Smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa

A thematic review and annotated bibliography of recent publications
This publication is made possible through funding received from the European Union.

Cover image: Sub-Saharan migrants leaving from Agadez (Niger) in order to reach the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 2006 © SID and CeSPI.
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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) commissioned the present publication in order to contribute to the understanding of migrant smuggling into, through and from North Africa and thus to facilitate the formulation of evidence-based policies to address this issue.

“Smuggling of migrants” is defined in article 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,¹ as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”. Article 6 of the Protocol requires the criminalization of such conduct and that of enabling a person who is not a national or a permanent resident to remain in the State concerned without complying with the necessary requirements for legally remaining in the State by producing a fraudulent travel or identity document, or procuring, providing or possessing such a document, or any other illegal means in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit.

Based upon this definition, the purpose and scope of this publication is to survey existing sources and research papers on smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa reflecting the current state of academic knowledge, as well as knowledge gaps and discussions on the subject. This study has two main objectives: to describe major findings on smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa, and to highlight the need for further research on specific issues that have not yet been studied and on areas where little analysis has yet been carried out.

The publication reviews literature that has been published by academics, journalists, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The reviewed literature was selected on the basis of its thematic relevance and date and the language of publication: only publications in English, French and Italian were reviewed. The research does not pretend to be comprehensive.

As far as the geographical scope of the review is concerned, it is important to note that it actually goes beyond the North African countries, because irregular migration and smuggling flows are transnational in nature; they often originate and/or end in the North African region. For this reason, sub-Saharan African and European countries are also considered. The presence of smugglers is recorded mainly in relation to crossing of the Sahara Desert and the maritime passages to Europe. Thus, while the main focus of the review is on North African countries (Algeria, Egypt,

the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco and Tunisia), literature considering countries of origin and transit such as Mali, the Niger and the Sudan, and countries of destination and transit, such as Greece, Italy and Spain, has also been reviewed to some extent. As far as the routes to Europe are concerned, those ending in Spain have not been given the same attention in this review as have journeys ending on Italian shores. Some of the most important theoretical research papers published on the subject of migrant smuggling in general have also been considered.

Where statistical data and other figures are quoted, reference is made to their source. The review is divided into thematic chapters that review research publications on the following topics:

- Quantifying irregular migration and smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa
- The geography of migrant smuggling routes
- Profiles and characteristics of smuggled migrants
- Smuggler-migrant relationships
- Organizational structures of migrant-smuggling networks
- Modus operandi of migrant smugglers
- Smuggling fees
- Human and social costs of smuggling

Finally, the thematic review presents a summary of major findings, highlighting the challenges of carrying out research into the issue of migrant smuggling and the gaps in that research. The review is complemented by an annotated bibliography of the reviewed literature.
Chapter One: Introduction

The Mediterranean Sea and adjacent regions
II. QUANTIFYING IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS

Chapter II reviews the literature with a view to quantifying the smuggling of migrants and irregular migration into, through and from North Africa. Estimates concerning irregular migration are also considered on the assumption that irregular migrants with no legal channels for migration are likely to resort to migrant smugglers.

Quantifying smuggling of migrants

An overall estimate of smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa has not yet been made. Research reports at the country level do not present precise data with regard to migrant smuggling. Little is known about the proportion of irregular migrants using smuggling services. In a survey carried out in Morocco, 87 per cent of sub-Saharan migrants arriving in that country were reported to have used the services of smugglers (Mghari, 2008, p. 8). As far as travel to Europe is concerned, almost all the migrants coming irregularly from Africa by sea seem to be serviced by smugglers: according to a recent analysis, while it is theoretically possible to travel clandestinely from Africa to Europe without the support of migrant smugglers, this is very difficult to manage in practice today (UNODC, 2006, p. 7).

Estimates of irregular migration

The recent literature points out how difficult it is to precisely quantify irregular migration flows into, through and from North Africa. As Düvell (2008a) has remarked, the hidden population of irregular migrants is very difficult to quantify and existing figures are often implausibly low or unbelievably high. The problem of quantitative estimates is a significant one for North Africa, as for other geographical areas. As Jandl (2004) has noted with regard to studies carried out in Europe, many methodologies exist for estimating the size of populations of irregular migrants living in a country and/or the number of irregular entries, and often these methodologies produce very different estimates of the same phenomenon. Regarding estimates of irregular migration through the Mediterranean, Collyer (2007, pp. 264-265) underlines that there is very limited empirical evidence, as the number of people arrested is the only reliable basis on which these estimates are usually made.

Estimates of irregular migration through and from North Africa to Europe

Comprehensive and precise estimates of irregular migration through and from North Africa to Europe do not exist, but partial evaluations have been made in recent years. For example, in 2004, the movement
of irregular migrants by sea was calculated by the International Centre for Migration/Policy Development (ICMPD), which estimated at 100,000 to 120,000 the number of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea each year, of whom 35,000 come from the sub-Saharan region, 30,000 from other countries and 55,000 from countries bordering the Southern or Eastern Mediterranean (see De Haas, 2007, p. 36). According to UNODC assessments, the numbers are higher: possibly as many as 300,000 African migrants try to reach Europe without proper documentation each year (ibid.) and smugglers are involved in many of these movements. More precisely, at least 200,000 Africans enter Europe illegally annually, while another 100,000 try but they are intercepted, and countless others lose their way or their lives (UNODC 2006, p. 5).2

While in the early 2000s the alarm was raised about the increase in irregular African migration into Southern Europe (see Sandell, 2005), other numbers currently support a different, and indeed opposite, view. For example, estimates recently published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) suggest a lower number of migrant crossings, at least from West Africa. According to its estimates, around 25,000 West Africans enter Europe by successful irregular crossings each year, accounting for 20-38 per cent of the overall estimated population of 65,000-120,000 sub-Saharan citizens entering the Maghreb countries yearly (IOM, 2008, p. 42). Italian sources also testify to a decline in the African population in Italy in recent years.3 The low percentage of African migrants among the total population of migrants entering Europe, especially if compared with the East European component of migration flows, is also noted by Péraldi (2008).

Estimates of irregular migration in North Africa

According to Fargues (2009, p. 1), irregular migration looms large in North African countries and irregular migration is more frequent than regular migration.

It should also be noted that, in the last few years, several legislative reforms have changed the legal framework for migrants in almost all the North African countries by introducing new requirements for entry and residence. In some cases, changes in the law have also affected the status of migrants who were already settled: this has meant that such persons may become irregular even when they have not deliberately breached migration laws (Fargues, 2009).

All in all, the most up-to-date studies (De Haas, 2007; IOM, 2008; Fargues, 2009) record an increase in irregular migration populations in North African countries. This supports the view that North African countries are not only points of departure for irregular migration directed towards Europe (outgoing flows), but are also areas of destination and transit for international migration coming from the South, in particular sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the first articles supporting this thesis was written in 2004 by a Tunisian scholar (Boubakri, 2004). More recently, other experts have confirmed and expanded the validity of his approach (De Haas, 2007). Different authors describe migration within North Africa and its surrounding regions in the framework of wider historical trends: local research reveals how regions of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia—not only the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the main receiving country—are countries of destination for seasonal migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa and neighbouring countries (Boubakri, 2004; Mebroukine, 2009, p. 6). The demand for cheap labour is no longer considered specific to European or Western countries: thousands of irregular migrants are attracted by large developing areas of North Africa where underground economies are flourishing (De Haas, 2007).

Recent regional research conducted by interviews with migrants (Khachini, 2008; Mebroukine, 2009) tends to demonstrate that the majority of those who are considered migrants heading towards Europe are in effect not in transit to Europe, but stay in North African countries with no intention of going on to Europe. It is also worth noting that, as pointed out by Van Hear (2004), migrants with few resources can only go as far as their money takes them. Some of them become “stranded”, while others stay on temporarily in order to prepare for their onward journey to another destination. It is important to note that such persons travelling in North Africa are potential clients for migrant smugglers.

While precise data on the nationalities of irregular migrants at the regional level have not been offered in the research literature, according to De Haas, in all...
Maghreb countries taken together, the most important nationality of arrested migrants seems to be Mali, followed, in order of importance, by the Niger, Guinea, Chad, Ghana, Senegal and Liberia (IOM, 2008, p. 32).

Comprehensive and comparable data collected in a standardized way on the issue of irregular migration into, through and from North Africa do not yet exist. Available data in the existing research literature on irregular migration are sometimes incomplete and/or contradictory. Still, although scattered, recent research does provide important background information on current trends, mainly concerning the numbers of irregular migrants living in particular countries, as well as numbers of asylum-seekers and of arrests of irregular migrants.

**Algeria**

According to police sources, the number of irregular migrants in Algeria was 13,000 in 2006 and 22,000 in 2007 (as reported in Mebroukine, 2009, pp. 2 and 6). However, these are considered “guesstimates”: Mebroukine states that it is impossible to obtain actual figures and, moreover, that it is not possible to control the southern borders of the country. It is important to remark that Algeria hosts more than 95,000 mostly Saharawi refugees and asylum-seekers (Fargues, 2009, p. 9).

Regarding arrests, according to sources consulted by Mebroukine (2009, p. 7), between 2000 and 2007, 65,000 foreigners were arrested in Algeria and in 2007 authorities recorded 35,000 police incidents related to irregular migration. Between 2000 and 2007 (ibid., p. 2), the Algerian police also arrested 70,000 Algerian nationals for crimes related to irregular migration: however, the article does not explain which specific crimes the figures related to. It does underline that strict control of migration flows has recently been attempted in Algeria. Also, according to other sources, numbers are very high: direct field observation suggests that the flows of expelled sub-Saharan migrants from Mali and the Niger (which are, respectively, Ti-n-Zaouâtene and I-n-Guezzam) together account for around 6,000 persons per month: the consulates of Mali and the Niger in Tamanrasset have confirmed these numbers (Fargues, 2009, p. 6).

As far as migration to Europe is concerned, it has been estimated that each year 2,800 Algerian nationals leave directly from Algeria by boat, to arrive irregularly in Italy or Spain (Mebroukine, 2009, p. 7).

**Egypt**

Estimates of the number of irregular migrants living in Egypt in the early 2000s were around 100,000 (minimum estimate). Among these migrants Egypt counts a large number of refugees and asylum-seekers (Fargues, 2009, p. 9): Cairo hosts a large population of irregular migrants as a result of the massive flow of asylum seekers coming from the Horn of Africa from the early 1990s onwards. The high number of irregular migrants in Egypt is also due to the presence of Sudanese migrants (Nass, 2008, p. 6).

**Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**

The Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya estimated at 1.0 to 1.2 million the number of irregular migrants living in the country in 2005, but other estimates vary up to 2 million (see IOM, 2008, p. 30). The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya hosts almost 5,000 refugees and asylum-seekers (Fargues, 2009, p. 9). A recent detailed report by ICMPD (2008, p. 83) highlighted that few reliable data are available on the real situation regarding migration and asylum in the country.

As regards arrests, it has been reported that 145,000 irregular migrants were expelled from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya between 2003 and 2005 (Hamood, 2006). Arrests and deportations are on the increase, but no official statistics are available (Fargues, 2009).

**Morocco**

According to local estimates, irregular migrants currently living in Morocco number at least 15,000 (Elmadmad, 2008, p. 15). Morocco also hosts almost 2,000 refugees and asylum-seekers (Elmadmad, 2008, pp. 14-16; Fargues, 2009, p. 9).

Since 2006, UNODC has recorded a decline in the numbers of arrests: some 36,000 migrants were arrested in 2003, as opposed to some 30,000 in 2005 (UNODC, 2006, p. 3). According to Mghari (2008, pp. 6-7), a
further decrease in arrests has occurred since 2006 because of the intensification of border controls: in his view, irregular crossings from neighbouring countries into Morocco have decreased since the “boom” between 2003 and 2005 and this is reflected in the number of arrests, which totalled 29,808 in 2005, 16,560 in 2006 and 14,449 in 2007.

**Tunisia**

Irregular migrants living in Tunisia in the early 2000s were estimated at some 10,000 (minimum estimate) (Fargues, 2009, p. 3).

As regards arrests, between 1998 and 2002 some 8,000 irregular migrants trying to make an illegal border crossing were arrested (UNODC, 2006, p. 5).

**Conclusions**

Data in the reviewed research do not focus on smuggled migrants but mostly on irregular migrants on a country basis. While studies on irregular migrants in North Africa note the existence of large numbers of migrants without legal status, reliable overall estimates and precise numbers on these groups are not available. Estimates of numbers of asylum-seekers and refugees are also approximations and data on arrests and deportations are scarce. Further research to establish the exact extent of irregular migration into, through and from North Africa is needed.

There is little specific research into the extent to which irregular migration into, through and from North Africa is facilitated by migrant smugglers. However, what research does exist corroborates the assumption that such migration is indeed facilitated largely by migrant smugglers.

Some of the recent studies replace the concept of “transit migrants” with the concept of “stranded migrants”. This reflects a change from previous Eurocentric views, as it does not assume the wish of all migrants to enter Europe. Rather, it highlights the vulnerability of irregular migrants and the existence of a stable population of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in North African countries.

In the opinion of the author of this review, the trend presented in the reviewed literature tends to show a reduction in the problem of irregular migration from Africa to Europe, with an increase in the problem in North African countries. This trend can be interpreted as an effect of the politics of “externalization” of immigration controls beyond the borders of the European Union towards countries along the Southern Mediterranean.
Chapter III reviews the recent literature with regard to the geography of irregular migration and smuggling of migrants. As pointed out by Pastore and others (2006, p. 98), the geography of migrant smuggling is difficult to research because of the secrecy of its organization. However, some information and data have been collected. In the following pages, the main findings concerning air routes are presented, followed by trends in maritime routes from North Africa to Europe. Finally, a review is made of knowledge concerning land routes to North Africa from West and East Africa.

Air routes

Air routes form a high-cost segment of the market of services for irregular migrants. Much more expensive and safer than journeys by land and sea, air travel is recorded and studied much less in the literature. Generally, little information has been collected on journeys by air because migrants pass unnoticed at border controls.

The international airports of Algeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Morocco can be destination points for hundreds of irregular migrants per year, but research has not highlighted this as a significant issue. Travel by air usually involves the use of fraudulent documents and corruption; smugglers can also be involved in the collection and delivery of migrants at certain points en route. In the case of “visa smuggling”, the smugglers facilitate invitations and travel arrangements. Once they have arrived at their destination, the migrants overstay their visas and remain in the country illegally. The percentage of migrants using air routes is unknown, but in Morocco a survey of 1,000 irregular sub-Saharan migrants showed that 13 per cent of them had arrived by air (Mghari, 2008, p. 5).

Some of the air routes used have been detected. For example, according to information collected by ICMPD (2007, 2008), Cairo has been used as a transit airport for asylum-seekers flying from the Horn of Africa directly to European countries, to Germany in particular, while Italian studies show that the Casablanca-Tripoli flight is frequently used by a network of Moroccan smugglers to move migrants to the embarkation points in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Monzini, 2008). However, recourse to air passage is not very frequent for smuggling from North African countries to the Mediterranean area and irregular flows from Asia usually transit in West or East African airports rather than in North African countries (ICMPD, 2008). In addition, direct flights from North African cities with fraudulent documents (passport or visa) are not considered a usual way to enter Europe irregularly. Only scattered evidence has been found on such travel.

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3For the purpose of this publication, the term “fraudulent documents” refers to the misuse of documents, including counterfeiting and altering documents, obtaining documents on fraudulent grounds and look-alike fraud, when a (stolen) passport is used by someone with a strong physical resemblance to the legitimate holder.
Sea routes to Europe

Few in-depth studies have been carried out on sea routes in the countries of embarkation. No references have been found in the research in English or French on sea routes departing from Egypt or Tunisia. The few studies available were initiated in Europe and almost all the studies on the routes departing from Morocco (Carling, 2007; Coslov, 2007a) and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Monzini, 2004 and 2008; Antonopoulos and Winterdyk, 2006; Hamood, 2006; Coluccello and Masssey, 2007) have been published in European countries (all of them except the work of Hamood).

In 2008, the total number of interceptions was around 15,800 in Greece, almost 37,000 in Italy, 2,500 in Malta and 13,500 in Spain. In 2008, of a total of 36,951 migrants in Italy, 11,834 were from East African countries, 11,304 from North African countries (including Egypt), 9,739 from West Africa, and 867 from Asia (figures supplied by the Ministry of the Interior, Italy, 2009). A growing preference for the eastern route can be seen from the increasing number of landings in Greece and Malta (see below for more details).

Among the routes into, through and from North Africa, those crossing the most protected border—the Schengen area border—are still the best documented. As pointed out by Monzini (2004), data on arrests of irregular immigrants in the different countries or near their borders mainly reflect the work of national authorities, providing only a general idea of current trends. The tables below show that the two main European countries of destination are Italy and Spain. The migrants there are visible and arrests are numerous because controls are stricter.

In the following paragraphs, the research findings for a number of European countries with regard to sea routes are reviewed.

France

France is not mentioned in the reviewed literature as a country of direct destination for the smuggling of migrants by sea to Europe. A 2006 institutional report notes that irregular migrants may enter France from Spain or Italy, which are the two main European countries of destination for sea routes, while none are mentioned as arriving directly by sea in the country (France. Sénat, 2006, p. 27). The great majority of irregular migrants in France overstay their visas after entering the country regularly, but the development of document fraud is difficult to estimate. Research on the organization of such document fraud has not been published to date (ibid., pp. 23-24).

Greece

Greece is a country of destination for migrants of different nationalities passing through Turkey by sea, landing mainly on the islands of Chios, Lesbos and Samos. According to Antonopoulos and Winterdyk (2006, p. 455), 10 per cent of irregular migrants entering Greece came by sea routes. Currently these flows are increasing sharply and changes in the ethnic composition of migrants indicate the development of new routes, especially from Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. As noted by researchers, data on arrests at maritime borders in Greece should be treated with caution because some arrests were made on Greek island soil; according to the Greek authorities, arrests totalled 9,049 in 2006, 9,240 in 2007 and 5,332 in the first half of 2008 (Maroukis, 2008, p. 66). In 2008, more than 15,000 migrants arriving by sea were intercepted in Greece, according to data published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There is a need for more in-depth knowledge: for example, no detailed information is provided on the type of vessels used and İçduygu’s conclusion (2004, p. 297) seems to be valid, that what we know is often merely a bit more than speculation.

Italy

The overwhelming majority of unauthorized migrants travelling to Italy by sea depart from North African countries, especially the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. However, from the early 1990s until 2002, most irregular travel originated in Albania, Malta, Turkey and non-Mediterranean countries. Monzini (2004) has considered the evolution of flows of migrants by sea coming directly from the Indian subcontinent, the Black Sea, the Balkans and North Africa in the last 20 years and the gradual decline of these routes. Table 1 shows the increase in landings in Sardinia and Sicily and the total of landings in all of Italy. It is important to note that Sardinia and Sicily are the two regions of Italy where the maritime routes from North Africa end. In

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fact, all these sea routes to Italy have been the subject of strict control and thus drastically reduced: major changes have occurred both in areas of departure and the ethnic composition of migrants.

According to that research, which focuses on the evolution of smuggling flows to Italy, the crossings from North Africa to Sicily started from Tunisia in the first half of the 1990s. The vessels used were fishing boats flying the Tunisian flag along with other sorts of small boat. It takes approximately 10 hours to travel to Pantelleria or Lampedusa using a dinghy and between two and three days or more to sail to Sicily on a fishing boat. At first, some of these crossings were of a spontaneous nature, while others were planned by professional smugglers. The smuggling continued to expand in the 1990s. Migrants paid a fee of between $300 and $600 to the smugglers who organized the trip. The migrants were almost all North Africans, predominantly Moroccans and Tunisians and, to a lesser extent, Algerians. They were mostly seasonal workers bound for jobs in fishing, agriculture or the greenhouses of Sicily. At that time, the crossings were tolerated.

However, after the signing of a readmission agreement between Italy and Tunisia in the summer of 1998, landings were drastically reduced: the increase in controls by the Tunisian authorities had the effect of reducing the number and frequency of arrivals. New treaties were signed in 2003 and a new law against smuggling of migrants was approved in Tunisia in 2004 (see also Cheikh and Chekir, 2008).

Since 2000, the frequency and numbers of arrivals from North Africa have risen to unprecedented levels. Most of these crossings originate in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, mainly in an area close to the border with Tunisia. A remarkable rise in the number of migrants coming to Sicily not only from the Maghreb but also from sub-Saharan Africa has been recorded since 2002. Coming from the eastern side (at the border with Egypt), migrants from the Horn of Africa and even from Asian countries (Bangladesh, Iraq, Pakistan and Palestine) began to use the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as a transit point, leaving from the border areas between it and Egypt.

As pointed out by Coslovi (2007b), in the Mediterranean region the growth in the importance of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as a country of transit corresponds directly to the decrease in the importance of routes originating in Albania, Tunisia and Turkey, and to the reduction of flows from Morocco to Spain.

The vessels normally used are dinghies and wooden or fibreglass boats of 5-6 metres in length. Recently, however, there has been an increase in landings made with old fishing boats of around 15 metres, holding more than 200 persons, usually asylum-seekers. The risk of shipwreck is very high and boats are not even supplied with enough fuel to reach the coast of Italy.

In 2007, the appearance of two new routes to Italy from outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya suggested that smugglers in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya were potentially facing some difficulties, probably owing to a temporary intensification of controls. One of these routes began close to Annaba in Algeria and ended in Sardinia. The second route originated in Egypt and apparently ceased to function after October 2007, when two dinghies with 21 dead migrants were discovered off the coast of Sicily. The Egyptian and Italian authorities reacted promptly and smugglers were arrested in both countries (Monzini, 2008).

Table 1. Migrants arrested at maritime borders of Sardinia, Sicily and all of Italy, 1999-2008

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>1,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1,973</td>
<td>2,782</td>
<td>5,504</td>
<td>18,225</td>
<td>14,017</td>
<td>13,594</td>
<td>22,824</td>
<td>21,400</td>
<td>16,585</td>
<td>34,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Italy</td>
<td>49,999</td>
<td>26,817</td>
<td>20,143</td>
<td>23,719</td>
<td>14,331</td>
<td>13,635</td>
<td>22,939</td>
<td>22,016</td>
<td>20,165</td>
<td>36,951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Public Order, Ministry of Home Affairs, Italy.
In 2008 and 2009, departures from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya were organized even during the winter, in tough weather conditions: in 2008 a total of 36,951 landings in Italy were recorded. According to recent studies, smugglers relied for a long time on the fact that the Italian authorities would tow vessels found out at sea into the port of Lampedusa (Monzini, 2008). Deaths of migrants on their way to Italy are on the increase (see chapter VIII).

**Malta**

Until 2005 Malta was an important point of arrival and departure for migrants wishing to enter Europe. Mainwaring (2008) examines the archipelago of Malta as an area of destination and transit on the trans-Mediterranean migration routes. In the late 1990s and up to the beginning of the 2000s, before Malta joined the European Union, the archipelago had been a hub for North African routes and even an intercontinental hub for smuggling from Asia (mainly from China): migrants arrived by air and in two hours were transported in rubber dinghies to southern Sicily by local smuggler organizations (Monzini, 2008).

Since then, the role of Malta as a transit point has been reduced, as it is almost impossible for migrants to leave the islands (Düvell, 2008a), so that Malta, like Cyprus, is now considered a dead-end destination; landings are nevertheless on the rise. In 2008, the number of migrant arrivals almost doubled from that of 2007, reaching 2,500. Most were asylum-seekers from sub-Saharan Africa, especially East Africa, while the presence of North African migrants declined sharply. Most departures were from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Zuara, Zliten, Misurata and the area around Tripoli).7

**Spain**

In Spain, almost all migrants using sea routes come from Africa. There are three main sea routes to Spain:

- The route crossing the Strait of Gibraltar and its surrounding areas (including Andalusia and Murcia)
- The route from Morocco and Western Sahara to the Canary Islands
- The route from the West African coast to the Canary Islands

Another way to enter Spanish territory is by entering Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish cities within the territory of Morocco) clandestinely or with fraudulent documentation.

Carling (2007) has reconstructed the main routes and their development in recent years.8 To sum up, clandestine travel to Spain started in the early 1990s, after the country required an entry visa for Moroccan nationals. As the smuggling services became specialized, the number of migrants and asylum-seekers transported increased as well: they were mainly migrants from Morocco and other North African countries, and increasingly from sub-Saharan Africa.

In 2002 an advanced surveillance system, the Integrated Overseas Surveillance System (SIVE), was put in place by the Government of Spain to curb the flow of irregular migrants to the coasts of Andalusia. This intensification of governmental controls had a huge impact on the destination points of migrants; the areas of departure and arrival expanded and routes became longer so as to avoid detection (Carling, 2007). Owing to the fact that the shores of the Canary Islands were less patrolled, a sudden shift to the Islands as a destination point for migrants was recorded in 2002. Migrants started leaving from southern Morocco and Western Sahara with local pateras, or fishing boats.

However, while up to 2005 migrant landings on the Islands were mainly by nationals of Morocco, from 2006 onwards the migrants came mainly from Senegal and sub-Saharan African countries. Increased cooperation by Morocco in prevention and repression activities led in 2006 to an expansion of the routes further south, with ships filled with up to 500 migrants leaving from Central and Western African countries and landing in the Canary Islands after extremely dangerous voyages.

The development of the new routes from Central and Western Africa led to an increased number of illegal immigrants entering Spain via the Canary Islands: their number rose from 4,715 in 2005 to 31,678 in 2006.

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7See MTM I-Map on Malta. The MTM I-Map is an interactive instrument supported by ICMPD, the European Police Office (Europol), Frontex, UNHCR and UNODC for the exchange of information on the migratory situation in States around the Mediterranean. It provides detailed maps for a visualization of the situation of migratory flows and routes (available from www.imap-migration.org/index2.html).

8Other literature on Spain has not been taken into consideration in this work.
However, from 2007 onwards, Morocco and Spain intensified their joint efforts to prevent migrant smuggling and unauthorized migration, which lead to a decrease of irregular immigrants by sea (-53.9 per cent) from 39,180 (2006) to 18,057 (2007), as seen in table 2.

Since 2006, the lengthy journey from West Africa and the need to avoid international border controls has made sea travel to the Canary Islands incredibly dangerous for unauthorized immigrants. The percentage of known migrant deaths at sea, over the total of migrants intercepted on this route, was still on the rise in 2008 (see chapter IX, on the human and social costs).

Land routes to North Africa

Land routes account for the low-cost segment of the market of irregular migration; travel can be as cheap as $60 and can cover large regional flows within Africa, mainly connecting sub-Saharan African countries and North Africa.

Two major land routes enter North African countries from the south:

- From Central and West Africa, mainly through Mali and the Niger
- From East Africa, including the Horn of Africa, mainly through Chad and the Sudan

In particular, the MTM I-Map singles out four different routes: Eastern Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean and West African routes.9

Research on the West African route to the Maghreb is the best developed. According to UNODC (2006, p. 11), to leave the region of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which internally is free of visa requirements, for North Africa, the main routes depart:

- From Senegal (to Mauritania, Morocco and eventually to the Canary Islands) (see Van Moppe, 2006)
- From Mali (to Algeria and eventually Morocco), through Gao
- From the Niger (to Algeria or the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and then Tunisia), through Agadez10

The East African routes are used mainly by migrants from the Horn of Africa: the routes depart from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, pass through the Sudan, Chad and then the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and end eventually on the shores of the Mediterranean, in Egypt, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and even in Turkey.

As mentioned above, the flows from East Africa will probably constitute the largest flow of migrants crossing the Mediterranean in the future. In this context, it is worth noting that this route has only recently been focused on as an important one in the international literature. Only a few years ago, international analysis of major routes from Africa to Europe, such as that of Van Moppe (2006), did not mention it. The most exhaustive studies on the East Africa routes have been presented recently by ICMPD (2007, 2008). The main hubs of the eastern route originate firstly in Ethiopia: Addis Ababa

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9See www.imap-migration.org/index2.html.

is a gathering and starting point. El-Gedaref and Kassala are hubs for refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia, Khartoum is a major transit point, while Dongola and Selima are also important transit points; in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya centres are Kufra, Sebha and Al Jawf.  

In the following paragraphs, the research findings for a number of North African countries with regard to land routes are reviewed.

**Algeria**

The routes to Algeria start from two major transit points: Agadez in the Niger and Gao in Mali. In Algeria the first target city is Tamanrasset, the most southerly town in Algeria, close to the border with the Niger, where 40 per cent of inhabitants are irregular migrants from neighbouring countries (Fargues, 2009, p. 5). Other hubs are Adrar (close to the border with Mali), Illizi (close to the border with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Tlemcen and Maghnia, close to the border with Morocco. According to current information, Maghnia is the most popular destination and also the place where most of the smugglers are based (Mebroukine, 2009, p. 2). The largest migration flows to Algeria come from the Niger (35 per cent), Mali (15 per cent), Nigeria (15 per cent) and Morocco (10 per cent).

**Egypt**

Egypt’s importance as a country of destination and transit for international irregular migration has been increasing, also as a consequence of the tightening of the border controls on the western routes and the increasing flow of refugees and asylum-seekers from East Africa. The country is also used as a gate of entry to Israel. In fact, the increasing controls on the Mediterranean have diverted the routes, which are currently manifold: they lead not only to Europe, but also to other North African countries and to Israel. However, though some research in Egypt describes the socio-economic profile of refugees and asylum-seekers from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia and the Sudan, and as well as their living conditions, the main features of the routes and the smuggling networks that operate along them are not described (Al-Sharmani, 2008; Nassar, 2008).

**Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**

IOM (2008, pp. 31-32) reports that the extent of the flow from Agadez (Niger) to Sebha in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is difficult to calculate, but probably amounts to some tens of thousands of migrants each year. Libyan authorities have stated that some 75,000-100,000 foreign nationals enter the country each year, but official statistics are not available. According to ICMPD (cited in IOM, 2008, p. 31), 50 per cent of sub-Saharan migrants entering the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are from Nigeria and 20 per cent from Ghana.

Dirkou, in the Niger, is an important transit hub to reach the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Hamood, 2006). Other important points of entry into the country are Al Qatrun, on the border with the Niger, and Ghat, on the border with Algeria, for Tunisians and also most recently for migrants from the Indian subcontinent (Bangladesh, Pakistan), Jdabia (a hub), Zuara, Zliten and Misurata are the main transit/embarkation points to reach Italy and Malta (ICMPD, 2008, p. 92).

As remarked by Roman (2008), the so-called “Libyan route” is still the cheapest way to reach Europe from East Africa. De Haas (2007, p. 18) highlights the strategic geographical position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for migration purposes, as it creates a link among the Nile Valley, East Africa and the Euro-Mediterranean region. Moreover, the borders between Chad, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Sudan are a relatively recent invention: the flow of goods between the three countries has been a reality of life for centuries (Hamood, 2006, p. 44).

Kufra is, together with Sebha, the most important hub in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The irregular flow here started in 2003, after the border with Chad was closed, and in 2004 the Governor of Kufra stated that 12,000 people passed the border every month, coming from Chad and the Sudan. Kufra is also the transit place for repatriation procedures and hosts a detention centre for migrants.

**Morocco**

According to De Haas (2007, p. 19), even though the land border between Algeria and Morocco had been closed since 1994, it was relatively simple to cross the border accompanied by a Moroccan or Algerian smuggler to reach Oujda. This opportunity is reflected in the

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11For a general and specific view, see the MTM I-Map.
estimates presented by Mghari (2008, pp. 5-6): 73.5 per cent of irregular migrants entered Morocco from the eastern borders with Algeria (Maghnia-Oujda 55.9 per cent), 17 per cent entered through the southern borders, and 7.2 per cent across the Atlantic Ocean and 5.7 per cent from Mauritania.

Conclusions

The current literature allows one to sketch a general map of the routes of irregular migration into, through and from North Africa. It is supposed, but not proven, that they coincide more or less with the routes of migrant smuggling.

In the reviewed literature, the most detailed analysis has related to maritime routes: regarding travel to Italy and Spain, recent research has reconstructed the main changes in the crossings, with much attention being paid to the various factors shaping those changes. In contrast, studies on air travel are completely lacking and most of the land routes have been best described by journalistic accounts. Academic literature on desert journeys is scarce, and no data or information are available to define the changes in these routes in recent years.
IV. PROFILES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SMUGGLED MIGRANTS

Who are the migrants and would-be migrants who pay for services and sustain the demand for the smuggling market in North Africa? A profile of the migrants involved is necessary to understand the smuggling process. The sources reviewed do not provide specific details on the profiles of migrants who pay for the services of smugglers. However, extensive research has been carried out on the social profile of migrants leaving North African countries and irregular migrants living in North African countries—two categories of migrants who have probably used the services of the smugglers at some point during their travels.

Chapter IV examines the profile of smuggled migrants from two perspectives. Firstly, the geographical perspective is considered: what is known about the migrants’ profiles according to their region of origin? Secondly, from the perspective of smuggling methods: what is known about the migrants’ profiles according to the modus operandi used by the people who smuggle them?

North African migrants

In the case of Algeria—a country where smugglers started to sell their services to Algerians willing to cross the sea at the beginning of the 2000s—the “clients” belong to all social strata: according to Mebroukine (2009, p. 7) they have in common their attraction to the Western lifestyle and a lack of work opportunities.

Since the late 1990s, as pointed out by Boubakri (2004, p. 11), the profile of migrants in Morocco has changed: in addition to low-skilled persons from poor backgrounds, there is a growing number of well-educated and highly skilled young people, with the percentage of women on the increase. A recent survey in Morocco, in the region of Tadla Azilal, has determined the profile of Moroccan irregular migrants who leave this area to reach Italy and Spain by irregular crossings (in this case through the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or Tunisia). They are between 20 and 30 years old on average, and a fifth of them are women. They belong mainly to the middle class (a “poor middle class”, as argues the author) and, despite their level of education being quite high, they suffer from a generalized lack of opportunities, welfare and public health services (Chadia, 2007).

According to a survey conducted in the Nile Delta region on actual and potential migrants in Egypt, the results, as reported by Zohry (2007, p. 60), show that the relatively new flow of Egyptian nationals going into Italy through the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is composed almost entirely of young males who migrate for a short
period of time, looking for earnings to send back to their families. For them, expected remittances are €6,000 a year, which, according to Zohry (2007), is a sum higher than an average life-time salary in Egypt. Their mean age is 28, 59 per cent of them are single, and there is a dominance of secondary technical certificate and university degree levels of education. Their first desired destination is Italy, the second is France. The vast majority of them rely on information collected from relatives and friends, and almost nobody knows about the possibility of deportation facing irregular migrants. According to the findings of the survey, the migratory chain is well localized and sustained by family networks. Commenting on the results of this survey, Roman (2008, p. 2) reports the title of a newspaper article: “Village’s best and brightest young people have been fished out of the Mediterranean”.

To conclude, according to the reviewed literature on North African migrants, poverty is not the most important factor shaping the profile of migrants (as stated by De Haas, 2007, p. iii). However, even though the decision to migrate is usually a choice made in search of better opportunities and is an investment made by the family as a whole, most of the migrants subject themselves to treatment that is often rough and involves a high risk to their personal safety, by resorting to the assistance of migrant smugglers because they cannot afford better travel.

Sub-Saharan migrants

Hammouda (2008) has published an important study on the social characteristics of sub-Saharan migrants in Algeria, estimated at at least 21,500 persons (ibid., p. 4). This study analyses their attitudes towards migration, taking into consideration various factors: proficiency in the language, urban or rural origin, education, age and economic resources. A total of 2,134 migrants were interviewed. The survey found that 57 per cent of the migrants interviewed had worked previously in Algeria and 70 per cent planned to be back home in a few years; only 21.45 per cent of them stated that they were in transit to Europe. Half of them were able to send remittances home (ibid., pp. 4-5).

Another survey, in Morocco, on a sample of 1,000 sub-Saharan migrants interviewed in different cities, found that 76 per cent of them were irregular (without papers), 21.5 per cent were asylum-seekers and 2 per cent refugees. A total of 59.4 per cent of them stated that they did not have a job and only 3 per cent had an “almost regular” job. The migrants interviewed perceived themselves as being rejected by society in Morocco and 72 per cent of them were willing to continue their migration to other countries or towns (Mghari, 2008, pp. 10-12).

A survey of sub-Saharan migrants transiting the Niger towards North African countries with the ultimate objective of entering Europe was conducted through interviews in Agadez. A number of migrants were interviewed and a population of educated, urban males was identified. The survey observes that migration is a very selective process: the better-educated have a higher propensity to migrate (Issa, 2007, p. 16): “contrary to conventional wisdom, as regards employment, the migrant seems to have no particular problem in fitting in: he is most often actively employed and not often jobless”. Both men and women migrants are often single and actively employed before departure. They both have a growing attraction to the way of life and standard of living of the people of Algeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Europe in particular (Issa, 2007).

Khachani (2008) also notes that unemployment is not a major cause of sub-Saharan migration to Morocco. Almost half of sub-Saharan migrants are “working poor”, in the sense that they had jobs before leaving, but their incomes were insufficient to meet their own needs or those of their family. However, they do have money to invest in the journey. Migration is often a long-term choice, a solution to improve the livelihoods of their families. According to the same author, it is important to stress that migrants have to fulfil the families’ expectations, in particular where the families share in financing the travel (ibid., p. 7).

According to Elmadmad (2008, p. 14) and Péraldi (2008), migration within the context of some sub-Saharan countries can be viewed as the only way to get away from very harsh living conditions. Sub-Saharan Africans are often escaping from difficult situations and looking for peace and security.

Non-African migrants

Specific study of the social profile of flows of migrants coming into North African countries from Asia or the Middle East, often by air, has not been conducted. Some reports by international organizations mention the existence of groups of smuggled migrants coming from Asia, especially from Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka (UNODC, 2006; ICMPD, 2008; IOM, 2008).
Nevertheless, literature based on research in North African countries generally does not mention them, showing scarce interest in the issue. It is noted that nationals of Bangladesh and Pakistan enter the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya across land borders in order to continue to Europe by boat (ICMPD, 2008). Egypt and the Suez Canal are also mentioned as major transit routes for Sri Lankan nationals trying to reach Cyprus and Italy (Nasser, 2008).

Profiles of migrants in relation to the smuggling methods used

The smuggling business is highly segmented and distinctions among migrants can be made on the basis of the fees they pay for smuggling services. Price differences are quite large: for example, a migrant will pay between €6,700 and €9,500 for travel by air from Cairo to Italy, and €2,000 if he or she decides to leave by boat (Zohry, 2007). As pointed out by Van Hear (2004), the migration alternatives reflect the class prerogatives of the would-be migrant; migrants who cannot afford to travel by air take cheaper routes by bus or on foot, or travel irregularly by boat.

Migrants smuggled using regular means of transport

An unaccounted-for segment of smuggled migrants consists of those who can afford to pay high prices. They get the best services available on the market: travel by air or by regular shipping lines, with fraudulent documents, including visas and possibly work permits in the country of destination. For such migrants, the risk of interception is almost non-existent. Details about successful smuggling activities are difficult to ascertain: they happen in secrecy and for this reason it is rare to obtain evidence on them. What we know of the migrants arrested does not tell us anything about other migrants of better means, as pointed out by Pastore and others (2006, p. 98).

Migrants smuggled using non-regular means of transport

According to Monzini (2005, p. 14), smuggling of migrants via maritime routes saw a rapid and drastic increase during the 1990s, for two main reasons: it satisfied the demand arising as a result of the most “urgent” migratory pressures and was the cheapest sector of the market for illegal immigration to Europe. A major change in the ethnic composition of migrants using maritime routes occurred after 2002, when sub-Saharan migrants overtook North Africans as the largest group of people landing in Europe (Carling, 2007; Coslovi, 2007b) and the number of asylum-seekers increased.

In particular, when irregular sea travel takes place without any attempt on the part of the smugglers to prevent police interceptions, two categories of migrants can be identified: those who have a real possibility of being accepted in Europe as asylum-seekers and those who come from very distant places and whose repatriation is too expensive (usually nationals of Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ghana, Liberia, Somalia or the Sudan).

Precise data are lacking on the overall proportion of asylum-seekers among migrants undertaking sea crossings. According to UNHCR, in Italy, more than 70 per cent of the 31,000 requests for asylum in 2008 came from persons arriving after irregular crossings.12 In the same year, more than 75 per cent of those who entered in Italy by sea were asylum-seekers and 50 per cent of them were granted international protection: most of them were from Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Iraq and Somalia.13 This indicates that the percentage of asylum-seekers among the total number of intercepted migrants arriving by sea seems to be on the increase.

Social organization of irregular migrants in North African countries

As reported by Alioua (2008), Boni (2008), Daniel (2008) and Liberti (2008) whatever their background, migrants try to circumvent legislative constraints during their long journeys and find themselves in communities of people sharing common needs and goals. All these authors describe the difficulties encountered by migrants during their journeys and note that being forced to stay in a hub before having the opportunity to continue their travel makes them develop strong community ties and a new identity as migrants (see chapter V.B). The portrait presented by De Haas (2007) is that of isolated young individuals in search of employment, who hide from authorities and have limited freedom of movement,

no legal protection and poor access to basic rights. According to most of the studies, during their stay in a place, migrants share experiences of making their travel affordable and of finding work in order to earn the money needed to move on to other places. Organizational structure and solidarity among migrants are well-developed among these irregular migrants; smuggling networks often belong or are well connected to this underworld.

With a journalistic perspective, Daniel (2008) describes several of these communities living on the outskirts of towns and cities and even in the forest in northern Morocco, close to Ceuta and Melilla. Generally, some of those in the community are able to suggest to newcomers the best means of coping with the current situation, to provide for their accommodation and even to indicate available solutions to continue their journey. Strict social control inside ethnic communities has developed, especially over women, who live in very difficult conditions (on these issues, see also Alioua, 2008, p. 699). Daniel (2008) in an appendix to his book also presents a vocabulary of the slang of French-speaking irregular migrants, and describes mafia-like organizations leading and “protecting” the communities.

To sum up, clandestine migrants are not free and alone: they belong to a community and have to respect the strict rules and social codes imposed upon them. They adapt to the control systems, reorganizing their movements (Alioua, 2008, p. 703).

According to Mebroukine (2009, p. 2), in Algeria the sub-Saharan migrants function in a parallel economic network, a black market. An important factor shaping the identity of these migrants is that they are excluded. Beyond the law in their countries of settlement, they do not benefit from any protection or rights: they are marginalized, excluded, precarious and perceived as dangerous by the States hosting them (Alioua, 2008, p. 701). It is a situation similar to that reflected in the European-based study by Broeders and Engbersen (2007), according to whom, for irregular migrants there is the emergence and existence of several informal and illegal markets in the sphere of housing, work, relations and documents. These informal markets can be classified as “bastard” or parallel institutions (ibid., p. 1597).

The migrant on the move

Recently, some journalistic reporting—in particular the work of Liberti (2007), Daniel (2008) and Gatti (2008)—has carried vivid descriptions and information on aspects of travel through the Sahara. Daniel (2008) has best described, from a journalistic point of view, the long journeys by bus from the main cities of West Africa, the long waiting time in the hubs, the agreements with the smugglers, the slang used, the arrival in North African towns, the settlement in ghettos and the socialization process within the migrant communities. Gatti (2008) and Liberti (2008) have described difficulties during the journey, stressing the high degree of corruption of the police forces working on the desert routes.

New in the literature on North Africa is also a psychological perspective on migrants. Daniel (2008) and Maroukis (2008, p. 73) note that the migrant does not stop his or her journey because of physical barriers. Once the decision to leave has been taken, nothing will discourage the migrant from trying to pass the borders several times, again and again. Moreover, as pointed out by Maroukis (ibid.), the expectations of the families in the countries of origin, the pressure of smugglers who need to be paid and the webs of debts that develop as the journey progresses all reduce the migrants’ options, denying them the choice to return home: even if the migrant cannot go on, he or she has to settle and find employment. Recent research has found that among migrants on the move there is a common psychological determination to overcome all obstacles (Alioua, 2008; Boni, 2008). The social death of the migrants suggests that they do not fear physical death: as reported by Khachani, the feelings of migrants about their “mission” are very strong: “We are already dead, here. Even if they...
built a wall up to the sky, I will find the way to overcome it” (Khachani, 2008, p. 13; see also the anthropological approach of Beneduce, 2008).

Conclusions

Some research has centred on understanding the social profile of migrants before embarking on their journey, some on their living conditions in the North African countries and even—to a lesser extent—on their psychological condition and attitudes. Current research on migrant profiles carried out in European and North African countries, and to a smaller extent in sub-Saharan ones (Issa, 2007), shows the prevalence of migrants who are not poor and uneducated: the average migrant is a young male belonging to the middle class. The lack of opportunities at home, or the low salaries, and the lack of opportunities for legal migration lead the would-be migrant to leave and to pay middlemen to help him leave: selection is made according to the different prices. The choice of air, sea or land routes (or even a combination of them) depends on the destination points aimed at and the funds available for travel. Little information has been collected on the decision-making process. Also, too little is known about asylum-seekers and the differences between their social organization and living conditions and those of other groups of migrants. What is lacking is an analysis of the ethnic composition of the migrant flows. There have been no studies on ethnicity, though it is clear that the social organization of irregular migration, and to some extent even of smuggling activities, is based on ethnic ties. Furthermore, there have been no studies on gender issues and focus on minors is also almost non-existent.
Chapter V reviews research findings with regard to the social profiles of migrant smugglers and the relationship between smuggled migrants and migrant smugglers.

Social profiles of smugglers

Information available on the social profile of smugglers is patchy and the picture that can be drawn from it is incomplete. According to testimonies collected by the Italian police from two pilots of boats that landed in Italy in 2005, in Al Zwarha (a Libyan city from which most of the departures from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya took place), there were at least five active clans, who exploited the complicity of the local police forces. The clans and their leaders had different origins: some, according to witnesses, were former agents of the secret services or of the police, others were small businessmen (trading in fruit, household appliances or jewellery), while still others were former convicts—drug dealers and traffickers or members of terrorist groups hostile to the regime. Many were described as the owners of estates and villas who travelled in large, expensive cars. In general they had available spaces (garages, stables, apartments, farmhouses or sheds) in which migrants could be hidden while they waited to depart (Monzini, 2008).

Daniel (2008) also describes smugglers as people well-placed in social life, but serious studies have not yet been published that can clarify this issue. According to Coslovi (2007a), the research suffers from a cognitive void because it is difficult, given the illegal nature of the transactions involved, to carry out (participant) observation that would lead to a better understanding of these issues.

Factors that shape the relationship

The relationship between smugglers and smuggled persons is mainly a business relationship. The smugglers offer the passage at a certain price, they negotiate the total amount to be paid for the journey and they are responsible for creating the conditions to leave.

Boni (2008) notes that when migrants are on the road they are perceived as persons who have money to spend in order to achieve their goals. Local passeurs offer services at higher prices, exploiting every passable route for profit. Corrupt police officials ask for money as well. The journey unfolds in long and rough stages, and slowly the migrant loses control over his or her own travel: often the trip is such that the migrant is entrusted by one passeur to another. Essentially, these mechanisms, from the point of view of smugglers, often transform the migrants into full-blown merchandise that is “moved” to make a fortune for the individual capable of taking advantage of the migrants’ vulnerable position.

Even though scanty, the available information shows some significant differences in the kinds of relationship that exist between smugglers and migrants. Coslovi
(2007a) has noted, for example, that in Morocco, even if the conditions seem rather set, the would-be migrant willing to get to European shores is well informed: he or she compares, chooses and negotiates the price, the conditions and the form of payment, and possibly protection and guarantees. In this case, the relationship between migrants and smugglers is clear, symmetrical and subject to well defined contractual ties between both parties (ibid.).

To understand what defines the relationship, it is important to consider the background to this kind of relationship. Moroccan smugglers began by operating “at home”: the first to make use of the services of the smugglers were the inhabitants of the same towns or villages as the smugglers themselves, meaning that the inhabitants could exercise a certain control over the smugglers (Coslovì, 2007a). The recruiters advertised their services and the buyers of the services were usually the parents of the migrants. It is surely owing to these specific characteristics that the Moroccan smugglers, who actually perform a social function at the local level (assisting local would-be migrants to leave), are not stigmatized and their networks are very flexible and quite overt. Even if it is not visible, the bosses are most likely involved in a chain of nepotistic protection and extensive systems of corruption, and are well-integrated into local social life (ibid.).

At the other extreme are the relationships established between sub-Saharan migrants who pass through the desert, and those who try to cross the sea, and their smugglers. Marked by authoritarianism, such relationships are founded in a context of considerable isolation and social marginalization, a social vacuum—a space of social exclusion formed by foreign sub-Saharan migrants. Different kinds of relationship can arise in these contexts. Journalists travelling in the region have also encountered hierarchical organizations that migrants are forced to submit to with the use of violence (Daniel, 2008; Gatti, 2008). Issa’s researchers in Agadez (2007) were not able to interview migrants from Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali because their “chairman” prevented them from doing so. Researchers in Morocco were asked for money in order to be allowed to carry out interviews in a few sub-Saharan communities. The “chairmen”—the heads of the migrant communities—who may often have close connections to the world of the smugglers, feel themselves in a certain sense the “bosses” of the migrants whom they protect (Mghari, 2008, p. 2). In these circumstances, in the view of the author of this review, the relative power of the agent/smuggler can easily be abused.

**Dependency**

Research has not explored the degrees of dependence of migrants on their smuggler according to the background of the “clients”. It is interesting to note that in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya the smugglers’ services are also used by migrants to move inside the national territory: migrants who feel unsure can pay up to $150 for a trip from Kufra to Tripoli, which is a fairly high price compared with the cost of a public bus trip from Cairo to Tripoli, which is around $20 (Hamood, 2006, p. 48). From Hamood’s interviews, major differences emerged in how different ethnic groups organized the same travel. For example, Sudanese nationals, more at ease, make the journey to Chad or Egypt alone, while Eritrean nationals complete the same trip spending much more because they always pay facilitators: they do not want to run the risk of being stopped by the authorities and it is difficult for them to evaluate the real risk of the journey. Italian investigators have also found that migrants are treated differently according to their nationality (Monzini, 2008).

More precise analysis of the different experiences of different kinds of migrants on the same routes has not been carried out. One hypothesis to be tested, following the results of the research of Hamood (2006), is that the more the migrant feels in danger (for example, not knowing the local language is a key alienating factor during these trips), the greater will be his or her need for assistance and service. Research has not yet been done on the different means of travel for migrants who are or are not able to speak Arabic or other local languages, or on the differences in travel between English- or French-speaking sub-Saharan nationals, nor on the differences in treatment of migrants of different religious or ethnic groups. According to the present author, in order to understand what percentage of migrants use the services of smugglers, it is necessary to examine their degree of vulnerability and the various factors determining it.

**Conclusions**

In the reviewed literature, some information has been presented on the relationships between smugglers and migrants. It emerges that the gradual increase in border controls and the repression of irregular immigration, whether real or feigned, heightens the need for irregular migrants to entrust themselves to others. Moreover, the prolongation of the routes necessary to avoid controls reduces the migrants’ capacity for independent travel,
placing them increasingly in unfamiliar and distressing situations.

There is no research on how migrants perceive smugglers. The reviewed literature does not provide an accurate description or analysis of the relationship between smugglers and their clients and the factors that determine it. Differences in the treatment of migrants according to their nationality, ethnicity or other characteristics need to be explored further. Also, the social profile of smugglers has thus far received too little attention in academia.
VI. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES OF MIGRANT-SMUGGLING NETWORKS

How are smugglers organized in North African countries? Do multi-trade organizations exist in North Africa that sell “full-packet” solutions and long-planned travel or do ad hoc and flexible organizations prevail? What are the different roles in the smuggling process? What determines how smugglers are organized? Chapter VI explores how these issues have been presented in the reviewed literature.

Organizational structures of migrant smuggling by sea

Regarding the organizational outline of the networks operating the irregular crossings of the Mediterranean, the most extensive studies are those of Monzini (2004, 2008), Coluccello and Massey (2007) and Coslovi (2007a), who address the different types of structure, their hierarchical relationships and the degree of coordination of the operation. Among his various sources, Coslovi used interviews with Moroccan smugglers to some extent. Monzini (2004, 2008) and Coluccello and Massey (2007) instead used judicial materials to piece together the structure of organizations based in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Much information on organizations moving migrants by sea to Spain has been provided by Carling (2007). Regarding Greece, the most important studies are those of Antonopoulos and Winterdyk (2006) and Içduygu (2004), but they do not describe the internal structure of the networks of smugglers who organize sea crossings.

According to Monzini (2004, 2008) and her analysis based mainly on judicial records and interviews with law enforcement officials in Italy, smuggling networks all around the Mediterranean are complex, but they are usually not structured hierarchically. Smugglers move in situations of continuous change and their organizations are highly flexible. Smuggling networks are not powerful and sophisticated criminal cartels; they are not organized as a mafia with strong ties with organized criminal groups. Rather, all the organizations operate on a short time-scale, responding to changing problems with flexible solutions.

The example of networks operating in Morocco

The empirical field research of Coslovi (2007a) confirms this view. According to the results of his study of journeys from Morocco to Spain with the pateras (the only research to use interviews with smugglers), the organization of travel includes:

*The recruiter.* This is the first person the client has contact with, usually in the community, through contacts or friends, or at the embarkation point.
The middleman. This is the individual who creates the direct contact between the client and the person who will take charge of the organization of the journey. At times, in particular if they live in the migrant’s home community, middlemen can act as guarantors and can hold the payment in reserve until the journey has been successfully completed. Middlemen are in contact with more than one smuggler.

The smuggler is the organizer of the trip, who negotiates conditions and prices.

The innkeeper makes safe houses available where the migrants wait for departure, which takes place when the prearranged number of people have arrived.

The passeur pilots and may also be the owner of the boat.

The smuggler in the country of destination is in charge of receiving the migrants.

Although they all have different functions, these roles are often interchangeable. Smuggling organizations are characterized by a marked flexibility, by changeable hierarchical structures and relationships, and limited longevity. The figures who have satellite roles are many: as in the case of Albania a decade ago (Monzini, 2004), in Morocco there are fishermen who work sporadically as passeurs, truck drivers who supplement their salary by transporting migrants to the embarkation point and neighbours who act as middlemen. The only stable figure is that of the boss, who coordinates operations and arranges for the use of the ships (Coslovi, 2007a).

The example of networks operating in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

According to the study of Monzini (2008), based principally on an analysis of judicial and police sources, in Tripoli and in small Libyan cities along the coast, smuggling involves a multitude of people who participate to various degrees in the operation. They are:

- Local middlemen who maintain contact with migrants of their own ethnicity (Egyptians, Eritreans, Moroccans, Sudanese). They may be the wives or lovers of Libyan smugglers of foreign origin.
- Those responsible for managing migrants awaiting departure in sheds or private houses (management, movement, room and board).
- Those responsible for procuring the boats (dinghies, small ships, fishing boats).
- Those responsible for positioning the dinghies at sea and gasoline supplies at the departure points, and/or for loading the fishing boats off the coast.
- Truck drivers who collect and accompany the clients to the departure points.
- Occasionally, but rarely, a crew for the boat.
- Foreign middlemen, well incorporated into international networks, whose function is to collect the clients in their home country, directly or with accomplices.

The organizational attributes of the Libyan networks that organize sea crossings show many similarities with those of Moroccan organizations. As in the Moroccan case, there are key figures who are tied to one another by tight connections of friendship or kinship (Monzini, 2008).

The example of networks facilitating sea crossings from Turkey to Greece

As far as crossings from Turkey to Greece are concerned, according to İçduygu (2004), small and flexible organizations using different kinds of boat facilitate travel. The organization of the business is not centralized. The author describes a large network consisting of different small independent groups, working in different countries. The network consists of both professional and amateur smugglers with different jobs and specializations: there are groups specialized in the falsification of documents, landlords who rent their properties as dormitories, small hotel owners and truck, bus and pick-up drivers and owners. These players are connected by business relationships (ibid.). According to Antonopoulos and Winterdyk (2006), smugglers who facilitate the smuggling of migrants by sea to Greece do not have great logistic sophistication.

Organizational structures of migrant smuggling by land

Serious research on smuggling organizations operating along the desert routes is not extensive. Only research based on small samples of interviews of migrants and
journalistic reports are available (Hamood, 2006; Daniel, 2008). Information on the routes and hubs in North African countries has been collected only recently, with a focus on foreign communities and ghettos entrenched in the social life of North African countries, where transit and irregular migrants live and where smugglers find a large proportion of their clients.

The reviewed literature has revealed the presence of smugglers and middlemen of various nationalities and languages along the routes that cross the desert and in several large cities. They are active in every hub and in all the oases throughout the desert. The sale of passages is generally mediated, during the long journey, by fellow countrymen of the migrants: the middlemen—“facilitators”—are generally of the same ethnicity as the migrant (Hamood, 2006, p. 50 ff.; Gatti, 2007; Daniel, 2008; Liberti, 2008). Journalistic literature reports that these facilitators also work in networks, at times consigning their passengers to their cross-border “colleagues” or receiving “reservations” from distant countries. As in the organization of travel by sea, there is an organizational level consisting of public relations, involving the recruitment of clients and perhaps also the organization of their accommodation before departure, and another level more directly tied to transport. Yet the structure of the networks of relations existing between the various players has not been studied in detail.

According to ICMPD (2008, p. 28 ff.), publications describe the omnipresence of smugglers who sell their services, more or less professionally and in stages along the East African routes, but in reality they are figures who are very difficult to locate and some only participate periodically in the business (ibid., p. 30):

> “Differentiated smuggling services are offered by various ‘providers’… Illegal migration from East Africa has to be seen in the context of a larger social framework, of which the smugglers only form a part. Family, friends, diasporas and peers have a role in supporting the migrants financially and to provide them with useful information for the migration project, including on smugglers. The informality, specialisation and often small scale of the operations make it highly challenging to combat smuggling activities and in particular those at the early stages of the migratory route.”

As stated by Heckmann (2005), organizations that transport a large number of people require a complex form of organization—that is, a large inter-organizational network of organizations—not a pyramid-like hierarchical organization. This seems to be the case for most of the smuggling networks in North African countries. Based on scarce information, the networks that assist illegal migration into, through and from North Africa seem to be extremely flexible. Different forms of organization and techniques coexist. In fact, smuggling networks operating on land are not hierarchically structured and are probably even less “defined” than those which smuggle migrants by sea (Monzini, 2004, 2008; Antonopoulos and Winterdyk, 2006; Carling, 2007; Coslovi, 2007a).

Nevertheless, according to verified sources, some of the West African groups—in particular the Nigerian ones—seem to be highly structured. If these networks do not control the routes themselves, they at least coordinate with other networks to which they outsource part of the transport along the route. After departure, the migrants receive instructions by phone (UNODC, 2006, p. 14). Moreover, as UNODC has noted, the main nationalities of arrested migrants do not necessarily coincide with the nationalities of the main groups of irregular migrants. In fact, it appears that migrants from wealthier countries are less likely to be arrested than those from the poorer countries (ibid., p. 13). It is also worth noting that Nigerian nationals are not among the most represented in arrest statistics: conversely, they are well represented among migrants who arrive in Italy by boat. 16 This means that they are able to pass through the controls.

In this respect, it is very important to note that smuggling activities can lead to practices of trafficking in persons, an issue rarely considered in the current literature. For example, according to the present author, the higher degree of organization of the Nigerian groups is probably connected with the needs of those who organize trafficking in women for sexual exploitation: for them, to move young girls through North African countries to Europe is a very important business-oriented activity. UNODC reports (2006, p. 15) that women, largely Nigerian, are transported in groups of up to 30 people and kept separately from other migrant groups. They are required to provide sexual services to their “protectors” during transit, but it is unclear to what extent they are trafficked into sexual servitude in Europe.

It is known that Nigerian providers supply as many as 50 per cent of the women working in the cheap sector

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16According to data provided by the Ministry of the Interior of Italy in 2009.
of the prostitution market in Italy (Monzini, 2007). This market has been flourishing since the 1990s, and a continuous turnover of women has been recorded since then. Initially, the women travelled on direct flights from Lagos to Rome. Following increased controls, the traffickers had first to relocate the transfers, both in Europe and in West Africa, and in the end began to use ocean routes, having the women passed from Morocco to Spain. The latest route leads from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to Italy, which is a cheap one. The risks of the trip are borne by the women, who also frequently endure various forms of sexual violence. These recent developments need to be studied more specifically in the light of the arrival of almost 3,000 young Nigerian women on Italian shores in 2008.

Conclusions

Specific research on the organizational structures of migrant smuggling networks that facilitate sea crossings has not been carried out in the North African countries themselves. Also, relevant investigative and judicial sources in North African countries have not been examined in order to study this issue. According to the little research that has been carried out on such organizational structures by European researchers, the smuggling networks facilitating sea crossings of the Mediterranean are complex, but usually not hierarchically structured. They continuously modify their structure in response to changes in the environment in which they operate. However, while there can be constant changes in players and their roles, there is one person who does not change his position in the structure of a smuggling network—the boss. In contrast to this, groups that are also involved in trafficking in persons seem to be organized more rigidly. As regards North Africa, in-depth research is lacking on how both organizations smuggling migrants and organizations trafficking in persons are structured and possibly connected. In particular, research about the organizational structures of migrant smuggling networks that operate along the land routes crossing the Sahara Desert is scarce, though the reviewed literature does note the presence of smugglers andmiddlemen of various nationalities and languages along the routes that cross the Desert.

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Data from the Ministry of the Interior, Italy, 2009.
VII. MODUS OPERANDI OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING

Chapter VII reviews recent research literature with regard to the following questions: What are the smuggling methods used by migrant smugglers? How is the process of migrant smuggling organized? What determines changes in methods and routes?

Modus operandi of migrant smuggling by sea

No study of recruitment and travel methods in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia has been found in the reviewed literature. However, study of smuggling of migrants by sea from Morocco and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does provide a general outline of its evolution.

Smuggling of migrants from Morocco

As regards sea crossings, information collected in Spain draws an outline of the evolution of such smuggling. At first, travel was organized spontaneously by the migrants themselves, but slowly professional smugglers started to make money arranging smuggling services. Wooden fishing boats of 5-6 metres, *pateras de pescadores*, were used to transport 12-15 passengers at a time. They used to cross the Strait of Gibraltar (11 kilometres wide at its narrowest point) and land without being detected by the authorities.

However, in 2002 SIVE, an advanced surveillance system, was set up by the Government of Spain to stop irregular migrant flows to the coasts of Andalusia. This system had an enormous impact on the destination points of migrants: owing to the intensification of governmental controls the areas of departure and arrival expanded and the routes became longer in order to avoid detection. Moreover, smugglers bought faster rubber dinghies and vessels, with a carrying capacity of 40-70 people (Carling, 2007).

In order to understand how the smuggling market works it is important to note how it adjusts to changing institutional frameworks in the countries of embarkation. Coslovi (2007a) in particular shows how pioneer smugglers who began to organize single passages in the 1990s from Morocco were successful in selling full-package solutions. He found that in the mid-2000s smuggling organizations had started to offer would-be urban migrants, already aware of the high risk of travelling with *pateras*, a different service—a complete package to go to Italy or Spain (boat ticket + documents + work permit) at a higher price. At the same time, the organizations continued to offer their traditional *patera* services, which were cheaper and more dangerous, to rural and more naïve people.

According to this evidence, the increasing controls in the Strait of Gibraltar led to a process of diversification of services and an enlargement of international and
national networks of the smugglers in Morocco. Other examples collected by Coslovi (2007a) show how the smugglers made contacts with those in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, with corrupt officers and with counterfeitors in order to circumvent the growing controls in the Strait of Gibraltar and to stay in the business. The smuggler is able to offer his clients a service of fraudulent documents and ferry tickets or, alternatively, false documents and access to Ceuta, at higher costs. Cheaper trips with migrants departing in containers or hidden in a truck are also sold; this system requires the connivance and corruption of border guard officers (ibid.). The existence of a combined trip from Morocco that includes transport by car to Casablanca airport, the flight to Tripoli and transport by car to the departure point in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has also been reported by Monzini (2008): in this case the price for everything up to the landing in Italy added up to around €4,000.

Migrant smuggling from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

A similar development of migrant smuggling in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has taken place, characterized by both the increase in the country’s importance as a hub for migrant smuggling and the gradual professionalization of the smugglers.

Initially, in the early 1990s, spontaneous travel to Sicily was organized by migrants themselves from Tunisia and the Italian authorities paid no attention to their arrival. Progressively, as in Morocco, smugglers created a market for such travel and recruited professional sailors to transport migrants to Sicily and sail the boats back. After the repression of this traffic at the end of the 1990s, Tunisian smugglers moved the embarkation points to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. When in 2002 and 2003 the Italian police arrested dozens of sailors, usually of Tunisian origin (Monzini, 2004), on Italian shores, the smugglers began to send boats to Lampedusa without professional sailors. The migrants started to sail the dinghies themselves. Slowly Libyan smugglers took over the business (Monzini, 2008).

As a result, in early 2000 departure points had been moved from Tunisia to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which is a transit and stopping-off point, not a place of origin for migration. Thus, in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya the technical skills relating to maritime passage have been developed only recently in response to international smugglers seeking new outlets. The flow from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to Sicily has recently grown and diversified, with a growing presence of people coming not only from the countries of the Mahgreb, but increasingly from the Horn of Africa and West Africa. Migrants arrive at Libyan departure points independently or else with the help of stage-to-stage smuggling organizations. From there, arrangements are made with maritime smugglers who are generally not of the same nationality as the migrants (Monzini, 2005, p. 15).

The reviewed literature further describes how the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya became the hub for migrant smuggling by sea in North Africa when smugglers who had been operating in other countries such as Egypt, Morocco or the Sudan extended their operations to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. For example, Hamood (2006) ascertained that when middlemen in the Egyptian city of Tattuan began to be targeted by authorities, they decided to physically relocate to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where they succeeded in continuing with their operations. From the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya they started to receive their countrymen, who arrived after land journeys in vans and trucks organized by accomplices, and then arranged their onward departure with Libyan boats (ibid., pp. 63-64). In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ties between the Egyptian and Moroccan groups tightened as individuals bonded over the difficulties they faced in their villages. The climate is one of cooperation among middlemen: everything is posited in terms of commercial transactions (ibid.).

Investigations in Italy have demonstrated that, while until a few years ago only single crossings were sold in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Pastore and others, 2006), now some smugglers are able to offer full-package solutions, including at times assistance in Italy on departure from the detention centres for irregular migrants (Coluccello and Massey, 2007; Monzini, 2008). According to these findings, for the full-package migration trip to Italy the sum of €3,000 is requested by Libyan smugglers, in two payments: €1,500 to the Libyan organizers at the moment of departure, with the remaining €1,500 paid by relatives in Italy once it has been determined that the trip was successful. In Milan, research based on interviews with police officers and analysis of judicial files found important ties between smugglers and the forgers who produce fraudulent documents on demand in order to regularize the migrant’s status (Coluccello and Massey, 2007). Coluccello and Massey were able to determine the progressive capacity of Libyan groups to increase their own importance in the international
CHAPTER SEVEN: MODUS OPERANDI OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING

system: on the one hand they put different ethnic niches of the market in contact (Eritrean, Moroccan and Sudanese smugglers), while on the other they maintained privileged ties with the legitimate world through extensive connections of corruption in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (ibid., p. 88). Their study also confirmed that the networks involved in this trade did not conform to mafia-like hierarchical organizations but rather smaller, more complex and fluid organizations (ibid., p. 77).

The statements made by migrants recorded in the files of the Court of Agrigento, in Sicily, confirm that contact with Libyan or Tunisian middlemen takes place in certain bars or in the market, and that the journey to Lampedusa costs between $1,000 and $2,000. On the outskirts of Tripoli, migrants are crowded into houses in the countryside for days or weeks, with armed guards to keep them in order and secrecy, while they await embarkation. After staying in these places, the migrants are taken to the coast at night using small buses which have been completely emptied of seats, making space to carry 50 to 60 persons at a time. The passengers are then loaded onto small boats and transferred to fishing boats waiting at anchor or are taken directly on board in small ports (Monzini, 2004; Hamood, 2006).

Perilous crossing

Most of the studies (Monzini, 2004, 2008; Hamood, 2006; Lutterbeck, 2006; Coluccello and Massey, 2007) describe the maritime crossings from North Africa as very dangerous, given that the vessels are piloted by the migrants themselves, who are not professional seamen and do not know the waters of the Sicily Channel. Currently, the migrant who takes responsibility for sailing the boat is normally allowed to make the crossing free. The skippers navigate the route to Lampedusa or to the Sicilian coast and the only tool they have at their disposal is a compass and sometimes a global positioning system (GPS). The boats sail without a flag, a name or any sort of documentation, and the owners of the boats remain unidentified, which prevents them from ever being investigated. The risk of shipwreck between African and Italian shores is very high. The boats are sometimes not even supplied with enough fuel to get to the Italian coast near Lampedusa or to the southern shores of Sicily. The smugglers rely on the fact that migrants will be intercepted, and rescued, by the authorities of European countries. The strategy of the smugglers is to send several boats at the same time, so that the reception infrastructures are overcrowded and the migrants are moved immediately to the mainland (Monzini, 2004, 2008).

Modus operandi of migrant smuggling by land to North Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa, given the length and complexity of the journeys, migration is usually divided into several stages and each one can involve several days of travel. Smuggling arrangements are generally described as small-scale and locally organized: the _passeurs_ are always persons who really know the territory. Moreover, individual migrants typically rely on their communities living abroad for assistance and rarely pay a single price for their entire journey (Collyer, 2007). According to the survey conducted in Morocco in 2007, travel is usually very long: 83.7 per cent of migrants interviewed crossed through more than one country and 21 per cent of them passed through four to six different countries (Mghari, 2008, p. 8).

The reviewed literature on journeys from West Africa shows that the first important step is to reach the “doors” of the desert. With this aim, migrants travel on their own or pay for the all-inclusive transportation services offered in all big capital cities. In Abijan, Accra, Cotonou, Lagos and Lomé it is not difficult to arrange long-distance travel in minibus to Gao (in Mali) or Agadez (in the Niger). Prices vary enormously, and the cost of a passage from Lagos to Gao can be as high as $1,000 (Daniel, 2008, p. 27), including all expenses and the fees paid by drivers to local police officials as bribes. For travel by private minibus, the journey is always paid in advance. Some passengers already arrange the deal with the transporters in Gao or Agadez by electronic mail (e-mail) or by telephone before their departure (Issa, 2007).

The second step is the desert crossing, which is very difficult and dangerous. Here, almost all migrants have to establish contact with middlemen so as to continue the journey and travel with drivers who know the routes and are able to avoid detection. Migrants have first to trust the middlemen who arrange their travels, and secondly they have to rely on the drivers of pick-ups and trucks, which travel for days, usually passing through several hubs. The choice of routes is not easy. According to information collected by Issa (2007), in Agadez, for example, 11 travel organizers operate illegally to reach the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Sebha) or Algeria (Tamanrasset), in close collaboration with 12 agencies,
employing 57 people across the town. They are the real masters of the game in matters of transportation of foreigners transiting through Agadez (ibid., p. 13). They can be contacted in advance from the countries of origin of the migrants or they are found directly in Agadez. To have a more precise idea, it is worth quoting the study by Issa (2007). As regards Agadez, the author mentions the following routes:

- Agadez - Arlit - Assamakka - I-n-Guezzam - Tamanrasset is the national route and the least risky.
- Agadez - Arlit - I-n-Guezzam - Tamanrasset is described as a route that avoids police checkpoints but is more dangerous.
- Agadez - Arlit - Tchingalen - Adrar Bous (Montagne) - Tchibarakaten Well (on this route, Libyan and Algerian smugglers “buy” passengers) - Janet (Algeria) or Ghat (the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).
- Agadez - Tree of Ténéré (Wells of Hope) - Ashagour (Artesian Wells) - Dirkou - Siguidine (the only village where one meets civilians) - Dao Timi - Madama - Toumo - Gatrone (Libyan and Algerian smugglers “buy” passengers) - Janet (Algeria).

It should be noted that everything is decided in the Tafassasset-Ténéré region, which is an area between northern Aïr and west Kawar, a most dangerous area where the terrain is flat and from noon onwards one can no longer ascertain the direction. Most of the journey takes place at night with the stars as the point of reference (ibid., p. 22).

Dirkou, in the Niger, is an important transit centre to reach the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The journeys connecting the two hubs are carried out using large lorries in convoys of up to 160 people or, more expensively, in minibuses for 25-30 people. Payments to corrupt officials at the border are routine. Migrants often speak of their journey across the desert as being the most dangerous part of their odyssey: besides having to face natural dangers, the lorries also have to be defended against well-organized groups of bandits (Hamood, 2006).

In-depth research on the modus operandi of smugglers in the desert and its evolution is lacking, but some interesting information has been collected through studies on some hubs of irregular migration. ICMPD has outlined the importance of hubs on the eastern routes: hubs can be oases, ports, refugee camps, airports, border towns and larger cities. Smugglers are said to operate out of hubs, where they recruit, gather or transfer their “clients” to other brokers (ICMPD, 2008, p. 28). Hubs are defined as “strategic transit places along the migration routes that provide migrants with the necessary infrastructure and services to continue their migration journey” (ICMPD, 2007, p. 24).

The description of Agadez, and other major migration hubs located in the desert and in North African towns, provides us with an idea of their social organization, allowing for a better understanding of the patterns of the travels (Hamood, 2006; Issa, 2007; Beneduce, 2008; Boni, 2008; Daniel, 2008).

Like Agadez, Kufra and, to a lesser extent, Oujda can also be considered hubs and indeed present some similarities. Firstly, clandestine migrants here live separately from the non-migrant population; secondly, they have to respect strict rules and social codes (Boni, 2008). They are not free or alone, because from the day they arrive, they belong to a community. The chiefs of these communities are known as “chairmen”, who head a hierarchical power structure (see chapter V). All the research points to the enormous importance of ethnic affiliation, which seems to form the basis of the overall migration system and daily life for migrants. To survive and pursue travel among foreign peoples, migrants trust those who share their own culture.

As noted by Daniel (2008), the three basic elements of the irregular travelling system to be found in the hubs are reception, lodging and escort:

- **Reception.** According to Issa (2007, p. 12 ff.) the “Yang Tchaga”, who are unofficial transporters, and other unofficial networks bring migrants to Agadez. Passengers in Agadez are left outside the town, for fear of controls, arrest and detention. The same happens in Kufra (Hamood, 2006), where most migrants are settled in the neighbouring area of Jinsia. In both towns, migrants hide for several days so as to find a passage to other destinations; the waiting time can be very long. They may be introduced to smugglers by the drivers who brought them here or may find them on their own. Alternatively, if they have to collect money in order to continue their travel, they can settle for months or even years.

- **Lodging.** In Agadez and in Kufra, countrymen and tribesmen already integrated into the local social life...
are trusted by the newcomers looking for accommodation facilities, a job or contacts to carry on their journey. The ethno-linguistic affinities determine the groups: Nigerian middlemen shelter mainly Nigerians and Ghanaians, while Senegalese deal with Senegalese, Gambians and Guineans. In Agadez, migrants from Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali are often met, lodged and cared for by a “powerful agent” who forbids them from having any contact with “people who ask questions” (Issa, 2007). Like Agadez, Kufra lives on its earnings from the passage of migrants and asylum-seekers; it is defined as a “transit economy” (Hamood, 2006). Low-paid workers of different nationalities are well integrated into highly exploitative labour markets. In Oujda, migrants live in a camp of around 300-400 persons without any facilities and with very few resources. According to local sources, migrants live in constant fear of the possibility of police raids at any moment and the violent mafia-like organizations that manage the camp (Elmadmad, 2008, p. 19).

- Transport. In Agadez, before departure and after having come to agreements with agents and transporters, migrants form groups and are obliged to hide and often to wait for days outside the township (7-25 kilometres from the town) (Issa, 2007). On the departure date, usually at night, they are brought to the bigger pick-ups and trucks on foot or with small cars to start an 800-1,000 kilometre journey. Prices depend on the route but, according to findings, the proportion of the fees to be paid is always the same: 10 per cent to the middleman, 25 per cent to the agent and 65 per cent to the transporter and owner of the vehicle (ibid.). According to the findings of Hamood (2006), based on interviews of migrants, to get to Kufra, 4x4 pick-ups are generally used. Between 25 and 45 people are squeezed into the open back: in a state of severe overcrowding, the people struggling to find enough places to sit, a convoy of two or three vehicles travels for an average of 10 days (ibid., p. 45). In the desert there are often delays because of vehicles breaking down, petrol running out, waiting for additional passengers or mistakes by the drivers. These delays can mean that passengers run out of basic provisions of food and water. Passengers often fall off the truck because they are in an open back and sometimes the drivers do not stop for those who have fallen off. Generally, the Chadian drivers travel during the night. Sometimes at the Libyan-Sudanese border the passengers are transferred to another vehicle, with a Libyan number plate (Hamood, 2006).

Conclusions

The modus operandi of smugglers and their smuggling methods are only partially known. An analysis of the role of corruption and document abuse in North African countries was not found in the reviewed literature. More information has been collected and studied on the organization of the travel, the treatment of the migrants and the logistic structures that are needed to transport people. The importance of ethnic ties emerges, but direct evidence on this issue has not been collected in North African countries: the current literature provides only scanty information on the ethnic basis of smuggling networks and their relationship with wider networks of migrants.

Smuggling of migrants is carried out in varying institutional contexts and, according to the reviewed literature, changes in those contexts can have a dramatic effect on the costs, the techniques and the technology used. According to most of the research, the evolution of legislation and policies related to migration and the development of new measures for the prevention and repression of irregular migrant flows have a huge influence on the shape of the main irregular migration routes (Carling, 2006; Lutterbeck, 2006; Coslovì, 2007b; De Haas, 2007; Düvell, 2008a and 2008b; Monzini, 2008). The widening of the scope of migration control at the national and international levels produces a constant redefinition of the geography of routes. More precisely, the geography of irregular migration is the result of the countermeasures of authorities, on the one hand, and the efforts of smugglers and migrants to contravene them on the other.

The two examples of how migrant smuggling has evolved in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Morocco, even if they are not necessarily broadly representative, allow us to hypothesize that repression sets selection mechanisms in motion, so that only those smugglers who succeed in finding new solutions are able to remain in the market. In the long term, therefore, it is often the repressive activity of the authorities that provokes, as a side effect, the formation of more professional networks and fuels the gradual functional specialization of groups of smugglers. This underlines the need for responses to migrant smuggling to be guided by holistic considerations that encompass the potential consequences of actions that merely divert smuggling activities but do not bring a complete end to them.
**Chapter VIII reviews recent findings on fees in order to answer the following questions: What are the factors that determine fees? How high are the fees? How are the payments made?**

### Factors that determine fees

According to research findings, the cost of the journey depends on the distance and complexity of the route, on the degree of institutional control of the route and on the reception of migrants in the countries of transit and destination. All these variables affect the possibility of success of the enterprise. Only De Haas (2007, p. 25) considers corruption one of the main variables in establishing the prices of journeys.

It is interesting to note that prices are usually standardized, but can differ according to different nationalities. According to IOM (2008, p. 18), in 2003 the price for a sea crossing from Morocco to Spain was $200-500 for Moroccan nationals, $800 for French-speaking sub-Saharan Africans and $1,200 for English-speaking sub-Saharan Africans. Generally, it appears that women pay more than men (Mghari, 2008).

In recent years, according to different sources, such as Lutterbeck (2006), Collyer (2007), Khachani (2008) and Monzini (2008), smuggling routes have become more risky and at times more expensive. As far as the sea crossings are concerned, currently, to reach the Canary Islands with very dangerous boats, prices for a crossing are between €1,500 and €3,000 (Khachani, 2008, p. 7).

According to Monzini (2005, p. 12), the strengthening of police controls and border patrols is increasing the risk of interception for smugglers, who need to invest more in corruption and means of transportation in order to successfully manage their business. As a result, prices for the services of smugglers are increasing.

### Fees

As far as the estimates are concerned, on the East African side the cost of a journey through the Sahara can range from $60-180 to $1,000 (ICMPD, 2007, p. 25). From the Italian police it is known that migrants from Eritrea and Ethiopia pay a few hundred dollars to Sudanese middlemen for travel across the Sudan, using the border area of Al Awaynat to enter Egypt. After a 10-day journey they are in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Monzini, 2008).

A survey including fees for smugglers and cost of travel has been conducted on the routes to Morocco, where 87 per cent of the migrants interviewed used the services of smugglers (Mghari, 2008, p. 8). The empirical research reveals that the total price paid for the journey, including possible smugglers’ fees and/or payments to corrupt officials was as follows.
(Khachani, 2008, pp. 8-10; Mghari, 2008, pp. 9-10):

- About half (52 per cent) of migrants paid between €1,000 and €2,000
- One third paid between €500 and €1,000
- About a quarter paid between €200 and €500
- About a fifth paid between €50 and €200
- Only 1.1 per cent paid more than €2,000 and they probably used air routes

The wide differences in prices probably reflect the existence of several networks of facilitators and the variety of itineraries and transport facilities available. However, the survey does not make clear how much was paid to the smugglers, how much the cost of the travel was or how much each migrant spent on corruption. UNODC (2006) presents a table with a list of scattered evidence of prices of various smuggling services, but a systematic study on this issue has not been undertaken.

On the sea routes, average prices have been recorded, but there is an almost complete lack of analysis of the financial side of smuggling. Irregular travel from Tunisia to Sicily cost around $250-$500 in the mid to late 1990s (Monzini, 2005, p. 16), while from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya a passage to Italy was around $1,200 in 2006, compared with around $800 in 2004 (ibid.). Last recorded prices between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Italy are as high as $3,000, but cheaper travel is also available. This is due to the fact that, while in previous years only single passages were sold, now services are more sophisticated and a kind of reception in Italy can be sold as well. In the latter case, advance payments are generally requested (Coluccelli and Massey, 2007). More research is needed on the business side of smuggling, including an examination of the costs of travel, for both smugglers and migrants.

As pointed out by Pastore and others (2006), who examined sea crossings, the industry of irregular migration is highly segmented and distinctions among migrants can be made on the basis of the fees they pay for the services (ibid., p. 114):

“As a matter of fact, human smuggling organizations have to operate within quite specific constraints ... . There is however a precise limit to the amount of money smugglers may request to a migrant: it must anyway be sensibly lower than what the migrant should expect to pay for getting a legal tourist visa. It must also be lower than what a migrant would need to pay for forged documents or for having a fake marriage organised.”

As pointed out by Van Hear (2004), the migration alternatives reflect the class prerogatives of the would-be migrant: migrants who cannot afford to travel by air take cheaper routes by bus, on foot or by boat. Price differences are quite high: for example, a migrant may have to pay between €6,700 and €9,500 for travel by air from Cairo to Italy, but €2,000 if he or she decides to leave by boat (Zohry, 2007).

Method of payment

The method of payment is generally cash (Mghari, 2008). Nevertheless, a specific study on how payments to smugglers are made by migrants in North African countries has not been carried out. Coslovi (2007a) found that payments were in some cases not all paid in advance, but in part upon arrival. In Morocco, those who belong to the local community have the right to a repeat attempt with a single fare price. This offer, however, is not valid for “foreign” migrants who pay for passage at the embarkation points and who may only buy a single travel opportunity. However, only sporadic evidence has been collected on these arrangements and it is not possible to determine whether there is systematic use of standardized forms of payment.

Conclusions

The current literature presents some data regarding the amount of money that migrants pay in order to travel irregularly, whether by land, sea or air. However, the data are piecemeal, and evidence collected on prices and methods of payment is scarce. What data there are have not been systematized. No study has been made or data gathered in the current literature on the cost of smuggling activities for the smugglers themselves. Smuggling is an important illegal business, requiring an economic approach in its study. Thus far such an approach is completely lacking.
IX. THE HUMAN AND SOCIAL COSTS OF SMUGGLING

Chapter IX reviews the literature with regard to the social and human costs of smuggling of migrants. Firstly, it presents data and information on the degree of suffering and the incidence of death among smuggled migrants. Secondly, it illustrates some aspects of the social cost of the business, both for the communities of origin of the migrants and from the point of view of the possible increase in crime rates related to it.

The human costs: suffering and death of migrants during travel

In 2004, ICMPD estimated that almost 10,000 persons had died in the last 10 years trying to cross the Mediterranean (see Lutterbeck, 2006, p. 61). The Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía has calculated that more than 4,000 migrants drowned seeking to land in Spain since the beginning of the 1990s. Fargues (2009, p. 13) argues that mortality rates on the sea route to Spain have been on the increase since 2001 and that the rate is now around two people out of every hundred: routes to Europe have been increasingly dangerous, perhaps in conjunction with tightened controls on the shortest ways and migrant smugglers inventing new but longer and therefore riskier routes. All the authors in the literature (Lutterbeck, 2006; De Haas, 2007; Zohry, 2007; Mghari, 2008; Fargues, 2009; Mebroukine, 2009) agree that the rising number of deaths of would-be migrants seeking to reach Europe by crossing the desert and by sea is a serious humanitarian problem.

The desert journeys

According to information collected through interviews, travel through the Sahara Desert is extremely harsh. On arrival in Italy after the boat crossing, migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa often remember their journey across the desert as being the most dangerous part of their odyssey (Monzini, 2005). Hamood notes that journeys are in large lorries in convoys of up to 160 people or, more expensively, in minibuses for 25-30 people. The jeeps, vans and trucks that cross the desert are always overloaded and it is common for someone to fall off and be left behind in the desert. At the borders, payments to corrupt officials and violence are routine. Besides having to face thirst, hunger and hypothermia, the migrants also have to defend themselves against well-organized groups of bandits. Journeys often end tragically: dozens of abandoned wrecks of lorries have been found in the desert (Hamood, 2006).

The journeys through the desert are very difficult and dangerous, as journalistic reports highlight (Daniel,
The Moroccan Association for Studies and Research on Migration (AMERM)/International Committee for the Development of Peoples (CISP) survey in Morocco (see Khachani, 2008, pp. 11-12), which collected information from migrants, is the only academic study to reveal the degrees of violence that migrants suffer during their journey. Lack of hygiene, exhaustion, thirst, hunger and long waiting times are faced by almost all the travellers (more than 70 per cent of migrants). The detailed data show that among the migrants surveyed:

- 63 per cent had suffered from physical disease
- 52 per cent had been arrested by police
- 43 per cent had been repatriated
- 40 per cent had been victims of a robbery and 43 per cent of theft
- 36 per cent had witnessed the death of someone during the journey and 36 per cent had seen human skeletons on the road
- 30 per cent had been involved in an accident
- 15.5 per cent of migrants (almost all of them women) had been the victim of sexual harassment and 11 per cent (that is, 36 per cent of the total number of women and 5 per cent of men) had been raped
- 13 per cent had been abandoned during the journey

Moreover, as pointed out by Khachani (2008, p. 13), the anonymous deaths in the desert are not recorded: they are invisible and nobody includes them in statistics. The author reports estimates by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria showing that 10,000 Nigerian nationals lost their lives on the routes to Europe between 1999 and 2002. Between 1997 and 2004 the Sudanese Popular Congress, a Sudanese association based in Kufra, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, recorded 486 deaths of travellers on the journey from the Sudanese border to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (the bodies were buried in Libyan territory) (Hamood, 2006, p. 47). Estimates of deaths in the desert are not given and very little research has been conducted on this.

Sea crossings

Fortress Europe, the press review collecting all news about accidents befalling migrants entering Europe irregularly, recently reported19 that the number of deaths is on the increase in the Sicily Channel: 418 migrants had died or gone missing in the first eight months of 2009, while in 2008 there had been 642 victims. In total, it was calculated that, since 1988, 3,467 persons had died in the Sicily Channel and in the last two years at least 125 had died trying to reach Sardinia from Algeria. When deaths occur, political and media attention increases; deaths demonstrate the weakness of policies to control migration and, at the same time, highlight the difficulties in protecting vulnerable migrants. Many accidents are not recorded and when boats sink bodies are recovered in the sea by fishermen (Monzini, 2005). According to Boubakri (2004, p. 5), between 1998 and 2002 the failure rate of the maritime crossing from Tunisia was around 20 per cent.

Most of the thousands of migrants arriving in Europe remember their sea crossing as a very difficult one. All of them felt sick and weak on the boats, because of the large waves and the strong smell of fuel. They often talk of how water and food were scarce, of the biting cold and of boats so crowded that they feared falling into the water. Poor hygiene and lack of space created conditions of terrible hardship for the passengers and facilitated the spread of disease. Cases of sexual abuse of female migrants were also recorded (Monzini, 2005, p. 16).

In Spain, the number of deaths is currently declining after a dramatic increase in 2006 (1,250). According to data collected by Fortress Europe (2007), in total 4,445 persons on their way to Spain died during the crossing, that is, 2,613 trying to reach the Canary Islands and 1,832 sailing to the Strait of Gibraltar. In 2008, there were 352 deaths, while in 2007 there were 887. Trends are different in Greece: at least 1,315 persons have died trying to reach Greece, 417 of them in 2008 and 257 in 2007.

According to the director of the Mauritanian Red Crescent, it seems that 40 per cent of the boats crossing the sea between Mauritania and the Canary Islands fail to make it across. Between 10 November 2005 and 6 March 2006, between 1,200 and 1,300 died (Khachani, 2008, p. 13). Fortress Europe recorded at least 1,035 deaths on the Canary Islands route in 2006 alone. In 2007, following an approximate 60 per cent decrease in landings, the number of incidents remained high and at least 745 migrants died.

Gathering information from different sources, including the newsletter of the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, United

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Against Racism compiled a list of those who had lost their lives while trying to enter Europe illegally.20

The social costs of smuggling: when migration fails

Usually migration is a long-term project intended to lead to improved quality of life for the migrant and his or her family. Recent empirical research based on interviews with 50 migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan living in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has explored the dynamics of travel organized by smugglers. The study reveals how smuggling works as part of migration and brings advantages to all those involved: to the migrant, if he or she arrives at the intended destination, to the smuggler, who makes an investment and obtains a profit, and in the end even to the families in their original country, or abroad, who in a few years receive remittances and recover the investment made in their relative who migrated (Koser, 2008).

Conversely, the high failure rate of internal journeys in Africa revealed in the current literature seems to indicate that in many situations migration can drain local resources and leave the country of origin and the communities of countrymen abroad still more impoverished than before. An in-depth study of this would be a useful contribution to current research. Most migrants depart with the savings of their family and loans from friends, making their migration a long-term investment. Moreover, when they find themselves in difficulty during the course of the trip, they ask for more money and often have it transferred in order to pay for later stages of the journey. The sums, for the country of origin, are often very high (as in some cases in Afghanistan and Pakistan) and dry up the family economy for years.

Thus, according to Beneduce (2008), migration geography has changed in recent times and the geography of humanitarian problems now associated with irregular migration (poverty, exploitation, segregation and abuse) is changing as well. Many of the migrants, or asylum-seekers, trapped between the economic demands of the smugglers and the permanent fear of being arrested and deported by the authorities, are impoverished and become stranded.

As Dowd (2008) has pointed out, the role of smugglers seems to be an important one in the formation of a population of stranded migrants. According to this author (ibid., p. 15), among stranded migrants:

“Most have engaged the services of smugglers, many of whom steal their money, force them to pay more than they agreed upon or abandon them with no choice but to pay other smugglers to continue their journey. Some migrants, especially those who pay different smugglers in stages, underestimate the cost of their journey and have exhausted their resources by the time they reach transit countries. There are two cases: returning home empty-handed, in debt and often in a worse economic situation than before they left, or staying abroad with an irregular status.”

These failed migrations, combined with the cases of death, arrest and illness of the migrant, make the social costs of irregular migration in Africa significant. The higher the risk posed to the migrants’ lives, the higher the social costs for their community of origin.

Smuggling and crime trends

Even if most of the smuggling networks are not considered part of organized criminal networks that are active in other areas of crime, according to the literature there is no doubt that migrant smuggling has become a highly profitable business. According to the reviewed literature, it is quite clear that the risks of detection and punishment for migrants are high and their potential losses are also high, while for the smugglers (other than those driving desert trucks or otherwise directly involved in transport) the risks are very low and the potential profits very high.

Because of these characteristics, there is some evidence that, in the long run, the migrant smuggling business can attract traditional organized crime. It is known, for example, that for several years Maltese contraband-smuggling groups have converted their business to the transport of people towards Sicily (Monzini, 2008). The same process of movement of smugglers into the business has happened in Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara (UNODC, 2006). In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, cases of drug trafficking were detected (ICMPD, 2008). Coslovi (2007a) also notes that in Morocco some smuggling organizations are also

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20 Finalized in May 2009, the list is available from www.unitedagainstracism.org/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf.
operating in other illicit markets, such as the drug traffic. In Albania, in the last decade smuggling and drug trafficking—together with trafficking in women associated with smuggling—were the first steps in the development of new and powerful structures of organized crime (Monzini, 2004). However, no reference in the literature has been made to investment of profits of smuggling into other illegal markets in North African countries.

The current literature records at least a marginal increase in rates of criminality connected with the return of deported migrants, who are deprived of work and resources. Issa (2007) reports an increase in prostitution and in the exploitation of children in Agadez and a growing new underworld linked to migrants sent back without resources. More generally, as Broeders and Engbersen (2007) note, more stringent control of irregular migrants leads to a more rapid descent of such returnee migrants into the underground. According to these authors, the cat-and-mouse game between the State and irregular migrants seems to result in a serious threat to irregular migrants' room for manoeuvre and further increases their dependence on informal, and increasingly criminal, networks.

Conclusions

Recently a new awareness has become apparent in the literature as regards the increasing social and human costs associated with irregular migration and smuggling of migrants. The current literature highlights the increasing risks to migrants travelling with or without smugglers and a survey has been carried out concerning the desert journeys. Data on the degree of suffering and deaths among migrants are still generally collected by journalistic sources, but the human rights issues associated with smuggling methods and irregular migration are mentioned widely in the literature. Still, more substantial research should be conducted on this topic. More in-depth research is needed on the social cost of smuggling of migrants for the communities of origin and on the risk of rising crime rates related to it.
Chapter X summarizes the main findings of the literature review. It starts with an overview of promising research methods and the challenges facing researchers in exploring the issue of migrant smuggling, before turning to the substantive findings emerging from the reviewed literature.

Research on smuggling: difficulties and promising approaches

According to the reviewed literature, currently most African migrants who decide to leave do so irregularly: there are very few opportunities to travel legally. If migrants do not have the means to pay for a flight and to acquire a false passport or visa, they are presented with two alternatives. The first is to travel independently towards their destination, finding the way as they go by and possibly paying for the services of ad hoc smugglers they meet en route. The second, and more expensive, method is to entrust themselves to local middlemen in their village or town who know how to direct them to better opportunities. In both cases, the migrant comes into contact with an interconnected, transnational, informal network of—more or less—specialized middlemen.

The working mechanisms of these systems for the sale of irregular passages are difficult to research. The principal sources that would make it possible to piece together the workings of the market are the smugglers themselves and their minders, who are difficult to reach and interview. The smugglers are difficult to interview because they are working illegally and authorities that work to suppress irregular immigration often prefer to maintain confidentiality regarding their work. In academic research activities, some best practices have been identified, however. Some researchers have been able to construct—at least in part—how the networks operate, from the point of view of the smugglers. These studies focus on maritime routes. One is the work of Coslovı (2007a), who, through field work carried out by insiders in two communities and with the help of a questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, was able to get a general picture of how Moroccan smugglers are able to sell passages to Europe, both to local people and to migrants coming from elsewhere. In contrast, research by Monzini (2004, 2008) and Coluccello and Massey (2007) has mainly used judicial sources and interviews with prosecutors and police officials to understand how smuggling operations emerge and evolve.

Important research has also been carried out using interviews with migrants as a major source of social investigation. One such important study was that conducted by Hamood (2006), the first to focus on the desert routes, based mainly on the collection of narratives of the journeys of migrants and asylum-seekers from Egypt, the Sudan and the Horn of Africa from the country of origin to the final destinations in
the European Union. The methodology used for the interviews is described and profiles of refugees and migrants are provided, grouped according to nationality.

More recently, two surveys have drawn a picture of the irregular migrant population living in North Africa and an outline of the services offered by smugglers. One is the AMERM/CISP survey in Morocco, quoted by several Moroccan studies (Khachani, 2008; Mghari, 2008) as a primary source of information on smugglers’ activities and the journeys made by migrants. The other is a survey carried out in Algeria, which defines a profile of irregular migrants in Algeria, focusing on their itinerary and on their economic activity and income, either in the country of origin before leaving or in Algeria (see Hammouda, 2008). These surveys were able to investigate communities of sub-Saharan Africans living in North African countries and to describe the travel of migrants in detail: prices, difficulties and the involvement of networks of smugglers were addressed.

It is important to note that the migrants themselves—the market’s clients—are at times evasive. The survey in Morocco demonstrated the difficulty of interviewing migrants with irregular status. They were reticent above all when faced with sensitive questions, such as those relating to sexual assault, to the amount of money paid to the passeurs or to the cost of the journey in general (Mghari, 2008). Migrants, furthermore, are not ideal sources as they have a very limited knowledge of how the smugglers’ networks work (Pastore and others, 2006).

Main substantive findings and needs for further research

One of the main findings of the review is that research and collection of information on smuggling of migrants in North African countries is generally not related to the study of migrant smuggling, but rather to research on migration issues. In the current literature, smuggling is mainly seen as a part of the irregular migration problem and the migration perspective is mainly used to analyse it. In this context, the findings are the following:

- The information presented in this study shows that migrant smuggling is a very complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. The enormous differences in the geographical, social and political situations in which various smuggling networks operate throughout North African countries, and with the countries to the north of the Mediterranean, make it difficult to formulate comprehensive explanations of migrant smuggling.

- Because of changing policies on migration and the introduction of stricter border controls, migration patterns in the North African region have become more complex. In the last five years, research on those patterns at the regional or at the national level has evolved rapidly, but the quantity and quality of data and information on smuggling networks are poor. It is therefore evident that more research is needed here.

- In recent research, North African countries that were previously considered mainly transit countries are now described also as countries of destination for irregular migration. Research has described a stable population of irregular sub-Saharan African migrants living in social exclusion, segregated into informal markets for housing and labour in North Africa, similar to those of irregular migrants in Europe (Broeders and Engbersen, 2007). The importance of such “stranded” migrants, who have failed in their plan to emigrate but cannot or will not return, is emerging in the research (Dowd, 2008; Düvell, 2008a).

- Estimates of numbers of irregular migrants show the presence in North African countries of large numbers of migrants who do not have legal status. However, the percentage of irregular migrants who have used the services of smugglers has not been calculated at the country or regional level, whether for those crossing the Mediterranean or those crossing the Sahara.

- The current literature enables one to draw up a general map of routes of irregular migration into, through and from North African countries. It is supposed, but not proven, that they coincide almost completely with the routes of migrant smuggling. Accurate studies of smuggling by air are completely lacking, while most of the land routes have been described at best by journalistic accounts and no data or information are available to define changes in these routes in recent years.

- The development of new routes and hubs for migration is seen mainly as a reaction to migration policies, but data on arrests and deportations are
difficult to interpret. A regional picture needs to be drawn in order to understand more clearly the interaction between policies and the development of routes.

• As regards the institutional response to migrant smuggling, more systematic information collection needs to be done. It is important to consider all the institutional branches concerned in order to understand how institutional responses work and how they affect smuggling networks. At the moment this picture is incomplete. Also, reports on North African countries do not usually present precise data on the number of persons arrested for smuggling-related activities.

• Researchers share the perception that problems posed by irregular migration and smuggling from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and from North Africa to Europe cannot be solved only with a security approach (see, for example, Lutterbeck, 2006; De Haas, 2007; Fargues, 2009).

• Even though no scientific data correlate the growth of the migrant smuggling market with the tightening of border control, the literature perceives the recent growth in irregular migration mainly as a consequence of policies of control and management of migration in the European Union and the North African countries (De Haas, 2007; Düvell, 2008a and 2008b).

• The importance of the human rights of migrants is becoming central in the discourse on migration in European and North African countries. Awareness of the social problems related to irregular migration and smuggling is growing both at the academic level and in civil society. One of the main findings in the literature is that smuggling routes—not only maritime ones—are increasingly dangerous (Lutterbeck, 2006; Fargues, 2009).

• The human rights issues associated with smuggling methods and irregular migration have been described, but more substantial research needs to be done in this respect. More in-depth research on the social cost of migrant smuggling for both the communities of origin and for communities abroad is also needed.

• More research on smuggling networks and their operations is needed, with specific focus on violations of the human rights of migrants. This could contribute significantly to enhancing the current debate on migration issues. Only by including migrant smuggling—considered an important criminal operation—in the overall dynamics of irregular migration will we be able to explain all the processes at play. The present review shows that smuggling is a very important factor to be considered in order to understand the overall picture of irregular migration, as it is a business that generates large profits.

• Extensive research has been undertaken into the social profile of migrants leaving North African countries irregularly and of irregular migrants living in North African countries, two groups that have probably both used the services of smugglers during their travels. However, specific research on smuggling networks has not been done in North Africa. Relevant investigative and judicial sources have also not been used in the current research.

• In the reviewed literature, there is no research on how migrants perceive the smugglers and no information on the social profile of smugglers.

• Information on the core groups organizing smuggling activities is not available; a perception of scarcely structured networks tends to prevail. Knowledge about the modus operandi of smugglers and their smuggling methods is sketchy.

• The importance of ethnic ties emerges in the research, but has not been studied comprehensively. Only scattered information is provided on the ethnic basis of smuggling networks and their relationship with wider networks of migrants.

• More information needs to be collected and studied on the organization of travel, the treatment of migrants by migrant smugglers and the logistics involved in the transportation of people.

• Information about the role of corruption and the use of fraudulent documents in migrant smuggling is rare in the reviewed literature.

• Studies on the interface between trafficking and smuggling in North African countries are lacking and no data have been collected on debt-bondage practices in this region, which are usually the basis for trafficking in persons.

This article describes the plight of the thousands of sub-Saharan migrants who, facing the reinforcement of European Union borders, manage to travel the roads of Africa in search of a better life, often at exorbitant human cost. In the course of their travels they create migratory relay stations in the places where they stop. The article goes on to present a few socio-political repercussions that according to the author stem from the transnational, anti-migrant policies that are currently redrawing the southern boundary of Europe and from the migratory movements of those trying to circumvent them.


This paper presents an overview of the different refugee groups that have settled in Egypt in the last two decades. The phenomenon is considered in the framework of analysis used for transit migration. Patterns and livelihood strategies are examined, with particular reference to the case of Somali and Sudanese groups. Government policies are also analysed.


Using material provided by the Italian authorities, European institutions and non-governmental organizations, this study presents an overview of events and policies implemented by the Governments of Italy and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the European Union and the International Organization for Migration, and outlines contentions surrounding those policies. The author argues that the implementation of detention and return schemes, commonly discussed in terms of the externalization of asylum, does not actually relocate the asylum procedures outside the external borders of the European Union, but rather deprives asylum-seekers of the possibility of accessing asylum determination procedures. The analysis of migratory patterns in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya further suggests that those policies, implemented to deter irregular migratory flows into Europe and to combat smuggling of migrants, might paradoxically result in “illegazilizing” the movement of migrants between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the neighbouring African States and in increasing the involvement of smuggling networks.

This article examines the social organization of migrant smuggling to and in Greece. In the European context, Greece is presented as a unique case because of its social, economic, political and geographical location. The research draws on a variety of information sources, such as interviews with police, official statistics, informal interviews with migrants in the country and interviews with two retired migrant smugglers.


This paper outlines the different legal tools that bind non-Egyptians and explores the problems that irregular migrants, including failed asylum-seekers, face in Egypt. It also explains the role of the Ministry of the Interior with regard to naturalization and deportations, and proposes alternative mechanisms.


This paper analyses the socio-political dimensions of irregular migration in Tunisia. After presenting the issue from a global perspective, the author focuses on public policies and the actions of non-governmental organizations in the field of migration, and highlights how concerted attention to irregular migration could have a serious impact on migrant flows, promoting a better management of irregular migration.


Using an anthropological approach, this article describes the fractured structure of the narrative of the refugees and clandestine migrants, drawing attention to the psychological consequences of the traumatic events they have been forced to live through. It notes how the day-to-day lives of many undocumented migrants are characterized by scenarios of death, violence and apartheid: migrants have decided to leave even at risk of dying, which affects their lives forever. The author also points to the emergence of a new geography, made of almost unknown, peripheral places (such as Benin City, Bukavu, Sangatte, Lampedusa), which are the main departure and transit points for irregular migrants.


According to this author, the current movements of clandestine African migrants cannot be compared with the various forms of labour or forced migration that have always existed on the continent; they pose a problem of human development. It is important to compare different perspectives: in Europe clandestine migration is usually represented as a dramatic phenomenon; on the contrary, in the context of some African countries, such as Mali or Senegal, it can be viewed as the only way to escape from very harsh living conditions. Clandestine migrants are not free or alone: they belong to a community and they have to respect the rules and social codes imposed upon them. The Africa of clandestine migrants is one of collective representations of “somewhere else” that Africans form in this age of globalization. Clandestine migrants are those who are rejected both by the socio-economic dynamics of their national State and by “developed” States. The main solutions have to be found in the countries of origin, especially in the field of political reform.

This report highlights the recent evolution of migration flows in Tunisia. The Maghreb has become a transit region because of restrictive migration policies in Europe and changes in labour markets and migration dynamics in the region. Firstly, Europe is considered a fortress against migration, defended by a ring of so-called “third countries” whose job is to act as a buffer between Africa and Europe. The Maghreb has become a transit zone and a commercial area, and major changes are reflected in migration trends, which need to be considered in relation to the wider social changes at play in the region. In order to understand these flows, it is important to adopt a wider perspective. The tightening of controls on the southern borders of the Maghreb States, revised rules of entry, new migration policies and the emergence of issues related to the rights of migrants are creating new problems. After discussing these issues at the regional level, the author presents the case of migration to Tunisia.


The focus of this article is on the progressive construction of a system of surveillance in Europe. The system is described as aimed at controlling irregular immigration and at identifying undocumented migrants. The European Union databases (the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS) and European Dactyloscopie (EURODAC) are described in detail and presented as milestones in a growing process of digitalization of borders. The authors analyse the counter-strategies these policies provoke among irregular migrants and their survival strategies, such as the concealment of their real identity and nationality. The authors explain the concept of “bastard” institutions to show how irregular migrants survive in a hostile society. The conclusion is that stricter controls will lead to a more rapid descent of irregular migrants into the underground and constitute an increased burden for undocumented migrants in Europe. “Travelling and staying in Europe may very well become an affair for professional and criminal activity as softer connections are cut off.”


This article examines the patterns and dynamics of transit migration towards Spanish-African borders and of unauthorized migration across them. The geography of migration is examined in detail, leading to several conclusions with implications for migration management. Firstly, the origins of sub-Saharan African transit migrants in Morocco are remarkably diverse. Secondly, cities and towns far beyond Europe play a pivotal role in the migration dynamics at the Spanish-African borders. Thirdly, the Strait of Gibraltar itself has lost much of its importance as a crossing point. Fourthly, large-scale smuggling to the Canary Islands directly from West Africa is still marginal in numerical terms, but represents a worrying scenario.


This article describes the main irregular routes from Morocco to Europe. The profile of the typical migrant is presented; he or she is usually not a poor and uneducated person, as in the 1970s, but generally belongs to the local middle class. The article focuses on motivations, exploring why migrants wish to change their life through migration. Secondly, it analyses the term “clandestine”, with reference to the situation of labour markets in Europe. Thirdly, it presents the term *harraga*, which means someone who “burns the borders”, burning his or her documents. Finally, it describes the different means of transportation to Europe (*pateras*, motorized inflatable boats, cargo ships) and the way smugglers profit from the difficulties would-be migrants have in organizing their travel themselves.


According to this article, owing to its geographical position, irregular migration issues are of concern to Tunisia. In Tunisia, the law defines irregular migration and prohibits irregular migration both entering and leaving the country.
Deprived of legal status, irregular migrants in Tunisia live in precarious conditions and are subjected to different sanctions for their irregular entry, stay and work.


This research demonstrates how irregular migrants in the European Union (EU) are fewer than assumed. While the European Commission has estimated that between 4.5 and 8 million foreign nationals reside in its territory without the right to legal residence, a detailed review of the situation in member States has currently lead CLANDESTINO researchers to estimate that the range is more likely to be between 2.8 and 6 million. Both figures were calculated for the year 2005. In February 2009, the EU funded project made information—produced by five European research centres and a European non-governmental organization—available in a new irregular migration database on its website. It has created a classification scheme for estimates on irregular migration.


The author criticizes the image of ever-growing numbers of “illegal migrants” crossing the Mediterranean and provides the reader with data and information on policies in force, highlighting the high degree of risk for migrants and the lack of legal channels for labour migration. The article presents and analyses data on arrests in Spain, explaining the major trends in arrivals of migrants to the Canary Islands. It is noted that only 5 per cent of all migrants who entered Spain in 2006 arrived by boat. Recent efforts made by African and European authorities to approach the problems posed by irregular migration by organizing meetings and increasing cooperation in migration control are presented.


This paper examines how smuggling of migrants is organized, with specific reference to the sea route between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Italian island of Lampedusa. According to the authors, recent major operations conducted by the Italian anti-mafia unit and the state police suggest transnational criminal organization of the trade. The networks involved, however, are not mafia-like hierarchical organizations, but are rather smaller, more complex and flexible criminal networks.


This study concerns the international and national instruments dealing with issues related to smuggling in migrants. It explains the framework of rescue operations and the rights of asylum-seekers in international waters, setting out to identify major challenges in the application of domestic and international rules and regulations.


This paper explores the relationships between smugglers and migrants in a rural area in Morocco (Beni Mellal and Khouribga) that is the home of many migrants. The social organization of smuggling networks is addressed, as well as migrants’ expectations and livelihoods. The smuggling process is considered a market, the shape of which is analysed along with the demand side of smuggling. The research methodology is based mainly on interviews with migrants, would-be migrants and even with smugglers.
This paper explores recent changes in the maritime routes from North Africa to Italy and Spain. The situation in the two countries of destination is compared, using data on arrests of irregular migrants and their nationalities. The paper illustrates the process of diversification and articulation of new routes as a result of intensification of border controls in countries of destination.


The book is an account of the routes and journeys of irregular migrants from different countries of West Africa to North Africa and eventually to Europe. The author is a journalist who travelled along these routes for several months over four years, moving with the migrants themselves. The book provides the reader with a picture of migration patterns, describing in detail migrants’ motivations, expectations, precarious existence and relationships with smugglers. The description of major migration hubs located in the desert and in North African towns provides an “inside view” of the social organization of transit migration. The book presents information on the way smugglers are able to move persons across borders and outlines the emergence of a large number of “stranded” migrants, that is, marginal people who are rejected by the countries of origin, transit and destination.


This publication reviews recent academic and in-depth analysis of irregular migration from West Africa and outlines the major changes and challenges in the Mediterranean region. De Haas argues that the concern about irregular migration from West Africa to Europe is exaggerated: it is not a new phenomenon and, according to the author, more West Africans live in North Africa than in Europe. The recent increase in irregular migrants in this region is not perceived as the result of operations by well-organized networks of smugglers, but mainly as a consequence of the policies of control and management of migration in European Union and North African countries. To explore this hypothesis, regional patterns are examined, with insights into the recent history of migration. The author notes how the heightened control of borders is at variance with the increasing demand for cheap labour in North Africa. Rather than resulting in a decline in migration, stricter border controls have led to the swift displacement of migration routes, increasing “illegality” and reliance on smuggling, as well as increasing the risk, costs and suffering for the migrants involved.

As regards smuggling, the importance of practices of police corruption is noted: it is considered one of the main factors influencing the fees and modus operandi of smugglers. Fees paid by migrants on major routes are listed. It is also stated that family networks determine the destinations, while smugglers only decide on the routes. In conclusion, quantitative estimates of numbers of both regular and irregular migrants and the effects of recent policies are presented. According to the author, migrants and smugglers continuously adapt their strategies to changing policies and the capacity to prevent their travel is limited. Restrictive migration policies are seen as a cause of irregular migration and smuggling as a result of restrictive immigration policies, rather than a cause.


This study presents major concepts related to migration and the evolution of migration patterns from West Africa over the last 20 years. Firstly, different routes and travel methods at the regional and global levels are described, together with the push and pull factors shaping them. Secondly, quantitative aspects are considered and calculations made to arrive at general estimates of trans-Saharan and trans-Mediterranean migration and irregular migration flows. Some 65,000-120,000 migrants are thought to enter North Africa annually. According to the author, the majority of irregular West African migrants entered Europe legally and subsequently overstayed their visas. The portrayal of migrants as desperate people is said to be inaccurate: most of them are relatively well-off. Research gaps and needs are listed at the end of the report.

This paper considers migrants who find themselves stranded in transit countries. It analyses the issues faced by large populations of stranded migrants in four countries (Mexico, Morocco, Somalia, Ukraine) and explores a variety of reasons and contexts where migrants, mostly in an irregular situation, are unable (and sometimes unwilling) to move lawfully to a third country or return to their countries of origin. The author explains their different motivations for initially moving and shows that migrants become vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, both during their journey and after they arrive. Some recommendations are made for identifying and dealing with stranded migrants.


This article surveys studies of clandestine migration and discusses various research approaches. The concept of "clandestine migration" is presented from its beginning in the 1930s and in the context of its social perception in Europe. The article underlines some problematic aspects, such as the difficulty of making valid estimates. As a conclusion, it notes how a stable population of non-European clandestine immigrants is emerging, living segregated lives in informal markets for labour and housing owing to their social exclusion from mobility (hence opportunity) and mainstream institutions. Instead of applying the conventional but crude legal/illegal dichotomy, the author makes a fine-tuned analysis of clandestine migration on a scale between the two poles.


This paper presents a typology of three dimensions to define transit migration: length of stay, intention and legal status. It observes the dynamics of changes in routes and the formation of hubs and nodal points (strategic transit places where migrants are able to find the necessary services, such as accommodation or information providers, to stay for a while before continuing on their migration journey), depending on migration policies adopted. The paper highlights the politicized nature of the concept of transit migration and its application in international relations.


This paper explores some difficulties and contradictions emerging in migration policies in Morocco. According to this author, the unclear distinction between irregular migration and illegal migration becomes visible in the case of sub-Saharan Africans, who are often considered not only irregular migrants but also as illegal migrants if they try to enter Europe. The article also argues that different institutions—some with the aim of managing migration, others with the aim of protecting the rights of the migrants—are not coordinated as they could be and as a result the rights of migrants are not well represented.


This mission report describes the position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on migration routes and focuses on the management of its southern borders. It provides a description of major routes used by irregular migrants and the operational methods of smuggling networks, and offers some final recommendations.


Countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean have become receivers of international migrants without the instruments and policies necessary for their integration. As a result, irregular migration has grown faster that regular
migration. The paper establishes that these countries currently host more than 3.6 million irregular migrants: irregular labour migrants targeting local labour markets are the largest category, followed by unrecognized refugees waiting for return or resettlement, then, in much smaller numbers, transit migrants waiting for a passage to Europe. Regardless of the different reasons behind their migration, these three categories tend to merge into one population group with no legal access to work, welfare or protection. The group acts as a regulator of labour markets while escaping government control. This paper provides interesting information about the fate of smuggled migrants who were deported back or intercepted on their way to Europe. It also provides new perspectives on the notion of transit migration.


This report explores livelihoods and travel conditions of irregular migrants in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the fast-changing policy scenario for migrants in that country. It describes travel through the desert, violations of human rights and the difficult living conditions in detention centres, based on interviews with migrants.


This paper presents an attempt to estimate the volume of irregular migration from a sending country perspective. It illustrates the presence of irregular migrants from Tunisia in countries of destination and, using data from the media, offers estimates of numbers of transit migrants crossing Tunisian territory.


This report provides an overview of the problem of irregular migration in France and presents some recommendations for the improvement of migration policies. It describes the problem, including irregular travel and the irregular employment of migrants (including in the French overseas territories) and explains how irregular migration has had a negative impact on the process of integration of regular migrants. It also provides insights into French policies adopted to increase the capacity of control of migrants entering into French territory (i.e. visa policies) and recommends an increase in efforts to adopt a development approach to migration, fostering development in the countries of origin, especially in those geographical areas most involved in migration dynamics.


The author, an undercover journalist, posed as an irregular migrant and travelled through West and North Africa in 2007. The book describes his travels with irregular migrants from West Africa to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and in particular his experiences on the land routes, as well as the treatment he received as an “irregular” migrant hosted in the detention centre in Lampedusa and as a worker irregularly employed in agriculture in southern Italy. It provides the reader with an inside view into the travels and living conditions of an irregular migrant.


This paper analyses patterns of recent migration policy in Italy, considered as a country of both destination and transit. According to the author, the persistence of push and pull factors for migration and the persistent attractiveness of Italy as a destination have led migrants to use mechanisms of irregular migration to enter the country. Sources used are statistics from governmental agencies, United Nations documentation, academic research and media coverage.

This research demonstrates that irregular migrants in the European Union are fewer than is generally assumed. While the European Commission has estimated that between 4.5 million and 8 million foreign nationals reside in its territory without a right to legal residence, a detailed review of the situation in member States has led Clandestino researchers to estimate that the range is currently more likely to lie between 2.8 million and 6 million. Both figures were calculated for the year 2005. In February 2009, the European Union-funded project made available information—produced by five European research centres and one European non-governmental organization—in a new irregular migration database on its website. A classification scheme has been created for estimates of irregular migration.


This paper is based on analysis of data collected by a recent survey of sub-Saharan irregular migration carried out in Algeria. It profiles irregular migrants in Algeria, focusing on their itinerary and their economic activity and income, either in the country of origin before leaving or in Algeria. The author distinguishes between migrants who are in transit and those who intend to remain as migrants in the country. He also distinguishes between migrants who intend to return to their country of origin and those who do not. The third difference explored relates to the motivation for migration—economic (in the case of migrant workers) or humanitarian (in the case of refugees).


This study describes the recent transformation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from a country of destination into a country of destination and transit, the most recent changes in attitudes towards migration and how migrants face serious difficulties. The research is based mainly on a collection of narratives of journeys of migrants and asylum-seekers from Egypt, the Sudan and the Horn of Africa from the country of origin to the final destination in the European Union. The methodology used for the interviews is described and the terminology explained in detail. Profiles of refugees and migrants are provided, grouped by nationality. Detention camps within the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are described, as well as the desert crossing, prices, deaths in the desert and sea crossings. All details are provided quoting interviews of the migrants. Accounts of the boat journeys, awareness of the risks of the voyage and smuggling networks assisting migrants of different nationalities are described. Institutional responses in Italy and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with a view to protecting the rights of asylum-seekers are presented and recommendations made.


This work illustrates the activities of smuggling networks and describes the market type of relationship linking smugglers and migrants. According to the author, rules are required to minimize the risks involved, but they can be enforced or not: often the relationship is a single exchange of a limited and short-term service and migrants are vulnerable to being cheated. The human smuggler’s network is one of considerable asymmetry. However, based upon the study of 50 cases, the author found no evidence of the involvement of traditional organized crime, but describes migrant smuggling as operated by large networks of organizations or an inter-organizational network that is not structured as a pyramid-like hierarchical organization.


This article first describes the dynamics and mechanisms of human smuggling from Turkey to Greece and evaluates the nature of smuggling between the two countries on the basis of empirical evidence, then shifts its attention to the
question of how the two countries respond to the challenges of this transborder crime. In seeking a proper answer to this question, the article attempts to relate the smuggling question in the Balkan region to its wider context at the European level.


This report is based on desk research of current knowledge on East African migration routes. It identifies push and pull factors affecting migration in the region, gathers information on migration-related intervention and illustrates migration flows in a number of countries, namely Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen. It provides a wide coverage of the problems involved and current responses to them. It also identifies current trends in migration and research gaps.


This report focuses on the situation of migration movements in East Africa, in particular in Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Based upon research in the field in the three countries and on consultations with a number of stakeholders on migration flows, the report provides a general view of migration trends, migration management capacities and local needs. The report presents an overview for each country of the migration system, regular and irregular migration, border management, refugee protection and trafficking in persons.


Chapter 8 examines the challenge of estimating irregular migration. It also notes the difficulties in defining the geography of irregular migration, given that hubs and routes change rapidly.


This paper presents the results of a study on transit migration conducted in Agadez with the support of the United Nations Children's Fund. It describes the travel routes, the equipment that is necessary to cross the desert and the main social problems posed by the existence of a double flow of migration: a flow going to the Sahara and a flow of returning migrants.


The author examines available methods and techniques for estimating the phenomenon of illegal migration in Europe. A number of different methodologies for estimating the size of hidden populations and clandestine entries are presented and illustrated by specific examples of research studies on the subject. Finally, the author argues that rational policymaking in the field of illegal migration needs to rely more on serious estimation techniques than on simple guesswork and that methods for doing so are both available and tested.


According to the author, Morocco is witnessing a strong migration flow from sub-Saharan countries and transit often turns into an unintended stay in difficult conditions. Morocco is becoming a place of residence for many migrants.
The travel of migrants is described in detail: fees, difficulties and the involvement of networks of smugglers as a burden for the migrants. The integration of migrants into working life in Morocco is also considered. To conclude, the author underlines how it is important—in order to intervene and prevent irregular migration—to understand the factors behind it, and thus to build a profile of migrants and their expectations.


This paper is based on ethnographic research carried out in Italy, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Malta exploring the situation of asylum-seekers in border areas. It notes that new parameters for refugee protection are emerging in the daily practice of local, national and supranational agencies dealing with irregular migration control. Some of these practices will affect and change the legal basis for formal regulations in the European refugee regime. The author cautions that the principle of non-refoulement could be undermined.


This empirical research is based on interviews with 50 migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and explores the dynamics of travel organized by smugglers. The conclusion of the article is that smuggling produces positive effects for each participant in the business: for the migrants, who once in the United Kingdom are able to repay their debt to the smugglers, for the different middlemen who are paid for their services and for the migrants’ households at home, who receive remittances.


This article focuses on recent developments in Algeria, where a policy to prevent and reduce irregular migration is being developed. According to the author, in May 2008 the decision of the Algerian State to define precise legal instruments to manage migration led to the promulgation of a law regulating the entry and stay of foreigners. The article notes the importance of the current public debate on migration to Europe by sea and the impact that it has on civil society.


This book is a journalistic description of the major routes and hubs of irregular migration in the Sahara Desert. The Italian journalist travelled several times on these routes, from Niger to Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal and describes the harsh conditions faced. He points out how repressive measures to combat irregular migration and increasing borders controls are ineffective, as they have very high social and human costs and do not resolve the problem.


This article explores the increasing “militarization” of borders in the Mediterranean and its effects. The evolution of policing activities on and across the Mediterranean and the growing involvement of networks of smugglers are considered together with the diversion of migration flows towards other, usually more dangerous, routes across the sea.

This paper examines the archipelago of Malta as a receiving and transit area on the trans-Mediterranean migration routes. The changing trends over the past years are presented and migration policies of Malta and the European Union are analysed, together with their main effects on the lives of migrants.


This paper explores migration, with a focus on irregular migration to Greece. A sociological profile of migrants and asylum-seekers is drawn. Sources of information are identified and major routes and migrant nationalities are mentioned. Policy implications are also presented.


According to the author, irregular migration has recently increased and the Algerian authorities have favoured a repressive approach; on the social side, xenophobia is on the rise. Algeria shares international borders with seven countries and can be used as a door to Europe. A new law to prevent and reduce irregular migration was approved in 2008 and is analysed here. The author concludes that some legislative changes are necessary given that irregular migrants are in legal limbo and there are no administrative procedures for the regularization of those who work in Algeria.


Based on a 2007 survey of sub-Saharan migration to Morocco, this article analyses the demographic and socio-economic profile of sub-Saharan migrants in transit through Morocco. Firstly, age, sex, education and family structures of migrants are presented. Secondly, the focus is on their journeys: costs, travel conditions and means of financing the travel. Thirdly, livelihoods in Morocco are explored and also the expectations of migrants. Finally, the social perception of sub-Saharan Africa is illustrated.


This working paper reconstructs the patterns of smuggling of migrants by sea to Italy over the last 15 years. It is based mainly on an analysis of judicial and police records, interviews with experts and analysis of media coverage. The major routes and methods of transportation are presented, including routes originating from Albania, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Tunisia and Turkey. Changes in routes are interpreted as a result of changes in migration policies adopted by the countries of origin, transit and destination. Opportunities for smugglers and the organization of their networks depend mainly on the actual enforcement of restrictive policies.


This paper is part of a research project led by the International Council on Human Rights Policy that examines the provisions that protect undocumented and smuggled migrants under international human rights law and suggests
how those provisions might be integrated into migration policies, alongside economic and law enforcement considerations. The paper presents an overview of the current situation of irregular migrants coming into Italy along smuggling routes. A literature review was conducted, with special focus on the human rights of irregular migrants. Major assumptions have been checked through empirical research, with a series of in-depth interviews with key actors (irregular migrants) and observers (journalists, social workers, experts and police officers) in Sicily, in the province of Ragusa, one of the main entry points for irregular migrants, and in Rome.


This article presents major findings on smuggling routes to Italy by sea from the beginning of the 1980s. It presents the main changes in routes and in the organization of smuggling networks. Finally, it explores the strong interdependencies among smugglers, migrant flows and state efforts of control. The nature of the routes is found to be the result of the interactions of these three forces.


This working paper analyses recent changes in smuggling of migrants to Italy by sea. It is an update of a 2004 study (see above) and presents a detailed analysis of all routes entering Italy, including the kind of boats used, organization of travel and major research carried out in Italy over the last four years. It shows the presence of transnational smugglers in all the countries involved in the smuggling business, who are organized into loose networks and are able to change their routes and arrangements depending on circumstance and opportunity. Particular study is made of the route between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Italy.


According to this author, Egypt’s capital Cairo hosts one of the five largest urban refugee populations in the world. For this reason, the paper concentrates on the legal aspect of irregular migration, discussing the characteristics of these migrants as asylum-seekers and refugees, while also examining the situation of transit migrants. Firstly, the paper tackles associated concepts and data issues, with reference to the existing literature and international standards. In the second part, an overview of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa is described as a prelude to the Egyptian experience. In the third part, the socio-economic profile of refugees and asylum-seekers from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia and the Sudan is outlined with reference to their legal status, their rights and their living conditions, measured in terms of income and sources of income, and access to education, employment, health care and social services. The paper concludes by looking at the socio-economic situation in Egypt and policy recommendations concerning government practices, procedures, mechanisms, policies and laws. Gaps in research are also highlighted with a view to better addressing these issues in the future.


This book collects articles and presents facts, figures and insights on migration—regular and irregular—through the Mediterranean area and provides the reader with a framework for further analysis. From a European perspective, attitudes and policies towards the migration/development issue are analysed, with a focus on current responses in non-European Union countries of transit for migrants. The issue of refugees is considered at the regional level and Morocco is singled out in relation to undocumented sub-Saharan migrant flows.

This paper presents the migration policies of Greece, and the organization of smuggling of migrants mainly from the Middle East (especially of Kurds). Based on fieldwork and a number of interviews, the research examines transit migration and singles out the problem of settlement, which is—according to the author—practically denied to migrants and asylum-seekers.


The author analyses the migration policies of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya within the broader international context. He explains how that country became a country of immigration and subsequently of transit, with migration flows towards Italy. The impact of the process of externalization of migration controls from the European Union to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is presented and possible scenarios are outlined.


This report presents major migration issues in Italy, with data on the control side of migration (from policing the borders to international cooperation agreements), admission mechanisms, regularizations and internal controls: all policies are summed up and the key characteristics of the migration management system in Italy are outlined. The article provides a conceptual framework for further analysis of migration in Italy.


This article presents migrant smuggling as a market where irregular services for migrants are sold. The Italian case is explored, particularly the north-west borders and the sea borders, together with changes in the organizational assets of smuggling networks. These changes are investigated by study of judicial and police records. Interviews with police officers, prosecutors and other professionals dealing with the issues involved have been collected in order to determine the nature of the market. As a result, the authors state that smuggling is based on a loose network of relationships among a wide population of passeurs, middlemen and travel organizers. Organizational structures are very flexible.


This report offers some estimates of the number of migrants from Africa in Spain, underlining the low proportion of their numbers in relation to the wider migrant population. Statements by Balthazar, an irregular migrant from Cameroon, are presented. Previously an officer working for the local administration, Balthazar decided to leave his country because of injustice in the management of the office he was working for. The article depicts all the difficult situations he faced while he was travelling, with Europe as his intended final destination. At the end he was unable to reach Europe. Now he lives in Rabat, working as a teacher of students of wealthy Moroccan families. The article describes the difficulties of obtaining a European visa in an African country, the management of irregular migration ending in Lampedusa and the Canary Islands and the increasing dangers involved in that travel. The author defines European policies on migration as policies that allow mobility (short stays, open only to elite members of the urban middle class), but not migration as such. To conclude, the author emphasizes the openness of Europe to immigration flows coming from Eastern European countries, compared with its closure to arrivals from Africa. The author also notes that the migrant population from Africa—which is actually rejected by a “war on migrants”—is composed mainly of Christian rather than Muslim Africans.

This paper is based mainly on interviews with activists and migrants in Greece and presents an overview of major issues relating to protection of asylum-seekers and irregular migrants. It illustrates current practices of border control, the functioning of detention centres and human rights violations experienced by migrants.


After defining irregular migration and tackling its different dimensions, this publication analyses the causes and dynamics of irregular migration in Egypt. It highlights the determinants of European Union policies in the realm of irregular migration and Egypt’s policymaking approach towards irregular migrants. The conclusion emphasizes the necessity of forging coherent and effective policies on irregular migration in the context of partnerships between countries of origin and destination, and between government agencies and non-governmental organizations.


This paper highlights major socio-political factors characterizing irregular migration to and through countries bordering the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. The coverage and analysis provided is based on 10 national reports describing various situational aspects related to irregular migration in each country. The paper takes a regional perspective, offering a conceptual framework for identifying and understanding the socio-political dynamics of the region. The conclusion highlights major recommendations that need to be taken into consideration in order to come to grips with the controversies of irregular migration in the region.


This paper attempts to put the illegal border crossings in Ceuta and Melilla into perspective. It argues that the recent illegal border crossings there were just the tip of the iceberg and that there are good reasons to believe that sub-Saharan Africa has the highest potential for immigration to Europe, which could evolve into one of the largest in history. The author argues that the time has come to approach immigration from this part of the world differently than has been done in the past, arguing that the events in Ceuta and Melilla are merely a preview of the power of this new immigration phenomenon.


This article explains how the migratory system in Italy, a recent country of migration, has been growing at a high rate over the last 20 years and explores the issue of the changes in main nationalities involved in the process of migration into Italy. It considers the irregular migration issue mainly from the perspective of changes in migration movements. Based on an analysis of data on regularization practices, the authors argue that the numbers of migrants coming from African countries have been decreasing in recent years, while the numbers of those coming from Central and Eastern European countries is on the increase.

The focus of this paper is on the involvement of organized crime in smuggling routes and in the mobilization of irregular migrants from Africa to Europe. Migrant smuggling is seen as a market, where travel services (by air, land and sea) are sold to migrants. Numbers of arrests and interceptions of irregular migrants in some transit countries are presented along with other estimates relating to irregular migration; however, it is noted that existing estimates are usually not completely reliable. The main routes from Africa to Europe are described; they are the desert crossing, the Atlantic crossing and the Mediterranean crossing. Finally, an estimate of the potential value of the market is offered, and the need for better enforcement against migrant smuggling is stressed.


This working paper explores the connection between forced migration and class and underlines how forms of migration vary greatly in cost. Access to resources, money and social capital shape migration strategies. As a result, the costs of migration to escape conflict have increased as a result of the strict international control regime, such that a migrant’s socio-economic background has become even more important in determining the success and methods of migration.


This paper analyses the organization of smuggling of migrants as an “intermediary structure” for irregular migrants. Migrants’ standpoints are presented in order to understand these intermediary structures and increase predictability over time. Technical means of transport/information, money and circumventing residence regulations (visa and passports) are the three basic elements explored. The relations between migrants and migrant smugglers (including recruiters) are considered and described in detail, as well as the kind of services sold. Being a woman is noted as having a significant impact on the organization contacted. The author also remarks that migrants can be very vulnerable to the relative power of agents, which can be misused, and destinations can change because of a lack of opportunity. The conclusion drawn is that using a migrant smuggler has become a very common migration practice in a restrictive migration context and is often the only way out of political and financial desperation. While organized crime is not necessarily involved in smuggling, different kinds of strategy can coexist; different typologies of services to facilitate illegal migration are presented.


According to this author, transit migration is a relatively new and “hot” topic to be studied in academia as journeys of migrants have become longer and more difficult. However, the definition is not clear: refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are three possible categories. Scarce attention has been devoted to explaining the causes of onward movements or transit: this is a question of how people negotiate their preferences within a context of restricted mobility. Considerations of how data can be collected, problems related to the precariousness of the research field, with scenarios always changing, ethical issues and the vulnerability of transit migrants are presented.


This report presents a short overview of the history of migration in Africa and devotes attention to the issue of the feminization of migration. Secondly, it provides evidence on smuggling of migrants and argues that smuggling is
becoming more professional because of networks that operate internationally. These networks are more and more often business-oriented, formed by nationals of countries of origin, transit and destination. Descriptions of specific migration routes (air, sea and land) departing from African countries are presented, as well as their costs and duration. Some tables with data rarely published in the literature, such as the number of cargo ships intercepted with migrants on board or the transport with which asylum-seekers arrived in the Netherlands, are presented as well. Maps of the main air, sea and land routes are provided.


This article examines demographic factors and migration systems linking North Africa to Europe. Studying the impact of remittance flows and other variables, it concludes that development aids as a tool for reducing migration flows are not effective enough. The author argues that a solution can be a “migration without borders” scenario. This scenario and its three main phases (massive movement; adjustment and return migration policies; and a stability and labour market equilibrium phase) are described as leading to a new equilibrium in the Mediterranean region in which illegal migration will not exist (as it is a result of restricting legal migration) and, after that phase, migration flows will reach an equilibrium based on the labour market. The final adjustment will satisfy the needs of European services and industries and reduce economic burdens in North Africa.


This article is the result of empirical research carried out in villages of departure for young migrants. It explores the level of awareness of migrants concerning migrant smuggling. According to the author, most migrants intend to migrate for a short period of time and are willing to return to their place of origin after having achieved specific goals. Fees and main routes to France and Italy are presented.