Criminal Intelligence

Manual for Managers
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1. An introduction to intelligence

FROM INFORMATION TO INTELLIGENCE

Before we can properly discuss and explore information, intelligence and analysis in theoretical and practical terms, we need to have some common understanding as to what these terms mean. Some definitions of these three key terms are as follows:

Information
- Knowledge in raw form

Intelligence
- Information that is capable of being understood
- Information with added value
- Information that has been evaluated in context to its source and reliability

Analysis (of either information or intelligence)
- The resolving or separating of a thing into its component parts
- Ascertainment of those parts
- The tracing of things to their source to discover the general principles behind them
- A table or statement of the results of this process

Understanding properly the difference between these terms and how they interact is important, however even at this early stage, these definitions point to key differences. Information is quite simply raw data of any type, whilst in contrast intelligence is data which has been worked on, given added value or significance.

\[
\text{INFORMATION} + \text{EVALUATION} = \text{INTELLIGENCE}
\]

The way in which this transformation is made is through evaluation, a process of considering the information with regard to its context through its source and reliability.

In its simplest form, intelligence analysis is about collecting and utilizing information, evaluating it to process it into intelligence, and then analysing that intelligence to produce products to support informed decision-making.
All these decisions involve applying our natural ability to “analyse” information, an overall process which can be usefully broken down into a series of stages, or questions we ask of ourselves, as follows:

- What exactly is the problem; what decision do we have to make and why is it significant or important?
- What information do we already have or might we reasonably obtain that could be relevant to the problem in hand. Where is it/how can we get it?
- What meaning can we extract from the information; what does it tell us about what’s going on?
- Is there only one possible explanation, or are there other alternatives or options. Are some more likely than others?
- How do these affect the decision we have to make, are some options potentially better than others; do some carry greater risk of success and/or failure?
- Are we ready to take action with a reasonable level of confidence, or do we need to gather more information first? If so, what else do we need and where/how can we get it?

The process of applying these questions, evaluating the answers, and then choosing how to respond, to act, is the essence of what analysis is about.

By bringing this process under our conscious control, we can monitor it, develop and improve it, and subject it to quality checks which can be quite complicated to grasp. Beginning that development of awareness and skill is critical. The practical advantages of developing an individual’s analytical skills are many, but can be summarized as follows:

**ANALYSIS GOES BEYOND THE FACTS**

- It can tell you how good (or poor) your information/intelligence is
- It can tell you things you didn’t know before
- It can tell you what you need to know to understand a situation
- It can tell you where to look further
- It can help you to communicate your understanding to others

### The origins of intelligence analysis

Knowledge has the potential to be equated to power. The concept of collecting and utilizing information to support decision making in some formal, structured way is nothing new. In order to obtain advantage over adversaries, it is imperative to possess the most up-to-date, accurate information regarding amongst other things, their intentions and capabilities. This rule applies in every field, be it politics, business, military strategy, or criminal intelligence. In addition, it is a process that has always been, and still is, continually developing and evolving, in response to changes in social/cultural factors, technology, organizational needs, and new/higher levels of analytical skill.

Reviewing the historical background, the “roots” of intelligence and analysis as a process and as a profession is a useful and important exercise. Raising our understanding of the origins of intelligence and analysis helps us to understand both where we are now and how/why we
arrived at this point. It also raises our awareness of how intelligence analysis is a continually changing, evolving practice, which if it is to remain relevant and useful in a practical sense constantly needs a fresh, flexible approach, new ideas, new skills, new techniques. The one constant for the professional intelligence analyst is that no two tasks or projects are ever exactly the same; every new piece of work requires a fresh approach.

There are many examples throughout history of military, religious and community leaders actively tasking individuals with information-gathering exercises and then basing their decisions on the information obtained in this way. Perhaps the earliest recognized text on the subject of information gathering and intelligence-based actions is “The Art of War, The Art of Strategy” written in the 5th Century BC by Sun Tzu, a Chinese mercenary warlord. He was renowned for his ability to command military campaigns whose success owed a lot to his effective information-gathering and intelligence-led decision-making. It says much for the quality of this work that it still remains in print today, and is essential reading for military and corporate strategists and intelligence operatives worldwide. From these early beginnings throughout history until relatively recent times, employing information-gatherers for primarily military goals has been a common trend.

What is more, a methodology arose from this process that basically involved direct contact between the information gatherer(s) and the client/decision-maker, as illustrated on figure 1-1:

Figure 1-1. Basic tasking model

This method had certain notable features:

1) The sheer logistics involved (no real technology for transport or communication) created a massive time delay between the tasking of the information gatherer, the obtaining of the information, and the delivery of the information to the “end-user”.
2) Using information collectors who operated by visiting locations and witnessing events either personally or through intermediaries guaranteed that the information collected would be limited by their senses and their ability to remember accurately what they saw; such information would thus always be highly subjective, and tend towards being based on opinion rather than fact.

3) The volume of information collected in return for such a large investment of time and resources would be extremely small.

Any investigation generates vast amounts of information; the larger the enquiry, the more information the investigator has to deal with. The problem for investigators is that no matter how good the system used to store all this information, they are always limited by their own mental capacity to embrace the information as a whole, to “take it all in” at once.

This understanding of the whole of the information is crucial to valid decision-making. Fully understanding a small part of the whole information available means that in fact the investigator only has partial understanding of the whole situation.

It might reasonably be taken as some measure of the importance and value of intelligence and analysis that despite these potentially crippling limitations the process still proved to be a decisive factor in the success of military and political campaigns throughout these times.

Methods in acquiring information changed only slowly throughout history until towards the end of the last century. The massive growth in technology that began then, and still continues today, brought about what has proved to be a massive change in methods of information-gathering, which in turn created a demand for new approaches to analysis and intelligence.

This process began in the late 19th Century with the advent of telegraphy and telephony, which allowed for messages to be sent almost instantaneously over greater and greater distances. At a stroke this removed the resource and time problem that the former methods suffered through their need for the information gatherer to move between source and client. This change carried with it a number of benefits.

Firstly, the “response time” between a client asking for information and receiving the result was vastly reduced; this represented a clear benefit in that it improved the clients’ ability to react quickly on the basis of such information. In addition, this development also had a knock-on benefit in that there was less time for the information source to “forget” or “lose” information whilst they were in transit, thus the quality of information also improved. Similarly, the lack of need for the information to be physically carried back to the client created a vast saving in resources; information gatherers were able to spend less time travelling/passing on information, and thus more time collecting information.

The overall result of this change was ironically that these benefits also carried with them a new problem for the client. Much larger quantities of information were gathered, far more quickly than before, and the reaction time for making decisions was reduced. In addition, controlling the process of information-gathering itself became a problem, with a new need for more emphasis on new tasks and orders for information-gatherers created as a result of their new, improved performance.
Thus where before the process involved information passing between information gatherer and client, because the new system created an information “overload”, a new problem arose in that the client simply was unable to process all the information received effectively and quickly and then react to it.

The analyst

A necessity arose for the client to return to a situation that enabled speedy interpretation of information and decision-making. This created a need for an intermediate stage between the information gatherer and the client, where the bulk of the information could be received, recorded, evaluated and examined to interpret and extract meaning, before the result of this process was passed to the client. This was the origin of the function of an analyst, and the process remains in essence the same today, as illustrated on figure 1-2:¹

Figure 1-2. Developed tasking model

¹The analyst may be supplied with raw information or with evaluated information in the form of intelligence, or with both.
The core function of the analyst can be broken down into a three-phase process, as follows:

- To gather information, to understand it and the relevance or relationship of each piece to all of the others.
- To develop this information objectively to arrive at an understanding of the whole.
- To communicate this understanding to others and so to put the intelligence process to practical use.

The problems

As this new methodology developed, and the variety, range, and accessibility of information sources expanded, the result was that relatively speaking, the “analyst” function grew in size, number and influence. Simply put, as more information was passed back to the “centre”, and more reliance placed on intelligence-led decision-making, organizations found that more and more people were required to evaluate information in order to generate, disseminate and analyse intelligence.

This ongoing situation has implications for today’s intelligence units and analytical staff. The more information that is collected, the more it aids analysis and thus decision making. However it also increases the subsequent workload, which in turn forces an increase in staff and productivity or a loss of effectiveness. In simple terms the increase in information to be analysed combined with the increased need for analytical product tends to always exceed the improved efficiency that having more/better trained analysts can offer. In other words, effective, professional analytical process tends to bring more work upon itself.

Criminal intelligence analysis

What is “criminal intelligence”? To most people, including criminal investigators, the term conjures up images of collator-style systems used to store and retrieve the information we collect about crime and criminals. As the volume and variety of the information we collect has expanded, we have gradually introduced more and more complex systems to assist with its storage and retrieval. Viewed in this limited context, the introduction of information technology (IT) has been a notable success; the use of IT for the storage and retrieval of crime information is now almost second nature to the operational criminal investigator, and there is no doubt that without these tools, as a service we simply would not be able to cope with the task of recording and collating criminal information.

Collecting information in itself does not result in obtaining intelligence. Information must be properly evaluated before it can be acted upon. The value of criminal intelligence can be enhanced further by analysis. When available intelligence is too complex and large in volume for simple action, it must be analysed in order for meaningful results to be obtained.

Currently, insufficient use can be made of the information we collect on crime or criminals to develop real “criminal intelligence”, either by intelligence units themselves or by their customers, the operational criminal investigators. Even with all the new systems for storage and easy access to criminal intelligence, investigators can still fail to make real use of this invaluable resource other than as a “ready reference” to the facts unless they properly evaluate this information and use analysts to analyse the intelligence that this process produces.
Criminal intelligence analysis (CIA) is a philosophy which sets out how we can approach the investigation of crime and criminals by using the intelligence and information that we have collected concerning them. It provides techniques that structure our natural deductive powers and thought processes, the “natural intuition”, which proficient investigators use subconsciously all the time. It also provides tools that help us to understand the information we collect, and to communicate that understanding to others.

The way forward

The criminal intelligence analyst is every bit as much an investigator of crime as the operational investigator. The key to CIA being of value as an operational tool is that the results of analysis have to be of direct value to the investigation. It follows then that the best results can only be achieved when the analyst and investigator work together in partnership, integral parts of the same team.

In the same way, the analyst and detective need to share many of the same skills needed to be good criminal investigators. The basic problem for intelligence analysts is putting intelligence and information together in an organized way so that the difficult task of extracting meaning from the assembled information is made easier. Only when the proper explanation of what the original information means has been derived can this intelligence be put to practical use. The techniques and systems embodied in this manual are practical tools, which can be of value in any investigation.

Intelligence analysis and organized crime

The advent of criminal intelligence analysis is directly linked to the transformation of individual crime into organized or group crime. The effective use of intelligence is crucial to a law enforcement agency's ability to combat criminal groups. Intelligence analysis also provides the agency with the knowledge required for effective management of its resources. With appropriate tasking, the products of intelligence analysis can assist in developing strategic plans to tackle current problems and prepare for future anticipated ones.

Criminal intelligence analysis permits law enforcement authorities to establish a pro-active response to crime. It enables them to identify and understand criminal groups operating in their areas. Once criminal groups are identified and their habits known, law enforcement authorities may begin to assess current trends in crime to forecast, and to hamper the development of perceived future criminal activities. Intelligence provides the knowledge on which to base decisions and select appropriate targets for investigation. While the use of criminal intelligence analysis is appropriate to support investigations, surveillance operations and the prosecution of cases, it also provides law enforcement agencies with the ability to effectively manage resources, budget, and meet their responsibility for crime prevention.

At the dawn of the last century, “organized crime” was synonymous with the Cosa Nostra. The picture of organized crime today is quite different. Many of the new criminal groups, with well-developed organizational structures, are established for obtaining power and wealth. These groups include outlaw motorcycle gangs, Russian organized crime, Asian organized crime, African organized crime, drug cartels and a myriad of street gangs—Asian, Korean, Hispanic, black, white supremacy, to name just a few. Levels of complexity are increasing even further with fluid almost structure-less networks evolving, such as West African criminal networks. It should be noted that cooperation between different organized crime groups and networks is commonplace.
Criminal groups continue to be involved in ventures such as trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, extortion, fraud and murder. Some are now moving into new criminal enterprises such as high-technology crime. The explosion of Internet resources in the last few years has opened new opportunities for financial gain for criminals. This escalation of high-technology crime is a challenging and relatively new arena for law enforcement.

Criminal organizations are more sophisticated and dynamic than ever before. The challenge for law enforcement is to be prepared for this increasing sophistication in order to reduce the impact of criminal activities on our communities.

In order to accomplish this, law enforcement agencies need forward looking, assertive, and comprehensive strategies to counteract the threat of organized crime groups. Criminal intelligence analysis, when tasked and used effectively, can be a major asset in the law enforcement arsenal. Countries with greater experience within criminal intelligence, such as the United Kingdom, have developed national intelligence models to help standardize how criminal intelligence is used.

Information technology is very much key to intelligence sharing. Particularly in this age of sophisticated multinational crime, including terrorism, a failure to share intelligence and information effectively limits the efforts of all states in combating it.
2. The intelligence process

INTELLIGENCE

The word intelligence can be used to describe the process of interpreting information to give it a meaning. It has also been used to describe a group or department that gathers or deals with such information or to describe the product of such activity or department. At its simplest, intelligence might be described as processed information. Narrowed down to law enforcement use, “intelligence” could be described as information that is acquired, exploited and protected by the activities of law enforcement institutions to decide upon and support criminal investigations.

INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE (PROCESSED INFORMATION) DESIGNED FOR ACTION

Intelligence always involves a degree of interpretation resulting in an inevitable degree of speculation and risk. The amount of speculation and risk is dependent upon the quality and quantity of information. Intelligence is usually divided in two main areas:

Strategic intelligence: Focuses on the long-term aims of law enforcement agencies. It typically reviews current and emerging trends changes in the crime environment, threats to public safety and order, opportunities for controlling action and the development of counter programmes and likely avenues for change to policies, programmes and legislation.

Operational intelligence: Typically provides an investigative team with hypotheses and inferences concerning specific elements of illegal operations of any sort. These will include hypotheses and inferences about specific criminal networks, individuals or groups involved in unlawful activities, discussing their methods, capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations and intentions that could be used for effective law enforcement action.

A good knowledge of operational intelligence is a highly recommended prerequisite to developing strategic intelligence capability. The development of operational intelligence in itself will provide an important source of intelligence to consider from a strategic perspective.
INTELLIGENCE VS EVIDENCE

It is important to emphasize that a state’s national legislation will dictate the way intelligence can be used for law enforcement purposes. The process of intelligence gathering in relation to a specific investigation is usually a prelude to any evidence gathering phase. Legislation will also dictate whether intelligence material gathered during the course of an investigation is protected from disclosure in criminal proceedings.

EVIDENCE: DATA FROM WHICH TO ESTABLISH PROOF

This part of the investigation responds to reported events and explains what took place and who was involved. Intelligence analysis aids investigations by helping to target available resources and identifying information gaps to focus the investigation more clearly. It also helps to avoid duplication of effort and prevent straying into areas of no relevance. To obtain maximum benefit, an analysis capacity should be employed at the earliest possible stage of an enquiry, preferably at the beginning, although, logistically this is not always possible.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The concept of the intelligence cycle is broadly recognized as the foundation of the intelligence analysis process, at both operational and strategic levels.

Figure 2-1. The intelligence cycle

Direction/tasking

Intelligence analysis is driven by the needs of clients, i.e. consumers of the analytical product. The analytical effort is thus often directed through tasking by these clients. They take the initiative at this stage of the cycle, but the principle of partnership requires that both they and the providers share a responsibility for working together to ensure that the requirements for the analytical product are clearly defined and understood by both sides.
The initial questions that have to be asked are:

- Who tasks?
- How do they task?
- Why do they task?
- What tasks are set?

In general these questions will be answered within the environment in which the analyst sits and therefore no hard and fast rules can be given in this respect. It is essential that a good client/analyst relationship exists in order for tasking to function effectively. The analyst must be objective, not influenced by preconceived ideas, but at the same time willing to accept the task without prejudice.

Tasking can take two basic forms:

- The client expresses a requirement for an analytical product focusing on a subject or a range of subjects of concern.
- The client formulates a general expectation for the analytical provider regarding an area of risk, threat or opportunity.

After the task has been clearly defined, the analytical unit commences its own planning for the remaining phases of the intelligence cycle.

Collection

The intelligence process relies on the ability to obtain and use data. However, the first and most basic problem to overcome lies with the collection and storage of this data which comes in many forms, from electronically retrievable to “hard copy”.

**COLLECTION: THE GATHERING OF DATA**

Care must be taken at this early stage to avoid data overload which is always a problem for any agency but data ignored because the provider believed it not to be relevant can cause problems later on.

**COLLECTION PLAN: A FORMALLY DEFINED APPROACH TO DESCRIBING THE INFORMATION NEEDED AND MEANS OF ACQUIRING IT**

The issue of planning all the activities in the intelligence process is particularly significant in the collection phase. In both operational and strategic intelligence analysis the topics and the scope of the analysis should be clear before considering further actions to be undertaken. A collection plan in which the information needed is identified, and the means of acquiring it are laid out, is imperative to ensure the orderly and precise collection of relevant information.
The collection plan should include the information categories that are important to the analysis, the specific data items needed to do the analysis, possible sources of information and sources to be contacted with specific requests, and a schedule to indicate when the information was requested and when it is needed by. In order to avoid “chaos”, a structured collection plan approach where the analyst is proactive, imaginative and explores all avenues to gain information is vital.

The three main types of sources of information are open, closed and classified.

- **Open source (OSINT)** is information that is publicly available. One very notable subset of open source information is so called “grey literature”. It can consist of research, technical, economic reports, “white papers”, conference documentation, dissertations and theses, discussion papers, subject-related newsletters, etc. One of the main difficulties in working with this type of source is evaluation as information available in the public domain can frequently be biased, inaccurate or sensationalized.

- **Closed source** is information collected for a specific purpose with limited access and availability to the general public. Closed source information is often found in the form of structured databases. In the context of criminal intelligence analysis, these databases will largely include personal data collected as part of ongoing targeting operations, or broader criminal records, vehicle registration data, weapons licensing, etc.

- **Classified** is information collected by specifically tasked covert means including use of human and technical (image and signals intelligence) resources. Use of classified information can significantly enhance the quality of an analytical product, as it is usually highly accurate; however, it can also make an analytical product significantly less actionable due to restrictions on dissemination.

The intelligence analyst must become an all-source analyst, i.e. selecting information sources for their relevance for the project rather than for availability or ease of access. An all-source analyst must avoid becoming a victim of a traditional concept that only closed or classified data sources are useful and contain valid and relevant data. The use of open sources often gives additional credibility to the final product or triggers off collection of further closed or classified information.

Selection of sources can also be regarded from the angle of cost effectiveness. Use of open sources instead of deploying expensive covert assets may significantly reduce the budget for a collection exercise, or alternatively, permit the acquisition of more information within an established budget. Use of open sources can also help protect or conserve sources of closed and classified information. At the same time, as exploration of open sources often requires handling extremely large data volumes, an analyst involved in OSINT should receive specialist training in the subject or be supported by an OSINT expert.

The ultimate objective of an operational intelligence analyst is to bring about the arrest of the criminal(s) under investigation and/or the disruption of a criminal group’s activities. The aim of the team should therefore be to develop the most useful sources and collect the information most likely to produce successful results. A common starting point is to identify the criminal’s associates—however, the objective should always be to identify relationships between individuals and their roles in the criminal activities, rather than identifying associates for their own sake.

A major issue in a collection exercise is the language of the source. Intelligence analysis is particularly appropriate for investigations of organized crime activities, which very often have a cross-border dimension. Exclusion of information (including open source information) purely on the basis of language can have a seriously damaging effect on the quality of an analytical product. Language training of analysts is one solution. Use of translation software is another.
An intelligence collection plan may contain the following elements:

- **Problem definition**—the intelligence problem needs to be precisely and clearly formulated
- **Project aim**—ideally a one-sentence definition of an intelligence requirement
- **Project scope**—it expands the definition of the project aim and sets out the actions expected from the analyst. It also contains a detailed description of the scope and purpose of collection measures and sources.

**Evaluation**

The validity of an inference is directly linked to the quality of the data behind the inference. Thus data evaluation is a key element of the intelligence cycle. It should be conducted simultaneously with or immediately after its acquisition, to ensure that the evaluation takes place within the context in which information had been acquired (as it is difficult to evaluate information that has not been submitted correctly within a local environment). Evaluation requires a separate assessment of the reliability of the source (the provider of the information) and validity and accuracy of the information.

**EVALUATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE AND THE QUALITY OF THE INFORMATION**

The source and the actual information must be evaluated independently of each other and therefore it is imperative that the person completing the report has a sound knowledge of the evaluation system. The two most widely used systems are 4 x 4 and 6 x 6 (See chapter 4 “Evaluation of source and data” for further details of this key process).

**Collation**

Collation is transfer of collected information and/or intelligence into a storage system (be it a filing cabinet or a computerized data base) in a structured (indexed, cross-referenced) format that permits rapid and accurate access. It is not equivalent to bulk filing of every bit of information or document acquired during collection. Irrelevant, incorrect and otherwise useless information is weeded out.

**COLLATION: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DATA COLLECTED INTO A FORMAT FROM WHICH IT CAN BE RETREIVED AND ANALYSED**

**Data integration and analysis**

The analysis stage of the intelligence process is a key one. Analysis can be described as in-depth examination of the meaning and essential features of available information. Analysis highlights information gaps, strengths, weaknesses and suggests ways forward.

**ANALYSIS: THE CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF INFORMATION TO DISCOVERS ITS MEANING AND ESSENTIAL FEATURES**
The analytical process is aimed at the use and development of intelligence to direct law enforcement objectives, both for short-term operational aims and for long-term strategic reasons. The scope of analysis and its overall credibility depends on the level and accuracy of acquired information, combined with the skills of the analyst. Analysis is a cyclical process, which can be performed to assist with all types of law enforcement objectives. Different types of crimes and criminal operations require different scenarios, but in all cases the information used should not be pre-filtered through an artificially and arbitrarily imposed selective grid.

Data integration is the first phase of the analytical process. It involves combining information from different sources in preparation for the formulation of inferences. Various techniques may be used to display this information, the most common being the use of charting techniques.

- **Link charting**—to show relationships among entities featuring in the investigation
- **Event charting**—to show chronological relationships among entities or sequences of events
- **Commodity flow charting**—to explore the movement of money, narcotics, stolen goods or other commodities
- **Activity charting**—to identify activities involved in a criminal operation
- **Financial profiling**—to identify concealed income of individuals or business entities and to identify indicators of economic crime
- **Frequency charting**—to organize, summarize and interpret quantitative information
- **Data correlation**—to illustrate relationships between different variables

The next step in the analytical process is interpretation or logical reasoning, which requires going beyond the facts. The disciplined approach to analysis requires the maximum amount of information to be assessed at the time of integration to determine its relevance. Excluding information at the beginning of the process can easily lead to the significance of a vital piece of information being overlooked. This can lead to incorrect analysis, which can ultimately jeopardize an inquiry.

Analysis often identifies additional projects that are tangential to the original one. In the past, it was usual to undertake these projects simultaneously and in conjunction with the main one. This approach led to dispersing of resources, delays and overall lower quality of the final product(s). Through experience, it has now become accepted that analytical projects should be undertaken sequentially, one at a time, or by independent teams of analysts.

Data description and integration techniques, like link analysis, are not an end in themselves. They are simply tools used by analysts in the process of deriving meaning from information. The first truly analytical product is an inference. An inference comes from the premises—one common mistake is to intuitively develop an inference and then look for premises that would support it. This emphasis on the primacy of premises should be reiterated by means of a statement such as “the premises that led me to my inference are...” and not “the premises supporting my inference are...” (When presenting results, however, the starting point is the inference—the big idea—followed then by premises from which it came).

A “premise” in inference development is used to identify facts or pieces of information that go together to make a particular point. Premises are the first and key stage in the true process of data analysis as against data description. Understanding how premises are identified is crucial to developing inferences.

Premises are the closest link to the described information, and thus are the most objective and accurate representation of data. For any given set of premises derived from a particular set of information, the premises may be combined in different ways to suggest different inferences.
There are four types of inferences:

- **Hypothesis**—a tentative explanation, a theory that requires additional information for confirmation or rejection.
- **Prediction**—an inference about something that will happen in the future.
- **Estimation**—an inference made about the whole from a sample, typically quantitative in nature.
- **Conclusion**—an explanation that is well supported.

It should be noted that all inferences require testing in some manner before they can be accepted as fact.

**Dissemination**

An intelligence analyst has the responsibility of disseminating analytical products to targeted audiences, as appropriate. Much of the routine dissemination may be conducted by way of short notes. But intelligence analysts should be able to give oral briefings on larger investigations and write structured reports detailing the currently available information.

**DISSEMINATION: THE RELEASE OF THE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS TO THE CLIENT**

Throughout the whole process the client will have been in close consultation with the analyst, and would have been asked on numerous occasions to answer questions relating to the particular project.

The dissemination process can take various forms, such as:

- Structured formalized reports
- A structured and formal oral presentations with supporting documentation
- Weekly overviews in the form of bulletins
- Ad-hoc briefing to intelligence and investigative teams

The dissemination phase completes the initial cycle of the intelligence process.

**Re-evaluation**

Re-evaluation involves a continual review of the whole intelligence cycle to identify ways in which any stage of the cycle can be improved. To be of most value, re-evaluation should occur throughout the process, not merely be left to the last stage of the cycle. Re-evaluation can be directed at:

- Process
- Analytical product
- Use of the analytical product
- Effectiveness of reporting
• Staff deployment
• Priority setting
• Analyst’s perspective
• Client’s perspective

Intelligence activity is a collective process, as opposed to something one person or a group of people do as individual entrepreneurs.
3. Example of a national intelligence model: the United Kingdom

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) of the United Kingdom is based on two premises:

1. There are three levels of crime in the United Kingdom: single-jurisdictional, multi-jurisdictional, and international.

These are designed to impact on criminal business on all three levels:

- **Level 1—Local issues**—usually the crimes, criminals and other problems affecting a basic command unit or small force area. The scope of the crimes will be wide ranging from low value thefts to murder. The handling of volume crime will be a particular issue at this level.

- **Level 2—Cross-border issues**—usually the actions of a criminal or other specific problems affecting more than one basic command unit. Key issues will be identification of common problems, the exchange of appropriate data and the provision of resources for the common good.

- **Level 3—Serious and organized crime**—usually operating on a national and international scale, requiring identification by proactive means and response primarily through targeted operations by dedicated units and a preventive response on a national basis.

2. The desired outcomes of law enforcement are: community safety, crime reduction, criminal control and disorder control. The Model achieves this through four prime components which are fundamental to achieving the objective of moving from the business of managing crime, criminals, disorder and problems to the desired outcomes of community safety, reduced crime, and controlled criminality:

- Tasking and coordinating process
- Four key intelligence products
- Knowledge products
- System products

**Tasking and coordinating process**

*Tasking and coordination group meetings* are chaired by a senior manager of a command unit who has the authority to deploy the necessary resources and comprise of people with key functional responsibility for the planning and execution of the law enforcement effort.
Strategic tasking is aimed at the setting up or amending the control strategy (i.e. priorities for intelligence, prevention and enforcement) and, having set the priorities, to make the principal resource commitments.

Tactical tasking is aimed at commissioning and applying the tactical menu to the control strategy, responding to new needs and monitoring of implementation of agreed plans. The tactical menu comprises four elements:

- Targeting offenders in line with the priorities of the control strategy;
- The management of crime and disorder hot spots;
- The investigation of crime and incidents which can be shown to be linked into “series”;
- The application of a range of “preventive measures” such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) and lighting schemes or community action initiatives.

Production of the intelligence products—the creation of the intelligence products requires the same commitment to resources and direction from the tasking and coordination group as the drive for intelligence capability.

The key intelligence products are the “deliverables” by which intelligence-led policing can be implemented and its impact measured in terms of crime reduction, arrests, disruptions and enhanced community safety. Intelligence products are the result of the collaboration between analysts and intelligence officers in which the raw information is collected, analysed and interpreted, and represented with recommendations about required decisions or options for action. The intelligence led approach to law enforcement requires only four broad classes of intelligence product as shown in table 3-1 following:

**Table 3-1. Four categories of intelligence product**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Strategic assessment | To identify the longer-term issues in an area, as well as the scope of, and projections for growth in criminality. | To establish law enforcement priorities, determine resource allocations, support business planning and inform senior managers and policymakers; To set a control strategy: priorities for intelligence, prevention and enforcement. | • Aim (terms of reference)  
• Scope (functional/geographic)  
• Current situation/survey  
• Main objectives set/met  
• Progress since last assessment  
• Major areas of criminality  
• Demographic/social problems  
• Patterns/trends  
• Resource constraints (overview/summary) |
| 2. Tactical assessment | To identify the shorter-term issues in an area this, with prompt action, can prevent a situation from deteriorating or developing. | To assist in the management of current operations and plans, as well as reallocate resources and efforts according to changing needs and problems. | • Current situation—progress on targeting, crime and other series; hot spots; preventive measures  
• Options for further action  
• Advantages/disadvantages. Best courses of action  
• Timeframe (short/medium)  
• Resource implications/changes |
Prioritization of intelligence work—a major responsibility of the tasking and coordination group is to resource, direct and sustain intelligence capability. For intelligence work to be fully effective, it needs adequate assets (sources, people, knowledge products, system products) and disciplines which ensure that intelligence activities follow the identified strategic and tactical priorities.

Sources of information should not be limited to either reactive or proactive work. Much valuable data exists within the results of existing reactive work. A sufficient proactive capability is also essential.

An investment in the right people for specific roles is a significant benefit. Three major components of work exist: data management, analysis and specific intelligence collection. The intelligence manager is the essential catalyst for bringing the business of the command unit, the intelligence collection and analysis together. All intelligence work should be supported by knowledge and system products.

### Knowledge products

They represent a range of products, either local or national, which define the rules for the conduct of business or best practice by which skilled processes are completed, and under what conditions work between agencies may take place. The “knowledge products” approach also represents a useful way to manage gap analysis in moving personnel issues forward to a more professionally based intelligence regime for law enforcement.

- National intelligence model
- Data protection guidelines
- Codes of practice
• National manuals and standards for:
  - Recording and dissemination of intelligence
  - Surveillance
  - Undercover operations and test purchases—Use of informants
  - Interception and accessing communications related data—Case law on covert techniques
  - Local research and data access protocols
  - Local inter-agency access protocols
  - Intelligence training

**System products**

System products enable the collection, reception, recording, storage, use and dissemination of information. Broadly, they can be grouped into three types:

• *Provision of access to means for data storage, retrieval and comparison during the research process* access to large quantities of readily available law enforcement and other relevant data is the backbone of intelligence-led policing. Combination of nation-wide systems with the more local and specialized ones provides enormous potential for sophisticated analysis of criminal and other problems. The key to success, in terms of the quality of the analysed intelligence products, is the ability to access and bring together the data from disparate IS platforms. They may include diverse computerized systems that contain:
  - Crime records
  - Open source data
  - Intelligence files
  - Analysis tools
  - Specialized databases (e.g., firearms registration, driver licensing, criminal records, etc.)
  - Case management tools.

• *Provision of access to facilities or systems for acquisition of new information and intelligence*—the gathering of intelligence to fill identified needs may require the deployment of ‘human sources’ such as informants or undercover officers, or the deployment of human or technical surveillance resources. At the higher level of operations, there will be a requirement to access sophisticated covert entry techniques or intercept communications. The more intrusive techniques are usually only available in serious crime cases and the requirement to protect the secrecy of methodologies makes it undesirable that they be used where they can not be deployed as such. Mobile surveillance resources are generally expensive and require a sound intelligence case to be made for their deployment.

At the local level, intelligence units will require possession of technical surveillance facilities commensurate with the investigations pursued at that level, and clear systems in place through which more sophisticated facilities can be accessed when the need arises. Within police forces, the distribution of surveillance resources, and the systems for accessing the more expensive or sensitive, will be policy issues integral to the crime and intelligence strategies.
• **Provision of operational security systems**—intelligence is a valuable commodity and must consequently be handled with care. The “need to know” principle is widely recognized as the backbone of the intelligence doctrine.

The correct balance to be struck between making information as widely available as possible to maximize its potential benefit, and restricting its availability to protect the security of sources, techniques and information, is critical. A number of access systems and facilities help support the integrity and effectiveness of the intelligence environment:

- The informant registration system;
- The provision and use of analytical tools of the right standard;
- The provision of secure accommodation and secure storage facilities;
- The provision of appropriate briefing facilities, suitably secure when necessary;
- The adoption of a national standard intelligence recording form which may incorporate risk assessment and handling restrictions;
- Controlled access to foreign law enforcement agencies.

### Analytical techniques and products

The National Intelligence Model depends upon four key intelligence products as discussed earlier. These products, in their turn, derive from nine analytical techniques and products, which underpin the development of professional knowledge in effective proactive law enforcement techniques.

**Table 3-2. Nine types of analytical technique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Results analysis</td>
<td>Assesses the impact of:</td>
<td>• Helping to identify best practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Patrol strategies and tactics</td>
<td>• Areas for improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reactive investigations</td>
<td>• Post hoc debrief of incidents and investigations as an aid to professional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Proactive investigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Crime reduction initiatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other law enforcement policies and techniques</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Crime pattern analysis</td>
<td>• Crime series identification</td>
<td>Management decisions about prioritization within the “tactical menu” of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Crime trend identification</td>
<td>• Hot spots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hot spot analysis</td>
<td>• Crime series identifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• General profile analysis</td>
<td>• Crime and disorder preventive and diversion initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operationally, they are an aid to investigators and others in identifying new and emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>trends and requirements for further analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Market profiles</td>
<td>Maintained assessments of the state of the criminal market around a commodity or service—drugs, stolen vehicles, prostitution etc.</td>
<td>Management decisions about prioritization of criminal and enforcement problems—the identification of targets and reduction opportunities:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | • Key players  
• Networks  
• Criminal assets  
• Associated trends in criminality  
These profiles are made up of other analytical products, chiefly from network and crime pattern analysis. | • The aggregation of standard market profiles maintained locally enables the building of a higher-level view  
• The profile may trigger more detailed analysis in target profiles, crime pattern analysis or network analysis to support operations |
| 4. Demographic/social trends analysis | • Nature of demographic changes  
• Impact on criminality or apparently associated criminality  
• Deeper analysis of social factors which might underlie changes or trends in offenders or offending behaviour  
Could underpin a crime and disorder audit or research into known or predicted social or demographic changes. | • Strategic decisions about resourcing and priorities in law enforcement  
• Illuminates where future pressures are likely to arise and informs partners  
• Use in planning of seasonal or other tactical operations in response to emerging social phenomena or movements of people |
| 5. Criminal business profiles | Reveals detailed operational modality including:  
• How victims are selected  
• Technical expertise employed by offenders  
• Weakness in systems or procedures which are exploited by offenders  
• Incorporates results from other types of analysis | Highlighting needs for changes in:  
• Legislation or other form of regulation  
• Resourcing to meet new threats  
• Operational planning in ascertaining key points for disruption  
• Immediate crime prevention/reduction opportunities  
• Raising knowledge standards through training and briefing products |
| 6. Network analysis | • Key attributes and functions of individuals within the network  
• Associations within/outside of the network  
• Network strengths and weaknesses;  
• Analysis of financial and communications data  
• Inferences about criminal behaviour in association with target profiles | Strategically:  
• Indicating to management the seriousness of of linked criminality for strategic considerations  
Tactically and operationally:  
• Informs target operations  
• Suggests effective lines of enquiry and opportunities for disruption  
• Highlights gaps in the intelligence so as to drive source deployments |
| 7. Risk analysis | The analysis of comparative risks posed by individual offenders or organizations to:  
• Individual potential victims  
• The public at large  
• Law enforcement agencies | The compilation of risk assessments as a prelude to prioritising intelligence or enforcement work at both strategic and operational levels leads to completion of risk management plans. |
### 8. Target profile analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illuminates criminal capability and includes information about: • Associations • Lifestyle • Operational modality • Financial data • Strengths and vulnerabilities • Techniques which have worked or failed against the target in the past • Can cover any form of offending, not limited to purely “criminal” activity</td>
<td>Support target operations by: • Informing target selection • Identifying needs for intelligence • Indicating how sources and resources may be deployed against the target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9. Operational intelligence assessment (research)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The real time evaluation of and research into: • Incoming information on associations • Other phenomena around suspects in a current operation • May or may not be entirely the responsibility of an analyst</td>
<td>The prevention of “mission creep” and the prioritization of investigative needs arising from incoming intelligence during a current operation, together with identification of resultant priorities for ongoing intelligence work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Evaluation of source and data

EVALUATION OF SOURCES AND INFORMATION

Once information has been collected it must be evaluated, a stage in traditional law enforcement activity which can often be ignored. A full and proper evaluation requires the assessment of the reliability of the source and the validity of information. This stage is crucial to the intelligence process as a whole and as such necessitates an explanatory chapter of its own.

A standardized system of evaluation has been developed using what is known as the 4 x 4 system, which is now widely accepted as common practice for law enforcement agencies. This system is for example used by analysts at Europol and any information received at Europol that is not evaluated will be assessed according to this system before use.

Other agencies use variants of this system, but each can be easily interpreted by reference to the explanatory tables, and if necessary the information can be converted from one system to another.

Three fundamental principles apply to evaluation:

1. It must not be influenced by personal feelings but be based on professional judgement.
2. Evaluation of the source must be made separately to the information.
3. It must be carried out as close to the source as possible.
Evaluation tables using the 4 x 4 system

Table 4-1. Source evaluation

| A | • No doubt regarding authenticity, trustworthiness, integrity, competence, or |
| A | • History of complete reliability |
| B | • Source from whom information received has in most instances proved to be reliable |
| C | • Source from whom information received has in most instances proved to be unreliable |
| X | • Reliability cannot be judged |

Table 4-2. Information evaluation

| 1 | • No doubt about accuracy |
| 2 | • Information known personally to the source but not known personally to the official who is passing it on |
| | • Logical in itself |
| | • Agrees with other information on the subject |
| 3 | • Information not known personally to the source but corroborated by other information already recorded |
| 4 | • Information which is not known personally to the source and can not be independently corroborated |

Evaluation tables using the 6 x 6 system

Table 4-3. Source reliability

| A COMPLETELY RELIABLE | • No doubt regarding authenticity, trustworthiness, integrity, competence |
| A COMPLETELY RELIABLE | • History of complete reliability |
| B USUALLY RELIABLE | • Some doubt regarding authenticity or trustworthiness or integrity or competence (one count) |
| B USUALLY RELIABLE | • History of general reliability |
| C FAIRLY RELIABLE | • Doubt regarding authenticity, trustworthiness, integrity, competence (two counts and more) |
| C FAIRLY RELIABLE | • History of periodic reliability |
| D USUALLY NOT RELIABLE | • Definite doubt regarding authenticity, trustworthiness, integrity, competence |
| D USUALLY NOT RELIABLE | • History of occasional reliability |
| E UNRELIABLE | • Certainty about lack of authenticity, trustworthiness, integrity, competence |
| E UNRELIABLE | • History of unreliability |
| F | • Cannot be judged |
Table 4-4. Data validity

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CONFIRMED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirmed by other independent sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Logical in itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agrees with other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PROBABLY TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not confirmed independently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Logical in itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agrees with other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>POSSIBLY TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Logical in itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agrees somewhat with other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not illogical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not believed at time of receipt although possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>IMPROBABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirmation available of the contrary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Illogical in itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Contradicted by other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cannot be judged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the two above evaluation systems differ by more than simply the number of grades, in particular where evaluation of information is concerned. The 4 x 4 system is based on a simple notion of personal knowledge. Hearsay information is afforded a lower rating. This simplicity has a value in itself, as evaluation becomes less subjective.

**Sanitization**

Following evaluation, it is advisable to continue with a system of sanitization. This is intended to protect the source or origin of the information from being detectable from the context or wording of the report. It also seeks to protect the circumstances or method by which the intelligence was obtained. To assist in this process the following sanitization guidelines are offered as examples of best practice:

- All intelligence should be accurately recorded. Reports for dissemination should only include intelligence related to the desired purpose of the dissemination;
- Care must be taken to remove from the text all material that in any way identifies the source;
- The timing and place of meetings with human sources may be irrelevant and could lead to the source being identified;
- Repeat intelligence from the same source could lead to the source’s identification. The use of a confidential source register, where reference numbers are randomly allocated, reduces this possibility;
- Sanitization should make it impossible for the reader to determine whether the source is human or technical;
- In some circumstances it may be advantageous to reveal a source’s true identity in the body of the intelligence without revealing their identity as the source. This may prove necessary, for example, where a source has been seen by other officers or criminals with the group of
named individuals, and not to name the source in the report might raise suspicions about his/her identity;

- Occasionally the intelligence of a single report will contain a range of intelligence material that could only be known by a limited number for individuals. Break this material into multiple reports and ascribe different references from a confidential source register to afford greater security;
- Where an officer is concerned that the contents of a report might indicate the source, reference should be made to a supervisor before dissemination or entry into an intelligence system takes place.

**Dissemination**

One further process to be completed at this stage, is to give guidance to any recipient on what they may do with the information. This may be done either by assigning a security classification to the report (e.g. secret, confidential, restricted), or by allocating a “handling code” which is a series of permissions and restrictions which determine who has the right or the need to be given access.

The following is an example of a system of handling codes:

**Table 4-5. Handling codes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dissemination permitted within law enforcement agencies in the country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dissemination permitted to other national agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dissemination permitted to international law enforcement agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dissemination within originating agency only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Permits dissemination, but receiving agency to observe the conditions specified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such handling codes can be added to the codes allocated earlier to the source and information. Thus a code of B24 would translate as:

B—Source from whom information received has in most instances proved to be reliable
2—Information known personally to the source but not known personally to the person passing it on
4—Dissemination within originating agency only

Once intelligence is integrated into an analytical product, it follows that if the product contains any intelligence graded at ‘secret’, then the whole document would have this protective marking. Similarly if any item was graded with a handling code of 4—dissemination within originating agency only—then the entire product would bear the same restriction.
5. Analysis and analytical process

The analysis stage of the intelligence process is critical for it concerns the examination of the meaning of the available information highlighting the essential features.

Analysis highlights information gaps, the strengths, the weaknesses and pinpoints the way forward.

Figure 5-1. The analytical process

The analytical process is critical to the development of intelligence to direct law enforcement objectives, both for short-term operational aims and for long term strategic reasons. The scope for analysis and its overall credibility is dependent on the level and accuracy of the information...
supplied combined with the skills of the analyst. Analysis is a cyclical process, which can be performed on all types of law enforcement objectives. Different types of crimes and operations require different scenarios, but to enable effective analysis the type of information which is used should not be pre-set by artificial measures, but by the availability of the information and the legal restrictions of each country.

Data integration is the first phase of the analytical process combining various types of information from different sources to establish areas of weakness in order to draw inferences for law enforcement action. Careful integration highlights information gaps and weaknesses in the enquiry, thus ensuring that the analyst will continue data collection, even at the earliest stages of analysis work. This stage of the process at the early part of an enquiry also allows the analyst to begin to develop hypotheses based upon limited knowledge.

**DATA INTEGRATION: COMBINING DATA IN PREPARATION TO DRAWING INFERENCES**

The next step in the analytical process is interpretation which frequently means going beyond the facts, asking the “what if” questions. For this phase to be successful, the previous stages must be accurate and complete, to minimize the risk that the analyst takes in making an informed judgement based upon the information available.

**DATA INTERPRETATION: GIVING THE DATA A MEANING; GOING BEYOND THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE**

By integrating the data usually in the form of charts, but also as tables or maps, the analyst is creating a platform from which interpretation can be carried out. Charts and other products are useful as briefing aids or as illustrations of ideas; however the underlying data and its meaning is what the analysis is all about. The manual will concentrate on these analysis by-products as they are extremely useful in firstly, helping to understand the overall intelligence analysis process and secondly, helping to determine the understanding of a particular problem.

**Figure 5-2. The process of analysis**
By following the process over and over again, the analyst can begin to either support or refute the hypotheses already developed. It does not matter if an original idea is wrong, the most important aspect is to identify that it is wrong. As the overall enquiry continues the level of degree of accuracy of the ideas becomes stronger and the analyst can then begin to have greater confidence in the hypotheses.

Thus a hypothesis provides a theory that can focus further data collection. The hypothesis or any inference should contain:

- **Key individual or individuals** - **WHO**?
- **Criminal activities** - **WHAT**?
- **Method of operation** - **HOW**?
- **Geographical scope** - **WHERE**?
- **Motive** - **WHY**?
- **Time-frame** - **WHEN**?

The hypotheses or inferences made can be tested by the operational teams and feedback is then essential. Hypotheses contain a great deal of speculation and need to be confirmed, modified or rejected by the findings that come out of investigation. To test hypotheses structured data collection is essential and therefore a collection plan must be developed.

In the process of analysis the following axioms and standards for analysts should be considered.

**AXIOMS FOR AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST**

**Believe in your own professional judgment**
You are the expert. Believe in your work and stand your ground if the intelligence supports your position

**Be a risk taker**
Do not be afraid of being wrong when forecasting trends or events. Taking risks is part of your job description. Only by taking risks you can maximize your value to your agency.

**It is better to make a mistake than to do nothing at all**
If you are wrong, and the facts call for it, admit it. Only those who don’t do anything make no mistakes.

**Avoid mirror imaging at all costs**
Mirror imaging is projecting your thought process or value system onto someone else. Your targets are criminals. Their mentality is completely different. You must learn to think like they do.
Intelligence is of no value if it is not disseminated

Communicate the intelligence, conclusions and recommendations clearly and effectively and in a timely manner. What your client does not know has no value.

When everyone agrees on an issue, something probably is wrong

It is rare and not natural for a group of people in the intelligence community to fully agree on anything. If it does occur, it's time to worry.

Your client does not care how much you know, tell them just what they need to know

Excessive details merely obscure the important facts.

Form is never more important than the substance

A professional appearance and appropriately selected formats are important, but they do not outweigh substance. Clients want to know what intelligence means, and they want it when they need it.

Aggressively pursue collection of information that you need.

Never settle for less than all you need. If you fail to get access to the vital data source for any reason, you will be held responsible.

Do not take the editing process personally.

If editorial changes do not alter the meaning of your message, accept them. If they do, speak up. Even then, it might be that a brighter mind has seen what you have missed. Believe in your product, but be self-critical.

Know your intelligence community counterparts and talk to them

You are not competitors; you are of the same breed. Become part of the network. Do not pick up the phone only when you need something.

Do not take your job, or yourself, too seriously.

Avoid burnout. Writing you off as an asset will be a net loss to your agency (although it may not immediately see it exactly like this). The welfare of your family and your health is more important than nailing down a criminal, or scaling another rung on the career ladder. Your role in the larger order of things is not self-important. Your commitment, perseverance and dedication to the job will bring results only over a long term.
TEN STANDARDS FOR ANALYSTS

1. Analysed data (i.e., intelligence) should be used to direct law enforcement operations and investigations.

2. Analysis should be an integral part of every major investigation the agency pursues.

3. Analytical products should contain, as a minimum, a written report. Visual products may also be presented, but are only acceptable as an addition to, rather than in replacement of, a written report.

4. Analytical products should contain conclusions and recommendations. These are presented to management for their consideration regarding decision-making.

5. The development of an analytical product requires the application of thought to data. Data compilation that does not reflect comparison or other considerations is not analysis.

6. Analytical products must be accurate. Consumers must be able to rely on the data provided to them by analysts.

7. Analysis must be produced in a timely manner.

8. Analytical products should reflect all relevant data available through whatever sources and means available to the analyst.

9. Analyses should incorporate the best and most current computer programs, compilation, visualization, and analytical techniques available in the analyst's environment.

10. Analyses should both reflect, and be evaluated upon, their qualitative and quantitative contribution to the mission and priorities of the agency or organization for which they are being produced.
6. Types of analysis

McDowell as shown in figure 6-1 following identifies the use of intelligence at three levels: tactical, operational and strategic. In essence it is easiest to begin with tactical intelligence which will lead to a requirement for and can feed operational and strategic intelligence analysis.

Figure 6-1. Integration of intelligence levels

**TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE**
Immediate targets providing direct action opportunity

**OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**
Linked target groups needing coordinated overarching response

**STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE**
Phenomenon on research and overview to provide trend forecasting and direction for change

**INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE**

**TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE**

Tactical intelligence is used to develop methods to counteract immediate criminal threats and is usually directed at a specific crime or criminal entity. It may be in reaction to an incident or used to prevent a crime.

Tactical information is usually factual data collected during case investigations and surveillance operations. The information may act as an investigative lead, or it may simply consist of a list of the subject’s associations, provide details of places frequented, listing of businesses associations,
or describe criminal tendencies. This information gives law enforcement authorities a basic understanding of the criminals and their activities.

Tactical intelligence consists of this data in a compiled and analysed form: names, addresses, identifiers, criminal associates and other identifying information. Tactical intelligence may take on many forms, but it is primarily the collection of facts to form a file on a targeted subject with a view toward an investigation or prosecution. This tactical intelligence is collected on an ongoing basis and should be readily available as an effective and valuable resource for investigators working on criminal investigations. Finally, tactical intelligence provides the pieces of information that are the building blocks on which intelligence professionals develop further analysis.

**OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS**

Operational analysis in essence consists of:

- Summarizing information received on a given enquiry in proportion to the reliability of the various components.
- Identifying the silent features such as groups of, or individual criminals; relevant premises, contact points and methods of communication. Such identification may come as a result of a structured approach to information and intelligence gathering as a result of a criminal incident or identification of emerging trends.
- Researching and interpreting information, carrying out further research, and then disseminating the results of the analysis as quickly as possible.
- Giving clear directions to operational teams in line with the aim of the intelligence-led policing.

Enquiries can be of varying duration. During their course the impetus can fluctuate, and differing operational priorities present themselves. Part of the operational task of the analyst is to assist in ensuring a balance whilst at the same time adhering to the original direction of the enquiry, giving due weight and consideration to new developments and priorities.

The length of operational analysis is immaterial. The most important factors for the analyst are the nature, source and validity of the information dealt with. The results will be an assimilation of the data, which comprise of known facts along with rumour, speculation and innuendo. The analytical product will contain further intelligence requirements, specific recommendations and options for further work. Equally essential and incumbent on the analyst, in operational work, is to research and develop information, in addition to answering operational questions, striking the correct balance between the two.

Analysts need to be flexible and creative and the quality of analysis is dependent more upon the experience, accuracy and sensitivity of the analysts themselves, than relying on the type of technique used. However a number of data integration techniques are used from the “Analytical Tool Box” which is constantly evolving, due to the need to target the ever-changing activities of criminals.

Presentation techniques for operational analysis differ from those which are required for strategic analysis. More emphasis is placed on the production of charts, diagrams etc., which will often support oral briefings to operational teams. In this respect the presentation of operational analysis findings is often concise due to the need to produce both timely intelligence and to meet operational demands.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The basic purpose of strategic analysis is to create knowledge to be used by decision makers for long-term planning and allocation of resources. A strategic analysis is therefore future oriented. The time horizon depends on the character of the decision that has to be taken. When conducting a strategic analysis one can have different levels of ambition, depending on the task given to the analyst.

The lowest analytical ambition level is descriptive analysis, in which data and information is, by the use of scientifically acknowledged methods, systematically organized, analysed and presented. Often the purpose is to find out if there are any general trends in the development of criminality, or a pattern of crime, and occasionally also to see if it is possible to extrapolate trends into the future. Statistics are often used in this type of analysis and it is probably the most commonly conducted type of crime analysis.

A more difficult level of analysis is the explanatory. The base of this kind of analysis is most often a descriptive analysis. However, now the purpose is also to understand the causes of criminality. This is a very difficult task because it most often includes the study of a large amount of variables and an understanding of how they are related to each other. To be able to conduct this type of analysis in a proper way normally demands good knowledge in the use of scientific methodology.

The most difficult analysis is the predictive that is to make prognosis of future development. To predict the future in detail is of course impossible, but by using either descriptive or explanatory analytical results, or both types of material, it is possible to reduce uncertainties and at least make so called “educated guesses”.

A strategic analysis often implies studies of complex relations of a large amount of variables. The approach and method should therefore be carefully considered and chosen. Methods used in, and experience from research within, academic disciplines such as social and political science, economics, criminology and behavioural science are often very useful when conducting various forms of strategic analysis. The outcome of a strategic analysis is often presented in form of a report, but oral briefings or presentations of a produced report are common in some law enforcement organizations.

A strategic analysis project can take many different forms. It could for example be:

- A general threat assessment;
- The production of a situation report or,
- A more specialized study of a certain phenomenon.

Detailed explanations are as follows:

Threat assessments

The purpose of a threat assessment is to analyse and evaluate the character, scope and impact of criminality. Often they will be long-term future-oriented and therefore at the most difficult level of analytical ambition. They normally have to include an explanatory analysis, or at least a study, of various contributory factors. When wanting to predict the occurrence of certain phenomena it is of course necessary to try to understand what causes them. Therefore, one major part in the production of a threat assessment is almost always the study of relevant
political, social, demographic, economic and other variables for the purpose of trying to understand their meaning and correlation.

Ideally, threat assessments are used as basis in the planning process within law enforcement organizations. An assessment could be specific, that is concerning one or just a few types of crime, or it could be general about all types of crime that confront an organization.

**Situation reports**

Another strategic analytical product is the situation report. This type of report is mainly descriptive and only oriented towards the current crime situation, and therefore is not as analytically ambitious or as difficult to conduct as a threat assessment. In a situation report, the ambition may not be to evaluate the impact of criminality, rather just to give a description of the current situation. As with threat assessments, situation reports can be specific or general. However, such reports give a picture of the current crime situation, criminals’ modus operandi, etc. They are often used as an aid to decision-making in respect of the allocation of resources, as well as the choice of methods and techniques to combat crime and should always attempt to be as predictive as possible and take into account, where available, trends apparent from previous reports.

**Risk assessments**

The aim of a risk assessment is to identify and examine vulnerable areas of society that are, or could be, exploited. By examining weak, and vulnerable areas, for instance within a certain business sector, it will then be possible to give recommendations about a number of diverse issues such as potential counter measures. When conducting risk assessments, not only the character of the vulnerable sector, but also the nature of potential criminals and their modus operandi has to be taken into account.

When producing any strategic analysis, the analyst should always remember that good presentation of the material will ensure the attentiveness of the reader. Therefore the analyst should:

- Have sound knowledge of clients’ requirements;
- Have an understanding of the subject matter;
- Have a clear idea of the structure of the report;
- Make informed judgments;
- Produce conclusions and recommendations that have practicality and relevance

Report writing is a skill in itself and specific training for the analyst may be required if they work in an environment that has set procedures and formats.
7. Security and the intelligence process

INTRODUCTION

Law enforcement agencies, as a vital part of their function, have a legitimate requirement to collect and store information. A great deal of this information will be of a personal or operational nature and, as such, privacy and security implications must always be at the forefront of the information custodian’s mind. Information that is not afforded adequate protection may be misused or alternatively accessed by unauthorized persons resulting in misuse of the information. Misuse of law enforcement information can be damaging to an agency’s operations and reputation and can also place individual lives or reputations in danger. Complacency and lack of due attention to security and control procedures can be a major contributing factor to the misuse of information. Alternatively, misuse may also result from corrupt behaviour on the part of law enforcement officers.

It is of the utmost importance that the opportunities for misuse are kept to an absolute minimum through appropriate safeguards and protective measures, adequate internal controls and suitable supervision. It is equally important that management and staff are aware of and understand the security needs of their organization and, in implementing suitable checks and balances, agencies should use an approach that encourages both personal and corporate integrity and develops an ethical climate that discourages the misuse of information.

THE INTELLIGENCE UNIT AND SECURITY

While all staff of an organization have a duty to ensure security obligations are properly met, an intelligence unit’s approach to security will be more extensive with greater emphasis on the protection of the unit’s personnel, assets and information. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the intelligence function of a law enforcement agency is, perhaps, one of the most sensitive areas in respect of the collection, storage and use of information. Not only could the misuse or unauthorized release of intelligence information jeopardize an agency’s operations, but such a release could also be extremely harmful to the individuals concerned—particularly when the intelligence is yet to be confirmed or verified. Secondly, the very nature of an intelligence unit’s work and the information it holds significantly increases the risk of the unit and its staff being targeted by organized crime for penetration and corruption.

THE MUSTS OF SECURITY

Security is a series of procedures and measures which, when combined, provide protection of people from harm, information from improper disclosure or alteration, and assets from theft
or damage. The basic premise on which all successful security systems are based is that no single security measure is, by itself, relied upon (Criminal Justice Commission 1995:1.7). To be effective, a system must comprise a number of complementary “layers” that provide checks and balances and multi-level protection. This is often referred to as the “defence in depth” approach.

In ensuring that intelligence information is being appropriately and securely dealt with, consideration must be given to the “security layers” that can be applied in respect of personnel, physical accommodation and information handling.

The intelligence unit must take steps to ensure that all members of the unit are of the highest possible integrity, with no personal circumstances or links to criminality that may see their integrity compromised. The unit must ensure it is physically secured at all times and that only authorized personnel can gain access to the intelligence work area. When handling information and files, intelligence personnel must also adopt work practices that ensure information is processed in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to their work. In general terms, the unit must take all appropriate measures to restrict knowledge of the unit’s activities to as few persons as possible to avoid any compromise of those activities.

Suitable security measures relating to staff and the operational environment will ensure that intelligence material is handled, processed and used in a manner which is commensurate with its sensitivity and, at no time, is placed at risk of passing into the hands of unauthorized persons. This will be achieved by ensuring that:

- The capture of intelligence material and the methods used are properly controlled;
- The storage of intelligence material is secure;
- The validity of intelligence material is confirmed;
- The integrity of intelligence material is maintained;
- The intelligence material is only available to persons deemed to have a need and right to that material;
- Disseminated intelligence material is only used for legitimate law enforcement purposes;
- Transmission of intelligence material is via secure means;
- There is overall management control and appropriate accountability for the intelligence system and related procedures.

It is important to understand that, in addition to protecting against any compromise of the intelligence unit’s activities, the security system also has an important role in protecting the right to privacy of individuals. A great deal of the information captured for intelligence purposes is drawn from allegations, unverified reports of activities and associations, and other sources where the veracity of the information has not been fully tested. For example, Godfrey and Harris (1971:93) discussed how the surveillance of several individuals arriving at a particular premises allegedly for a criminal enterprise meeting, confirms their presence at the premises, but does not confirm the relationship between the persons seen entering the premises. They went on to highlight how the problem is even more complicated where a public place, such as a restaurant, is involved. Who is engaged in conspiracy, and who is simply a hungry or thirsty member of the public? Similarly, if telephone records show the phone of a criminal target “A” called the phone of “B”, this does not necessarily mean “B” is involved in “A’s” criminal activities. Without confirmation of the users of the two phones at the time in question and the details of the conversation at the time, it cannot be verified whether “A” indeed called “B” or for what purpose the call was made. “B” could be later found to be totally innocent of any involvement of knowledge of “A’s” activities.
Information from observations of this kind can seldom be presented in court and, without other corroborating evidence, cannot be verified. It is, however, essential information for intelligence purposes in seeking to develop an understanding of the associations, networks and operational patterns of organized crime.

With this in mind, intelligence unit personnel and their managers must be fully aware of their responsibility to maintain a security system not only for protection of their own operations but also for the protection of individuals’ rights, by preventing the inadvertent leakage of unsubstantiated information that might be damaging to the person, or persons, to whom the information refers—whether or not that person has a criminal record.

THE MUST-NOTS OF SECURITY

While the importance of security in protecting against any compromise of the intelligence unit’s activities can never be overstated, it is important that security procedures are not applied to an extent where they impede the flow and use of intelligence products. Godfrey and Harris (1971:93) highlighted this fact in discussing a number of areas for which security policy should not be used to excess. These areas are still relevant today; and, in this respect, when preparing security policy and guidelines, the intelligence unit should note the following:

• Security must not be used to exclude authorized persons with a legitimate need and right to know from accessing intelligence reports and findings. Intelligence is only of use if it is disseminated to clients who need it. It is of little use if retained purely for the knowledge of intelligence personnel. Once a consumer’s need to know is determined, and found appropriate, the intelligence material must be made available. Watson et al, (1990: 405) discuss “need to know” and the “need-to-know-principle” as general intelligence terms. The concept of “need to know” involves not allowing access to information to those who do not need it to perform their job. For example staff in an intelligence unit have no need to know the terms of employment of other staff within an organization so they are denied access. Staff working in the personnel section of the agency have no need to know details of intelligence targets so they are not told. It is important to stress that access is by need and not solely by virtue of position, rank or level of security clearance within an agency. Even a person with the highest level of security clearance may be denied access to particular information on a basis that there is no “need to know”.

• The intelligence unit may place security conditions on the intelligence material and security obligations on the recipient in respect of how the material should be handled. However, the purpose of such conditions is to ensure that the material is suitably actioned by the appropriate people with due regard to its sensitivity, not to prevent it from being read.

• Security must not—under any circumstances—be used to conceal the employment of illegal or unauthorized techniques, such as electronic surveillance, where such is not permitted by law in a particular jurisdiction or if permitted where correct legal procedures have not been followed. Intelligence personnel and intelligence units must operate lawfully at all times and be accountable for their actions through appropriate documentation and audit procedures.

• Security must not be used to conceal reports from the jurisdiction’s political leadership or other representatives who are not members of the law enforcement agency. Nor should security be used to prevent documents from being used for prosecution purposes, even though the sources may be highly sensitive. Security must not be used to conceal or cover up mistakes or corrupt activities by members of the unit or agency.
SUMMARY

This brief introduction highlights how the sensitive nature of intelligence necessitates that security procedures must be an integral part of an intelligence unit’s day to day function. A key objective of security is to maintain the integrity of the intelligence unit, its staff and its information. This objective is best achieved by applying a “defence in depth” approach in respect of the following areas:

- Personnel security to assure the personal integrity of the organization’s staff;
- Physical security to protect the organisation’s premises and assets;
- Information security to protect information against inadvertent use or unauthorized access.

These areas are discussed in more detail in the following pages in order to give readers a basic insight into the steps that should be taken to maintain the integrity of the intelligence process.

In addition to providing for a secure and successful intelligence function, the adherence to sound security procedures should enhance the morale of the agency as a whole by providing strong resistance to misconduct and corruption. It should also encourage a greater flow of intelligence from within the agency due to the confidence in the security of the intelligence unit.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

“Personnel security is the means or procedures, such as selective investigations, record checks, personal interviews, and supervisory controls, that are designed to provide reasonable assurance that people being considered for access to classified information are loyal and trustworthy” (Watson, et al. 1990:435). The sensitivity of the intelligence area, and the information it handles, requires that personnel engaged in intelligence work be subject to extensive background checks prior to their employment or transfer to such areas. Personnel security vetting is a process that checks a person’s identity and verifies his or her background, character, and financial situation, in order to ascertain with a degree of certainty that the person is trustworthy, discreet and of suitable integrity for employment and access to classified material. This process goes beyond the basic pre-employment checks, as it does not necessarily follow that a person suitable for employment within the general stream of duties in an agency is automatically suitable for access to secure areas and classified material (Commonwealth of Australia 1991:85).

The integrity of a person can only be determined by probing the background of the person, his or her past employment history, associations and lifestyle. In discussing background investigation, Godfrey and Harris (1971:94) described the process as “not a perfect system by any means;” however, experience has shown that when done thoroughly, background security vetting does provide an effective means of establishing a person’s suitability for employment.

All intelligence staff must undergo initial vetting and be security cleared before commencing employment. Security vetting is a voluntary process and the potential staff member must consent to their background being investigated for the purposes of employment. Naturally, if consent is not given, employment will not be considered further as the obtaining of an appropriate security clearance (an administrative determination that an individual is eligible, from a security standpoint, for access to classified information (Watson, et al.1990:505). Staff should also be required to report any changes in personal circumstances, and undergo periodic security checks, to confirm continued suitability for intelligence duties.
Initial security vetting: the background investigation

Initial security vetting of a potential employee is conducted by way of a background investigation that should probe all aspects of the person’s professional and personal life. The investigation should seek to detect indications of lack of character or lack of integrity. Godfrey and Harris (1971:94) correctly pointed out that a person who lacks integrity in their personal life—for example, in past dealings with family or associates—should be considered a potential risk to act without integrity in a professional capacity, at some time in the future. Similarly, during a background investigation, inquiries with past employers will assist considerably in judging the person’s suitability for intelligence duties.

To assist in conducting the background security investigation, the person under consideration should be requested to complete a security vetting questionnaire—providing both personal and financial information. The questionnaire should require the person to provide full and accurate information in respect of the following:

- Personal details, including previous names;
- Family details, including spouse and children;
- Current and past residential addresses;
- Education history, including places of education;
- Employment history, including contact details of past supervisors;
- Travel movements (if applicable);
- Details of any criminal convictions;
- Details of any other adverse encounters with the law, including traffic offences;
- Financial details, including savings, investments and assets.

The questionnaire should conclude with a certification by the person as to the accuracy and completeness of the information provided. The person completing the questionnaire should also be required to provide certified copies of supporting documentation such as birth certificate, marriage certificate, passport, driver’s licence, and education/professional qualification certificates.

Armed with the information from the questionnaire, the officer performing the background security investigation can then conduct independent checks to verify the information provided and explore any particular areas that require further evaluation. When appropriate the investigating officer should seek additional information by contacting persons previously associated with the person under consideration such as past educators, past employers, family members, neighbours, etc. It is essential that the investigator carefully evaluates all information available on the subject of the investigation and that a balanced and informed assessment is made of the individual’s reliability and trustworthiness. (Character assessment is the balanced and informed estimation of an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness which is derived from comprehensive checks on identity, background, personal values and behaviour.) An assessment of the subject’s maturity, responsibility, tolerance, honesty and loyalty in past situations will enable conclusions to be drawn regarding the suitability of the subject.

It is also essential that the investigator verify the legitimacy of any documents provided by the subject. With the ease of access to sophisticated graphic software, it is not difficult today to produce high-quality certificates and other documentation that to all intent and purpose appears genuine. Checks must, therefore, be made with the issuing authorities to confirm that the claims made by the applicant are authenticated.
Any information that casts doubt over the subject’s integrity or character must be fully explored to a point where the information is either corroborated or discredited. For example, as Godfrey and Harris (1971:94) discussed, it would be of little value to simply report an allegation that a previous landlady felt the subject was an undesirable tenant because of noisy parties and wild goings-on that caused complaints from neighbours. The investigator would be duty bound to ascertain the character of the landlady and her relationship to the subject. The investigator would also have a duty to check the allegation with the neighbours and to ascertain if other information was available regarding the subject’s social activities. If the investigator were simply to report that the allegation could not be substantiated, it would be open to conclude that in the absence of other evidence, there remains a possibility that the criticism reflects accurately on the subject’s social life. If, on the other hand, details of the additional information gathered during evaluation are included in the investigator’s report, a clearer record is created. If the additional information enables the investigator to draw a firm conclusion, the record not only facilitates the removal of any doubt as to whether the allegation is substantiated or discredited but also ensures that the matter is clarified once and for all.

If the investigator is unable to draw a firm conclusion regarding a particular allegation and doubt remains as to the subject’s character or integrity due to the allegation, then the matter should be raised with the subject. As Godfrey and Harris (1971:95) correctly pointed out, such a procedure is delicate and should be undertaken with care and preplanning. A formal but not unfriendly atmosphere is recommended for such confrontations. Often, the subject’s responses will provide sufficient additional information to enable the matter to be clarified. If not, the confrontation will provide an opportunity for the investigator to observe the subject’s reactions and facial expressions, which may contribute to the investigator’s assessment of the matter.

In addition to probing the personal background of a person under consideration for employment in an intelligence role, it is equally important to examine the person’s financial standing. Such an examination will determine whether the subject is in any financial difficulty. A poor history of financial responsibility could cast doubts on the subject’s reliability and responsibility in other areas of life. On the other hand, financial problems have the potential to place a person at risk of compromise in the form of corruption or blackmail. The subject’s financial information should be cross-referenced with other lifestyle and employment information to provide a more complete assessment of earnings and expenditure. Additionally, the recording of an employee’s financial information at the commencement of employment provides a base for future comparisons should any allegations be made regarding unexplained wealth or changes in lifestyle.

If, having concluded all aspects of the background security investigation, the investigator is satisfied that the subject’s background, character and financial situation reveal nothing adverse, it can be concluded, with a degree of certainty, that the person is trustworthy and of suitable integrity for employment and access to classified material. A security clearance can, therefore, be issued. If, on the other hand, at the conclusion of the background security investigation, any doubt remains as to the character or integrity of the subject, then a security clearance cannot be granted and the person cannot be considered further for employment in the intelligence unit.

**Periodic security checks**

The fact that a person is cleared for employment at a particular time does not necessarily mean that person will always be suitable for employment. The person’s circumstances, values, attitudes and other traits could change over time. It is, therefore, important that information impacting on security clearances is kept up to date and procedures are in place for this to happen. On
commencing employment, intelligence personnel should be briefed on the security requirements of their position. They should be advised that, during their employment they are required to report any changes in personal or financial circumstances in order that an assessment can be made as to whether the changes impact on their security clearance. They should also be advised that, in addition to any changes they report, they will also be required, from time to time, to undergo periodic security checks to confirm their continued suitability for intelligence duties.

Periodic security checks should involve an updating of the initial background security investigation, focusing in particular on the officer’s personal life and financial status. Any significant changes to the officer’s previous profile should be investigated. For example, if social activities are found to have changed and there is evidence of increased spending or substantial borrowing, explanations should be sought for the changes. While increased income may have a legitimate source, if no apparent source can be identified the subject officer may fall under suspicion of corrupt activity. Alternatively, increased borrowing could indicate the subject officer may be vulnerable to corrupt approaches.

Periodic security updates should be conducted at regular intervals—say, for example, every two years. Personnel should be advised of these procedures and encouraged to actively participate as part of the unit’s anti-corruption strategy. Pride in the integrity of the unit and its personnel should be the overriding objective.

Notwithstanding the regular security procedures, the unit commander always retains full authority to order a background security investigation of one of the unit’s personnel at any time. The commander, after all, is responsible for the overall integrity of the unit. If there is any suspicion regarding the integrity or character of one of the unit’s personnel, the commander should act immediately rather than wait for the next periodic security check. Any delay in acting on such suspicions would expose the intelligence unit to an unacceptable risk of serious damage.

**Physical security**

Physical security is described by some as having two meanings. The first involving the “physical measures used to protect classified equipment, material and documents from disclosure to unauthorised persons” (Watson, et al 1990:438). The second involving the “physical measures, such as safes, vaults, perimeter barriers, guard systems, alarms and access controls that are designed to safeguard installations against damage, disruption, or unauthorised entry, information, or material against unauthorised access or theft, and specified personnel against harm” (Watson, et al. 1990:438).

Put simply from a law enforcement intelligence unit perspective, physical security involves the steps taken by an agency to provide physical barriers that prevent unauthorized access to premises and information, and protect personnel from physical harm (Criminal Justice Commission 1995:4.1). This is best achieved by having systems that enable premises to be secure when unattended and for access to be monitored. Persons authorized to access the intelligence unit should wear appropriate ID passes at all times when in the unit, and any other visitors should be escorted. The security system should, where possible, include electronic keys and audit logs of all access. In addition to secure access to the unit, all information and related documents should be stored in secure containers such as safes, strong rooms or secure lockable cabinets.

With appropriate physical security in place, personnel within the intelligence unit should have confidence that they can work freely without fear of compromising their material.
The physical environment

The location of the intelligence unit should be given careful consideration in order that the unit may be given the optimum protection. If at all possible, you do not want an area that handles extremely sensitive information to be located on the ground floor of the agency’s accommodation. Nor would it be wise to locate such an area close to a main entrance or busy corridors. To reduce the risk of unauthorized persons accessing the intelligence area, it is wiser to locate the unit above the ground floor and in a quieter part of the agency accommodation where there is less passing traffic, so to speak.

The physical work environment of the intelligence unit must be secure at all times, with access restricted to authorized personnel only. This is best achieved by issuing all unit personnel with identification passes, which must be worn in a visible manner at all times while working in the unit and by utilizing a single controlled access point, which requires unit personnel to use individual unique security keys to gain entry. (Modern technology provides numerous access security systems, ranging from simple electronically coded keys and proximity cards, to the more sophisticated systems that recognize individual attributes such as voice, fingerprint, and retina.) By using this type of electronic security system, a security audit log can be generated for all access to the unit. Where there is a necessity for visitors to enter the unit for legitimate work-related reasons, there must be a physical method of identifying the visitor and recording their access. A common method of recording visitors is to use a register, which can be completed with the following details:

- Date of visit;
- Name of visitor;
- Agency or organization the visitor represents;
- Name of the officer to be visited;
- Time of the visitor’s arrival;
- Time of the visitor’s departure;
- Signature of the visitor.

On completion of the register, visitors should be issued with—and instructed to visibly display—temporary visitors passes whilst within the intelligence unit.

During normal working hours, the responsibility for recording access to the unit by non-unit personnel should rest with a specific staff member. Outside of normal working hours, the unit should be secured to the extent that only unit personnel using their security keys may gain access. Movement detectors and internal surveillance cameras can provide additional levels of protection for the unit when unattended. If such devices are installed, they must be linked to an alarm system, which is monitored on a 24-hour basis; for example, in the agency’s main operation control room.

Building regulations and work place safety requirements usually require that offices have more than one exit in case of fire or other emergency. Within a secure intelligence unit such exits should be designed for “emergency flight from the unit only”. All emergency exits should be alarmed so that, if they are opened at any time, attention is immediately drawn to the fact that the security of the unit may be at risk of being compromised.

Central registry/file room

Intelligence files and source documents should be centrally stored in a separately secured dedicated area within the intelligence unit. This provides for a further level of security within
the unit and also enables additional controls to be placed on the movement of material. The walls of the central file room must be from slab to slab, rather than floor to ceiling, as many modern ceilings have open cavities for air-conditioning ducts and fire sprinklers, etc. Where possible, the walls and door should be at least fire-resistant, if not fireproof.

Access to the file room should be restricted to a small number of personnel (specifically the registry/file room personnel) and through a single door, which has a similar security access control system to that used for the main entrance to the intelligence unit. All movement of material to and from the file room must be recorded by the registry/file room personnel to ensure a full audit trail is maintained of access to material and to know exactly who has possession of particular material at any given time, should it be required by other personnel.

Storage containers

When in day-to-day use, it is sometimes impracticable to return all material to the central file repository. In such cases, intelligence personnel must have access to their own secure storage containers. In seeking to protect documentary information, the storage container in which the information is contained is the last line of defence. Storage containers must provide an adequate level of protection commensurate with the sensitivity of the material to be stored.

Clear desk policy

An additional security measure to prevent unauthorized knowledge of information is to ensure that all staff practice a “clear desk policy” when absent from their work place for an extended period of time. This will include securing material in appropriate containers and either logging off computer systems or implementing a password-protected screen saver. This type of security practice is particularly important in work areas that have open plan accommodation and where compartmentalization is difficult. It is also an important practice, on occasions, where an intelligence officer is seconded to assist another investigation unit that may not be afforded the same level of security as that of the intelligence unit.

Information security

Watson, et al. (1990:291), defines information security as “the process of safeguarding knowledge against unauthorised disclosure.” When handling information and files, intelligence personnel must adopt work practices that ensure information is processed in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to their work. Information security systems are based on the principles of accountability and protection. “It is axiomatic that, in order to be able to account for information, there must be a record of its existence. Also some items of information are more sensitive than others and, therefore, require a greater level of protection” (Criminal Justice Commission 1995:5.1). These principles are recognized by the use of a system that not only records information but also allocates security classifications and restrictions to differing levels of information sensitivity.

Classification systems

Information should be allocated a security classification dependent on its sensitivity and the level of protection it requires. The criteria for assessing the sensitivity of files or information are, at best, subjective. That is to say, a personal judgment factor enters into most decisions as
to whether a file, or particular piece of information, requires special treatment and protective handling. When making such assessments, consideration should be given to the amount of damage that could result—now or in the future—from any unauthorized disclosure, alteration or destruction of the information.

Commonly used classification systems usually employ three distinct categories of classification, for example “restricted, confidential, secret”, “in-confidence, protected, highly protected”; or alternatively “confidential, secret, top-secret”. Such classifications are a form of caveat that warns the recipient of his or her responsibility and liability with regard to the security of the information. As a general rule, the level of classification should be kept to the minimum consistent with affording adequate protection to the information. The urge to apply a higher classification when in doubt should be resisted. Over classifying can result in expensive storage and auditing measures and ultimately bring the system into disrepute.

In addition to utilizing a classification system, similar to that described above, the intelligence unit can also introduce a range of subject indicators that provide for additional categorization of information. A past approach to this type of additional categorization, discussed by Godfrey and Harris (1971:100) was to use colour tabs, or a combination of tabs, to alert users to certain aspect of the information or document’s contents. For example, a particular colour tab could indicate if the information is independently corroborated, a different colour could indicate that the matter involves corruption. Today, the use of technology and various computer software packages enables these categories to be an integral part of the intelligence unit’s database. The database records should clearly indicate the various subject matters covered in each document and also indicate any restrictions that are placed on the use of the material. In this way, personnel accessing the database should be able to quickly identify not only the classification level of the material, but also the matters the material relates to and whether there are additional restrictions placed on the material’s use.

An additional level of security used by some agencies is to use special security paper in addition to other caveats. Such paper makes each particular hard copy document unique, should there be more that one copy of the document.

Storage of intelligence material

Intelligence information should normally be stored in both hard-copy and electronic format. Hard-copy source documents must be retained in order to verify data recorded electronically. In addition to providing for secure storage of documents, as discussed under the heading of “Physical Security”, the intelligence unit must also have procedures in place to provide for appropriate backup copies of electronic data. Backup copies of electronic data should be created on a regular basis and stored at a separate secure location. Backup procedures provide a full record of the data at any given time in the past. This can be useful if an allegation is made that data has been tampered with. The existence of a full backup of electronic data also ensures a minimal amount of data is lost should a disaster of some type (for example a total system failure or fire) strike the intelligence unit. Collation methods and appropriate storage procedures for both electronic and hard copy material should be detailed in written procedural instructions. The procedures should provide for appropriate security and specifically nominate who is responsible for such material.

Access to electronically stored data should be subject to strict authorization, with appropriate procedures in place to ensure security is maintained. Authorized access should only be granted on a need-to-know basis, and each user uniquely identifiable through secure user IDs and personal passwords. Individual user IDs, coupled with appropriate structuring of data storage
procedures, will restrict access to only that data which that user has a need to access. All access transactions should be logged, and procedures should exist for audits to be conducted in this respect. Such procedures should cover both reactive and proactive auditing. Audits should be documented and available for inspection.

Included within access controls are any facilities that allow extraction/transfer of electronic data (for example, downloading from a central database to other applications such as a PC database or software graphics package). Any such facilities must be subject to strict control procedures, as access to such extracted data must also be maintained for audit purposes.

Although seen by some as inconvenient, where possible the use of portable storage media should be avoided or alternatively strictly controlled. This type of additional security approach will not only help to prevent unauthorized copying of electronic records but will also help to guard against damage by computer viruses that may be imported electronically through the use of such devices.

Suitable security precautions against this type of threat should include:

- Strict control over who has the ability to change the operating system and application software;
- Strict procedures controlling the import of software or documents from external sources;
- Compulsory use of virus checking software for all imported software and documents before being loaded onto the unit’s main system;
- A suitable decontamination plan should damage occur.

Integrity of intelligence material quality control

In addition to preventing unauthorized access to intelligence data, it is equally important that procedures are in place to ensure that the integrity of intelligence data is maintained. Relevance, accuracy and reliability are major considerations in respect of integrity. These factors are particularly important in respect of electronic databases, which are accessed and relied upon more frequently than hard-copy material. As such, intelligence databases should be subject to a specified process of quality control, with a dedicated member of the intelligence unit being responsible for checking new data after collation to verify it is free from error and that it has been correctly classified and stored.

Dissemination of intelligence

The security of an intelligence unit and its information systems also extends to the dissemination of intelligence material, either at the unit’s own initiative or in answer to requests from other units or agencies. Intelligence information should, under normal circumstances, be shared only between law enforcement agencies. When disseminating, care should be taken to ensure that the receiving agency has appropriate procedures in place to ensure that the security of the information is maintained at an appropriate level.

It should be clear to all personnel within the intelligence unit who has the authority to authorize the dissemination of intelligence material. This authority will ordinarily rest with the commander/officer in charge and/or one or more of the senior managers of the unit if the unit is large. Procedures should provide for a record to be kept of all such disseminations, highlighting the data disseminated, the reason for dissemination, to whom and by whom it was disseminated, and how the information was disseminated.
Where a request for information is received from outside of the unit, procedures should detail how an individual intelligence officer should receive and respond to the request. The identity of the requesting officer and the reason for the request should be carefully considered in order to verify if the request satisfies the need and right-to-know principles. Records of all disseminations should be retained and be available for auditing.

In respect of the physical transmission of intelligence material, the intelligence unit should have clear procedures regarding how intelligence material—both hard-copy and electronic copy—should be dispatched. Such procedures should provide for appropriate security through the use of suitable packaging such as double enveloping, receipt books and methods of transmission. Extremely sensitive material should only be dispatched via a secure “safe-hand” system. All records and receipts should be retained and available for inspection.

**Responsibility of the unit commander**

While all staff members have an obligation to maintain security, it should be noted that the intelligence unit commander has a particular responsibility for the effectiveness of an intelligence unit’s security system and related policies and practices.
8. Management of the intelligence unit

INTRODUCTION

The term “management” has been defined as the control and direction of organizational resources to achieve defined goals. Traditionally, managers have been tasked with the functions of planning, directing, staffing, training, budgeting, coordinating, reporting, providing public information and obtaining appropriate equipment. All of these functions are familiar to law enforcement managers. This chapter, however, will be focusing on those unique managerial challenges that occur when a law enforcement manager assumes the role of managing a criminal intelligence unit. When that occurs, the manager’s role becomes more complex; and there are a number of issues that must be recognized and considered.

CHALLENGES

The primary issue for the new manager involves understanding the proactive concept of criminal intelligence and how the process works. Harris called the management of the police intelligence unit, “Perhaps the most difficult assignment that can be given to a supervisor in a police department”. Part of this difficulty is because many law enforcement managers have had little exposure to intelligence, and an assignment as an intelligence unit manager will be their first opportunity to understand and work with the concept. Most law enforcement managers learned policing from the street up and have been trained throughout their careers to deal with problems in a reactive mode. Criminal intelligence requires a new mindset since it is an effort to change the perspective from a reactive approach to a proactive one. In essence, intelligence attempts to learn of criminal activity before it occurs and prepare the agency to deal with specific crime issues when they are small and can be managed with minimal resources. Once a crime problem takes root, it becomes more difficult to manage and requires additional resources.

Simply stated, a properly managed criminal intelligence function can have a tremendous impact on a law enforcement agency and the community it serves. However, the key words in that sentence are “properly managed”. It is not an easy task to properly manage this multidimensional task. It requires a trained staff that is provided appropriate direction and has the support of the agency, the political body that governs the agency, and the community it serves.

Law enforcement administrators can now benefit from a professionally managed criminal intelligence unit without being overly concerned about the threat of adverse litigation. The potential difficulty in this scenario, however, relates to the fact that much of the public is unaware of the professional standards now in place for criminal intelligence and might still
have a negative view of government and the intelligence function. Thus, it falls to the unit manager and the agency’s chief executive officer to sell the importance and legitimacy of the criminal intelligence function to community wide audiences, including the agency’s governing body. This can be accomplished with an ongoing, educational effort to inform politicians and citizens about criminal intelligence and its value to the safety of the jurisdiction. It needs to be well known that criminal intelligence is a proactive crime prevention effort and a viable part of community oriented policing. The educational effort can be supplemented with periodic reports to the relevant political body, which reinforces the function’s legal capabilities and identifies in general terms the existing criminal threats to the jurisdiction.

**CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES**

One of the first considerations for an agency is the extent of responsibilities that it intends to accept concerning the criminal intelligence function. Obviously, this is a local decision, but conditions regarding size of the agency and criminal issues within the area should dictate the need, mission and resources of the unit. In 1973, the United States National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals supported the concept that any police agency with at least 75 sworn personnel should employ a full-time criminal intelligence officer (Police Standard 9.11). This guideline may be a starting point for an agency but might not satisfy an agency’s need for criminal intelligence. Organized crime and terrorist activity is seldom overt and certainly does not recognize jurisdictional boundaries. Many times, an agency will need to perform a threat assessment to learn the extent of its organized crime presence.

Any agency needs to understand the proactive concept of criminal intelligence and recognize that most law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, are susceptible to organized criminal activity that may extend beyond jurisdictional boundaries. Their personnel should be trained to recognize and report indications of organized crime, and criminal extremist and terrorist activity. Often, small pieces of information, which may appear inconsequential by themselves, can be a significant part of a larger picture pertaining to a criminal enterprise.

Specific responsibilities for criminal intelligence units include the following:

- Initiate inquiries and conduct information searches to obtain criminal intelligence information relating to specific criminal activities designated by the chief executive officer.
- Develop and maintain a system for collecting, reviewing, evaluating, storing, collating, retrieving and disseminating information relating to designated criminal activities.
- Develop analytical capability to provide useful criminal intelligence reports, both strategic and tactical.
- Maintain the integrity and security of all information entrusted to the unit.
- Adhere to legal and ethical procedures in obtaining information.
- Develop methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the unit in accomplishing its law enforcement goals and in safeguarding the privacy of all individuals about whom the unit has information.
- Establish and maintain liaison with law enforcement agencies at all levels in order to foster a meaningful exchange of information on criminal matters.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The criminal intelligence function is a separate and distinct activity that requires special consideration when positioning it within an agency’s organizational structure.

Depending on the size of the unit, the criminal intelligence officer, supervisor or unit manager, needs direct access to the chief executive officer. This direct access is imperative since the unit’s primary function is to provide the chief executive officer (CEO) with timely strategic intelligence that will allow for appropriate planning to meet developing criminal trends. Members of the organization must recognize the need for the intelligence officer to report directly to the CEO. This reporting procedure, which circumvents the normal chain of command, is used to eliminate communication filters and to ensure the confidentiality of criminal intelligence information.

Ideally, the criminal intelligence unit should be located in its own secure office with appropriate equipment. It should not be combined with other investigative units such as narcotics, vice, detectives or internal affairs. Intelligence differs considerably from investigations, and it is important to understand why these legitimate law enforcement functions must be treated differently.

Basically, criminal intelligence is a proactive effort designed to prevent crime by providing the CEO with knowledge of criminal events that may occur in his or her jurisdiction. If performed properly, this allows the CEO time to make decisions to counter potential criminal activity. Frequently, the criminal intelligence process involves “soft” information, which cannot be used in court. “Soft” information can include hearsay information from rumours, suggestions and beliefs for the building of files. In collecting initial raw data, intelligence officers often go to sources that investigators would seldom consider for their investigative needs. In addition to surveillance observations and materials selected from public databases, intelligence officers may note anonymous comments about people who they believe may be planning a crime or listen to others they feel might be in a position to know. Their speciality is the nurturing of this type of soft data into refined and useful criminal intelligence.

This type of information collection involves careful evaluation and analysis and requires that the needs of law enforcement are balanced against the individual’s right to privacy. This right requires that the dissemination of criminal intelligence information be treated carefully and in conjunction with established right-to-know and need-to-know standards. As a result, intelligence files require a high level of security. This level of protection is greater than that required for most other law enforcement files.

On the other hand, the investigation of specific crimes is a strictly reactive function designed to arrest and prosecute the involved suspect or suspects. This effort is directed toward identifying suspects and witnesses, recovering stolen property and contraband, and procuring viable evidence for use in court. Its focus is toward “hard” or provable information, which is designed for court purposes.

The difference between the two disciplines is significant. Intelligence files need to be kept in a separate location from investigative files and the functions needs to be assigned to different units. This separation will help to ensure that professional standards are maintained in each area of expertise.

AGENCY SUPPORT

Agency support of the intelligence effort is crucial to a successful programme. That support must encompass all personnel from the chief executive to front line officers. The necessary
support can be obtained once staff understand the objectives of the programme, and how they can assist with the effort.

Frequently, the perception of the criminal intelligence unit has been a problem with some agencies. In some instances, the intelligence mission is not clear to those outside the unit. The function, role, objectives, and the mission of the unit need to be shared with others in the organization. The established guidelines for the release of information from the unit and the modification of the traditional chain of command should be explained to avoid misconceptions that a “secret squad” exists. Some of the mystery concerning intelligence is stripped away once the process is explained and the legal aspect of privacy rights and need for confidentiality is recognized. Most informed employees will subsequently accept the manner in which intelligence must operate and will assist in the effort.

UNIT MISSION

Determining the criminal intelligence unit’s mission is another important concern. The criminal intelligence function, like other specialized law enforcement assignments, requires appropriate direction and focus. Specific parameters are necessary so that the criminal intelligence effort will not lose its perspective and will retain its ability to consistently deliver a useful product. Mission statements help provide that direction. They should indicate the agency’s expectations of its criminal intelligence unit so that unit personnel, as well as the rest of the agency, understand the function.

Mission statements should address three different components:

1. The first portion should describe the criminal intelligence process of collecting, evaluating, collating, analysing and disseminating information related to criminal activities.

2. The second component requires the agency to identify the type or scope of criminal activity that the criminal intelligence unit will be addressing. In crafting this portion of the statement, it is important to determine what crime problems or issues are threatening the concerned jurisdiction. Each community or area has its own unique challenges and the mission statement should reflect those issues. For example, if a jurisdiction’s prevailing crime problem involves criminal street gangs or “emerging organized crime groups”, then the mission statement should identify those concerns as the unit’s focus.

   In determining the focus of the criminal intelligence unit, it is also important to identify an objective that can realistically be accomplished by the personnel and resources assigned to the unit. It is counterproductive to the unit to design the mission in such broad terms that the assigned personnel cannot adequately perform the job.

3. The final portion of the mission statement should describe the results that are expected to be obtained by the unit. If the primary function of the criminal intelligence unit is to provide strategic intelligence to the chief executive officer, this portion of the mission statement should indicate that the information provided will allow the CEO to make rational choices regarding unanticipated criminal threats and the deployment of the agency’s resources.

The following is a sample mission statement:

“The Department’s Criminal Intelligence Unit will collect, evaluate, collate, analyse and disseminate information on individuals and groups who are suspected of being involved in (criminal problems of concern to the jurisdiction) and will provide this information to the Chief Executive Officer for crime prevention and decision making purposes.”
TRAINING

State of the art training in criminal intelligence is available and should be made available for members of the agency. In order to maximize the benefits to be derived from a criminal intelligence unit, the department’s training commitment should start with the chief executive officer. The CEO needs to understand how the unit operates and what it can produce. Of particular interest for the CEO is how strategic intelligence products can help the agency prevent crime, properly allocate resources and budget for emerging crime problems. The agency's managers and supervisors must also understand the concept of intelligence and how it can help reduce crime. Their support will greatly enhance the coordination of the collection effort.

Front line personnel are a significant resource for the intelligence unit. They must understand that they are the eyes and ears of the agency. They are present in the community 24 hours a day, 7 days a week interacting with individuals and observing activities. It is critical that they understand their ability to contribute to the intelligence effort. In return, intelligence personnel should provide them with tactical information that will help keep them safe and assist them in recognizing threats in the community. Patrol personnel also need to understand the legal issue of individual privacy rights and the reason dissemination rules are so stringent. Proper training of such personnel will assist them in understanding the strategic need for the intelligence unit’s close relationship to the CEO.

It is important that local authorities are advised of the presence and purpose of the criminal intelligence function. These administrators are ultimately responsible to the community for the services of their governments and must be fully aware of the crime prevention aspects of the unit and the legal constraints within which its works.

Training the agency’s legal advisor prior to any legal issues arising also has its benefits. It provides an opportunity for the attorneys to understand the unit’s policies, procedures, and the legal constraints with which the intelligence unit must operate. Although legal actions against criminal intelligence units have drastically diminished in recent years, the unit’s legal advisor needs to be cognisant of the unit’s operational guidelines prior to receiving and legal claims.

MANAGING THE PROCESS

Criminal intelligence units require proper direction, appropriate guidelines and consistent oversight. The traditional five-step intelligence process of collection, evaluation, collation, analysis and dissemination will not prove valuable for an agency unless ongoing and effective direction and coordination exists throughout the five-step process. The objective of the process is to provide both strategic and tactical products for the agency.

The management, supervision and direction of a criminal intelligence unit will differ according to the size and composition of the unit. In every case, however, the direction of the intelligence effort is critical. Every intelligence project requires a focus. That focus and specific direction has to be of value to the agency. Many agencies have collected volumes of criminal intelligence information that has never been put to use. This obviously fills filing cabinets and computer space but fails to provide a useful product for the agency. Properly identifying targets can resolve this issue and provide useful products to help ensure the safety of the community.

Effective direction starts with the CEO providing general guidance and broad objectives. The unit manager will subsequently select the targets or identify the specific goals. Once a specific intelligence project is identified, the methods and procedures for the collection of information
must be considered and implemented. This collection plan is often the Achilles heel of the process. If a proper plan is not devised and carried out, then the objective is frequently not obtained.

Criminal intelligence personnel can be deployed in a number of different ways depending upon the project. Intelligence personnel can be assigned by criminal subject, criminal organization, geographic area, ethnic organized crime type or by criminal activity. This decision usually depends on the type of specific information gathering effort being undertaken.

Once a criminal intelligence project is initiated, the manager needs to meet with staff to determine what methods and resources will be used to obtain the required information. Data can be gathered through or from surveillance, undercover operatives, data banks, criminal informants and law enforcement or citizen sources. A method that should not be ignored is the use of overt intelligence personnel being assigned to monitor known criminal subjects. Once the habits of these suspects are established, intelligence officers can create appropriate opportunities to interview or converse with the criminal suspects in public places. This type of contact can be very effective. Many times, criminal subjects will willingly converse with police investigators in public. Even those subjects who will not voluntarily speak with known intelligence officers can be influenced by observing intelligence officers in public locations where the suspect expects to conduct either social or business meetings with criminal associates. The psychological impact of this type of contact in restaurants, bars, hotels and other public places will generally impede the suspect's activity and, undoubtedly, make them concerned that the officers are aware of their criminal intentions.

In addition to specific intelligence projects that are undertaken by the unit, regular sources of information must be cultivated and established by the unit to keep abreast of criminal activities within the jurisdiction. This stream of information would include the review of selected crime and arrest reports, newspaper articles, search warrants, special publications and items from law enforcement contacts or community sources.

All of this raw data must subsequently be reviewed and evaluated for mission relatedness and, if deemed appropriate, considered for file input. “The unit commander must establish an effective filing system. It should be one that minimises clerical work to the greatest extent possible while providing the analyst with an effective tool. A second major requirement for the filing system is that retrieval of information be easy. Finally, the system must be as simple as possible to enhance accuracy of filing so that... there is assurance that all information relative to a particular subject is made available.”

“In order to provide guidance, and at the same time ensure the legality of files, the unit commander must develop specific guidelines that determine what material can be entered into the files, how it is to be organized, and finally how information that is no longer deemed essential is to be purged from the files.”

The analysis step has been accurately described as the “heart” of the intelligence process. Without this part of the process the agency will not be able to extract a viable return from the collected data. This step of the process involves the need for management to ensure there is ongoing communication between the analysts and the data collectors. Their efforts need to be coordinated to ensure that appropriate data is available to the analyst for their respective projects.

The last step in the process involves the dissemination of the intelligence product. The consumers include the CEO, the agency and other law enforcement agencies. The unit manager needs to ensure that dissemination rules of “need to know”, “right to know” and the third-party rule (no original document that has been obtained from an outside agency is to be released to a
third agency) are followed. Additionally, appropriate guidelines need to be in place for release approval and to document the requests and release of information to consumers. “The unit commander must decide how the unit is to disseminate its output. In all cases, the intelligence unit should adopt an affirmative programme, disseminating information and output as widely as possible within the constraints of sensitivity of information. An intelligence file that is not used is worthless.”

Every intelligence unit should be evaluated on a regular basis. The unit manager should ensure that the unit is meeting its stated objectives. An informal evaluation should ask the following questions:

- Is the unit staying within its guidelines?
- Is the unit focused on its defined mission?
- Is unit training needed?
- Is the unit meeting its objectives?
- Is it producing analytical products?
- Does the unit provide the agency with both tactical and strategic products?
- Are the unit’s products valuable to the agency?

**SUPERVISION**

One of the keys to proper supervision is ensuring that all members are aware of the unit’s objectives and focused on their individual roles. This requires ongoing communication among members of the unit. Frequent meetings are necessary so that a team effort is established in reaching unit objectives.

The unit as a whole needs to know the targets, the ongoing activities of the unit and the information needs being sought. This sharing of information and ideas for obtaining essential data is necessary as tenured intelligence officers tend to have a variety of sources from which to access items of information. Close coordination between the field collectors and the analysts must occur so that an accurate and complete picture of the criminal issue is developed.

Clear and concise unit guidelines are essential for the smooth and efficient operation of an intelligence unit. Assigned personnel need to understand the rules and procedures under which they must operate. The guidelines for unit operations should address issues such as policy, mission, responsibilities, reporting procedures, file criteria and maintenance, information evaluation and classification, weeding procedures and dissemination. Additional guidelines must exist for the use of informants, unit security and the use of special funds. “The unit commander is also responsible for establishing guidelines that will inform investigators of targets they may cover and under what conditions... the commander then has the follow-on task of insuring that the investigators, in fact, observe the guidelines.”

**STAFFING**

The unit manager should keep in mind that criminal intelligence personnel must possess a wide range of abilities to ensure their success in this assignment. Some of the more obvious include integrity, high intellectual capacity and analytical ability, initiative, and the ability to communicate effectively, both verbally and in writing. Another consideration is the ability to establish
rapport with diverse individuals, from law enforcement personnel to the various members of the community. This ability is crucial and will ultimately determine an officer’s capability to obtain information from a wide range of sources. Other important characteristics are an officer’s judgment and his ability to anticipate what may occur in any given situation. Obviously, there are many individual skills to consider, but the success of the unit ultimately will depend on the talents of the personnel selected.

The rotation of personnel is a subject that many CEOs feel is important in today’s management environment. The argument in favour of a regular rotation of tenure relates primarily to the prevention of corruption in sensitive positions and to providing agency personnel a wider range of knowledge and experience. While rotation may be appropriate for many, if not most, assignments within a law enforcement agency, criminal intelligence is a specialized assignment that should not be rotated on a routine basis. The primary reasons for this perspective include the length of time it takes for an intelligence officer to learn the role and be effective, the skill development and training investment required, and the law enforcement contacts and other valuable contacts that have to be established. For these reasons, any rotation of intelligence personnel should be based on an evaluation of the quantity and quality of the intelligence products received from the individual.

LIAISON

An ongoing need exists for the sharing and coordination of criminal information between law enforcement agencies at all levels of government. In many instances, pertinent criminal intelligence data relating to one’s own agency is first obtained from adjacent agencies. This sharing of data on a regular basis allows for a more comprehensive review of criminal activities, which impact more than one jurisdiction. Local agencies should be networking on a regional basis and on a regular schedule. Pertinent information should also be shared with regional and national authorities. Professional investigative associations also offer valuable contacts and training opportunities.

SUMMARY

It is appropriate in this era of enhanced communication methods and ease of international travel that law enforcement agencies recognize their criminal intelligence component as the “Ultimate Management Tool for Law Enforcement”. Crime prevention and suppression is law enforcement’s business, and the criminal intelligence function allows police agencies to be proactive in addressing the criminal threats in our communities. As a critical component of community-oriented policing, criminal intelligence needs to be the approach that police agencies embrace to achieve an optimum level of public safety.

TEN STEPS TO ESTABLISHING A SUCCESSFUL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMME

1. Create a proper environment:
   - Obtain the active support of the agency’s chief executive officer.
   - Gain the political and budgetary support from the appropriate elected officials.
   - Educate the agency and the community concerning the benefits of having a criminal intelligence function.
2. Establish the criminal intelligence unit as a proactive crime prevention operation, which supports the concept of community-oriented policing.

3. Design unit mission statements focused toward specific criminal activities and disseminate them to the entire agency.

4. Select qualified personnel, including at least one trained analyst, to staff the unit.

5. Obtain separate, secure quarters for the unit.

6. Implement and enforce professional guidelines for:
   - Unit operations
   - File procedures
   - Security
   - Special expense funds
   - Informant control

7. Provide training for:
   - The chief executive officer
   - Appropriate elected officials
   - Criminal intelligence managers and supervisors
   - Criminal intelligence officers and analysts
   - The remainder of the agency’s personnel
   - Legal advisor

8. Liaison with neighbouring agencies and participate in regional and national criminal intelligence networks.

9. Require both strategic and tactical products from the unit and evaluate its operations on a regular schedule.

10. Ensure the chief executive officer meets regularly with the criminal intelligence unit supervisor to provide appropriate direction.
9. Standard and guidelines

THE STANDARDS MANUAL OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY ACCREDITATION

Criminal intelligence
As criminal intelligence relates to law enforcement agencies, it is principally concerned with collecting, processing, and disseminating information relating to specified crimes and criminal activities. These areas of concern vary widely among law enforcement jurisdictions but typically include organized crime, vice, illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, gangs, and civil disorders. Ordinarily, the intelligence function should not perform enforcement activities but should be a source of information for operational units. While some agencies may separate the function, others may assign it to the criminal investigations function as an added responsibility.

The standards in this chapter address the basic concerns of a law enforcement agency in carrying out the intelligence function. The standards do not include the intelligence gathering activities associated with special events, such as visits by dignitaries or sporting events. Nothing in this chapter should be interpreted as permitting the collection of data for political or other purposes unrelated to crime.

Administration
If the agency performs an intelligence function, procedures must be established to ensure the legality and integrity of its operations, to include:

- Procedures for ensuring information collected is limited to criminal conduct and relates to activities that present a threat to the community;
- Descriptions of the types or quality of information that may be included in the system;
- Methods for weeding out-of-date or incorrect information;
- Procedures for the utilization of intelligence personnel and techniques.

Commentary: The intention of this standard is to establish agency accountability for the criminal intelligence function in writing. Proving compliance with this standard may be accomplished through a series of documents or a single, all-inclusive directive.

For this standard, the agency has several options. First, this function may be an extension of the criminal investigation function. In this case, functional responsibility and position accountability can simply be described in the directives of such a body. On the other hand, the agency may wish to assign this function with its vice, drug and/or organized crime control functions. In this case the description of functional responsibility may be addressed within those directives.
The placement of this function within the organizational structure is optional but carries with it the responsibility for complying with the standards.

Intelligence activities are important in all agencies, regardless of size. Certain essential activities should be accomplished by an intelligence function, to include a procedure that permits the continuous flow of raw data into a central point from all sources; a secure records system in which evaluated data are properly cross-referenced to reflect relationships and to ensure complete and rapid retrieval; a system of analysis capable of developing intelligence from both the records system and other data sources; and a system for dissemination of information to appropriate components. The intelligence activities should include information gathering, analysis, and dissemination to the appropriate functions/components. Activities undertaken in the intelligence effort should avoid indiscriminate collection or distribution of information.

Training in the safe, effective and legal use of specialized intelligence equipment is required prior to personnel using the equipment. All use should be carefully documented. This equipment may include audio and/or visual monitoring equipment, night vision equipment, and specially designed surveillance vehicles.

If the agency maintains a confidential fund for intelligence activities, control and management of the fund should comply with all applicable standards.

A written directive governs procedures for the safeguarding of intelligence information and the secure storage of intelligence records separate from all other records.

Intelligence information should normally be distributed only to criminal justice agencies and on a need-to-know basis. Intelligence information should be collated and analysed in a secure environment. If a computer is used for intelligence purposes, there should be a secure system that protects against unauthorized attempts to access, modify, remove or destroy stored information.

The highly sensitive nature of intelligence files requires that they be maintained separately from other agency records to prevent compromise and protect the integrity of the system. If the intelligence function is performed by an individual with other responsibilities (CEO, deputy chief or as an activity of a larger function (criminal investigations)), the separation and security intentions of this standard should still apply.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY CENTRE—CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

Purpose

It is the purpose of this policy to provide law enforcement officers in general, and officers assigned to the intelligence function in particular, with guidelines and principles for the collection, analysis and distribution of intelligence information.

Policy

Information gathering is a fundamental and essential element in the all-encompassing duties of any law enforcement agency. When acquired, information is used to prevent crime, pursue and apprehend offenders and obtain evidence necessary for conviction. It is the policy of this agency to gather information directed toward specific individuals or organizations reasonably
suspected of criminal activity, to gather it with due respect for the rights of those involved, and to disseminate it only to authorized individuals as defined. While criminal intelligence may be assigned to specific personnel within the agency, all members of this agency are responsible for reporting information that may help identify criminal conspirators and perpetrators.

**Definitions**

*Criminal intelligence*: information compiled, analysed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity.

*Strategic intelligence*: information concerning existing patterns or emerging trends of criminal activity designed to assist in criminal apprehension and crime control strategies, for both short- and long-term investigative goals.

*Tactical intelligence*: information regarding a specific criminal event that can be used immediately by operational units to further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations and provide for officer safety.

**Procedures**

**Mission**

It is the mission of the intelligence function to gather information from all sources in a manner consistent with the law in support of efforts to provide tactical or strategic information on the existence, identities and capabilities of criminal suspects and enterprises generally and, in particular, to further crime prevention and enforcement objectives/priorities identified by this agency.

- Information gathering in support of the intelligence function is the responsibility of each member of this agency although specific assignments may be made as deemed necessary by the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the intelligence authority.
- Information that implicates, suggests implication or complicity of any public official in criminal activity or corruption shall be immediately reported to this agency’s chief executive officer or another appropriate agency.

**Organization**

Primary responsibility for the direction of intelligence operations; coordination of personnel; and collection, evaluation, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information is housed in this agency’s intelligence authority under the direction of the intelligence OIC.

- The OIC shall report directly to this agency’s chief executive officer or his designate in a manner and on a schedule prescribed by the chief.
- To accomplish the goals of the intelligence function and conduct routine operations in an efficient and effective manner, the OIC shall ensure compliance with the procedures, mission, and goals of the agency.

**Professional standards**

The intelligence function is often confronted with the need to balance information-gathering requirements for law enforcement with the rights of individuals. To this end, members of this agency shall adhere to the following:

- Information gathering for intelligence purposes shall be premised on circumstances that provide a reasonable indication that a crime has been committed or is being planned.
Investigative techniques employed shall be lawful and only so intrusive as to gather sufficient information to prevent the criminal act and/or to identify and prosecute violators.

The intelligence function shall make every effort to ensure that information added to the criminal intelligence database is relevant to a current or ongoing investigation and the product of dependable and trustworthy sources of information. A record shall be kept of the source of all information received and maintained by the intelligence function.

Information gathered and maintained by this agency for intelligence purposes may be disseminated only to appropriate persons for legitimate law enforcement purposes in accordance with law and procedures established by this agency. A record shall be kept regarding the dissemination of all such information to persons within this or another agency.

Compiling intelligence

Intelligence investigations/files may be opened by the intelligence OIC with sufficient information and justification. This includes but is not limited to the following types of information:

(a) Subject, victim(s) and complainant as appropriate

(b) Summary of suspected criminal activity

(c) Anticipated investigative steps to include proposed use of special investigative techniques

(d) Resource requirements, including personnel, equipment, buy/flash monies, travel costs, etc.

(e) Anticipated results

(f) Problems, restraints or conflicts of interest:

- Officers shall not retain official intelligence documentation for personal reference or other purposes but shall submit such reports and information directly to the intelligence authority.
- Information gathering using confidential informants as well as electronic, photographic and related surveillance devices shall be performed in a legally accepted manner and in accordance with procedures established for their use by this agency.
- All information designated for use by the intelligence authority shall be submitted on the designated report form and reviewed by the officer’s immediate supervisor prior to submission.

Receipt/evaluation of information

Upon receipt of information in any form, the OIC shall ensure that the following steps are taken:

- Where possible, information shall be evaluated with respect to reliability of source and validity of content. While evaluation may not be precise, this assessment must be made to the degree possible in order to guide others in using the information. A record shall be kept of the source of all information where known.
- Reports and other investigative material and information received by this agency shall remain the property of the originating agency, but may be retained by this agency.
Such reports and other investigative material and information shall be maintained in confidence, and no access shall be given to another agency except with the consent of the originating agency.

- Information having relevance to active cases or that requires immediate attention shall be forwarded to responsible investigative or other personnel as soon as possible.

- Analytical material shall be compiled and provided to authorized sources as soon as possible where meaningful trends, patterns, methods, characteristics or intentions of criminal enterprises or figures emerge.

**File status**

Intelligence file status will be classified as either “open” or “closed”, in accordance with the following:

- **Open intelligence files** are those that are actively being worked on. In order to remain open, officers working such cases must file intelligence status reports covering case developments at least every 180 days.

- **Closed intelligence files** are those in which investigations have been completed, where all logical leads have been exhausted, or where no legitimate law enforcement interest is served. All closed files must include a final case summary report prepared by or with the authorization of the lead investigator.

**Classification/security of intelligence**

Intelligence files will be classified in order to protect sources, investigations, and individual’s rights to privacy, as well as to provide a structure that will enable this agency to control access to intelligence. These classifications shall be re-evaluated whenever new information is added to an existing intelligence file.

(a) Restricted intelligence files include those that contain information that could adversely effect an ongoing investigation, create safety hazards for officers, informants or others and/or compromise their identities. Restricted intelligence may only be released by approval of the intelligence OIC or the agency chief executive to authorized law enforcement agencies with a need and a right to know.

(b) Confidential intelligence is less sensitive than restricted intelligence. It may be released to agency personnel when a need and a right to know have been established by the intelligence OIC or his designee.

(c) Unclassified intelligence contains information from the news media, public records and other sources of a topical nature. Access is limited to officers conducting authorized investigations that necessitate this information.

All restricted and confidential files shall be secured, and access to all intelligence information shall be controlled and recorded by procedures established by the intelligence OIC.

(a) Informant files shall be maintained separately from intelligence files.

(b) Intelligence files shall be maintained in accordance with state and federal law.

(c) Release of intelligence information in general and electronic surveillance information and photographic intelligence in particular, to any authorized law enforcement agency shall be...
made only with the express approval of the intelligence OIC and with the stipulation that such intelligence not be duplicated or otherwise disseminated without the approval of this agency’s OIC.

\(d\) All files released under freedom of information provisions or through disclosure shall be carefully reviewed.

Auditing and weeding of files

The OIC is responsible for ensuring that files are maintained in accordance with the goals and objectives of the intelligence authority and include information that is both timely and relevant. To that end, all intelligence files shall be audited and weeded on an annual basis as established by the agency OIC through an independent auditor.

When a file has no further information value and/or meets the criteria of any applicable law, it shall be destroyed. A record of weeded files shall be maintained by the intelligence authority.

SUGGESTED CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES

Every local and national enforcement agency engaged in the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence-related information should consider implementing the following standards and guidelines.

1. **Standard**—Every agency should implement a mission statement dictating the existence and function of its intelligence operations programme.

   **Guidelines**—The mission statement should contain a concise, well-defined mandate describing the programme; the use of the intelligence process in support of the programme; and the programme’s expected results. The statement should clearly delineate the programme’s focus on specific criminal activities and emphasize the use of intelligence as a crime prevention tool dedicated to the concept of community-oriented policing. The statement should specify the programme’s primary function is to help the agency’s chief executive officer (CEO) make rational choices regarding unanticipated criminal threats and the deployment of resources in response to those threats.

2. **Standard**—Every agency should recognize that active management and supervision of the criminal intelligence function are necessary to provide appropriate direction and control, staffing, and logistical support.

   **Guidelines**—Management and supervision of an intelligence operations programme are responsible for providing proper direction, guidelines and procedures, staffing, equipment, training, and direct access to the agency CEO.

3. **Standard**—Every agency should implement a policy and procedures manual detailing its intelligence operations programme, mission, methods of operation, file guidelines, and security procedures.

   **Guidelines**—The manual should depict the programme’s operational policy and procedures; protocol for creating an intelligence-related record on a subject; entering the record into a file and/or database; and/or opening an investigation on a subject. The protocol should be based
on the subject’s involvement, or suspected involvement, in the specific criminal activities focused upon the agency’s mission statement. A criminal predicate is required for all file entries.

4. **Standard**—Every agency should implement a set of guidelines that regulate the contents of its intelligence-related files.

**Guidelines**—The guidelines should conform to national regulations and prescribe the criteria for the retention and weeding of intelligence-related records contained in file. The information must be evaluated for its validity and the source assessed for reliability. Access to the information should be restricted to protect the source, investigation and a subject’s right to privacy.

5. **Standard**—Every agency should implement a process for systematically exploiting intelligence-related information that is intended to prevent and reduce crime.

**Guidelines**—That exploitation should consist of the following intelligence process:

- **Collection**—A planned effort focused on obtaining information identifying suspected or known criminal activity that impacts the jurisdiction.
- **Evaluation**—A determination regarding the validity of obtained information and an assessment of the reliability of the source.
- **Collation**—An orderly arrangement of information that systematically connects related activities in the file.
- **Analysis**—Conversion of information and intelligence that results in useful knowledge and appropriate recommendations to the CEO and the agency.
- **Dissemination**—The intelligence product is provided to personnel who have a “need to know” and a “right to know”.

6. **Standard**—Every agency should implement appropriate training for all personnel assigned to, impacted by, or overseeing the intelligence operations programme.

**Guidelines**—Personnel assigned to the agency’s intelligence operations programme should be trained in all aspects of the intelligence process, along with the guidelines and liability issues pertaining to the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence-related information. An understanding of intelligence, how it works and why it is important with a distinction between intelligence and information should be part of the training foundation. The training should emphasise analysis and clearly explain the terminology and definitions pertaining to intelligence. The agency’s CEO, the rest of the agency’s personnel, the agency’s legal advisor, and appropriate elected and public officials should also be trained or briefed in the intelligence process and the role it plays in the agency’s community-oriented policing programme.

7. **Standard**—Every agency should provide the intelligence operations programme with secure quarters and allow the programme to be a separate entity within the law enforcement agency.

**Guidelines**—Criminal intelligence is a pro-active crime prevention function that operates differently to an enforcement unit. It frequently deals with sensitive information obtained from diverse sources with various levels of credibility. This information must be handled differently to routine investigative information. The intelligence process involves evaluation and analysis and requires that the needs of law enforcement are balanced against the individual’s right to privacy.
The dissemination of this intelligence must be in conjunction with established “right to know” and “need to know” standards. These requirements support the need to assign the intelligence function to a separate unit and to maintain the intelligence file in a secure location.

8. **Standard**—Every agency should implement security precautions for their intelligence related database and information.

**Guidelines**—A directive should be written to govern the security precautions of the agency’s intelligence database and to protect the confidential storage of information in that database. The directive should also declare the files retained by the intelligence operations programme are kept separate from the agency’s other files.

9. **Standard**—Every agency should hold the intelligence operations programme accountable for producing both strategic and tactical products and for maintaining appropriate liaison with local, regional and national law enforcement agencies.

**Guidelines**—The CEO should expect a high level of accountability from personnel assigned to the intelligence operations programme and require both tactical and strategic products on a regular basis. The CEO should require the programme to liaise with neighbouring agencies and participate in regional and national networks so information of mutual interest can be shared and exchanged.

10. **Standard**—Every agency should implement a procedure for evaluating the effectiveness of its intelligence operations programme.

**Guidelines**—Objectives should be established by an agency so the management and operations of the intelligence programme can be evaluated on a regular schedule.

11. **Standard**—Every CEO with a criminal intelligence function should actively champion it and support it as a pro-active crime prevention tool that supports community-oriented policing.

**Guidelines**—The CEO should actively support the intelligence operations programme and ensure it receives the political and budgetary commitment it deserves. The support should extend to obtaining community support for this pro-active law enforcement effort at preventing crime.
Annex. Evaluations

1. POSSIBLE QUESTIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN COMPLIANCE AUDITS/SURVEYS FOR INTELLIGENCE UNITS—PAUL ROGER

**Personnel security**

- What personnel security vetting procedures exist in respect of personnel working within the intelligence area?
- Are periodic security updates conducted for intelligence personnel on a regularly basis?
- Are guidelines in place for disclosure by members should their personal circumstances change?
- What measures are taken by the intelligence unit and its personnel to guard against subversion\(^2\) or other risks to the intelligence unit?

**Physical security**

- Is the intelligence unit physically secured? (If yes, how?)
- Does the security prevent access by unauthorized persons?
- Is access and egress of authorized personnel monitored and recorded?
- Is access ability terminated when personnel are on leave or cease to work in the intelligence unit?
- Are there guidelines on staff taking intelligence material home or out of the building?
- Are there guidelines for transferring material to or from portable storage media?

**Capture of intelligence material**

- Do you have a data capture plan? (Attach copy of relevant documents)
- Does this plan detail procedures/guidelines that govern what intelligence is to be collected and the methods for collection? (Attach copy of relevant documents)
- What procedures are practiced to ensure that only designated data is captured and entered onto the intelligence database?
- Who is responsible for collecting data?
- Who is responsible for ensuring correct procedures are followed in respect of collection?

\(^2\) In the context of personnel security, subversion is the altering of a person's loyalties, or changing a person's moral standards, by the application of some form of coercion. This coercion normally takes the form of bribery, blackmail, psychological pressure or physical threats. Subversion, as a general threat, is best countered by education of staff as to methods, thus allowing individuals to recognize and counter it.
Storage of intelligence material

Hard copy storage

- What procedures are in place to govern the storage, handling and security of hard copy source material? (Give details or attach copies of relevant documents.)
- Do you retain hard copy source documents regarding intelligence information?
- Where are they stored?
- Who has access to these documents?
- How is access controlled?

Electronic storage

- Are there guidelines for recording intelligence material on electronic (IT) systems? (Give details or attach copies of documents.)
- Are there adequate access checks and scrutiny, e.g. passwords etc? How often are passwords changed?
- Is facility access deleted when personnel are on leave or cease to work in the intelligence unit?
- Is the IT system capable of producing an audit trail for any system interrogation?
- Is access graded on a “need-to-access” basis?
- Are files adequately safeguarded through back-up and recovery routines, and off-site storage of critical files, programs and systems?
- Is the IT system isolated from other networks and, if not, are appropriate “firewalls” in place?

Integrity of intelligence

Material quality control

- What quality control procedures are in place to ensure quality of data is maintained?
- In respect of electronic databases, what procedures are in place to ensure quality of data?
- Is there a clear responsibility in a particular position for the continued development, maintenance and implementation of quality control systems?

Culling and destruction

- Do you have procedures for the culling and destruction of intelligence material?
- What criterion is used during the culling process?
- Who is responsible for culling and the subsequent destruction?
- Are staff aware of any relevant archive or related legislation?
- When hard copy material is culled, is corresponding electronic data also culled? (If so, who is responsible for culling electronic data?)
- Are records maintained of culling and destruction exercises? (If so, are they available for inspection?)
- Are staff generally aware of the security and privacy implications of the intelligence function and the collection and storage of intelligence material?
- Is there an adequate system to ensure any amendments or updates to procedures are read and understood?
- Are staff aware of actions they should take and procedures to follow should they encounter any departures from approved and procedures in the operation of the intelligence system?
- Does unit management clearly demonstrate that it insists on the highest standards of ethical and professional behaviour?
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