tion about drug activities have been honed over decades. In many cases, all that is needed is the small amount of effort required to gather and submit administrative data, data that are gathered in the normal course of business for government in any case.

A renewed effort must be made to bolster our collective knowledge base around global drug issues. This information is in the strategic security interests of all parties concerned. Information-sharing obligations embedded in the Conventions are not consistently fulfilled by a number of key parties. Without this information, it become very difficult to describe the present situation or the direction things are going. It also becomes impossible to gauge the impact of specific and collective interventions.

2.5 Take the crime out of drug markets

The discussion above has outlined some of the ways that global drug control efforts could be improved to reduce the size of the drug markets and the associated violence and corruption. First, it suggests several ways current enforcement practices could be refined:

• Drugs must remain prohibited because the fact of illegality alone reduces the number of potential addicts, particularly in developing countries.

• Drug control must be conducted in ways designed to limit associated violence and corruption.

• Drug enforcement should focus less on high volumes of arrests and more on reducing the size of drug markets through targeted enforcement and situational crime prevention.

• The incarceration of drug users should be exceptional; rather, users should be tracked and addicts brought into treatment.

• The addict population should be a priority, as they provide the bulk of the demand.

• Open drug markets must be closed, using the techniques of situational crime prevention and problem-oriented policing.

The discussion then endorses the creation of multidisciplinary strategies tailored to meet the problems posed by particular drugs in particular places:

• Planning for drug control must not be centred on law enforcement agencies, and should involve coordinated actions from actors in a range of disciplines and government agencies.

• Enforcement agencies can participate, but need to move beyond a focus on punitively incarcerating individuals to look at ways of disabling the market, even when this means forgoing arrests.

• Although entrenched markets may be difficult to disable, they can be guided by enforcement action so that they do the least possible damage.

Finally, this chapter looks at ways the international community can build resistance to drug markets:

• Both cultivation and transit countries suffer from weakness in the rule of law; supporting the growth of institutional strength and integrity in these countries will make them more resistant to the trafficking of drugs and other forms of contraband.

• There remains great potential in the Conventions on Transnational Organised Crime and Corruption to collectively address the problem of global drug markets.

• There is a strong need to improve and develop international information sharing systems, so that progress can be measured and interventions evaluated.

A common thread throughout these proposals is the need to integrate the marginalised individuals, areas, and nations that cultivate, consume, and distribute drugs. These people need to be brought in, not pushed down. They will find it impossible to develop without getting beyond crime, but it is very difficult to get beyond crime without some prospect of development. It is incumbent on all in the international community to ensure that no one is faced with impossible choices, and that behaviour that benefits all of us is in the interest of each of us.
1 While the share of the global population living in poverty declined by half between 1981 and 2005, much of this is due to the growth of the Chinese economy. During the same period, the number of poor people in sub-Saharan Africa doubled, and little progress has been seen in reducing the number of poor in South Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East/North Africa. See: http://go.worldbank.org/VL7N5Ww220. The structural adjustment conditionalities of international lenders have been widely criticised as actually aggravating poverty, including by the World Health Organisation. See: http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story084/en/index.html. It has even been asserted that, by providing an influx of unearned wealth, international aid can produce an effect similar to the “resource curse” and can have a negative impact of democracy. See Djankov, S., J. Montalvo and M. Reynal-Querol “The curse of aid”. http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/870.pdf. Also Moyo, D. ‘Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa.’ London: Allen Lane, 2009. International peacekeeping has been similarly criticised. The international community has been taken to task for both its actions and its failure to act, including in instances of genocide. Some have even argued that international efforts to build peace have the unintended consequence of prolonging civil wars, since the lack of a clear victor keeps grievances at a simmer. See Luttwak, E. ‘Give war a chance’. Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999. There have been scandals in which peacekeepers have been found to be involved in criminal rackets, including human trafficking. Despite these issues, there is very little serious discussion of abandoning cooperative efforts to address poverty or conflict, only debate as to how best to improve current efforts.

2 There are, of course, other costs associated with drug criminalisation, including the mass incarceration of non-violent offenders and negative impact on the ability of people to access treatment.

3 “Ninety six percent of all countries (186 countries) are State Parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. Ninety four percent (183 countries) are State Parties to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. About the same number (182 countries) are State Parties to the 1988 Convention. These are among the highest rates of adherence to any of the United Nations multilateral instruments...” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Making drug control fit for purpose: Building on the UNGASS decade. Presented to Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Fifty-first session, Vienna, 10-14 March 2008.

4 For example, Yale law professor Steven Duke recently opined we should, “...and[ ] the market for illegal drugs by eliminating their illegality. We cannot destroy the appetite for psychotropic drugs. What we can and should do is eliminate the black market for the drugs by regulating and taxing them as we do our two most harmful recreational drugs, tobacco and alcohol.” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1240613604626546083.html

Similarly, Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron recently argued, “The right policy... is to legalize drugs while using regulation and taxation to dampen irresponsible behavior related to drug use... This approach also allows those who believe they benefit from drug use to do so, as long as they do not harm others... Legalization is desirable for all drugs, not just marijuana.... It is impossible to reconcile respect for individual liberty with drug prohibition.” http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/24/mizon.legalization.drugs/index.html

Others have been cautious, arguing generally against “prohibition” while limiting discussion of taxation to cannabis. For example, Milton Friedman and 500 other economists endorsed a plan to legalise and tax cannabis in the United States in June 2005: http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/


6 There are several ways drugs can kill, including their acute physical effects, their long term health impact, and their influence on behaviour. Neither alcohol nor tobacco are likely to kill the user through their acute effects; the same cannot be said of heroin or stimulant drugs, particularly for those with pre-existing health conditions. Long term health consequences have not been well studied for many of the illicit drugs, but heavy tobacco and cannabis smoking pose similar hazards. Unlike tobacco, alcohol can have an extremely dangerous impact on behaviour, but so can most of the currently illicit drugs. According to the Oxford Medical Companion (1994), “…tobacco is the only legally available consumer product which kills people when it is used entirely as intended.” This would not be the case if drugs like crystal methamphetamine were legalised.

7 http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/facts/en/


9 Data on drug prices from WDR 2008; data on GDP per capita from Human Development Report 2007/2008. Restrictions on coca cultivation have softened since 2006, and the reported price of cocaine in Bolivia has dropped to US$3.50 per gram, despite the fact that cocaine remains illegal and seizures have increased. The impact this will have on cocaine use in Bolivia has yet to be evaluated, but there is evidence of rising problems with cheap cocaine base products throughout the region.


11 http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/appendix_2_the_americas.xls


17 Ibid.


22 Age range in survey differs between countries: Denmark (16-64); Germany (18-64); United Kingdom (16-59); United States (12+) – all others, 15-64.

23 See endnote 24 below.

24 The International Narcotics Control Board was initially apprehensive when Portugal changed its law in 2001 (see their annual report for that year), but after a mission to Portugal in 2004, it “noted that the acquisition, possession and abuse of drugs had remained prohibited,” and said “the practice of exempting small quantities of drugs from criminal prosecution is consistent with the international drug control treaties...”

25 This is different from the Dutch ‘coffeeeshop’ approach, where drug tourists are free to consume cannabis in certain premises without risking a summons from the police, and known cannabis vendors are allowed to advertise their outlets.

26 See the reports of the Instituto da Droga e da Toxicodependência: http://www.idt.pt


28 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats08/gspats3

29 http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Drug-
Although “kitchen labs” for crystal methamphetamine have been an issue in the United States, a bit of precursor control can assure that this practice does not become widespread, and the smell and other hazards of homemade amphetamines manufacture tend to render small-scale production uncompetitive, particularly in urban areas.


Or, as UN Habitat notes, “[after urban flight] … ‘landlords’ attempt to extract profits from whomever remains, usually obtaining good returns at no outlay on their largely depreciated capital, no matter how low the rents.” UN HABITAT, Global report on human settlements 2003: The challenge of the slums. Nairobi: UN Habitat, 2003, p 29.

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