THEMATIC EVALUATION OF
THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO
AFGHANISTAN BY THE UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

Volume 1
Consolidated Evaluation Report

Independent Evaluation Unit
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Independent Evaluation Unit
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Volume 1: Consolidated Evaluation Report on the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Volume 2: Alternative Livelihoods Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan

Volume 3: Law Enforcement Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan

Volume 4: Rule of Law Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan

Volume 5: Drug Demand Reduction Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan

Volume 6: Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan

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The team would like to thank all who collaborated in the evaluation.

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Foreword

Afghanistan today produces 93 per cent of the world’s opium, and the country is beset with enormous challenges of reconstruction, state-building, development, weak governance, corruption and a deteriorating security situation. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the international community work under extreme difficulties. There are many sensitivities associated with operating in Afghanistan, and in undertaking this evaluation, the Independent Evaluation Unit was very much aware of the risk it was taking. It was always clear that given the diversity of views, ideological conflicts and different and sometimes competing interests, the products of this evaluation would be unlikely to be universally accepted.

The challenge of any evaluation is always to balance, on the one hand, evidence, objectivity and impartiality and, on the other, the sensitivities and the diverse expectations of stakeholders. Afghanistan is a flagship country programme of UNODC and the subject of the largest and most complex evaluation that the Independent Evaluation Unit has ever undertaken since 2003. The evaluation was bound to generate a lot of heat, as evidenced by the many pressures on the evaluators to massage messages that are viewed as being negative.

The results of the evaluation presented in this report confirm that UNODC has delivered to the people of Afghanistan through the Government, other national institutions and non-governmental organizations under very difficult conditions. The evaluation shows that UNODC works in partnership with the Afghan Government. This synthesis report provides only highlights of various snapshots from the five thematic areas of a very complex situation in Afghanistan and must be read together with the detailed thematic evaluation reports. The evaluation assesses the work of UNODC in building the capacity of Afghanistan government agencies. The evaluation makes a very bold conclusion that United Nations organizations are competing with each other for resources rather than working as “One United Nations”. It recommends that the United Nations and the international community as a whole should coordinate their efforts to build the capacities of the Government of Afghanistan in addressing the challenges of counter-narcotics, reconstruction and State-building.

It is my hope not only that UNODC, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community will find these reports useful but also that the recommendations will make a practical contribution to assisting delivery in Afghanistan. Many of the recommendations made here are deliberately not prescriptive but propose alternatives for consideration by those who know the situation better. I am also aware that many developments have taken place since the evaluation fieldwork was undertaken in mid- to late 2007. Some developments were already in the pipeline during the evaluation, and still others were initiated or triggered by the evaluation questions or discussions held due to this evaluation. I strongly commend and congratulate the programme management for having already taken action on those ideas triggered by this evaluation. The value of any evaluation is in its utility. The fact that some of the recommendations made here may already be in the process of being adopted or implemented does not render this report obsolete but, rather, reinforces the importance of these findings.
I proudly present these evaluation reports to the UNODC management both at headquarters and in the field, the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, donors and the international community at large in the hope that a diversity of ideas, views and experiences will help UNODC deliver better.

Backson Sibanda
Chief
UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit
Executive summary

For two centuries, Afghanistan was a buffer zone between contending international powers rather than a nation State. Resistance to the Soviet invasion during the Cold War and the following acute civil conflict have, over the past 30 years, wreaked havoc with vital infrastructure and weakened the precarious social contract between centre and periphery. Afghanistan today produces 93 per cent of the world’s opium and poses enormous challenges to reconstruction and state-building. Among the interrelated challenges are corruption, weak governance and poor security.

The following pages report on the results of an in-depth thematic evaluation of the response of UNODC to those challenges over the period from December 2001 to March 2007. This is the first technical assistance evaluation of a country programme conducted by UNODC. The present evaluation examines, in turn, efforts to build the capacity of Afghanistan government agencies via five subprogrammes: alternative livelihoods, rule of law, law enforcement, drug demand reduction and illicit crop monitoring.

The role of UNODC in alternative livelihoods (alternative development) over the years has been small vis-à-vis the magnitude of both poppy cultivation and donor contributions. Training and networking have been important project activities and have undoubtedly raised the profile of alternative development. Yet it is too soon to judge their long-term impact in a milieu where the alternative development concept is not integrated into incipient institutions. To be more effective, UNODC is encouraged to shift from a mostly project-level focus towards one that identifies interventions to influence national strategy and policy. Formal partnering with entities versed in Afghan rural development and more emphasis on work at the provincial level and “below” might also be considered.

In the area of rule of law, UNODC has worked across a broad functional spectrum: juvenile justice reform, prison reform, prison construction, post-release opportunities, criminal justice capacity-building and development of a Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force. UNODC has been a pioneer of justice sector reform, a milieu in which other agencies were absent or balked at involvement. The drafting of legislation, with backing from UNODC headquarters, is a significant achievement, as is the development of a juvenile justice administration and court system, in a milieu which previously had treated juveniles as adults. Both are likely sustainable.

Some of the work in prison construction and refurbishment remains incomplete, but could also be sustainable if funding is made available for completion and if that funding is used as intended. UNODC has tended to initiate these projects without guarantee of funding for completion. As happened with other subprogrammes, the amount of training was sometimes inadequate given the national need.

Work by UNODC in law enforcement sheds immediate light on the country’s challenges. Here, corruption is a major obstacle. Although projects have helped instil awareness among police and government officials of what needs to be done, the results remain small relative to the growing magnitude of the country’s traffic in illegal narcotics. It is clear that counter-narcotics policing is currently inadequate to
meet the challenge. Despite initial efforts by UNODC, much upgrading of the
Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) laboratory is required for it to
meet international standards. Cross-border cooperation with Pakistan and the
Islamic Republic of Iran remains weak, and there is a need in general for better
coordination between UNODC and other donors on parallel law-enforcement
activities. The scale of the illegal narcotics problem, when weighed against the time
required to develop an adequate police capacity to address it, is an argument in
favour of considering the presence of international police mentors.

Drug demand reduction also has its challenges, including internal
displacement, returning refugees and low levels of education. Work by UNODC in
this area represents but a small fraction of its overall allocation of funds, which may
indicate low donor interest. Despite those modest resources, UNODC has helped to
lay the groundwork, if fragile, and to bring to light the seriousness of the drug use
problem, in part through an early survey of the problem – whose statistics are now
outdated – and through keeping drug demand reduction issues at the fore. The issue
of demand reduction versus harm reduction has been long debated within UNODC,
and the lack of consensus and clarity at the time of the evaluation produced mixed
messages and impacted the programme in the field. The evaluation team however
acknowledges that, following the evaluation, from early 2008 on, several steps1
have been taken towards a clear harm reduction policy, which should coherently be
pursued in the future.

Illicit crop monitoring has long been the flagship programme of UNODC.
Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme products are international public goods, and
enjoy wide use owing to their credibility, their transparency and their reliability. The
Government of Afghanistan and other Governments use information generated
through the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme to assess fiscal, economic and
development policies and to devise new strategies. In preparing this evaluation,
considerable time and effort were devoted to looking at this programme, and this
report makes several recommendations, mostly of a technical nature and that
involve adjustments, rather than fundamental changes. Many of those
recommendations appear in the body of the report.

The evaluation identified four major issue areas cutting across all programme:
management, coordination, backstopping/monitoring and programme/project design.
As UNODC has evolved over the years, the accretion of institutions, policies and
procedures does not always favour good management. The evaluation exercise
detected some of these, probably because Afghanistan is the largest country
programme and is thus perhaps more challenging.

Coordination seems to be a widespread problem among all agencies working
in Afghanistan, including UNODC. There is substantial latitude for improved
coordination between UNODC and other entities in all subprogrammes. There is a
need for better internal coordination within the United Nations system. Within

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1 (i) UNODC Discussion paper - 23/01/08 - Reducing the adverse health and social consequences of drug abuse: A comprehensive
approach; (ii) Paper to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs - March 2008 - Making Drug Control Fit for Purpose. Building
on the UNGASS Decade; (iii) several policy statements by UNODC Executive Director (December 2007, Free drugs or
drug free? Executive Director Costa at a Drug Policy Alliance meeting, New Orleans; opening of the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs in March 2008 …).
UNODC, competition, or a desire for recognition, sometimes trumps coordination with national and international entities, to the detriment of meeting national needs.

The quality of backstopping and monitoring varies between components within a subprogramme. Nevertheless, UNODC headquarters and field operations in Afghanistan are too often weakly articulated with each other. A further need is greater attention to project/programme design. Overambitious and unrealistic designs that square badly with Afghan conditions illustrate the problem. This problem is also due to the pressure to achieve quick results in Afghanistan’s crisis-ridden milieu – and to a further need to build sustainability into design.

UNODC is at a crossroads vis-à-vis its role in Afghanistan. After September 2001, Afghanistan took centre stage in the global war on terror. And as it did so, enormous resources began to pour into the country to address the global threat of a so-called failed State – a threat multiplied many times over by astronomical earnings from illegal narcotics. To its credit, UNODC had laid some important foundations during its work in the country prior to 2001, when its interventions, typically in the form of projects, spanned a wide range of thematic areas. But UNODC can no longer compete at the project level with well-resourced donors. Its role must change. To remain relevant, it must search for niches where it has a comparative advantage. And such niches generally relate to the larger context of the status of UNODC as a United Nations entity, which confers upon UNODC the moral authority of a perceived neutral actor among competing interests. UNODC can do what bilateral entities cannot. Therein lie a strength and the basis for a vital role to play in Afghanistan.

Postscript
The fieldwork for this evaluation was completed on the 24th of August 2007 for the reports on Law enforcement, Alternative Livelihoods and Rule of Law, and on the 27th of November 2007 for the reports on Drug Demand Reduction and Illicit Crop Monitoring. Hence activities that have been undertaken after that date are not reflected in this report.

The evaluation team however acknowledges that, following the evaluation, a number of initiatives took place.
Management Review and Response to the
“Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance
Provided to Afghanistan by UNODC”

1. The thematic evaluation undertaken by the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) on five segments of the UNODC’s country programme in Afghanistan (COAFG) from 2001 until mid 2007, has been the most ambitious assignment for the IEU so far. It relates to UNODC’s largest programme envelope and has potentially significant implications in both political and financial terms on how the Office positions itself in Afghanistan and how it is viewed by the principal stakeholders. The comprehensiveness of the evaluation demonstrates the willingness of UNODC to operate in full transparency as well as its commitment towards continued improvement of its interventions. It has been noted that no other UN agency has engaged in an evaluation of similar magnitude in Afghanistan over the last two years. The scale and depth of the exercise itself, include valuable lessons for future programme design, implementation and monitoring.

2. Most observations and recommendations contained in the evaluation reports convey a positive appraisal of the work undertaken by UNODC in Afghanistan. This, however, does not reduce the significance of the remaining critical statements. The evaluation provides valuable insights and directs management’s attention towards focused action to improve the functioning of the country programme. UNODC has already started initiating corrective measures where these are called for and is continuing to develop its own niche, moving from a largely donor-driven country portfolio to undertake innovative work in areas such as rule of law (juvenile justice and legislation), research (opium surveys), law enforcement (cross-border cooperation), and demand reduction (HIV/AIDS). Over the last months, much consideration has been given to strengthening the management within the office in Kabul and in the provinces given the high visibility and credibility of the Office in Afghanistan. This is necessary in order to improve strategic thinking and synergy among the programme segments, strengthen coordination and consultation, and finally attain tangible results and impact, thereby imparting sound policy advice on the basis of both evidence and field-tested concepts. By June 2008 all five recommendations on alternative livelihood had been implemented or were ongoing, six out of ten for law enforcement, seven out of eight for rule of law, and seven out
of eight for drug demand reduction. Only a small number of the recommendations have not been accepted by the UNODC management, often because of the impracticability of implementing them in the extreme context in which operations are undertaken.

3. The specific circumstances in which UNODC’s technical programme is managed explain many of its shortcomings and are unfortunately common to any stakeholder operating in Afghanistan. These include the fragility or near non-existence of the country’s institutions, the lack of local human capacity, fast turnover of trained and capable staff, competition among ministries and departments, corruption, and other characteristics common to any (post-)conflict state. The complexity is exacerbated by the absence of coordination among principal stakeholders (a situation which is gradually improving), occasionally competing agendas, and a deteriorating security context. As also acknowledged by the IEU, this negatively affects the ability to adhere to principles of sound project management such as an environment conducive to capacity-building, strategic planning, synergies, sustainability and thus ultimately impact. Many of the critical comments are to be considered in this light. In a few cases, the recommendations contain generic remarks on UNODC policy that have little relevance in an evaluation focused on Afghanistan.

4. As UNODC accepts the general content of the evaluation, it is not responding to the recommendations in an exhaustive manner, but limiting itself to a few issues which demand particular attention from management.

5. UNODC’s capacity in Afghanistan – Some thematic evaluation reports, including the consolidated one, state that the programme development and monitoring as well as the technical capacity of UNODC in Afghanistan was limited. As this was recognized, the organizational structure of the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan (COAFG) has evolved significantly since mid-2007. In particular, two broad units to strengthen the strategic cohesion of interventions and the oversight capacity were established. One unit deals with counter-narcotics (CN) capacity-building issues and the other unit oversees the rule of law (RoL) and criminal justice (CJ) issues. In this connection, programmes have been re-profiled and additional staff recruited. In most thematic areas UNODC has acquired additional technical experts, including in provincial offices, resulting in better planning and more effective monitoring of implementation. The positive results of this effort have been demonstrated by the increase in and timeliness of delivery in 2007 and first quarter 2008. Future plans include the increase of the capacity of an Analytical Unit in order to strengthen evidence-based and well targeted interventions. This will also benefit external advocacy and information towards principal stakeholders, press/media and the general public.

6. Achievement indicators and impact measures – The lack of achievement indicators is highlighted as a factor limiting the quality of project monitoring and evaluation. Since the thematic evaluation took place, UNODC has adopted a new project format and structure which, in line with the principles of results-based
management (RBM), now includes improved logical frameworks and clear achievement indicators. Training was provided to all COAFG staff in project cycle management in November 2007. New guidelines for projects have been introduced and the workplans aligned to the outputs and indicators of the UNODC Strategy. The strengthening of RBM coupled with the identification of achievement indicators and impact measurements represent concrete steps towards enabling project coordinators to improve execution and monitoring, and thereby enabling future evaluations to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the interventions more easily.

7. Building infrastructure – The evaluation advises UNODC to reconsider its position related to the construction of physical premises and instead focus on capacity building. While the UNODC management, in principle, agrees with the recommendation it should be noted that in Afghanistan the notion of capacity building is embedded in the broader concept of nation building, human capacity building and institution building. Several UN agencies, including UNODC, report difficulties in developing human and institutional capacity due to the peculiarity of the country context. A case in point is the delivery of training for magistrates, prison wardens, or CN experts. The physical infrastructure needs to be conducive to learning, to the effective application of the notions imparted by trainers and mentors, and to the successful translation of these standards in concrete operations. Another example is the drainage problem at the Male Detention Centre in Kabul. This has been caused by improper use and lack of maintenance (a well-known problem in Afghanistan), and therefore UNODC repudiates the reasoning that it is due to a “design flaw”. COAFG is pursuing measures to strengthen the concept of maintenance in the country and to take practical steps to avoid similar situations. The ideal situation, with one stakeholder providing the hardware in which UNODC can inject the software, is an exception in Afghanistan (e.g. CNPA Training Academy) rather than the rule. The diverging practice of COAFG to the general principle upheld by UNODC becomes even more valid when the decentralization of national capacities towards the provincial or local levels, where very limited infrastructure is in place, is considered. UNODC embraces three operational priorities: 1) Policy advice and support in UNODC mandated areas (legal reform, CN, AL, DDR); 2) Institution building - enhancement of operational capacity including physical infrastructure if the situation so requires; 3) Capacity Building – strengthening of human capacity. This method has been underwritten by other independent project evaluation reports (2007), which highlight UNODC’s and COAFG’s approach as necessary and sustainable.

8. Partnerships and ‘One UN’ – Coordination with other UN agencies, the strategic value of partnerships, and the importance of operating in a harmonized fashion are often described in the respective evaluation reports as weak areas for UNODC. It should be noted that there is no lack of coordination mechanisms in Kabul, perhaps the contrary. The main issue, however, is to ensure synergy at the operational level in order to increase impact at the local levels. UNODC agrees that there is room for improvement and, as a country player with a rather limited financial budget, COAFG operations/impact are foremost to benefit from enhanced collaboration. Efforts, although insufficient, have been undertaken to this end. Since 2002,
UNODC has functioned as a special advisor on narcotic issues to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. In addition, since 2004 UNAMA, the UN body mandated to coordinate the different UN agencies and programmes, has been funding a UNODC liaison officer within its office. COA FG maintains strategic partnerships with the lead nation in the Justice sector (Italy) and CN (UK) following the 2002 Bonn Agreement. In addition, UNODC has consolidated several other partnerships leading to joint initiatives and concrete outputs with UNDP (governance, justice, and anti-corruption related issues); UNICEF (juvenile justice reform and rehabilitation); UNIFEM (women/girls in prisons, female drug users, and women with HIV/AIDS); WFP, FAO and World Bank (sustained counter-narcotics policies, e.g. AL); ICRC (penitentiary reform and treatment of prisoners); EC on police reform (EUPOL, border control and precursors); and diverse NGOs (Emergency, ISISC, Medica Mondiale, Save the Children, Care, AWEC, etc.).

9. Communication/backstopping – The IEU indicates that quality backstopping and monitoring is uneven, lacking, among other things, timely inputs from the substantive or technical units. Communication between HQ’s substantive units and experts in the field is ensured by several mandatory mechanisms at different stages of the project cycle. For instance, during project design, consultations between the FO and the relevant technical units at HQ are required through the UN Office Vienna (UNOV) database ProFi. The importance of the geographical desk facilitating this process as a ‘broker’ needs to be underlined. Yet the fast growth of UNODC’s interventions in and around Afghanistan, through a sharp increase in extra-budgetary resources, was not followed by a comparative growth in core funding allowing oversight and monitoring through especially, but not exclusively, the geographical desk. The UNODC management took note of the need to strengthen the backstopping capacity in order to provide better support to the FO in Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that the number of missions of experts from Vienna to Kabul doubled over the last year.
I. Introduction

A. Brief history

1. Afghanistan is in many ways a unique setting in the world. For two centuries, it was a buffer zone between contending international powers rather than a nation State. A precarious social contract between Kabul and the periphery held it together. In more recent times, nine years of war (1979-1989) between Soviet occupiers and mujahideen fighters destroyed vital infrastructure, including irrigation works, in a dry, drought-prone land – about 10 per cent is arable – of farmers and herders. The liberating mujahideen then fought each other in a bloody civil war that created havoc in cities and towns. As many as 2,000 rockets per day rained down on Kabul, levelling entire neighbourhoods. The chaos and fatigue of war ushered in Taliban rule (1996-2001).

2. Those years of war weakened and destroyed the old social contract that had once bound people to place. The war displaced legions of Afghans to nearby countries, including Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many are now returning to a land that cannot accommodate them economically, especially given that the population has grown meanwhile. And residing in the villages, where guns are plentiful, are former mujahideen fighters and commanders, some of them with influence and grievances with respect to the present order. Reports from those who work in the villages point to a widespread mistrust of government. The rampant corruption of some officials does not help – and does not inspire good governance as an important aspect of nation-building.

3. Today, insurgent forces have again formed, including elements of the former Taliban that had retreated in the wake of the military response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. They engage the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), mostly in the south, but increasingly through suicide bombings and guerrilla actions throughout the country – in a land where live ordnance and mines linger, even in Kabul, serving as a reminder of 25 years of war. Talk of a post-conflict milieu in Afghanistan is premature.

4. Afghanistan has now been in crisis for at least three decades. The chaos and uncertainty of the crisis have favoured the cultivation of opium poppy – a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment, as researcher David Mansfield puts it.\(^2\) By the 1990s, Afghanistan was the world’s chief producer of illicit opium, producing 70 per cent of illicit opium worldwide by 2000.\(^3\) Today, it produces about 93 per cent.\(^4\)

5. With the events of 11 September 2001, the crisis of Afghanistan came to the forefront of attention of the world community, in particular two key dimensions: first, illegal narcotics and secondly, what the world now calls “terrorism”. The two dimensions are related, each fuelling the other. Yet they are different and pose

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\(^3\) William Byrd and Christopher Ward, Drugs and Development in Afghanistan, Social Development Paper No. 18 (World Bank, December 2004), p. 3.

different threats. Some members of the world community consider one dimension to be more threatening than the other. Moreover, members are at odds over how best to address either threat, or how to address one without harming efforts to address the other.

6. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the lead United Nations agency, was established to strike a balance in addressing the two dimensions, and to do so within a larger framework of nation-building. Yet the balance is precarious. With a sparse, poor, ethnically diverse and overwhelmingly rural population living in a sprawling, often rugged terrain set in a troubled and unstable zone, Afghanistan invites volatility. One recalls that Afghans routed the British in the nineteenth century and the Russians in the twentieth century. Afghans once again saw outsiders as invaders and reacted adversely. Insurgent forces now active, or others yet to come into existence, may be ready to sow this vision and organize the reaction.

B. Challenge of Afghanistan

7. The challenges to drug control in Afghanistan are numerous, daunting and often mutually reinforcing. First, corruption is widespread and runs deep. In that regard, the enormous sums of drug money alone pose serious obstacles, especially to law enforcement but also to the rule of law. Further, large sums of donor money are entering Afghanistan to build and rebuild both the infrastructure and the operational capacity of the country’s institutions. It is not easy to manage those resources so that procedural safeguards to protect them do not impede much-needed disbursement.

8. Secondly, there is the issue of weak governance. Many institutions are new and remain weak, and the writ of the State tends, in general, to diminish as one moves outward from Kabul. Thirdly, related to the issue of weak governance, security is poor, especially in the rural areas. There, peasant farmers often mistrust the central government. Arms remain plentiful, in a milieu where former mujahideen commanders reside and where many former fighters have never disarmed and are reluctant to do so because of uncertainty about what the future might bring. Rural Afghanistan – which is most of the country – is potentially volatile, and that complicates rural development efforts. Furthermore, the very concept of development is new to many Afghans.

9. The international community should harbour no illusions about Afghanistan. The country’s numerous problems are multifaceted, and addressing them is fraught with obstacles. There are no quick fixes and no easy solutions. Above all, it must be borne in mind that nation-building is a long-term process under the best of conditions, and in the current Afghan context, a very long-term one.

C. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan

10. UNODC began supporting Afghanistan from Peshawar before the Bonn Agreement established the Afghan Interim Authority in December 2001. That support continued throughout the transition period, in the framework of the Bonn Agreement, and was refined with the signing in London on 1 February 2006 of the
Afghanistan Compact, following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in November 2004.

11. UNODC works in partnership with the Afghan Government as well as with donors and United Nations agencies. Its programme is aligned with the National Drug Control Strategy as well as with the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which identify the fight against illegal drugs as a cross-cutting priority. Programme objectives, as set out in the UNODC Strategic Programme Framework, target traffickers at the top end of the trade; strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods; reduce the demand for illicit drugs and improve the treatment of problem drug users; and develop State institutions at the central and provincial levels vital to the delivery of the drug control strategy. Institutional capacity-building is emphasized. The Afghanistan country programme, the largest of UNODC, encompasses 17 active projects (as at November 2007) addressing the areas of illicit crop monitoring, rule of law, law enforcement, alternative livelihoods, terrorism prevention and drug demand reduction.

D. Present evaluation

12. This in-depth thematic evaluation, which forms part of the 2007 work plan of the Independent Evaluation Unit, is the first technical assistance evaluation of a country programme that UNODC has undertaken. It covers activities in the period 2001-March 2007. Its purpose is to assess the work of UNODC in building the capacity of Afghanistan government agencies through five UNODC subprogrammes: Alternative Livelihoods, Rule of Law, Law Enforcement, Drug Demand Reduction and Illicit Crop Monitoring. It also considers the strategic positioning of UNODC and the net added value of its work. In more specific terms, the evaluation does the following:

   (a) It assesses the results of UNODC support provided through its project and non-project activities and in partnership with other key development actors;

   (b) It analyses how UNODC has positioned itself strategically to add value in response to national needs and changes in UNODC thematic areas;

   (c) It assesses the design, coherence and focus of the country programme;

   (d) It analyses the sustainability of activities and results at their relevant levels (communities and intermediate or higher level institutions) and whether they are connected to local, regional and national capacities and/or other forms of external support;

   (e) It provides accountability to UNODC management, Member States and donors.

13. Based on these assessments and analyses, findings are presented, lessons are drawn, and recommendations are made for realistic and effective strategies for UNODC and its partners.

14. The raw data informing evaluation findings come from two sources: documents and interviews with relevant stakeholders, including UNODC staff, Afghan public officials, members of the donor and diplomatic communities, officials from international agencies, staff from non-governmental organizations
active in communities and farmers and their leaders. The interviews were especially
important.

15. For scheduling reasons, two groups comprised the evaluation team and worked
at different times. Both groups spent one week in Vienna interviewing relevant
UNODC staff. They then went to Afghanistan, where they remained for three to four
weeks (the first group in the period 24 July-23 August 2007 and the second group in
the period 6-27 November 2007). Team members visited the provinces as time,
resources and security allowed. The alternative livelihoods and illicit crop
monitoring evaluators also conducted interviews of persons in the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

16. At the end of its country visit, each group presented its findings and
recommendations to UNODC/Afghanistan staff and/or external stakeholders (in the
case of the first mission), who gave feedback at a validation workshop in Kabul.
Draft reports on the five subprogrammes were also shared with UNODC personnel
in both Vienna and Kabul. Their relevant substantive comments were addressed by
the evaluators in preparing this final report. The report is based on those five
subprogramme reports, which the interested reader should consult for greater detail
and clarity.

17. Like most evaluations, this one also faced limitations. One major such
limitation was problematic security, which restricted team movement within the
country. Related to that was the problem of limited economic resources for the
evaluation itself. A further limitation, though less serious, was the scheduling
constraints, which made it necessary for the evaluation team to divide into two
groups, each visiting both Vienna and Afghanistan, at different times. That
complicated internal team communications.

II. Summaries of the analysis and findings for the five thematic
subprogrammes

18. This chapter summarizes each of the five thematic subprogrammes evaluation
findings. The interested reader might wish to consult the subprogramme reports for
more details.

A. Alternative livelihoods

19. The role of UNODC in the area of alternative livelihoods over the years has
been small vis-à-vis the magnitude of both poppy cultivation and donor
contributions. Activities fall within international and national policy and strategy
frameworks, yet remain little relevant because, first, they link to a weak Ministry of
Counter-Narcotics (MCN), and, secondly, their focus aligns poorly with the limited
UNODC resources. Confusion – among UNODC, donors and the Government –
accompanies the alternative livelihoods concept. Evidence is lacking that it has been
integrated in public planning, has improved policy formulation or the lives of poppy
growers or has reduced poppy cultivation.

20. Factors reducing the efficiency of the UNODC the Alternative Livelihoods
Programme include those related to donors, especially a growing donor tendency to
 earmark funds, resulting in activities that are less than optimal vis-à-vis UNODC capacities and country needs; a headquarters unit with a very limited substantive role in the Afghanistan programme; overall weak coordination among donors and United Nations agencies; a UNODC programme that has not been formally partnered; and a programme approach that fails to make the best use of limited UNODC resources. In a word, as it stands now, the UNODC Alternative Livelihoods Programme is not sustainable.

21. UNODC operates in Afghanistan as a small actor among multiple well-heeled international players whose alternative livelihoods resources dwarf those of UNODC. The two projects of the small Alternative Livelihoods Programme today constitute 15 per cent (about $9 million) of the UNODC ongoing country portfolio (about $65 million), but represent the equivalent of only 4 per cent of the yearly budget of a major donor (about $220 million) for the Afghanistan agricultural sector alone. In this setting, UNODC ceases to be unique as long as its work takes the form of “projects”. If it elects to remain active in the area of alternative livelihoods, it must find leverage points in order to be effective. Above all, it should drop its current project-level focus and adopt a strategic approach more aligned with its own limitations – one that identifies interventions that allow it to influence alternative livelihoods policy and strategy. That approach should also recognize that Afghanistan must be built from the provinces up, not from Kabul down.

B. Rule of law

22. The evaluation of this complex subprogramme considers six projects over a functional spectrum spanning the areas of juvenile justice reform, prison reform, prison construction, post-release opportunities, criminal justice capacity-building and development of a Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force.

23. To its credit, UNODC has been a pioneer in justice sector reform, in a milieu where other agencies were either absent or balked at involvement. While its projects are relevant to country needs, its activities, in particular with regard to building infrastructure, too often fall outside its area of expertise, and the results are thus adversely affected.

24. The drafting of legislation, with support from UNODC headquarters, represents a significant achievement, although here, as elsewhere, impact indicators are elusive. Development of a juvenile justice administration and court system, in a milieu which previously had treated juveniles as adults, represents another significant achievement.

25. So far, there is no evidence of the impact of the Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force, which became operational in 2005. The reason is thought to be a lack of police investigation and of evidence-collection skills in the provinces. Corruption within the Task Force is also a possibility.

26. Evidence points to design flaws in the construction of prisons and detention centres. This has led to deterioration and substandard conditions. Delays have plagued construction, a matter related to inadequate planning and financing.

27. It is doubtful that Afghanistan will be able to sustain UNODC activities, due to the inadequate planning and insufficient development of national capacity, in
addition to limited funding, which has hindered the ability of UNODC to deliver effectively.

C. Law enforcement

28. Law enforcement projects are compatible with Afghanistan Counter-Narcotics Strategy and its National Development Strategy, both of which are the expression of agreements reached between the country and its international partners, as detailed in the Afghanistan Compact of February 2006. Yet the results of project activities remain small relative to the growing magnitude of the country’s traffic in illegal narcotics. Counter-narcotics policing is inadequate to meet the challenge – while widespread corruption only increases.

29. UNODC law enforcement projects are also small relative to those of the wider donor community. They have nonetheless helped instil awareness among officials of the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Government of Afghanistan of what needs to be done. Yet this awareness will be diluted unless it is spread and unless basic training is forthcoming. CNPA in Kabul is in a formative phase and can undertake only limited and unsophisticated operational policing, which includes the all-important intelligence function, and training is needed at all levels. The CNPA laboratory does not yet meet international standards and must be upgraded. Efforts at cross-border cooperation with Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been weak. And in general, there is much room for better coordination between UNODC and other donors with parallel and potentially overlapping activities.

30. The effective development of an adequate police capacity is a slow, gradual process. This fact, combined with the scale of the illegal narcotics problem in Afghanistan, is an argument for considering the presence of sufficient international police mentors to contain it.

D. Drug demand reduction

31. Drugs have a long history in Afghanistan, where opium poppies have been grown since the eighteenth century. Opium has been used for centuries in parts of the country. Used as an analgesic in rural areas, it is now used increasingly for physical and psychological problems related to decades of war. Abused drugs include opium, heroin, hashish and pharmaceuticals. Statistics on drug use are scarce, with UNODC studies in 2003 and 2005 being the chief source. Most authorities agree that there has been a rise in drug use in recent years, and as much as 4 per cent of the population may be users of drugs. Evidence suggests that the bulk of heroin users, and many pharmaceutical users, acquired the habit as refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. Surveillance is poor. Rising injecting drug use, in a milieu of internal displacement, returning refugees and low education/awareness favour the spread of HIV infection.

32. UNODC has worked in demand reduction since 1989 and moved its headquarters for operations in Afghanistan from Islamabad to Kabul in 2002. Today, two public ministries focus on demand reduction: the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (policy) and the Ministry of Public Health (therapy). The roles and responsibilities
of the two ministries have yet to be clearly defined. Several non-governmental organizations also address the issue. Since 2001, with the help of UNODC, the Government has developed both drug demand reduction and harm reduction strategies, which are mandated in the Afghanistan National Drug Control Strategy. UNODC has definitely helped to lay the foundations for drug demand reduction and to get it on the national agenda, though it is not yet a national priority.

33. The sustainability of those low-investment achievements, however, is questionable. First, UNODC drug demand reduction projects over the past 20 years represent but a small fraction of its overall allocation of funds. This appears to indicate low donor interest and, perhaps, a low awareness of the issue. Despite the availability of funds for HIV projects, the field office has not acted early enough in joining existing initiatives.

34. At the time of the evaluation, UNODC seemed to lack a policy on harm reduction, and this impacted on the field operations in this area. However, since March 2008, several steps have been taken to clarify UNODC policy position on harm reduction5.

E. Illicit crop monitoring

35. UNODC has helped the Government of Afghanistan monitor poppy cultivation since 1994, when village surveys were the basic tool. The assistance grew in 2001, with initiation of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme. The addition of satellite remote sensing in 2002 improved the toolkit. The first objective of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme is to monitor opium production and communicate findings to the Government of Afghanistan and the world community. More broadly, it seeks to establish methods for data collection and analysis and to strengthen the Government’s ability to monitor, analyse and report, and thus allow the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics to assume control of the Programme in future.

36. The evaluation focuses on five key products of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme: (a) the Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey (ORAS); (b) the Annual Opium Poppy Survey (AOPS); (c) Opium Price Monitoring; (d) the Eradication Verification Survey; and (e) development of the capacity of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.

37. The Programme has developed a tradition of efficiency and high quality in product delivery. Its impact and relevance as an impartial, effective and reliable monitor of opium cultivation are unquestionable. Sustained for 14 years with adaptive flexibility and resilience, the Programme contributes to preparation of the annual UNODC World Drug Report. The surveys have raised public awareness nationally and globally and have led to actions to address a dynamic opium trade.

5 The evaluation team acknowledges that, following the evaluation, from early 2008 on, several steps have been taken towards a clear harm reduction policy: (i) UNODC Discussion paper - 23/01/08 - Reducing the adverse health and social consequences of drug abuse: A comprehensive approach; (ii) Paper to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs - March 2008 - Making Drug Control Fit for Purpose. Building on the UNGASS Decade; (iii) several policy statements by UNODC Executive Director (December 2007, Free drugs or drug free? Executive Director Costa at a Drug Policy Alliance meeting, New Orleans; opening of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2008 ...).
38. Nevertheless, factors exist that challenge sustainability. First, indicators to evaluate capacity-building within the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and the progressive ownership of the monitoring process, are lacking. Second, the Ministry’s provincial staff do not see themselves as being in the mainstream of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme. Third, there is weak communication between the Programme’s national coordination office and the Ministry’s survey and monitoring office. Fourth, low public salaries and a dearth of qualified personnel limit staff retention. And fifth, it is unlikely that the Ministry can assume control of the Programme by 2010, as envisioned, because of its still-limited capacity.
III. Outcomes, impacts and sustainability

39. This chapter synthesizes outcomes, impacts and sustainability. It looks across five extremely diverse subprogrammes in order to isolate commonalities and tendencies. Those will clearly apply more to some subprogrammes than to others. For details on outcomes, impacts, and sustainability of the specific subprogrammes, the interested reader should consult those subprogramme reports.

A. Outcomes

40. Outcomes are here understood as the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs.  

41. Perhaps the most salient trend over the five subprogrammes is that outcomes fall short of what had been anticipated or planned, whether for training or other forms of capacity-building or construction and refurbishment. The reasons for this short fall can be several, and they sometimes relate to external factors over which projects have no control during their implementation.

42. Beyond detailing major activities, the subprogramme reports, which are also based on written sources and interviews, often cite outcomes that are nebulous: for example, the profile in a particular thematic area has been raised; relevant agencies have been brought together for some project purpose; persons have been trained to some indeterminate level; or an office has been opened here or there. Outcomes, themselves the result of a set of activities, in turn producing impacts, have frequently brought about a dubious intangibility. Better project monitoring would avoid this problem.

1. Alternative livelihoods

43. Alternative livelihoods outcomes include a raising of the alternative livelihoods profile in Afghanistan, the opening of UNODC regional offices, the creation of fragile working groups and incipient networking in some regions.

44. UNODC has conducted a substantial amount of training, which has brought people from different government entities together. This coming together has also occurred in working groups that UNODC has established and maintained. Beneficiaries of both the training and the working groups acknowledge these events as helpful and request their continuation.

2. Rule of law

45. UNODC has made an important contribution to improving legislation in Afghanistan, a field in which little progress had been made in the past three decades.

46. Another important outcome is the development of the juvenile justice system through staff training and by instituting juvenile courts for the first time in the country.

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6 Based on the definition of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; see UNODC glossary.
47. Some of the construction and refurbishment remained incomplete or failed to meet international standards. And in some cases, the brevity of much-needed training fell short given the magnitude of the need.

3. **Law enforcement**

48. UNODC has conducted foundational training of CNPA, largely in Kabul, where it has worked with intelligence and other branches of CNPA. It has provided support to a crime laboratory.

49. But generally, outcomes in the area of law enforcement, which include a greater awareness of current needs, are otherwise intangible and, in any case, represent little more than a modest step vis-à-vis the monumental needs.

4. **Drug demand reduction**

50. The Drug Demand Reduction Programme, with few resources, has profiled a serious and growing drug-consumption problem. The work of UNODC has established a baseline, and this has influenced national strategy and policy. Two major UNODC assessments of drug use, while they do not reflect current usage patterns, have been effective advocacy tools.

51. UNODC established a National Drug Demand Reduction Working Group as a networking platform for the discussion of national drug control strategies. Another working group, on harm reduction issues, was set up within the Ministry of Public Health. Also, through project training, several Afghan professionals gained a better knowledge of drug demand reduction.

5. **Illicit crop monitoring**

52. The achievements of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, by contrast, enjoy a higher profile than those of the other subprogrammes. The opium surveys have raised public awareness at the national and international levels, and have drawn the attention of the Government of Afghanistan and other States, thus contributing significantly to favourable policy development and programme actions. The development of robust methodologies for estimating opium crop area, yield and price constitutes a valuable contribution.

**B. Impacts**

53. Impacts here refer to the positive or negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.\(^7\)

54. A basic limitation to impact assessment is the lack of reliable indicators. This is true for all five subprogrammes, in particular with respect to capacity-building activities, especially training. Furthermore, evidence suggests that, with the exception of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, impacts at the programme level – fewer farmers growing opium poppy, an improved justice system, improved

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\(^7\) Based on the definition of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; see UNODC glossary.
law enforcement, a reduction in drug demand – tend to be modest. Many of the factors affecting outcomes also apply here: construction projects uncompleted, training unsuited to the magnitude of its objective and activities went awry for want of adequate assessment of prevailing obstacles at the time they were designed. It must also be recalled that UNODC interventions represent small investments when compared with those of other donors, and the impacts also reflect that imbalance.

1. Alternative livelihoods
55. As regards alternative livelihoods, there is little evidence that the working groups, the training or equipment and buildings have had an impact on policy formulation, improved the lives of poppy farmers or reduced the amount of opium poppy grown.
56. However, it may be too early to assess the impact of some of the training and networking.

2. Rule of law
57. As regards juvenile justice, a long-term impact is likely, with a juvenile court now active, run by five female juvenile court judges – both aspects a novelty for Afghanistan.
58. The Rule of Law Programme much improved legislation that will enhance the quality of justice in the country. UNODC efforts to develop human resources and physical infrastructures will probably also have long-lasting effects, but only once they can be used to full potential. However, a substantial portion of UNODC resources went to refurbishment and construction, with work stalled or incomplete and refurbished buildings not properly maintained over time.

3. Law enforcement
59. The major impact in the area of law enforcement may be awareness among government and police officials of the work that remains to be done. The impact otherwise seems to be extremely small when compared with the magnitude of the law enforcement challenge.

4. Drug demand reduction
60. Despite meagre resources, the UNODC Drug Demand Reduction Programme has achieved high visibility on the drug demand reduction landscape. Yet the programme’s impact has been quite limited. It has not been able to mainstream drug demand reduction in other United Nations agencies. It has conducted a lot of training, but with uncertain impact. It is said that persons trained by UNODC have begun non-governmental organizations; that would be a further impact.

5. Illicit crop monitoring
61. The products of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme are international public goods and enjoy wide use owing to their credibility, transparency and reliability. The Government of Afghanistan and other Governments used information generated by the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme to assess fiscal, economic and development policies and develop new strategies.
62. The impact of illicit crop monitoring is thus substantial, although some areas still show margins for improvement. The demand for the information produced by the programme is high at both the national and global levels. It is too soon to assess the impact of the still-ongoing capacity-building efforts of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme.

C. Sustainability

63. If sustainability is understood as the extent to which the benefits of the project or programme will last after its termination, or the probability of continued long-term benefits,\(^8\) then all of the subprogrammes face a few serious sustainability challenges.

64. Nonetheless, a number of interventions are sustainable, or have sustainable components. The five thematic evaluation reports on the suggest that sustainability was not given adequate consideration when projects were being planned and designed. This is a fundamental problem from which other problems derive. The more common of such conditions not considered, as the reports indicate, include weak public institutions, low salaries and high personnel turnover. Not by chance, the reports also frequently cite the inadequate building of national capacity on the part of projects.

1. Alternative livelihoods

65. The Alternative Livelihoods report notes that the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics is currently unable to incorporate and sustain what the programme trains for. However, it is hard to assess whether the training itself, all quite recent, is otherwise sustainable.

2. Rule of law

66. The legislation introduced by UNODC should be sustainable as should be the juvenile courts and related innovations in the juvenile-justice system. The construction projects, if properly completed and used for the purpose for which they were designed, should also be sustainable.

3. Law enforcement

67. In the area of law enforcement, project activities fall far short of sustainability vis-à-vis the magnitude of the law enforcement challenge. However, some sustainable elements of the Law Enforcement Programme do exist, such as the development of the CNPA laboratory, communication and other equipment provided to the Interdiction Unit, training provided to officials of the Government of Afghanistan and software development. When these have been refined and fully developed, they should prove to be invaluable resources.

4. Drug demand reduction

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\(^8\) From the UNODC glossary; based on the definition provided by the Office of Internal Oversight Services.
68. The Drug Demand Reduction Programme has conducted a lot of capacity-building training, although it remains to be seen whether the results will be sustainable. Any new non-governmental organizations created by persons trained by UNODC would contribute to sustainability.

69. The Drug Demand Reduction Programme has operated with few resources, yet a fund-raising strategy is lacking. Complicating the problem was, at the time of evaluation, the lack of a clear position within UNODC on how to harmonize or otherwise handle demand reduction versus harm reduction. The evaluation team however acknowledges that, following the evaluation, from early 2008 on, several steps have been taken towards a clear harm reduction policy.

5. Illicit crop monitoring

70. The Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme has existed for 14 years under precarious conditions. Yet, according to the thematic evaluation report on illicit crop monitoring, there is no structured scheme for capacity-building, a situation which is complicated by low salaries and a scarcity of qualified personnel. The provincial staff of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics do not identify with the programme mainstream. It is unlikely, notes the report, that the Ministry can assume control of the programme by 2010, as currently planned.

IV. Major issues

71. Several issues emerged during the course of the evaluation, not all of them applicable to the same degree to all five subprogrammes, but all worthy of note in an evaluation of this kind.

A. Management

72. The current evaluation is not a management evaluation per se. Yet UNODC management, whether at headquarters or in the field, affects projects and programmes and is thus included. Any comments on that management, however, should be placed in a historical context.

73. UNODC was not born of a sole creative act. Its current management culture emerged over time. What is now UNODC evolved from forebears: the United Nations International Fund for Drug Abuse Control became the United Nations International Drug Control Programme in 1990, and then Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in 2000, followed by UNODC in 2002. Historical and functional accretions evolved, each playing a major role in turn: first, the conventions were the focus; then came lawyers, developers, law enforcers and those linked to the International Narcotics Control Board and regulatory matters. Demand reduction was first emphasized by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session, in 1998, with the issues of terrorism and corruption appearing thereafter.

74. The following presentation is divided into examinations of headquarters and the Kabul field office.
1. Headquarters

75. The frequency and forcefulness of criticism among professional staff suggest weaknesses in personnel structure and practices that adversely affect programme. Many interviewees felt that senior management did not pay attention to their voices. Practices with respect to hiring and promotion were also questioned.

76. With regard to drug demand reduction, headquarters management had, at the time of the evaluation, not yet resolved the UNODC policy debate regarding Harm Reduction, which created serious problems at the level of the country office in Kabul. The evaluation is aware of the politicized nature of this ideological debate, which does not make the work of UNODC easy, but acknowledges that, following the evaluation, from early 2008 on, several steps have been taken towards a clear harm reduction policy.

77. With respect to illicit crop monitoring, UNODC management tends to slight the limits of socio-economic data.

2. Kabul field office

78. Overall, information in the evaluation reports suggests a reluctance to exercise leadership and to take decisions and timely action. Specifically, the thematic evaluation reports signal an aggressive, alienating and non-consultative management style in the area of rule of law; inattention to serious problems in the area of law enforcement; and relative managerial indifference to drug demand reduction, not to mention harm reduction.

B. Coordination

79. Problematic coordination seems to be a widespread and generalized problem among entities working in Afghanistan. The need for coordination often seems to be little understood among government personnel. The individual evaluation reports suggest a substantial latitude for improved coordination between UNODC and other entities in all five subprogrammes. They also cite the larger problem of weak coordination between donors, and even between United Nations agencies. In UNODC, a competitive spirit, or a desire for credit and recognition, sometimes trumps coordination with national and international entities, to the detriment of meeting national needs.

C. Backstopping/monitoring

80. The quality of backstopping and monitoring often varies by component within a subprogramme. Nonetheless, there is a marked tendency across subprogrammes for headquarters and the field to be weakly articulated one with each other.

81. The Alternative Livelihoods headquarters unit, for example, plays no visible role vis-à-vis alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan. In regard to rule of law, there is little evidence of regular and effective liaison between headquarters and the country office. When UNODC undertook construction activities in which it had no expertise, headquarters backstopping and monitoring was problematic. On the other hand, headquarters made a significant contribution in developing national legislation.
82. The Law Enforcement report cites an urgent need for better programme monitoring. The Drug Demand Reduction report highlights a weak relationship between the headquarters HIV section and the country programme, which has apparently wavered with regard to handling the HIV/AIDS issue. No major coordination problems are reported for the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, probably because this is a flagship programme basically managed from headquarters.

D. Programme/project design

83. The evaluation reports reveal a strong pattern of a need for greater attention to project and programme design. Overambitious and unrealistic designs that square adversely with Afghan conditions well characterize the problem. This also relates to pressures to achieve quick results in Afghanistan’s crisis-ridden milieu – and to the need to build sustainability into design.

V. Lessons learned and best practices

84. The lessons learned and best practices as detailed in the subprogramme evaluations apply for the most part only to the subprogrammes. Comparison across subprogrammes is thus limited, as are generalizations at higher levels of abstraction. Nonetheless, the present section provides a couple of general lessons learned before listing lessons that apply to individual subprogrammes.

85. One general lesson learned is that UNODC must take initiatives to inform donors rather than respond to their sometimes uninformed notions and proposals. A second general lesson is that intervention strategies must match resources available to UNODC with country conditions related to strategy targets.

A. Alternative livelihoods

86. With respect to the area of alternative livelihoods:

   (a) Do not try to do too much. Look for feasible niches. Design programmes and activities that respond to the variable (by region) needs of the Afghan setting and that capitalize on the relative strengths of UNODC in a context of scarce resources;

   (b) Do not engage in activities without first assessing the institutional capacity of relevant entities to sustain the activities.

B. Rule of law

87. With respect to the area of rule of law:

   (a) Projects should include mechanisms to ensure outputs are used for intended purposes;

   (b) The development of national capacity, particularly in key areas of technical expertise, needs to be a far more explicit component of UNODC work;
(c) Experience with delays due to land rights issues and financial problems due to inflation, should be anticipated, based on the experiences within the United Nations system of working in conflict and post-conflict settings;

(d) Collaborative efforts should be undertaken from the outset;

(e) Caution is required to start construction projects when only partial funding is available. Partial funding may waste limited resources.

C. Law enforcement

88. With respect to the area of law enforcement:

(a) Projects should be developed based on reasonable expectations of advancement. Basic skills are necessary and must be thoroughly learned before any consideration of sophisticated professional development;

(b) Regional cooperation is necessary to successfully combat drug trafficking.

D. Drug demand reduction

89. With respect to the area of drug demand reduction:

(a) A good practice is the comprehensive community-led approach to prevention, treatment, care, and rehabilitation. An example is work by UNODC in refugee camps in Pakistan;

(b) UNODC work in other Central Asian countries has coordinated drug demand reduction and HIV/AIDS prevention. Projects there have implemented HIV/AIDS prevention and care among vulnerable populations to avoid a generalized epidemic. Such work is needed in Afghanistan. Also, the Afghanistan country office can learn from the experiences of other Central Asian countries.

E. Illicit crop monitoring

90. With respect to the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme:

(a) UNODC has demonstrated its capacity to design and implement low-cost projects, resulting in a high impact;

(b) UNODC has mastered effective sampling procedures based on rapid assessments and high-tech satellite imagery under difficult and changing conditions.

VI. Recommendations

A. Overall recommendations

91. UNODC should partner strategically with UNAMA in order to improve its platform for addressing important issues regarding illegal narcotics. The UNODC
Position of drug liaison officer with UNAMA is important and should remain continually filled in the future.

92. United Nations organizations are competing with each other for resources rather than working as “One United Nations”. Rather, they should coordinate their efforts to build the capacities of the Government of Afghanistan in addressing counter-narcotics problems. UNODC should build partnerships with other United Nations entities and undertake joint programmes in its areas of mandate. The concept of “the United Nations delivering as one” very much needs to be implemented in Afghanistan in order to avoid duplication and a wastage of resources.

93. Consideration should be given to strengthening the programme-monitoring function within UNODC by establishing a monitoring team at headquarters to review the progress of projects. Providing such oversight and feedback to management could prevent many problems. Considering the extent of the Afghanistan country programme, UNODC should consider creating a full-time monitoring and evaluation position to support management in decision-making at the country level.

94. UNODC should develop a country programme rather than operate under a “fragmented projects” approach. In this regard, it can seek support from the headquarters in programme design, and on further training on Project Cycle Management and evaluation.

95. At the country level, UNODC should play a greater role in research and advocacy, since it has expertise in those areas. That role could include helping the world community to become more aware of the needs and challenges in Afghanistan by issuing periodic publications on problems needing urgent attention; playing a stronger advocacy role for counter-narcotic efforts within Afghanistan by working closely with other donors as well as with government agencies; engaging in or supporting research on selected counter-narcotic topics; and stimulating debate on vital issues, for example, through workshops or discussion groups.

96. UNODC should discontinue its practice of investing in building construction and refurbishment, an activity better left to resource-endowed donors. UNODC management should not apply the 50-per-cent-rule to construction projects, which should not start unless full funding is guaranteed.

97. UNODC should develop a country human resource structure that defines the core positions needed to operate a large programme and ensure that those are constantly filled; the structure should include incentives and training in order to retain competent national and international staff.

98. UNODC Afghanistan needs structured backstopping to allow it to receive timely input from substantive headquarters-based units.

B. Alternative livelihoods

99. The alternative livelihoods efforts of UNODC must focus on the provinces.

100. UNODC must develop strategic partnerships with competent local entities experienced in rural development.
101. Donors should allow UNODC to use resources in a rational manner so as to best meet the needs of the country.

102. UNODC should not be involved in delivering construction or equipment or in strengthening institutions; other donors should do that.

103. UNODC should have a say in how the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund is used and should facilitate access to it by provincial governments and other relevant institutions, for, among other things, constructing, equipping and strengthening institutions.

C. Law enforcement

104. UNODC, in partnership with UNAMA and international donors, should continue to make every effort to persuade the Government of Afghanistan to address corruption by implementing comprehensive remedial measures; providing technical support to the relevant agencies for ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption (General Assembly resolution 58/4, annex); securing support of all donors; and addressing parity of pay and conditions of service between the police and the army.

105. UNODC should actively pursue the establishment of a coordinated mentoring programme to bring together an adequate number of international mentors to work with the police and customs officials, border guards and personnel in key ministries and agencies, while also advocating for a fully fledged international policing assistance to aid the border police and CNPA.

106. UNODC should consider focusing more on normative work and join efforts with UNAMA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to reform the Ministry of the Interior and the police force.

107. UNODC should work in close collaboration with UNAMA to raise drug-related issues at the highest levels of the Government of Afghanistan. UNODC should consider requesting a seat on the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and promptly fill the position of drug liaison officer with UNAMA.

108. UNODC should further develop and nurture cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan to develop common counter-narcotic and organized crime prevention efforts. UNODC has been diligent in promoting such cooperation but must redouble its efforts if success is to be achieved.

109. UNODC should actively encourage the transformation of the present police force into a police service by implementing a pilot project on building public confidence and establishing police school liaison programmes in order to encourage the public to cooperate with and support the police.

110. UNODC should adopt a long-term programme strategy for developing a professionally trained and competent police agency and should consider making available a staff member for developing a long-term programme plan and building partnerships with relevant international actors in Afghanistan.
111. UNODC should take the lead in developing a comprehensive training plan on administrative and management skills, the gathering and analysis of intelligence, and welfare issues.

112. Long-term plans should be made to establish a national criminal record office and a national fingerprint bureau. A consultant should be hired to advise on how to best establish and develop such facilities.

113. UNODC should increase public awareness about Afghanistan to help elicit more informed political and financial support from donors and create international awareness of the difficulties and challenges involved.

D. Rule of law

114. UNODC needs to recognize that “the process is a product” and incorporate the development of national technical expertise into its projects. This means doing far more than employing local subcontractors or the occasional consultation of national counterparts.

115. Project management needs to compete less against national and international partners and be more consultative.

116. Donor representatives in Afghanistan need to be regularly informed of the progress, problems and finances of projects. But donors also need to recognize the limitations of providing only partial funding for UNODC projects, as well as the overall lack of funding that has been provided to the justice sector in Afghanistan.

117. Further consideration should be given to additional measures, including conditionality, to ensure project outputs are used for intended purposes.

118. UNODC should build impact measures into its projects (particularly sample surveys of trainees) to facilitate future evaluation. If impact cannot be measured, effectiveness and efficiency cannot be determined.

119. Many documents published in 2007 provide a platform for a needs assessment for the rule of law sector. Based on such an assessment, UNODC should identify future work in collaboration with national and international agencies.

120. UNODC should, among other projects, consider exploiting its comparative advantage in the area of criminal justice research and data. A project to develop a national criminal justice statistical centre for Afghanistan might be appropriate.

121. In the light of substantial problems to date, UNODC should reconsider its role in the building and refurbishment of prisons and detention centres. Any future projects must clarify the power source from the outset.

E. Drug demand reduction

122. UNODC management should pursue the steps taken to resolve ideological debates about harm reduction and HIV issues by integrating the latter in a comprehensive drug demand reduction package; and make sure the new policy is disseminated extensively to all field offices. The evaluation team acknowledges that, following the evaluation, from early 2008 on, several steps have been taken towards
a clear harm reduction policy, which should make it easier for field staff to comprehensively address these issues.

123. UNODC should contribute to an effective advocacy and lobbying strategy for potential donors in order to ensure sustainable funding for future project development.

124. UNODC should support the Government of Afghanistan in developing a national research and training centre.

125. UNODC should develop a new approach to programme and project conception through better global planning and more differentiated projects.

126. UNODC should focus on normative work and support the Government of Afghanistan in developing an innovative programme.

127. UNODC and the international community should find a way to bridge the gap between the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and the Ministry of Public Health.

128. UNODC should take necessary measures to address the emerging HIV/AIDS problem through a clearly articulated policy.

129. UNODC should strengthen partnership with other United Nations organizations and civil society to reach a wider population, especially in rural areas.

F. Illicit crop monitoring

130. The monitoring of crop areas, production estimates and opium prices should remain the core activities of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme.

1. Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey

131. The Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey should be continued, but the number of questions on crops associated with opium poppy and wheat and on the availability of public services should be decreased.

2. Annual Opium Poppy Survey

132. The satellite data, derived maps and non-spatial data collected from various villages should be organized in a geospatial domain. A geodata model should be customized using appropriate software tools in the form of an information system for illicit crop monitoring. This geospatial database would allow long-term trend and pattern analysis using geostatistical tools and would facilitate retrieval, visualization and spatial analysis.

133. Estimations of crop area and production should also be available for the different altitudinal strata, which is the primary criterion of stratified sampling.

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9 (i) UNODC Discussion paper - 23/01/08 - Reducing the adverse health and social consequences of drug abuse: A comprehensive approach; (ii) Paper to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs - March 2008 - Making Drug Control Fit for Purpose. Building on the UNGASS Decade; (iii) several policy statements by UNODC Executive Director (December 2007, Free drugs or drug free? Executive Director Costa at a Drug Policy Alliance meeting, New Orleans; opening of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2008 ...).
134. The methods used in crop area estimation have evolved since 2002. The Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme has reached a stage at which its methodology can be stabilized, based on available data from satellite remote sensing systems, and can be carried out by the Government of Afghanistan. The distribution of the sample cells should be based on the stratified random sampling design with probability proportional to size of the cropped area.

135. The current approach of preparing an agriculture land-use map from medium-resolution data should be continued for five to six years to identify annual crop areas and short fallow and long fallow areas. The sample frame distribution should take into account the areas for the above-mentioned categories of agriculture use in proportion to the size of the local population, in order to measure the intensity of cultivation.

136. The entire database should be organized in the form of a customized information system for quick retrieval, visualization, quality evaluation and spatial analysis. It will also enable the geostatistical analysis of patterns and trends.

3. Village survey

137. The assessment of the redistribution of villages to capture opium-poppy growers (as done in 2007) should be done as soon as possible to determine the benefit of such action. If it is determined that there would be a net benefit of the redistribution of villages, the procedure for the redistribution of the sample must be spelled out or even developed as a small algorithm that can be implemented by different individuals, and it should be reported as part of the methodology, also explaining the merits of such a procedure.

138. Survey results should be reported according to altitudinal strata as well as by province and by areas grouping several provinces. Reporting by altitudinal strata may lead to some agro-ecological interpretations that are worth exploring.

139. The size of questionnaires should be reduced by limiting them to relevant items. Such items should include the number of households living in village, the number of opium-growing families, the area of agricultural land and the area under opium cultivation. This will save time in survey implementation and could help to increase the quality of information gathered. The ORAS survey should gather information (including gross revenue and fixed and variable costs) to develop opium-poppy budgets, which should be prepared and updated for different altitudinal strata and provinces. This information is likely to enhance comparisons between opium poppy and licit crops, and the monitoring of opium usage.

140. Measures of dispersion should be incorporated in the analysis for selected indicators to enable quality control of data and comparisons of altitudinal strata and groupings of provinces. Staff of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme in Kabul should to be given statistical training.

141. The Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme village survey data (headman survey in both ORAS and AOPS) should be analysed using SPSS or an equivalent statistical package that allows the testing of relevant hypotheses. Training could be provided by Research and Advocacy Section or by consultants. Promptness in tackling this issue would have a high pay-off with respect to enhancing the credibility of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme.
4. Farmers’ surveys (poppy-growing and non-poppy-growing farmers)

142. Caution is required when drawing generalized socio-economic conclusions based on the data of the AOPS survey, owing to limitations of the data. These limitations should be known by the end-users. The surveys for poppy-growing and non-poppy-growing farmers should be continued only if the concerns regarding sampling and information-gathering instruments are satisfactorily resolved and if there is real demand for socio-economic information to contextualize the activities ICMP.

143. UNODC should not duplicate the efforts of other institutions such as the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development of the Government of Afghanistan in gathering household information; the socio-economic context of the opium survey should rely on national household surveys such as the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), which is conducted every two years. If there is interest in a particular issue with respect to a specific region, province and altitudinal stratum, the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme could consider: (a) subcontracting or partnering with a suitable institution or consultant to address specific issues using NRVA public data; or (b) carrying out an in-house analysis using NRVA data. This could be the beginning of a series of special studies.

5. Price monitoring and value chain analysis

144. The path for possible research avenues has been opened by the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme since 2004. It could help enrich the opium value-added analysis with high potential pay-offs for counter-narcotic actions and policies. However, the Programme management needs to weigh the pros and cons of research and policy analysis at the expense of provision of services by the Programme.

145. The Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme should give serious consideration to retaking parametric statistics and econometric methods for the interpretation of socio-economic indicators, including prices. User-friendly statistical packages for time series analysis can be acquired to supplement a basic package such as SPSS.

146. The Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme partner with other organizations to conduct special studies of opium markets.

6. Eradication verification

147. All eradication verification should be carried out through ground surveys to ensure the necessary accuracy. However, this activity has to be weighed against the risk involved in verifying while eradication is under way. If eradication verification must be continued, manpower constraints and the exclusive acquisition of eradication satellite data and its interpretation need to be addressed.

148. If eradication verification is to be continued, the following measures are recommended:

(a) A methodology manual for eradication verification should be prepared;

(b) The results should not be included in AOPS; they can be provided to the interested stakeholders for internal use;
(c) UNODC should acquire exclusive remote sensing data for eradication verification, such as aerial photographs or videography, data from unmanned aerial vehicles or specifically programmed high-resolution satellite data.

7. **Capacity development**

149. UNODC should alert the Government of Afghanistan and donors that in the current situation it is unlikely that the transfer of knowledge and control of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme will happen by 2010.

150. A strategic plan should be prepared for developing the capacity of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics to monitor illicit crops as well as the impact of opium poppy reduction. It is important that this be done in consultation with stakeholders and with the participation of Ministry personnel. Furthermore, the plan should specify the mechanism that will support the creation of an enabling environment favouring innovation and further development of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, including measurement of impacts in the reduction of poppy cultivation.

151. Staff of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and national staff of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme in Kabul should be given training in statistical procedures for analysis of village surveys and price monitoring. Such training should include indicators for result-based achievement in different tasks.

152. Important training documents should be translated into Pashto and Dari.

153. Incentives to retain trained personnel should be in place.

8. **Dissemination of information, data-sharing and documentation**

154. The Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme should establish a policy for data-sharing.

155. Key processes, achievements and lessons learned through Programme implementation should be documented in order to facilitate institutional learning.

**VII. Conclusions**

156. UNODC is at a crossroads vis-à-vis its role in Afghanistan. That role dates back to the 1990s, when UNODC operations in Afghanistan were based in Peshawar. After September 2001, Afghanistan moved to centre stage in the global war on so-called terrorism. And as it did so, enormous resources began to pour into the country to address the global threat – a threat multiplied many times over by astronomical earnings from illegal narcotics. To its credit, UNODC had laid some important foundations during its work in the country prior to 2001, when its interventions, typically in the form of projects, spanned a wide range of thematic areas.

157. But UNODC can no longer compete at the project level with well-resourced donors. Its role must change. To remain relevant, it must search for niches where it has a comparative advantage. And those generally relate to the status of UNODC as a United Nations body. That status confers on UNODC the moral authority of an actor perceived to be neutral among competing national interests. UNODC can do
what bilateral entities cannot. And therein lies strength. It has a vital role to play in Afghanistan.

158. An overview of the five subprogramme evaluations suggests that the primary role of UNODC in Afghanistan’s refractory environment should lie in the realm of advising on strategy and policy. In some ways, the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, which is the UNODC flagship programme and which carries the thrust of its international profile with respect to Afghanistan, is a model, if a limited one. In monitoring the opium industry, the Programme highlights problem areas.

159. With respect to the area of alternative livelihoods, there is little room for UNODC, at least at the project level. Alternative livelihoods activities entail, first and foremost, development, which demands enormous resources that are well beyond those available to UNODC. There is little comparative advantage here.

160. In the area of rule of law, UNODC has made an important contribution to juvenile justice in Afghanistan, as well as to the development of aspects of legislation.

161. The work of UNODC in the area of law enforcement, or, to use the preferred term of the key evaluator, “policing”, has resulted in modest effects at best, given the enormous challenge. A new strategy is called for.

162. Work in the area of drug demand reduction is to be commended, though it has been hampered until recently by debates within UNODC on how to handle harm reduction and HIV/AIDS, and by the absence of fundraising strategy. The steps taken by UNODC management towards a clearer harm reduction policy should lift some of the past constraints.

163. This evaluation seeks to assist with that search for a redefined role. UNODC has an extraordinarily important role to play in Afghanistan.

164. It is hoped that this report will contribute positively to UNODC as it searches for viable roles in Afghanistan. This has been the guiding objective of the evaluators.
Annex I

List of persons interviewed

Afghanistan

**Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock**
Haidary, Director, Department of Agriculture
Katib Shams, Director of Balkh Agriculture and Irrigation, Mazar-i-Sharif

**Ministry of Counter-Narcotics**
Ahmadullah Alizai, Deputy Governor/Director, Directorate of Counter-Narcotics
Hasmatulla Asek, Regional Survey Coordinator, Kandahar and Nangarhar
C. Brett, Alternative Livelihoods Directorate
Daqiq, Director, Directorate of Counter-Narcotics
Gulam Nabi Faqiri, Admin. Chief (ex-Director), Northern region, Mazar-i-Sharif
General Khodaidad, Minister (former Deputy Minister for Policy and Coordination)
Abdul Mateen, Regional Survey Coordinator, Kandahar and Nangarhar
A. Omari, Alternative Livelihoods Directorate
Ghaws Rasoolzai, Deputy Director, Provincial Relations
Eng. Sami, Deputy Minister, Finance and Administration
Mohammad Khaiber Wardak, Database Unit
Mohammad Zafar, Deputy Minister, Head of Drug Demand Reduction

**Ministry of Economy**
Gh. Hazrat, Officer-in-Charge, Department of Economy

**Ministry of Education**
Mohammad Sidique Patman, Deputy Minister of Education

**Ministry of the Interior**
General Daud, Deputy Minister of Counter-Narcotics

**Ministry of Public Health**
S. Najeebullah Jawid, Supervisor, Drug Demand Reduction Action Teams (DRATs), Drug Demand Reduction Department, Kabul Public Health Directorate
Faizullah Kakar, Deputy Minister for Technical Affairs
Farmanullah Malangyar, Supervisor, Nangarhar DRAT, Drug Demand Reduction Department, Nangarhar Public Health Directorate
Temor Shah Mosamin, Chief, Psychiatric Department, M.M.H. and Shefa Curative Hospital
Ajmal Pardis, Head, Provincial Health Department
Saif-ur Rehman, National AIDS Control Programme
Joseph Rittmann, HIV Adviser, National AIDS Control Programme
Abdullah Wardak, Head, Drug Demand Reduction Department

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
A. Rhind
Hamidullah Yelani, Programme Manager and Deputy Director

Ministry of Women’s Affairs
Mazari Safa, Deputy Minister, Technical and Policy

Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
Colonel Ibrahim, Head of Intelligence Department
General Asef Jabar Khail, Head of National Interdiction Unit
Major Musbah, Acting Head, CNPA in Herat
Mohammad Naher, National Interdiction Unit
Nangyal, Officer-in-Charge, Precursor Control Unit
Lieutenant Colonel Nangyalai
Mohammed Younis Nazri, National Interdiction Unit
General Rahjoo, Deputy Head
Major Sayed Daud Shariti, Laboratory Head
General Shayesta Torabi, Director
Blackwater counterparts in the Counter-Narcotics Training Unit

Judiciary
Mohamad Eshaq Aloko, Deputy Attorney General for Investigation Affairs, Attorney General’s Office
Abdul Salam Azimi, Chief Justice, Supreme Court
Bashir Alimad “Barikzoy” Fazley, General Director for Special Prosecution of Counter-Narcotics, Attorney General’s Office
Mohammad Sarwar Danesh, Minister of Justice
General Abdul Salam Esmat, General Director, Central Prison Department, Ministry of Justice
Mr. Haleem, Head, Legislative General Department (Taqnin), Ministry of Justice
Abdul Malik Kamawi, Administrative General of Judiciary, Supreme Court
Noor Mohammed, Head of Section, Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force
Najibullah Rahmani, President of Counter-Narcotics Appeal Court
Anisa Rasooli, Chief Judge, Juvenile Appeals Court (former Chief Judge, Juvenile Court)
Colonel Safi, Commander of the Sixth Brigade, Afghanistan Border Police
Mohammed Seddiq, General Director of Children’s Rehabilitation Centres, Ministry of Justice
Timorshah Mohammad Stanekzy, Deputy Attorney General for Counter-Narcotics Affairs, Attorney General’s Office

**Provincial officials**
Ghulam Yayaah Ashna, District Officer, Gozara District
General Ata Mohammad Noor, Governor of Balkh Province, Mazar-i-Sharif
Community Development Council (Shura), Mahal Baqwanan, Ghozara District

**Other Government entities**

**Canada**
Dr. Nadir Habib, Development Officer, Embassy in Kabul
Linda Libront, First Secretary (Development)

**Italy**
Cristiano Congiu, Counter-Narcotics Attaché, Embassy in Kabul
Sara Rezoagli, First Secretary, Embassy in Kabul

**Norway**
Andreas Lovold, Second Secretary, Political Affairs, Embassy in Kabul
Merete Dyrud, Counsellor (Development Cooperation), Embassy in Kabul

**Pakistan**
Brigadier Feroze Muhammad, Defence Attaché, Embassy in Kabul
Waheed Khattak, Director, Community Development Unit, Commission for Afghan Refugees, Peshawar

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Katrina Aitken, Counter-Narcotics Institutions Adviser, Embassy in Kabul
Anna Aquilana, Acting Head of Rule of Law, Embassy in Kabul
Damon Bristow, Alternative Livelihoods and Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
David Cheesman, Head of Rule of Law Team, Embassy in Kabul
Francis Davis, Senior Prosecution Adviser, Embassy in Kabul
Ahmad Shah Habib, Drug Demand Reduction Adviser, Embassy in Kabul
Sebastian Heath, Eradication Team Leader, Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
Peter Holland, Chief, Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
Alice Mann, Livelihoods Adviser, Department for International Development, Embassy in Kabul
David Mansfield, Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
Bill Murray, Senior Prisons Adviser, Embassy in Kabul
Victoria Orme, Second Secretary (Criminal Justice), Embassy in Kabul
Rosemary Thomas, First Secretary, Embassy in Kabul
Ian Turner, Senior Prisons Adviser, Embassy in Kabul
Tom Voase, First Secretary (law enforcement), Embassy in Kabul

**United States of America**

Timothy Anderson, Alternative Development Program, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Robert Gibson, Director, Corrections System Support Program, Department of State
Raymund Johansen, Rule of Law Advisor, USAID
Curt Maier, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Kirk E. Meyer, Assistant Country Attaché, DEA
Kent Morris, Narcotics Affairs Officer, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Embassy in Kabul
Amy Slohr, Public Relations Officer, INL, Department of State
Ray Snowden, Architect, Corrections System Support Program, Department of State
Loren Owen Stoddard, Director, Alternative Development and Agriculture Office, USAID
Gene Trammell, Deputy Program Manager, Afghan Eradication Force, INL, Afghanistan
Chidi Ugonna, International Advisor, Poppy Elimination Program, Nangarhar
United Nations system

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
Mahdi Hussaini, Programme Officer
Johanna Klinge, Relief and Development Officer
Rick Reiman, Corrections Adviser
Sayed Ghias Sadat, Programme Officer, Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction/Institutional Development Group
Shakti Sinha, Senior Governance Officer

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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Gautam Babbar, Project Coordinator, Strategic Planning Unit
Sebastian Baumeister, Associate Expert, Anti-Human Trafficking Unit
Monica Beg, Drug Abuse and HIV/AIDS Adviser, HIV/AIDS Unit
Stefano Berterame, Chief, Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Unit, Global Challenges Section
Doris Buddenberg, Senior Manager, Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (former Representative, UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan)
Sandeep Chawla, Chief, Policy Analysis and Research Branch
Bernard Frahi, Chief, Partnership in Development Branch, Division for Operations
Walter Gehr, Chief, Terrorism Prevention Branch
Gilberto Gerra, Chief, Health and Human Development Section (former Chief, Global Challenges Section)
Stuart Gilman, Chief, Anti-Corruption Unit
Katharina Kayser, Programme Management Officer, Strategic Planning Unit
Anja Korenblik, Programme Management Officer (Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme), Research and Analysis Section
Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Chief, Europe and West/Central Asia Section
Timothy Lemay, Chief, Rule of Law Section
Francis Maertens, Director, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs
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Marie Mathiaud, Legal Advisory Section
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Paul Williams, Expert, HIV/AIDS Unit
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Patrick Halewood, International Project Coordinator
Radifullah Hamid, National Project Coordinator
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Bahram Momand, Provincial Alternative Livelihood Coordinator
Mohammed Naim, National Project Coordinator, Drug Demand Reduction
Eisa Nang, National Project Coordinator
Shukria Noori, National Project Coordinator, Justice Unit
Ajmal Noorzai, National Project Coordinator, Alternative Livelhoods
Christina Oguz, Representative
Matteo Pasquali, International Project Expert, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Capacity-Building
Shirish Ravan, International Project Coordinator, Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme
Daud Saskai, National Project Coordinator
Alexandre Schmidt, Officer-in-Charge, UNODC Regional Office for the Russian Federation and Belarus (former Deputy Representative, UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan)
Nazar Ahmad Shah, Senior National Programme Officer
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Basic Education for Awareness Reforms and Empowerment (BEFARE)
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Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
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Mohammad Shah Rauf, RDP Section Head

DeutschOrdensWerke International
Ulrich Köhler, Adviser to the non-governmental organization Nejat

DOST Welfare Foundation
Mohammad Ayub, Programme Director
Nabeela Elahi, Manager, drop-in centre for children
Mohammad Jawad, Project Assistant (AFG/H87)
Parveen Azam Khan, President

**European Commission**
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**German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)**
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Harald Waesch, Drug Demand Reduction Adviser, Integrated Drug Prevention Treatment and Rehabilitation Project in Afghanistan
Wafi Walim, Deputy Strategy Adviser, Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan

**International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas**
S. Javed H. Rizvi, Assistant Country Manager and Senior Communications Specialist

**Médecins du monde**
Olivier Maguet, Head, Harm Reduction Programme in Afghanistan

**Mission d’aide au développement des économies rurales en Afghanistan (MADERA)**
Abdul Rahman Satarzai, Deputy Director of Operations, Eastern Zone
Abdul Wali, Microfinance Specialist

**Nejat Drug Treatment Centre**
Tariq Suliman, Director

**Social Services to Afghan Women**
Dr. Toorpanikay, Head, Sanga Amaj Treatment Centre

**Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan**
Mohammad Nasib, Managing Director
Sardar Wali, Drug Demand Reduction Coordinator
Others

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Juan Estrada, Deputy Chief of Party/Senior Agribusiness Adviser, Alternative Livelihoods Programme, Eastern Region, Development Alternatives, Inc.
Peter Middlebrook, Consultant, Middlebrook and Miller Consulting
Sharon Miller, Consultant, Middlebrook and Miller Consulting
Mokhlis, Mullah and University Rector
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Prof. John C. Taylor, Cranfield University, United Kingdom
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Annex II

Terms of reference

Thematic evaluation on the technical assistance provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

I. Background

1. UNODC has been actively supporting the Government of Afghanistan since the inception of the transitional State of Afghanistan in December 2001. It has been working in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations agencies and donors and has been expanding its secretarial role for the relevant ministries (Counter-Narcotics, Interior, Justice, Reconstruction and Rural Development and Public Health).

2. The London Conference adopted the “Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success”, a which outlines the priorities and goals for Afghanistan over the next five-year period (2006-2010) mutually agreed between the international community and the Government of Afghanistan. UNODC has developed a Strategic Programme Framework b which aims at supporting the Afghanistan Compact. The Strategic Programme Framework equally fits within the National Drug Control Strategy, c highlighting four national priorities for the three years (2006-2009). The first is to target the trafficker at the top end of the trade; the second is to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods; the third is to reduce the demand for illicit drugs and improve the treatment of problem drug users; and the final objective is to develop state institutions at the central and the provincial levels vital to the delivery of the narcotics control strategy.

3. Over the years UNODC has provided technical assistance and advice to the Government of Afghanistan through support under country or global projects in five thematic areas or programmes. d

Anti-trafficking: UNODC builds capacity of the criminal justice system, strengthening counter-narcotics law enforcement, limiting availability of chemicals used in illicit manufacturing of heroin and strengthening border control and cross-border cooperation. The total value of the ongoing and pipeline project is about $23 million.

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c National Drug Control Strategy, an updated five-year policy for tackling the illicit drug problem (Kabul, January 2006).
d United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Programme in Afghanistan (February 2007).
Global challenges: UNODC builds capacity of national and provincial governments, empowers communities for drug demand reduction and promotes alternative livelihoods for drug control. Presently, assistance is provided through supporting seven ongoing and pipeline projects for a total value of about $16 million.

Rule of law: UNODC promotes stable and viable criminal justice systems and combats the growing threats of transnational organized crime, corruption and trafficking in human beings. Presently there are eight ongoing and pipeline projects with a total value of about $24 million.

Terrorism prevention: The Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC has been mandated by the General Assembly to provide counter-terrorism technical assistance to requesting Member States. In accordance with this mandate, a Global Project was launched with the main objective being to “support Member States in achieving a functional universal legal regime against terrorism in accordance with the principles of the rule of law”. The main activities are the provision of legal advisory services, training of criminal justice officials and assistance for the strengthening of institutional structures and mechanisms in Member States.

Core programme: research and advocacy: In order to promote the development and maintenance of a global network of illicit crop monitoring systems in the context of the crop elimination objective of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly devoted to countering the world drug problem together, UNODC has been providing overall coordination and direct technical support and supervision to the annual illicit crop surveys at the country level. Since 2000, the Government of Afghanistan, with the technical support of UNODC, has carried out an annual opium survey and has also carried out a number of rapid assessments. Along with illicit crop monitoring, other research and advocacy initiatives are also major inputs to building the capacity of the Government.

II. Purpose of the evaluation

4. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess how UNODC’s development cooperation has built the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan in the main areas of UNODC interventions, namely research and analysis, law enforcement, rule of law, terrorism prevention, alternative livelihoods and drug demand reduction. The evaluation will draw lessons learned and recommend improvements. At the same time, the evaluation will address the issue of what is the net value added of UNODC’s work and its strategic positioning. The evaluation will:

(a) Provide an assessment of the results achieved through UNODC’s support (project and non-project activities) and in partnership with other key development actors;

(b) Provide an analysis of how UNODC has positioned itself strategically to add value in response to national needs and changes in the UNODC thematic areas;

(c) Provide an assessment of design, coherence and focus of the country programme;
(d) Provide an analysis of to what extent activities and results are sustainable at their respective levels (communities, intermediate or higher level institutions) and connected to local, regional and national capacities or other forms of external support;

(e) Provide accountability to the UNODC management, Member States and donors;

(f) Based on the analyses of achievements and positioning above, present key findings, draw lessons and provide clear and forward-looking recommendations in order to suggest effective and realistic strategies by UNODC and partners towards intended results.

5. The present evaluation is conducted as part of the 2007 work plan of the Independent Evaluation Unit under in-depth thematic evaluations of UNODC. The Unit will work closely with the Europe and West/Central Asia Section, the Anti-Trafficking Section, the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit, the Global Challenges Section, the Rule of Law Section and the Research Analysis and Scientific Support Unit in Vienna and the Afghanistan Country Office during all phases of the exercise.

III. Scope of the evaluation

6. The evaluation will undertake a comprehensive review of the UNODC Afghanistan Country Office programme portfolio and activities from 2001 until March 2007.

7. The evaluation will measure effects and impacts of the country programme, examine UNODC’s support to the Government of Afghanistan, assess programme performances and draw lessons and best practices. In addition, the evaluation will concentrate on whether and how UNODC’s support played a role in developing national capacity, enhancing national ownership, advocating and fostering an enabling policy environment and fostering partnership and coordination throughout the evaluation process.

8. For the purpose of this evaluation, UNODC’s activities will be grouped into the following categories:

(a) Positioning of UNODC, policy and overall framework;

(b) Research and analysis (illicit crop monitoring);

(c) Law enforcement;

(d) Rule of law, including terrorism prevention;

(e) Alternative livelihoods development;

(f) Drug demand reduction.

9. The evaluation will answer the key questions outlined below in its final report. These questions remain generic, but are consistent with standard approaches to programme evaluation. There should be an element of flexibility, as the evaluation progresses, to adjust the evaluation’s focus in response to changing circumstances.
10. The consultants selected to prepare the evaluation will be required to develop the specific evaluation questions in the areas mentioned above, based on the following generic questions.

11. The list of key questions follows the evaluation criteria of UNODC.

IV. Key evaluation questions

A. Relevance

Has UNODC assistance been relevant to the needs and demands of Afghanistan to fight the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs, to monitor and report on production of illicit crops, to prevent terrorism and to strengthen the rule of law on its territory?

(a) Are objectives of programmes and projects aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of the Government of Afghanistan, UNODC’s mandates and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and other policy and development frameworks?

(b) Are designs of programmes and projects technically sound? Are the programme and project objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to the achievements of the Strategic Programme Framework, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and other strategic instruments?

(c) Are response activities and implementation strategies appropriate for meeting stated objectives, with a focus on assessing programme and project elements directly related to capacity-building, coordination and subcontractor performance?

(d) Are UNODC assistance activities responsive to the country’s needs? How well do the programme and project objectives reflect the specific nature of the problem and needs of the Government of Afghanistan?

(e) Does the Government at the national and local levels take the lead in developing and implementing frameworks and strategies within UNODC’s mandated issues?

B. Effectiveness

Is UNODC’s approach and assistance effective in enabling the Government of Afghanistan to fight the illicit drug menace, to establish rule of law and to monitor and report on production of illicit crops?

(a) To what extent has the UNODC country programme contributed to the achievement of the Afghanistan Compact, the Strategic Programme Framework and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy? What are the reasons for the achievement and non-achievement of objectives?

(b) How is institutional capacity development at the national and subnational levels promoted so as to guarantee rights and provide services, including through
strategy development, policy formulation and application, and data collection, analysis and utilization?

(c) To what extent have key skills (e.g. policy formulation, strategic or programme planning, management, analysis, knowledge management, etc.) and specific skills in thematic areas been enhanced?

(d) Have leadership skills been enhanced at the institutional and individual levels in order to drive integrated national (e.g. Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Strategic Programme Framework etc.) and subnational level agendas?

(e) Has there been any improvement in programming in terms of designing, addressing the country problem and producing results over the period under evaluation?

(f) Did integration (intra- and inter-thematic areas) take place while implementing different project activities?

(g) How are internal UNODC factors and constraints affecting effectiveness, including human resources, logistic support and the predictability and regularity of resources and flexibility of the budget?

(h) How are external factors (such as limited access to intervention sites, human resource constraints and the security situation etc.) having an impact on effectiveness?

(i) To what extent did policy and research support and influence the policy framework and intellectual approaches to elimination of illicit drug production and supply, and enhance Government capacity to formulate strategies and monitor drug production and supply?

(j) Is the illicit crop monitoring survey methodology technically sound and does it provide accurate and timely information to the Government and other Member States?

(k) Has UNODC developed the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan and institutions to undertake crop-monitoring surveys on their own?

C. Efficiency

How efficient has the implementation of the UNODC programme and projects been?

(a) Were alternative less costly intervention modalities considered in designing projects? Do they exist?

(b) Are there less costly methods which could achieve the same outcome or impact at the beneficiary level?

(c) To what extent has a transparent operating environment and accountability of Government been established?

(d) To what extent have partnerships been sought with other relevant actors (including United Nations agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?
(e) Is there effective coordination among the Government, UNODC and other implementing partners?

(f) Is the country human resource structure appropriate and efficient?

(g) Assess quality, timeliness, effectiveness and sustainability of management arrangements, technical inputs and assistance;

(h) Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by field and headquarters staff (administrative and managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?

(i) What are the potential challenges that may prevent the operations from producing intended results?

(j) How does illicit crop monitoring assistance enable the Government of Afghanistan to develop its capacity to monitor and report on production of opium poppy?

D. Outcome and impact

What impact has UNODC assistance created in Afghanistan?

(a) What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of interventions on people, institutions and the physical environment?

(b) Do the beneficiaries and other stakeholders affected by the intervention perceive the effect of the interventions on themselves?

(c) What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders, especially the Government of Afghanistan, implementing partners, other United Nations organizations and bilateral and multilateral donors, about the overall impact of UNODC’s response activities?

E. Sustainability

Are UNODC efforts in Afghanistan sustainable?

(a) Does the national Government take the lead in developing and implementing frameworks and strategies for eradicating illicit drug production, trafficking in and consumption of illicit drugs, monitoring and reporting on production of illicit crops and strengthening the rule of law on its territory?

(b) Are the UNODC supported policies and strategic issues integrated into the key national development documents?

(c) What are the specific legal, policy and regulatory changes that incorporate issues of UNODC thematic areas?

(d) Do the project interventions have a potential for scaling up or replication?
(e) To what extent have the findings and recommendations from past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified?

(f) How has UNODC ensured that benefits from its assistance continue after UNODC assistance stops?

(g) How was sustainability built into the programme and projects?

F. Lessons learned and best practices

Are there any lessons from UNODC involvement in Afghanistan?

(a) Identify key lessons in the thematic areas of focus and lessons on positioning that can provide a useful basis for strengthening UNODC support to the country and for improving programme and project performances, results and effectiveness in the future;

(b) Through in-depth thematic assessment, present good practices (highlighting features to be considered as good practice) at the country level for learning and replication;

(c) Draw lessons from unintended results where possible.

V. Evaluation methodology

12. The evaluation will take into consideration commonly agreed international evaluation norms and standards, including “Guiding principles for evaluation at UNODC”, “Standards of evaluation in the United Nations system”, “Norms for evaluation in the United Nations system” etc.

13. These evaluation terms of reference provide an overarching framework for the Afghanistan Country Technical Assistance evaluation, covering all UNODC areas of intervention in the country.

14. The Team Leader and team members of the evaluation are expected to assess the terms of reference and develop an evaluation framework with instruments to be discussed and agreed on by UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit. The evaluation framework should be flexible enough to accommodate any adjustment necessary due to the volatile political and security situation of Afghanistan and produce the best possible output.

15. The suggested key methods for the conduct of the evaluation will be, but should not be limited to, the following:

(a) A historical and contextual review of each of the thematic areas, e.g. the problem of illicit drugs in Afghanistan, as well as a review of any current special conditions in Afghanistan that require allowances to be made;

(b) A comprehensive desk review of external and internal policy, programme and project documents (including evaluation reports) relevant to UNODC assistance to Afghanistan. This will include a review of official documents, budgets, reports, websites and publications that deal with UNODC assistance to Afghanistan;
(c) Review the country programme and project planning, implementation and monitoring mechanisms;

(d) An extensive round of interviews and focus group discussions with the key stakeholders (Government, donors, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations organizations etc.) at both national and subnational levels and UNODC staff at headquarters and in the Afghanistan Country Office;

(e) Interviews of former representatives and former employees of UNODC (where possible) who can provide insights about some of the early challenges;

(f) Field visits to the selected project sites to gain first-hand information of the benefits received due to UNODC interventions;

(g) A survey among staff members of the UNODC Afghanistan Country Office involved in project implementation and project support.

16. The evaluation will be a participatory process that will give due importance to self-assessment by stakeholders involved in programme design and implementation. All information will, to the largest possible extent, be triangulated (use of three or more sources of information to verify and substantiate an assessment) and validated. Findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned should be clearly action-oriented and feed into major decision-making for future strategy and programme development.

17. The suggested selection criteria for field visits (one or more of the following criteria) are:

(a) The maturity of the programme, project or intervention within the country programme;

(b) The wealth of experience and the chances of generating interesting lessons;

(c) Strategic interest of the programme, project or intervention;

(d) Significant UNODC contribution, both financial and human resources.

VI. Evaluation team

18. The evaluation will be carried out by a technical team of six international consultants and an Evaluation Officer of the Independent Evaluation Unit.

19. One of the consultants, who has demonstrated experience in development evaluation, the United Nations system and the specific area of alternative development, will be the Team Leader.

20. The five other consultants will be specialized in relation to specific thematic areas (one on law enforcement and prevention of drug trafficking, one on the rule of law, one on drug demand reduction and two on illicit crop monitoring).
A. Responsibilities and qualifications of the Team Leader

21. The key responsibilities of the Team Leader include:

   (a) Developing the evaluation framework with detailed methods, tools and techniques;
   (b) Leading the evaluation process;
   (c) Assigning responsibilities to team members;
   (d) Ensuring adherence to the terms of reference and writing and disseminating reports;
   (e) In addition, the Team Leader is responsible for evaluation of cross-cutting issues, such as alignment of the country programme with national, United Nations Development Assistance Framework and UNODC strategies, partnerships etc.

22. The qualifications required of the Team Leader are as follows:

   (a) Preferably an advanced university degree in social science or other relevant discipline, with specialized training in areas such as evaluation, social statistics, quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis;
   (b) Design and management of evaluation processes, including evaluation processes involving multiple stakeholders and post conflict situations;
   (c) Policy planning and policy analysis;
   (d) Social science research in alternative development;
   (e) Previous work, research and evaluation experience in Afghanistan (desirable);
   (f) Knowledge of the United Nations or international development organizations (preferable);
   (g) Understanding of gender considerations;
   (h) Fluency in English and excellent writing skills.

B. Responsibilities and qualifications of the consultants

23. The key responsibilities of the team members are to:

   (a) Support the evaluation Team Leader in developing evaluation methods and tools;
   (b) Conduct evaluation of policy, strategy and interventions in their specific thematic area;
   (c) Write the thematic area report and perform any other tasks given by the Team Leader.
24. The qualifications required of the team members are as follows:

(a) Preferably have an advanced university degree specific to the thematic area under evaluation or other relevant discipline. Specialized training in areas such as evaluation; quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis would be an asset;

(b) Must have experience in planning, programme management and evaluation of projects, programmes and policy in the broader rule of law sphere, including criminal justice systems;

(c) Previous work, research and evaluation experience in Afghanistan (desirable);

(d) Knowledge of the United Nations or international development organizations (desirable);

(e) Understanding of gender considerations;

(f) Fluency in English and excellent writing skills.

25. The Evaluation Officers of the Independent Evaluation Unit will work as full members of the team and will bring to the team knowledge of country programme evaluation methodology and knowledge of UNODC’s operations and its thematic areas.

VII. Management arrangements and deliverables

26. The Independent Evaluation Unit will manage the evaluation and ensure coordination and liaison with the relevant regional desk at headquarters. The Independent Evaluation Unit Task Manager, in consultation with the Chief of the Unit, will lead the process, in close consultation with the regional desk and the country management team (Representative and Evaluation Focal Person). The Chief of the Independent Evaluation Unit and the Task Manager will also ensure substantive supervision of all members of the evaluation team and determine the team composition.

27. The UNODC Country Office will play a lead role in dialogue and interaction with stakeholders on the findings and recommendations, support the evaluation team in liaison with the key partners and discussions with the team, and make available to the team all relevant material. The country office will provide support for logistics and planning.

28. The Independent Evaluation Unit will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the evaluation. These will include costs related to participation of the evaluation consultants and the staff members of the Unit and to any stakeholder workshops during the evaluation mission.
A. Key deliverables

29. The evaluation team is expected to deliver key outputs shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An inception report containing an assessment of</td>
<td>The Team Leader will be in charge of drafting the report, with inputs from the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the terms of reference and a description of the</td>
<td>other four team members on their specific thematic area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>final evaluation methodology and instruments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft reports of thematic evaluations</td>
<td>Each of the five team members will prepare a report covering their specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final reports of thematic evaluations</td>
<td>thematic area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft country assistance evaluation report</td>
<td>The Team Leader will be in charge of drafting the report, with inputs from the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final country assistance evaluation report</td>
<td>other four team members on their specific thematic area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. The evaluation team members will hold a feedback session and present the initial findings in a workshop format to the country management team after completion of the field mission in Afghanistan. The evaluation Task Manager and the Chief of the Independent Evaluation Unit will attend and participate in the presentation and feedback workshop.

31. Once the Team Leader submits the first draft evaluation report, the report will be examined by the Independent Evaluation Unit for quality and fulfilment of the terms of reference.

32. The Independent Evaluation Unit will organize a dissemination session to present the draft report at UNODC headquarters and to the Afghanistan Country Office and stakeholders for feedback, comments and any correction of potential errors or omissions.

33. The Team Leader will receive the comments of the Independent Evaluation Unit and UNODC programme staff and stakeholders and, subject to agreement with the comments made, will adjust the report accordingly and send the final report to the Independent Evaluation Unit.
B. Timetable and key milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Milestones</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March-May 2007</td>
<td>• Circulation of the draft terms of reference to the relevant headquarters desk and Country Office for comments</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Finalization of terms of reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>May-July 2007</td>
<td>• Recruitment of consultants</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Briefing on Afghanistan country programme at headquarters</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Assessment of terms of reference and development of evaluation methodology, with appropriate instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-November 2007</td>
<td>• Independent review by the evaluation team (headquarters and country mission)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Team Leader travels to London to meet the peer reviewer</td>
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<tr>
<td>November-December 2007</td>
<td>• Submission of draft report by the evaluation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Briefing on draft evaluation findings and recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Circulation of draft report for feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>• Submission of final report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Payment

34. The consultants will be issued a consultancy contract and paid in accordance with United Nations rules and procedures.

35. A lump sum payment will be made in three instalments:

(a) First payment will be made upon signing the contract (travel expenses and 75 per cent of daily subsistence allowance);

(b) Second payment (50 per cent of the consultancy fee and 25 per cent of daily subsistence allowance) will be made upon receipt of the draft report by the Independent Evaluation Unit;

(c) The third and final payment (50 per cent, i.e. remaining, fee) will be made only after completion of the respective tasks and receipt of the final report and its clearance by the Independent Evaluation Unit.
THEMATIC EVALUATION OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AFGHANISTAN BY THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

Volume 1
Consolidated Evaluation Report

Independent Evaluation Unit