Monitoring and Tackling Corruption

Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI)

22 September 2016
UNCAC Multi-stakeholder workshop, Vienna
Rethinking corruption measurement and understanding why anticorruption policies don’t work

• Corruption decline is very slow in SEE for 2001-2016 and the reason is not the lack of anti-corruption legislation.
• Administrative corruption is making way to the high-level political corruption and state capture.
• Assessing, monitoring of AC policies and policy tools is important in order to understand corruption dynamics.
• Deep understanding of national-level AC policies requires studying and monitoring how these policies are implemented at the level of particular public organizations.
• We cannot really understand corruption without understanding the failure of anti-corruption in SEE.
Effects from the monitoring

• Transparency (open data)
• Accountability for promises made
• Responsibility from the government
• The monitoring and control improve the quality of public policies
• It allows wider participation
• Instrument for agreement between all stakeholders
• Supports the building of strategic vision
### CSOs’ role: Monitoring anticorruption policies and legislation at all levels

#### Macro level policies
- **Principles of governance**
  - Monitored by CSOs' analysis (e.g. SELDI CMS; RAI's methodology, etc.)

#### National policies
- **Standards for operation of the administration and strategies**
  - Monitored by CSOs' analysis (e.g. SELDI CMS; CSD's indicators for evaluation of Anti-Corruption Strategies)

#### Policies/measures at public organization level
- **General and specific rules for operation in concrete situations**
  - Monitored by CSOs' analysis of the anti-corruption procedure at organizational level (e.g. CSD's MACPI tool)
Assessment of the public policies

• Assessment of the process and its content – does the AC programme/strategy functions as planned?
• Cost-benefit analysis – efficiency of the AC measures and recommendations for better alternatives
• Assessment of the results – quality; unexpected effects
• Impact assessment – if the programme did not exist?
• Social analysis of the concerned groups
Specific objectives of the Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI)

To build an anti-corruption and good governance coalition of CSOs in SEE

To enhance CSOs capacity, knowledge and commitment to provide analysis, monitoring and advocacy

To promote the state-civil society dialogue and improve the environment for civil activism

To contribute to an enhanced cross-country public/civic support and participation for good governance and anti-corruption

To help the CSOs to improve their legitimacy, transparency and accountability
The partners of the SELDI initiative include:
1. Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria, (SELDI Secretariat)
2. Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER), Albania
3. House of Europe (HoE), Albania
4. Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN), Bosnia and Herzegovina
5. Partnership for Social Development (PSD), Croatia
6. INSTITUTI RIINVEST, Kosovo
7. “Syri i Vizionit”, Kosovo
8. Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC), FYR of Macedonia
9. Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ Skopje (IDSCS), FYR of Macedonia
10. Ohrid Institute for Economic Strategies and International Affairs, FYR of Macedonia
11. Center for Democratic Transition, Montenegro
12. Institute Alternative, Montenegro
13. Romanian Academic Society (SAR), Romania
14. Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies (CLDS), Serbia
15. Forum of Civic Action FORCA Pozega, Serbia
16. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, Turkey
17. Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Turkey

Associated partners:
18. Albanian Media Institute (AMI), Albania
19. Institute for Democracy and Mediation, Albania
20. Center for Civil Society Development in BiH, Bosnia and Herzegovina
21. Regional Anticorruption Initiative (RAI) Secretariat, SEE
22. Institute of Public Finance, Croatia
23. Lëvizja FOL, Kosovo
24. Organization for Democracy, Anti-corruption and Dignity - ÇOHU!, Kosovo
25. The Centre for the Analysis and Prevention of Corruption (CAPC), Moldova
26. The Network for Affirmation of the NGO Sector – MANS, Montenegro
27. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Serbia
28. Educational centre – Krusevac, Serbia
29. Proaktiv, Serbia
Structure of the Corruption Monitoring System

- **Experience based corruption indexes**
  - Corruption pressure
  - Involvement in corruption

- **Attitude based corruption indexes**
  - Awareness (identification of corruption)
  - Acceptance (tolerance) of corruption
  - Susceptibility to corruption

- **Assessments of the corruption environment indexes**
  - Likelihood of corruption pressure
  - Corruptness of officials
  - Feasibility of policy responses to corruption

(SELDI.net: Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity
CSD: Center for the Study of Democracy)
Main Topics / Reports’ Structure

1. Institutional and Legal Environment for Curbing Corruption
2. Civil Society and the Fight against Corruption
3. Reforming the Judicial System
4. Curbing Corruption in the Economy of SEE countries
   Special focus:
   - Hidden economy
   - Governance of the energy sector (or other corruption risk sectors)
5. International Cooperation
6. Regional Corruption Monitoring
7. Conclusions
Experience with corruption

• All indexes are based on population surveys, conducted in each of the SELDI countries with at least 1000 respondents, representative samples and identical methodology which allows cross-country comparisons.

• **Experience** based corruption indexes are built upon victimization-like questions which reflect actual experiences – being asked for a bribe (Corruption pressure) or/and giving one (Involvement in corruption).

• **Corruption pressure** is the main indicator not only for the levels of administrative corruption in a country, but for the overall corruption environment in a country.

• Corruption pressure is highly correlated with actual transactions (Involvement in corruption). It is the preferred indicator from the two experience based indicators.
Regional anti-corruption report

anticorruption reloaded

Assessment of Southeast Europe
Corruption pressure and involvement in corruption (2016)

% of the population 18+ who have been asked to give and have given a bribe (money favour, gift) in the last year

- **Albania**: Pressure (40%) and Involvement (50%)
- **Macedonia**: Pressure (30%) and Involvement (29%)
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**: Pressure (33%) and Involvement (28%)
- **Bulgaria**: Pressure (24%) and Involvement (22%)
- **Kosovo**: Pressure (27%) and Involvement (22%)
- **Montenegro**: Pressure (22%) and Involvement (22%)
- **Serbia**: Pressure (23%) and Involvement (19%)
- **Turkey**: Pressure (11%) and Involvement (9%)
- **Croatia**: Pressure (9%) and Involvement (12%)

## Resilience to Corruption Pressure

(AMONG THOSE PRESSURED INTO Bribing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bribed because Pressured</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Did not Bribe, despite Pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herze</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2016, base: respondents who experienced corruption pressure
Involvement in corruption with or without corruption pressure

(% of the population 18+, who have given a bribe with or without corruption pressure)

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Corruption activities and pressure – citizens’ involvement in corruption transactions

• In some cases transactions are admittedly initiated by citizens, without being pressed.

• The reasons are probably a complex combination of:
  – corruptness of the environment (if everyone is considered corrupt, people might try to give a bribe without pressure just to appease),
  – levels of corruption pressure (if the pressure is declining very fast, the citizens might try to initiate the transaction themselves in particular if they have done or ask for something undue),
  – effectiveness of the law enforcement (if the law enforcement is effective or the punishment is very severe, people might avoid offering bribes themselves, without indication that these bribes are expected and would be accepted by the official).
Corruption pressure, % (2014 and 2016)

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Corruption Pressure Bulgaria 1999 - 2016

% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour)

Corruption pressure
Corruption Pressure
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001 - 2016

% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour)

- 2001: 41%
- 2002: 49%
- 2011: 59%
- 2014: 23%
- 2016: 33%

Corruption pressure
Feasibility of policy responses to corruption (%)

(% of the population 18+)

- **Turkey**: 37% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 54% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 8% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Montenegro**: 42% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 52% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 6% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**: 50% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 45% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 4% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Croatia**: 55% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 44% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 1% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Serbia**: 62% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 38% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 0% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Kosovo**: 63% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 35% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 2% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Macedonia**: 63% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 35% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 2% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Bulgaria**: 67% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 30% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 3% (Don't know/No answer)
- **Albania**: 76% (Corruption can not be substantially reduced), 22% (Corruption can be substantially reduced or eradicated), 2% (Don't know/No answer)

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Monitoring Anti-Corruption in Europe
Bridging Policy Evaluation and Corruption Measurement

Monitoring Anti-Corruption in Europe

A project implemented by a consortium led by the Center for the Study of Democracy
Key recommendations

Deliver effective prosecution of high-level corruption

- Sentencing of corrupt politicians from the top political echelon provides a strong example for everyone and have proven very effective in strengthening anti-corruption measures in Croatia and Slovenia.

Adopt an independent corruption and anti-corruption monitoring mechanism

- The mechanism should be implemented through national and/or regional civil society network(s), and should be independent of direct national government funding. It should serve as a vehicle for opening up administrative data collection and public access to information.

Anti-corruption efforts should be focused on critical sectors

- Energy, public procurement, corporate governance of state owned enterprises, large-scale investment projects.
Thank you!

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