




Afghanistan

Opium Survey 2005



November 2005

ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	Afghan National Police
CPEF	Central Poppy Eradication Force
GPS	Global Positioning System
ICMP	UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme
MCN	Ministry of Counter Narcotics
MoI	Ministry of Interior
RAS	UNODC Research and Analysis Section
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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This report, and other ICMP survey reports can be downloaded from:

www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html

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PREFACE

The pace of democratic change in Afghanistan has been remarkable by any measure. The country's successful realization of democracy's milestones: the historic election of its President, the entry into force of its first ever Constitution and, most recently, fully democratic parliamentary elections – are all testimony to the conviction and courage of the country's citizens and its leaders.

This year, progress on the illicit opium market is catching up with political change. For the first time since 2001, Afghanistan has succeeded in achieving a decrease in opium poppy cultivation with the area devoted to drug crops declining an impressive 21% to 104,000ha.

The decline in cultivation is important and encouraging. In concrete terms almost 50,000 heads of households made a decision not to plant their fields with opium poppy. One field out of five which was planted with an illicit opium crop in 2004, was planted with a licit crop in 2005. This is real progress, and we need to build on it quickly.

This year's Survey spotlights elements that either contribute to or counter Afghanistan's opium economy, i.e., the kinds of decisions that farmers tend to make, and their reasons for making these choices; the efficacy of anti-cultivation laws and eradication programmes—it is this kind of detailed knowledge that we need to construct sound counter-drug and development strategies in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's first comprehensive eradication programme was initiated during the 2004-2005 growing season. In October 2004, the Government of Afghanistan ordered provincial governors to eradicate opium fields; the central government also undertook separate eradication campaigns, run by a special-purpose Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). In total, about 5,100 hectares may have been eradicated, roughly 5% of the 2005 opium cultivation. Almost three-fourths of the eradication (72%) took place in Nangarhar and Hilmand provinces, where, in 2004, poppy cultivation was ranked highest in the nation.

Unfortunately, although many Afghan growers cooperated with the Administration in 2005, nature did not. Favourable weather conditions and low rates of plant disease resulted in a much higher yield (kg per ha) than in the previous year. As a result, the total potential opium production decreased only some 2½%, to 4,100 tons. In 2005, Afghanistan's share of opium production remains roughly 87% of the world total. Even so, reason for optimism remains. For example, in terms of value, net income from opium exports remained US\$2.7 bn, but as a percentage of Afghanistan's GDP, this figure has declined by 10 percent since last year. The licit sectors of the economy are expanding, slowly bringing a greater number of alternative opportunities for farmers currently engaged in illicit cultivation. These new opportunities, whether triggered by economic expansion or concentrated development assistance, remain critical to Afghanistan's economic, social, and cultural recovery.

It may seem that in a country where reality is so stark, opportunities for the poor so limited, and consequences so dire, that there is not a great deal we can do to stop people from engaging in such a lucrative, albeit illegal, activity. That, however, is not what this year's survey results reveal. This year, it was Afghanistan's farmers who bravely complied with the government's anti-cultivation messages or eradication policy. The lack of significant change in production, described above, must be attributed to yield, which is itself determined by forces beyond our control. What we can influence, however, is the decision by a farmer not to cultivate opium, and we do this through the rule of law, effective law enforcement, and through sustainable economic development. This is what we learned in 2005:

- The law is a deterrent. Eradication of opium fields has been, and remains necessary: the law of the land, sanctioned by international conventions, must be respected. This year's Survey found the civil and religious *fatwa* launched against drugs, the opium eradication programme, and the efficacy of law enforcement, were strong enough to create a deterrent to opium cultivation among farmers.
- Viable, sustainable income generation programmes need to be in place to support both eradication and the decision not to cultivate. Again, we have learned a valuable lesson in 2005. To a considerable extent, in 2005, eradication was accompanied, and at times preceded, by alternative livelihood programmes and material support. Noteworthy is the fact that the 3 provinces where declines in cultivation were most striking (Nangarhar –96%, Badakshan –53%,) or where cultivation remained stable (Hilmand –10%), are the same 3 provinces that received the largest contributions for

alternative development (Nangarhar \$70.1 million, Badakshan US \$47.3 million and Hilmand US \$55.7 million).

- When farmers engage in illicit activities they put themselves beyond the protection of the State, leave themselves open to corrupt and exploitative individuals, and absent themselves from Afghanistan's bright potential. History demonstrates that, anywhere in the world, farmers who are given the option to choose between legality and illegality choose legality, even when the money earned is less. When the choice is between hunger and illegality, again, history tells us that farmers choose illicit pursuits, even when they may face serious retribution.

I call upon the Government and people of Afghanistan and the international community to respond quickly, and to build on the progress made this year: these achievements are fragile and could be easily reversed in the course of a season. Crop decline has been uneven, as some provinces actually increased cultivation in 2005 (Kandahar, +162%, Nimroz, 1370%, Balkh, 334% and Farah, 348%). Whether this year's decline will continue, or even accelerate over the years, will depend on the ability to stay the policy course, and to continue building an environment where the rule of law thrives, human security is strong, and opportunities for livelihood are ever present. To do this, we need to sustain our commitment to Afghanistan.

The key to counter-narcotics success will be the development of countryside replete with infrastructure, with irrigation facilities, market outlets and protection under law. For the period ahead, the Government has identified six key areas of intervention in rural areas: products and markets; infrastructure; rural micro-finance; post-war reconstruction; honest local administration; and the elaboration of a social safety net. This needs to be supported wholeheartedly and across the board.


The international community must have the wisdom to fight drugs and poverty simultaneously, to eliminate both the causes and the effects of these twin afflictions. This will be vital to sustaining 2005's gains. If there is one concrete measure that the Government and its development assistance partners can take now to ensure Afghanistan's future, it is this: food security and income generation programmes must remain in place, to support both the farmers' decisions not to plant opium, and enforcement measures designed to eradicate drug crops.

Most importantly, the burden of drug control should not rest only on the shoulders of the poor; measures must also be taken to target illicit wealth belonging to corrupt officials. To this end, the international community must be prepared to fight drugs, corruption and terrorism simultaneously and with equal determination.

It will take time and commitment to deal with the Afghanistan opium problem. Measurable initiatives can and should be pursued in the course of the next 12-24 months to sustain the declining reliance of farming communities on opium. These initiatives should include:

- The removal of corrupt governors;
- The removal of all government administration officials found to be involved in or benefiting from the drug industry;
- A commitment by all newly elected members of the Afghan Parliament to abstain from direct or indirect involvement in the drug industry;
- The disarmament and reintegration of militias, and a zero-tolerance policy towards their commanders' (warlords) involvement in drug refining (labs) and trafficking;
- The facilitation of mutual legal assistance and extradition of major drug traffickers, including making Afghan domestic legislation compatible with the need to provide evidence for, and serve international arrest warrants;
- A commitment by farming communities to refrain from drug cultivation as a condition for the receipt of future development assistance.

Dismantling the opium economy in Afghanistan with the instruments of democracy, the rule of law and rural development continues to be a very complex process. UNODC is, and will remain a loyal partner, committed to helping Afghanistan and other Member States realize every aspect of this historic task. We owe this not only to the Afghans, who are struggling to free themselves from the scourge of drug production, but also to the more than 100,000 people who die annually, directly or indirectly, as a result of their addiction to Afghan opium.



Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director
UNODC

FACT SHEET - AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2005

	2004	Variation on 2004	2005
Net opium poppy cultivation	131,000 ha	- 21%	104,000 ha
in percent of actual agricultural land	2.9%		2.3%
number of provinces affected ¹	32 (all)		25
Average opium yield	32 kg/ha	22%	39 kg/ha
Production of opium	4200 mt	-2.4%	4,100 mt
in percent of world illicit opium production	87%		87%²
Number of households involved in opium cultivation	356,000	- 13%	309,000
Number of persons involved in opium cultivation	2.3 million		2.0 million
in percent of total population (23 million)	10%		8.7%
Average farm-gate price of fresh opium at harvest time	US\$ 92	+ 11%	US\$ 102/kg
Average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time	US\$ 142	- 3%	US\$ 138/kg
Afghanistan GDP ³	US \$ 4.7 billion	+10.4%	US \$ 5.2 billion
Total export value of opium to neighbouring countries	US\$ 2.8 billion	- 3.6%	US\$ 2.7 billion
in percent of GDP	61%		52%
gross trafficking profits of Afghan traffickers	US\$ 2.2 billion	- 2.7%	US\$ 2.14 billion
total farm-gate value of opium production:	US\$ 600 million	- 6.6%	US\$ 560 million
Household average yearly gross income from opium of opium growing families	US\$ 1,700	+ 6%	US\$ 1,800
Per capita gross income from opium of opium growing families	US\$ 260		US\$ 280
Afghanistan's GDP per capita	US\$ 206		US\$ 226
Indicative gross income from opium per ha	US\$ 4,600	+17%	US\$ 5,400
Indicative gross income from wheat per ha	US\$ 390	+41%	US\$ 550

¹ In 2005, the Afghan Government reorganized the country's administrative division into 34 provinces. However, the 2005 opium survey was designed, and its results are presented, according to the previous administrative division into 32 provinces.

² Preliminary estimate

³ Source: Afghan Government, Central Statistics Office: GDP figures for the year 1382 (2003/2004): Afs 223,629 millions and for the year 1383 (2004/2005): Afs : 254,487 millions.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Opium poppy cultivation decreased by 21% to 104,000 hectares in Afghanistan in 2005

The area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan decreased by 21% from about 131,000 hectares (ha) in 2004 to a level of 104,000 ha in 2005.

Afghanistan opium poppy cultivation, 1994-2005 (hectares)


1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
71,000	54,000	57,000	58,000	64,000	91,000	82,000	8,000	74,000	80,000	131,000	104,000

Afghanistan: Opium poppy cultivation from 1986 to 2005 (hectares)



As a result of the decline in opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2005, global opium poppy cultivation will fall by some 16% in 2005. The share of Afghanistan would remain almost stable at 67%.

Global opium poppy cultivation 1990-2005* (hectares)



* For 2005, estimates for the "rest of the world" and Myanmar are still tentative

Opium poppy cultivation decreased in 19 provinces in 2005. The largest declines -in absolute terms- were found in Nangarhar (27,120 ha), Badakhshan (8,237 ha) and in Uruzgan (6,475 ha). A very sharp decrease of 96% was observed in Nangarhar, the number two opium poppy producing province in 2004 (28,213 ha). Badakhshan and Uruzgan, with the third and fourth largest areas under opium poppy cultivation in 2004, dropped to the fifth and sixth place in 2005. Opium cultivation in Central Afghanistan (Parwan, Paktya, Wardak, Khost, Kabul and Logar) almost disappeared in 2005: declining from 4,600 ha in 2004 to 106 hectares in 2005. Hilmand remained the province with the largest area under cultivation, although it declined by 10%.

Increases of more than 10% were seen in 10 provinces. Major increases -in absolute terms- were found in Balkh (8,342 ha), Kandahar (8,030 ha) and Farah (7,952 ha). Poppy cultivation in Kandahar increased 162% to 12,989 ha making it the province with the second largest area under cultivation. Surprisingly, Balkh, with a 334% increase, became the number three opium poppy producing province followed by Farah at 10,240 hectares. Neither province was an important producer last year or in previous years. In 2005, opium poppy cultivation moved from traditional growing areas (Hilmand, Laghman, Nangarhar, Uruzgan) to new provinces (Badghis, Balkh, Farah, Samangan).

The main opium poppy cultivation provinces in 2005 were (in order of magnitude): Hilmand, Kandahar, Balkh, Farah and Badakhshan. Together, these 5 provinces represented 65% of the total area under opium poppy cultivation in 2005.

Main opium poppy cultivation provinces in Afghanistan in 2005 (hectares)

Province	2003	2004	2005	Change 2004-2005	% Total in 2005	Cumulative %
Hilmand	15,371	29,353	26,500	-10%	25%	25%
Kandahar	3,055	4,959	12,989	162%	12%	38%
Balkh	1,108	2,495	10,837	334%	10%	48%
Farah	1,700	2,288	10,240	348%	10%	58%
Badakhshan	12,756	15,607	7,370	-53%	7%	65%
Rest of the Country	46,010	76,298	36,064	-53%	35%	100%
Rounded Total	80,000	131,000	104,000	-21%		

35% of farmers reported they decreased cultivation due to fear of eradication

As part of the survey 2,073 farmers in 1,243 villages across Afghanistan were asked why they were increasing or decreasing opium poppy cultivation. A total of 1,922 farmers (93%) reported reasons for the decline or the non-cultivation of opium poppy while only 151 farmers (7%) reported reasons for an increase of opium poppy cultivation in 2005. The main reasons quoted by farmers for not cultivating or reducing opium poppy cultivation in 2005 were:

- Fear of eradication (35%)
- Fear of imprisonment (20%)
- Forbidden by Islam (16%)
- Poppy ban (15%)
- Lower prices and less demand (10%)

The same question was asked as part of the UNODC's Farmers Intention Survey 2003/04, though at an earlier stage of the crop cycle, before the farmers had actually planted the opium poppy. At that time, in October 2003, the number of farmers reporting that they would reduce opium poppy cultivation was significantly lower and the main reasons for reducing opium poppy cultivation were: 'forbidden by Islam' and 'poppy ban'. In 2004/05, 'fear of eradication' gained strongly in importance as a deterrent to cultivating opium poppy.

The main reasons quoted by farmers for having increased opium poppy cultivation in 2005 were:

- Higher opium prices and higher demand for opium (40%)
- Personal consumption requirements (21%)
- High cost of wedding (16%)

As in the UNODC's Farmers Intention Survey 2003/04 findings, the high price of opium was one of the main reasons for increasing opium poppy cultivation. The need to engage in opium production to satisfy personal consumption requirements, which was not mentioned in 2003/04, showed a surprisingly high affirmative response. However, the sample of farmers admitting to increasing opium poppy cultivation in 2005 was small, so these results must be treated with some caution.


Potential opium production estimated at 4,100 metric tons (- 2.4%)

Potential opium production was estimated at around 4,100 metric tons (mt), representing a decrease of about 2.4% compared to 2004. The apparent discrepancy between the decrease in opium production and the decrease in cultivation was due to improved weather conditions. The opium yield in 2005 was estimated at 39 kg/ha, an increase of 22% compared to the 2004 yield (32 kg/ha).

Afghanistan potential opium production, 1994-2005 (metric tons)


1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
3,400	2,300	2,200	2,800	2,700	4,600	3,300	185	3,400	3,600	4,200	4,100

Afghanistan: Opium production from 1980 to 2005 (metric tons)



Global opium poppy cultivation is estimated to have fallen by some 16% in 2005 and opium production by some 3% as a result of the decline in opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan. The proportion of Afghanistan in global opium production is likely to remain close to 87%.

Global opium production 1990-2005* (metric tons)




* For 2005, estimates for the "rest of the world" and Myanmar are still tentative

Opium prices remain high

The average price for fresh opium at the time of harvest, weighted by regional opium production, amounted to US\$ 102 per kilogram, an 11% increase compared to last year. Fresh opium prices at the farm-gate level remain three to four times higher than in the second half of the 1990s. They are, however, significantly lower than over the 2001-2003 period when they had risen to around US\$300.

Fresh opium farm-gate prices at harvest time (weighted by regional production) in Afghanistan, 1994 – 2005 (US\$/kg)



The prices of dry opium remained relatively stable, decreasing 3% from US\$ 142 in 2004 to US\$ 138 per kilogram in 2005. The fragmentation of the Afghan opium market continues to give rise to important regional price differences. The lowest prices were found in Northern Afghanistan (US\$112), reflecting the following factors: lower prices in neighbouring Tajikistan; a limited number of traders; and, an increase in opium production. Prices were highest in Central Afghanistan (US\$235) where production basically ceased in 2005. Prices were above average in Eastern Afghanistan, possibly due to law enforcement activities, and in Western Afghanistan (US\$164), reflecting high opium prices in neighbouring Iran.

309,000 families are involved in opium poppy cultivation (compared with 356,000 in 2004)

The number of families involved in opium poppy cultivation decreased by 13% to 309,000 in 2005 (356,000 in 2004). This number represents about 2 million persons, 8.7% of the total population in Afghanistan (down from 10% in 2004) and 11.2% of the rural population in 2005. (The number of itinerant workers who work on poppy cultivation is not included).

Total number of opium poppy growing farmers


Region	Total Poppy Farmers	Average opium poppy cultivation area per farmer (ha)
Central	Negligible	
East	22,169	0.17
North-Easter	37,241	0.25
Northern	101,266	0.27
Southern	89,468	0.33
Western	58,869	0.32
Rounded total	309,000	0.25

The farmers who ceased cultivation in 2005 had received an average 13% of their total income from opium in 2004. In contrast, farmers who continued growing in 2005 had obtained 28% of their total income from opium in 2004.


Estimated farmers' per capita gross income from opium rose 6%, but poppy to wheat income ratio in 2005 (10:1) smaller than in 2004 (12:1)

The yearly gross income per opium growing family increased by 6% to US\$1,800 in 2005. The increase was entirely due to higher yields, which rose by 22% in 2005. The gross income from poppy cultivation per hectare increased to US\$5,400. This is almost 10 times higher than the gross income a farmer could expect from one hectare of wheat (US\$550 per hectare on irrigated land). This poppy to wheat income ratio (10:1) is now smaller than in 2004 (12:1) or 2003 (27:1). The net income from opium could not be estimated, but costs for opium poppy cultivation are thought to be relatively high. Inputs to cultivation including labour, fertilizer, seed, fuel, depreciation of agricultural equipment, as well as taxes paid to local commanders and various bribes keep these costs high.

Gross income of poppy cultivation in US\$ per hectare




Gross income of opium poppy and wheat in US\$ per hectare



Total farm-gate value of opium decreased 5% to US\$ 560 million

Based on opium production and reported opium prices, the farm-gate value of the opium harvest amounted to US\$ 560 million in 2005. Slightly lower production (-2.4%) and lower prices (-3%) reduced the overall farm-gate value of opium production. It was 6.6% lower than in 2004 and 45% lower than in 2003. The farm-gate value was equivalent to 11% of GDP (2004/05), down from 13% a year earlier.


Estimated value of opium production at farm-gate level, 1994-2005



Value of opiate exports to neighbouring countries


The value of 2005 opium production, exported by Afghan traffickers to neighbouring countries in the form of opium, morphine and heroin, was estimated at US\$2.7 billion, slightly less than in 2004 (US\$2.8 billion). Gross profits of Afghan traffickers would thus decrease from around US\$2.2 billion in 2004 to US\$2.14 billion in 2005. The value of opiates exports to neighbouring countries in 2005 is equivalent to around 52% of the 2004/05 GDP of Afghanistan⁴, down from 61% a year earlier.

Value of opiate exports to neighbouring countries, in billion US\$, 2000-2005



⁴ The GDP figure for the year 1383 (2004/2005): Afs : 254,487 millions does not include the value of opium production.

Size of the licit economy and the opiate industry in Afghanistan in 2005



Eradication

The annual opium survey neither monitors the activities, nor assesses the results, of eradication campaigns launched by the Afghan authorities during the opium growing season. As in previous years, the 2005 survey relied on a methodology designed to estimate the actual harvest (cultivation net of eradication). However this year, at the request of the Afghan authorities, UNODC implemented jointly with the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) a separate eradication verification survey (Support to the Verification Process of Opium Poppy Eradication). In this survey, UNODC verified the eradication of some 4,000 hectares of opium poppy by provincial governors. The majority of the governor-led eradication activities took place in the provinces of Nangarhar (46%) and Hilmand (26%), the two main opium producing provinces in 2004. In addition, the central Government undertook eradication, run by a special-purpose Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) and by the Afghan National Police (ANP). These campaigns reported the eradication of 200 ha by CPEF and of 900 ha by ANP, however this was not verified by UNODC. Thus, total eradication amounted to some 5,100 ha, equivalent to roughly 5% of opium poppy cultivation in 2005.

The overall area of opium poppy eradicated in 2005, as reported by Afghan governors, was substantially higher than the eradicated area verified by UNODC. Irrespective of these discrepancies, the findings of this report show that the threat of large-scale eradication has played a significant role in farmers' decisions not to plant opium poppy in 2005.

Cannabis cultivation estimated at 30,000 hectares

The village survey findings indicate that total cannabis cultivation could be around 30,000 ha in Afghanistan. To get a better idea of the extent of cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan, a separate survey would need to be implemented between June-September, which is the cultivation period of cannabis (farmers usually plant cannabis after the wheat or poppy harvest).

Opium Addiction

Survey findings indicate that 0.5% of the rural population is addicted to opium. This result is in line with the Rapid Assessment Survey, March 2005.

Methodology

The survey's methodology was based on a sampling approach which combined the analysis of satellite images and extensive field visits. More than 190 high-resolution IKONOS satellite images were used, covering 15 provinces - a total of 214,000 ha of agricultural land, representing 16% of the total agricultural land in these areas. To assist

with the interpretation of the satellite images, a large amount of ground data, including crop types, GPS coordinates and photographs were collected from 260 different locations (segment analysis).


In addition to the sample of high resolution imagery, the whole of Hilmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan and Balkh provinces were covered with 10 meter resolution SPOT5 multi-spectral images. The objective was to determine the poppy areas by mid-resolution satellite imagery and at the same time to update the agricultural areas in these provinces, which served as the sampling frame. In addition, the census survey with SPOT5 images enabled the analysis of results at the district level.

At the same time, a sample of 1,900 villages was surveyed (out of a total of 30,706 villages) by 310 surveyors to collect socio-economic data. Over 6,000 capsules from 160 fields were measured and 5,700 farmers were interviewed. In the areas not covered by satellite images, the surveyors also collected data on the extent of opium poppy cultivation. Opium poppy cultivation estimated through the village survey in 17 provinces accounted for only 16% of the total area under opium poppy cultivation.

The survey was completed as planned despite widespread security problems. Instability in several regions impeded travel for the surveyors. Insecurity affected both the safety of the surveyors⁵, as well as the farmers. Some non-compliance of the survey was due to farmers fear for their personal safety.


⁵ No surveyors were injured during the 2005 Opium Survey.

Agricultural land and level of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005




Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2000




Source: CND - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2000
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The administrative boundaries have been downloaded from Afghanistan Information Management Service, United Nations (www.aims.org.af).

Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2001




Source: CND - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2001
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The administrative boundaries have been downloaded from Afghanistan Information Management Service, United Nations (www.aims.org.af).

Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2002




Source: CND - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The administrative boundaries have been downloaded from Afghanistan Information Management Service, United Nations (www.aims.org.af).

Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2003



Source: CND - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The administrative boundaries have been downloaded from Afghanistan Information Management Service, United Nations (www.aims.org.af).


Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2004



Remarks: The 2004 survey was not designed to establish district estimates. The levels of cultivation by district presented on this map are only indicative. Although no data is available for the province of Paktika, anecdotal reports confirm presence of opium poppy cultivation there.

Source: CND - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html)


Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2005



Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations


Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005 (at province level)



Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005


Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium production in Afghanistan, 2005 (at province level)



Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium production change in Afghanistan, 2004-2005 (at province level)



Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Afghanistan, prices of dry opium in Nangarhar and Kandahar collected from traders, US\$/kg, March 1997 - August 2005

