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Access to Labour: The Role of Opium in the Livelihood Strategies of Itinerant Harvesters Working in Helmand Province, Afghanistan

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STRATEGIC STUDY #4

Final Report June 1999

Typically, the payment for itinerant harvesters in Helmand comprises of a payment in-kind, a bonus, if the yield of the opium crop is particularly high, and transportation. All these three elements of payment are negotiable and will depend on the bargaining power of the landowner and itinerant harvesters, respectively. The arrangement for the payment of local agricultural taxes, known as ushr, is also negotiable and proved to be an important part of contractual arrangements in the districts of Kajaki, Musa Qala and Nawzad in 1999. The provision of three good quality meals for itinerant harvesters is, however, non-negotiable and is considered a standard part of the agreement by both parties.

All respondents reported that they would be paid for their work on the opium harvest in-kind. However, both respondents and key informants reported that there are two forms of payment in-kind that are available to itinerant harvesters in Helmand. The first and most frequently used method of payment is a share of the final yield of the land worked. In 1999, itinerant harvesters in Helmand typically received one fifth or one quarter of the total opium yield, compared to one sixth to one fifth in 1998, possibly supporting the view that opium cultivation in Helmand has increased significantly in the 1998/99 growing season.

The other method of payment in-kind cited by respondents was the payment of a fixed amount of opium for a given amount of land and number of lances conducted. For, instance one respondent reported receiving 2.25 kg for 13 days work, equivalent to the value of $70 at harvest time. Key informants suggest that the risk of a poor crop means that itinerant harvesters prefer to receive a fixed amount of opium as payment for their work rather than a share of the final crop. Moreover, it is argued that a fixed payment, based on an agreed number of lances, offers itinerant harvesters the opportunity to complete their work in only 15 days, as opposed to the 16-20 days that itinerant harvesters receiving a share of the final yield tend to be committed to.

Amongst the respondents interviewed there were only four cases where itinerant harvesters were paid a fixed amount. Two of these cases were for the only respondents who reported that they were working as itinerant harvesters for relatives or friends (see Box 3).

Key informants reported that landowners preferred to pay itinerant harvesters a share of the final yield of the land worked rather than a fixed amount, believing that this method of payment compelled itinerant harvesters to work harder due to their shared ownership over the final output, and that it allowed the risk of crop failure to be shared with the itinerant harvesters.

Field work revealed that the majority of respondents were paid a share of the final yield of the land worked. However, it is noticeable from the reports of respondents that the share of the final yield changed with the onset of the harvest in Kajaki and Musa Qala. It is reported that the early harvest in Nawzad created a local labour shortage, forcing up the share of the final yield received by itinerant harvesters, from one fifth to one quarter not only in Nawzad but during the later stages of the harvest in Nad-e-Ali, and throughout the harvest period in Kajaki and Musa Qala.

The extent of the labour shortage in upper Helmand, is perhaps verified by the general consensus amongst respondents that landowners in the districts of Kajaki, Nawzad and Musa Qala had covered the entire cost of the local agricultural tax, known as ushr, whilst in the districts of Marja, Nade-e- Ali, and Nahr-e-Saraj this payment was typically shared by itinerant harvester and landowner.

Key informants suggested that the local authorities suggested that itinerant harvesters should not be paid more than one quarter of the final harvest, despite reports of this local labour shortage. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this policy was based on the judgement that the share accrued by itinerant harvesters working for only 15-20 days should not exceed that of sharecroppers, labouring for the entire season.

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Key informants have suggested that the landowners willingness to pay the full amount of the ushr in Musa Qala and Kajaki was a means by which to ensure the availability of itinerant harvesters and circumvent the local authorities reported decree that itinerant harvesters should not be paid more than one quarter of the final opium yield from the land worked. For a total yield of 100 kg of opium, the landowners agreement to pay the entire cost of ushr could be worth as much as an extra 2.5 kg for the itinerant harvesters. For the itinerant harvesters, this would be a share in the equivalent of an extra $75 during the harvest period in 1999.17/ Combined with an increase in the share of the total yield of the land worked, the landowners agreement to pay the full amount of the ushr, means that itinerant harvesters working in Musa Qala or Kajaki could receive as much as 7 kg more than they received from a 100 kg yield in Marja. This would constitute an increase in pay of the equivalent of $259, over a 20 day period (see Table 4).

For the individual itinerant harvester, the amount of opium received for their work ranged from 1 kg to almost 3.4 kg for between 13 to 20 days work. Consequently, daily wage rates would appear to fluctuate dramatically, with the lower end of the payments being paid in Marja. For instance, one respondent reported selling the 1 kg of opium he had received for 15 days work in Marja in the local bazaar for the equivalent of $37.00. This equates to a daily wage rate of almost $2.50.

Not surprisingly, the higher payments would seem to have been paid in Musa Qala or Kajaki where the most common payment was approximately one half of one maund, the equivalent of 2.25 kg for 13 to 16 days work.18/ This payment would represent the equivalent of between $5.20 and $6.40 per day. The highest payment reported amongst respondents was in Kajaki where one respondent from Oruzgan claimed that had received the equivalent of 3.4 kg of opium in return for 16 days work, representing a daily wage rate of approximately $7.80.

It is important to note that wage rates for itinerant harvesters in Helmand in 1999 have been higher than in previous years where one sixth or one fifth of the final yield was more common. Consequently, the daily wage rates at the higher end of the scale are considered unusual. However, based on these figures, those itinerant harvesters working in only one district for 16 days, could earn between $40 and $125, whilst those itinerant harvesters willing to work in three districts, with each harvest not exceeding 16 days, could earn from $120 to $374. The final amount earned would of course be subject to the nature of the agreement over the share of the final yield to be paid to the itinerant harvester and the market price of opium at the point of sale.

Moreover, this income could be supplemented with bonus payments from the landowner. Although reports of baksheesh payments were not common amongst respondents, a number of those interviewed did indicate that they had obtained a bonus payment from the landowner when there had been a particularly good yield. This baksheesh was typically paid in opium and could be from 300 to 500 grams of opium.

Given the working conditions, regular food and tea were considered a standard part of the payment for itinerant harvesters. Typically harvesters were found to be working long hours in the hot sun, from sunrise until 10:00 a.m. and then from 2:00 p.m. until dusk. Some respondents who were not experienced in lancing complained of feeling ill, blaming it on the odour of the opium. All respondents reported that three good quality meals were provided by the landowner. Respondents reported that breakfast, which would be served early, was typically bread and tea. Lunch was typically potato or rice, with curry, beans, okra, yogurt and bread, whilst dinner consisted of mutton or beef with vegetables, yogurt and bread. Tea was also provided three or four times during the working day.

Respondents also reported that transportation was sometimes provided for itinerant harvesters as part of their overall payment. Indeed, the landowner was typically found to provide transport for those respondents recruited at the district bazaar. Moreover, key informants revealed that the fear of a labour shortage in Musa Qala and Kajaki prompted some landowners to travel to other districts in search of itinerant harvesters, offering them transport to their next place of work once they had finished their harvesting in that area.

Accommodation was also provided for the itinerant harvesters generally in the landowners guest house, known as the hujera. However, some respondents were interviewed whilst staying in tents near the opium poppy fields that they were harvesting.

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17/ At the time of field work one kilogramme of opium cost the equivalent of $37 in Helmand.

18/ One Qandahari maund is the equivalent of 4.5 kg.