2nd Workshop on Proactive Approach to Counter Terrorism - Report

11–13 April 2018, Marriott Hotel, Islamabad
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I. Summary of Workshop

UNODC Country Office Pakistan signed an agreement with the Government of Pakistan in 2017 to provide technical assistance in the area of counter-terrorism through its PACT (Pakistan’s Action to Counter Terrorism) project, funded by the European Union. The PACT project aims, among other things, at enhancing coordination between the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and provincial authorities. Under the PACT umbrella, UNODC organised a series of workshops on Threat Assessment and Counter Terrorism coordination called Proactive Approach to Counter Terrorism. After the first two-day workshop on 26–27 October 2017 at PC Bhurban, Murree, a second three-day workshop was organised at Marriott Hotel, Islamabad from 11 to 13 April 2018.

The workshop, which was chaired by Mr Mohsin Hassan Butt, Member of Counter Terrorism and Counter Extremism NACTA, and facilitated by two UNODC consultants, Ms Olivia Hyvrier and Brig (Retd) Khalid Saleem, it brought together 24 participants from law enforcement agencies working on counter-terrorism related issues in all provinces of Pakistan, with the following objectives:

- To enhance stakeholders’ understanding about their role in NACTA’s function of formulating a national level threat assessment.
- To highlight the need of synergized threat assessments for an effective counter-terrorism effort at national and provincial levels.
- To share international experiences and good practices in formulating threat assessments.

On the first day of the workshop, Mr Mohsin Hassan Butt welcomed the participants and trainers and highlighted the latest achievements of NACTA as well as the objectives of the workshop. Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhatti, Director CT, NACTA, made a presentation on the organizational roles and functions of NACTA. He briefed on NACTA’s present structure, as well as its projects, such as a future terrorist databank, the national explosives regulatory policy, the development of Joint Intelligence Department (currently in recruitment phase, to be operational as of June 2018) and the ongoing research on terrorism and violent extremism.

Mr Arsalan Malik, Associate Programme Coordinator from UNODC briefed the audience on the United Nations mandate in combating terrorism and the four pillars of the UN CT Strategy adopted in 2006 and highlighted the different strands of the PACT Project.

Following the introductory session, the first day of the workshop was dedicated to presentations by Interpol’s representative, Mr Ommaney Chinyungurwa, Capacity Building Training Officer at Interpol’s Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore, and to a visit to NACTA’s new Headquarters, facilitated by the National Coordinator Mr. Ihsan Ghani.

Mr Ommaney Chinyungurwa presented Interpol’s structure, key role and responsibilities in the international fight against terrorism. While illustrating Interpol’s five action streams programme on Counter-Terrorism (identification, travel and movements, online presence, weapons, finances), he amply highlighted the role of National Central Bureaus (NCBs). Later he made a presentation on the role of Interpol’s policing capabilities to counter terrorism, including the different tools (17 databases) available to Member States in the fight against terrorism. Major databases to be used for counter-terrorism are: Mobile and Fixed Interpol Network Database (MIND/FIND), Interpol’s Criminal Information System (ICIS), Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) analytical file (created in 2015), Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFSIS), Facial Recognition Database (FR), DNA gateway, Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD), EDISON travel document database, Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (IARMS), Interpol Ballistic Information Network (IBIN) and GEIGER database
(CBRN). Other Interpol’s tools available to assist Member States can also be of interest in the context of counter-terrorism, like the Interpol’s Major Events Support Teams (IMEST), the Incident Response Teams (IRT) or the Disaster Victim Identification (DVI).

Towards the end of the first day’s session, participants visited NACTA Headquarters, where they were briefed by National Coordinator, Mr Ihsan Ghani, about the terrorism and extremism challenges faced by the country, also they were apprised of NACTA’s efforts to counter violent extremism, terrorism including its financing.

The second day was mainly devoted to presentations of threat assessment models from various countries.

Ms Olivia Hyvriër, from UNODC, made a presentation on threat assessment models and structures in Europe (the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland) and other countries including the United States. She explained the threat assessment process and rationale as well as the stakeholders involved. She also briefed on the use of threat assessment products at operational and policy levels, and as tools to interact with the general public.

Mr David Thorne, from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), introduced the participants to the Canadian threat assessment model: its coordination centre, the ITAC (Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre), its clients from intelligence and law enforcement (RCMP and CSIS), Army, Immigration and Border management, government oversight and policy. He also introduced two case studies (about Aaron Driver and Michael Zehaf Bibeau).

Major General Rajaguru, from Sri Lankan Army, made a presentation about Sri Lanka’s strategy and model. He talked about Sri Lanka’s thirty-year fight against Tamil Tigers separatist group (LTTE) and its impact on national security. He presented the current threat assessment for Sri Lanka, insisting on possible re-emergence of LTTE terrorism, birth of other terrorist groups, ethnic divisions, maritime security and organized crimes. He also explained the process of threat assessment and policy response in Sri Lanka.

Captain Nishantha Ranaweera, from Sri Lankan navy, deliberated upon Sri Lanka’s assessment and perception of upcoming challenges in relation to maritime security in the region. His presentation focused on emerging security threats in the context of maritime terrorism, transnational crimes, piracy, illegal fishing activities, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and human trafficking.

Later in the day, Ms Olivia Hyvriër briefed the participants on elements of methodology for different terrorist threat assessment products, highlighting areas which need to be taken into consideration while drafting threat assessments as well as how to analyze trends and their possible evolution. In an interactive session, the two facilitators of the workshop (Olivia Hyvriër and Brig (Retd) Khalid Saleem) also discussed the methodology for different products such as civil aviation threat assessment, terrorist use of the Internet, and impact of Syrian crisis on national threat assessment (including the question of Foreign Terrorist Fighters).

Towards the end of the second day’s session, participants were divided into four groups to carry out a scenario-based exercise on a possible national threat model. The scenario was simulated attacks on Universities in Peshawar and Karachi by a terrorist group considered dismantled. Each group presented its threat and information sharing model for the incident. Finally, the participants agreed on a possible template acknowledging NACTA’s central role in the process.
On the third day, Brig (Retd) Khalid Saleem, UNODC’s Consultant and Facilitator, through a presentation discussed the Possible Template for a threat assessment by NACTA. He emphasised that correct threat assessment is the basic requirement for an effective and proactive counter-terrorism approach. He further emphasised that for a correct threat assessment, it is important to understand the root causes, drivers, basic pillars and manifestations of terrorism besides correctly identifying the threat indicators through properly developed institutional threat perception and analytical ability. During the course of discussion, participants agreed that a terrorism-related national level threat assessment template may contain six group headings namely, Introduction, Aim, Environment (Global, Regional, Internal), Threat Spectrum (both Present and Potential), Analysis & Major Conclusions and Recommendations. He also explained various subjects, topics and threat indicators needed to be evaluated under each heading.

After the presentation, participants were again divided into four groups for developing mock threat assessments based on the agreed template format. Overall participants showed a good understanding of the template.

At the end of the workshop, UNODC officer-in-charge, Ms Jouhaida Hanano, Head of Cooperation at the EU Delegation, Mr Bernard François, and National Coordinator NACTA, Mr Ihsan Ghani, proffered their concluding remarks. Mr Bernard François thanked the UNODC and participants for a very informative and professionally rewarding workshop and highlighted the strategic engagement plan under discussion at policy level with the Government of Pakistan. Ms Jouhaida Hanano and Mr Ihsan Ghani both appreciated the relationship between UNODC and NACTA, and assured to jointly organise such workshops in the future.

Finally, the participants were awarded certificates jointly by the representatives of the three organisations.
II. Mandate of UNODC in Pakistan with specific reference to its engagement with NACTA – Presentation by Mr Arsalan Malik, UNODC
Main United Nations Counter Terrorism Bodies

United Nations counter-terrorism bodies are tasked with three main functions:

1. Provide CT needs assessments and gap analysis, a function supported by Security Council-mandated bodies.
2. Deliver CT capacity building and technical assistance.
3. Ensure coordination and coherence of CT efforts.

UNODC’s Role (Terrorism Related)

UNODC’s work in preventing and countering terrorism focuses on:

- Promote the ratification & implementation of the 19 international legal instruments against terrorism;
- Assist Member States to bring their CT legislation in line with these instruments;
- Provide training to criminal justice officials aimed at strengthening their capacities to prevent and combat terrorism;
- Strengthen regional and international cooperation in criminal matters.
UNODC’s Global Contribution

UNODC’s global contribution to strengthen the capacity of Member States was appreciated by the Secretary General in May 2017.

Since 2003, UNODC has contributed to 688 additional ratifications of the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and to the revision or drafting of 156 pieces of legislation.

More than 26,000 criminal justice officials received enhanced knowledge and expertise in terrorism prevention issues.

UNODC’s Support to Government of Pakistan

[Description of projects and initiatives related to terrorism prevention and support to the Government of Pakistan]
**Rule of Law and UNODC**

- A joint initiative of NACTA and UNODC to strengthen Pakistan’s response to Counter Terrorism with a Special Reference to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

**PACT**

- Islamabad Capital Territory Police (ICT)
- National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)
- Home Department (KP)
- KP Police
- Counter Terrorism Department (CTD)
- Research and Analysis Wing
- Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL)
- Counter Terrorism Cell

**Rol: Targeted Assistance**

- Pre Investigation
- Investigation
- Federal & Provincial Coordination
- Adjudication
- Prosecution Department
- Prosecution

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**The Composition of Project Steering Committee is as per below:**

a) National Coordinator, NACTA or a person designated by him (Chairman),

b) Joint Secretary, Ministry of Interior (Member),

c) Joint Secretary, Ministry of Narcotics Control (Member),

d) Joint Secretary (EU). Economic Affairs Division (Member),

e) Director General. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Member),

f) Home Secretary, KP, (Member),

g) Inspector General of Police ICT (Member),

h) Country Representative EU (Member),

i) Country Representative UNODC (Member).
Strategy

- Sustainability
- Partnership
- Qualitative Analysis
- Cost-Effectiveness
- International Best Practices

On-going feedback from the Project Steering Committee

Assistance delivered under PACT (Highlights)

- UNODC Pakistan in collaboration with NACTA launched a Case Management System for the Prosecution Department of KP.
- Improve the capacity of investigators in Crime Scene Management including evidence collection post terrorist incidents. (Manual)
- Develop training manuals for CTD personnel and the KP Police training schools to ensure a common standard of training. (7 thematic areas)
- Improve Federal-Provincial Coordination in information sharing between NACTA and CTDs. (Threat Assessment Workshops)
- Assisting NACTA for developing national and provincial policy and strategy related documents i.e. Witness Protection, Counter Terrorism Financing.
- Enhance the knowledge and skills of personnel at Forensic Science Laboratory KP and promote the use of forensic evidence in prosecuting terrorism related cases.
Thank you
www.unodc.org/pakistan
III. Roles and functions of NACTA – Presentation by Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhatti, Director CT, NACTA

Introduction

- Establishment of NACTA - 2008
- NACTA Act -2013
- Headed by - National Coordinator
- Assisted by - 3 Members i.e
  - Member (CT & CVE)
  - Member (Research & ICT)
  - Member (Joint Intelligence Directorate)
Functions

- To receive and collate data or information or intelligence and disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism.

- To coordinate and prepare comprehensive National counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies and review them on periodical basis.

- To develop action plans against terrorism and extremism and report to the Federal Government about implementation of these plans on periodical basis.

Functions (Cont..)

- To carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and to prepare and circulate documents.

- To carry out liaison with international entities for facilitating cooperation in areas relating to terrorism and extremism.

- To review relevant laws and suggest amendments to the Federal Government.

- To appoint committees of experts from Government and non-Government organizations for deliberations in areas related to the mandate and functions of the Authority.
Government’s Counter Terrorism Strategy

- National Action Plan
- Military Operations i.e.
  - Operation Rah-e-Nijat (SWA, FATA June, 09 to Dec. 09)
  - Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat, May, 09 – July, 09)
  - Operation Zarb-e-Azb (NWA, FATA, Balochistan, Karachi, South Punjab June, 2014 still continue)
  - Radd ul Fasad (Since Feb, 2017)

INTERNAL SECURITY MATRIX

Critical areas
- FATA
- KPK
- Balochistan
- Sindh
- South Punjab

Critical Themes
- Sectarian violence
- Governance & safe havens
- Cross-Border attacks
- Diverse militant landscape
- Nationalist Movements in Balochistan
- Military presence in KPK
- Actual & Perceived militancy in South Punjab

State Response
- Continuation of Zarb-e-Azb & Radd ul Fasad
- Formulation of long term policies
- National Action Plan
  - Large number of suspected terrorists arrested
  - 100% in urban areas
  - Stop & search / combing operations
  - 134.9 million SIMs verified & 30,000ivan blocked
  - Counter-terrorism
  - Monitoring of UDB/Schedulers

Soft Interventions
- CT & OVE Policies
- NAP
- Misadis Reforms
- CTF
- Securing cyber space
- Revamping CIS

Threat

NACTA PAKISTAN
CT Measures by NACTA

- Monitoring of National Action Plan
- Schedule-IV: Rationalization, Implementation, Monitoring & Databank
- National Counter Extremism Policy
- Policy on Maddaris Reforms
- Terrorist databank
- Intelligence Control Room
- CT Helpline-1717/ Hot line Hate Speech
- Android-iOS App (CHAUKAS)

Continued..

- SurfSafe Portal
- National Narrative
- National Explosive Regulatory Policy
- Revamping Criminal Justice System
- Taskforce on Chocking Terrorist Financing
- Raising of FMUs at Provincial CTDs
- Obligatory Cash Declaration Policy
- Branchless Banking Monitoring
**TASKS**

- Receive, Process and Disseminate Daily Situation Report (DSR)
- Issue timely threat alerts/ warnings based on credible information received from contributing agencies/ organizations and/ or collated information
- Develop capacity for real time access to mega databases like Telcos, IBMS, NADRA, Census Data, Excise & Taxation, Passports etc

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**Threat Alerts**

Since year 2014 till date, National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) has disseminated **5602 x Threat Alerts** based on the information received from different Intelligence departments.
Thank You

FEDERAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- Dte Gen ISI
- Service Int Agencies (3)
- Int Bureau
- MSA
- ANF
- ASF
- CAFs (6)
- SPD Security
- FBR
- FIA

- FATA Sectt
- Passports
- CAA
- FMU
- NADRA
- NH & MP
- Railway Police
- ICT Police
PROVINCIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- Home Department
- Police
- Special Branch
- Criminal Investigation Dept
- Counter Terrorism Dept
- Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU)
- Prisons
- Excise & Taxation
- Land Revenue

PROPOSED DESK TEAMS

- Mol
- Dte Gen ISI
- Mil Int
- Naval Int
- Air Int
- Int Bureau
- ANF
- ASF
- CAFs (6)
- SPD Security
- FBR

- FIA
- FATA Sectt
- Passport & Immigration
- CAA
- FMU
- NADRA
- NH & MP
- ICT Police
- Provincial Desk Teams (6)
ESSENTIAL DESK TEAMS

- Mol
- Dte Gen ISI
- Mil Int
- Naval Int
- Air Int
- Int Bureau

- FIA
- FATA Sectt
- ICT Police
- Provincial Desk Teams (6)
IV. Interpol’s Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and role of NCBs – Presentation by Mr Ommaney Chinyungurwa

Introduction to INTERPOL

Key roles and responsibilities
INTERPOL an International Organization

- International organization subject to International Law
- The Constitution outlines INTERPOL’s aims and objectives
  - it establishes the mandate of the Organization and guides the way for effective international police cooperation.
Mandate

Article 2:
To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”;

Article 3:
It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.
A GLOBAL STRUCTURE

Structure and Governance

- Strategy
- Implementation
- Oversight

SECRETARY GENERAL
Mr. Jürgen STOCK

PRESIDENT
Mr. MENG Hongwei
Over a century of international police cooperation

1914 - First Police Congress - Monaco
1923 - International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) created - Vienna, Austria
1946 - Red Notice issued
1956 - ICPC becomes ICPO-INTERPOL
1971 - UN recognizes INTERPOL
1989 - HQ moves from Paris to Lyon
2002 - 24/7 launched
2015 - INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation
2017 - 192 Member Countries

192 MEMBER COUNTRIES CONNECTED THROUGH A SECURE NETWORK
The RPD ensures the efficiency and quality of international cooperation between criminal police authorities through INTERPOL channels, with due respect for the basic rights of the persons who are the subject of this cooperation, in conformity with Article 2.

- Impact of LEA actions on individuals
- Creates TRUST
- Allows for Risk Management
Art 10. Purposes of international police cooperation

- to search for a wanted person;
- to locate a person or an object of interest;
- to obtain information related to a criminal investigation;
- to warn about a modus operandi related to criminal activities;
- to identify a person or a dead body;
- to carry out forensic analyses;
- to carry out security checks;
- to identify threats, crime trends and criminal networks.

Data Protection Principles

- Art 11. Lawfulness
- Art 12. Quality
- Art 13. Transparency
- Art 14. Confidentiality
- Art 15. Security
- Art 16. External processing for Police Purposes
Provisions common to notices

The request must be submitted in at least one of the Organization’s working languages;

The NCB or international entity must ensure:

- the quality and lawfulness of the data
- that the request fulfils the conditions linked to its publication
- that the data are of interest for the purposes of international police cooperation
- that the request is in compliance with INTERPOL’s rules (particularly articles 2 and 3)

The General Secretariat checks compliance for all color notices and Special notices

Notices and Diffusions Task Force

Created to conduct additional legal review of Notices

- NCB: Request for Publication
- NDTF: Review and decide on an action depending on the complexity of the case
- NCB: Respond to messages requesting further information on the case
- NDTF: Decision on the compliance of the Notice or Diffusion
THREE GLOBAL PROGRAMMES

COUNTER-TERRORISM

CYBERCRIME

ORGANIZED AND EMERGING CRIME

COUNTER-TERRORISM

PREVENTING AND DISRUPTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF TERRORIST NETWORKS AND THEIR AFFILIATES
**Action Stream: IDENTIFICATION**

- **Mission:**
  - Detection and positive identification of members of known transnational terrorist groups and their facilitators

- Maintain international data flow between law enforcement agencies
- Enhance data flow from military forces deployed to relevant hotspots
- Promote systematic inclusion of biometrics
- Improve positive identification of jailed terrorist suspects/convicts

**THE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS PROJECT**

**DETECT & IDENTIFY:**

- Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)
- FTF Networks
- FTF Travel Routes
- Dangerous Returnees & High Risk FTFs
CRIMINAL ANALYSIS FILE

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM LAW ENFORCEMENTS

OSINT

SOCMINT

CRIMINAL ANALYSIS FILE

OUTCOMES

➢ STRATEGIC REPORTS

European Transnational Fighters in Syria

Foreign Fighters from the Asia Region

Travel routes used by FTF

Photo album
MI-LEX: MILITARY TO LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA EXCHANGE
BRINGING BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION TO FRONTLINE OFFICERS

1. Military collects information from battlefield during operations.
2. Information is declassified and shared with the relevant INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB).
3. INTERPOL NCB processes critical data according to INTERPOL rules.
4. Information is entered into our global databases and analytical files.
5. Authorized frontline officers in member countries access the information via our secure communications network.

Mission:
Enhancing national and regional border security and reducing cross-border mobility of terrorists and their affiliates, and in identifying and disrupting networks that facilitate their travel.

Action Stream: TRAVEL AND MOBILITY

- Ensure systematic and rapid population of SLTD database.
- Enable access to frontline, hotspots and border posts, including in the context PNR/API systems.
- Identify high-value chokepoints, patterns and routes via strategic analysis.
- Identify facilitators.smuggling rings through operational intelligence analysis.
- Facilitate intelligence-led screening operations in high-value terrorist travel nodes.
**Mission:**
Preventing and countering the exploitation and abuse of cyberspace for terrorist purposes, by enhancing identification and detection efforts

**Online Presence**
- Promote systematic inclusion of digital identifiers in INTERPOL alerts
- Improve member countries awareness and capacity in the collection of Internet Service Provider (ISP) information

**Mission:**
Identification, tracking and interception of the illicit trafficking of weapons and materials necessary for terrorist activities

**Weapons & Materials**
- **Promote connection to iARMS** by member countries and seek interoperability with other national and regional systems
- Facilitate intelligence sharing among member countries about subjects and modus operandi linked to CBRN and IED incidents
- Enhance the capacity of countries to prevent and respond to CBRN and IED attacks by establishing countermeasure programmes
INTERPOL CBRNE METHODOLOGY

Prevention
Entire supply chain; Heighten awareness, report suspicious transactions, multi national, multi agency approach

Detection
Law enforcement supported by detection technologies across agencies

Response
Networks, best practices, exercises and training EEODN, IBDCWG, WCO

INTERPOL Watchmaker: Case

INTERPOL Chemical Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit (ChemEx) received alarm message on individual checked on the border and linked to project Watchmaker

Alarm message was triggered from NCB Yerevan, Armenia, while checking arriving passengers in the international airport

Individual appears to be subject of INTERPOL red notice issued by NCB Bahrain.
Charged for attempting murder, possessing and using improvised explosive device for terrorist purposes
Mission:
Trace and disrupt financial streams and direct financial supporters behind terrorist activity

Action Stream: FINANCES

- Promote inclusion of available financial identity/information in existing INTERPOL alerts
- Aid identification of vulnerable segments of terrorist commodity value chains via information sharing

INTERPOL Counter-Terrorism Strategy & Mandate

5 CT Action Streams

- IDENTIFICATION
- TRAVEL & MOBILITY
- WEAPONS & MATERIALS
- ONLINE PRESENCE
- BORDER SECURITY
- POLICE DATA MANAGEMENT
- INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
- FORENSICS

5 Selected Policing Capabilities
Thank you for your kind attention

NCB Role & Responsibilities
Status and role of the NCBs

NCBs are the natural stakeholders of the INTERPOL Information System

NCBs are the source of the data they record in the INTERPOL Information System

NCBs can authorize access to the INTERPOL Information System at national level

NCBs must control and supervise the access to and use of the INTERPOL Information System

Status and role of the NCBs

1. The NCBs are the natural stakeholders of the INTERPOL Information System:

   • Art. 5(4): “At the national level, the NCBs shall play a central role concerning the processing of data in the INTERPOL Information System”.

   • Art. 6(1): “NCBs are entitled to direct access to the System in the performance of their functions pursuant to the Constitution.”

   • Art. 7(1): “NCBs [...] shall retain, at all times, control over the processing of their data...”
Status and role of the NCBs

2. The NCBs are the source of the data they record in the INTERPOL Information System

They may therefore:
- Decide to transmit or disclose the data
- Restrict the access to or the use of the data
- Decide to delete the data, or on the contrary extend their retention

Status and role of the NCBs

3. NCBs can authorize access to the INTERPOL Information System at national level

- NCBs may grant access to the INTERPOL Information System to national entities of their country
- Several conditions must be fulfilled, by the national entity and by the NCB

- The extent of the access and processing rights are defined by the NCB, and must be laid down in a prior agreement between the NCB and the entity
- National entities operate under the responsibility of their NCB
Status and role of the NCBs

4. NCBs must control and supervise the access to and use of the INTERPOL Information System

NCBs must:

- Manage and register access rights granted at an individual level
- Appoint at least one security officer to ensure compliance with security procedures
- Designate a data protection officer to monitor the data processing operations performed by the authorized users of the NCB
- Regularly evaluate their national entities

NCBs and National Entities
Supporting Regional Operations

**OPERATION SUNBIRD III**
Counter-Terrorism Border Operation across ASEAN
27 MARCH - 5 APRIL 2017

Government of Canada
Government of Canada

www.isspols.net
35 Operational Spots: 27 March – 05 April 2017

OPERATION OBJECTIVES

• Use training and improved national and international partnerships to improve border security. **Catch more criminals/terrorists transiting borders!**

• Increase systematic screening of travelers and travel documents against INTERPOL databases.

• Increase number and quality of INTERPOL Notices and Diffusions.

• Promote systematic use of biometrics to identify criminals/terrorists.
OPERATION STRUCTURE:
Operational Coordination Unit (OCU)

- 10 ASEAN Member States
- Conducted I-Batch searches on databases.

OPERATION STRUCTURE:
National Local Units (NLUs) / Operational Spots

- Included representatives from the NCB, Immigration, Counter-Terrorism, and other units.
- Conducted systematic screenings of individuals and their passports against INTERPOL databases.
- Sent a daily report and communicated incidents immediately to the OCU.
- Deployment of INTERPOL Staff to provide additional on-site operational support
OPERATION RESULTS:
INTERPOL Database Searches = 8 million

Nominal searches: 2.2 million
(all I-Batch)

SLTD searches: 3.7 million
(I-Batch: 2 million, MIND: 1.4 million, FIND: 0.2 million)

TDAWN searches: 2.1 million

OPERATION RESULTS:
Summary of Hits, Arrests, Seizures

- SLTD Hits: 110
- Nominal Hits: 3 Red, 1 Blue, 1 Yellow
- TDAWN Hits: 1
- Arrests: 17 (15 non-database related, 2 database)
- Sentinel and Top Wanted Hits: 11
- Passports seized: 2
Summary

- NCBs are the natural stakeholders of the INTERPOL Information System
- NCBs are the source of the data they record in the INTERPOL Information System
- NCBs can authorize access to the INTERPOL Information System at national level
- NCBs must control and supervise the access to and use of the INTERPOL Information System
V. Interpol’s, 1 24/7 and tools available to Member States – Presentation by Mr Ommaney Chinyungurwa

Deployment of INTERPOL Policing
Capabilities to counter Terrorism

Terrorism is an global threat and
requires a global response

How can INTERPOL assist before a
Terrorist Incident?
Providing a secure platform for sharing information

INTERPOL Global Communication System 1-24/7

- Connect 192 member countries
- Platform of operational exchange of information
- Portal to INTERPOL databases
- Instant and 24/7 access
- Secure and reliable
Extension of the INTERPOL’s I-24/7

WORLDWIDE SECURE

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

AIRPORTS

POLICE - SPECIAL UNITS

BORDERS - MIGRATIONS

NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAUS - NCO

POLICE STATIONS

PORTS

COMMUNICATION VIA I-24/7

Mobile INTERPOL Network Database (MIND)
Fixed INTERPOL Network Database (FIND)

Capabilities for Operational Support and Border Control Management

**Tools**
- Electronic Automated Search Facility (e-ASF2)
- MIND/FIND
- I-Batch
- I-Check it
INTERPOL Criminal Information System (ICIS)
205,873 records

Date of creation: 1998

The database contains records on persons who are subjects of notices and diffusions
(caught, charged, suspect, criminal history, witness, victim, missing, unidentified person, unidentified body, deceased, possible threat, subject to UN sanction)

Recorded data: ID particulars, photograph, fingerprint, criminal history

Access: eASF2, FIND, I-24/7, I-Batch

- Travel Routes
- Motive Operandi
- Open Sources Information
- Personal Information
- Nominal data
- Sensitive data
- 48 countries and the United Nations contributing data

Border Operation targeting FTFs in South East Asia

- 438 wanted persons including FTFs shared
- 44 arrests made
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)

**184 377 records**

**Date of creation:** 2000

The database contains ten print and crime scene mark fingerprints of convicted nationals and non-nationals of a member country, unsolved crime scene marks, fingerprints of fugitives and missing persons.

**Recorded data:** ten print and crime scene mark fingerprint

**Access:** 24/7 (AFIS Gateway)

Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).

**Tenprints**
- Foreign nationals arrested in your country
- Fugitives
- Issued Notices and Diffusions
- Nationals suspected of transnational crimes

**Crime Scene Marks**
- Unresolved Crimes
Facial Recognition database
44 537

Date of creation: 2016

Storage of high-resolution images and metadata of facial images that are submitted by member countries and international organizations along with I-Link notices, diffusions for international comparisons.

Recorded data: facial images, EP Number, Country of Origin, Gender

Access: Indirect

Facial Recognition

Mobile Facial Recognition System:

Makes selected images available through mobile devices in order to assist operations and investigations in the field.
NEC Mobile Face Recognition Appliance

✓ What is Mobile Facial Recognition Appliance (MFRA)?
A small highly mobile appliance with embedded software for face recognition which works in conjunction with a HD video camera that captures faces in realtime.

![NEC Mobile Face Recognition Appliance](image1)

The Mobile Method

Stage 1 - Facial Recognition

- Selected facial images will be inserted into the device database
- HD video surveillance cameras will be strategically placed to capture the maximum number of facial images

![Mobile Face Recognition Appliance](image2)

- This will be completely unobtrusive and act as a filter/screen
- The interface will be monitored by a trained officer
- In the event of a ‘potential candidate’ we move to Stage 2
The Mobile Method

Stage 2 – Fingerprint Comparison

- The ‘potential match’ generated by the facial device will alert the border guard for the need to fingerprint the subject.
- The fingerprint device will have a database that corresponds to the images in the facial device.
- It should appear as a normal step of the border process.

- The fingerprint comparison will be instantaneous and will either confirm or exclude the identity of the subject.

DNA Gateway

175 003 records

Date of creation: 2002

The database contains DNA profiles obtained from samples collected from crime scenes, offenders, missing persons or unidentified bodies.

Recorded data: DNA profiles and case information

Access: 24/7 (DNA Gateway)
Types of DNA profiles

1. CRIME SCENE
2. REFERENCE
3. MISSING PERSON
4. UNIDENTIFIED HUMAN REMAINS

INTERPOL DNA Database

Use of INTERPOL DNA Gateway

1. **DVI** - In case of disasters where foreigners are victims
2. **CSI** – crime is believed to be committed by foreigner
3. **Fugitive** – criminal is believed to be hiding abroad
4. **Missing person**
**Stolen Lost Travel Documents**

76 217 926 records

Date of creation: 2002

The database contains records on lost, stolen and revoked travel documents, such as passports, identity cards or visa stamps, including stolen blank travel documents.

Recorded data: DIN, document type, issuing country.

Access: eASF2, FIND, MIND, I-Batch

---

**Travel Documents**

In the wrong hands, your passport is a weapon of mass destruction

INTERPOL Secretary General

For terrorist, your passport can be more dangerous than a bomb

For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons

9/11 Commission Report

???
Blatant Security Gaps

> 2.2 BILLION

~3.3 BILLION PASSENGERS

~1.1 BILLION SLTD CHECKS

2016

Travel Documents in SLTD
Purpose and Function

**PURPOSE**
- To enable law enforcement entities to prevent lost/stolen documents from being used in an illegal manner

**FUNCTION**
- The exchange of accurate, reliable information on lost/stolen TD, available on a real-time basis, and accessible from the collection created at the GS and/or from national databases.

Crossing Three Walls

- TRUSTED TRAVELLER PROGRAMMES
  - ETIAS in European Union
  - e-VISA SERVICE
- API and
  - PNR SYSTEMS
- MIND and
  - FIND SOLUTIONS
SLTD SOPP AND NATIONAL SOP

PROCESSING
VALIDATING
SOPP
N SOP

Lost Passport in UAE:
What to do?

SLTD SOPP

National Operating Procedure on the use of INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database

Philippines Guidelines/Policies on Stolen, Lost, Travel Documents (SLTD)

LEA & ROLES
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
MESSAGE FORMATS
PROCEDURE IF NOT ANSWERED
BEST PRACTICES
VERIFICATION CHAIN
FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2178 (2014)

Addressing the growing threat of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs)

Paragraph 9
“Calls upon Member States to require that airlines operating in their territories provide API to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011).”

EDISON Travel Document Database

Date of creation: 2011

The database contains relevant information on genuine travel and identity documents issued by member countries and international organizations. Information and software are provided to IPSG by the Dutch National Criminal Police Agency

Recorded data: images, descriptions

Access: I-24/7, Https
Edison TD
INTERPOL Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System
Database
849 443 records
Date of creation: 2013

The database contains records from member countries on lost, stolen, trafficked and smuggled firearms

Recorded data: serial no, make caliber, event

Access: 24/7

HIT SCENARIO
**INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network (IBIN)**

1 031 991 exhibits

**Date of creation:**

2009

The database combines digital signatures of 2D and 3D digital images of discharged bullets and cartridge cases from IBIN member countries.

**Recorded data:** bullets, casings, exhibits

**Access:** Dedicated network
What is IBIN?

An international repository of ballistic images to facilitate cross-border data sharing.
5 Mandatory Identifiers of a Firearm

Make

Calibre

Model

Country of manufacture

Serial Number

> 250,000 References
> 57,000 images
SUPPORT IN THE FIELD

MAJOR EVENTS

MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS

MAJOR DISASTERS

What is an IMEST?

• INTERPOL Major Events Support Team

• Events that attract foreign visitors / media attention

• Assist the security of the event and provides necessary training

Tailored to specific needs
Benefits of an IMEST

2. Investigative support

- INTERPOL Specialized units
- Immediate liaison with INTERPOL experts
- Use of INTERPOL Policing Capabilities

9 INTERPOL Major Event Support Teams in 2016
INTERPOL Response Team (IRT)

What is an IRT?

An INTERPOL Incident Response Team (IRT) is deployed at the request of a member country during a crisis situation.

Composed of expert police, INTERPOL staff, and external partners, who provide investigative and analytical support at the site of the incident.

The teams promote cooperation among countries and facilitate access to INTERPOL’s Policing Capabilities.
What Does an IRT Provide?

- Real-time assistance
- Operation liaison
- Language support
- Disaster Victim identification

When is an IRT deployed?

There are two types of IRTs:

- **Crime** – The deployment of specialized personnel to assist and support a member country faced with a major investigation.

- **Disaster** – An emergency response to unforeseen catastrophic events, such as large-scale accidents or natural disasters;
Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)

Consists of specialists from all areas of forensic and investigative expertise
IDENTIFICATION METHODS

Primary:
- Fingerprints
- Dental records
- DNA

Secondary:
- Personal description
- Medical findings / clothing
- Tattoos

RECENT IRTs DEPLOYED

- Paris attack 2015
- Terrorist November
- Nice attack
- Terrorist March 2016
- Mali Algerie 2014
- Burkina Faso Mass shooting Jan 2016
- Brazil AF447 June 2009
- Rosny-sur-Bois (Germanwings) March 2015
- Ukraine MH17 July 2014
- Indian Ocean Tsunami December 2004
- Surubaya Air Asia 8501 January 2015
- Kenya Westgate Mall Terrorist attack September 2013

WHAT IS DVI WORK?
IRT TSUNAMI, 26 Dec 2004

230,000 victims in 14 countries
Thailand: 5,400 victims, 3,100 missing, 2,400 foreigners
36 countries
International DVI-Teams 400 personnel from 30 countries

Disaster Support

Malaysia Airlines MH17

• At approx 14:15 GMT on 17 July 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (Boeing 777-200ER) flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur and carrying 283 passengers and 15 crew crashed in east Ukraine.

• All 298 people on board a Malaysia Airlines plane have died
INTERPOL Global Alerts – Supporting CT Investigations

Wanted for Arrest
Information Request
Warning: Known Offenders
Missing Person
Security Alert
Modus Operandi
Unidentified Bodies
UN Sanctioned Entities

Black Notice on Suspected suicide bombers
Orange Notice for Improvised Explosive Devices

The production of IEDs from Somalia to regional countries fueling terrorism in the region

Thank you for your kind attention
Thank you for your kind Attention
VI. National Threat Assessment models – Presentation by Ms Olivia Hyvrier

PRESENTATION

2 PARTS

1st PART:
THREAT ASSESSMENTS, WHO? HOW? WHY? FOR WHOM?

WHO drafts the national terrorism THREAT ASSESSMENT in most countries?

HOW is it drafted? WHAT material/input does it rely on?

WHY do countries prepare National Terrorism THREAT ASSESSMENTS?

FOR WHOM do countries prepare National Terrorism THREAT ASSESSMENTS? Who are their clients?

2nd PART:
TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT LEVEL SYSTEMS
WHO drafts NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENTS?

- Intelligence/security services

- More and more countries have a Counter Terrorism coordination or fusion centre
  - JTAC for UK
  - CITCO for Spain
  - OCAM for Belgium
  - NCT for Sweden

- Sometimes the CT coordination is part of the National Centre for Intelligence
  - Ex: US NCTC is part of the DNI

WHY COORDINATION or FUSION CENTRES?

REASONS:
Multiplication of sources of information
  - Fragmentation
  - Need to know
  - Different mandates
  - Lack of uniformity

EXAMPLE: US after 9/11
- multiple agencies
- amount of information
- lack of coordination
EXAMPLE: US NCTC

THREAT ANALYSIS
Under NCTA, NCTC serves as the primary organization in the USG for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the USG pertaining to terrorism and CT threats, intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism.

INFORMATION SHARING
NCTC ensures that other agencies with CT missions have access to and receive intelligence needed to accomplish assigned activities. NCTC’s analysis is coordinated throughout the USG, including senior policymakers and other members of the policy, intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities.

IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
NCTC has the statutory responsibility to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terrorist groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT
NCTC’s role as the National Intelligence Manager for CT (NIM/CT) requires integrating the CT mission across intelligence functions, disciplines, and activities to achieve unity of effort and effect.

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL PLANNING
NCTC has the statutory responsibility to conduct strategic and operational planning for CT activities across the USG, integrating all elements of national power—diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement efforts and among the agencies.

HOW? PROCESS

Information & intelligence material

Other departments (economics, foreign affairs, FIU)

Law enforcement agencies (security services)

Open sources

Coordination/fusion center

Other departments (economics, foreign affairs, FIU)

Law enforcement agencies (security services)

Open sources

Coordinating/fusion center

THREAT ASSESSMENT
US – NCTC EXAMPLE

The National Counterterrorism Center

FOR WHOM? CLIENTS

RECIPIENTS

INTERNAL USE

LEAs
INTELLIGENCE/
SECURITY SERVICES

NATIONAL OR
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT

GENERAL PUBLIC
CIVIL SOCIETY
PEOPLE
SECURITY APPARATUS  
(LEAs, Sec. & intel. Services, army)

**OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES**

**DISRUPTION**
**NEUTRALISATION**

**LEAs:**
arrest terrorists & bring them to justice

**NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

---

SECURITY APPARATUS  
(LEAs, Sec. & intel. Services, army)

**STRATEGIC PLANNING**

**ORGANISATION**

ADAPTATION TO THREAT

**HR**

**RESSOURCE MANAGEMENT**

---
GOVERNMENT

POLICY MAKING

UK CT strategy Contest
EU CT strategy

CT STRATEGY

CT ACTION PLAN

THREAT ASSESSMENT

NISP
NAP

GOVERNMENT

NEW LAWS & REGULATIONS
On weapons, explosives
AT laws

THREAT ASSESSMENT

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
CIVIL SOCIETY
INFORMATION - AWARENESS RAISING

• INFORMATION
  threat assessment online

• TRANSPARENCY
  Results

• DEMOCRACY

• AWARENESS RAISING
  vigilance

• COMMUNITY POLICING
  local captors

• Involving CIVIL SOCIETY in the response

Example of Sweden: NCT

What products?
Long term & short-term strategic assessments
Terrorist threat against Sweden and Swedish interests
Strategic analyses of incidents, trends and international developments
Impact on the future for Sweden and Swedish interests

For Whom?
various Government Offices
14 government agencies (part of the Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council)

Why?
Collaboration between government agencies leads to better threat assessments
Better threat assessments lead to more effective use of combined knowledge of all agencies
Example of threat level in the Netherlands

- Video

NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVELS
Threat assessments – threat levels

- Each country its system of threat assessment / threat levels.
- Some of the threat level systems focus on the threat / others on the response

Objective of the threat level assessment:
    trigger appropriate security measures (response)
    raise awareness in the population (also including civil society in the response)

- Threat is assessed by the security apparatus (LEAs, intelligence agencies, etc)
- Through an AT coordination body at national level (JTAC in the UK, NCTC within DNI in the US, OCAM in Belgium, CITCO in Spain, etc).

Example of UK Threat level system

- Who assesses the threat levels in the UK?
    Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC)
    Internal service (MI5)

- JTAC:
    16 governments and departments agencies
    Assessing the level & nature of the threat from international terrorism
Example of UK threat level system

UK levels system focuses on the threat, not on the response.

- LOW: attack is unlikely
- MODERATE: attack possible, not likely
- SUBSTANTIAL: strong possibility of attack
- SEVERE: attack very likely
- CRITICAL: attack expected imminently

The threat level expresses the likelihood of an attack in the near term.

Example of Finland threat level system

Who?
SUPO: Finnish Security and Intelligence Service

What?
Threat against Finland and Finnish interests

How?
Based on available intelligence, operational capacity and motivation of terrorist organisations or persons and groups linked to them, and the time span of possible attack plans

Aim?
Provide a clear picture of the nature of the threat against Finland
Thank You!

Questions?
National Level Threat Assessment – Canadian Model

PRESENTED BY: DAVID THORNE
THREAT ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP
APRIL 12, 2018

Presentation Content

- ITAC: Canadian Model and Methodology
- Threat Assessment Clients
- Case Studies
- All information available publicly / through open sources
Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC)

- Independent Federal Organization

- Consists of:
  - Full time ITAC employees
  - Seconded employees from security and intelligence agencies

- Range of Products (from tactical to strategic / different classifications)

- Partnerships: NTAC (AUS); CTAG (NZ); JTAC (UK); NCTC (USA)

ITAC Operations

1. Reporting on specific threats to Canada or Canadian Interests

2. Assessing and recommending the National Terrorism Threat Level for Canada

3. Assessing and setting the Terrorism Threat Level for Special Events
National Terrorism Threat Level

- **On-going assessment of Threat to Canada**
- **Threat Levels:**
  - CRITICAL; HIGH; MEDIUM; LOW; VERY LOW
- **Assessed as MEDIUM since 2014:**
  - “Intelligence indicates that an individual or group within Canada or abroad has the intent and capability to commit an act of terrorism. ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR.”

---

**National Terrorism Threat Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Critical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A violent act of terrorism is highly unlikely</td>
<td>A violent act of terrorism is possible but unlikely</td>
<td>A violent act of terrorism could occur</td>
<td>A violent act of terrorism is likely</td>
<td>A violent act of terrorism is highly likely and could occur imminently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures are in place to keep Canadians safe.</td>
<td>Measures are in place to keep Canadians safe.</td>
<td>Additional measures are in place to keep Canadians safe.</td>
<td>Heightened measures are in place to keep Canadians safe. Canadians are informed of what action to take.</td>
<td>Exceptional measures are in place to keep Canadians safe. Canadians are informed of what action to take.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Threat Level for Special Events

- May work in conjunction with event-specific Joint Intelligence Group
- Event may be monitored actively (+1 intel product) or passively
- EXAMPLES:
  - Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games
  - June 2018 G7 Summit (hosted in Canada)
  - Canadian Formula One Grand Prix (hosted in Montreal)
  - G20 Summit (hosted in Argentina)

Clients: Enforcement / Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE</th>
<th>CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• National Police Force</td>
<td>• Security Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Counter Terrorism</td>
<td>• Threat Reduction Abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Single Organization / Many Roles</td>
<td>Typically CSIS will begin CT investigations and transfer to RCMP if needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (FBI; DEA; Secret Service; State/Local Police)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reason to BELIEVE an offence has been / will be committed</td>
<td>• Reason to SUSPECT an offence has been / will be committed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Clients: International Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANADIAN FORCES</th>
<th>GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army, Navy, Air Force</td>
<td>Embassies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety of Theatres / Roles</td>
<td>Aid to Canadian Citizens Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectivity to LE / Intel</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(major events / extreme circumstances)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Clients: Borders and Immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY</th>
<th>IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES, and CITIZENSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ports of Entry</td>
<td>Grants Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement Powers</td>
<td>Issues Travel Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Abilities</td>
<td>Immigration / Refugee Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clients: Government Oversight and Policy

PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA
- Coordinates overall CT planning, preparedness and response

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
- Whole-of-Government Responsibility

CASE STUDY 1 – Aaron Driver
- August 10, 2016: RCMP receives FBI tip
- Video of man wearing black balaclava: Threatens to detonate bomb in unidentified city in 72 hours
- RCMP identified suspect from previously worn balaclava
- RCMP intercepted suspect who was shot and killed after attempting to detonate device
CASE STUDY 1 – Aaron Driver

Driver / Uploaded threats video

News Footage from Court Appearance

CASE STUDY 1 – Aaron Driver

• APPLICATIONS?
  ○ Near Miss
  ○ Well-Known Suspect (fits ITAC mandate pre-attack)
  ○ Value of Familiarity with Subject (recognized by analysts)
  ○ Was under Peace Bond for suspected links to terrorism... was this effective?
CASE STUDY 2 – Michael Zehaf-Bibeau

- October 22, 2014: MZB (relatively unknown to RCMP) shoots and kills an unarmed soldier guarding the National War Memorial
- Hijacks car, drives short distance to Parliament Hill (Legislative, Executive, Judicial branches of Canadian government are located here)
- Killed in shootout with security officers / RCMP
CASE STUDY 2 – Michael Zehaf-Bibeau

**APPLICATIONS?**
- No opportunity for specific product pre-event (MO?)
- Post-event… is there still a threat? MZB part of a group?
- Weapon was antiquated, could have been much worse
- Security arrangements at Parliament? PM was present
- Effectiveness of IARD training? Adequate firearms?
- MZB was unable to obtain a passport – was this the correct strategy?

THANK YOU!

QUESTIONS?
VIII. Terrorist Threat Assessment model of Sri Lanka – Presentation by Major General Rajaguru and Captain Ranaweera
Sri Lanka’s overall National Security context

The assessment on primary threats to our National Security at present

The strategies that are being formulated in response to these assessments

THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN SRI LANKA
RISE OF TAMIL SEPERATISM

NORTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCES OF SRI LANKA

LTTE – A RUTHLESS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD
PEACE INITIATIVES

THIMPU TALKS
IN JULY-AUGUST 1985

PEACE TALK I
PRESIDENT JR JAYAWRADANA (JULY TO OCT 1987)

PEACE TALK II
PRESIDENT R PREMAKASA (MAY 1989 TO JUNE 1990)

PEACE TALK III
PRESIDENT CHANDRIKA KUMARATUNGA (OCT 1994 TO APR 1995)

PEACE TALK IV
PRIME MINISTER RANIL WICRAMASINGHE (FEB 2002 TO NOV 2005)

PEACE TALK V
PRESIDENT MAHINDA RAJAPAKSE (NOV 2005 TO AUG 2009)
UNITARY SRI LANKA
SEPARATE HOMELAND

DEMOGRAPHY
- SINHALESE: 73.9%
- TAMIL: 12.6%
- MOORS: 7.4%
- INDIAN TAMIL: 5.2%
- OTHERS: 0.9%

- 1/3 LAND AREA OF SRI LANKA
- 1,142 KMS OF COASTAL LINE APPROX 5/6 OF THE COUNTRY'S COASTAL LINE (1,494 KM)
- 2 X MAIN HARBOURS
- 2 X DOMESTIC AIRPORTS

JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND

ARMED FORCES

POLICE

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
2002 Ceasefire
Monitored by Scandinavian Countries
(Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission - SLMM)

Direct Dialogue
Facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government

LTTE BRUTALISM DURING THE FINAL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT
Lakshman Kadirgamar

- Born: April 12, 1932
- Birth place: Mannipay, Jaffna
- Died: August 12, 2005
- Education: Trinity College - Kandy, University of Ceylon, Ceylon Law College and Balliol College, Oxford.
- Professions: Diplomat, politician and lawyer.

1994: Entered politics under People’s Alliance (PA) National list, Foreign Minister
2001: Special adviser on Foreign Affairs to the President Chandrika Kumaratunga
2003: Candidacy for the position of Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations.
2004: Foreign Minister

2005: On August 12, Kadirgamar was shot by an LTTE sniper in Colombo as he was getting out of the swimming pool at his private residence.

Closure of Mavil Aru

On 21 July 2006
LTTE closed the Mavil Aru Anicut:

- Disrupted water supply for 14,000 acres of paddy land
- Denied right to access water for 22,000 civilians
# Humanitarian Operation

## Strength of LTTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At the Beginning of Ops</th>
<th>By the End of Ops (Include Dead Cadres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Combatants</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>30000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Tigers</td>
<td></td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Wing</td>
<td>5 Aircraft (Small Planes and Helicopters)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ARTILLERY GUNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Gun</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>152MM ARTILLERY GUNS</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130MM ARTILLERY GUNS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122MM ARTILLERY GUNS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120MM MORTARS</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 MM GUN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BARREL MULTI BARREL ROCKET LAUNCHERS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BARREL MULTI BARREL ROCKET LAUNCHERS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LTTE BUDGET – US $300 million

**Illegal means:**
- Drugs
- Human smuggling
- Money laundering, etc

**Legal means:**
- Shipping lines
- Hospitality industry
- Fund raising through charity organisations, etc
ERADICATED TERRORISM
WITH A FAR REACHING VISION...

DEFENCE
LAW AND ORDER
FOREIGN POLICY
ECONOMIC POLICY
CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

- Re-emergence of terrorism
- Emergence of other extremist groups
- Creation of ethnic divisions and communal violence
- Challenges of maritime security
- Growth of organised crime
- Foreign interference in domestic affairs
RE-EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM

CONTINUOUS PRO-LTTE DEMONSTRATIONS IN UK
PRESENT LTTE/ PRO LTTE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK

LTTE/ PRO LTTE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK

TLC (Tamil Liberation Centre)
DAYAMARAN @ SANGILIYAN

TCC/TEPA (Tamil Coordinating Committee)
PSIVAPARAN @ NEDHYAWAN

EX COMBATANTS GP
VINAYAGAM @ ARIVALAGAM

TGTE
VISVANATHAN RUDRAKUMARAN

GTF
FATHER S. J. EMMANUEL

CREATION OF ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

CHALLENGES OF MARITIME SECURITY AND BORDER CONTROL
THREAT ON MARINE RESOURCES

A snapshot of Indian poaching in Sri Lankan waters.

Adapted from Scholzera (2015) and Davies and Smythe (2018).

SHIPPING LANES CLOSE TO SRI LANKA

Chinese-built rail link Due 2016
Chinese-financed port Due 2017

"String of Pearls" route
Oil shipping lanes

Indian Ocean

100 miles
PIRACY IN INDIAN OCEAN

HIGH RISK ZONE

GROWTH OF ORGANISED CRIME
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY RESPONSE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

STRATEGIC DECISIONS

POLICY FORMULATION
INTELLIGENCE ARMS

STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

CHIEF OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (CNI)

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE ARMS

STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS)

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Directorate of Military Intelligence

Directorate of Naval Intelligence

Air Intelligence

Criminal Investigation Department

Terrorist Investigation Division

Police Special Branch

Special Task Force
INTERACTION WITH OWN TROOPS

Civil Military activities
Citizens and Vigilant Committees
Enhance the Confidence
Sense of Security
Impact on National Security
PROACTIVE APPROACH TO COUNTER TERRORISM

Captain Nishanthea Ranaweera RSP
Sri Lanka Navy

MARITIME SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION
SRI LANKA’S ASSESSMENT AND PERCEPTION OF OVERCOMING CHALLENGES
Heavy dependency on the maritime domain...

- Nearly 90% of consumables are ocean origin
- Seaborne trade: 80% by value, 90% by volume
- 46,000 ships and over 4000 ports
- Over 400 million containers to carry 90% cargo

Sri Lanka’s geographical location
THE LOCATION

20% of the global Ocean
66% World’s Oil
33% World’s Bulk Cargo,
50% World’s Container Shipments
35 Indian Ocean Rim Countries

OVER 100,000 SHIPS EVERY YEAR

Coastline 1,340 Km
8 times of land
24 times of land
27 times of land

SLOCs
Territorial Waters (12NM)
EEZ (200 NM)
Search & Rescue Region
Claim of Continental Margin outer limits
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF INDIAN OCEAN REGION

a. About 30% of world trade is handled through the Indian Ocean.
b. Half of the world’s container traffic passes
c. Continental shelves cover about 4.2% of the total area of the Indian Ocean and are reported to be very rich in minerals
d. 40 out of 54 types of raw materials used by U.S. industry are supplied by the Indian Ocean.
e. Several of the world’s top container ports are located in Indian Ocean
f. Indian Ocean possesses world’s largest fishing grounds,
g. 55% of known world oil reserves are present in Indian Ocean.
SECURITY CONCERNS/CHALLENGES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Maritime Terrorism
Nation/State threats
Transnational criminal and piracy threats
Illegal and unregulated fishing activities
Drug Trafficking and Arms Smuggling
Human Trafficking
EMERGING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS

Maritime Terrorism

- Terrorist’s inability to hold a sizable fleet to launch attacks on ports or vessels
- No terrorist group has been capable of acquiring capabilities similar to Sea Tigers

LTTE'S NAVAL WING

WAS FORMED IN THE EARLY 1980’s
THE POTENT ENEMY AT SEA: LTTE SEA TIGER WING

Initially LTTE terrorists used small boats fitted with low capacity OBM's armed with small arms for LOG/Personnel moves.

Use of High speed fibreglass boats fitted with medium calibre Weapons & operating as clusters.
ATTACK CRAFT WITH MEDIUM CALIBRE WEAPONS

25mm type 61 modified for single barrel
4 Kw Dome type Radar for forward gunner
4 Kw Dome type Radar
12.7mm type 56

ATTACK CRAFT; 16m IN LENGTH, POWERED BY OBMs

4 x 200 HP Yamaha OBMs

SUICIDE ATTACK ON MV CITY OF LIVERPOOL
MV CITY OF LIVERPOOL: AFTER THE ATTACK

THREATS FACED BY SRI LANKA NAVY

- Threats to Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)
- Threats to Harbours and Anchorages
- Cluster attacks on naval units by Sea Tiger craft
- Suicide attacks on Naval Units
- Underwater saboteurs: at Harbours and at Sea
- Land based heavy weapons placed along the coastline
- Gun runners in high Seas
- Arms smuggling under cover of fishermen
- Mining of shores and choke points
- Air threat from light aircraft
- Amphibious attacks on Bases on shoreline
• Continued to REACT to Sea Tigers until we realized that REACTIVE strategy is not going to bring us effective results
• At the very crucial stages we realized that we need to have a PROACTIVE strategy

• Restructured our:
  – Tactics
  – Platforms and,
  – Weaponry
• Sea Tiger fire power and swarming tactics were countered with ease
SLN SPECIAL BOATS SQUADRON (SBS) AND RAPID ACTION BOATS SQUADRON (RABS)

SBS / RABS In Action

Small boat squadrons action northern sea of Sri Lanka.
**DRUG TRAFFICKING: FEW IMPORTANT FACTS**

- There are around 45,000 drug addicts in our country
- These addicts use 763 Kg of heroin per year
- Total heroin smuggled to Sri Lanka is estimated to be around 3.5 tons per year
- This is considerably in excess of the requirements of drug-dependent persons
- Authorities apprehend only 10% of the drugs that come to Sri Lanka

**THE FISHERMEN’S CHALLENGE**

- Over 50,000 marine fishing vessels
- Over 4000 offshore fishing vessels
- Fishing vessels: a major drug trafficking mode
- Impossible to check each and every vessel
- 19 fisheries harbours
- Over 70 identified fishing landing sites
- 16 anchorage sites
MARITIME PIRACY

- Drop in Somali based piracy should not mask security threats to shipping in other regions
- Off West Africa and South East Asia, a violent ‘petro-piracy’ is thriving
- South East Asia: hijacking of small coastal tankers by maritime pirates, averaging one attack every two weeks
- Why have we failed to find permanent solutions to maritime piracy despite our efforts?

- Combined Task Force 150, 151 and EU NAVFOR Somalia or Operation Atlanta even today remains active, but piracy has not stopped
- If the international navies leave, there is a strong possibility of Somali pirates recommencing their activities
HUMAN SMUGGLING

• Women and children exploited by illegal actors to take a very risky journey
• Asia: generate an annual value of USD 2 billion by criminal groups
• ‘Ghost Ships’: a challenging situation especially in the Mediterranean seas
• Why have we failed to end human trafficking when we have so many mechanisms in place?

SRI LANKA’S PERCEPTION OF OVERCOMING CHALLENGES
INTELLIGENCE

• Be proactive against the enemy
• To be proactive against the enemy, one must have the most updated knowledge of the probable enemy intentions

STRONGER COOPERATION

– No nation has the ability to face maritime security challenges alone
– No Navy is capable of conducting surveillance covering each and every square inch of the sea

CONCLUSION

• Sharing intelligent among the nations.
• Navy to be neutral and impartial in order to collaborate with other nations
• Effective ‘Regional Integration’ can be sighted as the most important pillar in finding solutions
• Lasting solutions to maritime security issues can be found ONLY if we are PROACTIVE at all times
• By being REACTIVE to threats and challenges, we are allowing another day for the illegal actors.
• The Sri Lankan case: best example to show the effectiveness of adopting a PROACTIVE strategy in eradicating maritime terrorism
IX. Methodology for different threat assessment products – Presentation by Ms Olivia Hyvrier followed by an interactive session – Facilitated by Brig (Retd) Khalid Saleem and Ms Olivia Hyvrier

ELEMENTS OF METHODOLOGY

Mrs Olivia HYVRIER

PRESENTATION

1st part: theoretical
  What kind of threat assessment products?
  How in general to draft threat assessments?

2nd part: practical
  Example 1: sectorial threat assessment
  Example 2: thematic threat assessment
  Example 3: impact of a crisis on the threat assessment
Different types of threat assessments:

- **National terrorism threat assessment**
  threat to Pakistan on its soil & Pakistani interests abroad

- **Terrorist group threat assessment**
  TTP threat assessment to Pakistan
  IS threat assessment to Pakistan

- **Threat assessment by sector**
  Maritime terrorist threat
  Terrorism threat to Civil aviation

- **Threat assessment by theme**
  Threat related to terrorist use of the Internet
  Threat related to terrorist use of explosives
  Terrorist modus operandi: latest evolutions and related threat

Threat report vs threat assessment

- **Post-crisis threat report**
  Report in relation to a specific event (kidnapping, attack, arrest, etc.)
  Attack in Pakistan / in the region/ somewhere else in the world in case of impact for Pakistan

- **Threat assessment in relation to an event / a crisis**
  Consequences in terms of threat of the current situation in Syria
  Potential impact for Pakistan
What is taken into consideration to draft threat assessments?

Challenges:
- Level & nature of current terrorist activities
- Information from various departments of various nature
- Comparison with other countries
- Comparison with previous attacks

Evolution

Fragmentation

What is taken into consideration?

Terrorist capabilities:
- Possible scale of the attack
- Modus operandi
- Threatening potential
- Balance between capabilities and intention
- Assessment
What is taken into consideration?

Terrorist intentions

- Open source propaganda
- Intelligence material
- Assessment

What is taken into consideration?

Timescale

Some attacks take years to plan, others are prepared in a limited timeframe.

How to assess the likelihood of an attack in a certain timescale?

Intelligence available

Judgement about how close an attack might take place
National threat assessment

PRIORITIZATION! Main threats to lesser threats

FOCUS? National / national interests abroad

RECIPIENTS? Time they have / their focus

TIMESCALE? Short /medium term

EVOLUTIONS of the threat? Trends - future of the trend (success?)
you have to analyse why? And what consequences for the future. Analysis involves taking risks sometimes.
Ex: Modus operandi. Before, that group used explosives, now they started to use hand weapons. Why? Is it likely to be a long term trend? What consequences?
Ex: evolution of targets: before, this group use to target mainly the army, now also civilians. Why? Possible evolution? Consequences?

ANTICIPATION

NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT STRUCTURE

• Introduction: 2 to 3 paragraphs
  – Current assessment of the threat level
  – Announcing the structure of the document
  – Environment

• Core part: 2, 3, 4 parts
  – Each part on one threat
  – higher to lower threat (order of importance - priorities)
  – Threat comes from... 1 group / 1 region / 1 reason

• Conclusion: 1 to 3 paragraphs
  future evolution of the threat / future trends
Example of structure:
Singapore threat assessment (06/17)

OVERVIEW

1. WORSENING REGIONAL THREAT SITUATION
   ISIS-Linked Attacks & Plots in Southeast Asia

2. PERSISTENT TERRORISM THREAT TO SINGAPORE
   1. ISIS-Linked Plots against Singapore
   2. Terrorist Targeting of Singapore
   3. Threat from Home-Grown, Self-Radicalised Lone Actors
   4. Threat from Radicalised Foreigners Resident in Singapore

3. THREAT PROGNOSIS

4. SGSECURE- A CALL TO ACTION [RESPONSE]

5. CONCLUSION


Example 1:
sectorial threat assessment

Civil aviation terrorist threat assessment
Example 2:
threat assessment related to a theme
Threat related to terrorist use of the internet

Example 3: terrorist situation report in relation to a crisis zone
Possible impact of Iraq and Syria like situations on our countries’ level of threat?
Thank You!

Questions?
X. **Group exercise on national threat assessment model – Moderated by Ms Olivia Hyvrier**

The participants are divided into 3 groups. Each group prepares a short presentation about what should be the best threat assessment model at national level in their opinion in a specific case scenario.

**The scenario:**
The scenario is that of a multiple terrorist attack by group XYZ both on the University of Karachi and on the University of Peshawar. Each attack was perpetrated by a group of 5 young men who used hand weapons as well as grenades (10 people involved in total). The police intervened quickly enough to neutralise 4 of the attackers in Peshawar (although one fled) and 3 in Karachi (two managed to flee). 15 students were killed in Peshawar, and 30 wounded while 20 were killed in Karachi and 34 wounded.
The terrorist group XYZ created in February 2017 was supposedly neutralised since the arrest of its leader known as Amir in September 2017.

However, one of the members of the group shouted the name of the organisation XYZ before his death. The Pakistani authorities are now waiting for the official claim on the twitter account of the group on the Internet to confirm the group is actually responsible for the attack.

**Your presentation:**
Your presentation should:
- map the different stakeholders potentially involved in information sharing
- explain what communication channels they will use
- map the threat assessment process in relation to the present case scenario
- explain NACTA’s central role in the process
- assess the future threat in relation to the situation
- reflect on possible mitigation measures to be taken in the short and medium term

You may sum up your views in a chart on a powerpoint presentation. The presentations shouldn’t last more than 10 minutes.

Thank you!
XI. Discussion on possible template for national threat assessment – Presentation by Brig (Retd) Khalid Saleem

**National Threat Assessment**

(A POSSIBLE TEMPLATE)

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**National Level Threat Assessment**

- **Part 1.** Discussion – Threat Assessment Concept and Template
- **Part 2.** Groups Activity - Practice Threat Assessment Template
- **Part 3.** Presentations by Respective Groups / Discussion
- **Threat**

  - Any individual, entity, occurrence (natural or man-made), action or inaction likely to cause damage, harm, loss or destruction of any asset
Categories Of Threats. No hard and fast rule, categories depend upon perspective from which threat is visualized. Some suggested categories include:

- Internal or External
- Natural or Manmade
- Present or Potential (Existing or Future)
- Imminent, Intermediate or Distant / Long Term

Threat Assessment

- A systematic effort to identify and evaluate existing or potential (terrorist) threats to a state, its jurisdiction or assets

Basic Purpose of Threat Assessment

- Understanding threat spectrum in totality to determine best responses / approaches to secure assets against threats
Basic Ingredients of A Threat Assessment in a Nutshell

- **Resources**: Available to terrorists
- **Capabilities**: Skills, knowledge and ability to reach to an asset etc
- **Intent**: Motivation to mount the threat
- **Precedence & Likelihood**: When, Where and How similar threat materialized previously. Chances of it happening now
- **Own Vulnerabilities**: Which can be exploited by terrorists

Important Considerations for National Threat Assessments

- Full spectrum of threats and contributory factors be taken into account for a wholesome threat picture
- **Who, What, Where, When and How** are the basic questions which should be answered
- Fused intelligence process is the foundation of threat assessment which helps to provide reliable, informed answers to these questions, without such a process threat assessment remains unreliable
Important Considerations for National Threat Assessments

- Threat assessment is not a solitary or unilateral function,
- It rather requires comprehensive research & analysis process incorporating the knowledge, assessments and understanding of various government departments, ministries, agencies, think tanks and NGOs etc,
- Which they can share with NACTA in the form of Reports, Analysis Papers, Intelligence Summaries, Briefings or other finished products

Threat Assessment Cycle

1. Planning and Direction
2. Collection
3. Analysis/Production
4. Dissemination
5. Feedback
6. Processing
Introduction

- May introduce the subject / provide background
- Strategic framework for threat assessment
- Types of existing threats, may briefly mention external and internal threats etc
Aim

- Aim should be clear and concise. Avoid double aim.
- Clearly mention any limitations e.g. scope, purpose timelines etc as if laid down by higher authorities.
- Don’t include unnecessary limitations to limit or expand the scope of assessment.
- (Just an Example) – “To formulate national level terrorism threat assessment with a view to recommend suitable measures to Federal Government for rooting out the menace of terrorism from country”.

Environment (Relevant Conclusions Only)

- Global Environment
  - A review of global environment affecting own and terrorists’ options.
  - Broad global configuration
  - Global Terrorist Organizations
Environment (Relevant Conclusions Only)

Regional Environment

- A review of regional environment affecting own and terrorists’ options.
- Potential for political, financial or any other kind of support for both sides.
- Any Regional Terrorist Organizations in own country

Environment (Relevant Conclusions Only)

Internal Environment. A review of own and terrorists internal scene, psycho-social and economic conditions and public will with particular reference to following :-

- Physical Environment. Terrain, Weather / Climate, Transportation, Communication Infrastructure etc.
- Human Environment. Demographic Distribution, Social Structure, Economic Factors, Political Culture, Political System and Public Perception and Will etc.
- Impact of Internal Environment. Impact upon any strategic options of dealing with terrorism / terrorists (such as Kinetic Operations, Engagement, Talks or Negotiations etc)
**Threat Spectrum**

- **Present Threat** (Current Threats / Threat Actors/ Factors)
  - **Group ABC** (Each group may be given a brief treatment here and a detailed description may be attached as Annexure or following details about each group may be mentioned here)
    - **Overview & Rationale.** Why this group is taken as a threat, its current activities, objectives etc. Mention of proscribed / 4th Schedule List etc
    - **Ideology.** Concepts, Doctrines, any other Peculiarities
    - **Leadership.** Prominent Figures and Composition. Key leaders, trainers, Religious Figures, Recruiter, Fund-Raiser, Bomb Makers with Names / Alias / Ages / Role of the known Individuals Involved with the Group, etc.

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**Threat Spectrum** (Continued form Previous)

- **Present Threat** (Continued from Previous)
  - **Group ABC** (Continued from Previous)
    - **State of Preparedness / Weapons /Arms etc**
    - **Training / Training activities of the group / individuals**
    - **Associated Groups.** List of other groups having an alliance or otherwise affiliated with the group.
    - **Conflicts.** List of groups that are in conflict with the target group.
    - **Dispositions/Locations/Areas of Operations.** Geographic areas where the group has a presence.
    - **Activities / Modus Operandi.** Recent and present activities, tactics and techniques used by the group.
 threatens.Spectrum (Continued form Previous)
  
  Present Threat (Continued form Previous)
    o Group ABC (Continued form Previous)
      - Major Incidents. Overview of major attacks conducted by the group, successful actions against the group or other significant events.
      - Fundraising. Fundraising / financial structure of the group and the individuals/entities involved.
      - Recruitment. Recruitment methodology of new members and the individuals/entities involved.
      - Communication Modes. Used to Communicate with Rank and File / Recruitment
      - Sources of Weapons and Explosive

  Threat Spectrum (Continued form Previous)
  
  Present Threat (Continued form Previous)
    o Group ABC (Continued form Previous)
      - Addresses Details. Addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, online/social media user names etc
      - Businesses / Charitable Organizations. List of businesses, charitable or other organizations associated with the group, e.g. travel agencies, currency exchanges, religious institutions or companies owned/used by members of the group.
      - Key Locations. Such as safe houses, sanctuaries, training areas etc, if not listed in any of above field
      - Strengths and Weaknesses. Major strengths and weaknesses of this particular group.
**Threat Spectrum** (Continued form Previous)

- **Present Threat** (Continued form Previous)
  - Group DEF
  - Group GHI
  - Group MNO
  - XXXXXXX
  - Individuals
  - Any other Threat Actor / Factor

**Threat Spectrum** (Continued form Previous)

- **Potential Threats**. Trends / tendencies / individuals / groups etc which can prove to be threats in future, e.g. :-
  - State of Weopnaisation in Society
  - Availability of Dangerous Materials. How easily dangerous materials are available in society.
  - Collective Societal Norms. Apathy, Level of Concern or Regard for Human Values, Educational outlook etc
  - Social Behaviours. Pleasant, Accommodative, Adoptive or Aggressive, Violent, Frustrated etc
  - Common Crime Rate and Tendency of Organized Crimes
“It requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds. Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do extraordinarily cruel things.”

*Albert Bandura*

(Renowned scholar, psychologist and originator of social cognitive theory)

> **Threat Spectrum** (Continued from Previous)

- **Potential Threats.** (Continued from Previous)
  - *Extensive Right or Left Tendencies* in individuals / social setups / cultures
  - *State of Polarization in Various Geographical Areas / Segments of Society*
  - *Indicators of Hate Material, Hate Mongering*
  - *Subversive Propaganda / Material etc*
  - *Any Organization Which May Pose a Threat in Future*
**Threat Spectrum (Continued form Previous)**

- **Potential Threats** (Continued from Previous)
  - **Techniques Employed by Various Cults, Shady Organizations**
    - Charismatic Attractions (Individuals / Personalities)
    - Esoteric Appeals (generally abstract – for intelligenistsia – example HUT)
    - Exoteric Appeals (for general public- focusing on concrete grievances of both intelligentsia and masses, like unemployment, corruption, lawlessness etc).
    - Demonstrations of Potency (we can do it for you and the government can not)
    - Coercion (money extortion/bhatta, forced recruitments, forced illiteracy or forced education)

**Analysis / Major Conclusions**

- **Conceptual Contours of Threat**
  - **Political Construct of Terrorism**: Anarchist, Egalitarian, Traditionalist, Secessionist or Preservationist etc
  - **Ideological Base of Terrorism**: Religious Sentiments, Hate, Ethnic, Linguistic, Separatism etc
  - **End Goals / Objectives / Design of Inimical Forces**: With due consideration to basic problems in identifying Terrorist Types / Goals i.e. Goal Transformation, Goal Conflicts, Misleading Rhetoric, Goal Ambiguity.
Analysis / Major Conclusions

Dominant Characteristics of Threat

- **Forms of Warfare.** Terrorism, Guerilla Warfare or Conventional Warfare.
- **Strategic Approaches**
  - Conspirational Strategy (Focusing on Internal Coups or Takeovers of Organizations / Govts)
  - Militancy
  - Urban Warfare Strategy
  - Forces Focused Strategy
  - Strategy of Protracted Operations (Popular War)
- Prudence or Boldness of Actions
- Speed and Frequency of Actions

Analysis / Major Conclusions

Dominant Characteristics of Threat (Continued from Previous)

- Types of Targets Selected or Likely to be Selected
- **Weapons, Explosive and Tactics Used** i.e. assassinations, bombings, tossing grenades, arson, torture, mutilations, hijacking and kidnapping etc.
- Training and Proficiency of Terrorists in Weapon Explosive Handling etc
Analysis / Major Conclusions

- Dominant Characteristics of Threat (Continued from Previous)
  - Political Means
    - Selective - Where small elite terrorist groups threaten or carryout violent acts.
    - Mobilizational - Where terrorists elites attempt to actively involve large segments of population for their cause.
    - At places selective groups gradually evolve into mobilization movements/phenomenon.
    - Selective and Mobilizational Means are best viewed as ends of a continuum, with many cases falling in between them.

Analysis / Major Conclusions

- Public Sentiment / Support (for whom) For Terrorists / Towards Government Actions
- Liberty of Action Degree of liberty of action enjoyed by terrorists and Government forces
- Likely Terrorists’ Targets
- Terrorists’ HVTs / Leadership
- Centre of Gravity of Terrorism/Terrorists
**Analysis / Major Conclusions**

- Likely Risks
- Likely Terrorist Harbour Areas / Sanctuaries
- Terrorism Contributory Factors
- Future/ Potential Threats in Making
- Potential Threats/ Threat Actors / Factors

**Recommendations / Way Forward / Suggestions**

- Areas Needing Attention
- Policy Needs (Requirement of New Policies, Policies Needing Revision / Improvements)
- Laws Needing Attention
- Response - Implementation Strategy
  - Political Prong
  - Developmental / Engagement Prong
  - Counter Extremism / De- radicalization
  - Kinetic / Operational Prong
XII. **Group exercise on developing national threat assessments – Moderated by Brig (Retd) Khalid Saleem**

**Narrative**

1. After the fateful events of 9/11, the country has been facing a spate of horrendous terrorism for almost two decades now. During our war against terrorism, besides thousands of armed forces/law enforcement/polic officials, thousands of innocent civilians including women and children have also lost their lives. In this backdrop, NACTA (National Counter Terrorism Authority) was established by Government vide NACTA Act 2013.

2. The first and foremost mandate of NACTA revolves around formulating threat assessments for enabling Federal Government to make adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism from the country.

3. At present, NACTA is in the process of formulating 'National Level Threat Assessment' based on the inputs received from various agencies/stakeholders. You have been deputed by your concerned department to assist NACTA in formulating the said assessment. The document will be presented to the Prime Minister / Cabinet to help them carve-out suitable response for countering terrorism / extremism in the country through respective ministries / departments.

**Requirement**

1. Participants working as a group divided into following sub groups (of 6-8 officers each), draft a national level threat assessment to be discussed in NACTA Secretariat on 13 April for finalization and presentation to Prime Minister / Cabinet at a later date:-

   a. Sub Group 1 - Aim and Environment
   b. Sub Group 2 - Threat Spectrum
   c. Sub Group 3 - Analysis/ Major Conclusions
   d. Sub Group 4 – Recommendations

2. Respective part of Threat Assessment will be presented by Sub Group Leader (or a presenter nominated by him) on 13 April 2018 for 10 - 15 minutes each (between 1100 - 1230 hrs). For better understanding of all, power point presentations would be much appreciated.

3. Note; for the purpose of this exercise, participants are at liberty to assume / suppose any logical / rational data / information for formulating the respective portion of threat assessment and draw relevant conclusions.
XIII. Closing Remarks by Ms Jouhaida Hanano, Advisor, UNODC Officer-in-Charge

Good Afternoon and Aslam-au-alikum ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of UNODC’s Country Representative Cesar Guedes, let me begin by thanking you all for participation and contribution during this workshop and appreciate the support which UNODC received from the National Coordinator of NACTA Mr. Ihsan Ghani and his team in making this event possible.

Also, I take this opportunity to thank delegates from Interpol, Sri Lanka and Canada for sharing their experiences and best practices on coordination and information sharing.

Proactive Approach to Counter Terrorism Workshop is part of a series of workshops planned between UNODC and NACTA under the agreed framework of Pakistan’s Action to Counter Terrorism (PACT) project, which is a three-year European Union funded project. UNODC remains committed to supporting federal and provincial authorities in close consultation with NACTA for further strengthening the criminal justice response to proactively counter terrorism.

UNODC is the key United Nations entity with the mandate and expertise to deliver counter-terrorism related technical assistance to Member States and in the last 12 years we have globally provided assistance to 169 countries, resulting in some 688 new ratifications of the legal instruments, 156 new or revised pieces of counter-terrorism legislation and more than 26,000 national criminal justice officials provided with enhanced counter-terrorism expertise.

Given the unique nature, combined with the emerging and evolving threats posed by terrorism, the United Nations and its international development partners appreciate the initiatives undertaken by the Government of Pakistan including the development and successful implementation of a National Action Plan against terrorism.

We appreciated and value Mr. Ihsan Ghani’s personal initiative for inviting workshop participants to NACTA office for a visit followed by a detailed briefing on their role and responsibilities including recent initiatives undertaken such as development of guidelines for countering violent extremism, model laws for monitoring the financial flows of charities and initiation of dialogue with madrassa and education institutes for promoting inclusiveness.

Again, I thank you all for your active participation during the workshop and assure UNODC’s continued support in organizing similar workshops in the future.

Thank you!
XIV. Closing Remarks by Mr Ihsan Ghani, National Coordinator, NACTA

Afternoon and Asalmualikum Ladies and Gentlemen!

To begin with I would like to thank each one of you for attending the 2nd Workshop on Proactive Approach to Counter Terrorism and take this opportunity to extend appreciate the participation of delegates from Sri Lanka, Canada and Interpol. This workshop was a result of NACTA’s close working relation with the United Nations and the European Union under the frame work of Pakistan’s Action to Counter Terrorism (PACT) Project.

NACTA is the leading national institution which was formed in 2013 with to develop a coherent response to effectively overcome the challenges posed by terrorism. In the recent past, NACTA has developed a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy under the framework of a National Action Plan and National Internal Security Policy which are presently being successfully implemented in conjunction with other provincial and federal entities. As part of NACTA’s proactive response to the growing threats of terrorism it has developed and disseminated over 5000 threat alerts and more than 2000 information reports in the last 20 months which has resulted in pre-empted arrests of terrorists on several occasions. As part of our international cooperation mandate NACTA would continue to engage with international organizations including the United Nations, Interpol, Asia Pacific Group to name a few in our common fight against terrorism.

NACTA remains committed to organizing such workshops in the future by bringing together representatives from provinces to discuss and develop common practices and for improving coordination as a proactive response to countering the menace of terrorism.

Lastly, I thank you all for visiting our new building and providing me with an opportunity to brief you all on NACTA’s work in detail. NACTA looks forward to continuing holding such workshops in collaboration with the European Union and the UNODC.

Thank you!
## XV. Annex 1

### List of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Dushan Rajaguru</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Army</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mr. Ranaweera</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Army</td>
<td>Navy Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ommaney Chinyunguma</td>
<td>Interpol</td>
<td>Police Training Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Olivia Hyvrier</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>Senior International Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>David Thorne</td>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Delegate from Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Brig. * Khalid Saleem</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>Senior National Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mr. Zahoor Ali</td>
<td>Home Deptt. GB</td>
<td>Dy. Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Muhammad Arif</td>
<td>Home Deptt. GB</td>
<td>Dy. Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mujeeb Ur Rehman</td>
<td>S &amp; GAD</td>
<td>Dy. Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Saifullah Abro</td>
<td>Home Deptt. Sindh</td>
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<td>CDR. Ehsanullah Khan</td>
<td>Pakistan Navy</td>
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<td>Engr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhatti</td>
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<td>Mr. Muhammad Abid</td>
<td>AJK Police</td>
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<td>Dr. Murad Khan</td>
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<td>Parvez Ahmed</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Zahid Ullah Khan</td>
<td>NACTA</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
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Agenda

2nd Workshop on Proactive Approach to Counter Terrorism

11 April 2018 (Wednesday)

09:00 - 09:30 Hrs.  Reception and Registration of Participants
09:30 - 09:40 Hrs.  Welcome Address by UNODC and NACTA
09:40 - 09:50 Hrs.  Introduction of participants and UNODC facilitators
09:50 - 10:00 Hrs.  Group Photo
10:00 - 10:20 Hrs.  Presentation on the mandate of UNODC in Pakistan (with specific reference to its engagement with NACTA)
10:20 - 10:45 Hrs.  Roles and functions of NACTA
10:45 - 11:00 Hrs.  Tea Break
11:00 - 12:30 Hrs.  Interpol’s Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and role of NCBs
12:30 - 14:00 Hrs.  Lunch
14:00 - 15:45 Hrs.  Presentation by Interpol on I/247 and tools available to Member States
15:45 – 16:00 Hrs  Tea Break

12 April 2018 (Thursday)

09:00 - 09:45 Hrs.  National terrorism threat assessments models (Presentation by Ms. Hyvrier)
09:45 – 10:20 Hrs.  Threat Assessment Model of Canada (Mr. David Thorne)
10:20 - 11:00 Hrs.  Threat Assessment Model of Sri Lanka (General. Rajaguru and Captain Ranaweera)
11:00 - 11:15 Hrs.  Tea Break
11:15 - 12:00 Hrs.  Methodology for different threat assessments products – interactive session (Brig. (r) Khalid and Mrs Olivia Hyvrier)
12:00 - 13:00 Hrs.  Lunch
13:00 - 14:30 Hrs.  Group exercise on national threat assessment model
14:30 - 14:45 Hrs.  
*Tea Break*

**14:45 - 15:30 Hrs.**  
Group presentations

**15:30 - 16:30 Hrs.**  
Discussion on possible template for national threat assessment (Brig (R) Khalid Saleem)

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**13 April 2018 (Friday)**

**09:00 - 11:00 Hrs.**  
Group Exercise on developing threat assessments

11:00 - 11:20 Hrs.  
*Tea Break*

**11:20 - 12:30 Hrs.**  
Group Presentations

12:30 - 14:00 Hrs.  
*Lunch*

**14:00 - 14:30 Hrs.**  
Conclusions of the seminar (Facilitators)

**14:30 - 15:00 Hrs.**  
Closing Remarks by UNODC Country Representative Mr. Cesar Guedes, Head of Cooperation Mr. Bernard Francois from European Union delegation to Pakistan and National Coordinator of NACTA Mr. Ihsan Ghani

**15:00 - 15:20 Hrs.**  
Distribution of Certificates

15:20 Hrs.  
*Tea Break and End of Workshop*