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The Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Coping Strategies of Opium Traders

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STRATEGIC STUDY #2

Final Report October 1998

All the respondents indicated that their mobility within the eastern region was not constrained. However, discussions regarding inter-regional mobility provoked a variety of responses from farmgate opium traders.

In Achin and Shinwar all the opium traders interviewed suggested that they did not purchase opium from the South, despite its traditionally lower price as a consequence of the poor quality of the opium from that region. It was a unanimous view that the opium in the South was generally of the spin variety and was not in high demand from large traders and processors. The explanation offered for this was that the use of spin opium in the production of heroin led to a grey-coloured final product that was unpopular with consumers in the West.

Further discussions revealed that respondents did feel constrained from traveling to the southern region to purchase opium. Primarily the reasons offered were financial with respondents indicating that a journey to the south would only be viable if significant quantities of opium were bought. It was suggested that this required financial resources that were not at the disposal of smaller traders. This was highlighted by the claim that for the first time a major trader from Shinwar had arranged the transportation of a large quantity of opium in consultation with a trader in Qandahar in 1997.

Aside from the financial constraints a large number of traders also indicated that they were unfamiliar with the Southern region, had few contacts in the area and would feel ?nervous' purchasing opium in the Qandahar and Helmand.

In the south, all respondents indicated that there were no restrictions on trading in opium in other districts or provinces. Whilst all the traders interviewed in the south tended to focus the bulk of their trading on neighbouring districts, most were willing to travel further afield when local supplies were scarce or prices more competitive

There certainly appeared to be few restrictions on the opium trade in the southern region. Opium could be seen drying in the sun in all the bazaars visited. Moreover, many of the shops trading in opium were open fronted and given their location in the district centres, close to the district administrators, or woliswals, office. Indeed, one respondent, a trader of 25 years, indicated that restrictions on the opium trade in the past had prompted him to conduct his business from his house. However, growing confidence had led the respondent to rent a shop and trade in opium openly in the bazaar.

A few examples were given of opium from the south being transported and sold in the eastern region. These examples usually involved a number of traders, each contributing a proportion of the total amount of opium required. However, it was generally felt that, although there were no restrictions on such trade, it rarely proved profitable.

Yet, despite the claims of improved security and the freedom of trade a number of respondents did suggest that there had been a number of incidents where convoys of opium had been attacked. Respondents and key informants indicated that these cases tended to be amongst the bulk cross border traders.

13. Security as the most significant change in the opium trade

The majority of those interviewed in Shinwar and Achin reported that they had been trading in opium for 3 to 5 years. None of those interviewed indicated that taxes were imposed upon their trade. When questioned none of the respondents indicated that they had suffered financially or physically due to robbery. Indeed, all the respondents suggested that physical security was currently not a problem. This was highlighted by all respondents as the most significant change in the nature of the opium trade over the last few years. For those traders that had been trading in opium for ten years, both security and considerable increases in the number of farmgate traders were cited as the most significant changes they had experienced in the opium trade.

Similarly, in the south the increase in the number of traders was most commonly cited as the most significant change in the opium trade over the last ten years. However, the improving security situation was also considered of great importance by the majority of respondents and key informants in the south.

14. Trading in opium and social mores

None of the respondents in the east indicated that they perceived trading in opium as conflicting with current social mores. The buying and selling of opium appeared to be undertaken by all those who had sufficient cash-flow during harvest time. Moreover, while one respondent in the east indicated that advances were un-Islamic he saw no conflict between the opium trade and his religious obligations.

In Ghani Khel and Kahi it was possible to see a number of shops which specialise in the buying and selling of opium, conducting business behind the cover of a curtain. In the bazaars in the more remote parts of Achin, opium was traded more openly. Indeed, children, both male and female, as young as 10 were witnessed selling opium in a number of these local bazaars in Achin district.

However, respondents did see a divide between trading in opium and the processing and trading of heroin with the large majority of respondents finding the latter socially unacceptable. Whilst all the respondents indicated that processing required investment costs that were beyond their financial capacity, only one respondent indicated that he would engage in heroin processing if he had the resources. Key contacts were also cited as a pre-requisite to diversifying into heroin processing and trading. Respondents indicated that they personally did not have access to the ?right people' with either the knowledge of the production process, or the influence to ensure processing and trading could be undertaken without restriction.

Perhaps surprisingly, the vast majority of respondents in the south believed the opium trade to be un-Islamic. Yet despite this almost 85% of those interviewed in the south had performed Haj and two were in fact mullahs. Two respondents in the south considered the provision of salaam as un-Islamic.

15. The coping strategies of opium traders

None of the respondents believed that the opium trade would end imminently. Consequently, none of the small traders interviewed saw the need to act against UNDCP's efforts to eliminate opium cultivation.

Similarly, few respondents in the south believed that the trade in opium would be banned by the local authorities. Indeed, only one respondent who was a specialist opium trader had diversified his business, electing to trade in both fertiliser and opium in anticipation that the trade in opium may be banned in the future.

Respondents in the south indicated that the opium trade is an integral part of the local economy, providing a significant source of income for a large proportion of the population. As such, respondents believed that a ban on the trade in opium would have negative consequences for local trade and industry that are not directly linked with the opium trade.

Increasing demographic pressures and the lack of viable income earning opportunities for those with an education was cited as the primary motivations for trading in opium. Respondents indicated that without alternative income sources for those with an education the authorities could not ban the trade in opium. A number of respondents suggested that attempts to ban the trade without providing alternatives would result in a growing antagonism between the population and the local authorities.

There was also a general consensus amongst respondents in the south that Afghans earned very little from the illegal drug trade and that the greatest proportion of profit was accrued by khariji, or foreigners. This perception exacerbated the resentment that respondents felt towards attempts to ban the trade in opium.