

## Integrated versus Quantitative Methods: Lessons Learned





## Integrated versus Quantitative Methods : Lessons Learned <sup>\*/</sup>

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### **Abstract**

The key to reduced poverty is an integrated approach to development addressing quality growth, environment, education, health and governance. Government, as the key determinant of a country's domestic and international relations regarding all the various issues previously mentioned, must function efficiently and effectively with integrity. This requires coordination among all governmental and parastatal agencies and increased involvement of all other key stakeholders. A precondition for an integrated approach is an equally comprehensive an integrated assessment of existing institutional rules and regulations, systems and processes, and interfaces and synergies. Moreover, such and assessment in conjunction with strengthened civil liberties and other democratic principles empowers the public to monitor governmental action thus establishing a system of checks and balances.

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## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Leading multilateral development agency institutions claim that the key to reduced poverty is increased growth. Lessons learned from pilot countries<sup>1</sup> reveal that the key to reduced poverty is an integrated approach to development addressing quality growth, environment, education, health and governance. Although many economists continue to question whether this broader agenda is too ambitious, they are wrong. Government, as the key determinant of all of these other issues, must itself function efficiently and effectively with integrity. This requires co-ordination among all governmental and parastatal agencies and increased involvement of all other key stakeholders.

A precondition for an integrated approach is an equally comprehensive an integrated assessment of existing institutional rules and regulations, systems and processes, and interfaces and synergies. Moreover, such an assessment in conjunction with strengthened civil liberties and other democratic principles empowers the public to monitor governmental action thus establishing a system of checks and balances.

Development agencies are slowly starting to accept that improving governance and reducing corruption is cost-effective. They are also learning that greater transparency and broader participation in decision-making improves the ability of the public service to deliver timely and quality services. These aspects of quality are central to what the poor- and everybody else for that matter- value most in economic progress and development. Accordingly, development institutions have begun to commission corruption studies. However, those studies that are based on an approach where data is collected by outsiders for external use have had little effect on the recipient communities. Greater practical results are achieved when funds are allocated for use *in* developing and transitional countries *by* the national or sub-national stakeholders in order to collect data *for* these stakeholders rather than on surveys conducted by external stakeholders for external use.<sup>2</sup>

It is critical for data collection to be integrated with other initiatives to improve the quality of decision-making, planning, implementation and/or monitoring in the recipient country. Of equal importance is that data is collected regularly to establish a baseline allowing transparent monitoring for future assessments, and that the data is shared broadly and promptly with all key national and sub-national stakeholders. High quality standards are expected regarding the validity, precision, robustness integrity of the data itself. In particular, strict standards must be followed regarding sampling, supervision and consistency control to identify any interviewers whom, for example:

- change the sample when a respondent is unavailable
- ask only key questions or to complete the entire survey themselves to save time.

The integrated approach used by the United Nations is based on:

- a request from the local community
- local involvement in developing the instrument and the approach
- developing local capacity to conduct the country assessment, including the survey(s)
- local involvement in the data collection (supported by outsiders)
- a detailed plan for broad dissemination and local use of the data

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<sup>1</sup> Pilot countries currently participating in the United Nations' Global Program against Corruption are Benin, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Romania, South Africa and Uganda.

<sup>2</sup> A recent internal (unpublished) study done by the World Bank challenged the value added to policy and decision-making of the more than US\$ 100 million spent on surveys over the last 10 years.

- local commitment to a broad-based and transparent action planning process
- local commitment to conduct follow up surveys for monitoring and evaluating the impact of action plans developed based on the survey results.

This approach promotes the holistic, periodic and transparent mapping of:

- corruption levels, types, location, causes, effects and cost; and
- service delivery quality, cost, timeliness and coverage.

The data collection process can be lengthy and expensive, and when inadequately conducted, can result in questionable data, which has little or no impact on reducing corruption or improving service delivery. The UN is concerned about the integrity of the data and compared to the traditional methods, more resources will be spent on supervision to assure the integrity and validity of the data. One of the key weaknesses of the quantitative method is that the mass of numbers compiled is of no strategic use without local ownership and an integrated, transparent use of the data.

With the UN's more integrated method about 20 per cent of the job will be to collect data and about 80 per cent will be to facilitate improved decision-making and accountability within the government. The objective is broader and geared towards serving the needs of the public in a developing country and adding value to the local integrity system rather than serving a limited group of foreign stakeholders and investors.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the intended use of these studies is evidence- based planning as a catalyst for change. Ridding the public service of corruption is not a task the government can resolve alone. Involvement of stakeholder groups outside the government is necessary for monitoring and providing checks and balances. This would include the participation of the parliament judiciary, media, private sector and civil society.<sup>4</sup> By encouraging a broader and more expeditious dissemination of the findings and an increased and broader use of valid data, it is expected that *improved national and local decision-making* will result in increased trust between the public and the State. Accountability and transparency are key conditions that could help a country curb corruption.<sup>5</sup> And, although crooked police may be one problem, the real concern should focus more on crooked nations. A government that does not conduct itself for the welfare of its citizens is one that will fail because it cannot be trusted. The UN's integrated method should give citizens a voice in their own governments and ultimately make those governments answerable to the people they represent.

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<sup>3</sup> The index is basically assessing how international business people perceived corruption. The TI index does not give locals any guidance on what needs to be changed.

<sup>4</sup> Petter Langseth, Rick Stapenhurst and Jeremy Pope, 1997. *The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption*, EDI Working Paper Series, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

<sup>5</sup> Richard C. LaMagna, 1999. *Changing a Culture of Corruption*, Washington, D.C.: US Working Group on Organized Crime, National Strategy Information Centre.

## II. INTRODUCTION

In recent years corruption, or *the misuse of public powers for private gain*,<sup>6</sup> has emerged as a serious obstacle to democratic government and economic growth.<sup>7</sup> For this reason, there is now increased interest and need for anti-corruption policies and measures that are effective in building integrity to prevent corruption and increase the cost and uncertainty of national and international civil servants misusing their powers for private gain.

What was presented historically by economists as a “crime without victims” and an acceptable way of “*greasing the wheels*”<sup>8</sup> is now seen as making the poorest poorer and “*sanding the wheels*” of development, economic growth and justice. Surveys conducted in Uganda,<sup>9</sup> Tanzania<sup>10</sup> and Ukraine<sup>11</sup> in the late 1990s found that people bribing public servants were less satisfied with the service delivery, especially if they were poor, uneducated and/or old. The same surveys also found that the protectors of rule of law were the ones who were breaking the law. More than 60 percent of people asked reported that they had paid a bribe to the police, and close to 50 percent of the same people reported having paid bribes to the courts.

Since 1994, the world has witnessed an unprecedented increase in awareness raising by governments and international agencies regarding the negative effects of corruption. Attempts to curb corruption started without the luxury of significant experience and debate, and continue at a pace that is too fast for most academic institutions to add sufficient insight or guidance. Most of these efforts are geared towards public education while fewer initiatives focus on measures and policies *to increase the risk, cost and uncertainty* for corrupt national or international public officials and bribe-givers. Without some enforcement there will be no change in behavior because corruption will continue to be perceived as “low risk and high profit”.

Corruption materializes in different forms. It normally includes several of the elements depicted below:

*"Bribery"* – the offering or granting to a public servant or a person that performs public functions, of any valuable article, benefit or advantage for himself or another person or entity in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his public functions.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Petter Langseth, Rick Stapenhurst and Jeremy Pope, *The Role of a National Integrity Systems in Fighting Corruption*, Washington: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1997.

<sup>7</sup> Economist, Economic Focus, October 5<sup>th</sup> 2000, *Why quality matters*

<sup>8</sup> “Service Users who pay a bribe have more than *three times* the rate of being dissatisfied with the service speed and more than *four times* the rate of being dissatisfied with the staff member. This suggests either that after paying the bribe they expect a superior service and are disappointed if this does not happen, or more likely, that they resent being forced to pay for a service they believe should be without charge.” See: CIETinternational, *Uganda National Integrity Survey 1998: Final Report*, World Bank, August 1998.

<sup>9</sup> “The services where bribery is most common are the police and judiciary, with two thirds of the users paying bribes to the workers in the police (63 percent) and half of users paying a briber to workers in the judiciary services (50 percent).” CIETinternational, 1998 *Uganda National Integrity Survey 1998: Final Report*, World Bank, August 1998.

<sup>10</sup> CIET International, *Service Delivery Survey: Corruption in the Police, Judiciary, Revenue and Lands Services*, Washington: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1996.

<sup>11</sup> World Bank, *Ukraine National Integrity Survey: Citizens’ Experiences of Public Service Quality, Integrity and Corruption*, 1998.

<sup>12</sup> The UN has defined corruption in its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as: “i) the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions; and ii) the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her function.”

*"Embezzlement"* – theft of public resources by public officials, and as such it is understood as another form of misappropriation of public funds.

*"Fraud"* – any deceiving behavior to the damage of another person or entity (in this case the State) for ones own or a third party's benefit.

*"Extortion"* – money (or other resources) extracted by the use of coercion, violence other threats to use force.

*"Abuse of Power"* – using one's vested authority to give undue preferential treatment to any group or individual or to discriminate against any group or individual.

*"Conflict of Interest"* – engaging in transactions or acquiring a position or commercial interest that is incompatible with their official role and duties.

*"Favoritism"* – a mechanism of power abuse implying "privatization" and a highly biased distribution of state resources, no matter how these resources have been accumulated in the first place.

## **Definition of Corruption**



*"Nepotism"* – (a form of favoritism) where an office holder with the right to make appointments, prefer to nominate his proper kinfolk positions within the public administration.

### III. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DATA COLLECTION

Most of the work done by the traditional development institutions subscribes to an approach that can be described as “data collection by outsiders for outside use.” Generally conducted by external experts, international surveys tend to be done for external research purposes. International surveys help spark debate about those countries which fare badly. Such surveys help to place the issue on the national agenda and keep it at the forefront of public debate. However, international surveys are comparative and fraught with statistical difficulties.

One value, however, has been that they have highlighted the need for national surveys, and these are now being undertaken with increasing thoroughness. With public awareness of levels, types, causes and remedies of corruption dramatically improved over the last 5 years, the utility of collecting data about corruption is to increase the accountability of the state towards its public by establishing measurable performance indicators that are transparently and independently monitored over time.

The approach pilot tested under the framework of the UN Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC) by the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) in collaboration with UNICRI<sup>13</sup> is an integrated approach where national or sub-national surveys are ideally conducted by locals (in some cases helped by outsiders) for local objectives. A key outcome of this process is to give citizens a voice in their own governments and ultimately make those governments more accountable and transparent.

With GPAC’s integrated approach, data collection should be an important but small proportion of entire initiative. The majority of effort should be to use the data for evidence-based planning and decision-making, as well as for transparent impact monitoring. Using the quantitative example again, a majority of the resources and effort are used in gathering the data and very little is being spent on applying the data to the recipient country’s immediate or future needs.

Often a larger sample size is required in the integrated approach than that which is necessary according to the quantitative approach. This is partly because the data is used to compare corruption sub-nationally across districts or provinces within a recipient country. In addition, the data collection itself is not merely for gathering data, but also to raise awareness and empower citizens by asking pertinent questions that might impact directly on their lives. With a sample size of 18,412 households in Uganda, more than 100,000 citizens were directly involved in the data collection and the related 350 focus groups involved another 5,000 citizens in the process.<sup>14</sup>

The data collection process itself could almost be seen as an empowerment process or as pilot run of a functioning democracy. This approach is based on the experience of the only country, Hong Kong, that successfully fought systemic corruption in the early 1970s and managed to sustain a remarkable clean country since<sup>15</sup>. Although it might not provide a perfect model, it is one of the few we have.

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<sup>13</sup> UNICRI, United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute is the organization that conducts the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), one of the studies used by Transparency International in their annual Corruption Perceptions Index.

<sup>14</sup> CIETinternational, 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Lai, Alan N. 2000. “Corruption Prevention: A Hong Kong Perspective,” *Responding to the Challenges of Corruption: Acts of an International Conference*, edited by Anna Alvazzi del Frate and Giovanni Pasqua. Milan: United Nations.

### **The Case of Hong Kong**

In 1974, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) was established in Hong Kong. It was provided independence from both police and civil service and was empowered to report directly to the Governor, with oversight from the Legal Council. The ICAC was immediately given broad powers of arrest, detention, bail, and search and seizure. In addition, it was given the authority to conduct wire taps, examine bank accounts, issue subpoenas, and investigate complaints and allegations against those thought to be involved in corrupt practices.

The primary piece of legislation that empowered ICAC was the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (PBO), which made it an offense for public officials or employees of private sector to solicit favors or money, or to maintain a living standard that could not be explained by their reported income.<sup>1</sup> The PBO put the burden of proof of the accused and gave ICAC the authority to seize unexplained assets, and forfeit them to the general treasury of Hong Kong.

In 1999, Hong Kong spent over \$90 million to fight corruption for a population under 6 million people. What most people do not know is that Hong Kong spent a large part of this money on running more than 2,700 workshops in the private and public sector to empower people and businesses to become actively involved in the fight against corruption.

Another key feature of the Hong Kong model is the use of regular surveys to monitor perceived corruption levels as well as the trust level between the anti-corruption agency, Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), and the public. According to 1998 survey almost 85.7 percent of the public would trust ICAC sufficiently to report corruption incidents and 66 percent were willing to give their names when doing so.

Another remarkable finding monitored by regular surveys is the fact that very few of the fundamentals in Hong Kong (trust, corruption levels, and prosecution) have changed since Hong Kong joined China, a country reported to have high levels of corruption.

*Sources:*

Lai, Alan N. "Corruption Prevention", Presentation at ISPAC Conference in Milan Dec. 1999

LaMagna, Richard C. Changing a Culture of Corruption, and Independent Commission Against Corruption, Operations Department Review, 1998-1999.

Working with local and international partners UN's GPAC is concerned about the integrity, precision and robustness of the data. Therefore, a fair amount of supervision will be done to assure that the data has actually been collected in direct interface with the defined sample. Although this supervision is rather expensive, the integrity and precision of the data will be assured. The survey data will also be validated by desk review of other information sources, focus groups with opinion makers and selective case studies.

In the following TI corruption survey is used as an example of a quantitative method and the integrity survey in Hungary and Lebanon are used as an example of a integrated method.

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Integrated Method Hungary and Uganda</b>	<b>Quantitative Method TI-Index</b>
<b>Objective of the survey</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International, national and sub-national awareness raising</li> <li>- Evidence-based planning, decision-making and monitoring at national and sub-national level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International and national awareness raising</li> <li>- Risk management for foreign investors</li> </ul>
<b>Audience</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public</li> <li>- Public officials</li> <li>- National private sector</li> <li>- Opinion makers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International private sector</li> <li>- International development community</li> </ul>
<b>Client</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Initiated by locals for local use</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Initiated by outsiders for external use</li> </ul>
<b>Survey Method</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Face to Face Interviews</li> <li>- Focus Groups</li> <li>- Case Studies</li> <li>- Desk Review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Face to face interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Dissemination of the data</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National level</li> <li>- Sub-national level</li> <li>- Internet</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International Level</li> <li>- Internet</li> </ul>
<b>Integrity of the data</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- High level of supervision</li> <li>- Large sample</li> <li>- Representative sample</li> <li>- Integrity tests</li> </ul>	Unknown to TI
<b>Utility of the data</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Action planning, decision-making and monitoring at national and sub-national level</li> <li>- Awareness raising and accountability</li> <li>- Balancing of powers</li> <li>- Empowerment of villagers</li> <li>- Monitoring and evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Awareness raising</li> <li>- Risk management for foreign investors</li> </ul>
<b>Integration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 20% Data collection</li> <li>- 70% Evidence-based decision-making and dissemination</li> <li>- 10% Monitoring/evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Data collection 90%</li> <li>- Dissemination 10%</li> </ul>

## **IV. THE “INTEGRATED APPROACH”: TWO CASE STUDIES**

### ***A. Dissemination and use of data in Uganda: Focus on improved decision-making at the sub-national level<sup>16</sup>***

In 1998, the Inspector General of Government (IGG) in Uganda requested a National Integrity Survey to be conducted among more than 18,412 households.<sup>17</sup> The survey results were then discussed among 348 focus groups with more than 5,000 participants across 46 districts. Households were asked in particular about their experiences with services such as: primary education, health, police, local administration, judiciary and the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). This survey was part of an integrated approach to measure corruption in Uganda.

*The Country Assessment included:*

- (i) Integrity Survey. An Integrity Survey, where randomly selected households were interviewed by locally trained and internationally supervised consultants, was developed and pilot-tested in Uganda by CIET International in close collaboration with the Office of the IGG.<sup>18</sup> The sample size was large enough to obtain specific findings for each of the 46 districts in Uganda. The sentinel survey method was used, where the same households are surveyed every two to three years, to allow progress to be monitored against the baseline established in the first survey.
- (ii) Focus Groups. Professionally facilitated focus groups were organized allowing respondents to clarify the reasons for the survey percentages in terms of “real” pain and concerns. During the group sessions, respondents were asked their perceptions of problems and possible solutions. One quote was collected from each focus group as evidence of the real “pain level” caused by corruption.
- (iii) Service Provider Survey. Service provider survey was conducted among 1,500 civil servants to obtain their perspective on the problem.
- (iv) Opinion-maker Focus Groups. Focus groups with key opinion makers reviewed the problematic areas and prioritized causes of corruption. More importantly, these groups assessed the viability of the changes suggested by the citizens, the focus groups and the service providers, in other words, a “reality test” on the recommendations made.
- (v) Workshops. Integrity workshops and meetings became a cornerstone of the participatory process to curb corruption at all levels of government. It became the key tool for bridging awareness raising to action. Central to this were the small working groups which developed action plans, using visioning to shift discussion from complaint to action. Participatory workshops were also used to develop broad-based participation to maintain momentum. The broader the base of participation and wider the degree of ownership of the action plan in all stages, the more likely it will be carried out and sustained.

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<sup>16</sup> CIET International will call this approach “Community Based Planning and Decision Making”

<sup>17</sup> At the time, the World Bank management and survey experts felt that the sample size was excessive. The IGG argued that he would like to have specific data from each of the 46 districts in the country in order to address and monitor corruption types, levels, location, causes and remedies in health, education, local government administration and Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). What increased the sample size was the fact that few villagers had direct dealings with the URA.

<sup>18</sup> The survey was requested by the IGG, funded by the World Bank and UNDP, and conducted by CIET International in collaboration with the IGG staff and students from Makerere University.

*Use of the data and outcomes of the process*

- (i) Investigative Journalism Workshops. The role of the media in raising awareness has been critical to the strategy for developing accountability in Uganda. The work of newspaper journalists, who credibly investigate malfeasance at the highest level, has led to the censuring of political figures at the highest level of government, with strong support from an active Parliament. Since fewer than 15 percent of Ugandans get their news by print, training for radio journalists began in 1999, at a time when the number of district-level radio stations, often broadcasting in local dialect, began to increase. Much as print journalist training proved a key ingredient in spurring the national debate, radio journalist training proved instrumental in buttressing the participatory process to curb corruption at the district level.<sup>19</sup>
- (ii) Censuring of Corrupt Ministers. During 1998, the Ugandan Parliament was involved in four cases where Ministers close to the President were censured for illicit enrichment or resigned as a result of a censuring motion. Such actions would have been unthinkable previously. However, since 1997, the strengthened media, Parliament, and IGG were able to make “grand” corruption a lower profit and higher risk proposition. These three institutions compliment each other in addressing corruption at the highest levels, fostering insecurity among the corrupt and fueling a national debate on integrity, transparency and good governance. The key challenge for any Parliament seeking to reduce corruption is to ensure that its own house is in order. Preventive measures in Uganda included monitoring and publishing the declared assets of parliamentarians and strengthening the Ethics Committee in Parliament. So far the censuring process appears to have been largely transparent, based on facts. Although there has been some criticism of the process.<sup>20</sup>
- (iii) Judicial Commission of Inquiry. Pressure was put on the police by the more than 30 district integrity workshops disseminating the survey, findings indicated that an average of 63 percent of the people surveyed had experienced corruption when dealing with police. These findings, coupled with the finding that more than 50 percent of the citizens experienced corruption in dealings with the courts, created a lot of anger among the public who demanded a change.<sup>21</sup> In response to this demand, the government was obliged to come up with a credible response. A three-person commission, headed by a judge, decided to travel across the country to listen to complaints about police corruption. As a result of this process, more than 400 senior police officers were suspended. Responding to this the Police Commissioner attacked the credibility of the survey. In doing so, the media reported on his illicit wealth and he was forced to resign.<sup>22</sup>

One of the challenges that continues to face the integrated approach in Uganda is assisting the IGG’s staff to master the skill of helping the local district administration to follow up and assist in implementing the action plans resulting from this process. This is a different and probably more demanding skill to develop but at the same time is crucial if these districts are to have any changes to curb corruption.

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<sup>20</sup> Langseth, Petter, 1999, *Update on Uganda Staying the Course*, World Bank PREM –News June 1999. Published as part of “Rent Seeking Riles, World Bank Survey Corruption in Uganda by Alice Storch, June 1999

<sup>21</sup> CIETinternational, 1998.

<sup>22</sup> Langseth, Petter, 1999, *Update on Uganda Staying the Course*,

The second Country Assessment is scheduled for late 2000 or early 2001. With the first survey as a benchmark, the real accountability will be in place the moment the results from the second survey are disseminated broadly across all 45 districts.

### ***B. Dissemination and use of data to improve quality of decision-making in Hungary***

A comprehensive country assessment is in the final stages of completion in Hungary.<sup>23</sup> Supported by the UN, this assessment is examining the levels, locations, costs, causes of and remedies for corruption, and the effectiveness and credibility of the efforts of the Government to contain corruption. The country assessment includes surveys of the general public, private sector and civil servants, as well as case studies and focus groups both at the national and municipal level. An international meeting is being organised in Vienna on October 26, 2000 to discuss the outcome of the comprehensive country assessment and to elicit the comments of other international experts and UN member countries. A national Integrity Meeting is being planned on November 28-29 in Budapest where between 100-150 representatives from key stakeholder groups (government, parliament, private sector, civil society, media and others) will prioritize the issues and design a National Integrity Strategy and an Anti-corruption action plan, based on:

- the country assessment (findings from the surveys and the focus groups);
- the case studies;
- inputs from international experts in certain strategic areas; and
- the Minister of Justice's 25-point program.

The Hungarian Government has also appointed an independent National Integrity Steering Committee (NISC) with representatives from the international community, civil society, academia, media, government, parliament and the private sector to oversee the development of the National Integrity Strategy and the implementation of a credible Anti-Corruption Action Plan for the criminal justice system.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> *The Development of a Rapid Assessment Methodology: Results of a UN Expert Group Meeting*, Global Programme against Corruption Working Paper. Vienna: UN Centre for International Crime Prevention, December 99.

<sup>24</sup> UN Project document; *Assessment of Corruption in Hungary*, November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1999

## V. LESSONS LEARNED

Perhaps the foremost achievement in the “governance area” over the last 10 years has been the shattering of a taboo, which shrouded corruption from discussion particularly in diplomatic circles and intergovernmental institutions. The topic is now out in the open and from this debate a potentially powerful coalition has emerged. Interest groups that never collaborated previously now recognize that governments alone cannot hope to contain corruption. Still, while breaking the code of silence was a milestone, most accept that the time for talking has past; it is now a time for action.

The support and participation of an active but independent civil society must be attained. Government must allow new *checks and balances* to be established including:

- timely and broader access to information.
- an independent judiciary with integrity
- a legislative representing the public and role-modeling the right behavior
- a result oriented and clean executive and
- a strong civil society empowered by a free and independent media.

The eight most important lessons learned over the last 10 years seem to be:

*First*, Economic growth is not enough to reduce poverty.<sup>25</sup> Poverty alleviation will not occur without a broader, integrated strategy to change focusing on integrated (integrated) rather than quantitative development strategies.

*Second*, the misuse of power for private gain seems to be endemic and everywhere.<sup>26</sup> It is not just a case of public officials abusing their positions, but people in general taking advantage wherever there is easy money to be made.

*Third*, Curbing systemic corruption is a challenge that will require stronger measures more resources and a longer time horizon than most politicians and “corruption fighters” will admit or can afford. Very few anti-corruption policies, measures and/or tools launched today are given the same powerful mandate and/or financial support as the often-quoted experience of the ICAC in Hong Kong.

*Fourth*, left unchecked, corruption will only increase and make the poorest poorer. Corrupt transactions are entered into consciously. Profit and opportunity are weighed against the risks of being detected and the likelihood and extent of any punishment. Where risks and punishment are minimal and rewards greater, the likelihood is for corruption to increase. Corruption can be initiated from either side. Those offering bribes may do so either because they want something to which they are not entitled, and therefore need the official to “bend the rules,” or because they believe the official will not give them their entitlements without some form of inducement. Officials may solicit bribes in order to supplement their salaries or raise their standards of living. Therefore, both the bribe “giver” and the bribe “taker” must be addressed in the “North”<sup>27</sup> as well as in the “South”.

*Fifth*, raising awareness without adequate enforcement may lead to cynicism and among the population and actually increase the incidents of corruption. Citizens, who are well-informed through the media about types, levels and location of corruption but who have few examples

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<sup>25</sup> “Why quality matters,” *The Economist*, October 7, 2000.

<sup>26</sup> Transparency International, *The TI Sourcebook*, Berlin: Transparency International, October 2000.

<sup>27</sup> One key objective of the OECD Convention is to criminalize bribing of public officials in the South by private companies in the North.

of reported cases where perpetrators are sent to jail, might be tempted to engage in corrupt acts where “high profit and no risk” appears to be the norm. It is therefore critical for any anti-corruption strategy to balance awareness raising with enforcement. The message to the public is that the misuse of public power for private gain is: (i) depriving the citizens of timely access to government services; (ii) increasing the cost of services; (iii) curbing economic and democratic development; and (iv) high risk low profit (e.g. corrupt are punishable by jail sentences and fines). The challenge is how best to communicate this message to population at large.

*Sixth*, Development agencies, NGOs and private sector from countries in the “north” can either be part of the problem or the solution. Recent corruption cases involving the World Bank, the UN and other multilateral and bilateral organizations, provide evidence that misuse of public power for private gain can happen in any society or organization where there are insufficient checks and balances. Credible reporting of these cases both in the north and the south should help to “level the playing field” facilitating the investigation and prosecution of corruption whenever it is found.

*Seventh*, A country’s national institutions do not work in isolation. Where they do, they will fail in their totality.<sup>28</sup> A transparent system of checks and balances, designed to achieve accountability among the various arms and agencies of government—and one that manages conflicts of interest in the public sector—disperses power and limits opportunities for conflicts of interest. This concept, which describes a modern system of government, has been referred to as “horizontal accountability.” The dispersal of power and increased degrees of accountability make it more difficult for a well-placed politician to distort the system.

*Eight*, Public trust in governments, anti-corruption agencies and their anti-corruption policies and measures is key when a country invites the public to take an active role in monitoring the performance of its government.<sup>29</sup> In Hong Kong according to a 1997 survey 66 percent of the population is willing to submit their name when filing a complaint or “blowing the whistle” on a corrupt official or colleague.<sup>30</sup> It is even more impressive that this trust relationship, built systematically over 25 years, has not changed much since Hong Kong joined the China in 1996. If anything, the public in Hong Kong, when surveyed about what they fear the most by joining China, put increased corruption as one of the biggest threats.<sup>31</sup> Without public confidence in the anti-corruption polices and measures, complaints systems will fail, investigative media reports will remain unfounded and anti-corruption trials will lack credible witness testimony.

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<sup>28</sup> The *TI Sourcebook*, October 2000.

<sup>29</sup> Discussing the role of the civil society in the fight against corruption in 350 focus groups in Uganda (CIETinternational, 1996) villagers were quoted to say; “*we know who the corrupt officials are, but to whom should we give the evidence and to what extent are we safe?*”

<sup>30</sup> LaMagna, Richard C. 1999. *Changing a Culture of Corruption: How Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption Succeeded in Furthering a Culture of Lawfulness*, Washington, D.C.: US Working Group on Organized Crime, National Strategy Information Center.

<sup>31</sup> LaMagna, Richard C. 1999. *Changing a Culture of Corruption:*

## VI. LESSONS TO BE INTERNALIZED

Lessons that have not yet been internalized by the key stakeholders involved in the fight against corruption include:

1. *It takes integrity to fight corruption.* Any successful anti-corruption effort must be based on integrity and credibility. Without integrity, the uncertainty, risk, and cost for a corrupt regime cannot be raised because the risk of being exposed by other corrupt officials is present. Without the necessary integrity within the international development community, international officials are forced to *pretend* that they are fighting corruption, and the local corrupt civil servants *pretend* that they will stop misusing their public powers for private gain.

2. *Building integrity and credibility takes time and consistency.* Most international agencies have not demonstrated sufficient integrity to fight corruption. They still have not accepted the fact that integrity and credibility must be earned based on development agency actions rather than their speeches. The extent to which a development agency has sufficient integrity to be a credible partner in an anti-corruption program cannot be judged by international agencies themselves but rather by the public in the recipient country.

3. Most anti-corruption initiatives interface with the people who are paid to fight corruption. Very few initiatives involve the people suffering from the effects of corruption. It is therefore critical to do more of what ICAC in Hong Kong has done over the last 25 years. Interfacing directly (face to face in awareness raising workshops) with almost 1 percent of the population every year.

While Hong Kong has monitored the public's confidence in national anti-corruption agencies annually since 1974,<sup>32</sup> few development agencies and/or Member States have access to similar data. The larger question is whether the development agencies, even with access to such data, would know how to improve the trust level between them and the people they are supposed to serve. Another question is whether they would be willing to take the necessary and probably painful action to improve the situation.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> In Hong Kong the trust level is considered critical for the effectiveness of any complaint or whistleblower measures and is monitored closely. In 1997, 85.7 percent of the public stated that they would be willing to report corruption to ICAC and 66 percent were willing to give their names when reporting corruption. As a result more than 1,400 complaints were filed in 1998, up 20 percent from 1997. See: Richard C. LaMagna, *Changing a Culture of Corruption*, US Working Group on Organized Crime, 1999.

<sup>33</sup> Results from "client satisfaction surveys" conducted between multilateral agencies and the public in the past were often so bad that they were given limited circulation and ignored.

Even within the international development agencies the trust level between their own staff and their internal complaints function is rarely monitored.

<sup>34</sup> See GPAC informational brochure, 2000.

<sup>35</sup> UN's Global Programme against Corruption is currently working in Hungary, Lebanon, Romania and has been invited to elaborate projects in Indonesia, Benin, Colombia, South Africa and Uganda.

<sup>36</sup> GPAC has developed a selection matrix facilitating the selection of

## VII. GLOBAL CORRUPTION TRENDS: THREE INVOLVEMENT LEVELS

The main objectives of the Global Trends Programme are to:

- collect information about the status of corruption in UN member countries on an annual basis;
- summarize and disseminate findings at the national and international levels; and
- propose specific set(s) of anti-corruption measures to national governments based on research findings from the pilot countries.

GPAC is planning to establish relationships with member countries at three levels:

- High involvement: These are 8 to 10 pilot countries where GPAC will take on the role as *lead facilitator* to the government and among other things help conduct a comprehensive Country Assessment (possible sample: 8-10 countries).
- Medium involvement: These are countries where GPAC will *collaborate* with other development agencies to gather data using a standardized UN survey instrument (possible sample: 20-30 countries).
- Low involvement: GPAC will establish a *partnership* with a global survey company, such as Gallup International, to include a set of questions within existing global/regional survey instruments (possible sample: 70-100 countries).

### **A. High Involvement: The country assessment**

The country assessment will be conducted by the CICP in collaboration with the UNICRI and various national research institutes. The main purpose is to produce a clear and coherent picture of a country's situation by evaluating the types, levels, locations, costs, effects, causes of and remedies for corruption in public administration, private sector, high level finance and politics. The will be accomplished by monitoring the three main types of corruption: (i) public administration and "street-level"; (ii) private sector (especially in medium-sized businesses); and (iii) high-level finance and politics.

However, a more practical objective of the assessment is to use and disseminate the data as a means of:

- Raising awareness among the relevant stakeholders and the public
- Empowering the civil society to oversee the state
- Providing a basis for evidence-based action planning
- Establishing measurable performance indicators; and
- Monitoring the implementation of the anti-corruption action plan.

A country assessment resulting in a *corruption monitoring protocol* could be regularly issued (every two to four years) to document the phenomenon of corruption and the progress made by a member country to fight it.

In order to assess the types, levels and locations of corruption various techniques are combined in an integrated approach including:

- (i) A desk review: to compile all relevant existing anti-corruption information.
  - Legal Assessment: to examine the entire existing legal anti-corruption framework, including criminal and criminal procedure codes, civil service laws (standing orders), public procurement regulations, anti-money-laundering statutes, codes of conduct, etc.

In addition, the legal assessment will evaluate legal gaps, inefficiencies and inconsistencies among the various laws are analyzed. Finally, it will examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation and enforcement process.

- Institutional Framework Assessment: to analyze the capacity and resources of the relevant institutional anti-corruption framework, including an assessment of the effectiveness of control mechanisms and oversight bodies that are responsible for monitoring and ensuring the quality and integrity of the relevant institutional framework. The UN-Country Assessment concentrates in particular on “process mapping” to analyze the functions, procedures, reporting relationships, access to information and incentives within the institutional framework. The mapping specifies how an organization does its business; what it does efficiently and inefficiently, where there are conflicts of interest and where there are excessive opportunities for extortion (bribe-taking) and bribe giving. Therefore, an inventory and evaluation will be made of the extent to which the judiciary; executive and legislative bodies are already active in the prevention of and fight against corruption. Particular attention will be paid to the balancing of powers including an assessment of the independence of the judiciary, the legislature and the media. The aim is to identify the specific problems and their root-causes that are faced by each of these bodies and agencies.
  - Assessment of the Civil Society and the Media: to evaluate the public and media’s access to reliable and objective information. In order for the civil society and the media to hold the government accountable, they must have access to information and be ensured of a free and independent press. Different techniques can be used to assess the quality and the vigilance of the media reporting on corruption cases ranging from: (i) systematic content analysis, (ii) the impact of different media types; and (iii) the review of who owns and controls the media. Regarding the access to information the country assessment is not only going to assess laws on the books, but also to what extent a journalist or a citizen actually can access certain information in a timely and free fashion.
- (ii) Public opinion surveys: to survey the types, levels and locations of corruption based on both experiences and perceptions. Significant effort will be spent on assuring the quality of the data by choosing a representative sample, assuring implementation of the survey according to the terms of reference and verifying data submitted by the interviewers. The sample size will be chosen to produce quality data not only at the national but also at the sub-national level. As an example in Uganda each of the 46 districts would have survey data comparing their district with the national average. This type of survey was requested by the Inspector General of Government who argued that the only way he could fight corruption was to have information about corruption levels across sub-national units.
- (iii) Focus Groups: to conduct in-depth discussion held with targeted interest groups in government and society. This technique often produces extremely detailed information on peoples’ views regarding corruption, what they see as the causes and what the government might need to do to fight it. The focus groups sessions usually concentrate on the following questions:
- How big is the problem of corruption?
  - What are the types and extent of corruption?
  - What are the negative effects of corruption?
  - What are the root causes?
  - How effective are current laws and programmes?
  - What are possible solutions?

- What issues should be dealt with first?
- (iv) **Case Studies:** to use local experts to prepared detailed examples of typical corruption cases in order to facilitate a better understanding of how corruption actually is taking place. Well-documented practical case studies may help anti-corruption agencies fine-tune their measurement as well as to make the public and potential whistleblowers more aware.

### **Independent Oversight of Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Lebanon**

In Lebanon such an institution, a National Integrity Steering Committee (NISC) was recommended by the President and approved by the Legislature (Council of Ministers). Its mandate, resources (staffing and budget) and independence was outlined in a Presidential Decree following the endorsement of the Council of Ministers. The NISC is comprised of members representing the key stakeholder groups. (judiciary, legislature, executive and private sector). It meets on a monthly basis and records its discussions and decision in English and Arabic. These minutes are then shared openly with the public and are being made available on the NISC website.

The mandate of the NISC is to oversee the planning, implementation and evaluation of a National Integrity Strategy and an Anti-Corruption Action Plan. *To achieve this mandate, the NISC is seeking to increase the risk, uncertainty and cost of national and international civil servants that misuse their public powers for private gain.* Examples of activities overseen by NISC are: (i) the selection and management of consultants, (ii) the identification of lead opinion-makers known for their integrity to participate in 12 focus groups, (iii) identify resource people and participants for the action planning workshop, (iv) the selection of case studies to be compiled by national experts and (v) the review, endorsement and monitoring of anti corruption action plans submitted by different stakeholder groups.

*Source: UN Project document; Support to the National Anti Corruption Strategy; LEB/98/R71, Revised June 29<sup>th</sup> 2000*

As already mentioned it is foreseen that the actual data collection will be the smaller part of the process. The main challenge is to use and disseminate the data to bring about change. In particular, the data can be used to create the basis for change by raising awareness among the relevant stakeholders and the public. A well-informed public is an empowered public that will be increasingly able to hold the state accountable. Secondly, the data collection is a precondition to evidence-based planning. Through a regular repetition of collection, an evaluation of trends in corruption may be conducted. Moreover, successes and failures can be identified as anti-corruption policies and measures are implemented.

### ***B. Medium Involvement: Standardized UN instrument conducted by partners***

To gain a global view of corruption beyond the pilot countries, GPAC will work in partnership with other development institutions to gather data across 20-30 additional countries using a standardized UN survey instrument. The set of standard questions may be included in national sample omnibus surveys with the data collection being contracted to international research companies covering whole regions. Data processing and analysis would be divided between the UN and these research companies. The UN would then prepare a research brief that summarizes the findings including comparative tables, comments and some basic conclusions. This brief will be developed at several levels: global (all countries included), regional and sub regional. The data may be disseminated through a press

conference and a series of events organized in relation to GPAC, such as workshops or conferences. Although only a selection of the country assessment components will be used in a medium involvement country, the process will be similar to that used in the “high involvement” countries.

Ideally the basic information sources for the “medium involvement” countries should be:

- (i) National surveys of the general public<sup>37</sup>. These should include a uniform set of indicators (questions) that cover: level of tolerance of corrupt practices, susceptibility to corruption (likelihood to use corruption), frequency of practical experience with corruption (pressure on behalf of officials and actual involvement on behalf of citizens), trustworthiness of institutions and agencies with respect to corruption, effectiveness of corruption practices as a “problem-solving tool”, trust in the anti-corruption agencies and anti-corruption efforts of the government at the national and the local level.
- (ii) National surveys of the business sector. These will be based on a quota sample of companies representing the more important economic sectors in a given country, including basic divisions like public and private companies, and small, medium and large companies. The questions to be used will be similar to the general population survey but will also include “business specific” questions related to the main aspects of corruption in the business sphere.
- (iii) Desk Research: This will include information about the status of the anti-corruption legislation in a given country and the effectiveness of law enforcement institutions. In quantitative terms, the status for each desk research indicator would be transformed into a score (the maximum representing high effectiveness and high degree of availability of anti-corruption legislation; and the minimum indicating no anti-corruption legislation and low level of enforcement). Desk research would be conducted by UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention regional and country offices, and subsequently data processing would be done by CICP. Data processing and preliminary analysis would be conducted by research agencies.

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<sup>37</sup> See Appendix 2, Standard Survey Instrument.

### **Medium Involvement Assessment**

Step 1: Member country will request to participate in GPAC;

Step 2: The UN, the government and another development agency will sign an agreement regarding the data collection;

Step 3: The UN will work with the development agency who will assist the government in conducting the desk research and the two surveys using the UN survey instruments;

Step 4: The UN will work with the development agency to assist the government in setting up and supporting a NISC to oversee the use of the survey data in improving decision-making and monitoring the impact of the Anti-Corruption Programme;

Step 5: The UN will collaborate with the development agency to assist the government in the development, implementation and evaluation of a National Integrity Strategy and an Anti-Corruption Action Plan; and

Step 6: UN will, in collaboration with the NISC and the other development agency, conduct a second assessment two years later.

### ***C. Low Involvement: UN to include questions in existing survey instrument***

GPAC will collaborate with other development agencies already working in the governance area in the member country, and with a global research company such as Gallup International. While the development agency will be responsible for many of the steps performed in the “high involvement” country, the research partner will be asked to add a set of questions to an existing survey instrument. This type of collaboration is already taking place with Gallup International Research and Education Center (Hungary) and Information International (Lebanon). By cultivating a network of international survey companies GPAC would seek to conduct such surveys in 70-100 countries. This information would be disseminated as part of the “Global Trends Report.”

Again, the process will follow that of the “high involvement” country.

Step 1: The UN, the government, another development agency and the local research institution will sign an agreement regarding the data collection;

Step 2: The UN will work with Government and the research institution to design as survey instrument which includes the UN questions; and

Step 3: The UN will, through the development and the local research partner, assist the government in disseminating the data.

## VIII. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOL-KIT

Because corruption is dynamic and has crosscutting dimensions, the most appropriate approach to curb it must also be dynamic, integrated and holistic. Therefore, the technical co-operation activities facilitated by CICIP under the framework of GPAC are supported by a modular approach that draws from a broad set of anti-corruption policies and measures, or “tools.” These anti-corruption tools may be utilized at different stages and levels in a variety of combinations according to the needs and context of each country/sub-region, thereby maximizing the flexibility of the adoption of such measures.

The Anti-Corruption Tool-Kit<sup>38</sup> covers areas relating to prevention, enforcement, institution building, awareness raising and monitoring and assessment of corruption levels. This extensive, though by no means exhaustive, collection of theoretical approaches and their associated practical applications has been developed from anti-corruption research and technical assistance activities, including the GPAC comprehensive Country Assessment, undertaken by the UN and various other organizations and nations world-wide.

Because it is, by its very nature, a work in progress, CICIP continues to invite comments or inputs to increase and improve the current scope of the tool-kit, thereby giving greater insight and understanding of the individual anti-corruption measures.

Whether the initial implementation of such activities was successful or not, lessons can be drawn for future initiatives. However, in order to improve these tools over time CICIP is implementing a systematic action learning process to identify best practices. Through this process the most successful tools will be identified and refined, and incorporated into the tool-kit.

A government that has become essentially dysfunctional and one in which corruption is an acute problem requires a strategy that contains these six responses to the status quo:

- (i) awareness raising, creation of an enabling environment;
- (ii) institution building and/or reorganization;
- (iii) prevention and the establishment of an ethical standard(Leadership);
- (iv) enforcement;
- (v) anti-corruption legislation including the strengthening of laws, practices and regulation;  
and
- (vi) independent and transparent monitoring and evaluation.

Each of these responses has its own particular strengths, weaknesses and limitations. None can succeed in isolation. However, synergies can be created by the various functions, and the mutual support provided the responses are sufficiently synchronized.

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<sup>38</sup> Global Programme against Corruption, *Anti-Corruption Tool-kit*, Working Paper. Vienna: UN CICIP, October 2000.

## **IX. CONCLUSION**

Like others in the “development business,” GPAC has experienced a steep learning curve with regard to understanding the negative impacts of corruption and devising means of curbing it. After almost seven years of governance work in client countries, both member countries and the development agency community have realized that the problem of corruption was underestimated. As a result, a sufficiently serious strategy or approach to control the situation has not been designed. Making matters worse, many of the local and international stakeholders are still in denial and are unwilling to accept the responsibility for the current situation.

The integrated approach described in this paper is based on the premises that:

- Most governments cannot be trusted to curb their own corruption. It must be a joint task involving all key stakeholders guided by an independent National Integrity Steering Committee with members selected for their integrity and competence;
- Levels, types, causes, effects, cost of and remedies for corruption must be documented in a transparent manner through the use of desk research, focus groups and surveys conducted by independent and professional entities;
- Broad-based data collection must be conducted regularly over a given period of time to allow impact monitoring of the anti-corruption work;
- Survey findings must be disseminated widely both in English and the local languages;
- Country assessments should be used to: (i) improve the quality of decision-making both at the national and sub-national level; and (ii) to allow independent impact monitoring of the Integrity Strategy and Anti-Corruption Action Plan; and
- Broad-based groups of stakeholders should be given a mandate by the government to devise and implement Integrity Strategies and Anti-Corruption Action Plans for each of their groups (legislative, judiciary, media, civil society) on how to fight corruption.

Conducting the survey is only a small part of the process. The majority should be spent on facilitating broad-based processes resulting in an evidence-based action plan that will be implemented and subsequently evaluated. The organization of an action-planning workshop at the end of the survey is part of the process and provides a forum for the presentation of the survey results. Throughout the entire approach, several objectives are reached:

- *Creation of an open dialogue* among stakeholder groups, traditional and non-traditional, in order to address corruption;
- Promotion of a stronger sense of *common ownership* for reform initiatives brought about through the broad participation of stakeholder groups and, in turn, a greater interest in successful implementation;
- Expansion of *public awareness* about the overall impact of corruption, their role in fighting it and the resources available to assist them;
- Encouragement of *greater accountability* among civil servants to provide services in an efficient and effective manner; and
- Establishment of *increased risk* of participating in corrupt practices as public awareness of basic rights to services and complaint mechanisms increases.

By using the integrated approach described herein, broadly disseminating the survey results through print and broadcast media, the discussion on corruption will be permeate from the central government level all the way to the isolated villages. What remains to be seen at this point is the level of progress made in addressing corruption. This should be clarified by subsequent surveys, which will reinforce the objectives among the surveyors and the respondents, and will raise their expectations to make greater and greater improvements.

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<sup>1</sup>UN Project document; *Assessment of Corruption in Hungary*, November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1999

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## XI. ANNEX

### COUNTRY ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Topic	Applied Instrument	Lebanon	Hungary
TI-Index	Multiple Surveys		
Citizens' perception of corruption in public admin	1. Survey 2. Focus group with citizens		
Citizens' first-hand experience of corruption in public admin	Focus groups		
Business perceptions (private and public).	1. Survey 2. Focus group with citizens		
Business' first-hand experience of corruption in public admin	Focus groups		
Citizens first-hand experience of corruption in the criminal justice system.	1. Survey 2. Focus group with citizens		
Citizens Perceptions of corruption in the criminal justice system.	Focus groups		
Trust level between public and the Anti –Corruption agencies	1. Survey 2. Focus Groups		
Action by the criminal justice system: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reported cases (police and other agencies);</li> <li>Cases prosecuted;</li> <li>Sentences;</li> <li>Average length of prison sentence;</li> <li>Average monetary return.</li> <li>Offender's profile: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Age and gender;</li> <li>Size and turnover (corporate);</li> <li>Money, gifts or services received;</li> <li>Services provided.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Desk review		
Legislative source.	Desk review		
Anti-corruption policy structures.	Desk review		
Anti-corruption implementation structures.	Desk review Focus Group to score		
Codes of ethics and integrity testing procedures for public officials and implementation mechanisms.	Desk review		
Public awareness and educational initiatives.	Desk review Focus Groups to score		
Public officials: disclosure of assets, liabilities and income tax returns.	Desk review Focus group to score		
The issue of immunity for public officials.	Desk review		
Bank secrecy provisions.	Desk review		
Simplicity of provisions regarding transparency in public sector works.	Desk review		
Provisions regarding regulation of and transparency in financing political parties and campaigns.	Desk review		
Provisions regarding the support and protection of victims, witnesses and whistleblowers.	Desk review		
Ratification of international and bilateral instruments	Desk review		
Capacity of the Criminal Justice System <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of judiciary staff (judges, prosecutors, police)</li> <li># of vacant positions</li> <li>relative to the size of the population</li> </ul>	Desk review		

• Remuneration of criminal justice officers			
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Survey Instrument

T1. Interview number:

Number of cluster                      Number of the respondent in the cluster

T2. Number of interviewer:

County ID                                      Interviewer ID

A1. AS YOU SEE IT, WHICH ARE THE THREE KEY PROBLEMS YOUR COUNTRY IS FACING TODAY?

**Show card A1. Mark up to three answers.**

- A1A 1 Political instability
- A1B 1 Ethnic problems
- A1C 1 Corruption
- A1D 1 Low incomes
- A1E 1 Crime
- A1F 1 Unemployment
- A1G 1 Environment pollution
- A1H 1 Health Care
- A1I 1 High prices
- A1J 1 Education
- A1K 1 Poverty
- A1K 1 Development agency's approach to development
- A1L 1 Other (Please, indicate!) .....
- AIM 1 Do not know/ No answer

A2. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE YOU SEEN PUBLIC OFFICIAL MISUSE THE PUBLIC POWERS FOR PRIVATE GAIN?

**One answer only.**

- 1. Almost all officials are involved
- 2. Most officials are involved
- 3. Few officials are involved
- 4. Scarcely anyone of the officials is involved
- 9. Do not know/No answer

A3. DEALING WITH A PUBLIC OFFICIAL HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT A CITIZEN HAS TO DO ONE OF THE FOLLOWING IN ORDER TO BE SUCCESSFULLY SERVED?

***One answer a line.***

1. Very likely
2. Rather likely
3. Rather unlikely
4. Not likely at all
9. Do not know/No answer

A3A	To give cash to an official	1	2	3	4	9
A3B	To give a gift to an official	1	2	3	4	9
A3C	To do a favor to an official	1	2	3	4	9

A4. AS YOU SEE IT, TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD YOU EXPECT TO FIND THE MISUSE OF PUBLIC POWERS FOR PRIVATE GAIN AMONG THE FOLLOWING GROUPS:

**One answer a line.**

1. Almost everybody is involved
2. Most are involved
3. Few are involved
4. Scarcely anyone is involved
9. Do not know/No answer

A4A	Journalists	1	2	3	4	9
A4B	Teachers	1	2	3	4	9
A4C	University professors and officials	1	2	3	4	9
A4D	Officials at ministries	1	2	3	4	9
A4E	Municipal officials	1	2	3	4	9
A4F	Administration officials in the judicial system	1	2	3	4	9
A4G	Judges	1	2	3	4	9
A4H	Public prosecutors	1	2	3	4	9
A4I	Investigating officers	1	2	3	4	9
A4J	Lawyers	1	2	3	4	9
A4K	Police officers	1	2	3	4	9
A4L	Customs officers	1	2	3	4	9
A4M	Tax officials	1	2	3	4	9
A4N	Members of parliament	1	2	3	4	9
A4O	Ministers	1	2	3	4	9
A4P	Municipal councilors	1	2	3	4	9
A4Q	Business people	1	2	3	4	9
A4R	Doctors	1	2	3	4	9
A4S	Political party and coalition leaders	1	2	3	4	9
A4T	Local political leaders	1	2	3	4	9
A4U	Representatives of non-governmental organizations	1	2	3	4	9
A4V	Representatives of international development agencies	1	2	3	4	9
A4W	Representatives of international business	1	2	3	4	9
A4V	Bankers	1	2	3	4	9

A5. BASED ON WHAT DID YOU COME UP WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT REGARDING LEVELS OF CORRUPTION IN THE COUNTRY?

**One answer only.**

1. Personal experience (you have had to provide cash, gifts or favors)
2. Talks with relatives and people you know
3. Media information
4. Officials' living standard differs from what they receive as personal incomes
5. Other (Please, indicate!)
9. Do not know/No answer

A6. AS YOU SEE IT, WHICH OF THE ACTIVITES LISTED BELOW FALLS UNDER YOUR DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION

**One answer a line.**

		Yes	No	DK/NA
A6A	Gift to a doctor to take special care of you	1	2	9
A6B	Extending a favor to be allowed to take sabbatical	1	2	9
A6C	Using connections to exempt somebody close to you from military service	1	2	9
A6D	Interceding before a high-rank executive to employ a relative of yours	1	2	9
A6E	Personal request before a municipal councillor for obtaining construction permit	1	2	9
A6F	Extending cash to policeman not to revoke your driving license	1	2	9
A6G	Abuse of official position in order to perform private business	1	2	9
A6H	Providing official information to people you know for the purpose of personal benefit	1	2	9
A6I	Accepting cash by officials for the purpose of tax concealment or reduction	1	2	9
A6J	Pre-election grants for political parties	1	2	9
A6K	Additional reimbursement for a lawyer who assists a suspect in terminating his case	1	2	9

A7. IMAGINE SOMEONE WHO HAS EXTENDED CASH OR A GIFT TO AN OFFICIAL AND HAS OBTAINED WHAT THEY WANTED. HOW, IN YOUR VIEW, IS THIS CITIZEN MOST LIKELY TO FEEL?

**One answer only.**

1. Angry
2. Indignant
3. Embarrassed
4. Content
9. Do not know/No answer

A8. IMAGINE YOURSELF IN AN OFFICIAL LOW-PAID POSITION AND YOU ARE APPROACHED BY SOMEONE OFFERING CASH, GIFT OR FAVOR TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEM. WHAT WOULD YOU DO:

**One answer only.**

1. I would accept, if all do that.
2. I would accept, if I can solve their problem
3. I would not accept, if the solution to the problem is related with law evasion
4. I would not accept, I do not approve of such acts
9. Do not know/No answer

A9. AS YOU SEE IT HOW ACCEPTABLE ARE THE FOLLOWING IF DONE BY A PARLIAMENTARIAN OR MEMBER OF CIVIL SERVICE?

**One answer a line.**

1. Acceptable
2. Somewhat acceptable
3. Somewhat unacceptable
4. Unacceptable
9. Do not know/No answer

A9A	To accept an invitation for a <u>free lunch/dinner</u> to solve a personal PROBLEM	1	2	3	4	9
A9B	To resolve a personal problem and accept a favor in exchange	1	2	3	4	9
A9C	To accept <u>gifts</u> for the solution of personal problems	1	2	3	4	9
A9D	To accept <u>cash</u> for the solution of personal problems	1	2	3	4	9

A10. As you see it, To what extent are the following acceptable done by officials at Ministries, municipalities and mayoralities?

**One answer a line.**

1. Acceptable
2. Somewhat acceptable
3. Somewhat unacceptable
4. Unacceptable
9. Do not know/No answer

A10A	To accept an invitation for a <u>free lunch/dinner</u> to solve a personal problem	1	2	3	4	9
A10B	To resolve a personal problem and accept a favor in exchange	1	2	3	4	9
A10C	To accept <u>gifts</u> for the solution of personal problems	1	2	3	4	9
A10D	To accept <u>cash</u> for the solution of personal problems	1	2	3	4	9

A11. IF IN THE LAST YEAR YOU WERE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE SOMETHING (CASH, GIFT OF FAVOR) IN EXCHANGE FOR A PUBLIC SERVICE IT WAS BY:

**One answer a line.**

		Yes	No	No contact	DK/NA
A11A	Doctor	1	2	3	9
A11B	Teacher	1	2	3	9
A11C	University professor or official	1	2	3	9
A11D	Official at a ministry	1	2	3	9
A11E	Municipal official	1	2	3	9
A11F	Administrative official in the judicial system	1	2	3	9
A11G	Judge	1	2	3	9
A11H	Public prosecutor	1	2	3	9
A11I	Investigating officer	1	2	3	9
A11J	Police officer	1	2	3	9
A11K	Customs officer	1	2	3	9
A11L	Tax official	1	2	3	9
A11M	Member of parliament	1	2	3	9
A11N	Municipal councilor	1	2	3	9
A11O	Businessman	1	2	3	9
A11P	Banker	1	2	3	9
A11R	Other (Please, indicate!)	1	2	3	9

A12. WHENEVER YOU HAVE CONTACTED OFFICIALS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, HOW OFTEN IN THE LAST 3 YEARS DID THEY

**One answer a line.**

1. In all cases
2. In most of the cases
3. In isolated cases
4. In no cases
9. Do not know/No answer

A12A	<u>Directly demanded</u> cash, gift or favor	1	2	3	4	9
A12B	Not demanded directly, but <u>showed that they expected</u> cash, gift or favor	1	2	3	4	9

A13. WHENEVER YOU HAVE CONTACTED OFFICIALS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, HOW OFTEN IN THE LAST YEAR DID THEY

***One answer a line.***

1. In all cases
2. In most of the cases
3. In isolated cases
4. In no cases
9. Do not know/No answer

A13A	Give cash to an official	1	2	3	4	9
A13B	Give gift to an official	1	2	3	4	9
A13C	Do an official a favor	1	2	3	4	9

A14. WHENEVER YOU HAVE CONTACTED OFFICIALS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, HOW OFTEN IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS DID THEY

***One answer a line.***

1. In all cases
2. In most of the cases
3. In isolated cases
4. In no cases
9. Do not know/No answer

A14A	Give cash to an official	1	2	3	4	9
A14B	Give gift to an official	1	2	3	4	9
A14C	Do an official a favor	1	2	3	4	9

A15. IF YOU STRONGLY NEEDED A SERVICE AND AN OFFICIAL DIRECTLY DEMANDED CASH , WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE?

***One answer only.***

1. I would pay by all means
2. I would pay if I can afford
3. I would not pay if I had another way to solve the problem
4. I would not pay by any means
9. Do not know/No answer

A16. AS YOU SEE IT, TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE GOVERNMENT PUTTING SERIOUS EFFORTS IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION AMONG

**One answer a line.**

		Yes	No	DK/ NA
A16A	Influential business people	1	2	9
A16B	High-ranking public sector officials	1	2	9
A16C	Lower-ranks officials in direct contact with ordinary people	1	2	9

A17. AS YOU SEE IT, WHICH ARE THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS INCREASING CORRUPTION IN YOUR COUNTRY

**Show card A17. Mark up to three answers.**

- A17A 1 Low salaries of the officials in the public sector
- A17B 1 Crisis of morals in the period of transition
- A17C 1 Imperfect legislation
- A17D 1 Communist past legacy
- A17E 1 Inefficiency of the judicial system
- A17F 1 Those in power striving at making fast money
- A17G 1 Missing strict administrative control
- A17H 1 Secularities of our national culture
- A17I 1 Office duties interfering with the personal interests of the officials
- A17J 1 Other (Please, indicate!):
- A17J 1 Badly designed development agency projects (privatization)
- A17J 1 International business
- A17K 1 Do not know/No answer

A18. PLEASE, INDICATE HOW FAR YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

**One answer a line.**

1. Fully agree
2. Rather agree
3. Neither agree, nor disagree
4. Rather disagree
5. Fully disagree
9. Do not know/No answer

A18A	People comply with the law only whenever that suits them	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18B	It is acceptable Members of Parliament and Government to receive cash, gifts or favors from individuals or entities	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18C	To solve a problem successfully one should offer cash or gifts to the officials one has contacts with	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18D	If an official wants cash to solve a personal problem of mine, I would pay	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18E	It is acceptable officials at Ministries, municipalities and mayoralities to receive cash, gifts or favors from individuals or entities	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18F	The officials I have contacted with usually want, or show they expect, cash or gifts	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18G	Young officials are more corrupt than the old ones	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18H	In the last year I have often had to extend cash and gifts to the officials I have been in contact with	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18I	Corruption in is widely spread in our country	1	2	3	4	5	9
A18J	Corruption can be substantially curbed in our country	1	2	3	4	5	9

A19. REGARDING CORRUPITON IN YOUR COUNTRY; WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IS CLOSEST TO WHAT YOU THINK?

**One answer only.**

1. Corruption cannot be curbed
2. There will always be corruption in our country, yet it can be limited to a degree
3. Corruption in our country can be substantially reduced
4. Corruption in our country can be eradicated
9. Do not know/No answer

A20. AS YOU SEE IT, WHAT IS EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN THE FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONS

Not proliferated at all

Proliferated to the highest degree

1                      2                      3                      4                      5

9. Do not know / No answer

**One answer for each line in column A20.**

**Show card A20.**

		A20							A21	A22
A20A	Presidency	1	2	3	4	5	9	1	1	
A20B	Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	9	2	2	
A20C	Government	1	2	3	4	5	9	3	3	
A20D	Industry line ministries	1	2	3	4	5	9	4	4	
A20E	Municipal government	1	2	3	4	5	9	5	5	
A20F	Municipal administration	1	2	3	4	5	9	6	6	
A20G	Army	1	2	3	4	5	9	7	7	
A20H	Customs	1	2	3	4	5	9	8	8	
A20I	Tax offices	1	2	3	4	5	9	9	9	
A20J	Judiciary	1	2	3	4	5	9	10	10	
A20K	Police	1	2	3	4	5	9	11	11	
A20L	Committee on Posts and Telecommunications	1	2	3	4	5	9	12	12	
A20M	Committee on Energy	1	2	3	4	5	9	13	13	
A20N	Privatization Agency	1	2	3	4	5	9	14	14	
A20O	Agency for Foreign Investment	1	2	3	4	5	9	15	15	
A20P	Commission for the Protection of Competition	1	2	3	4	5	9	16	16	
A20Q	Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission	1	2	3	4	5	9	17	17	
A20R	Audit Office	1	2	3	4	5	9	18	18	
A20S	National Bank	1	2	3	4	5	9	19	19	
A20T	National Institute of Statistics	1	2	3	4	5	9	20	20	
A20U	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)	1	2	3	4	5	9	21	21	
A20V	International development institutions	1	2	3	4	5	9	22	22	
Do not know / No answer								99	99	

A21. AS YOU SEE IT, WHICH OF THE ENLISTED INSTITUTIONS ARE MOST CORRUPT

**One answer only. Put down respondent answer in column A21 of the above table.**

**Show card A20.**

A22. AS YOU SEE IT, IN WHICH OF THE ENLISTED INSTITUTIONS ARE LEAST CORRUPT

***One answer only. Put down respondent answer in column A22 of the above table.  
Show card A20.***

A23. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE YOU WILLING TO REPORT CORRUPTION?

**One answer a line.**

1. In all cases
2. In most of the cases
3. In isolated cases
4. In no cases
9. Do not know/No answer

A23A	I am willing to report corruption	1	2	3	4	9
A23B	I am willing to report corruption without giving my name	1	2	3	4	9
A23C	I am not willing to report corruption	1	2	3	4	9
A23D	Do not know/No answer					

A24. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU TRUST THE FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONS WITH INFORMATION ABOUT CORRUPTION?

**One answer a line.**

1. In all cases
2. In most of the cases
3. In isolated cases
4. In no cases
9. Do not know/No answer

A24A	Police	1	2	3	4	9
A24B	Government in General	1	2	3	4	9
A24C	The Media					
A24D	Courts					
A24E	Municipal Government					
A24F	Anti-corruption agencies	1	2	3	4	9
A24G	International Development agencies (ombudsman)					
A24H	International NGOs (Transparency International)					
A24I	Do not know/No answer					