SHORT HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM OF SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR THE CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

Sections

Resolution of ECOSOC 159 (VII) II, D
Terms of Reference of Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Reform Proposals in General
Part I: THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS
1. International Organs not Exclusively Concerned with Control of Narcotic Drugs - (a) NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AS INTERNATIONAL ORGANS - Dutch Government
French and Dutch Governments
United States and Germany
(b) THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR ORGANS - (aa) THEIR JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
Mandates and Trusteeship Agreements
(bb) JURISDICTION OF SINGLE ORGANS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS
(c) INTERNATIONAL ORGANS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS (LEAGUE OF NATIONS) CONCERNED WITH CERTAIN LIMITED TASKS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS
2. International Organs Exclusively Concerned with the Control of Narcotic Substances
(b) PERMANENT CENTRAL BOARD - Composition and characteristics of the Board
Reinterpretation of article 19 of the 1925 Convention
Appointment and tenure of the members
Allowances and remuneration
Privileges and immunities
Staff and organizational arrangements
(aa) SUPERVISORY AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD
(i) Control functions
(ii) Supervisory functions of the Board
(bb) ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE PERMANENT CENTRAL BOARD
(C) SUPERVISORY - Body Composition-appointment
Personal qualifications of members
Tenure
Secretariat
Functions
(d) THE OPIUM SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE HEALTH COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON HABIT-FORMING DRUGS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
(e) NON-PERMANENT ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (LEAGUE OF NATIONS) DEALING EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS
B. General Characterization of the Existing System of International Control of Narcotic Drugs
Part II - SOME PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE PLANNING OF A FUTURE CONTROL SYSTEM
1. The Functions of a Future System of International Control of Narcotic Drugs
SECRETARIAL (MINISTERIAL) FUNCTIONS AND PROMOTION OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW CONVENTION
Acceptance of convention; condition of recognition of new States
Designation of States permitted to become parties to the convention
FUNCTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND WORKING OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONTROL BODIES.
Appointment and qualifications of the members of the control bodies
Provision for constitutional emergencies
Rules of procedure
Meetings
Appointment of staff
Co-ordination of international control organs
Liaison
Budget and auditing
(c) INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENTS (aa) INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH
(bb) TECHNICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENTS
Examples of technical aid
Economic and financial assistance
Education and propaganda
(aa) INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED
(dd) REQUESTS FOR ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY CONTRACTING OR NON-CONTRACTING PARTIES
Determination of kind of regime to which a drug is to be subjected
Request for remedial measures
Jurisdiction of the policy-making and administrative body to make such requests
(ee) EMBARGO, BOYCOTT, AND OTHER ENFORCEMENT MEASURES (See part I, A, 2, (b); section dealing with the PCB.)
Conditions and time limits of embargo
Boycott
"Review" of embargo and boycott
Other enforcement measures
(ff) MAKING OTHER LEGALLY BINDING DECISIONS
Notifications determining the beginning of legal effects
(gg) RECEPTION, FROM CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS, OF LEGALLY BINDING DECLARATIONS
(e) LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
(aa) ENLARGING OR RESTRICTING THE SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF CONTROL AND DETERMINING THE KIND OF REGIME UNDER WHICH A GIVEN DRUG SHOULD FALL Proper balance between danger of drug and administrative difficulties of control.
Limitation of control to drugs of certain chemical groups
Change of control regime
Flexibility of control regime
Factors in determining the control of a drug
(bb) OTHER CHANGES OF THE CONVENTION
Methods of amending the convention
Negative method
Positive method
Question of ultra vires
Precedent of article 21 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization
Facilities for constitutional emergencies
Permission of initiative by all contracting countries
Vote of policy-making body on amendment
(b) POLICY FUNCTIONS
(i) ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS246
Influence of economic functions on international supervision
Draft Convention of 1939
Limitation Conference of 1931
Weighted voting
Control and supervision of international economic organs
Economic functions to be performed by existing specialized agencies
Part III GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE NEW CONTROL MACHINERY MAY BE BASED
2. Special Organs for the Control of Narcotic Drugs267
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION ON THE POLICY-MAKING BODY
INDEPENDENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS
4. The United Nations as the Appointing and Financing Authority
5. Continuity of Functions of the Organs of Control
6. Adjustment to Changing Conditions
7. Indirect Administration
8. Recognition of Regional Problems
9. Single Clearing House for all Communications between Governments and International Control Organs
10. Principle of Universality
Part IV. OUTLINE OF THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATONAL CONTROL MACHINERY
1. Organs not Exclusively Concerned with the International Control of Narcotic Drugs (a) UNITED NATIONS
(b) WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
(c) INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
(d) OTHER ORGANS
2. Organs Exclusively Concerned with the Control of Narcotic Drugs
(a) THE POLICY-MAKING ORGAN Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Composition, etc. of the Commission
Government representation on the Commission
Rules of procedure; financing
(b) THE ADMINISTRATIVE (SEMI-JUDICIAL) BODY Administrative arrangements
Immunities and privileges
Frequency of meetings
Appointment of members
Continuity, tenure and constitutional emergencies
Personal qualifications of members
Removal from office
Number of members
Privileges, immunities, remuneration of members
Remuneration in particular
Rules of procedure
Quorum
Financing
Methods of allocating expenses
Secretariat
(e) REGIONAL ORGANS

Details

Pages: 55 to 104
Creation Date: 1950/01/01

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AUTHORITY

SHORT HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM OF SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR THE CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

Resolution of ECOSOC 159 (VII) II, D

The resolution, headed "Simplification of Existing International Instruments on Narcotic Drugs" (159 (VII) II, D.) adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on 3 August 1948, reads in part:

"The Economic and Social Council . . .

"Taking note of the complexity of these instruments (relating to the international control of narcotic drugs) and the desirability of simplifying the organization of international co-operation for controlling the traffic in narcotic drugs,

"Requests the Secretary-General to begin, work on the drafting of a new single Convention in which provision shall be made for a single body to perform all control functions excepting those which are now or may hereafter be entrusted to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs".[1]

In taking this decision the Council acted on the recommendation of its Commission on Narcotic Drugs.[2] In proposing a "single body" the Commission on Narcotic Drugs took up a problem which had on several occasions attracted the attention of international organs. When the machinery for examination of the estimates, provided for by the planned convention for limiting the manufacture of narcotic drugs, was discussed by the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, at its 13th and 14th sessions, some members of the Committee objected to the establishment of a new body, suggesting instead that the new functions should be entrusted to the already existing Permanent Central Board.[3] The creation of an additional control organ was also strongly criticized during the 1931 Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.[4] Up to the end of the active existence of the Advisory Committee some of its members favoured a consolidation of the PCOB and the Supervisory Body.[5]

Terms of Reference of Commission on Narcotic Drugs

With this problem in mind the framers of the terms of reference of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations provided that the Commission should "consider what changes may be required in the existing machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs and submit proposals thereon to the Council".[6]

pp. 230, 295, 312; vol. II, pp. 69, 70 etc.

The question of simplification of the international machinery for the control of narcotic drugs was also referred to by the representative of the United Kingdom during the first part of the first session of the General Assembly.[7] He suggested the establishment of "a single small body of, say, eight persons, in substitution for the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body".

At the 2nd session of the General Assembly, its Fifth Committee consented to a proposal of the representative of the USSR to ask the Secretary-General to furnish a report regarding the possibility of co-ordinating and simplifying the international machinery for the control of narcotic drugs.[8]

The problem of simplification of the international administrative structure came up again at the 6th session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.[9]

When the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, on the proposal of its American member, adopted the recommendation to the Economic and Social Council to initiate studies on the possibilities of simplification of the international machinery,[10] it attacked a problem the existence of which had been pointed out by different Governments on many occasions. While the need for separate existence of the Supervisory Body and Permanent Central Board was continuously disputed, the necessity for a policy body such as the former Advisory Committee and the present Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in addition to one independent organ composed of individual experts, was generally accepted.[11]

Reasons for Separate Existence of the PCB and SB

Three principal reasons were generally given for the separate existence of the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body, whenever the present organizational structure of control was defended:

  1. The 1931 Conference on Limitation was constitutionally incompetent to confer upon the Board functions different in kind from those provided for by the 1925 Convention,[12]

  2. The examination of estimates as well as the establishment of estimates for non-co-operating countries or territories cannot be entrusted to a body like the PCB, on which a strong representation of the medical profession is not guaranteed.[13]

  3. It would be functionally difficult to have the same body establish "estimates" and subsequently supervise their execution.

Reform Proposals in General

Proposals to reform the machinery of control of international drugs have generally limited themselves to suggestions relating to:

  1. The Advisory Committee, and its successor the Commission on Narcotic Drugs;

  2. The Permanent Central Board;

  3. The Supervisory Body.

Although these three organs are the only permanent ones exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs,[14] there are other organs entrusted with control functions in this field.

Part I: THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

A. The Existing International Control Machinery

The former and existing international control organs, concerned with the control of narcotic drugs, may be divided into the following groups.

  1. International organs not exclusively concerned with control of narcotic drugs:

  1. National Governments as international organs.

  2. International organizations of a general nature: the League of Nations and the United Nations and their organs.

  3. General jurisdiction of the League of Nations and of the United Nations as such.

  4. Jurisdiction of single organs, provided by international instruments relating to the control of narcotic drugs:

  5. The Secretary-General (Secretariat).

  6. The Council of the League of Nations; the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations;

  7. The Health Committee of the League of Nations;

  8. The Permanent Court of International Justice; the International Court of Justice.

  9. International organs of a specialized, nature, which are primarily concerned with other problems but are incidentally charged with functions of control of narcotic drugs: International organs other than organs of the United Nations (formerly of the League·of Nations)

  10. Office International d'Hygiene Publique.

  11. World Health Organization.

  12. Permanent Court of Arbitration.

  13. Universal Postal Union.

  14. Conferences of States charged with functions by the international instruments relating to the control of narcotic drugs.

  1. International organs exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs.

  1. The Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs of the League of Nations and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the. United Nations.

  2. Permanent Central Board.

  3. Supervisory Body.

  4. The former Opium Sub-Committee of the Health Committee of the League of Nations and the present Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs of the World Health Organization.

  5. Various non-permanent organs exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs ("Technical Body"; various commissions; "Body of Three Experts").

1. International Organs not Exclusively Concerned with Control of Narcotic Drugs - (a) NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AS INTERNATIONAL ORGANS - Dutch Government

Following a methodvery common in international legislation, particularly in the earlier period of international administration, the Hague Opium Convention of 1912 entrusted a national Government, i.e.,the Government of the Netherlands, with certain secretarial or ministerial functions, such as:

  1. Forwarding texts of laws and administrative regulations and statistical information, to be communicated by each contracting party to the other contracting Governments;[15]

  2. Inviting Governments to sign or ratify the Convention;[16]

  3. Receiving and keeping documents of signature, ratification (accession), and denunciation, and notifying the contracting Governments of the receipt of such documents;[17]

  4. Inviting the contracting parties to send delegates to a conference at The Hague to arrive at "an immediate agreement" on questions arising relative to the ratification or the enforcement of the Convention, or of laws or regulations enacted or measures taken under the Convention.

The first General Assembly of the League of Nations, on the proposal of the Dutch Government, took over for the League the duties placed on this Government by the Hague Opium Convention "with regard to the collection of data and dealing with disputes".[18] Article III of the 1946 Protocol transferred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the functions conferred upon the Netherlands Government under articles 21 and 25 of the 1912 Convention, i.e.,the duties, formerly exercised by the League of Nations, in relation "to the collection of data", and the function of. receiving denunciations of the Convention and of notifying the other contracting parties of such actions.

The Protocol, however, left untouched the following tasks of the Dutch Government:

Receiving and keeping documents of signature and ratification (accession);[19]

Notifying the contracting countries of the receipt of such documents;

Inviting the contracting parties for a conference to settle disputes relative to the ratification of the Convention or its enforcement.[20]

French and Dutch Governments

The French and Dutch Governments were also entrusted with the following secretarial tasks which bear upon the international control of narcotic drugs, but

were of a merely ephemeral importance: ratification of the Peace Treaties of Versailles,[21] of St. Germain-en-Laye,[22] of Trianon[23] and of Neuilly-sur-Seine[24] implying simultaneous ratification of the 1912 Convention. Documents ratifying these Peace Treaties were to be deposited in Paris[25] and the French Government undertook to notify all signatory Powers of such deposits. The French Government also accepted the obligation to communicate to the Government of the Netherlands a certified copy of the Protocol (proc?s-verbaux)of deposit of each ratification of the above-mentioned Peace Treaties and to invite this Government to accept and deposit such certified copy as if it were a deposit of an instrument of ratification of The Hague Opium Convention of 1912.

United States and Germany

Functions, different in kind from the secretarial functions of the Dutch and French Governments, were given to the United States of America and Germany under article 19 (4) of the 1925 Convention. Both Governments were authorized to nominate one person each to participate, together with the Council of the League of Nations, in the appointment of the members of the Permanent Central Board. This privilege was abolished by the 1946 Protocol, which transferred the right of appointing the members of the Board to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

(b) THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR ORGANS - (aa) THEIR JURISDICTION IN GENERAL

Covenant and Charter

By virtue of Article 23 (c) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, its Members entrusted "the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to . . . the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs". This was done on the suggestion of the Government of Great Britain.[26] On the basis of Article 23 (c), the first General Assembly adopted the above-mentioned resolution of 15 December 1920, by which the League took over the functions entrusted to the Dutch Government by the 1912 Convention of collecting data and dealing with disputes, entrusted its secretariat with the duty of collecting relevant information, and established the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs to assist the Council in dealing with any questions that might arise in connexion with the League functions relating to the control of narcotic drugs.[27]

The Charter of the United Nations does not contain any express reference to the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. The authors of the Charter, however, left no doubt that the "international economic, social, health and other related problems" with which the new world organization is authorized to deal include "international co-operation in the suppression of, traffic in, and abuse of opium and other narcotics and dangerous drugs".[28]

This general jurisdiction under the terms of the Charter establishes the competence of such United Nations organs as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, with their Commissions and Committees, and the Secretariat, to deal with problems of international control of narcotic drugs, just as the Covenant had bestowed the same competence on such League organs as the Assembly, Council, and Secretariat, with their Committees and Commissions.

Mandates and Trusteeship Agreements

Various provisions of the League mandates stipulated the duty of the Mandatory Power to adhere on behalf of the mandate, or to apply to such mandate "any general international conventions already existing or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations respecting . . . the traffic in drugs, . . .".[29]

The Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Western Samoa provides for the Administering Authority to control the production, importation, manufacture, and distribution of opium and narcotic drugs.[30] Texts of Agreements for Trust Territories of the United Nations contain clauses to the effect that the Administering Authorities undertake to apply to the Trust Territories the provisions of certain present and future international conventions and recommendations, including-if correctly interpreted-conventions and recommendations relating to the control of narcotic drugs.[31] The Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese

Mandated Islands imposes upon the United States the obligations "to control the traffic in . . . opium and other dangerous drugs".[32]

The provisions of the Mandates and of the Trusteeship Agreements relating directly or indirectly to the control of narcotic drugs do not designate particular organs of the League or of the United Nations. It was the League and it is the United Nations as a whole which exercises the supervisory functions, relative to the control of dangerous drugs in Mandates or Trust Territories. The League used, and the United Nations uses, in this capacity, its appropriate constitutional organs (Council, Mandates Commission, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Secretariat of the League; Trusteeship Council, General Assembly, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Secretariat, and eventually the Security Council of the United Nations) [33]

The Final Act of the 1934 Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs designates the League of Nations as a whole, and not one of its organs for the performance of research functions. The Conference recommended that the League of Nations "be enabled to give prizes as a reward for results obtained by research work for the purpose of discovering medicines which, although producing the same therapeutic effects as the drugs, do not give rise to drug addiction"[34]

This provision being a recommendation of the Conference, the 1946 Protocol could not substitute the United Nations for the League.

(bb) JURISDICTION OF SINGLE ORGANS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

In addition to the general jurisdiction of the League and the United Nations and their organs, various international instruments (conventions, agreements and protocols) conferred particular functions on individual organs of the League and of the United Nations.

  1. The Secretary-General (Secretariat) of the League of Nations, and the Secretary-General (Secretariat) of the United Nations

General jurisdiction

The Secretary-General (Secretariat) of the League of Nations was and the Secretary-General (Secretariat) of the United Nations is in a position to perform numerous functions in his capacity as organ of the League of Nations, or the United Nations, because the League had and the United Nations has general jurisdiction of supervising the execution of international treaties relating to the control of narcotic drugs.

Conventional functions

In addition, several provisions of the Conventions, Agreements, and Protocols dealing with narcotic drugs designate the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, or of the United Nations, for the performance of certain tasks. These special clauses do not necessarily create powers of the Secretary-General of either organization which he would not be authorized to exercise within the general jurisdiction of the League or of the United Nations. The provisions in question, however, sometimes clarify·his legal position or establish a duty of the Secretary-General, where perhaps no such duty, but only a right to act, would exist.[35] In some cases the Secretary-General is given additional rights which he may perhaps not have under the general provisions of the Charter (Covenant).

The rights and duties originally exercised by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations under various Conventions, Agreements and Protocols dealing with the control of narcotic drugs-in so far as they were not obsolete or already carried out-were transferred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by virtue of the Protocol of 11 December 1946. In addition to these functions, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was given new tasks under the Protocols of 11 December 1946 and of 19 November 1948.

"Secretarial" or "ministerial" functions

  1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations (League of Nations) is under these provisions designated to receive, deposit, register, and keep in the Archives of the United Nations (League of Nations) such documents as instruments of ratification, acceptance, accession, denunciation-as well on behalf of Metropolitan Countries as on behalf of Dependencies under the various Colonial clauses-and to notify the contracting parties and other Members of the United Nations (formerly of the League of Nations) of receipt of such documents.[36]

  1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations (League of Nations) is obligated to keep and publish from time to time a special record showing which States have signed, ratified, acceded to, or denounced the Convention of 1925.[37]

  2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was directed to prepare texts of the instruments revised in accordance with the amendments of the Protocol of 1946.[38] He was also directed to send a certified copy of the Protocol, including the annex, to all parties to the above-mentioned international instruments, and to all Members of the United Nations, and to those nonmember States to which he had previously communicated a copy of the Protocol.[39]

  3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations (League of Nations) is also designated to receive and communicate information such as data of legal and statistical nature, particulars of each case of the illicit traffic discovered, and annual reports on the working of the 1931 Convention.[40]

The Secretary-General of the League was also designated-by recommendations of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference-to receive results of examination by Governments of the possibility of replacing diacetylmorphine by other drugs of a less dangerous character,[41] to inform Governments of the preparation of certain League documents, and to communicate to them copies of such documents.

Other legally relevant declarations

  1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations (League of Nations) is also designated to receive and to communicate to Governments legally relevant declarations such as:

  1. Acceptance of the recommendation of the World Health Organization (Health Committee of the League of Nations) to place additional narcotic drugs under the provisions of the 1925 Convention ;[42]

  2. Notification, by parties to the 1931 Convention, of their permission to trade in, or manufacture for trade, any phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or ecgonine alkaloids of coca leaf not having been in use on 13 July 1931.

18, 20, 21, 22, 24, and last paragraph of the 1936 Convention; last paragraph of the Protocol of Signature of the 1936 Conference. Articles VI, VIII, IX of the Protocol of 1946. Articles 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 of the 1948 Protocol. Article 25 of the Hague 1912 Convention, together with article III of the 1946 Protocol.

  1. The Secretary-General also advises the World Health Organization (formerly the Health Committee of the League) of such notification. It is very doubtful whether this obligation of notification exists in regard to drugs falling outside the scope of the 1931 Convention, but within the scope of the 1948 Protocol. However, the Protocol provides for a much more far-reaching obligation. Notification has in this case to be made of any "consideration" by a Government that a drug which is or may be used for medical or scientific purposes is liable to be addiction-forming or convertible into an addiction-forming product; i.e., this notification has to be made even if the Government concerned does not permit manufacture of or trade in the drug. In addition, the parties to the Protocol undertook·to apply the appropriate regime of the 1931 Convention to drugs found by the World Health Organization to be addiction-forming or to be convertible into addiction-forming products. This may perhaps be interpreted to mean that the provisions of the 1931 Convention, including its procedural clauses, do not apply to drugs which are outside the Scope of this Convention, but fall under the Protocol, until the World Health Organization has made its finding on their dangerous character or the Commission on Narcotic Drugs has decided on the provisional application of control measures. In this latter case, Governments are obligated to notify their permission to manufacture and trade under the provisions of article 20 of the 1931 Convention and perhaps also under its article 11(2);

  1. Decisions of the World Health Organization (Health Committee) as to whether such alkaloids are capable of producing addiction, or convertible into drugs capable of producing addiction;

  2. Decisions of the Body of three experts as to whether the alkaloids not capable of producing addiction, but convertible into drugs capable of producing addiction, should fall under group I or II of article 1(2) of the 1931 Convention;

  3. Decisions made in the course of the procedure to revise these decisions of the World Health Organization (Health Committee) and of the Body of three experts;

  4. Applications to start this procedure of revision[43] (also to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the World Health Organization (Health Committee));

  5. Notification, by parties to the 1948 Protocol of their consideration that drugs outside the scope of the 1931 Convention are liable to the same kind of abuse and productive of the same kind of harmful effects as the drugs falling under the 1931 Convention. The Secretary-General also transmits this notification to the World Health Organization and to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs;

  1. Decisions and findings of the World Health Organization, as to whether such drugs should be controlled by the regime laid down in the 1931 Convention for drugs of group I or whether they should come under the regime laid down by that Convention for drugs of group II;

  2. Decisions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, that the Control of the 1931 Convention applicable to drugs of group I should provisionally apply to the drug in question pending receipt of the decision or finding of the World Health Organization;

  3. Decisions made in the procedure of revising such decisions of the World Health Organization, or of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Secretary-General also transmits these decisions and findings of the World Health Organization and Commission to the Permanent Central Board and to the World Health Organization or Commission on Narcotic Drugs respectively;

  4. Applications to start the procedure of revision[44] (to be communicated also to the World Health Organization and to the Commission);

  5. Annual statements of the Supervisory Body and supplementary statements containing the estimates of the medical and scientific needs of each of the narcotic drugs for each country or territory, forwarded to the Secretary-General by the Supervisory Body for the purpose of transmission to Governments ;[45]

  6. Request by the Permanent Central Opium Board for explanations from countries in which excessive quantities of narcotic substances are accumulating, or[46] which threaten to become a centre of the illicit traffic, or which may have failed to carry out their obligations under the 1931 Convention.[47]

  7. Notification by contracting parties of the manufacture or conversion of narcotic substances, or of the subsequent authorization of such manufacture or conversion, or of the cessation of manufacture or conversion of any of these drugs.[48]

  8. Request for the revision of the 1931 Convention or for the revision of the 1936 Convention.[49]

  9. Decisions, by parties to the 1925 Convention, to submit a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention for an advisory opinion to the Technical Body to be appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly by the Council of the League of Nations), or to resort to arbitration.

Appointment of staff

  1. The Secretary-General is also designated to perform certain functions regarding the staff of the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Board.

He appoints the secretary and the staff of the Board on the nomination of the Board, subject to the approval of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly of the Council of the League of Nations). He controls the staff in administrative matters.

He provides the secretariat of the Supervisory Body and ensures close co-operation of the Supervisory Body with the Permanent Central Board.[50]

Invitation to accede to international instruments

  1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was also designated to communicate copies of the text of the 1946 Protocol to Governments in order to determine the participating countries in accordance with directions given to him. Similar functions were originally exercised under the 1925, 1931, arid 1936 Conventions by the Council of the League[51] and transferred by the 1946 Protocol to the Secretary-General of the United Nations who acts, in this respect, under the direction of the General Assembly.[52]

  2. The Council of the League of Nations and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

General jurisdiction

The Council of the League of Nations was authorized to deal with any matter within the jurisdiction of the League, which included, of course, the, supervision of the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in narcotic substances.[53]

Conventional functions

In addition to this general competence, the Council of the League was designated by various international instruments relating to the control of narcotic drugs, to perform specified functions. This designation does not always mean that the Council would not have been authorized to perform these functions, within the gen eral jurisdiction of the League, without such special designation.

The functions of the Council of the League of Nations, under the various international instruments, were transferred to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations by the 1946 Protocol.

Functions of appointment

(1) The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (Council of the League) as an appointing body.

The Council of the League, together with one representative of the United States and one of Germany, was designated to appoint the members of the Permanent Central Board. The 1946 Protocol transferred this function to the Economic and Social Council and eliminated the special privileges of the United States and Germany.[54] Other bodies which the Economic and Social Council (formerly the Council of the League) is designated to appoint are:

A Commission to decide when the poppy-growing countries have ensured "the effective execution of the necessary measures to prevent the exportation of raw opium from their territories from constituting a serious obstacle to the reduction of consumption in the countries where the use of prepared opium is temporarily authorized" ;[55]

A Commission to investigate whether the measures referred to above are no longer being effectively executed;[56]

A Commission to decide whether the Powers signatory States to the Protocol of the Second Opium Conference of 1925 have taken "such measures as may be required to prevent completely, within five years . . ., the smuggling of opium from constituting a serious obstacle to the effective suppression of the use of prepared opium";[57]

A Commission of Inquiry to visit opium-producing countries for the purpose of making a careful study of the difficulties connected with the limitation of the production of opium in those countries[58] (the two last-mentioned functions were not transferred to the Economic and Social Council) ;

A technical body to give an advisory opinion on disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the 1925 Convention;[59]

Approving the appointment, by the Secretary-General, of the staff of the Permanent Central Board.[60]

Functions relating to the organizational work of the PCB

(2) The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly the Council of the League) is charged with performing additional functions to facilitate the work of the Permanent Central Board. The Council has, in consultation with the Board, to make the necessary arrangements for the organization and working of the Board, with the object of assuring the full technical independence of the Board.[61] The Council of the League was also requested by the 1925 Conference "to decide to include in the expenses of the Secretariat, the expenses of the Central Board and its administrative services."[62] This provision, being a request of an international conference, was not amended by the 1946 Protocol.

Functions connected with exempting preparations and with placing additional drugs under control

(3) The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly the Council of the League) is also designated to perform certain functions in connexion with the substantive scope of the 1925 Convention.

The decision of the World Health Organization (formerly the Health Committee) exempting certain preparations, has to be communicated to the Economic and Social Council (formerly to the Council of the League) which in turn communicates the findings to the contracting parties. Upon such communication the provisions of the 1925 Convention are not applicable to the preparation concerned.

The recommendation of the World Health Organization (formerly of the Health Committee of the League of Nations) to place additional drugs under the control of the 1925 Convention, is to be communicated by the Economic and Social Council (formerly by the Council of the League) to the contracting parties.[63] In connexion with the substantive scope of control, the Council of the League was also given certain functions of a temporary nature. The Council was asked by the 1925 Conference to invite the Health Committee of the League to consider the expediency of starting immediately ( i.e., even before the 1925 Convention entered into force) the procedure for exempting preparations and for placing additional drugs under the control of the Convention.64 The Council was also requested by the Final Act of the 1931 Conference to ask the Health Committee of the League to consider the desirability of bringing drugs of group I of the 1931 Convention (which did not fall under the 1925 and 1912 Conventions) under the provisions of the 1925 Convention, in accordance with article 10 of this Convention. With a view to bringing these drugs of group I at least under the restriction of the 1912 Convention, the Council was also asked to call the attention of parties to this Convention but not to the 1925 Convention, to the provision of the 1912 Convention according to which they were obligated to place under control new derivatives of morphine, of cocaine, or of their respective salts, and other alkaloids of opium, which are liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects.[65] The Conference also recommended the Council to invite the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs to examine the possibility of extending the control system of the 1925 Convention to every preparation containing any proportion of any drug included in group I of the 1931 Convention.[66]

These functions of a temporary nature were not transferred by the 1946 Protocol.

Participation in the "embargo procedure"

(4) The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly the Council of the League) is also called upon to take part in the procedure by which the Permanent Central Board exerts pressure for the strict observation of the 1925 and 1931 Conventions.

The Economic and Social Council, as formerly the Council of the League, receives from the Permanent Central Board an annual report on its work.[67] If a country, which in the course of the "embargo" procedure[68] is requested by the PCB to give explanations, does not supply such explanation within a reasonable time or supplies an unsatisfactory explanation, the Board may call the attention of the Economic and Social Council (formerly of the Council of the League) to the matter. The Board may, in this case, recommend that no further exports of the substances covered by the 1925 (1931) Convention (1948 Protocol), or of any of them, shall be made to the country concerned until the Board reports that it is satisfied as to the situation in that country in regard to the affected drugs. The country concerned as well as the Government of any exporting country which is not prepared to act on the recommendation of the Permanent Central Board, is entitled to bring the matter before the Economic and Social Council (formerly before the Council of the League). The report published by the Board on the matter is communicated to the Economic and Social Council (Council of the League) which forwards the report to the Governments of all the contracting parties.[69]

Invitation to accede to international instruments

(5) The Council of the League of Nations also determined the countries which were permitted to sign or accede to the Conventions of 1925, 1931, and 1936 relating to narcotic drugs. Under these provisions, the countries permitted to sign the Convention or to accede to it, were those to which the Council of the League communicated a copy of the Convention for this purpose.[70] All Member States of the United Nations and such non-member States as are invited by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, may sign or accept the 1948 Protocol.

Decision on fulfilment of legal premises

(6) The Economic and Social Council (as formerly the Council of the League) has been authorized to decide whether the measures taken by the poppy-growing countries to prevent the exportation of raw opium from their territories from constituting a serious obstacle to the suppression of opium smoking, are still effective. The Council may decide either on the strength of the information at its disposal or on the basis of a report of a Commission appointed by the Council to investigate the question. If the Council concludes that the measures of the poppy-growing countries are no longer effective, the States parties to the Protocol of the First Opium Conference of 1925 are entitled to denounce this Instrument.[71]

Publication of record of parties to the 1925 Convention

(7) The Council of the League was designated to direct the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, to publish, from time to time, the record of parties which have signed, ratified, acceded to, or denounced the 1925 Convention.[72] The 1946 Protocol eliminated this designation of the Council leaving it thereby to the provisions of the Charter to provide for authority to determine the frequency of the publication of this record.[73]

(iii) The Health Committee of the League of Nations and the "Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique" (World Health Organization)

Although the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique was not an organ of the League of Nations but a separate organization created by the Agreement of 9 December 1907, it has been found advisable to treat it together with the Health Committee, which was an organ of the League of Nations, because of their closely inter-related functions in the field of narcotic drugs. The functions assigned to the Health Committee and to the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique by the 1925 and 1931 Conventions were transferred to the World Health Organization by the Protocol of 11 December 1946. Prior to this Protocol, the Protocol concerning the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique of 22 July 1946, provided for the transfer of duties and functions exercised by the Office including the functions relating to the control of narcotic drugs, to the World Health Organization.[74] The World Health Organization, although not an "organ" of the United Nations in the narrower meaning of the word, is therefore also included in this section.

Functions relating to the substantive scope of conventions

The World Health Organization (as formerly the Health Committee of the League of Nations) is authorized:

  1. To exempt certain preparations, that cannot give rise to drug addiction on account of the medicaments with which their narcotic components are compounded, and which, in practice, preclude the recovery of the narcotic substances, from the application of the 1925 Convention;

  2. To recommend to the parties to the 1925 Convention to place additional narcotic drugs under the control provisions of the Convention; and

  3. To decide whether any phenanthrene alkaloid of opium or any ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf, which were not in use on 13 July 1931, are capable of producing addiction or convertible into a drug capable of producing addiction.

The Health Committee had to consult the Permanent Committee of the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique before taking these decisions. The World Health Organization, replacing the Health Committee in this capacity, has to consult an expert committee appointed by the Organization, by virtue of the Protocol of 11 December 1946. This expert committee, therefore, takes the place of the former Permanent Committee of the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique.[75]

Various temporary functions

The Second Opium Conference of 1925 and the Conference of 1931 for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs asked the Health Committee to undertake the following measures of a temporary nature:

The 1925 Conference asked the Council of the League to invite the Health Committee to start the procedure of exempting certain preparations and of recommending the placement of additional drugs·under the control of the 1925 Convention and for this purpose to consult the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique. The Conference, knowing that the Convention would not enter into force immediately, desired to have the above-mentioned time-consuming procedures completed, or at least advanced, when the Convention came into force;[76]

The Conference of 1931 recommended that the Council of the League should request the Health Committee to consider the desirability of bringing certain drugs of group I of the 1931 Conference, which did not fall under the provisions of the 1925 Convention, under the control of this Convention;[77]

The Conference of 1931 on the Suppression of Opium Smoking recommended that the assistance of the Health Committee should be obtained in preparing a programme of research regarding the effects of opium smoking on the individual, the addiction-causing constituents of opium, and methods of cure of addiction to opium smoking. The Conference also desired to obtain the assistance of the Health Committee in supervising the execution of such a programme.[78]

These temporary functions were, of course, not transferred to the World Health Organization.

Functions under the 1948 Protocol

The World Health Organization was designated by the Protocol to decide whether a drug, outside the scope of the 1931 Convention, is capable of producing addiction, or of conversion into a product capable of producing addiction, and, therefore, whether this drug should be placed under the regime laid down in the 1931 Convention for drugs of group I or group II of this Convention. This authority of the World Health Organization is added to the above-mentioned powers originally possessed by the Health Committee and transferred to the new organization.

It should be pointed out that under the procedure of the 1931 Convention - in contradistinction to that of the 1948 Protocol - the World Health Organization, like the Health Committee before it, cannot always decide the regime under which a drug is to be placed. Under which regime a drug, that is not by itself addiction-forming but convertible into an addiction-forming drug should fall, is decided under this procedure by a body of three experts of whom one member is elected by the Government which initiated the procedure, another member by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (formerly by the Advisory Committee on Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs) and the third by the two members so selected.

Power of appointment

The Health Committee of the League of Nations and the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique each had the right to appoint one member of the Supervisory Body. The World Health Organization, replacing the Health Committee and the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique, has therefore the right to appoint two members of the Supervisory Body.[79]

Composition

The Health Committee of the League of Nations was an advisory and technical organ of the Council and Assembly. It was composed of members appointed in an individual capacity.

Opium Sub-Committee; Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs

The Opium Sub-Committee was a permanent organ of the Health Committee. The World Health Organization has established an "Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs", composed of five experts, to deal with the functions of the organization under the international instruments concerned with the control of narcotic drugs. This committee was formerly given the designation "Expert Committee on Narcotic Drugs". The Permanent Committee of the Office International d'Hygi?ne Publique was composed of one representative each of all parties to the Agreement of 1907 creating the Office.

The Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body were technically independent organs of the League of Nations and are similarly independent organs of the United Nations. They will, however, be treated later in the sections on organs exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs. In the same chapter will also be treated the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, and its successor, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

(iv) The International Court of Justice (Permanent Court of International Justice)

The International Court of Justice, as formerly the Permanent Court of International Justice, can be in a position to decide disputes arising from the application and interpretation of Conventions relating to narcotic drugs, within its general jurisdiction, based on its statute and on conventional provisions for the settlement of disputes by the Court. In addition to this general competence, the 1925, 1931, and 1936 Conventions envisage the settlement of disputes by the Court.[80]

In regard to such settlement, the International Court of Justice was substituted for the Permanent Court of International Justice by the 1946 Protocol.

(c) INTERNATIONAL ORGANS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS (LEAGUE OF NATIONS) CONCERNED WITH CERTAIN LIMITED TASKS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

(aa) OFFICE INTERNATIONAL D'HYGIENE PUBLIQUE

See above under Health Committee of the League of Nations (section A, 1 (b) (bb) (iii)).

(bb) WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

See above under Health Committee of the League of Nations (section A, l (b) (bb) (iii)).

(cc) THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION

The Permanent Court of Arbitration may also be called upon to settle disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the Conventions relating to the control of narcotic drugs, within its general jurisdiction (Hague Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes) by virtue of general agreements for the settlement of disputes by arbitration. In addition, the 1931 and 1936 Conventions expressly referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in regard to the settlement of disputes.[81]

(dd) UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION

Several provisions of international instruments of the Universal Postal Union contain references to narcotic substances which are of importance for the prevention of illicit traffic.[82]

They stipulate the prohibition of transmission whether by letter, box or parcel, including air parcel, of opium, morphine, cocaine, and other narcotic substances.[83]

By virtue of these provisions, the organs of the Universal Postal Union, such as the Executive Commission, Congress, Administrative Conferences, and the International Bureau, may deal with problems of international control of narcotic substances. It should not be overlooked, however, that the initiative for the establishment of these functions of the International Postal Union came from the International Opium Conference of 1912 at The Hague.[84]

(ee) CONFERENCES OF STATES

Conferences of States are an instrument, provided by general international law, for international legislation and other methods of solution of international problems. Consequently, they have, within the limits set by the principle of sovereignty, the most far-reaching jurisdiction in the field of narcotic drugs. The international instruments relating to the control of narcotic drugs refer several times to such Conferences for the performance of certain functions. This does not necessarily mean that the Conferences would not have the powers referred to in the instruments in question without such special delegation.

A Conference of States concerned is to be held to consider the action to be taken if the parties to the Protocol of 11 February 1925, of the First Opium Conference of 1925, are entitled to denounce this Instrument, because - as established by the Economic and Social Council (Council of the League) - certain measures taken by the poppy-growing countries are no longer effective.[85]

A special conference of the same parties is to be held during the last of the conventional fifteen years within which opium smoking should be entirely suppressed, to consider measures to be taken in regard to habitual addicts.[86]

A conference is to be invited by the Dutch Government to meet at The Hague for the settlement of questions arising relative to the ratification or enforcement of the 1912 Convention.[87]

The Parties to the 1931 and 1936 Conventions are bound to meet for the purpose of revising these Conventions if a request of a contracting party for revision has been endorsed by not less than one-third of the parties to the Convention concerned.[88]

A conference of all signatories of the 1931 Convention was considered for the adoption of necessary measures in case the entering into force of the Convention had been delayed for more than two years after signature.[89]

2. International Organs Exclusively Concerned with the Control of Narcotic Substances

These are:

  1. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs of the League of Nations and its successor the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations;

  2. Permanent Central Board;

  3. The Supervisory Body;

  4. The Opium Sub-Committee of the Health Committee of the League of Nations and the Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs of the World Health Organization;

  5. Various non-permanent organs.

(a) ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRAFFIC IN OPIUM AND OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS (COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS)

Assembly resolution of 15 December 1920

Apart from the International Opium Commission of 1909, the first international organ exclusively concerned with the problem of narcotic drugs was the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs of the League of Nations. It was created by the resolution dated 15 December 1920 of the first Assembly of the League of Nations "in order to secure the fullest possible co-operation between the various countries in regard to the matter, and to assist and advise the Council in dealing with any question (regarding the traffic in narcotic drugs) that may arise". Despite some attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the Advisory Committee to the functions taken over by the League from the Dutch Government, the Advisory Committee exercised very general powers of a policy-making body in regard to the international control of narcotic drugs.[90]

Composition of Advisory Committee. Representation of "interests"

The above-mentioned resolution provided for inclusion on the Committee of representatives of the "countries chiefly concerned" with the problem. Two important principles of the organization of the Advisory Committee were followed from the beginning:

(1) Governmental and not individual representation on the Committee; although this principle was partly neglected by the addition of experts (Assessors), who did not represent Governments, to the Committee in a non-voting capacity;

(2) Representation on the Committee of the main interests in the field. In the beginning, the interests of manufacturing and producing countries and those in which opium smoking constituted a serious problem, were sufficiently represented, but not the interests of the consuming countries.

Number of members

The number of Government representatives on the Committee, originally limited to eight and later gradually increased to fourteen, was increased by the Council at its 59th session in 1920 to twenty-one, thereby providing for a more satisfactory representation of the interests of consuming countries.[91]

The number of members of the Advisory Committee was then increased, by the 77th session of the Council in 1934, to twenty-five. Four more countries were added, at their request, after 1936; but several members withdrew (Germany 1933, Italy 1937, Japan 1939, Sweden 1937). In 1939 the number of members was set at twenty-four when the Committee was renewed.

Tenure of members

The duration of the membership of Governments was at first unlimited. In 1930 the tenure of the new members was restricted to three years, but in 1934, at its 77th session, the Council decided that the duration of membership should be indefinite.

When, in 1936, the Council adopted rules regarding the constitution of the League Committees, the tenure of members of governmental committees, including, of course, the Advisory Committee, was limited to three years. Membership was renewable.

United States participation

In addition to the members and the assessors, a United States "observer" took part in the work of the Committee from January 1923 on. The members of the Committee were generally either officials connected with national administrations for the control of narcotic drags or diplomatic officers.

Sub-committees of the Advisory Committee

The Committee had five principal sub-committees -the Agenda Sub-Committee, the Sub-Committee on Seizures, the Standing Sub-Committee for the Application of Chapter IV of the Hague Convention, the Sub-Committee to study Questions in regard to Indian Hemp and Indian Hemp Drugs, and the Sub-Committee of Experts to draw up the List of Drugs and Preparations coming under the Hague (1912) and Geneva (1925) Opium Conventions and the Limitation Convention (Geneva 1931).

The members of all Sub-Committees, except the members of the Sub-Committee on the List of Drugs, were Government representatives. The latter Sub-Committee was composed of members appointed in an individual capacity.

Principle of overlapping membership

The principle of overlapping membership (rotation) did not apply to the Advisory Committee.

The functions of the Advisory Committee as the principal policy-making organ in the drug field were described as authority "to investigate and report on existing conditions, to recommend action, and to discuss illicit traffic cases publicly regardless of what country's feelings may be hurt".[92]

Importance of public opinion

The Advisory Committee was also described as "the one forum in the world where the problem of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs can be and is publicly discussed and where any Government whose territory has been used as a base for the illicit traffic may without fear or favour be publicly asked to account for its stewardship".[93]

These two statements emphasize one of the most important elements in the success of international control of narcotic drugs, i.e., the strength of public opinion.

Scope of work of Advisory Committee

In the course of its history, the Advisory Committee took a leading part in the preparation of all international instruments relating to the control of narcotic drugs that were concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations. It made numerous recommendations, censored Governments, asked for explanations of Government actions, or lack of actions, and undertook inquiries.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, by resolution of 16 February 1946, established the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in accordance with Article 68 of the Charter of the United Nations.[94]

Composition of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The Commission has an exceptional position among the Commissions of the Economic and Social Council in that its members are appointed by Governments without consultation with the Secretary-General, and without confirmation by the Council as in the case of other Commissions. This full acceptance of the principle of governmental representation is due to the fact that the success of the Advisory Committee is ascribed largely to the acceptance of this principle in its organization. The resolution of 16 February 1946 provided for a tenure of three years for the fifteen members of the Commission. The Economic and Social Council, at its 8th session, amended this provision, and decided that ten countries should serve for an indefinite period and five countries for three years.[95]

The principle of overlapping membership (rotation) does not apply. The members are to be chosen from countries "which are important producing or manufacturing countries, or countries in which illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem".

The Commission-as formerly the Advisory Committee-has also an exceptional position in view of the fact that some of its functions are not based on the provisions of the Charter, but on other conventional stipulations.[96]

Functions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (terms of reference)

The terms of reference of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs provide for the following functions:

  1. Assisting the Economic and Social Council in supervising the application of international instruments relating to the control of narcotic drugs;

  2. Performing the functions entrusted by international convertions to the former Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. These functions were legally taken over by virtue of the Protocol of 11 December 1946.

  3. Advising the Council on all matters pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs and preparing, when necessary, draft conventions relating to the control of narcotic drugs.

  4. Proposing to the Council changes considered desirable in the existing machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs.

  5. Performing other functions in the field at the request of the Council.

Functions under international conventions

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (formerly the Advisory Committee):

  1. Prescribes the nature and scope of information which Governments have undertaken to supply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (League of Nations) in annual reports on the working of the Convention.[97] These annual reports are to be made in accordance with a form drawn up by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (Advisory Committee).

  1. Appoints one member of the Body of Three Experts.[98]

  2. Appoints one member of the Supervisory Body.[99]

Functions of the Advisory Committee not expressly transferred to the Commission

Several assignments given to the Advisory Committee by recommendations of international conferences, were of course not expressly transferred to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs; it is, however, assumed that the Commission has the power of performing these or similar assignments under the terms of reference:

  1. Drafting a model administrative code to the 1931 Convention on the pattern of the Code drafted by the Advisory Committee to the "1925 Convention.[100] There does not seem to be any theoretical objection to the power of the Commission to modify these two Codes drafted by the Advisory Committee or to draft a model administrative code to the 1936 Convention if such code should be found to .be useful;

  2. Examining the question of applying the system of control provided by the 1925 Convention to every preparation containing any proportion of the drugs included in group I of the 1931 Convention;[101]

  3. Assisting in preparing a programme of research into certain addiction problems of opium smokers ;[102]

  4. Preparing a form of annual report to be made by Governments of territories in which, opium smoking is still permitted;[102]

  5. Considering the desirability of meetings of the representatives of the national central offices for the supervision and co-ordination of operations relating to the suppression of the illicit traffic.[103]

Functions under the 1948 Protocol

In addition to the above-mentioned functions transferred from the Advisory Committee to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, this body acquired additional functions under the provisions of the 1948 Protocol.

  1. Receipt of notifications from countries which consider any other drugs besides those covered by the 1931 Convention to be liable to the same kind of harmful effects as the drugs falling under article 1 of the 1931 Convention.

Receipt of notifications of findings of the World Health Organization as to whether such drugs are addiction-forming or convertible into addiction-forming drugs and, consequently, as to the question of the regime which is to be applied to them.

  1. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, pending receipt of the final decision of the World Health Organization, determines whether such drugs shall be provisionally submitted to the regime applicable to group I of the 1931 Convention.[104]

(b) PERMANENT CENTRAL BOARD - Composition and characteristics of the Board

The Permanent Central Board was established by the 1925 Convention. It is composed of eight persons. Personal qualifications for membership are formulated in such a way as to assure general confidence in the impartiality of the members of the Board.[105]

The framers of the 1925 Convention wanted to exclude from the actions of the Board the representation of the different interests in the drug, field, but definitely intended that its members should be familiar with the problems which these interests may entail For this reason, the Board is not composed of Government representatives but of independent experts. In appointments consideration should be given to including in the membership, in fair proportion, persons acquainted with the drug situation of producing, manufacturing, and consuming countries. To assure familiarity with the interests of these three types of countries, persons "connected'' with each group of countries should be included in the membership of the Board. In addition to this personal and geographical background, the Convention requests that the members of the Board should have certain technical capabilities and character qualifications. The "technical competence" required by the Convention includes a thorough knowledge of the economic, social, administrative, fiscal, legal, medical, and pharmaceutical problems of the control of narcotic drugs. Since the inception of its work in 1928 the membership of the PCB has represented these various skills. It is also required that the members be impartial and disinterested. To ensure their independence the members of the Board should not hold any office which puts them in a position of direct dependence on their Governments. The same phrase had been used by the 11th session of the Council of the League of Nations, to ensure the independence of the members of the Permanent Commission.[106] It was in the beginning interpreted to mean that officials in active service of their Governments cannot be appointed to membership of the Board.

Reinterpretation of article 19 of the 1925 Convention

The Economic and Social Council during its 6th session, however, endorsed the opinion expressed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to the effect that:

The provision of Article 19, paragraph 5 of the 1925 Convention is fulfilled if a candidate who, at the time of appointment to the Permanent Central Board, is in a position of direct dependence on his Government will, following his appointment, not hold such position for the duration of his membership of the Board.

"In this way the clause in question would enable the Council to appoint, to the Board, a judge, a university professor, a medical practitioner, a lawyer, or specialists of other professions without requiring that the person appointed give up his position or cease to exercise his profession while serving on the Board.

"In this way it Would also be possible for the Council to appoint to the Board an official in active service of his Government provided (i) that following his appointment he ceases temporarily, i.e., for the duration of his membership of the Permanent Central Board, to exercise his functions as an official of the Government (by taking, for instance, leave of absence), and (ii) while exercising his powers and functions as a member of the Board he will not act under the instructions of his Government".[107]

Appointment and tenure of the members

The members of the Board were originally to be appointed by an "electoral body" consisting of the Council of the League and one representative each of Germany and the United States. They are, at the present time, .appointed by the Economic and Social Council. Their tenure of office is five years.

Allowances and remuneration

The members of the Board have never received any remuneration for their services, but only expense allowances. This practice seems to be in disagreement with the original ideas of the authors of the 1925 Convention. The report of Sub-Committee A of the 1925 Conference reads in part:

". . . It cannot be expected that it will be possible to obtain the services, as members of the Board, of persons who possess the qualifications necessary and who will be willing to give the amount of time which the work of the Board will require unless they receive a remuneration for their services. This remuneration will necessarily be at a high rate if men of the first-class are to be secured . . ."[108]

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations, at its second session, recommended in view of the increased work load of the members of the Board that the Economic and Social Council take the measures necessary for granting them adequate remuneration during their term of office.[109]

The Economic and Social Council recommended that the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions should examine, in the light of this recommendation of the Commission, the question of the remuneration of the members of the Permanent Central Board.[110]

Privileges and immunities

On the initiative of the Commission, the Economic and Social Council recommended that Governments. should extend to the members of the Board privileges and immunities on the lines laid down in the Convention[111] on Privileges and Immunities, as approved by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946.

Staff and organizational arrangements

The Secretary and staff of the Board are appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (League of Nations) on the nomination of the Board and subject to the approval of the Economic and Social Council (Council of the League). The Economic and Social Council (Council of the League) is called upon, in consultation with the Board, to make the necessary arrangements for the organization and working of-the Board; in this way the full technical independence of the Board is to be assured. In administrative matters the staff is to be under the control of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (League of Nations).[112]

The functions of the PCB may be grouped into ( aa) supervisory and control functions and ( bb) enforcement functions.

(aa) SUPERVISORY AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD

If one understands by control the right to permit or prohibit individual transactions in narcotic drugs, or at least the right to check directly upon such individual transactions as to their compliance with the provisions of the international Conventions, the Board may be described as having no such powers,[113] but only certain powers of supervising the application of the Conventions by the national authorities (supervisory functions).

(i) Control functions

An exception to this general statement is offered by the provision of article 14 (1) of the 1931 Convention.

  1. Exports of 5 kilogrammes or more of narcotic substances belonging to group I of the 1931 Convention, to territories to which neither the 1925 Convention nor the 1931 Convention apply,[114] are not to be authorized until the Government in question has ascertained from the Permanent Central Board that the export will not cause the estimates for the importing territory to be exceeded. If the Board notifies that such an excess would be caused, the Government is not entitled to authorize the export of any amount which would have that effect.

  2. Any other authorization of export (i.e., of less than 5 kilogrammes) of the above-mentioned substances to territories to which neither Convention applies is immediately to be notified to the Board.

(ii) Supervisory functions of the Board

Information supplied to the Board

  1. The Permanent Central Board is authorized to obtain information to enable it to watch the course of the international trade in narcotic drugs.

The Governments agreed to send to the Board "in a manner to be indicated by the Board" annual statistical reports:

(1) On their production of raw opium and coca leaves;

(2) On the manufacture of crude cocaine and ecgonine, morphine, diacetylmorphine, cocaine, and their respective salts, and of any other narcotic drugs to which the application of the 1925 Convention has been extended by virtue of article 10 of the 1925 Convention, or which fall or may in the future fall under the provisions of the 1931 Convention or of the 1948 Protocol.[115]

(3) On the amounts of any of the drugs falling under the 1931 Convention or under the 1948 Protocol which were used by manufacturers and wholesalers for the compounding of preparations, whether for domestic consumption or for exports, for the export of which export authorizations are not required, together with a summary of the quarterly statements of manufacturers (containing the amount of raw materials and of each of the drugs received by them, the quantities of the drugs produced, quantities of raw materials and manufactured drugs disposed of, and quantities in stock at the end of each quarter);

(4) Statistics on stocks, held by wholesalers or by the Government for consumption in the country for other than government purposes, and on consumption, other than for government purposes, of: raw opium, coca leaves; medicinal opium; crude cocaine and ecgonine; morphine, diacetylmorphine, cocaine and their respective salts; all preparations, officinal and non-officinal (including the so-called anti-opium remedies) containing more than 0.2 per cent of morphine or more than 0.1 per cent of cocaine; all preparations containing diacetylmorphine; galenical preparations (extracts and tinctures) of Indian hemp and of any other narcotic drugs to which the Convention has been extended by virtue of article 10 or which fall or may in the future fall under the 1931 Convention or under the 1948 Protocol;[116]

(5) Amounts of narcotic substances (falling under the 1925 or 1931 Convention or the 1948 Protocol) confiscated on account of illicit import or export, and the manner of their disposal;

(6) Quarterly statistics of imports and exports of narcotic substances covered by the 1925 and 1931 Conventions and by the 1948 Protocol;[117]

(7) Annual statistics of manufacture of prepared opium, and of raw materials used for such manufacture;

(8) Annual statistics of the consumption of prepared opium ;[118]

(b) The Governments also undertook, when forwarding the annual statistics, to give the Permanent Central Board reasons for eventual excesses over their estimates.[119]

(c) The Permanent Central Board may also obtain from Governments information on any matter which seems to require investigation; it is "the friendly right" of contracting parties to call the attention of the Board to such matters.

The Board is under an obligation to ensure that the information and explanations (see below) it receives shall not be made public in such a manner as to facilitate the operations of speculators or injure legitimate commerce.[120]

Information under the estimate system

(d) The Permanent Central Board receives information within the framework of the estimate system.

Estimates under the 1925 Convention

As early as in the 1925 Convention the contracting parties undertook to send to the Permanent Central Board annual estimates of the quantities of each of the substances covered by the Convention (which includes raw opium, coca leaves, and medicinal opium) to be imported into their territory for internal consumption during the following year for medical, scientific, and other purposes. The estimates are not binding and may be revised, in which case the revised figures are to be communicated to the Board.[121]

Estimates under the 1931 Convention and under the 1948 Protocol

The Permanent Central Board is to receive annual estimates for each of the drugs which fall under the 1931 Convention or the 1948 Protocol, to each of the territories to which these two instruments apply. The Board also receives eventual supplementary estimates and transmits both kinds of estimates to the Supervisory Body for examination. These estimates are binding.

Estimates from non-contracting countries

The Permanent Central Board also receives estimates from countries or territories to which the Convention of 1931 and the 1948 Protocol do not apply. The Board is bound to request such countries or territories to supply these estimates; The Permanent Central Board is authorized to prescribe the form of the estimates.[122]

Additional information under the 1948 Protocol

( e) The Permanent Central Board will receive notification:

(1) Of findings of the World Health Organization on the addiction qualities of a drug falling under the 1948 Protocol and on the regime under which this drug is to be placed;

  1. Of the provisional measures taken by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, pending such a decision by the World Health Organization.

(bb) ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE PERMANENT CENTRAL BOARD

The Permanent Central Board has the obligation of watching continuously the course of international trade in narcotic drugs falling under the 1925 and 1931 Conventions and the 1948 Protocol.

(i) The so-called embargo, created by the 1925 Convention and provided by article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention.

Measures which the Board can take

The Permanent Central Board may take the following measures in the cases mentioned below:

  1. The Board may ask for explanations, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations (formerly of the League of Nations), from the Country in question;

  2. If this explanation is not given, within a reasonable time or is unsatisfactory, the Board may call the attention of the Governments of all the contracting parties and of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly of the Council of the League of Nations) to the matter, and may recommend that no further exports of narcotic substances[123] or of any of them shall be made to the country concerned until the Board reports that it is satisfied as to the situation in that country in regard to the substances in question.

The Board is bound to notify the Government of the country concerned of such a recommendation, and this country may bring the matter before the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly, before the Council of the League of Nations).

Governments that are not willing to follow the recommendation of the Board may also bring the matter before the Council; they are bound to inform the Board immediately that they will not act on the recommendation, giving if possible explanations for their negative attitude.

It is interesting to note that under this procedure any country which is directly interested in the question before the Board is to be invited to be represented at the meeting of the Board. In this way the Convention aims at ensuring that the point of view of the interested Governments is sufficiently considered by the Board which is, as was shown above, a body of independent experts.

The Board has the right to publish a report on the matter and to communicate it to the. Economic and Social Council (formerly, to the Council of the League of Nations), which would forward it to the contracting parties.[124]

Conditions under which the Board may act

The preceding measures can be taken by the Board in the following cases:[125]

  1. If the information at its disposal leads the Board to the conclusion that excessive quantities of narcotic substances are accumulating in any country or that that country threatens to become a centre of illicit traffic. In this case the measures taken by the Board may apply to any country and territory, no matter whether such country or territory is party to the 1925 and 1931 Conventions and the 1948 Protocol or not, and to all drugs falling under the 1925 Convention (but excluding prepared opium except in cases where the Board may find that illicit international transactions in this substance are taking place on an appreciable scale[126] or under group I of the 1931 Convention or the 1948 Protocol;[127]

  2. If the annual statement, to be prepared by the Permanent Central Board, indicates that any party to the 1931 Convention or the 1948 Protocol has or may have failed to carry out its obligations under these instruments, in this case the above-mentioned measures of the Permanent Central Board apply only to parties to the 1931 Convention and the 1948 Protocol. The drugs involved are those falling under the 1931 Convention for parties to this Convention and those controlled by virtue of the 1948 Protocol for parties thereto.[128]

The Permanent Central Board prepares the above-mentioned annual statement showing. with respect to each country or territory, for the preceding year, the estimates of each drug, and the amounts of each drug consumed, manufactured, converted, imported, exported and used for the Compounding of preparations, exports of which do not require export authorizations. "Each drug" means drugs failing under the 1931 Convention and also drugs which will be subject to control by virtue of the 1948 Protocol. The Board is under obligation to publish this annual statement,[129] together with an account of such explanations given by Governments or required by the Board as the Board thinks it necessary to publish, and with any observations which the Board may wish to make on such explanations.

These "embargo" measures of the Board are based on a highly complicated and therefore unsatisfactory legal basis.

(ii) Embargo measures introduced by article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention

Conditions

Another case of embargo is permitted by the 1931 Convention and by the 1948 Protocol[130] under the following conditions:

  1. If it appears to the Board, from the quarterly import and export returns at its disposal, or from the notifications made to the Board on exports of drugs of group I of the 1931 Convention or the 1948 Protocol, to territories to which neither the 1925 nor the 1931 Convention applies, that. the total amount of a drug which had been or was authorized to be exported to any country or territory, exceeds the estimates for that country or territory plus the amounts shown to be exported from such country or territory; and

  2. If the drug concerned falls under group I of the 1931 Convention or of the Protocol of 1948.

Measures

The Board is bound to give immediate notification of such a situation to all the contracting parties to the 1931 Convention and the 1948 Protocol, who are bound not to authorize, during the "currency of the year in question", any new exports of the drug concerned to the country involved.

The limitation of the embargo to the "currency of the year in question" makes its imposition impossible if the revelation of the dangerous situation in a given territory comes from the fourth quarterly import and export return. The embargo will also have very little or no effect if the critical situation is revealed to the Board by an earlier return (first, second, or third quarterly return) transmitted to the Board late in the year or after the end of the year.

As long as the embargo lasts a contracting party may permit exports only in exceptional cases in which it considers such exports to be "essential in the interest of humanity or for the treatment of the sick". Exports can also be permitted after supplementary estimates have been furnished for the country under embargo, covering the excess import and the additional quantity required.

It is assumed that the embargo under article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention can be imposed on countries which are not parties to the 1931 Convention, or the 1948 Protocol if drugs falling under this Protocol are involved.

In contradistinction to the "embargo" provided by article 24 of the 1925 Convention and by article 13 (1) (a) and article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention, the embargo under article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention is not a mere recommendation.

(C) SUPERVISORY - Body Composition-appointment

The Supervisory Body was created by the 1931 Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs. It was composed of four members, of which one was to be appointed by the Permanent Central Board, one by the Advisory Committee on Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, one by the Health Committee of the League of Nations, and by the Office International d'Hygiene Publique. The Protocol of 11 December 1946 substituted the Commission on Narcotic Drugs for the Advisory Committee, and the World Health Organization for the Health Committee and the Office International d'Hygiene Pubique, as appointing bodies.

Personal qualifications of members

The 1931 Convention does not expressly establish any requirements as to the personal qualifications of the members of the Body. A study of the preparatory material and particularly of the minutes of the 1931 Conference, reveals, however, that the framers of the 1931 Convention thought of the members of the Body as independent experts, some of whom should have the medical knowledge necessary for the performance of the functions of the Body.

Tenure

No provisions were made as to the period of tenure of office of the members of the Body. This omission would perhaps justify the interpretation that it is left to the appointing bodies to determine the period, and by agreement between them, it was fixed at three years when the first appointments were made in 1933. Later, renewals made during the life-time of the League of Nations were also made for the same period.[123] The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, at its third session, recommended that the terms of office of the members of the Supervisory Body should be five years, and requested the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the other appointing bodies to this recommendation.[132] The Economic and Social Council, at its 7th session, took note of the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs containing this recommendation.[133]

Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Supervisory Body shall be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (formerly, of the League of Nations). The Secretary-General shall ensure close collaboration with the Permanent Central Board.

Functions

The functions of the Supervisory Body are:

  1. To furnish estimates of the medical and scientific needs of narcotic drugs which fall under the 1931 Convention or will fall under the 1948 Protocol, for each territory of the world, whether such territory is subject to the 1931 Convention or not, if such estimate is not supplied by the Government having jurisdiction over such territory;

  2. To examine such estimates for each territory for which they were furnished by the Governments having jurisdiction over the territories;

  3. To require any further information or details which the Supervisory Body may consider necessary in regard to such estimates supplied by Governments;

  4. To amend, with the consent of the Government concerned, any estimates-in accordance with such information and details so obtained;

  5. To establish and send to Governments, through the Secretary-General, an annual statement of estimated world requirements of narcotic drugs for scientific and medical purposes, containing estimates for each individual territory and drug, and, if necessary, an account of any explanations given by Governments or required of them, and any observations which the Supervisory Body may desire to make.

These functions of the Supervisory Body also apply to supplementary estimates furnished by Governments.[134]

(d) THE OPIUM SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE HEALTH COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON HABIT-FORMING DRUGS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

These committees have been referred to in the section A, 1, ( b), ( bb), (iii), dealing with the Health Committee of the League and with the World Health Organization.

(e) NON-PERMANENT ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (LEAGUE OF NATIONS) DEALING EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

  1. The "Technical Body" (see section A, 1, ( b), ( bb), (ii), dealing with the Council of the League).

  2. Various commissions to be appointed for specific tasks by the Economic and Social Council (Council of the League) (see section A, 1, ( b), ( bb), (ii).

  3. The "Body of Three Experts" (see section A, 1, ( b), ( bb), (iii), dealing with the World Health Organization).

B. General Characterization of the Existing System of International Control of Narcotic Drugs

1. Use of Existing Organs of International Administration

The present system of international control of narcotic drugs has, for the performance of its functions, made large use of already existing organs of international society originally founded for other purposes. Such organs are the United Nations (League of Nations), Permanent Court of Arbitration, International Court of Justice (Permanent Court of International Justice), World Health Organization (Health Organization of the League of Nations, Office International d'Hygiene Publique), Universal Postal Union.

This use of existing organs is justified by many reasons of economy. On the other hand, it is responsible for the fact that the organizational continuity in a special field may be threatened by (1) emergencies which otherwise might not affect this special field, and (2) constitutional changes in the existing organizations to which single functions belonging to the special field have been entrusted. Such constitutional changes may be undertaken without any consideration of the needs of the specialized field.

2. Use of Special Organs

In addition to such existing organs, the present control system has established new organs specifically for control in the field of narcotic drugs: the International Opium Commission of 1909, Commission on Narcotic Drugs (Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs), Permanent Central Board, Supervisory Body, Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs of the World Health Organization (Opium SubCommittee of the Health Committee) and several nonpermanent organs (see section A, 2, ( e)).

3. Different Kinds of Organs

The existing organization is performing its functions through:

  1. A selected national Government (Netherlands: see section A, 1, ( a));

  2. International organs having jurisdiction of a general nature (League of Nations, United Nations);

  3. Special organs, which are, however, not limited to functions in this field, e.g., Universal Postal Union, International Court of Justice;

  4. Special organs exclusively concerned with functions in the particular field ( e.g., International Opium Commission of 1909, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Permanent Central Board, Supervisory Body).

4. Indirect and not direct Administration

The existing international organization for the control of narcotic drugs offers a sample of indirect international administration, which means that it does not deal with individuals but with Governments. There are a few minor deviations from this principle, such as commissions of inquiry.[135]

The existing system follows here the usual pattern of international administration, although international society has occasionally and for exceptional reasons resorted to methods of direct administration ( e.g., European Danube Commission).

5. System of "Supervision" and not of "Control"

It has been stated that the present system of international administration of narcotic drugs is a system of "supervision" rather than of "control" (see section A, 2, ( b) dealing with the Permanent Central Board).

6. Contact with Local Authorities

The international system of control of narcotic drugs, although a system of indirect administration, does not limit itself to relations with national Governments. It has established extensive contacts with local authorities. In addition, the 1931 Convention requires that separate. estimates and information be furnished for territories and other dependencies.

COLONIAL CLAUSE

The so-called colonial clauses, included in the four Conventions, two Agreements,[136] and the 1948 Protocol (but not in the 1946 Protocol) dealing with the control of narcotic drugs, represent an attempt to adjust the legal rigidity of the State system of international society to meet the situation of some Powers, which have dependencies of widely different character and at different stages of development towards self-government. Direct co-operation of local authorities with international bodies is not uncommon in other technical fields of international administration.

7. Regional Needs

Regional needs have also found consideration in the present system. The Agreements of 1925 and 1931 dealing with the gradual suppression of opium smoking were limited to countries having possessions in East Asia in which opium smoking was a serious problem.[137]

8. Sovereignty of States

The present system gives ample consideration to the principle of "sovereignty" of States. This is particularly borne out by the fact that the consent of States is required in many aspects of the international administration of narcotic drugs. Estimates of medical and scientific needs are generally not established by international organs but by the States themselves. The States may be asked for explanations of their estimates, they may even be subjected to pressure of public opinion, but in essence they are the final judges of their medical and scientific needs. Estimates may not be changed without their consent, and may not be established by the Supervisory Body unless the States themselves fail to do so.

The addition of new drugs to the system of control is left, by the 1912 Convention, to the national authorities.[138] The 1925 Convention requires, in this respect, the acceptance of the recommendation of the World Health Organization (formerly, of the Health Committee of the League of Nations) by contracting parties.[139] On the other hand, the 1931 Convention and the 1948 Protocol provide for procedures for placing new drugs under control without the consent of the contracting parties.[140] These provisions may, however, be considered exceptions in a system which is chiefly based on the principle of consent of States.

9. Methods of Control but not Methods of Production and Trade are Prescribed

The existing system of control, with the exception of the two Agreements of 1925 and 1931 relating to the gradual suppression of opium smoking, generally prescribes to the contracting parties only certain methods and actions of control, and not methods of production and trade, for the achievement of their conventional obligations to regulate the production of raw opium and to limit the manufacture and trade of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific needs. This means that Governments are required to obtain the necessary information, to license persons and premises concerned with the manufacture of and trade in narcotic substances, to require export and import authorizations, to require the maintenance of certain books and records, etc. On the other hand, the selection of the system of production or trade (State ownership or private ownership, State monopoly, limitation of cultivation to certain areas, etc.) is left entirely to the discretion of the national Governments themselves. Furthermore, the present international administration of narcotic drugs is not an administration of economic matters. There exists no allocation of quotas, no fixing of prices and no production, manufacture, trade, or stocking by international organs. Only the two Agreements of 1925 and 1931 relating to the gradual suppression of opium smoking, prescribed to the contracting parties such measures of an economic nature as establishing of government monopolies and government shops.[141] This abstention from the prescribing of economic measures for the achievement of the conventional aims by national Governments and from the undertaking of economic measures by international organs is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that numerous proposals of an economic nature had been made in the period between the two world wars, e.g., the allocation of manufacturing quotas,[142] the setting up of an international selling office,[143] the fixing of production and export quotas,[144] the establishment of State monopolies for the purchase of raw opium from cultivators and for selling it,[145] the regulation of prices of raw opium,[146] the establishment of a State monopoly over the trade in, and manufacture of, narcotic drugs,[147] and, in 1946, the creation of international stocks.[148] Even such a farreaching scheme as the establishment of a League of Nations drug factory possessing a world monopoly of the manufacture of narcotic substances had been proposed by the Chinese Government at the 13th session of the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs.[149] This proposal anticipated to some extent the most striking feature of the American Plan for the control of atomic energy (Baruch Plan).

10. Principle of Universality

The present system of international administration in the field of narcotic drugs is based on the principle of universality of the application of the existing Conventions.

ESTIMATE SYSTEM

The establishment of estimates by the Supervisory Body for non-co-operating countries, whether parties to the 1931 Convention and the 1948 Protocol or not, serves this principle.

Drugs, p. 23.

The Permanent Central Board can apply the measures of pressure, provided by the 1925 Convention, to any country in which excessive quantities of narcotic substances (covered by the 1925 Convention or in group I of the 1931 Convention or of the 1948 Protocol) are accumulating, or which threatens to become a centre of illicit traffic, no matter whether such country is a party to the 1925 or 1931 Convention or the 1948 Protocol or not.[150]

IMPORT AND EXPORT CERTIFICATES

The obligatory embargo applying to drugs of group I of the 1931 Convention (and of the 1948 Protocol) can be imposed by the Permanent Central Board on all countries whether parties to the 1931 Convention (or to the 1948 Protocol) or not.[151] The parties to the 1925 and 1931 Conventions and the 1948 Protocol undertook to apply the import and export certificate system to countries which are not parties to these international instruments, and, if such application is found impossible, to apply such provisions of the system as the circumstances permit.[152]

The parties to the 1931 Convention and to the 1948 Protocol undertook to apply additional control measures to drugs belonging to group I of these two instruments, when exported to countries or territories to which neither the 1925 Convention nor the 1931 Convention applies[153] (see section A, 2, ( b), ( aa), (i), dealing with the PCB).

OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY

Other measures which were intended to serve the principle of universality of the international administration of narcotic drugs are:

  1. The free accessibility to the four Conventions and to the Protocols of 1946 and 1948 for almost all countries;

  2. The application of the principle of simultaneous ratification by the Peace Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, which provided that the ratification of these Peace Treaties includes the ratification of The Hague Convention of 1912, unless the country in question had already ratified this Convention previously;

  1. Clauses which provide for the entry into force of international instruments which have practically universal application, if a limited number of States become parties to the instrument in question.[154]

11. Co-ordination of the Work of the Various Organs

Despite the complexity of its structure, the international administration of narcotic substances has been successfully co-ordinated so that hardly any duplication is present. This is not primarily the result of an exact definition of the jurisdiction of the organs concerned, clearly delimiting their respective powers. There existed even before the establishment of the Permanent Central Board a certain fear that its functions, as provided for by the 1925 Convention, would at least in part overlap the functions of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs.[155] But experience has shown that such overlapping has generally been avoided, and the cases where it has occurred do not present a problem of any importance. This favourable record compares advantageously with experiences in many other fields of international administration in which complaints of overlapping activities and unnecessary duplication are not uncommon.

The authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the authors, likewise, of the Charter of the United Nations, tried to mitigate the problem of unnecessary duplication by providing in both instruments for some co-operation among the various independent organs of international administration.[156]

PART PLAYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN CO-ORDINATION

The conventions relating to the control of narcotic drugs facilitated, however, much closer co-ordination by placing the whole system of control and its various organs under the League of Nations and later under the United Nations. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations appoints directly all members of two organs of control, i.e., of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Permanent Central Board. Two members of the third organ of control (the Supervisory Body) are appointed by organs whose members are themselves elected by the Economic and Social Council (PCB and Commission on Narcotic Drugs).

A very important position in the close co-operation of the three organs exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs is held by the Secretary-General and the Secretariat of the United Nations (formerly League of Nations).

The Secretary-General is expressly called upon to provide the secretariat of the Supervisory Body and to ensure that this organ collaborates closely with the Permanent Central Board.[157] The Secretary-General also provides for the control of the staff of the Board in administrative matters, and appoints its secretary and staff on the nomination of the Board and subject to the approval of the Council.[158]

This close connexion with the League of Nations, of the control organs exclusively concerned with narcotic drugs, although ensuring successful co-ordination, was on the other hand responsible for certain legal difficulties arising from the disappearance of the League of Nations. It compelled the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body to continue their work on an emergency basis until the Protocol of 11 December 1946 entered into force.

IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONNEXION WITH POLITICALLY INFLUENTIAL BODIES

The close connexion of the organs of control, particularly the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (formerly, the Advisory Committee) with politically influential bodies such as the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (formerly the Council of the League of Nations) represents perhaps one of the most important elements in the successful performance of the international administration of narcotic drugs.

NEED FOR SEVERAL PROCEDURES TO PLACE ONE DRUG UNDER CONTROL

A certain duplication is caused by the fact that the Conventions of 1925 and 1931 and the 1948 Protocol provide for different procedures for placing additional drugs under control. If the parties to the 1925 and 1931 Conventions and the 1948 Protocol should not be identical, three different procedures would be necessary to place one new drug under control in respect of all parties to the three instruments. If by the procedure provided in article 1 of the 1948 Protoco1, the World Health Organization decides that the new drug should fall under the regime laid down for drugs of group II of the 1931 Convention, this decision will by no means have the same effect for parties to the 1931 Convention who did not accept the Protocol. To have the same effect,[159] the World Health Organization would have to pronounce formally that the drug in question is not capable of producing addiction but convertible into an addiction-forming drug. The decision on the type of regime, however, would be made by the Body of Three Experts (see section A, 2, ( e); and A, 1, ( b), (iii)). It is, theoretically, not impossible that the decision made by this Body might differ from the decision of the World Health Organization, with the result that a given drug which is not addiction-forming but convertible into an addiction-forming drug might be placed by the parties to the Protocol under the regime applying to drugs of group I, while States which did not accept the Protocol might be permitted to apply to the same drug the less rigid regime provided for drugs of group II; or vice versa.

Furthermore, the World Health Organization would have to transmit its decision not only to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but also to the Economic and Social Council, and the decision would have to be forwarded to the Governments not only by the Secretary-General, but also on behalf of the Economic and Social Council, if it were decided that the decision should have the effect of a recommendation under the provisions of the 1925 Convention,[160] in order to extend the control to parties to this Convention who are neither parties to the 1931 Convention nor to the 1948 Protocol.

12. Representation of "Interests"

The existing system of control provides for the representation of the main interests in the field, i.e., of producing, manufacturing, and consuming countries; on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (formerly on the Advisory Committee). The provisions relating to the composition of the Permanent Central Board, although providing for impartiality and therefore excluding the "representation of interest", ensure that the members of the Board, on account of their past experience, are familiar with the viewpoints of the above-mentioned three main groups of interests.

CONSIDERATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

It is particularly interesting to note that the present international administration guarantees sufficient consideration of the administrative problems of control in addition to the control of the drugs themselves.

the reference in the title of the 1948 Protocol to "drugs outside the scope" of the 1931 Convention is not interpreted to mean that drugs which might fall under article 11 of the 1931 Convention cannot become the subject of a procedure under article I of the 1948 Protocol.

This understanding of the administrative problems of control found expression in the establishment of the special regime for drugs of group II as provided by the 1931 Convention and the 1948 Protocol. Proper consideration of the administrative standpoint is also given by article 11 of the 1931 Convention which provides that the decision on the kind of regime for drugs which are not addiction-forming by themselves, but convertible into such drugs, is entrusted to the "Body of Three Experts'' and not to the World Health Organization.

The principle of governmental representation on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (formerly on the Advisory Committee) helps to ensure a better balance between the burden of control measures, and the dangers inherent in the drug to be controlled, than would otherwise be the case. Opinions have been frequently expressed that this guarantee of the consideration of administrative problems has contributed to the prevalence of a spirit of realism in the international administration of narcotic drugs.

13. Legislative, Judicial and Administrative Functions

All three branches of modern government may be found in the field of international control of narcotic drugs: legislative, judicial, and executive or administrative functions.

LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS

The Conventions of 1931 and 1936 provide for conferences of the contracting parties for their revisions, i.e., for the performance of legislative functions. Every modern parliamentary process of legislation provides for special organs ( e.g., parliamentary committees) to discuss legislative proposals and also, in most cases to take preliminary decisions on the kind of proposals to be submitted to the vote of the legislative body as a whole.

The normal method of international legislation (conferences of States) was generally followed by the authors of the international instruments in the field;[161] but the disappearance of the League of Nations and pressure of time forced the adoption in two cases, i.e., the Protocols of 1946 and 1948, of a faster method Which may perhaps be called the "protocol method".[162] In these cases the international instruments were discussed and adopted by organs of the United Nations (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Economic and Social Council, and General Assembly) and were then opened during sessions of the General Assembly for the signature of, and acceptance by Governments. No separate international conferences were called for this purpose.

A similar part was played by organs of the League of Nations (Advisory Committee, Council, Assembly) in the discussion of the instruments relating to the control of narcotic drugs which were adopted, under the auspices of the League of Nations, by conferences of States. The most prominent and intensive part in this preparatory work of legislation has been performed by the Advisory Committee and its successor the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. In this sense, the Committee (Commission) may be said to have performed legislative functions, similar to the preliminary functions usual in national parliamentary legislation.

The discussion and criticism of the international and national control of narcotic drugs carried on by the Committee and by the Commission may also be considered to have a definite similarity to the corresponding discussions in national parliaments or in their committees. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and formerly the Advisory Committee have been called the policy-making bodies of the international administration of narcotic drugs. Their activities have included very important elements of a "legislative" and "parliamentary" character.

The Conventions of 1925 and 1931 and the 1948 Protocol provide for international procedures by which new drugs can be placed under international control without resorting to conferences of States. These procedures may be called "legislative" procedures and the organs involved may, therefore, be said to have limited "legislative" functions. Because of the limited scope of these functions, and of their nature, it may, perhaps, be thought preferable to call them powers of enacting administrative regulations rather than "legislative" powers. By the procedure provided by the 1931 Convention or by the 1948 Protocol additional drugs can be placed under control without the consent of the States that will be obligated.

JUDICIAL (ARBITRAL) FUNCTIONS

The Conventions of 1912, 1925, 1931, and 1936 provide for judicial or arbitral settlement of disputes arising from the application of these Conventions.[164] In addition to these functions of a judicial nature, the functions of the Permanent Central Board in recommending and imposing embargoes are held to be of a judicial or semi-judicial nature.

Doubt has been expressed as to this designation of the functions of the Board. The decision of this controversy may, in the last instance, depend on the definition of the term "judicial". This word may be understood in two meanings:

  1. In the "formal" sense that the functions exercised by a judge are "judicial";

  2. In the substantive sense that functions, which by their nature require for their proper performance the safeguards with which civilized States usually invest their judicial procedure in order to ensure impartial "administration of justice", i.e., impartial application of legal provisions to a given factual situation, may be called "judicial".

Such safeguards are: judicial independence guaranteed by:

  1. The exclusion of orders from superior officials to the judge as to the way he is to decide a particular case before him. Return of a case by an appeal court to the court of first instance for reconsideration in the light of the expressed views of the appeal court, is of course not such an order;

  2. The fact that the judge cannot be removed from office or demoted during good behaviour, and sometimes not even transferred to another post without the approval of an independent personnel body. Promotions also often require such approval;

  3. The fact that often the Government can only appoint judges with this approval or can select judges only from a limited number of candidates nominated by an independent body;

  4. The fact that parties have certain guaranteed procedural rights.

While it is true that judges have Sometimes discretionary powers and administrative officers are closely directed by the law in deciding certain cases, it may be stated that generally the opposite is true. The problem is furthermore, confused by the fact, that judges are sometimes not "independent" and that administrative authorities are, in increasing measure, called upon to decide cases which in earlier times would have been considered to be of a "judicial" nature. There exists a tendency to invest such administrative procedure, dealing with "judicial" subjects, with at least some of the guarantees usually connected with "judicial" procedure or to subject it to judicial review. If these more recent developments are eliminated and a return made to the original conception of the division of governmental powers into three branches, it must be admitted that the application of legal provisions to a given factual situation by officials of a guaranteed impartiality is at least very similar to what is usually called a "judicial" procedure. This is the case in the recommendation or imposition of embargoes by the Permanent Central Board under article 24 of the 1925 Convention and article 14 of the 1931 Convention. The members of the Board are to be impartial and disinterested.[166] They are not subject to orders in making their decisions. No provision exists for deposing them during their tenure. Procedural rules are laid down guaranteeing the rights of the parties. In the procedure relating to the "recommendation" under article 24 of the 1925 Convention, the matter can be brought before the Economic and Social Council (formerly the Council of the League) only after the decision of the Board. In all cases the Board has to apply definite legal provisions to given facts and in the case of the obligatory imposition of the embargo under article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention it has no discretionary power, i.e., if it finds that the legal premises exist it has to impose the embargo.[167] The Board has, however, such discretionary power when deciding on a "recommendation'' under article 24 of the 1931 Convention and article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention.

It may be concluded that the designation of these functions as "judicial" by authoritative statements is based on several good reasons and that the use of the term "semi-judicial" already takes into consideration opposing arguments. In any case the use of these terms helps to emphasize the need for the impartiality and independence of the Board.

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

The Permanent Central Board has the duty to watch continuously the course of international trade in narcotic substances. This duty, and such functions connected with it as the preparing of annual statements, the drawing up of forms for estimates, and the receiving of statistical and other information, may be called administrative functions. Its right to appoint a member of the Supervisory Body may also be said to be an "executive" function.

The commission on Narcotic Drags, as formerly the Advisory Committee, also performs a few functions which may be called administrative (executive), such as drawing up a form for annual reports[168a] and appointing a member of the Supervisory Body.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations (formerly of the League of Nations) has been entrusted with numerous administrative functions such as: receiving and communicating information on the working of the Conventions; and on laws and regulations; functions relating to instruments of ratification, accession, acceptance, denunciations, etc.

There may be some doubts on the proper designation of some of the functions discussed in this section as judicial or legislative. It has occasionally been stated that the functions of the Permanent Central Board connected with recommending or imposing embargoes are administrative rather than semi-judicial, and this despite the element of impartiality and that of applying definite legal rules to a given situation.

Whatever may be the legal character of one or another single function of the international organs which control narcotic drugs, it can be definitely stated that the international control of narcotic drugs includes legislative and judicial as well as administrative tasks.

ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS NOT NECESSARILY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THEORETICAL PRINCIPLE OF DIVISION OF POWERS

These functions are, however, not assigned to the various bodies existing in this field in strict accordance with their nature as legislative, judicial, or administrative bodies. This is due to the fact that the international control was gradually built up in conformity with practical needs and with no particular emphasis on governmental theories of government.

One may call the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (formerly the Advisory Committee), a policy-making body having certain functions of a "legislative body" (discussing, drafting, and proposing new conventions); one may characterize the Supervisory Body and the Permanent Central Board as administrative bodies, and one may call the latter organ a judicial or semi-judicial body; but such designations are only correct in a general way, because, as has been shown, the policy-making body has certain administrative functions and the Permanent Central Board has, in addition to its "judicial functions", other functions which are definitely "administrative". No attempt has been made to enumerate all the functions which would show that no perfect division of powers, in the sense of the classical constitutional theory, has been carried out in the field of international control of narcotic drugs; but the examples given seem to be sufficient to prove the empirical rather than the doctrinaire approach.

Part II - SOME PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE PLANNING OF A FUTURE CONTROL SYSTEM

Some of the factors which require careful consideration in planning any future organization of international control of narcotic drugs are:

  1. The functions of a future system of international control of narcotic drugs;

  2. The methods developed by international administration for the performance of these or similar functions, and particularly the experiences gained in the field of control of narcotic drugs.

1. The Functions of a Future System of International Control of Narcotic Drugs

No reasonable selection of any type of international organization is possible without reference to its functions. No one can foresee with certainty what functions will be adopted by the international conference of Governments which will be called to adopt the planned single convention. But, without reference to its functions, any consideration of the future organizatinal structure of the control of narcotic drugs must assume a somewhat speculative character. For this reason the present memorandum proceeds from the hypothesis that the future international organization will have about the same functions as are performed by the present organization, in addition to tasks which may eventually result from the extension of international control to the limitation of raw materials and crude drugs. The acceptance of this hypothesis may also be justified by the wording of the resolution of the Economic and Social Council [159 (VII), II, D.]

The functions considered are:

  1. Secretarial (ministerial) functions and promotion of acceptance of the new convention;

  2. Functions necessary for the organization and working of the new international control bodies;

  3. International research, and technical and other assistance to Governments;

  4. Functions of supervision and control:

  5. Information to be obtained;

  6. Publication and communication of information;

  7. Discussion and evaluation of information obtained by the international control organs;

  8. Making requests for action to be taken by Governments;

  9. Embargo, boycott, and other enforcement measures;

  10. Making other legally binding decisions;

  11. Receipt, from Governments, of legally binding declarations;

  12. Legislative functions;

  13. General statements of the existence of facts or conditions on which the new convention may make dependent the entry into force of certain obligations;

  14. Settlement of disputes;

  15. Policy-making functions;

  16. Economic functions.

SECRETARIAL (MINISTERIAL) FUNCTIONS AND PROMOTION OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW CONVENTION

Secretarial (ministerial) functions connected with the acceptance of the basic instruments on which the international system of control is founded, such as receiving, depositing, registering, and preserving documents of signature, ratification, accession, acceptance, denunciation, and notification of the receipt, deposit, and registration of such instruments will be included in the general clauses of the single convention.

Provisions will have to be considered to further universal acceptance of the new convention. It will be necessary to ensure the general acceptance of the new convention by all existing States. It may also be found advisable to ensure the acceptance by new independent States which may be created in the future. In connexion with such political changes difficult legal problems of State succession arise. Some way may perhaps be found to avoid these difficulties in connexion with the new convention.

Acceptance of convention; condition of recognition of new States

It is a general State practice to ensure that a new State, which is requesting recognition, is able and willing to fulfil its obligations under international law. There is no decisive reason why this demand of the international society on a new State should be limited to the rules of customary international law. It may perhaps be considered whether it would not be feasible to include in the new convention a clause, by virtue of which the contracting parties undertake to refuse recognition to any new State, which does not accede to the new international convention on narcotic drugs. In this case a more elaborate version of an idea would be accepted, which was already at the root of the various provisions of the Peace Treaties after the First World War, providing for ratification of the 1912 Convention.

Designation of States permitted to become parties to the convention

Authority will also have to be established to determine the States or political entities which are to be per-mitted to become parties to the new convention. Embarrassing political questions are sometimes involved, such as the fact that a given political entity is not recognized by some members of the international society. The present Conventions provide in various clauses that all Members of the United Nations (formerly of the League of Nations) and such non-members as are directly or indirectly invited so to do, by communication of a copy of the instrument in question, may accede. This direct or indirect invitation is sometimes issued by the Secretary-General and sometimes by the Economic and Social Council (formerly by the Council of the League). Such variations are only explained by historical facts. The new convention may determine one body which will be authorized to designate the States that will be permitted to become parties to the new single convention or to other future conventions in the field. Whether the policy-making body to be provided by the new convention, or some other organ of the United Nations such as the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council, should be charged with this function will require careful consideration.[169] If the policy-making body is chosen, it may be assumed that it will proceed in accordance with the policy as outlined in recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It may even be expressly stipulated that the policy-making body is in this respect boundby such recommendations. Before the policy-making body shall have been constituted in accordance with the new convention, an organ of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council, might be authorized to issue the invitations.

FUNCTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND WORKING OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONTROL BODIES.

The new international control machinery will have to perform certain functions which are of an organizational nature, necessary for its constitutional establishment and continuation, for obtaining the necessary financial means, for controlling their expenditure, and for ensuring the best possible co-ordination of the work of the organs and persons concerned with the international control of narcotic drugs.

Appointment and qualifications of the members of the control bodies

The new convention will, therefore, have to provide for the appointment and qualifications of the members of the control organs.[170] If the functions of the policymaking body will be entrusted to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations, the new convention will perhaps limit itself to providing for the appointment and functioning of the body in "constitutional emergencies" or to establishing authority for adopting the necessary remedial measures in case of such an emergency.

A decision will have to be made whether or not any provisions regarding the tenure of office of the members of the new international control bodies shall be included in the new convention; as regards the policy-making body this may be necessary only in the event of a "constitutional emergency".[171]

The problem will arise whether the convention shall regulate the election of officers of the new control bodies, their terms of office, their functions, and other conditions of their work, or whether this shall be left wholly or partially to the rules of procedure of the control body in question.[172]

The new convention will have to contain provisions on the privileges, immunities, and remuneration of members of the control bodies and perhaps of their staff, which are necessary for the performance of their functions, or will have to provide for constitutional powers to conclude agreements to this end.[173]

Provision for constitutional emergencies

Legal difficulties which arose as a result of the dissolution of the League of Nations and compelled the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body to continue their work on an extra-legal basis until the amendments of the 1925 and 1931 Conventions provided by the 1946 Protocol entered into force, may be avoided in the future if the new convention provides for some means of self-perpetuation or other continuation in case of a constitutional emergency. It by no means requires political catastrophe such as the Second World War to create a constitutional emergency. An amendment of the Charter providing for an Economic and Social Council, different in essential features from the present Council, or certain reorganizational measures carried out by the Economic and Social Council which affect its Commissions, might bring about the same emergency situation.

Rules of procedure

Such questions as "quorum", rights of outvoted minorities, and whether the solution of these and similar questions can be left to the rules of procedure, will require discussion. The same applies to the authority for enacting the rules of procedure and to the conditions under which they may be enacted.[174]

Meetings

The frequency of the meetings of the control bodies is not expressly settled by the Conventions, although clearly implied by the nature of their functions determined by these Conventions.

This situation has created serious misunderstandings and has been responsible for certain suggestions in the discussion of the budgets of the Permanent Central Board and of the Supervisory Body which, if accepted, might seriously have impaired the effectiveness of international control. Methods will have to be considered to avoid such difficulties in the future, ensuring at the same time, as is the case under the present system, the greatest possible financial economy.

No provision is contained in the existing Conventions of the location of the meetings of the control bodies and of their permanent administrative offices. The location of meetings and of the administrative offices can have a very important bearing on the efficiency of their work. The future international machinery will have to be equipped to find the best compromise between considerations of general economy which, at present, are being observed very strictly, and sectional efficiency of international administration.

Appointment of staff

Existing Conventions also provide for the appointment of the secretariat of the Permanent Central Board and of the Supervisory Body.[175] How far the influence of the administrative (semi-judicial) body on the appointment of its staff should be retained and whether the policy-making body should be given such influence, are additional problems.

Co-ordination of international control organs

The Secretary-General of the United Nations secures close co-ordination of the work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Permanent Central Board and of the Supervisory Body.[176] The present system has proved to be highly successful, but it may be suggested that at least part of this success is due to personal elements; one may add that, without favourable personal conditions, the best machinery for co-ordination will fail to achieve the desired results. Proper provisions for the appointment of the members of the control bodies and of the secretariat would considerably contribute to the creation of these favourable conditions.

Liaison

The new control system may also-directly or in-directly-provide for better liaison between the international control bodies and national administrations, which are undoubtedly the most important organs of the international control system, and for better liaison among the national administrations themselves.

Meetings of representatives of the national central offices were considered for this purpose.[177] The importance of personal contacts will have to be taken into consideration.

Liaison will also have to be maintained with such specialized agencies as the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Trade Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and with other international organizations concerned with such problems as civil aviation, maritime shipping, inland-water transport, railways, motor traffic, etc. The following examples may be given to substantiate the need for such liaison:

Most-favoured-nation clause

  1. Many administrators favour the exclusion of narcotic drugs from the benefits of most-favoured-nation clauses in trade agreements.[178] Such a measure might require the backing of the International Trade Organization;

    Foreign loans to facilitate substitute crops

  2. Suggestions have been made that certain difficulties of opium-producing countries in their efforts to limit production can be overcome with the help of foreign loans to facilitate the introduction of substitute crops. Possibilities and conditions of carrying out such programmes deserve attention;[179]

    Prohibition of narcotic substances in international mail

  3. "Narcotic substances" are excluded from transmission by letter, box, or parcel in international mail.

There exists, however, no legal provision which would make the term "narcotic substances" ( stup?fiants) of the Universal Postal Convention and Agreements identical with the drugs controlled by the international Conventions relating to narcotic substances.

Budget and auditing

The expenses of the present international control system form part of the budget of the United Nations, but parties to the 1925 and 1931 Conventions, who are not Members of the United Nations, are under an obligation to contribute their share of the expenses.[180]

It may perhaps be considered useful to include in the new single convention some provisions for financing its administrative machinery. Authority can be created for budgetary arrangements with the United Nations, and for financing in "constitutional emergency situations".

The details of such an arrangement may be settled in the light of the conditions which will prevail at the time of its approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations.[181] Whether express provisions for auditing of the finances of the new control machinery by an organ of the United Nations should be included in the single convention offers another problem for consideration.

(c) INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENTS (aa) INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH

Assistance to national research and execution of international research, when more economical and more promising, represent a not unusual function of international administration.[182] International research projects in the field of narcotic drugs can also be found.[183]

(bb) TECHNICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENTS

It will also have to be considered whether, and how far, assistance to Governments should be made one of the tasks of the international control of narcotic drugs.

The consideration that the inefficiency or inexperience of a single national administration may endanger the whole work of international control, will enable the importance of this problem to be sufficiently appreciated. The new convention may provide that the principles governing technical assistance be consistent with the policy, adopted by the competent organs of the United Nations, for granting such assistance. It will have to be decided whether such assistance which, of course, can only be given on the request of the administration concerned, is to be financed by international or national means,[184] or whether the problem of financing should be solved on the merits of each particular case. The question of principle may perhaps be taken up, whether an international control organ may be authorized to suggest to a national administration that it make a request for technical assistance.

Examples of technical aid

Precedents of technical aid, given by international organs to national administrations, exist in the field of international control of narcotic drugs. The 1948 mission of the Secretariat of the United Nations to Peru offers an example[185] and in this connexion it may also be recalled that the "Model Administrative Codes to the International Opium Conventions of 1925 and 1931", which were prepared by the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, give valuable assistance to many national administrations.[186] In formulating the relevant clauses of the new convention such assistance may also perhaps be thought of as the giving of an opinion, in the light of previous experience of international organs or other administrations, on drafts of laws, regulations and bilateral agreements relating to the control of drugs, or the offering of assistance in the drafting of such documents. If this aid is requested, early and ample consideration can be given to international interests.

Economic and financial assistance

It has already been stated that opium-producing countries may be in need of financial assistance.[187] Such aid may also be claimed by some countries which have a serious problem of addiction to opium smoking or coca-leaf chewing, and which, because of their limited economic resources, cannot afford the financial means to provide for the educational, medical, and rehabilitational measures which are necessary. In some cases economic assistance may be required to increase the living standard of the working population that may be particularly exposed to the evil of addiction. It will be the task of the future international administration of narcotic drugs to initiate the necessary measures to ensure the assistance of the international bodies concerned, such as the International Trade Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and to assist in the necessary co-ordination of the efforts which may have to be undertaken simultaneously by several agencies.

Education and propaganda

Whether, and by what means, education and propaganda should be used in the campaign against the drug evil, will also require careful consideration.

(d) FUNCTIONS OF SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

(aa) INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED

The information which is supplied to organs concerned with the international control of narcotic drugs may be summarized as follows:

(i) Information on laws and regulations;

(ii) Information on the structure and working of the domestic control machinery;

(iii) Summary information on the transactions (manufacture, production, trade) in the substances under control which may either be:

a. Post factuminformation: statistical returns or b. Advance information: estimates;

(iv) Information on individual transactions;

(v) Summary and detailed information on other circumstances of the production and manufacture of, and trade in narcotic drugs, such as the number, name, and location of manufacturers and traders, the beginning or ceasing of the manufacture of or trade in a particular drug;

(vi) Police information (summary and detailed) on violations of the Conventions, laws, and regulations, relating to the control of narcotic drugs;

(vii) Information given in the course of enforcement procedures, started by the administrative body;

(viii) Information on national research activities and results of such activities and other information of a scientific nature;

(ix)General information on the working of the Convention;

(x) Other relevant information;

(xi) Inspection and other direct methods of obtaining information.

(i) Information on laws and regulations[188]

The importance of this information is emphasized by the fact that all Conventions in the field provide for the contracting parties to transmit as a duty, their laws and regulations enacted in execution of these instruments. Not only narcotic laws in the narrow meaning are to be transmitted but also other statutes containing relevant information, such as pharmacy laws, customs laws, laws regarding medical practice, penal provisions, etc. While laws sometimes do not represent the factual situation but rather reflect intentions, regulations and particularly administrative instructions frequently offer a more adequate picture of the real situation.

(ii) Information on the structure and working of the domestic control machinery

This information is not expressly required by the present Conventions, but its transmission is implied by several provisions, e.g., those dealing with communication of laws and regulations, with the obligation to establish a "central office".[189] The League of Nations as well as the United Nations have on the basis of this legal authority and within their general jurisdiction requested information in regard to the machinery of international control.

(iii) Summary information on the transactions in narcotic substances

a. "Post factum" information: statistical returns (see part I, A, 1, (a); (b), (bb), (i); B, 2, (b); i.e., the sections dealing with the Government of the Netherlands, the Secretary-General, and the Permanent Central Board); b. "Advance" information: estimates (see part I, A, 2, (b), (c); sections dealing with the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body). The estimates supplied under the terms of the 1931 Convention and those planned under the Draft of 1939 have a double nature:

  1. That of juridical acts having the legal effects provided in the Convention (or Draft Convention);

  2. That of items of "advance" information which, if reasonably accurate, are useful as such to the international control organs without reference to their legally binding character. The estimates provided by the 1925 Convention have only this informational value.

The idea of estimates played also a very important part in the control system suggested by the 1939 Draft Convention for the limitation of the production of raw materials. These estimates were to include the quantities of raw opium required in each territory for medical and scientific needs, for the manufacture of prepared opium or for sale for use in the form of prepared opium, and for other non-medical consumption where such consumption may be lawful.[190] The estimates were to state, in order of preference (if the "quota system" were to be adopted; otherwise without this "order of preference"), the producing (exporting) countries whose raw opium it was desired to obtain and the amounts desired from each.[191] An estimate system concerning the poppy-plant was also considered, but not included in the Draft.[192]

(iv) Information on individual transactions

Many national authorities are not satisfied with periodical summaries of trade transactions in narcotic substances, but require information on each individual transaction, including often retail sales. The present international control system requires that in certain cases of export to territories to which neither the 1925 nor the 1931 Conventions apply, post factum or "advance" information shall be transmitted to the Permanent Central Board.[193] It will have to be decided whether and how far this principle should be extended to other international transactions; if the idea is accepted, the following questions will call for a solution:

  1. Should the information on individual export (import) transactions be given post factum or "in advance"?

  2. Should the notification be made to the international control organ by the exporter or importer, by a Government or by individuals and Governments at the same time?

  3. Should the international control organ be authorized to examine such an advance notice as to its agreement with the estimates of the country in question?

  4. In this case, should the transaction be delayed until the exporter (importer) is notified of the result of the examination?

  5. Should this delay, if accepted, be limited to a certain time, after which the exporter (importer) would be free to carry out the transaction?

  6. Should the decision of the control organ that a planned transaction would cause the estimates of a given country to be exceeded, make this transaction unlawful?

  7. Should the control organ obtain the right of consent to any export to a territory which will not be voluntarily subject to the new convention?

The idea of an "international clearing house" for all exports and imports was considered but not retained by the Conference of 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

  1. Summary and detailed information on other circumstances of the production and manufacture of and trade in narcotic drugs

(See part I, A, 1, (b), (bb), i; section dealing with the Secretary-General.) Such items of information as names and addresses of manufacturers of narcotic drugs, whether the manufacture or conversion of given drugs is carried out for domestic requirements only or also for export, etc., have proved valuable. Thought may be given to the question whether the names and addresses of wholesalers, exporters, and importers should not be added to this information.[194]

  1. Police information (summary and detailed) on violations of the Conventions, laws, and regulations, relating to the control of narcotic drugs

(See Part I, A, 1, (b), (bb), (i); part I, A, 2, (b); sections dealing with the Secretary-General and the Permanent Central Board.)[195]

  1. Information given in the course of enforcement procedures undertaken by the administrative (semi-judicial) organ

(See part I, A, 2, (b); section dealing with the Permanent Central Board.)

Article 24 of the 1925 Convention provides that the Government of an exporting country which is not prepared to act on the embargo recommendation of the Permanent Central Board, should immediately notify the Board. The question arises whether Governments should not be expressly obligated to inform the international control authority of their incapacity, perhaps through no fault of their own, to carry out conventional provisions, whether an enforcement procedure is pending or not. It is, e.g., important for the international control authority to know whether countries find it impossible to apply all or some provisions of the import and export certificate system to countries or territories that are not subject to the 1925 Convention.[196] The annual reports mostly fail to submit this kind of information.

  1. (viii ) Information on national research activities and results of such activities and other information of a scientific nature[197]

Such an obligation of Governments involves the delicate problem of protecting legitimate trade secrets. Early action for the control of newly discovered addiction-forming drugs is of the greatest importance for its success. Final judgment on the addiction-causing liability of a new drug can, however, often be made only after a long study. It follows that the international control authorities may be interested in national research activities, possibly leading to the discovery of new addiction-forming drugs. Not only interests of manufacturers of narcotic drugs, but also interests of many other drug manufacturers will be affected by a general obligation of Governments to report on relevant research; a satisfactory compromise between these conflicting interests may prove very difficult. The question may be studied whether a solution can be found through modification of the domestic and international rules relating to the protection of industrial property.[198]

  1. General information on the working of the Convention

In addition to the details which, in accordance with the present Conventions, Governments have to supply to the international control authorities, contracting parties to the 1931 Convention are under the express obligation to forward to the Secretary-General of the United Nations an annual report on the working of the Convention in their territories.[199]

  1. Methods and procedures for written communications

The information the international control authorities receive from the various Governments is by no means limited to the items expressly provided for by the Conventions and Agreements in this field. A considerable amount of information has been requested and received on the basis of recommendations and resolutions of organs of the League of Nations and of the United Nations, adopted within the scope of the general jurisdiction of these two Organizations. The present conventional provisions relating to information to be supplied are complicated and not always very clear. This may be due to the gradual growth of the law controlling the international administration of narcotic drugs and to unavoidable compromises which had to be made.

It will have to be considered whether the new convention should not limit itself to a general description of the kind of information (including statistics and estimates) to be supplied by contracting Governments. In this case, power would have to be given to an international organ to determine what details should be transmitted by Governments. The question will come up whether this discretionary power should be given to each organ of the future control system, regarding information required for the performance of its particular func tions, or whether this discretionary power should be held by one organ, i.e., the policy-making organ.[200] If the latter course is adopted, thought may be given to the possibility of the policy-making organ consulting the administrative (semi-judicial) organ before deciding on the kind of information which is to be supplied by Governments. This discretionary power is partly anticipated by the provisions of the present Conventions, establishing the right of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to draw up a form for annual reports, and of the Permanent Central Board to draw up a form for estimates.[201] -

It may perhaps be considered whether the new convention should not establish the general authority of the international control organs to draft forms for the use of Governments in supplying information. Such a provision would be in agreement with the present situation in which, in addition to the forms drafted in accordance with the 1931 Convention, various questionnaires and circular letters are used on the basis of resolutions and recommendations of organs of the United Nations.

Requests of the international control authorities under the new convention to supply information on the basis of forms, questionnaires, and circular letters, would not have the limited effect of recommendations, but would create a legal obligation to comply with the demand. The right to draft such forms, circular letters, and questionnaires, may be given to the policy-making body, with or without consultation of the administrative (semi-judicial) body, or both bodies may be given the right to draw such forms as are needed for obtaining the particular information required for the performance of their separate functions.

In addition to the information supplied by Governments to the international control authorities, efficient international administration also requires a certain amount of direct exchange of information between individual Governments. The substance of this information is predominantly of a police nature. Parties to the 1925 Agreement and to the Final Protocol of the Bangkok Conference of 1931 undertook to exchange information and views in regard to illicit traffic in opium and in regard to all matters of common interest in connexion with the suppression of opium smoking.[202]

It may be stated that insertion in a convention of the period for which, and of the date on which, certain information is to be supplied, emphasizes the legal obligation to supply the information required in time. It is, on the other hand, very difficult to determine in advance whether changes of such dates and periods may not become necessary in the interest of better administration. The Convention of 1931 requested the Supervisory Body to forward the world-statement of estimates not later than 1 November of each year.[203] It was very soon found advisable to advance this date to 1 December. A proc?sverbal was drawn in 1936 carrying out this change but it never entered into force.[204] The 1946 Protocol advanced the original date of 1 November to 15 December. This experience may lead to the suggestion to omit, from the new convention, the exact determination of periods (quarterly, annual) for which information is to be supplied, and of dates on which this is to be done. The power of timing may be given to the policy-making body, with or without consultation of the administrative (semi-judicial) body in cases in which the information in question is of particular concern to this organ. Such an arrangement does not affect the need for granting authority to the administrative (semi-judicial) organ to determine dates and periods in individual enforcement cases, in procedures pending before this organ.

The information to be supplied under the present treaties is in some cases to be addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in other cases to the Permanent Central Board and sometimes to the Supervisory Body.[205]

This leads, as practice has shown, to some confusion on the part of national administrations. It happens, not infrequently, that, e.g., annual reports are sent to the Permanent Central Board and estimates and statistics to the Secretary-General.

If the new convention establishes a single secretariat serving both control organs, the convention may also provide that all information furnished by Governments is to be forwarded in duplicate to this secretariat which would transmit the information to the appropriate control organ for action in accordance with the latter&rsquos jurisdiction and to the other control organ for information. This procedure would have the additional advantage that all information would simultaneously be made available to both control organs. If necessary, special precautionary measures might be devised to ensure respect for information of confidential character (see part III, section 9).

(xi) Inspection and other direct methods of obtaining information

The present control system relies predominantly on data supplied by Governments. This method is characteristic of indirect international administration.[206]

The question arises whether this system should be supplemented and strengthened by methods of obtaining information directly, e.g., by inspection, commissions of inquiry, etc. In this case, the following points will have to be considered:

  1. Is a system of inspection useful and necessary?

  2. Should such inspection be undertaken only on the request of the Government concerned or as a general measure under conditions specified in the convention?

No opinion is expressed here as to the acceptability of an inspection without request of the Government concerned. Should such inspection be instituted under the new convention, provision should be made for advance notification to the authorities concerned. Inspections without Government request may also be subject to other restrictive provisions, e.g., they may have to be ordered by a qualified majority (two-thirds, three-fourths) of the competent control organ, or they may be undertaken only after previous warning as to the insufficiency of the information of the country concerned and after granting time for improvement.

(bb) PUBLICATION AND COMMUNICATION OF

INFORMATION

Publication and communication of information obtained by the international organs is a very important factor in international administration. It is indispensable that national authorities be informed of the relevant facts of international trade and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.

The publication or communication may be limited to the facts as reported, or be accompanied by explanations and critical observations (see part I, A, 1, (b), (bb), (i) ; part I, A, 2, (b), (c), sections dealing with the Secretary-General, PCB and SB).[207] Communication and publication are not necessarily the same. Some facts communicated by or to Governments may not be suitable for publication.

At present the publication of an exact record of dependencies, on whose behalf the various instruments have been signed or ratified, or documents of accession or acceptance deposited, or denunciations made, meets with many difficulties.[208] This is due, inter alia, to administrative and territorial changes in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. The question arises whether the contracting parties should not be obligated by the new convention, either directly or by a constitutional decision of the competent control organ (the policy-making body) to report the application of the convention to a new territory separated from a dependency or formed by the division of such a dependency. This information is, of course, only required if by virtue of a special provision the legal position of a dependency can be different from the position, under the convention, of the metropolitan Power.

The conventional provisions now in force relating to publication and communication by international control organs of information furnished by Governments are rather complicated. The international organs do not confine themselves to publication or communication of information received for that purpose under the Conventions. Many studies of the Secretariat are made available to the Governments and to the general public on the basis of the authority given to the Secretariat by decisions of the constitutional organs of the United Nations.[209] It is suggested that this actual situation should be recognized in the new convention and that a fair measure of discretion be given to the international control organs to communicate and publish information at their disposal. No reference need be made to specific cases. Safeguards against misuse of such power may be considered, particularly with regard to information of a confidential character.[210]

(bb) DISCUSSION AND APPRAISAL OF INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ORGANS.

(See part I, 2, (b) (c); sections dealing with the PCB and the SB.)

The existing Conventions have established, by express provisions or by implication, the right of the international control organs to discuss and appraise the information at their disposal. The Permanent Central Board is authorized to question or to express any opinion on the statistical information supplied by the Governments, except on the amounts imported or purchased for government purposes or for the use of Governments and excepting also the statistical information relating to the manufacture and consumption of prepared opium. The Board may apply the "embargo" procedure of the 1925 Convention if it finds that illicit international transactions are taking place on an appreciable scale.[211] The procedure for the enforcement measures provided by the 1925 and 1931 Conventions gives the Permanent Central Board far-reaching authority to express its views on the information relating to the drug situation in the various countries.[212]

The Supervisory Body has the duty of examining the estimates of drug requirements supplied by Governments and the right to express any opinion or make any observations with regard to these estimates.[213] The 1939 Draft provided for the same examination by the Controlling Authority of the estimates of raw opium.[214] The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and other organs of the United Nations (as formerly the organs of the League of Nations) have the right to discuss and criticize the drug situation in any country; this right is based on the Charter (Covenant) and resolution 9 (I) of the Economic and Social Council of 16 February 1946. The international control organs, particularly the constitutional organs of the League of Nations and of the United Nations, have not confined themselves to discussing and expressing critical opinions on problems and situations referred to in the existing Conventions. This prerogative of free and public discussion of all facts and problems having a bearing on the drug situation has been the most powerful vehicle of progress and success in the field of the international control of narcotic drugs. This fact should find recognition in the new convention by giving the international control authorities sufficiently wide general powers to discuss, examine, and express opinions on all matters relevant to the control of narcotics. That does not mean that the international control organs of the future must be given unlimited authority of discussion and censuring; proper limits to their power can be drawn in accordance with the aims of the international campaign against the drug evil.

(dd) REQUESTS FOR ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY CONTRACTING OR NON-CONTRACTING PARTIES

Requests may be made for actions that may have to be taken to correct a situation which exists in violation of the provisions of the convention. On the other hand, it may also be provided that certain actions have to be taken by Governments only if requested by the international control authority. It may, for instance, be stipulated that certain more stringent control measures have to be adopted only if requested by the competent international organ

Determination of kind of regime to which a drug is to be subjected

The international control authority should decide on the necessity of such measures in the light of experience to be gained from a less stringent system of control. Such discretion given to the international authority would add to the flexibility of the control system. The rights of national Governments would be protected by the fact that the international control authority could not request the application of control measures which are more stringent than the maximum measures agreed to in advance. In this way, there would be no need for determining in advance all the details of two definite kinds of regime;[215] one to be applied to more dangerous drugs and the other to less dangerous drugs. It would be up to the international control authority, within limits to be set by the convention, to modify the regimes applicable to the different kinds of drugs in the light of practical experience. It is realized that such discretionary powers will obligate national Governments to change their laws and regulations at times determined by the international control authority. The discussion of the suggested power by experienced national administrators will show whether sufficient authority, given by national legislatures to con-trol authorities, may not make this burden of frequent changes in national laws and regulations a comparatively light one.

Request for remedial measures

The right of the international authority to request a Government to take remedial action with a view to correcting a situation inconsistent with its conventional obligations, would greatly contribute to a stricter observation of the new convention. In most cases such a request would probably obviate the need for more far-reaching measures.

Some of these requests may have a legally binding character; others, for instance requests made to non-contracting parties, may have only moral force (recommendation).

Jurisdiction of the policy-making and administrative body to make such requests

The power of the policy-making body to make such requests would have to be delimited from the jurisdiction of the administrative (semi-judicial) body. In. this case, as in the other cases of jurisdiction discussed above, definite suggestions are extremely difficult as long as the functions of the international control system are not finally settled. It is, however, proposed for consideration, that the administrative body be given the authority to make requests for action in the course of the estimate and the enforcement procedure, and to make other requests of legally binding character which are directed at single Governments. The policy-making body would be authorized to make requests of legally binding character which are addressed to all contracting parties such as requests for applying more stringent rules of control This body would also be called upon to make requests outside the estimate and embargo procedure, and having only moral force, whether they are addressed to single Governments or to all contracting parties.

Requests for remedial action are not. unknown to the present control system. They have been made on several occasions, although they were not based on express powers given to the requesting organ by the Conventions.[216]

(ee) EMBARGO, BOYCOTT, AND OTHER ENFORCEMENT MEASURES (See part I, A, 2, (b); section dealing with the PCB.)

Certain changes in the present procedure will probably be suggested. In the cases in which the Permanent Central Board is authorized to "recommend" the imposition of an embargo, the new convention may be strengthened if it replaces this wording by a text which leaves no doubt that the administrative (semi-judicial) body has the right to impose embargoes of narcotic substances with legally binding effect on all contracting parties.

Conditions and time limits of embargo

The conditions under which such an embargo may be imposed should also be clarified.[217] It may be considered whether it would not be opportune to give the administrative (semi-judicial) body power to impose an embargo in all cases in which the following three conditions exist:

  1. The country concerned violates obligations as defined in the new convention;

  2. Such violation may touch upon the effectiveness of control of other countries, or of international organs (in case an organization such as an international monopoly or a stockpile is created);

  3. The intended enforcement measures may be instrumental in inducing the country concerned to observe its obligations.

The question should be examined whether the time limitations of the embargo such as limitation to "the currency of the year" should not be dropped.[218] This applies also to the present inability of the Permanent Central Board to impose an embargo before the end of the year, when a country fails to fulfil its conventional obligations without threatening to become a centre of the illicit traffic.[219] It is realized that the existing time limitations of the embargo system are based on the present system of information (annual and quarterly statistics). It may be mentioned that the possibilities and range of information at the disposal of the new administrative body may be greater than those of the present permanent Central Board.

Boycott

It has been stated that the embargo system is more onerous to the consuming than to the manufacturing countries. This argument loses part of its strength if the embargo can be applied to raw materials. It may be investigated whether power should not be given to the administrative body to impose boycotts of trade in narcotic drugs; such a measure would have a considerable effect on manufacturing and re-exporting non-manufacturing countries. The conditions for imposing a boycott may be similar to those for the imposition of an embargo.

Embargoes and boycotts would have to have legally binding effect on international economic organizations relating to narcotic drugs that may be established in the future (stockpile, opium monopoly, etc.).

"Review" of embargo and boycott

While the "recommendation" of an embargo can be brought before the Economic and Social Council for review,[220] the "imposition" of the new embargo introduced by the 1931 Convention,[221] is not subject to this procedure.

The following problems will have to be considered in this connexion:

  1. Whether an appeal against imposing an embargo or boycott should be admitted;

  2. Whether an appeal should always, or never, or in certain cases only, have a delaying effect;

  3. To which organ such an appeal, if admitted, should be made.

The value of an appeal in a procedure which depends for its intended effect on speed, may be doubted, particularly if the rights of the affected countries are protected by the high standing of impartiality and competence of the members of the administrative body and by procedural guarantees. The traditions of the international control of narcotic drugs and the excellent experience with the present Permanent Central Board may be conducive to the acceptance by the international society of States of the right of the new administrative body to impose embargoes and boycotts without possibility of appeal. If an appeal is admitted, the appeal authority may be given to:

  1. A political body like the Economic and Social Council; this, although in accordance with the present legal situation,[222] may perhaps be considered inconsistent with the legal character (semi-judicial or even judicial) of the embargo and boycott procedure:

  1. The International Court of Justice; no particular burden would be imposed on the Court in view of the predictable scarcity of appeal cases, but an appeal before the Court might prove to be very time-consuming;

  2. A specially constituted appeal organ, which may be composed of judges ( e.g., one or three) selected by lot from a list of competent jurists. This list would have to be prepared by an international organ, e.g., by the Economic and Social Council on the basis of national nominations. Another possibility would be to permit an appeal to an arbitral tribunal formed in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

The question may also be discussed whether an appeal, if admitted, should be based on grounds of law only or also on grounds of facts.

Other enforcement measures

Compulsory measures such as an embargo and boycott are extreme measures which, as experience has shown, are applied only in cases of serious violation of international obligations. The international administrative organ will, therefore, have to retain the power of appeal to public opinion, which is inherent in such steps as calling the attention of an influential political organ such as the Economic and Social Council to the matter, making a request for remedial action, publishing reports on the case under consideration, etc.

It will have to be considered whether the international administrative body should not be expressly given the power to impose sanctions more lenient than boycott or embargo, such as some kind of formal censure.[223]

The international administrative body may also be entitled to pronounce a formal threat of the imposition of an embargo or boycott if the offending country does not correct the situation within a stated period.

Some thought will have to be given as to whether the administrative body should not be in a position to take certain provisional emergency measures, if such steps are necessary to prevent irreparable damage to one or more countries, other than the offending country itself. It is admitted that such emergency powers will not easily be accepted by the contracting parties. It may perhaps be provided that these emergency decisions cannot be adopted except by unanimous vote of all members of the new administrative body. The emergency measures in question may, e.g., refer to the immediate limitation of imports to minimum amounts of manufactured drugs or raw materials pending the final decision in the embargo procedure.

(ff) MAKING OTHER LEGALLY BINDING DECISIONS

In addition to enforcement decisions and to "legislative" measures the international control machinery will have to be in a position to make several decisions of an administrative nature, which may be legally binding on the contracting parties. [224]

The following problems will have to be solved:

  1. Power of the administrative organ to supply estimates for non-co-operating countries (contracting or non-contracting parties) and conditions under which this may be done;

  2. Power of the administrative organ to change estimates, and conditions under which this may be done;

  3. Extent of the power of the administrative organ to decide on exports to and imports from non-contracting countries;

  4. Extent of the power of the administrative authority in regard to all individual export and import transactions in narcotic substances (International Clearing House).

Notifications determining the beginning of legal effects

Certain notifications determine the beginning of legal effects on contracting parties, such as the notification of the decision of the World Health Organization on the addiction-forming character of a new drug, or a decision of the World Health Organization, or of the "Body of Three Experts" as to the kind of regime under which a new drug, which is not addiction-forming by itself but convertible into such a drug, should be placed. In order to simplify the present system, under which the function of making such notifications is exercised sometimes by the Economic and Social Council and sometimes by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,[225] this function should be vested in the Secretary-General.

(gg) RECEPTION, FROM CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS, OF LEGALLY BINDING DECLARATIONS

The present Conventions and the 1939 Draft provide for various kinds of legally binding declarations to be made by Governments to international control authorities such as:

  1. Estimates and supplementary estimates;[226]

  2. Statement in order of preference from country it is desired to obtain raw opium, and amounts thereof;[227]

  1. Acceptance of the recommendation of the World Health Organization to place new drugs under control.[228]

If the new convention provides that contracting parties may undertake additional obligations of a general nature, declarations to this effect should be addressed to the secretariat of the policy-making body. Declarations relating to the estimate or enforcement procedure may be addressed to the administrative body. It would, however, be simpler to have all declarations addressed in duplicate to one body. The same simplification could also be applied to notifications which initiate a procedure, e.g., those which start the placing of new drugs under control, in accordance with article 11 of the 1931 Convention and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

(e) LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS

Under this heading two kinds of functions may be considered:

  1. Enlarging or restricting the substantive scope of control and determining the kind of regime under which a given drug should fall; and

  2. Other changes of the new convention.

(aa) ENLARGING OR RESTRICTING THE SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF CONTROL AND DETERMINING THE KIND OF REGIME UNDER WHICH A GIVEN DRUG SHOULD FALL Proper balance between danger of drug and administrative difficulties of control.

The present system of control provides for exempting certain preparations from its restrictions and for the addition of new drugs to its regime. The enlargement of the substantive scope of control may be done by four different methods.[229] In addition, provisions are available for application of interim measures to new drugs which are subject to a procedure pending before the World Health Organization.[230] Two main considerations guide the subjection of new drugs to international control: (1) their potential harmfulness and (2) the burdens of additional control on the drug trade, Government authorities, and the medical profession.

The aim of most legislators is to strike a proper balance between these two elements. It is for this reason that in cases in which the 1931 Convention permits the choice of two different regimes ( i.e., in case of drugs which are not addiction-forming by themselves, but convertible into such drugs), the World Health Organization is only called upon to decide on the properties of the drugs, while the choice of the regime is left to a body of three experts, one of which is selected by the Government concerned, one by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, i.e., by a commission composed of Government representatives, and the third by these two members. The procedure under the 1948 Protocol is different as in all cases it leaves the decision as to the regime to the World Health Organization. It may be stated that the system of enlarging the substantive scope of control, as developed by the 1931 Convention and the 1948 Protocol, generally seems satisfactory.

Control of drugs that are not addiction-forming by themselves but convertible into such drugs, in the light of the development of synthetic drugs

Thought will, however, have to be given to the question whether the distinction between drugs that are addiction-forming and drugs that are not addiction-forming by themselves but convertible into such drugs, can be maintained in its entirety by the future convention. Certain drugs which did not seem to be addiction-forming at the time of the 1931 Conference for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, proved later to be addiction-forming to a certain degree (codeine). There seems to be little reason for placing a drug of very limited addiction-forming qualities under a stricter regime than a drug that is not addiction-forming, but can easily be converted into a very dangerous addiction-forming drug. On the other hand, the control of chemical substances which may be easily converted into synthetic narcotic drugs may not be acceptable to some Governments. Theoretically it is not impossible that such neutral substances as coal tar or such drugs as aspirin may become convertible, by some fairly simple chemical process, into dangerous addiction-forming drugs. The following problems will have to be studied:

Limitation of control to drugs of certain chemical groups

  1. Whether the control of drugs which are found to be not addiction-forming, but convertible into addiction-forming drugs, should not be limited to certain substances belonging to organic chemical groups, such as the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium and ecgonine alkaloids of the coca-leaf and some other limited groups. Problems arising from new discoveries may be met by quick measures which will be adopted under the more flexible new control scheme. By the suggested limitation of the control of non-addiction-forming drugs, Governments would be assured that such substances as coal tar and aspirin will not be liable to an undesirable and burdensome control regime.

Change of control regime

  1. What provisions should be made that drugs placed by the new convention under a more stringent regime can later be transferred, in the light of experience, to the group of drugs liable to the less stringent regime or vice versa. While the present system permits such change of regime for drugs which are not enumerated in article 1 of the 1931 Convention, but added to control by the procedure provided for by the 1931 Convention or by the 1948 Protocol, no such change of regime is possible for drugs already enumerated in article 1 of the 1931 Convention. If the new convention should enumerate some drugs which it places under control, in addition to unspecified substances which can be brought under control by some kind of procedure, it might be found necessary to permit a change of the control regime for both groups of drugs.

Flexibility of control regime

  1. Whether the convention should provide for two or three definite kinds of regime or for a more flexible system. The policy-making body may, for instance, be authorized, within limits set by the Convention, to name the individual control measures relating to the retail trade from which a given drug, found by the World Health Organization to have a very limited degree of addiction-forming qualities, may be exempted.

On the other hand, the policy-making body may be vested with the power - within limits set by the convention - of placing particularly dangerous drugs, again on the basis of an opinion of the World Health Organization, under additional restrictions. Drugs belonging to certain organic chemical groups, which are not addiction-forming in themselves, but easily convertible into dangerous drugs, could be placed under a more stringent regime than drugs slightly addiction-forming.

Factors in determining the control of a drug

Considerations which may guide the policy-making body in these decisions on the control regime are:

  1. Dangerous character of the drug itself;

  2. Facility of its convertibility into an addiction-forming drug;

  3. Dangerous character of the drug derived from the conversion of the non-addiction-forming drug;

  4. Medical use of the drug in question; a dangerous drug which is not widely used in medical practice may more easily be placed under a stringent regime.

A decision on the regime of a given drug should, therefore, take into account administrative factors as well as purely medical considerations and requirements. This would be assured if the decision on the control of a given drug and on its particular kind of regime were within the jurisdiction of a governmental body, such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Commission would, of course, have to base its findings on an opinion of the World Health Organization. The policy-making body will also be authorized to adopt provisional control measures pending the decision or examination of the World Health Organization, if the procedure of the 1948 Protocol is followed in this respect by the new convention.[231]

(bb) OTHER CHANGES OF THE CONVENTION

Since the creation of the League of Nations, six international conferences have been held to deal with the control of narcotic drugs. Two amendments, which were found desirable (date of communication of the statement issued by the Supervisory Body and control of paracodine) could not be carried out because of the complicated procedure involved in adopting such amendments.

Methods of amending the convention

After the end of the Second World War indispensable amendments had to be adopted (transfer of the League functions; synthetic drugs) by the method of emergency Protocols. The question arises whether some procedure cannot be introduced which, although in agreement with the nature of the society of States as a society of sovereign countries, would render more flexible the international law relating to the control of narcotic drugs. The 1931 and 1936 Conventions provide for international conferences for their revision.[232] Experience has shown that this method does not facilitate speedy adoption of changes which may become necessary to adapt the control system to changing conditions resulting from scientific progress and political developments.

Negative method

The following method of amending the new convention is suggested for consideration: the policy-making body is authorized to draft amendments which are to be submitted to the contracting parties. A country which does not, within a period fixed by the policy-making body, communicate its objection to the amendment is considered to have accepted it. If, within the given period, objections were not raised by a certain number of countries, including the countries whose co-operation is essential to the effectiveness of the international control, i.e., of the main manufacturing and producing countries, the amendment enters into force without, however, binding those countries which communicated their objections in time.[233] The period within which objections can be made would be fixed by the policy-making body with due consideration of the urgency of the proposed amendment. The convention may prescribe that the policy-making body cannot set this period at less than, e.g., three months.

Positive method

Another method would require the express acceptance of the proposed amendment by the contracting Governments; this method is, as experience has shown, not only time-consuming but sometimes defeats its own purpose. Thus, e.g., experience with the procedure instituted by the 1925 Convention for placing new drugs under control is by no means encouraging.[234] It therefore seems preferable to introduce a procedure stipulating that acceptance of an amendment by a country is assumed, if this country does not object within a certain period.

Question of ultra vires

The question would have to be examined whether such a provision would be consistent with the rules of national constitutions relating to the acceptance of international obligations. If this should not always prove to be the case, the new convention may stipulate that countries which indicate, at the time of the ratification of the new convention or at the time of amendments of their national Constitutions, that they are constitutionally unable to accept the procedure suggested for the amendment of the convention, are only obligated if they communicate their acceptance in accordance with their respective national constitutions.[235] Even if a few countries would have to give their express consent to a proposed amendment of the convention, this procedure would greatly facilitate the process of amending the convention and adapting it rapidly to changing conditions.

Precedent of article 21 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization

The acceptance of the Constitution of the World Health Organization seems, however, to indicate that the outlined procedure for the amendment of the new convention would not meet serious difficulties resulting from national Constitutions. According to article 21 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, the Health Assembly has authority to adopt regulations concerning, among other things, "sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease" and "advertising and labelling of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international commerce". These regula tions come into force for all members, except for such members as inform the Director-General of the World Health Organization of their rejection, within the period stated in the notification of the regulations.[236] These regulations may in some respects involve much more far-reaching measures than are usual in the field of control of narcotic drugs; particularly the regulations regarding advertising will affect the Press law of several countries.[237]

Facilities for constitutional emergencies

The adoption of this simplified procedure would facilitate the solution of problems likely to arise in situations of constitutional emergency.[238] If in some emergency the membership of the two new control organs cannot legally be renewed, the remaining old members may be authorized to continue functioning and to co-opt additional members, perhaps for a limited time to be determined by the new convention, until, by the simplified procedure, the necessary amendments can beadopted to create a new legal basis for the renewal of the membership of the control organs. It may be pointed out that the suggested procedure does not exclude the consultation of Governments on their views relating to the amendment in question before this amendment is submitted to them for acceptance or rejection. It may be assumed that in order to secure an acceptance the policy-making body will often desire to resort to this consultation.

Permission of initiative by all contracting countries

Other means may be studied to give Governments which will not be represented on the policy-making body the possibility of proposing amendments for acceptance by the contracting countries. Amendments submitted by national Governments would have to be placed on the agenda of the policy-making body, whether these Governments are represented on this body or not.

Vote of policy-making body on amendment

The new convention may also contain provisions as to the majority required for adoption of a draft amendment by the policy-making body. The question will have to be decided whether unanimity, qualified majority, or simple majority will be sufficient. It may be held that this problem should be solved in accordance with the importance of the amendment, certain amendments requiring unanimity, other amendments requiring qualified majority and others requiring a simple majority only.[239]

(f) GENERAL STATEMENTS OF THE EXISTENCE OF FACTS OR CONDITIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE CONDITIONS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NEW CONVENTION

In connexion with the duty of Governments to suppress opium smoking, international instruments have provided for the formal statement of certain conditions on which depend the final date at which the total work of opium suppression would have to be completed.[240] It is, of course, difficult to foresee what conditions, if any, will require formal statements under the provisions of the new convention to be concluded several years from now. The possibility cannot be excluded that certain reforms which are desirable may depend on developments which the drafters of the new convention will not be in a position to foresee exactly. It is, for instance, quite possible that future scientific progress may render any medical use of diacetylmorphine superfluous. A drug may be discovered which will have all the valuable medical properties of diacetylmorphine, without having its dangerous qualities. At the time when the international conference for the adoption of the convention meets, such a substance may already have been found, but its properties may still be disputed. The new convention can in this case provide that contracting parties undertake to prohibit the use of diacetylmorphine whenever the disputed qualities shall have been satisfactorily confirmed. This prohibition will involve the problem of disposal of existing stocks and perhaps of compensation for manufacturers and traders who are prevented from selling their stocks of diacetylmorphine. This example is not offered to make any suggestions on the existing controversy regarding diacetylmorphine; it is only desired to point out a problem which the drafters of the convention will face. If they adopt a solution similar to the one just mentioned, they will have to confer formal authority to state that the new drug in question has the desired qualities. If the World Health Organization will be called upon to decide on the medical properties of the new drug, it will still be necessary to determine whether the technical opinion of this organization means that the legal conditions set by the new convention are met. Furthermore, it may be necessary to set a date from which the time starts to run for the disposal of the existing stocks of diacetylmorphine. For a solution of this and other problems a procedure will have to be outlined for the formal statement of the existence of conditions on which such legal consequences as the prohibition of the use of diacetylmorphine depend. Organs which may be called upon to make such a statement are:

  1. The new administrative (semi-judicial) body, perhaps with qualified majority (unanimity, two-thirds or three-quarters majority);

  1. A committee of the chairmen of the policy-making and administrative bodies, and a third person chosen by agreement of the two chairmen;

  2. The Economic and Social Council (perhaps by qualified majority, e.g., two-thirds majority). This possibility may perhaps raise certain objections, but it would be in accordance with precedent[241] particularly if the decision is left to a committee appointed by the Council;

  3. The policy-making organ.

(g) SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ARISING IN REGARD TO THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE NEW CONVENTION

The Conventions dealing with narcotic drugs have different provisions for the settlement of disputes arising from their application and interpretation.[242] Different organs such as a conference of States to be called by the Dutch Government, a Technical Body to be appointed by the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and arbitral tribunals, including tribunals formed in accordance with the Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, are called upon to settle problems of application and interpretation. In two important cases in which the interpretation of provisions of the 1925 Convention was doubtful, none of the several methods provided by this Convention was followed (Technical Body, Arbitration, International Court of Justice). The Economic and Social Council, following the recommendation of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, adopted a resolution (123 (VI) (D)), which clarified the provisions of article 19 of the 1925 Convention, relating to the personal qualifications of the members of the Permanent Central Board.[243]

The long-standing controversy on the authenticity of the French or the English version of article 24 of the 1925 Convention did not find any solution. This experience seems to indicate that the present conventional means for the interpretation of disputed clauses did not prove very practical in these two cases.

Some of the methods of interpretation which may be considered are:

  1. The international administrative organ or the policy-making body may be authorized to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Such authority would, of course, require approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations.[244]

  1. A committee composed of the chairmen of the policy-making body and the administrative body, who are in office at the time when the dispute formally arises; a third person chosen by agreement of the two chairmen may be added to this committee; if no agreement can be reached, each of the two chairmen may nominate one person and the third member may be selected by lot.

  2. Interpretation by unanimous decision of the members of the new administrative (semi-judicial) body;

  3. Interpretation by a qualified (two-thirds) majority of a joint session of the policy-making and of the administrative bodies.

Another method of interpretation or settlement of disputes is that accepted by the International Postal Conventions since the early times of the international postal administration. Thus, e.g., the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union is authorized to give an opinion on disputed questions, on the demand of the parties to the dispute.[245]

(b) POLICY FUNCTIONS

Even the most perfect administrative machinery requires criticism of its work. Principles which may or may not be incorporated in a new convention will have to be discussed; the desirability of amendments and of simple administrative changes will have to be considered. Even judicial decisions may have to be criticized although no suggestion is made of any interference in pending judicial or semi-judicial procedures. Criticism of practices of national administrations need not necessarily be based on the provisions of the new convention, which, of course, cannot foresee all conceivable governmental actions or omissions that may add to the danger of narcotic drugs. In such cases the international control organ may adopt recommendations which, although they do not have legally binding character, will be of great moral value. These and other functions which may be summarized as policy-making or "parliamentary" functions, will properly fall within the jurisdiction of an organ composed of Government representatives, such as the present Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Organs such as the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly will continue to exercise their present functions as supreme policy-making organs of the international machinery for the control of narcotic drugs.

(i) ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS246

It is characteristic of the present control system that it is generally left to the national Governments to choose the economic means, although not always the administrative means, by which they desire to accomplish the purpose of the Conventions, i.e., the limitation of manufacture of, and trade in, narcotic drugs to medical and scientific needs, the suppression of non-medical consumption, and the establishment of control over the production and distribution of raw opium.[247]

The international organs are particularly not charged with the performance of economic functions such as fixing quotas of production, manufacture, export and import; nor with determining prices, maintaining international stocks, etc. But during the history of international control of narcotic drugs, many proposals were made for the performance of economic functions by international organs, such as:

  1. Allocation of production quotas of raw opium;[248]

  2. Allocation of export quotas of raw opium;[249]

  3. Approving a new basis on which the area to be sown with poppy shall be calculated in the future;[250]

  4. Agreeing to the amount of the "regulating" and "emergency" stocks of raw opium to be maintained by a contracting party and to their revision;[251]

  5. Consultation by contracting parties on arrangements for the reduction of excessive "regulating" and "emergency" stocks and on the increase of too-small regulating stocks;[252]

  6. Allocation of manufacturing quotas;[253]

  7. Regulation of prices of raw opium and price control of manufactured drugs;[254]

It is interesting to note that no agreement could be obtained on definite proposals for regulating prices; as was once stated "in view of the extreme intricacy of the question".[255]

  1. Establishing an international stockpile of narcotic drugs. 256 This proposal was one of the alternatives suggested by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its first session for application to Japan and, eventually, to Korea. The suggestion of a United Nations inspectorate which would have to sanction each individual import of narcotic drugs to Japan, and eventually to Korea, was the other alternative;

  2. Setting up an international selling office; 257

  3. Establishing a drug factory with a world monopoly of the manufacture of narcotic drugs. 258

  4. Establishing a world monopoly of raw materials and administering a commodity agreement on raw opium. 259

Influence of economic functions on international supervision

Serious difficulties will arise if an attempt is made to entrust a policy-making body, such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, or an administrative (semi-judicial) body such as the Permanent Central Board, with the above-mentioned or similar economic functions. Despite all efforts to reduce the number of international control organs to two bodies exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs it does not seem improbable that Governments would prefer to entrust a third body with such economic functions, if they decide to provide for functions of this kind in the new convention.

Draft Convention of 1939

When the composition of the controlling authority under the Draft Convention of 1939 (raw materials) was discussed, the representatives of Turkey and Yugoslavia insisted that the producing-exporting countries be represented. 260 Consuming countries also demanded representation. This induced the authors of the Draft Convention to suggest the creation of a new body, despite the opposition to such a proposal in view of the fact that three bodies already existed in the field.

Limitation Conference of 1931

When the international organ for the administration of the planned Convention for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs was discussed, which provided for the allocation of manufacturing quotas and, eventually, for the control of prices, the idea was brought forward that the constitution and maintenance of the international organ "will be a matter in the first instance for the consideration of the Governments of the supplying countries", i.e., of the manufacturing and exporting countries. 261 It was also suggested that this international organ might form a part of the organization of a manufacturers' association.

Weighted voting

The question of "weighted voting" will offer another thorny problem. It is very common that international economic organs, with real power, arrange the voting rights of the participating countries in proportion to their interests in the field. Difficulties of agreement on the structure of an international organ for the performance of economic functions may be responsible for the failure to assign such functions to international organs, although this assignment may otherwise be desirable.

Control and supervision of international economic organs

If an additional organ for the performance of economic functions is established, it will have to be under the supervision and control of the policy-making and semi-judicial bodies. Exact details of supervision and control cannot be proposed without reference to the particular economic functions which the new convention may assign to the new organ. It may be feasible to submit this organ to a control system, similar to that affecting national Governments and individual producers, manufacturers, and traders.

If, for instance, individual export or import transactions have to be submitted to the new administrative body for examination or approval before a national administration can grant an export or import authorization, then similar transactions of the international organ performing economic functions will have to be submitted to the administrative body for the same examination or approval before they can be carried out.

Other possibilities of supervision of an international economic organ may include such measures as:

  1. Participation of a member of the administrative (semi-judicial) body in the meetings of the economic organ, either with full voting rights, or in a deliberative capacity only. It may, for instance, be provided that the member of the semi-judicial body should be the chairman of the economic organ composed of an equal number of producing (exporting) and consuming countries in the case of an organ dealing with raw materials.[262]

  1. Decisions of the economic organ such as allocating production, manufacturing, and export quotas, or fixing prices, may require the consent of the administrative (semi-judicial) body or of a representative authorized by this body to give or refuse the consent. Such a provision would probably help to induce the representatives of particular interests on the economic organ to keep the general welfare in mind when making decisions.

These methods of assuring proper supervision of the work of the economic organ are perhaps not the best ones; they are only mentioned to indicate the intricacies of this kind of supervision.

Economic functions to be performed by existing specialized agencies

Certain economic functions which do not refer to the processes of production, manufacture, and distribution of narcotic substances, but which are, nevertheless, required for the accomplishment of the purposes of international control, represent an entirely different problem (e.g., granting loans to producing countries to facilitate the substitution of other crops for the opium poppy, or giving financial aid to Governments to assist them in their measures of rehabilitation of addicts). Existing international organizations (e.g., the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) may be called upon to assume these tasks.

  1. The Influence of Methods Developed by International Administration on the New Single Convention

Within the limits of existing Conventions the present system of control has on the whole been successful, particularly in the field of manufactured drugs; but much less so in the field of raw materials and crude drugs.[263] It is anticipated that organizational principles which have proved their value will be retained in the new single convention.

It should be mentioned in this connexion that the resolution of the Economic and Social Council[264] relating to the simplification of the international control of narcotic drugs, maintains the traditional division of functions between a policy-making body (Commission on Narcotic Drugs) on the one hand and administrative bodies with semi-judicial functions (Permanent Central Board and Supervisory Body) on the other hand.

It must be kept in mind that the international administration of narcotic drugs differs from the control of other commodities by its primarily social motivation. This partly explains why methods applicable to commodity agreements with their predominantly economic motivation have been generally not introduced into the field of international control of narcotic substances. On the other hand, suggestions were made to apply certain principles of the control of narcotic drugs to the control of armaments and atomic energy, these proposed controls having not only political, but also humanitarian aims.[265]

Part III GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE NEW CONTROL MACHINERY MAY BE BASED

  1. Use of Existing Organs[266]

UNITED NATIONS, OTHER EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the United Nations, which under the new single convention will retain its over-all jurisdiction over the control of narcotic drugs, several other organizations will have to be entrusted with functions relating to the control of narcotic drugs. They may be divided into two groups:

  1. Those organizations which may be expressly entrusted by the new convention with certain functions (the World Health Organization and perhaps the International Court of Justice);

  1. Those organizations which are not expressly charged by the new convention with the performance of functions. The convention will, perhaps, establish the necessary authority for entrusting existing organizations with the performance of tasks as they may arise. From the viewpoint of the narcotics administration it may be preferable that the performance, by international organizations, of control functions in the field of narcotic drugs be grounded on provisions of the new convention rather than on general provisions of their own constitutions or charters, provided that these constitutions permit the execution of the functions in question. In this case, eventual amendments will be under much closer control of persons familiar with the problems of narcotic drugs.

2. Special Organs for the Control of Narcotic Drugs267

In addition to the use of existing organs, the new convention will have to provide for special organs for the performance of its functions. In this respect, it might to a certain extent follow the existing Conventions. The following special organs exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs are envisaged:

  1. The policy-making body, the functions of which will be assigned to a commission of the Economic and Social Council, formed in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations (Commission on Narcotic Drugs);

  2. The semi-judicial body (administrative body) replacing the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body, perhaps to be known as the International Control Authority;

  3. International Conferences of States parties to the new convention, most probably not as a regular organizational feature of the new system of control; such conferences to be convened only when the need arises;

  4. Eventually, another organ for the performance of functions of economic administration, if such functions are provided for by the new convention.

It may be considered advisable not to refer in the new convention to such organs as the "Expert Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs" of the World Health Organization. The World Health Organization should be left free to organize, at its discretion and within its constitution, the performance of the functions assigned to it by the new convention.

  1. Government Representation on the Policy-making Body and Impartial Technical Character of the Administrative Body

GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION ON THE POLICY-MAKING BODY

It is anticipated that in accordance with the resolution of the Economic and Social Council[268] the Commission on Narcotic Drugs will be entrusted under the new single convention with the functions of a policy-making organ.

It might be advisable to insert in the convention provisions concerning the composition, constitution, powers, and functions of this Commission, taking into account the fact that it is also an organ of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Another method would be to insert recommendations concerning this matter in the Final Act of the Conference which will adopt the new convention. The legal aspects of this question and problems resulting from the dual character of the Commission as an advisory organ to the Economic and Social Council on the one hand and a treaty body on the other hand will require careful study. It is interesting in this connexion to mention that at its 8th session the Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution [199(VIII)] concerning the procedure for the election of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, amending the terms of the Council's resolution 9 (I) of 16 February 1946, under which the present Commission was constituted, as follows:[269]

"The Commission shall be composed of fifteen (15) Members of the United Nations which are important producing or manufacturing countries or countries in which illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem.

"The following ten (10) Members of primary importance in these fields are appointed to membership of the Commission for an indefinite period until such time as they may be replaced by decision of the Economic and Social Council: . . .

"The term of office of the other five (5) Members shall be three years. They shall be eligible for re-appointment. The following five Members are appointed to membership of the Commission for a period of three years: . . .

"The term of office of the Members of the Commission shall begin on the opening day of the first meeting of the session following their election and end on the eve of the first meeting of the session following the election of their successors."

INDEPENDENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS

The new convention will have to contain provisions concerning the composition, constitution, powers, and functions of the administrative (semi-judicial) organ and ensuring its technical independence. In this connexion due consideration should be given to the principles embodied in article 19 of the 1925 Convention concerning the independence of the Permanent Central Board and of its members; to the resolution of the Economic and Social Council, 123 (VI) of 2 March 1948, endorsing the opinion expressed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on the meaning of the provisions of this article which requires that members of the Board shall not hold any office which puts them in a position of direct dependence on their Governments; and to the terms of the administrative arrangement made in accordance with article 20 of the 1925 Convention between the Economic and Social Council and the Board [resolution 201 (VIII) ].

4. The United Nations as the Appointing and Financing Authority

The new convention should contain provisions concerning:

  1. The appointment of the members of the administrative (semi-judicial) body and the policy-making body by an organ of the United Nations (Economic and Social Council) ;

  2. The appointment and administrative control of the Secretariat of these bodies by the Secretary-General of the United Nations;[270]

  3. The financing (budget) of these bodies and their administrative services by the United Nations. The new convention should also stipulate that parties to the new convention which are not members of the United Nations will bear their share of the expenses in accordance with a scale to be drawn up by the competent organs of the United Nations.

5. Continuity of Functions of the Organs of Control

The nature of the work of international control of narcotic drugs requires that it must not be discontinued even for a short period. The new convention should contain provisions ensuring the continuous functioning of the international control machinery even in times of constitutional emergencies.[271]

6. Adjustment to Changing Conditions

The new convention should provide for the possibility of quick adjustment of its provisions to new developments. This not only applies to the substances which it will control and to control measures, but also to the organizational structure of the control machinery.

7. Indirect Administration

It may be assumed that the new convention will maintain the principle of indirect administration. This, of course, does not exclude certain changes in the existing system of control (right of inspection, commissions of inquiry, etc.).

8. Recognition of Regional Problems

The new convention may perhaps authorize the international control organs to deal with certain problems on a regional basis and to establish for this purpose the necessary regional machinery. Such authority does not involve the risk of unnecessary financial burdens; the General Assembly of the United Nations will be in a position to exercise control over budgetary appropriations for the execution of proposals of the control organs to create regional machinery. The possibility of Governments of countries in the region concerned contributing their share of the additional financial burdens should not be excluded.

9. Single Clearing House for all Communications between Governments and International Control Organs

The question has been discussed as to the advisability of having all communications (in duplicate) of national Governments addressed to one office (secretariat) which would route the communications to the appropriate control organ in accordance with the latter's jurisdiction (see part II, 1, ( d), ( aa), (x), last paragraph).

10. Principle of Universality

Experience has shown conclusively that by isolated efforts of Governments it is impossible to limit the use of drugs to medical needs only and to prevent their abuse by the illicit trafficker and the addict. The 1931 Convention therefore embodied the principle of universality by stipulating that from the moment of its entry into force its chief measures of control will apply not only to States parties but also to all States non-parties. This measure proved to be practical and its application very successful.

To maintain the principle of universality the new convention should provide:

  1. For free accession to the convention, recognizing only such limitations of this principle as may be required by compliance with the general principles and policy of the United Nations;

  2. For application of the administrative measures of the control organs and of the other provisions of the convention to all countries and territories ;

  3. For the entry into force of the new convention before its universal acceptance, as soon as a sufficient number of ratifications, including the ratification by countries whose participation is essential, ensures the possibility of universal application of the convention.

Contracting parties might also undertake to require, as a condition of recognition, that any new State accedes or at least expresses its willingness to accede to the new convention.

Part IV. OUTLINE OF THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATONAL CONTROL MACHINERY

The new convention may differentiate between:

  1. Organs not exclusively concerned with the international control of narcotic drugs, and

  2. Organs exclusively concerned with this control.

1. Organs not Exclusively Concerned with the International Control of Narcotic Drugs (a) UNITED NATIONS

The new convention may confer upon the United Nations the following functions:

  1. Initiative concerning improvements of the control system;

  2. Over-all supervision of its working;

  3. Co-ordination of the activities of the various control organs;

(This co-ordination may be entrusted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The convention may reserve his responsibility under the Charter to the appropriate organs of the United Nations.)

  1. Appointment of members of control organs and their staffs, e.g., the Economic and Social Council to appoint members of the administrative body and the policy-making body; the Secretary-General to appoint the members of the staff.

(b) WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

This organization may assume responsibility for decisions concerning the addiction-forming and addiction-sustaining properties of drugs. If different control regimes are maintained, the policy-making body may request the World Health Organization for an opinion concerning the regime under which a drug should be placed.

(c) INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The Court may be designated to:

  1. Settle disputes arising from the application of the convention and give advisory opinions on legal problems, unless another procedure is chosen for this purpose;[273]

  2. Decide on the removal of members of the administrative body.[274]

(d) OTHER ORGANS

The new convention may establish the legal basis for using other existing international organs for the performance of functions for which they are constitutionally and technically equipped. If such a general clause is adopted no further international organs need be expressly mentioned. -

2. Organs Exclusively Concerned with the Control of Narcotic Drugs

It has already been pointed out that definite proposals on the future organization of the international control machinery depend on the functions which will have to be carried out. The following outline of the organizational structure of the two control organs may offer a basis for discussion.

Assuming that an international administration of narcotic drugs will refrain from economic functions which, if necessary, might be entrusted to a special organ, the new convention should provide for two organs only:

  1. A policy-making organ; and

  2. An administrative organ (with semi-judicial functions).

The following problems will have to be settled in regard to these organs:

Appointment, tenure and renewal of the membership;

Personal qualifications of the members of the administrative organ;

Criteria for the selection of Governments represented on the policy-making organ;

Privileges, immunities, and remuneration of the members of the administrative organ;

Privileges and immunities of the control organs themselves;

Rules of procedure, including voting and quorum;

Financing of the work of the two organs;

Secretariat of the two organs;

Co-ordination of the work of the two organs and of other international organs concerned with the control of narcotic drugs;

Representation of the organs in their relations with other bodies.

(a) THE POLICY-MAKING ORGAN Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The functions of a policy-making organ may be assigned by the new convention to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council. This Commission was set up by the Economic and Social Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Composition, etc. of the Commission

As stated above[275] the inclusion in the new convention of provisions, or in the final act of recommendations, concerning the composition, constitution, functions, and powers of the Commission as policy-making body raises legal problems which will require further study.

Should constitutional difficulties arise ( e.g., by amendment of the Charter of the United Nations affecting the principle of Government representation on the policy-making body), provisions in the new convention should allow for the continuation of the functions of the Commission until these difficulties are removed.

Government representation on the Commission

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs should continue to be composed of Government representatives in a manner ensuring the representation of important producing and manufacturing countries and countries in which illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem (Economic and Social Council resolution 9 (I) of 16 February 1946). Consideration should be given to an equitable geographic distribution of the countries represented on the Commission.

Rules of procedure; financing

The rules of procedure of the Commission will be determined by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.The expenses of the Commission and its administrative services should be included in the budget of the United Nations.[276] The Secretary-General should be entrusted with the co-ordination of the work of the Commission, of the administrative (semi-judicial) body and of other international organs performing functions of control of narcotic drugs.[277]

(b) THE ADMINISTRATIVE (SEMI-JUDICIAL) BODY Administrative arrangements

The principle embodied in article 20 of the 1925 Convention concerning arrangements between the administrative body and the competent organ of the United Nations (Economic and Social Council) on problems relating to the organization of the work of the administrative body should be maintained in the new convention with such modifications as may be necessary.

Immunities and privileges

The problems relating to privileges and immunities of the administrative body and its members should be solved in the new convention.

Frequency of meetings

If the new convention does not contain provisions concerning the frequency of the meetings of the administrative body, settlement of this question may be left to the arrangements referred to above between the administrative body and the Economic and Social Council.

Appointment of members

The members of the administrative body should be appointed by the Economic and Social Council on the basis of nominations by Governments.

Continuity, tenure and constitutional emergencies

Each member should serve until he is constitutionally replaced. If a member is unwilling or incapable of serving, the administrative body may be authorized to co-opt a member to serve until the member who is unwilling or incapable of serving is legally replaced.

The present tenure of five years of membership on the administrative body may be retained. If for any reason the renewal of the membership of the administrative body becomes impossible, this body should continue in office until such time as its membership is renewed.

Personal qualifications of members

The new convention should provide for membership on the body of persons familiar with the problems of the manufacturing and producing countries and countries in which illicit traffic constitutes a serious social problem. In the performance of their functions they should be independent; should they have to serve on a full time basis, provision might be made concerning incompatibility of membership on the body with any other occupation, including active service in the employment of their Governments. Members should, however, be in a position to retain their governmental positions in inactive status ( e.g., leave of absence). Provision may also be required that the members, as a body, possess the necessary knowledge and experience to deal with legal, economic, medical, pharmacological, administrative, educational, and fiscal problems of drug control. As in the 1925 Convention, emphasis should be laid on the importance of technical competence, impartiality and disinterestedness of members as a condition for general confidence.

Removal from office

Consideration should be given to the inclusion, in the convention, of provisions stipulating that members of the administrative body, although, in principle, irremovable, could be removed from office should serious reasons make their membership on the body undesirable. The decision in this matter could be left under the convention to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations or the International Court of Justice, or perhaps to a joint session of the administrative body and the policy-making body. The Economic and Social Council should act in this matter on the unanimous recommendation of the administrative body, the member whose case is under consideration not participating in the vote. If the decision is left to a joint session of the administrative body and the policy-making body, unanimity should be required, the member whose case is under consideration not participating in the vote.

Number of members

The membership of the present Permanent Central Board is fixed at eight and that of the Supervisory Body at four. The number of members of the administrative body may be fixed at not less than eight and not more than twelve. It should be sufficient to allow for the representation of different geographical areas and of the skills necessary for the efficient performance of the functions of the administrative body.

Privileges, immunities, remuneration of members

The international conference on the new convention will also have to consider the problems of privileges, immunities, and remuneration of members of the body. In this respect the convention may provide for enjoyment of "diplomatic privileges and immunities" by the members[278] or for the enjoyment of such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions (functional approach to the problem).[279]

Remuneration in particular

The convention should provide for adequate remuneration of the members of the administrative body. This was proposed by the Second Opium Conference in 1925. Time has added to the validity of the reasons that prompted the Conference to formulate this proposal some twenty-five years ago. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (first and second sessions, 1946-47) took up this question and in the report to the Economic and Social Council[280] expressed the opinion that due to economic and social changes it is increasingly difficult to find qualified persons of independent financial means and in a position to serve on the Permanent Central Board without remuneration. The increase in the work of the administrative body (extension of control to synthetic drugs, additional duties under the new convention) will make this difficulty more acute.

Rules of procedure

The convention may authorize the body to draw up its own rules of procedure,[281] and to delegate powers to an executive committee, and may enumerate the cases in which unanimity or qualified majority is required for the adoption of decisions.

Quorum

If the convention requires a quorum it may also provide that this requirement be suspended if, due to a constitutional emergency, a renewal of membership is delayed or becomes impossible.

Financing

The problem of financing the work of the Permanent Central Board was not expressly regulated by the 1925 Convention.[282] The 1925 Conference requested the Council of the League to make the necessary financial arrangements.[283] It is suggested that a clause in the new convention should stipulate that the financing of the work of the new administrative body be ensured by and through the United Nations.

The convention should provide for refund to the United Nations of proportionate shares of the expenses by contracting parties who are not members of the United Nations.

Methods of allocating expenses

It is not, perhaps, necessary to refer in the convention itself to one of the differentmethods of allocating expenses to participants in international administration. Provision may be made for financing in constitutional emergencies.

Secretariat

As in the case of the Supervisory Body under the 1931 Convention, the secretariat of the administrative body may be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

  1. ORGAN ENTRUSTED WITH ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

Should the new convention set up a special organ entrusted with economic functions ( e.g., an international opium monopoly) it might be necessary to place it under the supervision of the policy-making body and/or the administrative body. Measures of supervision and control applicable to States parties to the convention should be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the "economic" organ.

  1. ORGANS OF NON-PERMANENT CHARACTER EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED WITH FUNCTIONS OF CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

(See part II, 1, ( f) and ( g).)

(e) REGIONAL ORGANS

Temporary or permanent regional organs, should they prove necessary, may be set up as sub-commissions (sub- committees) of the policy-making body and of the administrative body. No specific provision would be required for the establishment of such organs in a particular region; it would be sufficient to give the legal authority to make such decisions to:

  1. The policy-making body ( i.e., the Commission on Narcotic Drugs as an independent organ under the convention) ; or

  2. The policy-making body, subject to the approval of the Economic and Social Council; or

  3. The Governments of the region concerned, with the approval of the policy-making body. This approval would be required to make the regional organs (which can be created by Governments at their discretion provided they agree to bear the expenses of such organs) part of the world machinery for the control of narcotic drugs.

1

Document E/968, 13 August 1948, pp. 8, 9; E/SR.189, 3 August 1948, p. 15.

2

Document E/799, 28 May 1948, p. 27.

3

League of Nations documents: C.121.M.39.1930.XI, pp. 400-401; C.88.M.34.1931.XI, vol. I, pp. 59-60.

4

League of Nations document C. 509.M.214.1931.XI, vol. I,

5

M. Gaston Bourgois at the 24th session of the Committee: League of Nations document C.175.M.104.1939.XI, p. 5.

6

Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its first session, p. 26.

7

United Nations Official Records of the first part of the first session of the General Assembly. Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, p. 302.

8

Document A/C.5/SR.57, 7 October 1947; see also document A/C.5/W.37 of 6 November 1947.

9

Document E/SR. 130 and 131.

10

Document E/CN.7/S.R.W.68, 69, 70.

11

Official Records of the first part of the first session of the General Assembly. Plenary Meetings, p. 302; document E/SR. 131; resolution of ECOSOC (159 (VII) II, D); document E/ 968, p. 9; and E/CN.7/S.R.W.70; E/799, p. 27; see also E/CN.7/S.R.W.70.

12

S. H. Bailey, Anti-Drug Campaign, p. 121.

13

League of Nations document C.88.M.34.1931.XI. vol. I, pp. 59-60.

14

Another organ exclusively concerned with problems of narcotic drugs was the "Opium Sub-Committee" of the Health Committee of the League of Nations. The World Health Organization has, at present, an "Expert Committee on Habit-forming Drugs."

15

Article 21.

16

Articles 22 and 23.

17

Articles 22, 23 and 25.

18

Assembly resolution of 15 December 1920. League of Nations document 1 A.P., p. 538 (see section A (a), (aa), (dd)of this memorandum).

19

Articles 22, 23.

20

Article 24.

21

Article 295.

22

Article 247.

23

Article 230.

24

Article 174; see also article 280 of the Treaty of S?vres.

25

Article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles, article 381 of the Treaty of St. Germain, article 364 of the Treaty of Trianon, and article 296 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

26

David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, part I, p. 219.

27

League of Nations document I.A.P., p. 538.

28

Fifth report of the Drafting Committee of Committee II/3 of the San Francisco Conference, document WD 40 II/3/A/5, 26 May 1945; statements of the U.S., Canadian, Chinese, and Indian representatives in Committee II/3; verbatim minutes of nineteenth meeting, 4 June 1945.

29

Article 19 of the Palestine Mandate; article 12 of the Syria and Lebanon Mandate; article 9 of the Tanganyika, of the Ruanda-Urundi, of the British and French Cameroons, and of the British and French Togoland Mandates.

30

Article 6 (5).

31

Article 7 of the Agreements for Western Samoa, Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urtmdi, British Cameroons, British Togoland; article 6 of Agreements for French Cameroons, French Togoland, and New Guinea:

32

Article 6 (3).

33

Article 83 of the Charter.

34

Recommendation No. 10.

35

It is, of course, assumed that the League of Nations or the United Nations agreed to perform the conventional functions in question.

36

Article 13, 14, and 15 of the 1925 Agreement; last paragraph of the Final Act of the First Geneva Opium Conference of 1925. Articles 34, 35 (2), 36, 38, 39 of the 1925 Convention; section 3 of the Protocol of the Second Opium Conference of 11 February 1925, relating to a Commission to be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations; last paragraph of the Final Act of the Second Opium Conference of 1925. Articles 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 of the 1931 Convention; last paragraph of the Protocol of Signature of the 1931 Convention; last paragraph of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs. Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the 1931 Agreement; last paragraph of the Final Act of the Conference of 1931 on the Suppression of Opium Smoking. Articles

37

Article 37 of the 1925 Convention.

38

Article IV.

39

Article IX of the Protocol.

40

Article 10 of the 1925 Agreement; article 30 of the 1925 Convention; articles 21 and 23 of the 1931 Convention; article 16 of the 1936 Convention; and article 21 of the 1912 Convention, together with article III of the 1946 Protocol; article X of the 1925 Agreement (number of opium smokers).

41

Articles VI and IX of the Final Act (not transferred to the United Nations).

42

Article 10 of the 1925 Convention.

43

Article 11 of the 1931 Convention.

44

Articles 1, 2, 3 of the 1948 Protocol.

45

Article 5 (7, 8) of the 1931 Convention.

46

The English version is followed; if the French text is followed, this passage would have to read: "... are accumulating and thereby threaten to become a centre..."

47

Article 24 of the 1925 Convention; article 14 of the 1931 Convention.

48

Article 20 of the 1931 Convention.

49

Article 33 of the 1931 Convention; article 25 of the 1936 Convention.

50

Article 20 of the 1925 Convention; article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention.

51

Article V of the 1946 Protocol; resolution No. 54 (I) of the General Assembly. Articles 33 and 35 of the 1925 Convention, and article 27 of the 1931 Convention. Article 19 of the 1936 Convention.

52

Resolution 54 (I) of the General Assembly; articles 34, 35 as amended of the 1925 Convention, articles 29, 28, as amended, of the 1931 Convention, articles 20, 21 as amended, of the 1936 Convention.

53

Article 4 of the Covenant; similarly the Economic and Social Council is authorized to deal with social, health, and related matters including problems of narcotic drugs; Article 62 of the Charter.

54

Article 19 of the 1925 Convention.

55

Articles II and III of the Protocol of the First Opium Conference of 1925.

56

Article IV of the same Protocol.

57

Articles I and II of the Protocol of the Second Opium Conference of 1925.

58

Article V of the Final Act of the Second Opium Conference of 1925; League of Nations document A.7.1927.XI.

59

Article 32 of the 1925 Convention.

60

Article 20 of the 1925 Convention.

61

Article 20 of the 1925 Convention.

62

Section VII of the Final Act.

63

Articles 8 and 10 of the 1925 Convention.

64

Article VI of the Final Act.

65

Article 14 ( d) of the 1912 Convention. Recommendation No. III of the Final Act of the Conference of 1931, for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

66

Recommendation VII of the Final Act of the Conference of 1931 for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

67

Article 27 of the 1925 Convention.

68

Article 24 of the 1925 Convention, article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention; articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol of 19 November 1948.

69

Article 24 of the 1925 Convention, article 14 of the 1931 Convention, articles 1 and 2 of the 1948 Protocol.

70

Articles 33 and 35 of the 1925 Convention, articles 27 and 29 of the 1931 Convention; articles 19 and 21 of the 1936 Convention. These functions were transferred to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

71

Article IV of the Protocol.

72

Article 37 of the 1925 Convention.

73

Article 37 of the 1925 Convention as amended:

74

Article 2 and annex I, of the Protocol; see also resolution of the First General Assembly of the United Nations dated 12 February 1946, regarding the transfer of certain functions, activities and assets of the League of Nations; and, Arrangement concluded by the Governments represented at the International Health Conference dated 22 July 1946, section 2 ( d), ( e).

75

Articles 8 and 10 of the 1925 Convention. Article 11 of the 1931 Convention (original and amended versions).

76

Article VI of the Final Act of the Second Opium Conference.

77

Recommendation III of the Final Act of the Conference of 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

78

Recommendation X of the Final Act of the-Conference.

79

Article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention (original and amended versions).

80

Article 32 of the 1925 Convention, article 25 (2) of the 1931 Convention, article 17 of the 1936 Convention.

81

Article 25 of the 1931 Convention; article 17 of the 1936 Convention.

82

Article 49 of the Convention Postale Universelle of 5 July 1947; article 12 of the Arrangement concernant les Lettres et les Boites avec valeur d?clar?e of 5 July 1947, and article 16 of L'Arrangement concernant les Colis Postaux, of the same date.

83

See also article 20 of the Dispositions concernant le transport des Coils Postaux par voie A?rienne.

84

Final Protocol of the International Opium Conference of 1912, vol. I.

85

Article IV of the Protocol of the First International Opium Conference of 1925.

86

Article V.

87

Article 24.

88

Article 33 of the 1931 Convention and article 25 of the 1936 Convention.

89

Protocol of Signature of the 1931 Conference for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs; see also article 23 of the 1912 Convention and resolution III of the Final Protocol of the Second International Opium Conference of 1913.

90

League of Nations Official Journal, special supplement, January, 1921, pp. 21 and 22.

91

League of Nations document C.121.M.39.1930.XI, p. 390.

92

Herbert L. May, Fighting Dangerous Drugs, in "Windows on the World" (1939), p. 85.

93

Stuart J. Fuller, American Observer on the Advisory Committee, U. S. Department of State, Press Release of 5 February 1938.

94

Resolution 9 (1).

95

Documents E/SR 258 and E/SR 258/Corr; E/1175/Corr.1 and E/ll81/Rev. l: resolution adopted on 2 March 1949.

96

Articles 5 (6), 11 (4), and 21 of the 1931 Convention; article 2 of the Protocol of 1948.

97

Article 21 of the 1931 Convention.

98

Article 11 (4) of the 1931 Convention, see section A,2,e

99

Article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention.

100

Recommendation II of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

101

Recommendation VII of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

102

Recommendations X and XI of the Final Act of the International Conference of 1931 for the Suppression of Opium Smoking.

103

Recommendation 4 of the Final Act of the 1936 Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs.

104

1948 Protocol to bring under international control drugs outside the scope of the 1931 Convention, articles 1 and 2.

105

Article 19 of the 1925 Convention.

106

League of Nations Official Journal, minutes of the 11th session of the Council, p. 90.

107

Document E/750/Rev. 1, p. 3.

108

League of Nations document C.760.M.260.1924.XI., vol. 1, p. 471, vol. 2, p. 139.

109

Document E/575, pp. 86, 87, 23.

110

Resolution 123 (VI), D, ( b); document E/777, p. 29.

111

Resolution 123 (VI) (E); document E/777, p. 30.

112

Article 20 of the 1925 Convention. See the arrangement adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its 8th session: documents E/OB/4; E/1166; E/l166/Corr.1; E/SR/258 and E/SR/258/Corr.1.

113

L. E. S. Eisenlhor: International Narcotics Control, p.270.

114

This will also apply to drugs of group I of the Protocol of 1948.

115

Preparations containing drugs of group II of the 1931 Convention or of the 1948 Protocol are excluded (article 13 (2) (c) of the. 1931 Convention) from the Statistics on manufacture.

116

Drugs falling under group II of the 1931 Convention or of the 1948 Protocol are exempted from consumption statistics. The parties to the 1931 Convention undertook to treat solutions or dilutions of morphine or cocaine or their salts in an inert substance, liquid or solid, which contain 0.2 per cent or less of morphine, or 0.1 per cent or less of cocaine in the same way as preparations containing more than these percentages.

117

Statistics relating to imports and exports of drugs falling under group II of the 1931 Convention or of the 1948 Protocol may be sent annually instead of quarterly. No statistics need be sent on exports and imports of preparations containing drugs of group II.

118

Articles 22 and 23 of the 1925 Convention, articles 22 and 17 of the 1931 Convention.

119

Article 6 (2) of the 1931 Convention.

120

Articles 25 and 27 of the 1925 Convention.

121

Article 21 of the 1925 Convention. This provision retains no practical value except perhaps in regard to raw opium, coca leaves and medicinal opium.

122

Article 2 (1), (3), article 5 (1), (2), (4), (5), of the 1931 Convention; articles 1 and 2 of the 1948 Protocol.

123

Covered by the 1925 and 1931 Conventions and by the 1948 Protocol.

124

The term "contracting parties" may not always denote the same countries, depending on the drug involved (compare: article 24 of the 1925 Convention, article 13(1)(a) and article 14(3) of the 1931 Convention, and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol. In view of the wide acceptance of the 1925 and 1931 Conventions and of the hope that the 1948 Protocol will be equally generally accepted, this juridical complexity is fortunately not of great practical importance.

125

Article 24 of the 1925 Convention (English version).

126

Article 23 of the 1925 Convention.

127

Articles 24 and 26 of the 1925 Convention, article 13 (1) (a) of the 1931 Convention, and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

128

Article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention (see League of Nations document C.191.M.136.1937.XI., p. 190); article I of the 1948 Protocol.

129

For difficulties as to the timing of this publication, see League of Nations document C.364.M.185.1935.XI. pp. 6, 7.

130

Article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

131

Article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention.

132

Document E/799, 28 May 1948, p. 24.

133

Document E/1065, 30 August 1948, p. 46.

134

Article 5 of the 1931 Convention.

135

League of Nations document C.580.M.219.1926.XI.

136

The Agreements of 1925 and 1931 contain limited "colonial clauses", which apply to protectorates only (article 13 of the 1925 Agreement, article 5 of the 1931 Agreement).

137

The Turco-Yugoslav Agreement establishing a "Central Opium Bureau" offers another example of a regional approach, which has some bearing on the international control of narcotic substances.

138

Article 14 ( d).

139

Article 10.

140

Article 11 of the 1931 Convention, article I of the 1948 Protocol.

141

Article 1 of the 1925 Agreement and article 1 of the 1931 Agreement.

142

League of Nations document C.121.M.39.1930.XI. p. 400.

143

League of Nations document C.175.M.104.1939.XI. p. 4.

144

Ibid., p. 16.

145

Ibid., p. 17.

146

Ibid., p. 20.

147

Recommendation IV of Final Act of the Conference of 1931 for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, etc.

148

Report of the first session of the Commission on Narcotic

149

League of Nations document O.C./sc.L/I.

"SANCTIONS"

150

Articles 24 and 26 of the 1925 Convention, article 13 of the 1931 Convention, article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

151

Article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol. The measures under article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention can be taken against contracting parties only.

152

Article 18 of the 1925 Convention, article 13 of the 1931 Convention, and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

153

Article 14 (1) of the 1931 Convention, article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

154

Article 36 of the 1925 Convention; article 30 of the 1931 Convention; article 6 of the 1948 Protocol; see also article 22 of the 1936 Convention.

155

League of Nations document O.C. 669.

156

Article 24 of the Covenant, Article 63 of the Charter.

157

Article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention.

158

Article 20 of the 1925 Convention.

159

It is of course assumed that the drug in question belongs to the group of phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf (article 11 of the 1931 Convention);

160

Article 10 of the 1925 Convention.

161

See also Process-verbal of 26 June 1936, which was, however, signed at the International Conference of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic.

162

The Protocol on paracodine was to be adopted by a conference of States: document C.202.M.131.1939.XI., p. 18.

164

Article 24 of the 1912 Convention, article 32 of the 1925 Convention, article 25 of the 1931 Convention, article 17 of the 1936 Convention.

165

Documents O.C.669, p. 3; C.557.M.199.1927.XI, p. 44; C.328.M.88.1928.XI, p. 102; E/O.B./W.63, p. 5, etc.

168

Article 11 of the 1931 Convention and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

166

Technical Courts often have members who are not lawyers .

167

It is true that, in practice, the Board does not impose the embargo in cases where the excess is unimportant. This practice does not change the obligatory character of the embargo under article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention, but may perhaps be justified by the rule De Minimis non curat praetor.

168a

The Commission, by drawing up the form, determines the details of information which contracting parties are under obligation to furnish under article 21 of the 1931 Convention. The same function could be performed by legislative procedures.

169

The 1948 Protocol designates the Economic and Social Council (article 5).

170

In accordance with resolution 159 (VII), II, D of the Economic and Social Council, this study proceeds on the assumption that the new convention will provide for two organs (1) the policy-making body, (2) the administrative (semi-judicial) body.

171

Article 19 of the 1925 Convention; article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention; see also article 9 of the Draft Convention of 1939 on the appointment of the members of the Controlling Authority. The legal uncertainties resulting from the omission of the 1931 Convention to define the tenure of office of the members of the Supervisory Body will have to be taken into consideration.

172

In the event of the policy-making body being a commission of the Economic and Social Council this may be considered for "emergency" situations only. The problem of providing, in the new convention, for constitutional details (composition, qualifications, immunities, privileges of members) of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs will be discussed in a later section.

173

This may not be necessary in the case of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

174

Article 19 of the 1925 Convention; article 24 (6) of the 1925 Convention; article 24 (7) of the 1925 Convention; as regards the policy-making body this may be necessary only in the event of a constitutional emergency.

175

Article 20 of the 1925 Convention; article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention.

176

Article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention.

177

Recommendation 4 of the Final Act of the 1936 Conference; see also article VIII of the 1925 Agreement and article VIII of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference for the Suppression of Opium Smoking.

178

Recommendation VIII of the Final Act of the Conference of 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

179

See, for example, article 1 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development referring to "development of territories".

180

This was the legal opinion of the Second International Opium Conference of 1925; recommendation VII of the Final Act; see also article 13 of the 1931 Convention.

181

Article 17(3) of the Charter of the United Nations.

182

E.g., see article 19 of the Agreement for the Regulation of Production and Export of Rubber (1934 and 1938 versions); article 17 of the Agreement of 1942 for the International Control of the Production and Export of Tin; Agreement on a Tin Research Scheme; etc.

183

E.g., resolution X of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference for the Suppression of Opium Smoking; resolution 159 (VII), II, C. of the Economic and Social Council, dealing with Methods of Determining the Origin of Opium; see documents E/CN.7/117 and addenda, E/CN.7/159 and addenda; resolution F of the Economic and Social Council of 6 July 1949, document E/1459.

184

The aid of private endowment funds may also be considered.

185

An international seminar for the training of national administrators represents another possibility of technical aid.

186

See document C.774.M.365.1932.XI.

187

See part II, 1, (b).

188

See part I, A, 1, (b), (bb), (i).

189

Article 15 of the 1931 Convention; article 11 of the 1936 Convention; see also recommendation I of the Final Act of the International Conference of 1931 for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, asking Governments to consider the desirability of establishing a "single authority" and to report on the results of the study.

190

Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the draft convention.

191

Article 5 (3) (i) (ii), article 8, 18 of the Draft Convention of 1939.

192

Document C.175.M.104.1939.XI, p. 7; chapter VII of the Draft Convention of 1939.

193

Article 14 (1) of the 1931 Convention.

194

Article 20 of the 1931 Convention.

195

Article 23 of the 1931 Convention; article 22 (1) (e) of the 1925 Convention.

196

Article 18 of the 1925 Convention.

197

Part I, A, 1, (b) (bb), (i); recommendation VI of the Final Act of the Conference of 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

198

See also article I of the 1948 Protocol.

199

Article 21; see also article 25 of the 1925 Convention.

200

Excepting, of course, information needed by the administrative (semi-judicial) body in the course of an individual enforcement case.

201

Article 5 (1) of the 1931 Convention; article 21 of the 1931 Convention; see also article 4 of the Draft Convention of 1939 and resolution XI of the Final Act of the International Conference of 1931 on the Suppression of Opium Smoking.

202

Article VIII of the 1925 Agreement; article VIII of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference on the Suppression of Opium Smoking. There exist several bilateral agreements on the exchange of police information.

203

Article 5 (7).

204

Document C.191.M.136.1937.XI., pp. 237-238.

205

Article 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention.

206

See, however, resolution V of the Final Act of the Second International Opium Conference of 1925 (Commissions of Inquiry).

207

Article 27 of the 1925 Convention; articles 5 (7), 14 (3) and 21 of the 1931 Convention etc.; see also articles 11 and 19 of the Draft Convention of 1939.

208

See article 37 of the 1925 Convention.

209

See also recommendation IX of the Final Act of the 1931 Conference for Limiting the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs.

210

See article 27 of the 1925 Convention and article 14 (last paragraph) of the 1931 Convention.

211

Articles 22 and 23 of the 1925 Convention.

212

Article 24; article 26 of the 1925 Convention; and article 14 of the 1931 Convention.

213

article 5 (6) (7) (8) of the 1931 Convention.

214

Article 10 of the Draft.

215

Articles 13 and 11 of the 1931 Convention.

216

See article 2 (3) of the 1931 Convention; article I of the 1948 Protocol and article 3 (3) of the Draft Convention of 1939.

217

E.g., see controversy on the different Wording of the English and French texts of article 24.

218

Article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention.

219

Article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention; article 24 of the 1925 Convention.

220

Article 24 of the 1925 Convention, article 14 (3) of the 1931 Convention.

221

Article 14 (2) of the 1931 Convention.

222

In the case of embargo "recommendation".

223

This right may be considered to be implied in the right of criticism; see part II, 1, ( d), ( cc).

224

Articles 2 (2) (3) and 5 (6) of the 1931 Convention; articles 3 (3) and 10 (2) of the 1939 Draft.

225

Article 11 of the 1931 Convention; articles 1 and 2 of the 1948 Protocol; article 8 of the 1925 Convention; see also notification of the acceptance, by a contracting party, of the Recommendation of the World Health Organization to place a new drug under control; article 10 of the 1925 Convention.

226

Article 2 (1) and article 3 of the 1931 Convention. Articles 3 and 7 of the 1939 Draft.

227

Article 5 (3) (i) (ii) of the 1939 Draft. It is assumed on the basis of article 8 of the draft that importing countries would have been bound by such statements as modified by the allocation made by the International Control Authority under article 13 of the draft.

228

Article 10 of the 1925 Convention.

229

Article 14 ( d) of the 1912 Convention; articles 8 and 10 of the 1925 Convention; article 11 of the 1931 Convention; and article 1 of the 1948 Protocol.

230

Article 2 of the 1948 Protocol.

231

Article 2 of the 1948 Protocol.

232

Article 33 of the 1931 Convention; article 25 of the 1936 Convention.

233

See the different approach of the Universal Postal Convention, articles 21 to 25.

234

Article 10 of the 1925 Convention.

235

There may be a certain danger that some countries will interpret their Constitutions in a narrow sense in order to be able to make such a reservation.

236

Article 22 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization.

237

Limitation of such constitutional rights as personal liberty may also be involved.

238

See part II, 1, (b).

239

See, for different classes of amendment: articles 21-25 of the Universal Postal Convention.

240

Articles I and II of the Protocol of the Second International Opium Conference of 1925; articles III and IV of the Protocol of the First International Opium Conference of 1925; see part I, A, 1, (b), (bb), (ii), the section dealing with the Economic and Social Council (Council of the League).

241

Articles I and II of the Protocol of the Second International Opium Conference of 1925; articles III and IV of the Protocol of the First International Opium Conference of 1925.

242

Article 24 of the 1912 Convention; article 32 of the 1925 Convention; article 25 of the 1931 Convention; article 17 of the 1936 Convention.

243

See part I, A, 2, (b).

244

Article 96 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations.

245

245 Article 26 of the Universal Postal Convention, signed in Paris in 1947. The Bureau is the Executive Office of the Union.

246

See part I, B, 9.

247

See, however, article I of the 1925 Agreement and article I of the 1931 Agreement.

248

Article 17 of the 1939 Draft.

249

Articles 12, 13, 14 of the 1939 Draft (quota system); article 15 (free order system); article 16 (both systems).

250

Article 21 of the 1939 Draft.

251

Articles 24 and 26 of the 1939 Draft.

252

Articles 25 and 26 of the 1939 Draft; i.e., of stocks above or below the determined level.

253

Report of the Sub-Committee on Limitation of Manufacture to the 13th session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. League of Nations document C.121.M.39.1930.XI. p. 400; Draft Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, drawn up by the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs at its 14th session; articles 8, 9, and 10; League of Nations document C.509.M.214.1931.XI.v.I, pp. 281 and 282.

254

Chapter 12 of the Draft Convention of 1939; article 20 of the Draft Convention for Limiting the Manufacture. Drawn up by the 14th session of the Advisory Committee; League of Nations document C.509.M.214.1931.XI.v.I. p. 285.

255

Report to the Council on the plan drawn up by the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, with a view to the Limitation of Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs. League of Nations document C.509.M.214.1931.XI.v.I. p. 296.

256

Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its 1st session, pp. 55 to 59.

257

League of Nations document C.175.M.104.1939.XI. p. 4.

258

League of Nations document O.C/SC.L/I; see part I, B, 9; report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, of the American Association for the United Nations, on independent sources of revenue for the United Nations, pp. 3 and 4.

259

See document E/CN.7/155, pp. 149 and 151.

260

League of Nations document C.175.M.104.1939.XI. p. 5.

261

League of Nations document C.121.M.39.1930.XI. p. 400.

262

A similar composition was suggested for the Controlling Authority of the Draft Convention of 1939. League of Nations document C/175.M.104.1939.XI. p. 5.

263

See part II, 1, (b).

264

Resolution 159 (VII) II, D.

265

League of Nations document D.159; Prof. Joseph P. Chamberlain "Legal Implications of International Control of Atomic Energy", in "Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1946)" pp. 89-102; Herbert L. May, "Narcotic Drugs and Atomic Energy: Analogy of controls", 1946.

266

See part I, B, 1.

267

See part I, B, 2, 3.

268

Resolution 159 (VII) II D.

269

Document E/1205.

270

Article 20 of the 1925 Convention and article 5 of the 1931 Convention.

271

Part IV, 2, ( a) and ( b).

272

Estimates, embargoes, etc. See part I, B, 10.

273

Part II, 1, ( g).

274

Part IV, 2, ( b).

275

See part III, 3.

276

It has been suggested that provision should be made for financial contributions of contracting States which are not members of the United Nations.

277

See part IV, l, ( a).

278

Article 7 of the League Covenant; article 19 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

279

Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations.

280

Report of Sub-Committee A, adopted 2 February 1925; League of Nations document C.760.M.260.1924.XI, vol. I, p. 471, vol. II, p. 139. See also Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its first session, document E/251, p. 7; Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its second session, document E/575, p. 23; Resolution of the Economic and Social Council 123 (VI) of 2 March 1948.

281

These rules may also provide for the officers of the body (President, Vice-President).

282

Indirectly perhaps by article 20.

283

Resolution VII of the Final Act.