



**International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan  
8-9 February 2004**

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## INTRODUCTION

On Feb 8 and 9 2004, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan in Kabul, the Government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, United Kingdom (UK) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) co-hosted an International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan.



President Karzai addressed the Conference of over 300 participants with a strong condemnation of the drugs trade and expressed his Government's determination for decisive action against it. This was the first time that Afghans had gathered at such a high level and in such large numbers to discuss the issue of illicit drugs and the implementation of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. Reflecting a true sense of Afghan ownership of this issue ---which the Conference aimed to promote--- following address by President Karzai, the National Security Advisor and the Director of Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), several Afghan Ministers along with the Governor of Kandahar and a village elder from Nangarhar shared their experiences and perspectives. Another feature which made this Conference remarkable was the presence of 18 Governors, 32 provincial Police Chiefs and other community members from the provinces outside of Kabul. They actively exchanged opinions with central government officials in Kabul and representatives of the international community. There was also strong representation from the NGO community ---both Afghan and International--- and the international security presence.

Representing the international community, high-level and expert delegates from 18 countries participated in the Conference as well as representatives from the European Commission, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other organizations. Therefore, despite the fact that some capital-based international delegates were unable to attend due to the worst snow in Kabul in 10 years which prevented flights in, high level of international engagement was realized at the Conference.

Building on thematic discussions which took place in the practitioner's workshop (on the first day of the Conference) and the working group (on the second day), action plans for orienting future work were prepared in the five key areas of law enforcement, judicial reform, alternative livelihoods, drug demand reduction and public awareness. Coupled with networks of experts and policy-makers built in the context of the Conference, these action plans will serve as a starting point in coordinating activities and filling the gaps. Calls for further practical international support were also made and the discussion ---especially in term of additional funding--- will be fed in to the Berlin Conference where the Afghan government and the international community will discuss the future of Afghanistan in the wider context of Afghan post-conflict nation building.

## **BACKGROUND**

This Conference was convened at the initiative of the UK Government (with the lead role for Counter Narcotics in Afghanistan), reflecting the belief it shared with the Afghan Government and UNODC that in order to continue to effectively address the complex and wide reaching problems experienced in Afghanistan as a result of the cultivation, trafficking and export of opium poppy, wider and more informed participation was necessary both from various segments of the Afghan society and the international community.

The objectives of the plenary session and general debate was to encourage the active participation of all Afghan Ministries and key players from the provinces ---where much of the follow-up actions need to take place and yet hitherto had little participation in general policy level discussion on the issue of illicit drugs--- and to achieve acknowledgement that illicit drugs issue is a central concern for Afghanistan, holding the key to success in all other efforts made in attaining security and development. This awareness raising was identified to be an important objective as the realization of goals specified in the National Drug Control Strategy requires active and concerted action by various line ministries as well as by all segments of the society, including in the provinces. In doing attaining the above, the organizers of the Conference aimed to also increase support from the international community, by jointly observing the difficulties that Afghanistan faces in its fight against drugs and by discussing direction to increase effectiveness of efforts in the counter narcotics struggle.

The aim of the thematic discussion was to enable existing experts in the fields of law enforcement/judicial reform, alternative livelihoods and demand reduction to discuss their experiences to date, share best practice, and to identify key issues in planning a way forward. The facilitators of the three thematic groups worked for some weeks before the Conference to elicit views of experts from a wide range of backgrounds and incorporated these views into draft action plans prepared by the Afghans (coordinated by CND) which were used at the Conference as a tool to focus the group discussion.

## **PLENARY SESSION AND GENERAL DEBATE**

President Karzai opened the plenary session, making a pervasive 30 minute intervention declaring that the drugs trade was damaging Afghanistan's efforts to develop into a secure, stable democracy with a prosperous economy. Stressing that it was in the interests of all Afghans to fight against drugs, he called on active participation of all Ministries and provincial authorities in the fight against drugs through implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. Expressing his Government's strong determination to fight illicit drugs ---making it clear that it is not conditional to international assistance---, President Karzai made a strong case for international support in this endeavour, pointing to the magnitude of the problem and the ability of drugs to undermine all other efforts currently in place for building a secure and prosperous state. He alerted to the fact that the profits of the drugs trade were being



used to support terrorism and counted this as an additional reason why drugs problem should be tackled without any further delay.

Among other central government participants, National Security Advisor Rassoul identified illicit drugs issue as being a top security concern for Afghanistan and called upon line Ministries to take much more active role in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy. CND Director Yasini further expanded on the link between drugs and terrorism by observing that “terrorist activities thrive on exactly what narcotics provide: illegal money and political instability”. Alerting that “the worldwide war against terror depends, in great measure, upon Afghanistan’s war on drugs”, he called for urgent international assistance to Afghan Government’s counter narcotics efforts, which CND leads. Deputy Minister of Defence Wardak pressed for a greater role for the Ministry of Defence and the Afghan National Army in the fight against drugs, arguing that their role was to help create a stable Afghanistan and that tackling drugs is quintessential to achieve this goal. Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development Atmar stressed Afghan Government’s commitment to mainstreaming counter narcotics objectives into its national development programmes, which his Ministry is taking the lead.



As valuable contribution to the Conference, two inspiring speeches were made by Governor Pashtun of the Kandahar province and a village elder from Nangarhar, Ghulam son of Mohammad, representing a rare occasion where the views of those closer to the problem were shared with central government officials and international experts. Governor Pashtun, in his thought-provoking speech, identified direct implications of illicit opium being (1) decreased licit agricultural output, (2) spread of bribery and corruption and (3) increase of addicts. Further identifying as long term implications (1) “the increase of power of warlords who present main obstacle to the normal development of

legitimate government” and (2) “absence of the rule of law which brings conducive conditions for the return of international terror to Afghanistan”, he called for “effective action before it is too late”. Ghulam son of Mohammad, expressing appreciation “on behalf of all farmers of Afghanistan” for the convening of this Conference and drawing attention to the problems of Afghan opium cultivation, shared the difficulties of the average Afghan opium growing farmer who are often forced “by the man in power to cultivate opium in their agricultural field” with no choice due to weak economy, unemployment and illiteracy. He courageously discussed about the loan bondage based on opium payment (*salaam*) and deplored the even when they grow opium poppy, many farmers are still struggling to feed their family as the profit is taken by the traffickers and *salaam* dealers. He stated that “Afghan farmers want to increase their standard of living in a legal manner and find sufficient amount of food for their families and as a result of that give a better service for the agriculture of the country” and called for the Government and international community to address farmer’s concerns. He referred for need of regulation against *salaam* and initial



assistance in freeing them of *salaam* bondage as well as assistance in basic infrastructure such as irrigation, electricity and market access. He declared that if such assistance is provided to in making the transition, Afghan opium growing farmers will not grow any poppy and “instead of poppy they will grow flowers and with pride present a developed, shining and agricultural Afghanistan to the international community”.

The British Ambassador Rosalind Marsden spoke on behalf of the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Bill Rammell ---who was prevented from attending by the snow---spelt out the adverse impact of Afghan opium production on Afghanistan, the UK and the world. She spoke of the priorities for the international community in terms of the various aspects of counter narcotics efforts ---law enforcement, judicial reform, alternative livelihoods and demand reduction. And she made a call for more international participation and assistance in counter narcotics work in Afghanistan.



UNODC Representative in Afghanistan Mr Mohammad Amirkhizi made the point that the battle against narcotics cultivation has been fought and won in other countries and it was possible to do so here, with strong, democratic governance, international assistance and improved security and integrity.



UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa arrived despite the weather conditions to contribute at the end of the Conference delivering his thought provoking speech. Echoing various interventions made, he observed the need to further strengthen all efforts in fighting the illicit drugs issue in Afghanistan, lest the danger of the country turning into a narco-state. He emphasized that parallel to technical efforts to



be made in each of the five thematic areas by line ministries, there is an urgent need to deal with overarching questions. One is the question of involvement of officials in the drug economy and the other was the question of need to increase dramatically the interdiction capacity against traffickers and laboratories ---in which the contribution of the international military presence was called for, especially in the recognition of the link between drugs and terrorism. He further highlighted the need for strong anti-corruption measures in general to be taken in order to maximize the impact of the counter narcotics and other effort to ensure security and development in Afghanistan.

NB: Select speeches are included in the appendices. Some are unofficial by status as they are notes made in English based on translation from Dari, but they have been included to reflect the nature of the speeches as delivered.)

## THEMATIC DISCUSSION

Three working group with thematic focus were asked to record “key themes” that evolved from the discussion to take forward to the conference in order to agree the way forward.

### LAW ENFORCEMENT/JUDICIAL REFORM

Five speakers gave presentations, giving an overview of what activity has taken place on Counter Narcotics Law Enforcement (LE) to date, particularly within the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. There was consensus that a lot more needed to be done, particularly on increasing interdiction capability.

After the main speakers, Mirwais Yasini, Director of CND gave a clear outline of the problems faced. These include official corruption, the need for significantly increased interdiction capability, more rapid reaction forces, more mobile teams, support of coalition forces, eradication, arrests and precursor control. He made a clear request to the international community for more support.

The discussion then opened to the floor where Governors and Police Chiefs from the provinces as well as some international delegates contributed to a discussion that focused on the following key points.



### Key Themes

#### 1. Corruption

Involvement of officials and commanders in the drugs trade was recognised as a key problem. The Central Afghan Government needs to address this, but it is also something that each Governor and Police Chief needs to tackle in their own province. Low salaries to Government employees contribute to this problem since there is no social safety net, but are no excuse. There must be visible action against corruption.

#### 2. Need to Increase CN Police Numbers and Interdiction Capability

It was agreed that more counter narcotics police are required and that they need to be widely deployed to the provinces. There was an Afghan suggestion that there should be

300 CN police in Kabul and 700 in the regions at each of 7 key provincial locations, although this was not substantiated and any final agreed figures need have a clear rationale behind them. There was agreement that there was a need to extend the successful Mobile Detection Team model operating within Kabul into the Provinces and that more international mentors and training are needed, particularly in the Provinces.

### *3. CN Police Assistance for Equipment and Resources as Well as People*

There was a strong Afghan plea for more equipment and resources for the Counter Narcotics Police in particular, but also the Afghan police in general. Since drug traffickers were well equipped then the police needed to be too. Lack of operational budgets was also an issue and when equipment was donated its running costs also needed to be provided for. The need for international mentors to provide ongoing training support, particularly in the provinces, was also important. Any increase in resources needs to be linked to results.

### *4. Strong Centre to Support Action at Local Level*

It was agreed by all, that there was a need for a powerful centre to exert control over the provinces and support action at local level. This was true for the security of Afghanistan as a whole. Ministry of Interior plays an important role in being responsible for both national law enforcement & civil governance at the provincial & district levels. A strong Ministry of Interior with effective reach into the provinces is necessary to create the environment that will support the delivery of the Afghan CN strategy.

### *5. Judicial Reform to Address CN – Role for Special Drugs Prosecutor*

It was agreed that this was a vital area - a functioning judicial system was required to make law enforcement a reality. The idea of a Special Drugs Prosecutor was raised by the Afghan Deputy Attorney General and it was agreed that this should be considered further after the conference.

## **Outcomes**

This was an extremely large and diverse group, so decisions were difficult to achieve. However, there was general agreement that the draft Action Plans on law enforcement and judicial reform highlighted what needed to be done and were a useful tool to take forward more concerted action. There was also a very clear message against corruption at all levels. Discussions in this group gave the Counter Narcotics Directorate of the Afghan Government and the Ministry of Interior an opportunity to hear from the delegates the issues that need to be addressed. And it gave the international community an opportunity to hear of concrete ways in which they could contribute (mobile detection teams, training and mentoring etc).

## **ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS**

Four speakers gave presentations, sharing their experiences and perspectives on Alternative Livelihoods (AL) and general discussion begun by identifying what has worked over the last ten years in the area of AL, recognizing that there is a wealth of

experience available. The need to better understand the farming systems in the different areas of Afghanistan in which poppy is grown was also emphasized, so that viable agricultural, as well as off farm, alternatives may be identified. Participants shared the opinion that no single project or organisation can resolve the scale and nature of the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and a wider programmatic approach was required.

In an effort to address the vast field related to AL, discussions were carried out centring around the following key themes identified at the beginning of the practitioner's workshop as the key areas in need of discussion.

## **Key Themes**

### *1) Coordination*

The necessity of reconstituting the AL Working Group was agreed by everyone – but with more commitment from those present to make it work. Afghanistan remains a largely agricultural country and opium poppy is unfortunately part of the agricultural/cropping system on an increasingly widespread basis in Afghanistan. All relevant Ministries should play an integral part of AL strategy, policy and programmes.



### *2) Mainstreaming*

The importance of mainstreaming the issue of AL and opium production was stressed. There was little argument on the need to 'mainstream' the issue of drugs into the whole fabric of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and development programme in Afghanistan.



### *3) Conditionality and Community Commitment*

There was a divergence of opinion about 'conditionality', with most of those with experience of it in practice expressing grave reservations. The view was expressed that without effective governance and law enforcement, 'conditionality' in managing development type projects in opium producing areas is unlikely to be effective and may even have the opposite effect.

### *4) Timing and Coordination between Alternative Livelihoods and Law Enforcement*

Whether an eradication programme could be counter productive was discussed, if, for instance it was used as general punitive action directed solely at the farmer producers without at the same time addressing trafficking, processing and trading and without having AL options in place. It was agreed that AL, interdiction and eradication measures must be co-ordinated.

Other issues of importance raised by members of the working group were:

- Insecurity in many of the key opium producing areas is seriously inhibiting both investment and the rehabilitation/development programme. Security and good governance are fundamental conditions for the development of AL.
- AL includes taking a holistic approach that includes safe water, health, education, rural infrastructure and other important logistical issues as well as strengthening community responsibility and capacity.
- The importance of developing Civil Society, community responsibility and the private sector including rural banking services supported by the security forces, police etc.
- Good programmes already exist, but they are not, by and large based in agricultural industries. This should be addressed.

### **Outcomes**

The following decisions were made that will take the issues raised above forward:

- The AL Working Group was reconvened and a smaller executive group created to review and take forward the Action Plan. This was followed up by their first meeting two days later.
- The group will assess capacity building needs in alternative livelihoods in MRRD, CND, MAAH and other relevant ministries and formulate a programme to address these needs.
- A database will be established to analyse relevant major development programmes in terms of their potential impacts on alternative livelihoods and poppy production.
- They will ensure that counter-narcotics and alternative livelihoods issues are adequately reflected in the policies and strategies of Government. An inter-ministerial technical commission will be established to address this issue.

### **DEMAND REDUCTION**

Five speakers gave presentations on Demand Reduction (DR) initiatives currently in place in Afghanistan. These were followed in most instances by questions and comments from the floor. In general there was a broad consensus as to what the key issues are and how they can most effectively be tackled.



All the presentations raised the issue of difficulties in attending to identified needs with the available resources. All made attempts to provide some understanding of the causes of drug use, such as poverty, unemployment and availability, and of the types of services that are currently on offer, such as outreach work, motivational counselling, detoxification,

rehabilitation and after care programmes. There was agreement that the problem is one of “polydrug” use, rather than specific substance use, that Afghans are taking a large range of drugs including tranquillisers, stimulants and chemical opiate substitutes as well as heroin.

Co-ordination at many levels, and the subsequent need for improvements was also a common factor in the presentations and in the subsequent discussion.

## **Key Themes**

### *1. Lack of Awareness*

There is a general lack of awareness about drug use generally, particular about how it relates to opium cultivation, and the nature of drug addiction. There is a need for all relevant ministries and other national and international decision makers to be properly informed of the issues, on how they can influence demand reduction progress and why it is important for them to do so.

### *2. A Need for a Comprehensive Treatment and Rehabilitation System in Afghanistan*

There was agreement that “Best Practice” in drug treatment and rehabilitation needs to be recorded and agreed throughout Afghanistan, with development of a national protocol. It was proposed that the Afghan Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), in conjunction with other relevant agencies (e.g. MoH, UNODC and NGOs), should identify and plan service delivery and co-ordinate best practice.

### *3. Coordination between NGO's, Government, UN, Media and other Bodies is Essential, as is Regional Cooperation*

Much was discussed about the need for co-ordination and monitoring, both between the various drug services and other national and international bodies. A national strategy was called for that would ensure equity in service provision between Kabul and the provinces, since current provision is largely centred in Kabul.

### *4. Need for Training and Capacity Building at All Levels.*

There was general agreement that training and capacity building were integrally linked and that they were a critical element to progress in demand reduction facilities and services. Some staff training has already been accomplished, but much more is needed in several key areas. All groups proposed, in one form or another, the development of a national training and research centre to establish educational and training programmes in all aspects of drug abuse prevention.

### *5. Need for More Resources in Demand Reduction.*

There appeared to be a common perception that Demand Reduction is given less attention and less priority in the allocation of resources than Law Enforcement or Alternative Livelihoods. Demand reduction was described as the “Third Pillar” of the national drug control, strategy for Afghanistan of equal importance and therefore equally deserving of funds as the other two pillars. It needs to be clearly understood that drug

abuse/addiction is a distinct barrier to development leading to economic, social and health-related problems for individuals, families and communities.

## **Outcomes**

Many of the issues discussed require long-term work. The outcome of this group was to bring many experts together, from a wide variety of disciplines, who agreed what needed to be achieved and who have convened a Demand Reduction Working group to pursue the objectives agreed.

## **CONCLUSIONS**


Much was achieved in the course of this conference but the most significant factor was -- -as put by a Afghan participant--- the symbolic value of convening a high-profile conference in Kabul which sent a strong message to the Afghans, in particular, and their partners in assistance that illicit drugs issue is a top priority of all those interested in securing Afghanistan's future. Despite the security considerations, weather conditions and the difficult logistics of arranging such an event in Kabul, organizers persisted in holding the Conference in Kabul and were rewarded with unprecedented numbers of high level participants from the central government and a significant representation from the provinces of Afghanistan as well as from the international community. All stakeholders came together to explore the specific problems and look for directions in finding the solutions.

Afghan speakers were forthcoming in sharing their honest assessment of the current situation and made clear their determination to rid their country of opium poppy. This in itself is a major achievement in a country where discussion on the opium economy has been a taboo due to its implication to the security environment. Especially important were contribution made from those close to the problem. Their presentations with candid analysis and practical suggestions were one of the key highlights of this Conference.

International speakers delivered a strong message that urgent and decisive action was required from the Afghan government ---at all level--- and communities with international assistance if Afghanistan was to be saved from turning into a narco-state. Many measures related to counter narcotics were discussed, including the need to fight against corruption of officials related to the illicit drugs related activities.

Above discussion in the plenary session and the general debate, taken together with the thematic discussion have been incorporated into five action plans in the key areas of law enforcement, judicial reform, alternative livelihoods, drug demand reduction and public awareness. The action plans reflect the current state of affairs in the each field that the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy aims to address, by describing the current situation and areas for future work. They do not purport to offer any magic solution and nor are they elaborate and technical in nature. But they do correctly reflect the current condition in Afghanistan and the limited capacity and resources that Afghanistan and its supporters have to work with. It is an important starting point in identifying the actual state of counter narcotics effort in the country and to articulate the required resources. Expert working groups from each area will continue to work together on the complex problems that face the Afghan Government on these issues and the action plans will

serve as the starting point. Conclusions from this conference will be taken forward to the Berlin Conference to be convened in late March 2004 and lessons learnt will inform strategic planning for future progress. The Afghan Government, UK and UNODC will continue to seek increased international involvement in specific counter narcotics activity and it is sincerely hoped that the Conference was able to make its contribution in raising awareness among the Afghans and in bringing proper attention to the Afghan drugs issue from the wider international community.





# International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan

To support implementation of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy

8 – 9 February, 2004 (1382)  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kabul

## Agenda

### **Guiding Issues:**

- The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy
- Improving co-ordination of existing projects
- Mainstreaming of drugs into all development sectors
- Identifying where new activities are required or can be implemented
- Encouraging the International Community to take on specific tasks



## **Sunday, February 8**

From 12.00                      Arrival, Registration and Coffee/Tea, Light Lunch

13.45                              Recitation from the Holy Koran  
Introductory Plenary and instructions: Mirwais Yasini, Director, CND

14.00                              **Separate Practitioners Workshops** for experts on:

### **1. Law Enforcement/Judicial Capability**

Chair:                              Mr Sharifullah, CND

Speakers:                        Chris Farrimond, HMCE, UK  
General Sattori, CNP, MOI  
Nazar Ahmad Shah, UNODC  
President Di Gennaro, Italian Justice Project  
Ambassador Vergau, German Police Project

Facilitator:                        Tony Regan, British Embassy

### **2. Alternative Livelihoods**

Chair:                              Dr Wasiq, CND

Speakers:                        Mr Azizi, MRRD  
Marc Theuss, AKDN  
Barbara Burroughs, Relief International  
Steve Shaulis, Central Asian Development Group

Facilitator:                        Anthony Fitzherbert, MRRD

### **3. Demand Reduction**

Chair:                              Dr Zafar, CND

Speakers:                        Dr Kaka, Drug Demand Treatment Centre, MoH  
Mohammad Naim, UNODC  
Dr Bayan, GTZ  
Dr Stanekzai, Nejat  
Dr Latif, BBC

Facilitator:                        David Macdonald, UK Consultant



- 18.00 Reports from Workshop Chairs. Summary by Mirwais Yasini, Director
- 18.30 Pre-dinner drinks
- 19.00 Official dinner

### **Monday, 9 February**

- 08.00 Arrival, Registration and Coffee/Tea
- 09.00 - **Opening Plenary Session**  
09.30
- Recitation from the Holy Koran
- Afghan Transitional Authority President, Hamid Karzai
- Ambassador Rosalind Marsden on behalf of UK Foreign Office Minister, Bill Rammell
- Mohammad Amirkhizi, UNODC Representative Kabul on behalf of UNODC Executive Director, Antonio Maria Costa
- Statement by Chair:** National Security Adviser, Dr Rassoul
- Deputy Minister of Defence Wardak
- Deputy Minister of Interior Hilal
- 11.00 Tea/Coffee
- PRESS ONLY - Press Conference  
Mirwais Yasini, CND  
Ambassador Rosalind Marsden, UK  
Mohammad Amirkhizi, UNODC
- 11.30 **Overview of Afghan National Drug Control Strategy and Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND):** Director, CND, Mirwais Yasini
- Presentation** by Kandahar Province Governor Pashtun
- Presentation** by Ghulam, son of Mohammad, Village Elder, Nangarhar Province



- 12.30 Lunch
- 13.30 **Break out into Working Groups for:**
- 1. Law Enforcement/Judicial Capability**  
Chair: Deputy Minister of Interior Hilal  
Facilitator: Tony Regan, British Embassy
  
  - 2. Alternative Livelihoods**  
Chair: Deputy Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development  
Facilitator: Anthony Fitzherbert, MRRD
  
  - 3. Demand Reduction**  
Chair: Minister for Public Health Siddiq  
Facilitator: David McDonald, UK Consultant
- 15.30 Tea/Coffee
- 16.00 Chairs' report on Workshop discussion
- 16.30 Concluding debate: Speakers  
Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development Atmar  
Mr Mohammad Ali Hashemi, Iranian Drug Control Agency  
General Alexander Fyodorov, State Drugs Control Committee, Russian Federation  
US Assistant Secretary of State Bobby Charles  
US DEA Administrator Karen Tandy  
UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa
- 17.30 Chairman's summary and Close



## **LAW ENFORCEMENT: ACTION PLAN**

**Key Afghan Stakeholders:** Ministry of Interior, Counter Narcotics Directorate, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance

**Current Key International Stakeholders:** UK (lead nation on counter narcotics), Germany (lead nation on police reform), Italy (lead nation on judicial reform), UNODC, US, Iran, EC, France.

### **Afghan National Drug Control Strategy**

The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy calls for the delivery of law enforcement operations aimed at dismantling opium bazaars, destroying stockpiles and laboratories. It calls for the establishment of a specialist, well-trained Police force, with an intelligence analysis and narcotics testing capability, and with the expertise necessary to tackle drugs crime both inside Afghanistan and on its borders.

### **Current Situation**

The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) were created as a specialist counter narcotics department of the Ministry of Interior at the start of 2003. CNPA units have been developed with international assistance in Kabul and seven key priority cities (Jalalabad, Kandahar, Lashkargar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Feyzabad). Recruitment has been carried out and basic training has been provided (through UNODC and the UK), but work needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of the units already operating, which suffer from a lack of expertise, poor administration and weak management, and expand the numbers of CNPA. A basic forensic science station is being established in the CNPA HQ. This needs to be built on and integrated into a wider forensics science service.

At present the CNPA have a low interdiction capability. Anti-smuggling work has commenced at the City Gates of Kabul through the deployment of a mobile detection unit, but more of these are required. Other interdiction has thus far relied upon the capacity of non-CNPA MOI resources. A specialist Afghan force within the MOI has been trained to conduct interdiction operations against traffickers, processing facilities and drug stockpiles.

There remains confusion among the different law enforcement agencies, including within the Ministry of Interior, over who has prime responsibility for drugs law enforcement. This needs to be addressed and the role of the CNPA made clear. The Border Police (BP) and General Police are currently being reformed and their roles and responsibilities in the sphere of drugs law enforcement need clarifying so that the appropriate training can

be provided. There needs to be a strong centre to exert control over the provinces and support action at local level.

#### **Areas for future work**

- Tackle **corruption** and involvement of officials and commanders in the drugs trade through visible action.
- **Increase** in the numbers of CNPA operational and **extension** of the regional CNPA network to other priority regions through extension of UNODC G38 project
- **Increase effectiveness** of existing CNPA units with regard to operational enforcement, management, administration and finance through the presence of international trainers and mentors in Kabul and the regions
- **Expedition and expansion** of UNODC H10 project to develop Afghan interdiction capability within the CNPA beyond Kabul
- **Expansion** of anti-smuggling training programme to establish additional Mobile Detection teams, operated by the CNPA, in Kabul and along strategic trafficking routes across Afghanistan
- **Establishment** of corporate development branch within Kabul CNPA HQ to oversee development of Standard Operating Procedures, the management of budgets, procurement of operational assets and co-ordination of training
- **Establishment** of CNPA forensic science capability in all CNP units, and co-ordination with the development of a wider forensic science service for the Afghan police in general
- **Development** of a further central Afghan eradication capability
- **Clarification of roles and responsibilities** of the Border and General police in drugs issues, and delivery of any training required



## **COUNTER NARCOTICS JUDICIAL REFORM: ACTION PLAN**

**Key Afghan Stakeholders:** Ministry of Justice, Attorney General's Office, Supreme Court, Counter Narcotics Directorate, Ministry of Interior

**Current Key International Stakeholders:** UNODC, Italy (as lead nation on judicial reform), UK (as lead nation on counter narcotics)

### **Afghan National Drug Control Strategy**

The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy calls for the establishment of an efficient and modern criminal justice system to address drug trafficking and other forms of criminal activity, including strengthening key components of the criminal justice system, such as courts, prosecution offices and correction centres. Laws will be enacted to ensure that drug traffickers are punished severely to provide the required deterrence. All Afghan drug laws should conform to international standards as set out in the United Nations Drug Conventions to which Afghanistan is a party, and mechanisms should be established to monitor compliance with those Conventions. Moreover, respect for core values, such as the inviolability of basic human rights, should be factored into all relevant capacity-building programmes.

### **Current Situation**

A new Drug Law has been signed by the President and is now in effect. It complies with the relevant UN Drug Conventions, but more detailed implementation regulations are required. Many judges and officers of the court, particularly in the provinces, are not aware of it. The drug law must be incorporated into the ongoing justice sector reform initiatives carried out by UNODC (criminal law and capacity building of the Ministry of Justice; penitentiary reform; juvenile justice reform), by UNDP (governance promotion; support to the Judicial Reform Commission), and by UNICEF (support to wayward youth).

The prosecution of drug cases, especially for major criminals, poses some particular problems. They are often very powerful people, particularly in their local areas, capable of bribing and intimidating their way out of trouble. Witness testimony may be difficult to obtain. The Afghan Government remains determined to prosecute such criminals, but faces difficulties doing so safely and efficiently through the existing courts system.

### **Areas for future work**

There is in principle agreement from the key stakeholders to examine the development a stand-alone capacity within the justice sector to deal with cases prosecuted under the 1382 (2003) Drug Law securely, fairly and efficiently. Co-ordination with reform programmes in the wider justice sector is vital. Many details need to be worked out. A first step will be a visit by a panel of international experts to Kabul to meet with key stakeholders and develop recommendations based on their findings. But the following areas need consideration:

- **Amendment** to 1382 (2003) Drug Law to define serious offences with central jurisdiction and lesser offences with provincial jurisdiction and **review** evidentiary rules. **Publication** of law in basic form.
- In the short term, **adapt and secure** sections of existing judicial and prison facilities to hold major drugs criminals.
- In the longer term, **creation** of a special prosecution unit to help prosecute serious offences together with **construction** of a high security court and prison facility for high-profile cases and/or inclusion of adequate security measures in existing prisons to house such offenders. Investigate role for a Special Drugs Prosecutor. **Establishment** of witness protection/relocation capability.
- **Training** for judges, prosecutors and defenders in the 1382 (2003) Drug Law and for Counter Narcotics Police in collection, preservation and presentation of evidence;
- **Assistance** from International Community to provide Prosecutable Evidence for the major drugs traffickers;
- Phased **construction** of special court and prison facilities in all provinces for secure and efficient prosecution of lesser drug offences.



## **ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS: ACTION PLAN**

**Key Afghan Stakeholders:** Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, Ministry of Food and Light Industry, Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment, Counter Narcotics Directorate of the National Security Council and Afghan NGOs.

**Current Key International Stakeholders:** UNODC, FAO, UNDP, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Union, UK (as lead nation on counter narcotics), US, Iran, Japan and several international NGOs

### **Afghan National Drug Control Strategy**

In the area of Alternative Livelihoods the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) recognises that the elimination of the opium economy can only be achieved if alternative sources of livelihood are available for farmers and agricultural labourers. The strategy accepts that an approach that addresses the different reasons why farmers grow poppy, and integrates development interventions with awareness building and law enforcement interventions, will be most effective. Interventions should not be confined to agriculture, but should include employment creation, small enterprise development and social safety nets. Special attention should be paid to interventions targeted at women currently involved in poppy production. Counter Narcotics objectives should be mainstreamed throughout national development programmes.

### **Current situation**

Capacity in many Ministries to implement alternative livelihoods programmes is limited; and understanding of the concept across the Afghan government is weak. There has been little strategic thinking since the adoption of the NDCS in May 2003. In addition, the Alternative Livelihoods Working Group has been inactive for six months. The appointment of an Alternative Livelihoods Consultant with UK funding should help to fill this strategic gap and pave the way for longer term capacity building through UNODC and other agencies.

However, a number of substantial programmes have recently been launched that may have significant impacts on livelihoods in Afghanistan, including alternative livelihoods for poppy growers. USAID's Rebuilding Afghanistan's Agricultural Markets Programme (RAMP) is a \$150m investment in agricultural livelihoods, including rural credit and agri-processing activities. FAO (with DFID support) and many NGOs are carrying out rural/agricultural development projects in a variety of poppy growing areas. A 'Research in Alternative Livelihoods Fund' (RALF) has been established with DFID support to encourage innovative applied research in natural-resource based alternative livelihoods.

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), with a current budget in excess of \$100m, has already had an impact on the local governance structures and is expected to support the development of rural infrastructure and income generating opportunities. The National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP) coordinates labour-intensive schemes which provide employment opportunities as well as restoring essential infrastructure. The Micro-finance Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) is piloting activities to make micro-credit accessible to the poor. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the European Commission have contributed to these programmes.

Notwithstanding the potential contribution of the above programmes to livelihoods, there has been no serious attempt so far to analyze them from a counter-narcotics perspective, and to guide them so that counter-narcotics impacts can be maximised. A current priority is to develop guidelines for mainstreaming and to apply these as appropriate to programmes supporting the development of employment, enterprise, or agricultural livelihoods.

The assessment of the level of poppy production is progressing well with both UNODC and the USG producing annual reports documenting the amount and location of poppy cultivation. UNODC also produce data on the farmgate and market price of opium on a monthly basis. However more work is required in the area of impact monitoring. The reasons for cultivating opium poppy differ across different socio-economic groups. A greater understand of how different groups respond to the variety of (development and law enforcement) interventions aimed at reducing opium poppy cultivation is required to inform effective policy development in the field of alternative livelihoods. Whilst a National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), which includes a variety of livelihood indicators, has been carried out and a NRVA Unit is being institutionalised with EC support. More needs to be done to develop Afghan capacity in these fields, and to mainstream evaluation and monitoring through all projects.

### **Areas for future work**

There is an urgent need for activities at the strategic level, in building capacity, and for support to ongoing and new programmes and projects. Some of the priorities are:

#### Strategy, co-ordination and capacity building

Revitalisation of Alternative Livelihoods Working Group and creation of a smaller executive group to review and take forward the Action Plan

- Assessment of capacity building needs in alternative livelihoods in MRRD, CND, MAAH and other relevant ministries and formulation of a programme to address these needs.
- Establish a database and analyse of relevant major development programmes (and relevant sub-programmes) in terms of their potential impacts on alternative livelihoods and poppy production, and preparation and application of specific guidelines to optimise these impacts.

- Ensure that counter-narcotics and alternative livelihood issues are adequately reflected in the sectoral policies and strategies of Government. Establishment of an inter-ministerial technical commission to address this issue.
- Establish mechanisms for closer coordination and strategy development between Alternative Livelihoods and Law Enforcement Working Groups.

#### Support to programmes and projects

- Based on the above analysis, increase resources for those programmes likely to have maximum alternative livelihoods impact.
- Support programme/ project supervisory bodies (i.e steering committees, advisory groups) to monitor the application, and review the effectiveness, of guidelines for mainstreaming counter-narcotics in programme/project implementation.
- Support the design and implementation of new programmes and projects to address livelihoods to fill gaps in existing programmes (or in cases where existing programmes are insufficiently flexible to provide vehicles for mainstreaming counter-narcotics objectives). For example, there are current needs in pro-poor agricultural livelihoods, rural finance, off farm activities, and micro/small enterprise development.

The CND will work with relevant ministries, international agencies and national and international NGOs to monitor projects proposals which will contribute to achieving the goals of the NDCS. Some of the proposals have been already submitted and categorized using the framework of outputs of the NDCS Alternative Livelihoods Implementation Plan, and working level discussion and coordination will continue in the context of this exercise.



## **DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION ACTION PLAN**

**Key Afghan Stakeholders:** Counter Narcotics Directorate, Ministry of Health (Lead Ministry for Demand Reduction), Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Ministry of Information and Culture, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, Ministry of Womens Affairs, Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, Ministry of Justice, Afghan NGO's.

**Current Key International Stakeholders:** UNODC, GTZ, DOH, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Japan, UK and the US.

### **Afghan National Drug Control Strategy**

The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy calls for the creation of effective preventative and treatment-based mechanisms to cope with growing domestic drug consumption. These mechanisms need to be mainstreamed into education, health and law enforcement programmes and closely coordinated and monitored. Taking into account the scale and nature of the problem, the strategy calls for the establishment of drug abuse prevention and treatment programmes which are both community-based and residential, and which provide for the rehabilitation, aftercare and social reintegration of drug addicts as well as prevention programmes targeted at those groups at-risk of drug abuse. The Strategy identifies the need for comprehensive training for personnel involved in implementing demand reduction activities, and also calls for the social exclusion caused by drug addiction to be reduced and for addicts to be diverted into treatment services rather than arrested and punished. Such drug demand reduction policies and activities of the government should be coordinated and monitored by the CND who will chair the drug demand reduction coordination committee.

### **Current Situation**

Generally there is a lack of awareness and understanding about the risks and dangers of drugs that are available in Afghanistan and the resultant need to mainstream demand reduction across all sectors of society. While emphasis has been placed on opium and heroin, hashish and pharmaceutical drugs such as tranquillisers and painkillers are also frequently abused. Injecting of heroin and analgesics is of particular concern. There is also a lack of acknowledgement that all indicators suggest a substantial increase in drug abuse in Afghanistan. Many factors have contributed to this, including the mental health problems caused by war and conflict, poverty and unemployment and the return of refugees from neighbouring countries with high rates of drug addiction.

At the same time, capacity to deal with the economic, social and health-related problems of individuals, families and communities due to drug abuse and addiction is limited. The CND, with support from UNODC, developed a dynamic broad-based Demand Reduction

Working Group that includes representatives from several Ministries, International Organisations and local NGOs active in the field. However there is an urgent need for strategic thinking to develop a well-coordinated National Plan of Action and a Government structure to oversee its implementation. An ad hoc Demand Reduction Planning Group consisting of the UK, CND, UNODC and GTZ meets on a regular basis to discuss these problems and issues.

In terms of demand reduction services and facilities there have been several positive initiatives, although small-scale and piecemeal, led by UNODC, GTZ, the Colombo Plan, and local NGOs such as Nejat, Shahamat and Wadan. These have centred mainly on Kabul and refugee communities in Pakistan, with some limited services being extended to Badakshan, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces and have included both treatment services for addicts and drug abuse prevention activities aimed at youth, women and other at-risk groups. The local authorities in Herat have also established a detention centre for drug addicts, but with limited treatment facilities.

There is now an urgent need to develop culturally appropriate services and facilities in all provinces, particularly poppy cultivation areas. Limited residential and community-based treatment and rehabilitation services in Kabul city provide useful models for other areas of the country and these need to be scaled-up and systematically extended to the provinces. This will be partially achieved through Demand Reduction Action Teams implemented through UNODC in conjunction with provincial offices of the Ministry of Health, and also GTZ's proposed Integrated Demand Reduction Programme.

Drug abuse prevention education and training resource materials in the form of audiotapes, videos, booklets, posters and stickers have been developed by UNODC, GTZ and local NGOs but with limited distribution due to funding shortages. Training of practitioners and social multipliers has been carried out by UNODC, the Colombo Plan, and other agencies, but again has been limited in scope.

Much more needs to be done to develop Afghan capacity in drug abuse prevention and to mainstream demand reduction across all relevant Ministries, agencies and NGOs working in the development field. All initiatives in this area should be coordinated and monitored, with particular emphasis placed on quality control, comprehensive training and systematic development of services to ensure a professional and effective response to the problem.

### **Areas for future work**

There is an urgent need for: activities at the strategic level; capacity building in all aspects of demand reduction; the provision of comprehensive training to service providers; and, the development of support and advisory services for existing and new programmes and projects. Priorities include:

**Regular meetings** of the broad-based Demand Reduction Working Group and creation of a smaller executive group to review and oversee the implementation of the Action Plan

**Development** of a national protocol for drug treatment and rehabilitation

**National assessment** of the extent and nature of drug abuse in order to design and develop appropriate and rational responses. (note: this will be partially met by UNODC's planned assessment of drug abuse in 6 key provinces in 2004).

**Comprehensive training** on drug awareness and drug abuse prevention for social multipliers such as teachers, journalists, mullahs, community leaders, healthcare workers and police officers.

**Expansion** of community based drug treatment and rehabilitation facilities to the provinces, especially the major cities, in line with ATA priorities, and including aftercare and follow-up activities with provision of vocational training and income-generation opportunities for recovering addicts.

**Creation** of a pilot scheme for drop-in daycare centres for drug addicts in Kabul, and subsequent extension to further provinces if the pilot proves successful.

**Development** of culturally appropriate drug abuse prevention education and training resource materials for schools, health clinics, treatment centres and other relevant institutions.

**Incorporation** of drug abuse prevention education and training into University and other national courses for healthcare workers, social workers, community development workers and teachers.

**Provision** of risk reduction services to intravenous drug users and those at-risk of injecting as a public health measure to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS and other blood borne viruses.



## **PUBLIC AWARENESS : ACTION PLAN**

**Key Afghan Stakeholders:** Counter Narcotics Directorate, Ministry of Health (Lead Ministry for Demand Reduction), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Lead Ministry for Alternative Livelihoods), Ministry of Interior (Lead Ministry for Law Enforcement), Ministry of Information and Culture, Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, Ministry of Women's Affairs, Afghan Radio, Local Press, Afghan Film Directorate.

**Current Key International Stakeholders:** BBC World Service, ISAF/Coalition, Radio, Inter-News Agency, UK, US, I. R. Iran.

### **Afghan National Drug Control Strategy**

The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy calls for the citizens of Afghanistan to be aware of the internal and external consequences of poppy cultivation and its cross-cutting effect on all sectors of society. Public awareness projects should be carefully designed to complement initiatives that address both supply and demand, particularly in poppy cultivation areas. Opium poppy cultivation, which has now become the cultural norm in many parts of Afghanistan, needs to be combated in national education and training programmes. Apart from the use of opiate drugs such as opium and heroin, public awareness campaigns must include the risks and dangers of the wide range of other psychoactive substances available in the country, particularly hashish and pharmaceutical drugs like tranquillisers and painkillers. Women in particular should be educated, so they can act as agents of change in the household. Use should also be made of tribal and religious structures, as well as modern media channels, to get the message across. Such messages must point to the illegality of opium poppy cultivation and the damage caused by its abuse, production and trafficking to individuals, communities and society.

### **Current Situation**

The Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) has been implementing Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Public Awareness Campaign, which has included: broadcasting Islamic-based counter-narcotics messages on a variety of Kabul and provincial radio stations; and, the production and distribution of a Public Awareness CD in conjunction with Inter-News Agency. Although the impact of the PR campaign has not been assessed, UNODC data suggests that religious messages can be a significant factor in reducing drug demand.

The BBC World Service, Afghanistan's most listened to radio station, has also broadcast counter narcotics messages, including the use of high-level political messages, as well as interviews with the public and religious leaders throughout Kabul. The BBC AEP

(Afghan Education Project), in conjunction with UNODC, runs a weekly radio drama that addresses many social issues, including the demand for and supply of drugs.

More locally based community awareness campaigns have been carried out by UNODC, GTZ and several NGOs through the distribution of anti drugs videos, audiotapes, posters and stickers.

However, the task of disseminating counter narcotics messages in Afghanistan is complicated by a poorly-developed media infrastructure and largely informal traditional means of communication. There is a lack of capacity within the Afghan Government for developing the information materials necessary to feed an intensive CN public awareness campaign and implement it in a systematic manner. The Afghan government, together with international assistance, needs to make more use of traditional and informal means of influence, for example tribal structures and religious networks, to get the anti-drugs message across.

### **Areas for future work**

The Afghan Government needs to develop, together with international assistance, a more structured, systematic and continuous national drug awareness campaign that involves the National, Provincial and Local Government, media outlets, traditional structures and local communities. Areas for future work include:

- **Development** of regular updated Public Awareness Campaigns on all aspects of CN, such as demand reduction, law enforcement and alternative development initiatives, via Radio, TV and Press throughout Afghanistan.
- **Development and distribution** of posters and drug awareness pamphlets to relevant institutions, such as schools and health facilities, throughout Afghanistan.
- **Regular CN speeches** by the President, Governors, Ministries and influential Religious leaders aired and updated on a regular basis.
- **Regular reporting** of eradication and seizure successes, drug interdiction activities and high profile arrests, and other law enforcement initiatives, in an effort to increase the deterrent effect.
- **Provision** of radios to schools, community groups, religious leaders and any other relevant institutions, to enable messages to be passed onto provinces throughout Afghanistan.
- **Monthly newsletter** from CND to be provided and distributed to all relevant Ministries and relevant organisations, providing updates on CN activities in Afghanistan.
- **Development** of 'mobile cinemas' showing and discussing drug awareness video programmes in rural communities, with distribution of posters, stickers and gifts for children.

**International counter narcotics conference**  
**Statement by H.E President Hamid Karzai on counter narcotics, Monday 9**  
**February 2004**

By the name of Allah the most compassionate the most Merciful  
Praise and thanks to God and Salutation to his Prophet Mohammad (PBUH)

Dear brothers and sisters!

Welcome you all to this important conference on countering poppy cultivation, and the production, processing and trafficking of heroin.

The issue of opium, poppy, the production of heroin and processing of other harmful substances produced from poppy along with anti-terrorism problem is one of the main problems of our country. Afghanistan as a society developing towards peace, prosperity, a substantive economy, and as a member of international community knows its own problem in this regard. Afghanistan is obliged in its own national interests to fight against poppy cultivation, production of heroin and trafficking of illicit drugs by any means possible.

Afghanistan, since the establishment of interim administration till today, has been fighting against this, trying to eradicate poppy cultivation, to destroy processing laboratories and to stop drugs trafficking. But we are not yet successful.

Poppy is still cultivated in the country, processing laboratories are still existing, opium is still being converted to heroin, trafficking and traffickers are still ample. In both areas, it not only affects the economy of Afghanistan but the money, which is earned from the trafficking, production, and business of heroin fuels terrorism. Terrorism and narcotic drugs are involved and cooperate in the destruction of Afghanistan, the region and the world.

Afghanistan is therefore firmly committed to take serious action against poppy cultivation, the production and processing of heroin and other narcotic drugs, and their trafficking, because of economic reasons and reasons of national security.

Last year, with the assistance of UK government and United Nation Office of Drugs and Crime we were able to develop out National Drug Control Strategy. Most obviously, we have to focus on eliminating narcotic drugs and poppy cultivation, including through the eradication of poppy cultivation and heroin production; we have to destroy the labs which convert opium into heroin; we have to block drugs traffickers, the trafficking routes and eliminate the traffickers' power. We also have to protect Afghanistan's borders as part of that strategy.

We need more assistance and the cooperation of neighboring countries and international community, especially in the joint struggle against drug trafficking, drug markets and

addiction. We ask the international community to cooperate and assist us to implement our National Drug Control Strategy to fight against poppy, heroin and its trafficking. In the eradication of poppy cultivation, destruction of heroin labs and in the elimination of expanded trafficking from the borders of Afghanistan as well as in a sustainable process and in fact to implement this intention.

It is important that the international community assists Afghan farmers and those people who are obliged to begin poppy cultivation, due to the lack of water, the devastating war, migration and the last 30 years of economical crisis. They should be provided with alternatives to growing poppy through income generation programs.

Afghanistan is an agricultural country and is one of the most suitable countries for agriculture and fruit production in the region. Maybe, in some fruit production it is one of the best in the world.

In the presence of assistance, Afghanistan has the capability to eliminate poppy cultivation and replace it with other legal and useful production.

I remember that 3 or 4 years before when violence, the lack of water and drought were at their peak in Afghanistan, the people in south west of the country destroyed their orchards of pomegranates to grow poppy.

No farmer would destroy his orchards and agricultural lands to start poppy cultivation until obliged to do so. Afghanistan can grow better cumin and saffron which have good market. In Afghanistan medical plants can be grown which are used in the production of different medicines in the world.

Thus our country is the richest in culture of agriculture and fruit. Our fruits can be the best in the region from the point of view of quantity and quality. So on the one hand we are eradicating poppy cultivation, and on the other we have to provide alternatives to farmers. The poppy lands were eradicated, are being eradicated and will be eradicated but the farmers need to have agricultural, reconstruction and economical alternatives. Alternative income generation has to start from the beginning; otherwise, eradication will be very temporary. Today if we eliminate poppy cultivation farmers will be obliged to start it again.

So, to get good results of from the fight against drugs, poppy cultivation, and heroin production we ask the international community and international organization to assist and cooperate with us in the development of our economy based on legal agriculture, fruit processing, fruit markets orchards. Afghanistan has the ability to do this.

But this doesn't mean that we have to wait for the development of an economy based on legal agriculture and ignore serious action. Not at all, Afghanistan will fight against poppy cultivation and use its entire sources in this regard. Poppy cultivation not only undermines our economy but it eradicates it and connects it with crimes and terrorism.

The hundreds of millions of dollars is not the income of Afghanistan, it is the income of drug traffickers and the mafia, which flows to foreign banks. But its disaster, disgrace and ill reputation remains for Afghanistan. It causes the death of our people and fuels terrorism. It also demolishes the very important historical infrastructure and defames Afghanistan. Therefore, Afghanistan is very well committed to fight against poppy cultivation, whether the international community assists us or not we are obliged for our national interest to fight against poppy cultivation.

Poppy cultivation is against Islam. Our religion strictly prohibits poppy cultivation. It is against Islam, against our national interests, national security and national economy. The three main pillars Afghanistan stands on are its religion, its economy and its security. If the international community wants success soon I ask them to cooperate us in order to fight against poppy cultivation, heroin production and its trafficking.

I have formed forces inside Afghanistan that can eradicate poppy cultivation, demolish heroin processing labs and protect borders from trafficking.

We also want to develop cooperation among different departments in Afghanistan and I want to enhance this cooperation more i.e. with more cooperation between the Department of National Security (intelligence) and the Ministry of Interior Affairs; cooperation between the Department of National Security and the Counter Narcotics Directorate; cooperation between the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Counter Narcotics Directorate; and cooperation between departments in the capital and departments in provinces of the country, to create mutual coordination and understanding against poppy cultivation. The cooperation between different countries in the world is important to fight trafficking and control the movements of the mafia. The cooperation of the neighboring countries and international community is also very important in this regard.

Therefore, mutual cooperation in the country and from the country to the neighboring countries and international community can be vital in stopping drug and its trafficking. Of course the elimination or eradication of demand in the countries to where drug is supplied from our region is also an important principle.

I ask the participants of the conference as I mentioned there should be multilateral financial, technical and intelligence cooperation in the implementation of National Drug Control Strategy. Our international counterparts should be assured from Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan will devote its national values to fight narcotics.

I would like to repeat this that the illicit drug weakens our national values and I don't want to be a weak country, I want to be the owner of a strong government, strong country, strong economy and a vibrant society. Narcotics are against our national interests, so we are determined to cooperate and Afghanistan is ready to cooperate in every field.

I once again repeat this that, with the cooperation of international community or not, Afghanistan is obliged to fight narcotics. And whether Afghanistan will succeed or not on its own is another question. But our intention is to fight against drugs in every aspect. The success of this fight needs the cooperation of international community which has been good up to now. I hope it gets better, more expanded and more harmonious.

I wish you success in your conference. From our side you have the best helper and cooperator to rescue the lives of our people from this evil. I wanted to describe the issue so our foreign colleagues understand better. We hadn't seen addicts in Afghanistan before, and we didn't even know what addiction was? But now we do see the young addicted to heroin in our community. Addiction by heroin and death are the same. Death inflicted by pistol, rocket or bomb is fast - but death through addiction to heroin causes the slow death of people and the destruction of the families. Therefore, our commitments are strong, straight and decisive to fight against illicit drugs. We want your cooperation.

We are grateful for the cooperation of UNODC, all UN member countries and the government of UK in this regard.

I wish you success in your conference.

**Speech of Dr. Zalmei Rassoul, National Security Adviser on the occasion of the International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan, 8-9 February 2004**

Excellencies, Experts, Dear Friends and Colleagues,

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to Kabul and to this most important conference aimed at helping Afghanistan address its serious opium poppy cultivation, trafficking, and use problem.

I must offer my most sincere thanks to the United Kingdom Government and to the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime for their tireless efforts in making this conference possible, from both substantive and administrative standpoints. Let me also thank my colleagues in the Counter Narcotics Directorate and Mr. Mirwais Yasini, Director General of CND, for much of the technical background work which appears in the documents before you today.

From my position as National Security Advisor, I can see the wide ranging damage drugs cause Afghanistan. The drug problem affects the reconstruction of the national army and DDR in that it fuels insurgent military groups; it affects the justice reform in that judges often feel powerless against coercive drug lords; and it affects the reform of the police by providing cash incentives for corruption.

In addition, I see the frustrations of my fellow senior officials in the Afghan Government who struggles with the realization that illicit crop cultivation, production, processing, trafficking and drug abuse undermine the promotion of our legal economy and the rule of law is at odds with the national interest of Afghanistan. We realize that without effective measures such as considerable reduction in poppy cultivation, crack down on heroin laboratories and trafficking and most importantly the establishment of benchmarks and achievable indicators to tackle the drug problem, there will be an adverse effect on the process of development, stability, and governance.

As all of you are keenly aware, we are not facing an easy task. According to research of UNODC on farmers' intentions, many farmers are planning to increase their cultivation of opium and to move cultivation to new areas in 2004. The issue requires the concerted effort of all Afghan people, all Afghan line ministries, our international partners, and a firm and long-term donor commitment.

The framework for our collective action is before you today- the National Drug Control Strategy, put into force by President Karzai in May 2003. This is the first time Afghanistan has adopted a policy document dealing with all aspects of this blight on our society.

The overall goal of the Strategy is the elimination of the production, consumption and trafficking of illicit narcotics into, within, and from, Afghanistan. It foresees the elimination of cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan within a 10-year period. It also

aims to counter the trafficking, processing and distribution of narcotic drugs, to increase efforts against money laundering, to reduce problem drug use and to enhance regional and international cooperation on drug control.

To achieve its overall goal, the National Strategy includes five **implementation plans** which form the discussions yesterday in the practitioners workshops and will be further discussed in the working groups today. Those five plans include the following:

Institution Building: The main body within the Government responsible for the coordination of all drug control initiatives in the country is the Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) established within the National Security Council (NSC) in October 2002. The implementation plan foresees the strengthening of the capacity of the CND and the establishment of a mechanism to coordinate activities in all areas of drug control.

Judicial Reform: Appropriate drugs legislation and a modern criminal justice system are essential to ensure the efficacy of anti-drugs law enforcement. Therefore, the implementation plan includes activities to coordinate donor programmes on judicial reform, the establishment of an anti-drugs legislative system that meets international standards, and the formulation of laws on the classification of drugs.

Law Enforcement: A drug law enforcement structure is being established, including the creation of a drug control unit within the police under the Ministry of Interior with departments for intelligence, investigation and interdiction. Activities under the implementation plan include the strengthening and further development of a transparent and effective drug law enforcement structure, the provision of training and equipment, the enhancement of an intelligence and a narcotics analysis capacity, as well as the extension of law enforcement capacities to the provinces.

Alternative Livelihoods: A strong commitment to long-term development and poverty reduction strategies will be required if the goal to eliminate opium poppy cultivation from Afghanistan is to be achieved. The objective of the implementation plan is to reduce the dependence of Afghan communities on opium poppy cultivation through the development sustainable licit livelihoods that address the different reasons why farmers cultivate opium poppy.

Demand Reduction: There is evidence that amongst the Afghan community the consumption of opiates, cannabis and pharmaceuticals has increased. To address this problem, the implementation plan includes conducting an assessment of the scale and nature of drug abuse and misuse in Afghanistan, establishing drug abuse/misuse prevention and treatment programmes, and improving drug awareness in Afghanistan.

The implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy will be monitored by the CND. However, all activities outlined in the Strategy will be subject to an operational plan to be drawn up annually by the respective line Ministries. It is those line Ministries that I call upon today to ensure that the Strategy moves ahead. CND stands ready to assist those line Ministries in their operational plans. I have been impressed by the technical expertise that

CND can offer and it is to CND that we must turn, as Afghans, for advice, guidance and specialized knowledge in our fight against drugs.

Apart from what the Afghan Government might bring to this challenge, we need the international community to work more with us, to help us in our struggle which has international consequences. I can assure you that we are particularly interested in doing more with our neighbors – neighbors who also suffer from some of the same issues such as drug abuse, trafficking, production, and corruption.

In addition, we are interested in developing closer ties with those further afield too, to share their expertise and experience. We also welcome the wealth of expertise and practical experience many national and international NGOs make on key aspects of drugs policy, particularly in the fields of demand reduction and alternative livelihoods. In this regard, I encourage those NGOs to work closely with CND and line Ministries to ensure their valuable contributions are in line with National Drug Control Strategy.

While Afghanistan is making every effort to strengthen and live up to the goal of eliminating illicit drugs from its territory and reality within a 10-year period, it also recognizes that reversing the numerous internal obstacles hampering counter-narcotics activities is a global challenge. Alone, with limited resources, and a devastated infrastructure, Afghanistan does not stand a chance of winning. Afghanistan needs the financial support of the international community, and heavily relies on the concerted efforts of all, to consolidate its State and strengthen its institutions, restore law and order, resuscitate the agricultural sector, promote alternative income-generating opportunities, and rebuild its devastated infrastructure.

Based on inputs from the practitioners' workshops conducted yesterday, I look forward to receiving concrete plans on how we move forward in our common goal of ridding Afghanistan of its opium economy.

Thank you, once again, for your efforts.

Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan  
National Security Council  
Counter Narcotics Directorate

**Remarks delivered by Mir Wais Yasini**  
**Director-General of CND**  
**Kabul – 9 February 2004**

President Karzai, Minister Rammell, Distinguished Guests, Fellow Afghans

Welcome to this vital conference. Thank you for your attendance. And special thanks to the British government for co-hosting this conference and for taking the lead in Afghanistan's struggle against narcotics.

I call this conference "vital," and I want to tell you why. One one level we Afghans struggle against drugs for all the good and usual reasons:

- We're concerned about the health of our people, especially our children.
- We're concerned about the values of our society.
- We're concerned about our good name.

Every country represented here today has the same concerns. By themselves, these concerns are more than sufficient to bring together. As human beings, of whatever nationality and religion, we're all concerned about the scourge of drugs.

But here in Afghanistan there's an additional reason. Our recent tragedy – the past quarter century of chaos from which we're only now emerging – has engendered a new and more immediately destructive concern directly connected with drugs. I speak of terrorism, the 21<sup>st</sup> century's most immediate threat to civilized society worldwide.

Narcotics and terrorism go together in Afghanistan. The worldwide War on Terror depends, in great measure, upon Afghanistan's War on Drugs. Let me make that link in four quick steps.

- Prior to 9/11, my country, Afghanistan, served as the main haven for so-called Islamist terrorism. Their terror represents a perversion of Islam.
- Those same terrorist elements are doing their desperate utmost to get hold of Afghanistan again.

- Terrorist efforts thrive on exactly what narcotics provide: illegal money and political instability.
- Lose the Afghan Drug War, and our enemies in the War on Terror will regain their main base.

We don't plan to lose the Afghan Drug War. It's going to be long and very difficult, perhaps more difficult than initially conceived. But let me tell you this much for sure: We plan to win.

Winning must be based on plan and structure. 15 months ago we had neither one. Now we do. It's for this reason that 2002-2003 represents a foundation year – the most important year ever – in Afghanistan's anti-narcotics efforts. Let me highlight three developments:

- The Counter Narcotics Directorate – our government's central anti-drug agency and a key unit within the National Security Council – was established in October 2002.
- A comprehensive National Drug Control Strategy – Afghanistan's first ever – was approved in May 2003.
- Far-reaching anti-drug legislation – the most forceful in our history – achieved passage in October 2003.

These developments have laid the groundwork. Now it's 2004: Time for actual implementation on the ground. Law enforcement, alternative livelihood, demand reduction – all three of these now need to be done, not simply discussed.

Let me tell what's been done to good effect thus far. Government intervention has led to decreased cultivation in Helmand, Kandahar, Ningarhar – three prime poppy growing provinces located in the south. 21,000 hectares of opium poppy have been eradicated.

Those areas where cultivation rose in 2003 – most dramatically in the northeastern province of Badakhshan – are located precisely where our government programs have had the least reach.

This stark contrast points to an obvious conclusion: That narcotics control is a function of government authority. Such was the case under the Taliban. However hideous their methods, they controlled the country. Only by means of widespread control could they impose their ban successfully.

That ban was temporary, cynical, and brutal. It was calculated to raise prices, to consolidate regime control, and to curry international favor. It was accomplished, like most Taliban policies, by means of internal terror.

Now, thanks to God, Afghanistan has a different government. We don't decapitate and amputate. We don't terrorize. We base our efforts on the structure of government set forth in our new Constitution. Our counter narcotics interventions will proceed according to law.

But they must proceed. They must proceed immediately before narcotics become truly endemic, before the narco-terrorists become further entrenched, before our War on Drugs becomes even more difficult.

We must continue our work in alternative livelihood. In the long term, this provision is crucial to lasting victory.

We must continue our work in Afghan demand reduction at home – together with your work in your respective countries. In the long, long run, nothing less than worldwide demand reduction will reduce world supply.

We must continue our work in public awareness. Prior to our long conflict, narcotics were stigmatized in Afghanistan. This moral high ground must be regained.

But we can't depend on these measures alone. We must also proceed immediately with more forceful efforts. Simply stated, the Afghan government must begin eradicating opium poppies.

This eradication must go province by province, district by district, field by field. It must be comprehensive and impartial. It must be done as an Afghan government operation and under Afghan government control.

Our struggle is not against the Afghan farmer. Many Afghan farmers find themselves between two stones of a grinding mill. One stone is economic poverty. The other stone is pressure from the international community and, indeed, from our Afghan government. Let's remember that narcotics control is a function of alternative livelihood as well as law enforcement.

But we can't wait for comprehensive alternative livelihood to come on line. And, because drugs are illegal under both Muslim and Afghan law, we can't provide compensation. We have to eradicate now – and to tell our farmers that whatever short-term income losses are necessary for Afghan national security.

To bolster this argument I bring you good news and bad news. The good news is that, according to the 2003 survey released by UNODC and CND, 91% of Afghan farmers don't grow opium poppy. So, as things stand, only 9% would suffer short-term loss. But there's bad news. A survey of farmers' intentions, conducted last fall, indicates that more farmers – in fact, far more – plan to begin growing poppy.

So the time to act – to eradicate – is now.

Our nation is at a crossroads. It began as a buffer state. Gradually, during much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it grew into an authentic nation-state. Then disaster struck, and now we must begin again. This time the great risk is that Afghanistan will become a narco-state. If it does, it will also become, once again, a terrorist state.

Let me add a personal perspective. In December and January I had the honor to serve as Deputy Chairman of our Constitutional Loya Jirga. Every day for nearly three weeks I worked with my fellow delegates in a representative and democratic process. We succeeded – just as we succeeded in the June 2002 Loya Jirga and in the December 2001 Bonn Conference. As I sat in the Loya Jirga tent, these accomplishments filled me with pride.

But privately I was also filled with nagging worry. I knew, more than most delegates, the deep threat posed by narcotics. I knew that narcotics can undo all our accomplishments, can ruin constitutional government, can wreck our country once again, can re-open the door to terrorism.

The stakes are enormous – obviously for Afghans, but also for the international community. Winning the global war on terror means winning the war on drugs in Afghanistan.

Here's why today's conference is so vital. Let's get to it.

February 5, 2004

## **THE TOTAL ERADICATION OF OPIUM PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

Afghanistan, after 25 years of war, destruction and absence of an effective central government due to the Soviet invasion and its after shocks, had lost all its administrative and social institutional infrastructures; and turned in to the ideal location for an outlawed terrorist movement of AL-QAIDA and its international associates. One of the most dreadful by-product of this period in Afghanistan was the un-precedented growth of opium cultivation almost all over Afghanistan. Although it was bringing a huge amount of illegal cash in to the hand of a few, this very flow of huge cash was responsible for the development of sustainability of local warlords and international terrorism. Now that we Afghans with the help of regional and international friends, after a long period of suffering were able to liberate our homeland from terror and the rule of gun, we need to do our best for total eradication of drug production. Drug production is one of the most important source of sustainability of warlordism and international terror.

### **II. THE PRESENT SCALE OF THE PROBLEM**

Just to give an idea of the scale of the problem, it was estimated that in 2000 the market value of opium produced in Afghanistan was about 83-83 billion US\$; and this amount has increased by about 50% since then. Out of the above 84 billion US\$, only 2-3 billion is coming to Afghanistan. This is less than 3% of the total cash generated the balance of 97% goes to the pockets of international mafia and this mafia will not be ready to give up such a huge source of income easily. This cash is usually given to the Afghan poor farmers as advance and thus keeping him bonded to cultivate opium.

There is little doubt that the heavy destruction to the irrigational system and agriculture activities during the past 25 years forced the Afghans to seek high cash return on agriculture products from their reduced amount of land holdings. As a result of no government control and the desperate low level of agriculture outputs in this agriculture based economy even those districts and provinces which had never heard of opium are now fully involved in cultivation of opium over a large areas of their cultivable land.

### **III. IMPLICATIONS, DIRECT AND INDIRECT**

It is not very difficult to see the extremely terrible implication of the status of the ever-increasing cultivation of poppies and other drugs in Afghanistan. The terrible implications are not only for the Afghans and Afghanistan but the regional countries and international community as a whole is also receiving a heavy blow of destruction to their economies and social systems.

Direct implications for Afghanistan are:

1. Reduction in agriculture output, in particular in wheat and other food items.
2. Spread of bribery and corruption at an uncontrollable level.
3. Increase of addictions to opium and heroin at a very fast speed.

Indirect long-term implications are:

1. Because of the control over the illicit drug trace, the ever increasing economic power of the Afghan warlords who are the main obstacles to the normal development in Afghan political and social life. As a result, the legitimate governments will have more and more problems to bring a true democratic system to Afghanistan.
2. The presence of warlords and absence of the rule of law will bring conducive condition for the return of international terror to Afghanistan.

3. It is not possible that the international community, now so much sympathetic to the Afghan cause, will totally lose interest and stop supporting Afghans in their just struggle to achieve a stable, representative and democratic political system in Afghanistan.
4. The international community should be prepared for another and may be many September 11 style terrorist operations.

#### IV. IT IS TIME TO DO SOMETHING EFFECTIVE BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE

Before it is too late and the situation is totally out of control, we should plan and implement a practical program for the eradication of the poppy cultivation and drug production in Afghanistan. We should all remember that this is Afghanistan and the country of the Afghans, therefore, it is the responsibility of the Afghans to study, plan and initiate a comprehensive planning for the total destruction of poppy cultivation within a reasonable timetable. Since the international community as a whole has equal responsibility to eradicate the poppy cultivation, we Afghans are fully justified to expect the world community to help us in fully implementing the total eradication of drugs which is most important conditions for the full reconstruction of our war torn country. Unless we could be successful in the total eradication of the opium production in Afghanistan, the hard work of the Afghans and international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan is highly expected to fail. It should be equally noted that with ever increasing spread of the poppy cultivation, almost without containment, it could be too late to do anything effectively, if we do not move fast enough and full seriousness.

#### V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

For the total eradication of poppy in Afghanistan, there had been many plans presented and different ways suggested and discussed so far. Some are very ambitious but not practical, some are easy to implement but take so much long a time that one cannot be sure of the final outcome, some are too expensive and some are too difficult to achieve. I would like to present the following three different groups of options:

##### 1. SHORT CUT BUT, LESS PRACTICAL:

a. To encourage and convince the international community to legalize the import and use of opium in their respective country. The result will be very low price in consumer markets and the Afghan farmers will not earn much to attract and motivate them for more cultivation.

b. If the above proposal is not acceptable to world community, then they should, at least, allow the Afghan government to plan the following steps for only one or two year:

Legalize the cultivation and export, but impose 3000% official export tax on the opium exports. This cost will make the opium so much expensive that the Afghan farmer might not find any purchasing agent anymore, hence the result is obvious.

##### 2. LONG TERM PRACTICAL OPTION, BUT COULD BE TOO LATE:

To plan gradual but very much manageable process of eradication for taking over 10-12 years. This will allow for some 8-10%/annum eradication of the existing level of production. However, though this long-term plan looks practical and easy in implementation, there is a very high risk of higher percentage of annual increase as compared to the rate of annual eradication level, and the net result will always be in favour of increasing production. Besides, allowing the poppy production for such a long time will enable the process to take deeper and deeper roots in our society and it will not be possible to through it out without serious economic and social problems.

##### 3. OPTIMUM SOLUTION, HOW TO DO IT:

The ideal solution would be a moderately long program, 4-5 years, coupled with parallel economic and social rehabilitation program. The plan shall consist of:

a. Voluntary eradication or reduction of production at a rate of 20-25% per annum, in return for specific economic and social rehabilitation programs for the target community.

b. The economic rehabilitation shall involve projects in areas of big irrigation programs to bring extra land under agriculture for increasing the land holding of small farmers, introducing alternative high cash crops, improving the employment capacity of the target region by bringing in small

agriculture based industries, increased attention to general education and skill job training programs, increasing overall anti-drug awareness of the younger generations.

c. The social rehabilitation will require all kinds of social development projects in the context of our local cultural and religious values.

#### VI. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AFGHANS

This is an established fact that the total eradication of drug production and drug abuse could be only achieved by understanding the Afghan people and its cultural values, and making best use of the positive qualities of these values. It is equally obvious that the Afghans know more about their cultural values than any outsider; therefore, the process of drug eradication should be considered as a purely Afghan issue and should be planned, activated, implemented and completed by the Afghans or at least with the Afghan leadership. Because of the complex nature of the process and the requirement of huge amount of investment, the process cannot be carried out without the huge, active and continuous support of the world community. Therefore, the Afghans should gladly welcome international contributions for the realization of the working plans developed by themselves.

#### VII. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IN PARTICULAR THE CONSUMER COUNTRIES

Because the serious and vigorous implementation of drug eradication will cause serious short lived problems for the Afghans and if successfully implemented, it will eventually benefit the major consumer countries and their social problems; it is to be truly considered the moral responsibility of these countries in particular and world community in general to give full financial and technical support to the Afghan program for total eradication of drug production in Afghanistan.

## Village elder from Nangahar Province

### Ghulam's Speech

By the name of Almighty Allah the most merciful the most compassionate

First of all on the behalf of all the farmers of Afghanistan I would like to welcome all the dignified guests, international personalities, high ranking host government officials.

We should be proud of today's international conference in Afghanistan and the region - it is a victory for all the hardworking farmers of Afghanistan.

On behalf of all farmers I would like to thank all those organizations and personalities which have struggled in this international event and have taken firm steps with thorough bravery to organize this conference. And I would like their success from Allah the Almighty in the eradication of poppy cultivation.

Respected guests and dignified international officials!

Our beloved country Afghanistan has a proud history; it also has pages filled with problems and economical crisis. One of the problems is the cultivation of poppy and its production by Afghan farmers.

Political events have meant that the farmers of Afghanistan, because of the weak economy, unemployment and illiteracy, have been obliged to change their agricultural fields into poppy fields.

The political events in Afghanistan have badly affected agriculture. Afghan farmers are forced by the men in power to cultivate poppy in their agricultural fields.

Afghan farmers are directly and indirectly given heavy loans and kept in an environment where the only method of finding a loaf of bread is thought to be poppy cultivation.

Experiments have proved that, no matter what amount of poppy is grown, it still cannot provide enough wheat or food for one year of the Afghan farmers' children, because the benefits and significant amount of money goes to pockets of drug and heroin traffickers.

The farmers of Afghanistan want to earn money legally. They want to increase their standard of living in a legal manner, and find a sufficient amount of food for their families and as a result of that give a better service for the agriculture of the country.

The main reason Afghan farmers cultivate poppy is they lack the basic necessities of life. Because of poverty their children are deprived of education. Afghan women, as well as doing their housework, are obliged to take part in agricultural work, another product of the economical problems in the country.

The farmers of Afghanistan are unable to use chemical fertilizers so that they can save their agriculture from disaster. The agricultural seeds have also become very limited in variety - if there is a good harvest it is only due to the blessing of a good climate. A flood of wheat on the market has meant that the price has dropped. For instance, in the year 2003 the price of One Kilogram wheat was Five Afghani or Five Cents. Similarly, proper markets for fruit, corn and dairy products do not exist, and no private or governmental cooperative system exists.

The needs of farmers are not being addressed either by the government, international organizations, or agencies.

Afghan farmers are in debt to opium traffickers and work with bending backs on the fields. There is no system or regulations for the rearing of livestock. Due to lack of water and animal diseases in most of the regions shepherds have lost their livestock. In some regions they are still losing them, but there is no attention from the government or international community's side.

Dignified guests!

I on behalf of all Afghan farmers promise that if Afghan farmers find safety from poverty, find the chance of education, become part of the agricultural revolution's benefits and are able to sell their produce on national and international markets, they will never plough one square meter land for poppy cultivation. Instead of poppy they will grow flowers and with pride present a developed, shining and agricultural Afghanistan to the international community.

The farmers of Afghanistan with the leadership of our national leader Hamid Karzai welcome the decisions of the international community and promise that we will welcome the decision of this conference and will act to implement them in a practical manner.

May the farmers of Afghanistan live long!

The farmers of Afghanistan with the leadership of respected Hamid Karzai are ready for any kind of sacrifice to eradicate poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

Speech prepared for the  
International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan

9 February 2004, Kabul

**The counter-narcotics challenge in Afghanistan**

Antonio Maria Costa  
Executive Director  
United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime*

## **The counter-narcotics challenge in Afghanistan What's next?**

President Karzai, Minister Rummel,  
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

For more than two millennia, Afghanistan was at the cross-road of civilizations, and a major contributor to world culture. In the past quarter century, however, the country has found itself at the cross-road of international terrorism. It has also become the world's largest producer of narcotics.

We all -- namely Afghanistan itself, as well as the countries and the international organizations assisting it -- face a huge task. Counter-insurgency is the key battle-ground, but the struggle against narcotics has to be pursued with equal determination because the link between drugs and terrorism is clear. The counter-narcotic challenge can be won: Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey (on the opium front), Peru and Bolivia (on the cocaine front) have shown that legal and viable economic activities can replace illicit cultivations. The same countries have also shown what works, what does not. In general, the process of eliminating illicit drugs has required:

1. a strong, democratic government, committed to the task,
2. the support, financial and otherwise, by the international community,
3. an environment of security and integrity,
4. an appropriately long time frame (a generation or even more).

In the light of these historical benchmarks, what assessment can we make of the drug situation in today's Afghanistan?

\* \* \*

Issue One: a strong, democratic government, committed to the task.

I begin with an optimistic comment. On balance, the accomplishments of the past couple of years have certainly been positive. Afghanistan's progress towards the establishment of democratic governance, framed by the new Constitution and supported by dedicated administrators, has been impressive. I salute President Karzai's courage, vision and dedication to modernize the country.

The foundations of counter-narcotic works were also gradually put in place. The Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) was established (Oct. 02). The National Drug Control Strategy was adopted (May 03). The Drug Control Legislation has entered into force (June 03). This trilogy – Directorate, Strategy and Drug Law – is straightforward, logical and to the point: three

steps, not sufficient of course, but quite necessary. More is now needed, and this is what this Conference is all about.

Another important decision by the Afghan administration was to ban opium poppy production, trafficking and abuse. I remind you that this was the first time a government in Afghanistan committed itself to reach beyond banning poppies cultivation. Since then, other important legislative and administrative measures have been taken, including two large scale eradication campaigns (in 2002 and 2003).

Let me spend one minute on the relation between eradication and interdiction – two instruments with different purposes, addressing distinct targets. Recent news from the field is not good: the Farmers Intention Survey for 2004 just completed by UNODC and the government (CND), projects a continuing increase of opium poppy production in 2004 – perhaps to bumper crop level. Let's face it: at present the government is not strong enough to redress the risk-reward balance, which currently favours those who are engaged in narco-activity. They know they face little chance of retribution by the law. We need to turn this imbalance around, above all, by increasing law enforcement capabilities and the risk of penalty. In doing so, let us separate the question of traffickers, driven by greed, who should be the primary target of severe retribution, from the question of farmers. Driven by poverty, farmers have to be confronted with eradication campaign, coupled with development assistance (a subject I will address later).

Counter-narcotic work needs strong governance: in Afghanistan, the lack of security is a problem. We should respond to it, in two ways. First, we should not wait for greater security, but rather focus on activities that can be carried out despite the context, working for example with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We can do a lot in the more secure provinces which, incidentally, are also the ones where opium cultivation, less intensive until now, is spreading. Second, given the fact that in Afghanistan the issue of narcotics is heavily intertwined with the overall question of security and reconstruction, counter-narcotic interdiction (intelligence, destruction of clandestine labs and of convoys) should be addressed by the military running counter-terrorism activities, to break the trafficking chain up to the borders.

Point Two: the support by the international community.

History has shown that a country cannot dismantle a drug economy by itself. Indeed, during the past two years, in the wake of the Tokyo Conference, significant assistance has been provided by several countries, most notably by the United Kingdom, whose role we all appreciate. It may be worthwhile recalling that the Co-Chairs' summary at the Conference stipulated, in Article 6, that financial pledges were made conditional to Afghanistan's own efforts to eliminate narcotic production and trafficking.

On its part, the United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime* (UNODC) has played a triple role: (i) it has advised UNAMA place drug policy in the

mainstream of assistance; (ii) it has helped the national authorities to establish drug control laws and structures; (iii) it has undertaken several field projects.

Today's conference is about assessing the areas where, and by what means implementation of the NDCS, the drug control strategy, can be further improved, with concrete results (see annex for details.)

a. Institution building. The geographical coverage of CND, the counter-narcotic directorate, needs to be expanded. I compliment the Head, Mirwais Yasini, but his staff needs to increase and be provided with better training and more professional skills in management. Not all Ministries recognize as yet the coordinating role of CND, which must become an effective counterpart to all of us, external third parties.

b. Judicial reform. In Afghanistan drug production, trafficking and consumption were not only banned by decree: they were declared unconstitutional by the recent Loya Jirga. Let's now turn this pronouncement, truly a world premier, into concrete projects. The reform of codes, of penitentiaries and of the juvenile justice system (areas where the Italians have taken the lead), is an extraordinary task, all the more as the Karzai's administration inherited a country without police, without prosecutors, without judges, without courts and without (decent) jails. I invite all donors to be proactive on this front.

c. Law enforcement. Setting up the Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA) in the Ministry of Interior was another remarkable achievement and Germany's key role as lead nation for police reform is greatly appreciated. The counter-narcotic training offered in Kabul now needs to be extended to more provinces, to tackle drug-trafficking closer to production. The task is immense, since investigative and intelligence capacity for controlled deliveries, precursors control and witness protection are not in place there. (The head of police in a northern province reported recently to me that a law enforcement operation the day earlier was done by "...50 policemen, all illiterate, without means of transportation. They hitchhiked, armed with 3 pistols, to interdict a traffickers' convoy of several Land Cruisers" he said with a frown.)

d. Alternative livelihoods. Progress has been timid, in absolute as well as relative to the CND Strategy goals. Disappointing is the lack of donors' interest in funding licit livelihoods initiatives in rural areas: the United Nations Social Compact project, for micro-loans in rural areas (to replace narco-lending), is starved of resources. Poverty may not be a justification for opium cultivation, but it is undeniably a reason for it. In other parts of the world (Latin America and South-east Asia for example), rural projects reached tens of thousands farming families, organized under agro-businesses and producer associations. In addition to generating employment and income to young people and women, alternative livelihood programmes produce food exports, with balance of payments returns. It is exactly this combination of micro- and macro-economic benefits that make alternative development initiatives particularly attractive – and once again popular in the development community, after some disaffection in the recent past. Why not trying this initiative in

Afghanistan, and do so in a more robust manner? The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development's commitment to channel resources towards rural counter-narcotic work and rural rehabilitation needs support.

5. Demand reduction. It needs to be mainstreamed in the development programs. Joint Afghan-UNODC projects have established treatment centres in Kabul; they need to be expanded to the provinces and especially to refugees facilities.

Point Three. an environment of security and integrity.

In addition to improved policy and stronger coordination, I believe we need to address three additional, overarching issues. They are difficult to deal with, even orally, so I bid for your understanding.

One is the alleged involvement of the government officials, civilian and military, in Kabul as much as at the provincial level, in the drug economy. What is the point of putting together counter-narcotics law-enforcement teams, or alternative livelihood projects? What is the point of risking people's live, if some within the system are willing to let the criminal forces make their way? Without clear determination to isolate and prosecute the officials and the commanders who personally benefit from the informal tax charged to traffickers to allow them to run their business, the Anti-drugs Legislation and the Drug Control Strategy are irrelevant. My *Office*, which recently brokered the first international convention against corruption, stands ready to provide the necessary technical assistance. Indeed, the Convention lists specific measures (for example, screening of officials and verification of their net worth) that need immediate application in Afghanistan, even before the Convention enters into effect.

The other point, raised earlier, concerns the international security involvement, notably the Coalition Forces, in the battle against the narco-economy. At a time when the Afghan national security capacity is still limited, the Coalition Forces only have the ability to assist the Afghan government in its fight against drug traffickers and clandestine laboratories. These forces would also have access to intelligence necessary to conduct such law enforcement operations, especially at the provincial level. But as long as the Coalition Force defines their mandate of ensuring security in a narrow sense i.e. not allowing terrorist to carry out operations -- and do not demolish the terrorists' source of funding, they will not succeed in either task. The opium economy will thrive, and so will insurgency. What is the point of freezing Al Queda's bank accounts overseas, if they can replenished right here in Afghanistan?

My third message is addressed to far those away lands where the Afghan drugs are trafficked and/or consumed. It is futile to concentrate only on the supply side of the opium equation: if world demand persists, consuming over 4000 tons of opium a year, somewhere, somehow opium will

be produced. Convergent efforts are therefore needed by countries through which Afghan opiates are trafficked (Central Asia, Pakistan and Iran) and where heroin abuse persists (the same locations, as well as Western and Eastern Europe). In other words, all countries that are part of the Afghan drug problem should be part of the solution. As an economist, I can even provide you with a bit of cost/benefit analysis. Remember that 1 gr. of heroin sells in Kabul at about \$1, while it retails in Berlin or Paris at \$100. Well, the cost of chasing that very same gram of heroin in Europe is about \$100, taking into account law enforcement as well as prevention and treatment. By helping farmers and by destroying traffickers cargos right here in Afghanistan, the same gram of heroin can be interdicted at about \$1 cost. Is this a convincing argument?

Point Four: an appropriate time frame (a generation or even more).

Other countries have dismantled the drug economy over a long period of time: a generation, or even more. However, this message has not gone through, yet. Public opinion, and media, are raising nagging questions. “Why isn’t the military coalition able to bring under control a phenomenon connected to international terrorism?” “Why isn’t the Kabul government able to enforce the opium ban as effectively as the previous regime did in 2001?”

We know that there are no simple answers to these questions. Spawn after decades of civil and military strife, the opium economy in Afghanistan has chained poor rural populations – farmers, landless labourers, small traders, women and children – to the mercy of domestic warlords and international crime syndicates that continue to dominate in areas in the country’s south, centre and east. We all need to reconcile with the fact that dismantling the opium economy will be a long and complex process, since this time around is to be done with the instruments of democracy, rule of law and development.

\* \* \*

Taking the above into consideration, I would come to the following conclusion:

- a.) The constitutional, political and legal foundations for effective drug control are all in place. This is not a small result in a country where until recently politics was in the hand of few and lawlessness prevailed. Democracy is taking deeper and deeper roots.
- b.) Yet, democracy cannot survive unless a proper balance is found between too-much and too-little government. At the moment in Afghanistan the bias is in favour of the latter (too-little government, especially in the provinces) with the result that illegal activities flourish.
- c.) Time is running out, fast. The drug problem in Afghanistan is becoming ever more severe. The severity of the problem is not only mirrored in

the fact that the land under poppy cultivation is large (80.000 ha.) and growing, while the volume of opium produced is high (3.600 tons) and increasing. The drug problem is becoming more severe because the drug cancer is spreading and deepening into legitimate business, local administrations and military circles. Narco-cartels are been born, with all the tragic consequences we have experienced -- and fought at a tremendous cost -- elsewhere.

By collapsing these three points into one, I conclude that two forces are at play in Afghanistan at present. One force, of historical nature, is championed by the Government and by President Karzai himself: the force leading to the firm establishment of democracy and the rule of law throughout the country. The other force, of sinister nature, is the one represented by the traffickers, the warlords connected to them, and the terrorists. In between are the poor farmers who, driven by miserable living conditions, take advantage of the quick money to be made cultivating highly priced opium, and of the low risk of retaliation. I am convinced that reason and civic sense will prevail, yet the country has reached a cross-road. Unless helped more vigorously, both financially and militarily, it could go down the wrong path.

In closing allowed me a metaphor. In the tradition of Afghanistan, the celebrated Buzkashi game horsemen struggle for control of the mutilated carcass of a calf or a goat. In the drug power game played now in Afghanistan, there are many, powerful players: drug merchants, field commanders, war-lords, corrupt politicians, even farmers and money-lenders. They struggled for the control of another kind of carcass: the remnants of a state that was thorn apart by feuding bands of criminals. Let us help President Karzai call the game over. Time out for the merchants of death.

I thank you all for your attention.

**HMA ROSALIND MARSDEN ON BEHALF OF UK MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, BILL RAMMELL, 9 FEBRUARY 2004**

1. Opium is destroying Afghanistan's future. It is undermining the potential of the country's fragile economy. It is financing the arms and explosives that fuel warlordism and extremism. And it is depriving increasing numbers of their health through addiction.

2. Nor do the effects of Afghanistan's opium problem stop at its frontiers. The number of international delegates here today is testament to this. 75% of the heroin on the world's streets originates from the poppy fields of Afghanistan. The consequences are felt globally.

3. From a UK perspective, 95% of the heroin sold on Britain's streets comes from Afghan opium poppy fields. We are therefore committed to support President Karzai's determination to eliminate opium cultivation. But this ambitious target will only remain achievable if implementing Afghanistan's National Strategy remains an international priority. Achieving sustainable reductions in opium poppy cultivation levels will be possible only as a consequence of long-term political commitment and donor support. Afghanistan's socio-economic fabric cannot recover overnight from its decades of conflict and lack of investment. The development of Afghan drug law enforcement capacity and the emergence of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers will take time to deliver. And until the security environment is stabilised and the Afghan authorities are strong enough to take a firm stance against those in positions of authority involved in the drugs trade, making a genuine impact on the drugs trade in Afghanistan will remain a real challenge.

4. I hope that out of the conference and today's workshops we can agree plans for real action. I hope too that we shall receive specific commitments by international partners to take on projects. You will have seen the draft action plans, and some project proposals, which were circulated before the conference. Many of you started useful discussions in the Practitioners' Workshops yesterday. I am sure these will continue this afternoon. International co-operation, effective exchanges of best practice and inter-agency co-ordination are prerequisites for concerted success. I would encourage you to discuss what support and knowledge you can bring to these projects

5. I also welcome the discussions on counter narcotics by Afghanistan's neighbours, within the framework of the Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration, which took place this morning. Again I hope that these discussions and the declaration which results will lead to practical co-operation and assistance. There is certainly a lot of experience to share.

6. In the action plans, we have identified four specific areas for discussion, which follow the key strands of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. Progress in all these areas is required for a comprehensive approach to tackling the drugs problem in Afghanistan.

7. The first is **Law Enforcement**. We need to increase the risk for poppy farmers and traffickers through effective law enforcement to stop the opium economy growing further. We should be working to expand a network of Afghan drug enforcers to **interdict** consignments, arrest traffickers and destroy laboratories. We have started the training of a specialist counter-narcotics police force in partnership with our German colleagues. 150 officers have been trained to date and there is a mobile detection team operational at the City Gates of Kabul. However, we need to do more – train more officers, expand

mobile detection teams and increase interdiction. And international mentors are needed to build up the skills base of Afghan officers, particularly in the regions. **Eradication** is also important and has a role to play targeted where farmers have access to alternatives and as part of a comprehensive law enforcement strategy.

8. Very closely linked to law enforcement capability is ensuring that there is **Judicial Capacity** in place to be able to prosecute and imprison traffickers. We are working with Italy to ensure that members of the criminal investigation and prosecution system acquire the necessary expertise to enable successful prosecution and imprisonment of drugs criminals. We need to ensure too that secure prisons are ready to receive those sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

9. Just as important as law enforcement is recognising that eliminating poppy cultivation will require a substantial commitment to long-term **development and poverty reduction**. It is essential that efforts to lure farmers away from poppy are part of broad-based economic and social development. Unless we offer poppy farmers a realistic and long-term alternative, they will continue to pursue the low-risk short-term option of cultivating opium. I believe we need to draw on the lessons learned from successfully eliminating opium poppy cultivation in other parts of the world. This means:

- **We must have a long-term vision.** Rebuilding sustainable alternative livelihoods takes time.
- **We must synchronise law enforcement and livelihoods investments** so that the Afghan people do not fall into further poverty and hardship.
- **We must avoid creating perverse incentives.** Linking aid directly to poppy production and elimination will undermine efforts to address the root causes of opium poppy cultivation and encourage more.
- **We must co-ordinate our interventions.** Eliminating poppy production in Afghanistan will require a concerted effort by the whole international community and Afghanistan.

10. Finally, we should improve awareness of how local demand for opium is causing addiction rates to soar. **Drug demand reduction** must be treated as a top health priority. Currently there are no preventative or treatment-based mechanisms within Afghanistan for dealing with addiction. These should be built into educational, health and law enforcement programmes. As we have found to our cost, intravenous drug use brings with it a lottery of disease and infection. We must offer our experience and information to prevent the nightmare of HIV/AIDS from becoming a reality in Afghanistan. It is also very important that we do not forget our own responsibility in our own countries to reducing demand and tackling trafficking routes.

11. There are many constraints that we face in trying to tackle this issue. Security is one, and the events of the last couple of weeks have made that even clearer. Expansion of the PRT network is essential to bringing about a wider stability – as is the extension of ISAF's mandate outside Kabul. We need to ensure that we create an environment in which we are able safely to undertake counter narcotic and reconstruction activity.

12. I wanted to end by reminding you that today is not about pledging. Nor is it about recycling previous commitments. It is about identifying how we can work together to channel our concerns into concrete proposals for action to tackle Afghanistan's drugs problem. There is a lot of experience in this room and in our own countries which can be shared and built upon. We are all stakeholders in Afghanistan's future. We must prevent drugs from destroying that future.