CP Myanmar	Outcomes	Status- yet to be achieved, partially, achieved or not yet measurable or NA
SP1 on TOC	Not funded at the CP level	NA in the context of the CP
SP2 on Anti-Corruption (funding available as of March 2017)	1 outcome in total Outcome 1: Myanmar more effectively prevents, raises awareness of, detects, investigates and prosecutes corruption.	**Partially achieved** as not all outputs were yet measurable like the output 3 on improved capacity of CSOs and the PS to prevent and contribute to combating corruption. Although some activities (symposiums and workshops) were organized with these stakeholders, their understanding, capacity and engagement to combat anti-corruption was not yet observed. In addition, based on interviews with CSOs, UN agencies and other international organizations, detection, investigation and prosecution remain Achilles' heel in the fight against corruption. POMYA continues to build capacity through trainings and mentorship but behavioural shift and institutions strengthening require long-term support to observe a change and an increased number in prosecution and condemnation.
SP3 on Criminal Justice	5 outcomes in total Outcome 3.1 Prosecution[32]; outcome 3.2 police reform and outcome 3.3 on prison management	Partially as not all five outcomes have been achieved.
SP4 on Drug and Health	2 outcomes in total **Outcome 1**: access to drug prevention, treatment, care and rehabilitation services in line with scientific evidence enhanced **Outcome 2**: availability, quality, coverage and impact of HIV prevention, treatment and care responses amongst PWUD and those in detention setting enhanced.	Partially achieved but in good progress to be fully achieved. Only some delays in output implementations (e.g. drug use survey)
SP5 on Alternative Development	3 outcomes in total Not assessed by this evaluation	Partially achieved according to the SP evaluation[33]

Source: Evaluation team based on data from ROSEAP Smartsheets

The adoption of a new national drug control policy should be highlighted as this is aligned with the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) outcome. UNODC provided support to the

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30 Outcome 3 of SP4: 'Prison management improved in line with international standards'; outcome 4 of SP4: 'more effective and evidence-based crime prevention strategy, plans and measures developed in line with international standards'

31 Outcome 4. Output 4.2: 'a national crime prevention strategy and action plan developed. Implementation supported.' A draft copy of the national crime prevention strategy was produced in 2016; it was updated in 2017 to include the Government of Myanmar's priorities and in 2018 it was finalized and translated in Burmese.

32 Outcome 3.1 of SP3: Prison management improved in line with international standards.

33 https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/MMRZ39_mid-term_Independent_Project_Evaluation_August_2018.pdf

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

consultative process as well as technical guidance. This is significant as it is the national level adoption of the UNGASS framework in the region.

While the overall effectiveness of the CP was affected by a lack of funding in some SPs, this evaluation as well as the recent evaluation of SP5[34] found the effectiveness of the SPs, and by extension the CP, to be overall satisfactory. Considering the political climate, the funding gaps for some outcomes and outputs and the short-staffed team of POMYA, this is a major achievement.

The complex nature of the thematic areas addressed by UNODC makes impact measurement difficult without extensive resources. The reconstruction of the ToC allowed the evaluation team to understand what had changed. As underlined in the evaluation report for SP5[35] on alternative development, while impact could not be observed, some preliminary outcome results could be measured. As UNODC is the only UN agency that has access to prisons in Myanmar, the contribution to preliminary outcome level results are easier to make in this regard. In SP3 on criminal justice, the contribution could not be established so easily as the space is crowded with numerous international actors. Some preliminary impact was observed where UNODC's legal niche and prison management expertise were the focus of the outcomes (outcome 4 and 3 of SP4[36]). In the other outcomes, either activities had not been funded, or the targets were insufficiently defined to gauge UNODC's contribution. The design of the indicators, baselines, targets and ToC are critical for measuring and assessing impact. In light of the UN reforms, and attainment of SDGs, additional monitoring will be required by the UNCT and this should encourage POMYA and other UNODC offices (ROSEAP and POIDN) to refine the language, invest in monitoring tools and staff, and create a ToC for each SP.

The CP's governance is organized around one PGC per year with the relevant stakeholders to share progress and challenges and agree on the next year's workplan. Donors are not invited to the PGC which was viewed as a missed opportunity to align their priorities to those of GoM. However, the SP working group meetings have a wider membership and do include donors. Overall, government officials, UN agencies, CSOs' and other international organizations representatives were pleased with UNODC's level of expertise and professionalism but requested that activities – especially capacity building - be inscribed into a ToC or a 'vision' as described by CSOs, IOs, and donors. According to stakeholders, that vision could help measure progress and achieve greater awareness, stronger institutions and tackle corruption and ToC related challenges through a multi-stakeholders-lens rather than being too focused on the government. A limited focus affects the level of effectiveness and the overall longer-term impact of the SPs and CP. For instance, capacity-building activities for CSOs should not just be one workshop unless the purpose is to raise awareness on certain tools or international mechanisms and/or international standards that fall under UNODC's mandate. In that case, the terminology used to define the activities was found to be unclear and failed to adequately manage stakeholders' expectations and thereafter to be fully effective in achieving the CP's outcomes.

BOX 2: ANTI-CORRUPTION IN MYANMAR

Anti-Corruption in Myanmar

SP2, anti-corruption (3 outputs[37]) raised **$4,010,330**. The two donors were Sweden and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Norway. The Swedish funds were focused on supporting Myanmar to more

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34 https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/what-we-do/anti-corruption/topics/12-supporting-myanmar-in-developing-a-national-anti-corruption-strategy-and-action-plan.html
35 https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/MMRZ39_mid-term_Independent_Project_Evaluation_August_2018.pdf
36 Outcome 3: Prison Management improved in line with international standards; outcome 4: more effective and evidence-based crime prevention strategy; plans and measures developed in line with international affairs.
37 Output 1: Improved legal and policy environment to support the government's anti-corruption efforts in line

effectively prevent, raise awareness of, detect, investigate and prosecute corruption ($3,260,520). Funding commenced in March 2017 and will end in December 2019. UNODC launched activities quickly when the new commission (ACC) entered into office at the end of November 2017. The Norwegian funds are dedicated to addressing corruption in the fishery sector ($749,809)[38]. Governmental stakeholders were satisfied with the level of expertise and support provided in a two-year period, **54 activities** were planned, **1649 people** were trained.

The SP was articulated across one outcome and three outputs with the overarching objective to build Myanmar's capacity to prevent, raise awareness of, detects, investigates and prosecute corruption cases. As seen in the ToC (end of the report), tools, beneficiaries, implementing partner varied for each output. Many activities (workshops, symposiums, legal reform support, mentorship, dissemination, capacity building) were implemented with a satisfactory level of effectiveness (35 out of 54 planned activities were implemented).[39]

A further consideration in project design of the scope for awareness-raising targeting the private sector and civil society is suggested, though it is recognized that this may not be possible in the remaining project period – but may be addressed in a potential next phase". According to the interviews and the desk review, output 1.1 was achieved, and output 1.2 and 1.3 were partially achieved. UNODC has not yet integrated a clear monitoring process on how to assess behavioural change and conduct target population assessments to measure the effectiveness and impact of its awareness raising campaign through these symposiums and workshops or gage the level of institutionalized memory of the governmental body trained by UNODC on varied topics related to AC.

The reconstructed ToC for SP2 showed that UNODC has clear control of each output's beneficiaries, implementing partners, and the needed tools; while the narrative reports underline the activities that have been implemented at the output level such as trainings, legal technical assistance on reforms, symposiums and forums with stakeholders to raise awareness on the need to fight corruption, the reporting of the impact at the outcome level could not yet be done because of the absence of data (indicator one being the number of corruption cases reported, initiated, investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated for instance. According to POMYA some 46 cases were under investigation at the time of evaluation and although the team was aware of only two cases during the country visit the evaluation was able to verify the level of contribution of these outputs toward achieving this outcome). Some risks were identified by the evaluation team that had been integrated in the initial design of the SP2 but not in the programming and in the monitoring of the outputs. The evaluation concluded that SP2 was operating on the right assumptions, using UNODC's tools to achieve preliminary outcomes and overarching ones but that monitoring, conducting conflict analysis, and stakeholder mapping on a regular basis would strengthen the effectiveness and impact and would allow UNODC to showcase its outcome level results.

Strengths: Guardian of the UNCAC; technical expertise and local presence of an international adviser/manager in Yangon and in Naypyidaw (two international experts), funded with soft-earmarked funding enabling UNODC to genuinely meet the needs of Myanmar. The presence of the two international experts in Naypyidaw is viewed as a key added value by government agencies to obtain more speedy and ongoing support from UNODC. Mentoring was offered to the Anti-Corruption Commission, especially on legal manual and legal frameworks' reforms.

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with international standards; output 1.2 Enhanced institutional capacity to prevent, raise awareness of, detect, investigate and prosecute corruption; output 1.3 improved capacity of civil society organizations and the private sector to prevent and contribute to combating corruption.

[38] Funds to be spent between 01-12-2018 and end of CP

[39] UNODC POMYA 2018 annual report.

Weaknesses: one-off seminars and workshops do not always include follow up activities. No monitoring of outcome level results.

*Source: Evaluation team analysis*

Efficiency

While the CP was developed for and planned to be implemented during the period of 2014 to 2017, it didn't become operational until 2015 and faced several delays and slow-down of activities due to fundraising issues as well as the on-going political situation, including elections and the crisis in the Rakhine State.

While the original CP explicitly identified risks and mitigating strategies, including political instability and security issues, the evaluation found no evidence that this identification and mitigation of risk was an on-going process. Integration of ongoing risks analysis into the work plan may have allowed more flexibility and adaptability to the context of Myanmar and as a result the CP may have incurred fewer delays and cancellation of activities.

Overall, the evaluation found that based on the level of activities implemented by POMYA (complete vs delayed), the level of funds raised (USD $8,366,329 excluding funds dedicated to Alternative Development[40]), the degree of efficiency of the CP was satisfactory. This was determined through a review of Umoja's financial reports, stakeholder interviews and the desk review. The analysis was however conducted at the SP level rather than at the CP level as funds and activities are raised and implemented at the SP level and so is reporting.

DIAGRAM 4: CP MYANMAR SPs" BUDGET

CP MYANMAR SPS' BUDGET VS RECEIVED FUNDS
- Approved budget
- Received funds

SP 1: $0 / $0
SP 2: $4,252,800 / $4,010,330
SP 3: $8,227,800 / $2,777,169
SP 4: $5,479,700 / $1,578,830
SP 5: $12,258,500 / $9,272,658

Source: Evaluation team based on data from Umoja

DIAGRAM 5: SP2's BUDGET DISBURSEMENT

SP2's Budget Disbursement (Sweden Funding) in Myanmar
- Project Mgt 5%
- PSC 11%
- Equipment, visibility material & maintenance 2%
- Personnel 34%
- Activities Operation (incl travel) 48%

Source: Evaluation team based on data provided by POMYA during the evaluation field mission

Indeed, the total budget raised was divided amongst the SPs, as shown in diagram 4 'CP Myanmar SPs' budget vs Received Funds'. SP2 received the bulk of funds (excluding SP5 which was the most funded SP) almost double the amount for SP3 and three times that of SP4. SP3 focused on criminal justice and

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40 For details on SP 5 please refer to the evaluation report.
https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/MMRZ39_mid-term_Independent_Project_Evaluation_August_2018.pdf

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

received funding mainly from YES UNDP[41], INL[42], UNFPA[43], AtH-UNOPS[44] and FCO[45]. SP4 focused on Health and Drugs and received funding from UNAIDS and INL. SP2 is composed of a single outcome with three outputs, with activities covering all three outputs (100% coverage) and a budget implementation rate of 55%[46]. SP3 on criminal justice is divided into 18 outputs across 5 outcomes where 6 had implemented activities (33% coverage) and a budget implementation rate of 66%[47]. SP3 funding is strictly earmarked, which dictates what type of activities can take place rather than adapting activities to the needs of the country, which was found more restrictive and not enabling UNODC to really tailor the activities to the countries' requests. SP4 on Drugs and Health is divided between two outcomes with 10 outputs, with 4 of them having implemented activities (40% coverage) and a budget implementation rate of 84%[48]. One of the key activities of SP4, the national drug survey[49], was delayed due to a political change of opinion regarding its necessity. Funds were disbursed for workshops/ training, equipment, travel, consultants and awareness-raising activities. According to Umoja's dashboard, as seen in diagram 5 'SP2's Budget Disbursement (Sweden Funding) in Myanmar', 48% of the funds are dedicated to activities' implementation, 34% to personnel and 13% to Project Support Cost (PSC). This budget breakdown is used as an example as most SPs' budgets are structured more or less the same. The evaluation team chose SP2, as a special focus made on Anti-Corruption in the box above and because, besides SP5, it was the most funded.

While 34% of personnel costs can seem excessive, staff costs are associated to outcomes and outputs delivery. UNODC is viewed as an expert-based agency whose services rely on these staff members and international consultants experience. It thus explains the high cost invested in personnel. However, the evaluation found through interviews and desk research that POMYA was not sufficiently staffed in order to implement the scope of work and the level of engagement required – in terms of duration and frequency – with local governmental bodies and other stakeholders. SP2 enabled the office to grow with three international experts dedicated to anti-corruption, however similar experts' recruitment was needed for other SPs.

Overall the evaluation found the CP and related SPs to be efficient in fundraising efforts and implementation of activities, despite having some SPs unfunded. Given the complex context in which POMYA is working, delays of activities are to be expected. However, on-going risk assessments may have provided additional flexibility to predict and respond to these delays.

Sustainability

POMYA applies the Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness that puts an emphasis on government ownership for the sustainability of the interventions. As seen under design, the CP was signed by the relevant governmental bodies to ensure alignment of priorities and strengthen the ownership of working toward achieving the set objectives. According to interviews with beneficiaries and governmental bodies and the desk review, governmental officials were eager to move forward with the reforms and work towards these goals. The evaluation team could however not conduct a population survey to check whether the legal reforms (put in motion by the GoM with the support of POMYA) were

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41 YES UNDP: Youth Employment through Skills United Nation Development Programme.

42 INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

43 UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund

44 Access to health fund UNOPS

45 FCO: Foreign Commonwealth Office of the UK

46 According to Umoja dashboard donor reporting as of April 2019.

47 According to Umoja dashboard donor reporting as of April 2019.

48 According to Umoja dashboard donor reporting as of April 2019.

49 UNODC COYMA 2018 annual report.

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

effective or not and whether they were content with the pace of reforms. However, the GoM participates in the PGC and engages regularly with UNODC. The government agencies' ownership of the CP's objectives was more easily observed at the SP level; each agency was working towards their specific objectives (anti-corruption, police reform, judiciary and prison reforms etc.). The CP was extended until December 2021[50] and could be extended for another few years should the government and donors agree to its objectives and outcomes. Thus, there is no exit strategy in place. The RP does not have an exit strategy either. UNODC programmes are often extended or get redrafted into a different logical framework but based on prior projects, similar stakeholders and similar service offerings. According to interviews with UNODC staff members and the desk review (comparing prior RP, CPs), the content remains similar but with a different package and this is why an exit strategy is not common practice across UNODC programming. The projectization model of UNODC limits the ability for long term planning and sustainability including the development of an exit strategy. The reliance on extra-budgetary funding prevents the Country Office from reliably predicting their ability to carry out long term planning and thus limits the ability to be confident about long term results. ROSEAP has attempted to address this issue by conducting a donor mapping and developing a fundraising strategy for the region. POMYA has developed strong relationships with donors that aid in more predictable funding.

Staff members in counterpart institutions face high turnover and changes in policy and governmental budgets can negatively impact the sustainability of the CP's activities. Thus, the CP implemented Train of Trainers (ToT) curriculum and helped publish and translate manuals and handbooks into Burmese for schools and special agencies, so that teachers, educators and trainers can pass on their knowledge to others. However, the institutional memory of the beneficiary institutions could not be verified by the evaluation team. From a contribution analysis, 22 agencies working together with a more integrated framework of action (which should be the UNDAF[51]) would help generate greater sustainability and longer-term measurable impact, which is what the UN reforms expect. At the moment, the UNDAF for Myanmar was not yet approved by the government and therefore no evaluation of the UNDAF was conducted that could have helped understand the effectiveness and relevance of such framework. Finally, the CP calls for changes in the laws or amendments (see Box 1) that are long-term objectives that require constant presence and ongoing support from UNODC and other agencies. Thus, the sustainability of the CP depends on many different players – UNODC, the government of Myanmar, other beneficiaries and the donors - which demands closer coordination, fundraising and ongoing engagement with relevant stakeholders.

Human Rights, Gender and Leave No One Behind

Based on interviews, observations and desk review, the issue of human rights (HR) was present in all workshops and presentations. In particular, HR have been incorporated into POMYA's work in the areas of drugs and health, gender-based violence (GBV) and more recently in the whole of SP2 on anti-corruption. Myanmar is a complex environment with a long history of conflict and HR concerns which was further evidenced by the recent UN FFM[52]. While not applied at the design phase, POMYA is now reviewing its programme in light of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). Given the findings of the FFM as well as the thematic work and counterparts of UNODC, it is imperative that HRDDP is applied and that POMYA specifically considers the principle of "No One Left Behind" in regard to marginalized groups. While it was reported that HR and gender issues were incorporated and present in all workshops according to interviews, there was no evidence of the application of the principle of

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[50] Awaiting final approval for extension by the Programme Governance Committee

[51] However, no UNDAF had been approved yet officially at the time of the evaluation

[52] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1643079?ln=en

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

'Leave No One Behind'. Many stakeholders stated that it was critical for UN agencies, including UNODC, to raise the issue of HR diplomatically with governmental bodies[53]. UNODC's mandates stipulates that all activities are anchored in HR and therefore, UNODC has the responsibility to advance and pass on the message in a sensitive manner.

While gender was not significantly addressed in the development of the CP, it's important to note that UNODC did not have a gender strategy or gender policy at the time of the development of the CP. Since that time, POMYA has made significant progress towards mainstreaming gender in all programming and can be considered a good practice example. POMYA reporting included gender-disaggregated data in 2017 and 2018, although this was not standard across all the SPs, and was not systematically done before 2017. A requirement to monitor the female/male ratio of officers or governmental representatives was observed and efforts to promote gender equity were confirmed during the desk review and interviews. In addition to these standard practices of sex-disaggregated data collection, POMYA has implemented several initiatives to promote gender mainstreaming. Recent funding has provided for the recruitment of both an international and national gender expert. This has allowed all gender related work to be contextualized as well as translated to ensure relevance. POMYA has developed strong working relationships with both UN Women and UNFPA and due to UNODC access to law enforcement counterparts has been able to develop and implement programming related to law enforcement and gender. Specifically, POMYA received written request from the Chief of Police for introductory training on police response to GBV and gender equality in all 14 states and regions. This training will be a coordinated effort involving UNODC, UN Women and UNICEF and represents the significant trust that POMYA has developed in Myanmar.

Finally, to ensure a current understanding and response on the issues of HR and gender, POMYA is a member of both the Human Rights and Gender Thematic group and regularly consults with the UNODC Gender Team.

Cooperation and partnerships: POMYA was reported to be less visible among the 22 UN agencies, although it participates in the UNCT and in coordination groups. POMYA cannot attend as often as other agencies, as it does not have the same capacity in terms of staff members and offices across the country to dedicate as much time to coordination. POMYA has two international staff, amongst other local staff, which remains small for the scope of operations and UNODC's mandate compared to other agencies that are spread out all over the country[54]. As the majority of POMYA staff is located in Yangon while government offices are located in Naypyidaw, meetings with government officials require considerable effort and logistics. This can sometimes pose a hinderance for coordination. According to interviews with governmental officials and other UN agencies, this small presence makes UNODC a less obvious choice for partnership as staff members are few and field operations might require more time to recruit the needed experts. Nonetheless, POMYA has developed a trusted relationship with the government counterparts and is seen as trusted experts in the areas of drugs, crime and terrorism. In addition, POMYA has established working relationships with many other UN entities and has implemented a number of joint activities and joint programming. These activities and programmes were carried out with UNDP (although difficulties of coordination and implementation were reported), UNFPA, UNAIDS, and UNOPS and more recently with UN Women. Since 2015, POMYA has implemented a total of eight joint programmes with a total of 3.4 million USD in funding.

The recent UN reforms will place additional emphasis on joint programming and coordination and while POMYA is well-placed to respond to this requirement, there will continue to be challenges related to staffing and resources that will need to be overcome to be effective in increasing POMYA's visibility as a valuable partner.

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53 https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1040681
54http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Infographic_United_Nations_in_Myanmar_MIMU_IG003v03_28Feb2019.pdf

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR

With regards to internal UNODC coordination, POMYA and ROSEAP have a fluid relationship whereby thematic experts from Bangkok support SPs in Myanmar when needed and fundraising efforts are concerted between the regional representative and the Country Office manager in Myanmar. This effective coordination helped raise funds for POMYA and fill funding gaps such as for SP1 of the CP on transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking. All activities in SP1 taking place in Myanmar are funded through the RP and implemented through the technical experts in Bangkok in coordination with POMYA.

Conclusions

Myanmar is geo-strategically important within the region. Its long and numerous borders are porous and provide the means to smuggle drugs, people and goods within and across the region. It is a critical country for UNODC engagement. Furthermore, its fragile institutions, the protracted conflict and diverse population make it a particularly challenging country. UNODC needs to be kept regularly informed of the environment in which it is operating, and in particular on conflict sensitivity dynamics and HR. Although UNODC implemented activities from the RP and the GPs in Myanmar, a strong local presence is required if UNODC is to successfully engage with and assist governmental institutions. The CP was organized around five SPs of which four were funded. While the SP1 was not funded through the CP, activities took place in Myanmar through the RP, demonstrating the benefit of single strategic programme. Anti-corruption received the bulk of funds. This evaluation revealed the need for a ToC for each SP rather than the CP as the former represent programmatic directions and expected results. While the three evaluated SPs demonstrated different levels of effectiveness, the overall level of effectiveness was deemed as satisfactory. The CP as a programmatic framework did not prove to be a very effective and relevant tool, as many outputs were not implemented across the three funded SPs and its design was not conducive to effective monitoring. The CP indicated the objectives of UNODC in Myanmar, which constituted the terms for engagement with the GoM. In addition, funds were raised at the SP level rather than at the CP level. POMYA (as any other UN agency) must receive signed approval from the GoM before it can implement, maintain a local presence and have a clear strategic framework to engage with the GoM. However, how delivery is structured or named (RP or a strategy) is largely irrelevant to the stakeholders, provided the objectives and the means to achieve them are clear. Currently, POMYA is stretched as it operates with a small team of international and local experts compared to the task. As a result, POMYA does not always have the time to attend UNCT meeting and coordinate effectively with other agencies. Within the new UN reforms, POMYA will have to be more present and there will be increased pressure to with the UNCT and through the office of the UN Resident Coordinator.

From an efficiency standpoint, the implementation rate of the disbursed funds varied from one SP to another. This clearly indicates where donors' priorities are and where UNODC is perceived as a niche and expert agency. Fundraising and coordination efforts between ROSEAP and POMYA were found to be effective, although the sustainability of POMYA and the CP is always a question as they rely solely on donor funding. Despite this challenge, no exit strategy was found. In order to sustain outputs, POMYA developed ToTs to build the beneficiaries' institutional memory and avoid knowledge loss. Finally, HR and gender mainstreaming were introduced but could be integrated and mainstreamed throughout the different stages of the CP and the SP's design, implementation and monitoring process. Overall, UNODC's presence is welcome and required and despite the challenging environment, has already shown some preliminary results that will need ongoing support to yield longer-term impact.

Recommendations

- ROSEAP and POMYA[55] should integrate the **ten Fragile State Principles** into the programming and monitoring framework of the next CP, to include applying conflict sensitivity programming across all services and each SP.

- ROSEAP and POMYA should, within the next 12 months, develop a **long-term strategic partnership agreement with the Government of Myanmar.** It should propose to list of services typically offered by UNODC and develop SMART outcomes that would form part of a 'dropdown menu' that the MS could choose from (refer to recommendations for the RP). This agreement, which is signed, should be based on the RP and aligned with Myanmar's priorities without repeating all the detail contained in the log-frame.

- ROSEAP and POMYA should within the next year develop **a Theory of Change** for each SP that will more easily explain the logic and the objectives to each SP, clearly identify the keys to achieve change, list external factors that can have a negative or positive impact, map who and with what tools and roles the different stakeholders take in the pathways to achieve the objectives.

- ROSEAP should, within the next year, strengthen **POMYA's in-country expertise** based, either through the Surge (see RP evaluation report), or increase staff expertise across all SPs through resorting to the 'cabinet of experts' based in Bangkok (refer to recommendations for the RP) in order to support the workload, strengthen POMYA's presence in UNCT, anchor its presence in Myanmar and implement activities across the programme.

- UNODC HQ and ROSEAP and POMYA should redefine **UNODC's key services** within the next year (see recommendations for the RP evaluation) – for instance, workshops are equivalent to information-sharing sessions, in order to manage stakeholders' expectations; continue strengthening mentoring activities for capacity development rather than one-off workshops in order to build institutional memory of the agencies and not just the trainees.

- ROSEAP should **develop monitoring tools** that are tailored to the activities implemented by the different SPs. These tools should be able to collect data related to behavioural change as part of capacity building activities, tracking tools on legal reforms, and the impact or changes in the local and international media. POMYA can then contextualize the set of tools to fit the country's strategic framework.

Lessons learned and Best Practices

- Best Practices: Stakeholder consultation prior to any programme design and development is good practice and should be continued.

- Lessons Learned: Building capacity takes time and it is more difficult to gauge results than those of normative and technical legal assistance.

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[55] Each recommendation is aimed at the POMYA in conjunction with the ROSEAP.

THEORY OF CHANGE SP2 ON ANTI-CORRUPTION

Source: Evaluation team analysis

ANNEX V: COUNTRY PROGRAMME MYANMAR