This is a critical year for Afghanistan. We have said this before. But this year is different. There is real potential to make concrete progress in important areas, from fighting illicit opium production to increasing productivity in traditional agricultural commodities, from combating organized criminal groups to advancing regional economic cooperation. We should bring the same sense of urgency to addressing these challenges as we are bringing to efforts to improve the security situation. I welcome efforts towards an international engagement that is not only re-energized, but also brings together civilian and military efforts in a more comprehensive way.

Ban-Ki Moon, UN Secretary-General (The Hague, March 2009)
This document has not been formally edited. It is meant for discussion and is not an official document of the United Nations. The designations employed and presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations.
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Acknowledgment:
The Management expresses special thanks to the staff of the Country Office in Afghanistan and the geographic desk located at our headquarters, to the Canadian Government for the support given to its program, to the Embassy of Norway for its logistic aid and enthusiasm in helping this exercise forward, and to the Office of the UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, UNAMA, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics of Afghanistan, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Health, and other Government departments for their substantive guidance.
Process

Our national strategic framework is designed to support national, regional and international action under the principle of ‘shared responsibility’. The international community considers the narcotics industry as a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region, and beyond. It defines the elimination of the narcotics industry as a “vital and cross-cutting area of work”.

The strategy espouses the National Counter Narcotics Strategy (January 2006), highlighting four national priorities for the present three years (2006-2009): to target high-level traffickers; to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods; to reduce the demand for illicit drugs and improve the treatment of problem drug users; and to develop institutions at the central and provincial levels vital to the delivery of the narcotics control strategy.

UNODC’s Country Office for Afghanistan (COAFG) started to roll out activities to the provinces and to prioritize interventions as early as 2007. While budgetary pressures left this inherently sound exercise incomplete, the current strategy builds on these experiences and refines the method by applying the principle of *subsidiarity*, integrating local or provincial interventions with national and regional realities.

The menu of services currently provided by UNODC in Afghanistan will be locked together in one solid package, exploiting internal and external synergies with a view to maximize impact. In the same vein, the menu of services is to be calibrated to local circumstances and requirements. At the provincial and district levels, packages of interventions will differ depending on local priorities, the potential for engaging in partnerships, gaps perceived to achieve an ‘integrated approach’ and the availability of resources.

Working with the above premise, internal discussion papers were drafted and circulated in late December 2008. The aim was to identify niche interventions, both geographically and substantively, for COAFG’s program, which rests on pillars in Criminal Justice, Counter Narcotics and Research, Advocacy and Information.

The process continued during January 2009 with an internal debate among UNODC staff, assisted by more generic consultations with both national and international stakeholders. A mapping exercise supported the discussion, indicating not only the current UNODC presence within Afghanistan (i.e. the UNODC provincial offices, the Justice Support Centers, intended Border Liaison Offices) but equally the presence of key partners such as the regional/provincial offices of UNAMA, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), offices of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA) and Border Police (ABP).

With the assistance of the Embassy of Norway and following the informal consultation today with international stakeholders in Kabul, COAFG will design its 2009-2010 work-plan and bring its draft Country Program for Afghanistan to the next stage, soliciting inputs and support of the technical units based at UNODC headquarters, before finalizing the process.

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1 The Afghanistan Compact (signed in London on 1 February 2006) is complemented by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2006-2010 (launched in January 2006), as the National Strategic Document which aims to achieve objectives enshrined in the Compact.
Executive Summary

UNODC in Afghanistan is best known for its research and opium surveys. Our work undertaken in other areas, such as Counter Narcotics and Criminal Justice, acknowledged as it may be by Government counterparts and external experts, is less visible for a number of reasons. The current strategy revision, by making optimal use of our comparative advantages as a specialized UN agency, will correct this by seeking maximum impact at the local or provincial levels through partnerships. More than the nominal size of the program, it is the quality of its interventions that will determine impact, credibility and visibility. UNODC has to do less geographically but better substantively.

The strategy outlines UNODC’s vision for the coming two years (April 2009- May 2011). The strategy builds on our comparative advantages, notably our status as a UN body, our specialist expertise in drugs and crime and our capacity to facilitate Afghanistan’s participation in international responses. We also apply a geographic model to guide our assistance to the Government of Afghanistan in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, integrating local, national and regional interventions as appropriate. Impact is best achieved at the grassroots level, but national and regional influences shape grassroots outcomes. We therefore aim to link provincial interventions with national frameworks and the existing Rainbow Strategy.

As well as continuing the proven elements of UNODC’s program, there are six novel elements in the strategy that warrant particular attention:

1. Subsidiarity – Interplay between local, national and regional

Activities at the provincial level aim to bring the widest range of services closest to beneficiaries. We therefore have a preference for designing interventions locally, but local impact is deepened by tying it to national and regional interventions. Twenty (20) out of the thirty-four (34) Afghan provinces are border provinces, with a population of fifteen (15) million out of the estimated total twenty-four (24) million for Afghanistan, and ethnic lines stretch well beyond the formal boundaries. Progress at the local/provincial level can be furthered, consolidated or diluted by events at the national level or in a neighboring country. Conversely, where insecurity inhibits local action, national or cross-border interventions can positively influence provincial trends. We will therefore strive at the national and regional levels to shape the conditions for grassroots success.

2. Securing the buffer zones – Focusing on the western borders

The contraction of areas under opium cultivation in Afghanistan leaves Herat, Farah, Nimroz and Ghor as significant buffer provinces. There is potential to make all four opium poppy-free but also a risk that intense interventions elsewhere will displace cultivation westwards. A parallel displacement of insurgent activity appears to be underway already. A focus on the western border also engages our comparative advantage as a UN body in addressing the concerns of neighboring countries (Iran, Pakistan and Turkmenistan) and strengthening cross-border cooperation, thereby facilitating a constructive relationship with other international stakeholders active in Afghanistan. Initial areas of mutual concern are narcotics and human trafficking.

3. Exploiting internal and external synergies – Enabling partnerships and maximizing impact

Our survey of the humanitarian crisis in the defunct Russian Cultural Centre, located in the centre of Kabul, highlighted that a vast majority were returnees or deportees from Iran and Pakistan. The crisis painfully demonstrated the interconnections between irregular migration at the western borders, human trafficking, addiction and the drug trade, injecting drug use, HIV/AIDS, poverty
and a lack of employment opportunities for young males, with a dearth of available treatment and rehabilitation options.

The crisis also indicated the potential for internal synergies within UNODC’s program. For example, prisons are overcrowded and living conditions are deteriorating, partly due to an increasing addiction problem and accompanying petty crime. Our criminal justice program will seek to improve detention centers, expand their treatment services and provide support to drafting legislation related to alternative sentencing. Simultaneously, our counter-narcotics program will seek measures to prevent addicts ending up in courts and prisons, such as treatment services outside of prison settings, social harm reduction, shelters and early prevention.

The interesting cross-pollination of issues allows us to bring partners together thereby augmenting the delivery of services, not necessarily directly mandated to UNODC, and maximizing impact through synergy.

**4. Strong body, effective aid – Anti-corruption measures**

Strong emphasis is to be given to implementing the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). There are two key enablers for stability and further development: building effective institutions and strengthening Afghanistan’s economic foundations. Fraud not only wastes scarce resources that should help build the country, it has the debilitating effect of eroding internal resistance against external threats. The state is constantly at risk of subversion by money, threats and violence. Afghanistan is entering a challenging phase of reforming its anti-corruption framework and related legislation, efforts that we can assist based on extensive experience. In this respect, we will continue to provide technical assistance and advisory services to enhance the institutional and human capacity of the Afghan criminal justice organs. Advocacy and awareness are other tools to our disposal when battling what has become the worst internal threat to the legitimacy of the Afghan Government.

**5. The next stage of precursor control – Backtracking**

Significant seizures of acetic anhydride – the principal precursor chemical required to convert opium into heroin – in Iran, Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan broke a spell created by the absence of such seizures in Afghanistan’s neighbors since 2001. Nevertheless, these apparent successes did not occur on the basis of intelligence gained from within Afghanistan. The lack of national capacity in this regard prevents high-value law enforcement such as backtracking investigations. We therefore intend to use regional operations as focal exercises in supporting cross-border cooperation against precursor smuggling, as well as centerpieces around which to organize the development of Afghanistan’s domestic capabilities.

**6. Ownership and sustainability – Afghanization of national drug and crime responses**

Counter-narcotics has proven to be one of the greatest challenges in implementing the Afghanistan Compact. Eradication has been slow and comes at a very high cost due to the poor security situation.

In turn, the area under opium poppy cultivation is expected to decline for the second year in a row and it is highly likely that the number of opium poppy-free provinces will again increase. To sustain these efforts, alternative livelihoods need to be promoted. However, the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF), established at the London conference to fund the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), has failed to deliver meaningful alternative livelihoods to Afghans. Different mechanisms are now in place but the central policy role of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) has been dramatically weakened over time.

If the Government is to extend its authority and assume responsibility for counter-narcotics and crime policies, it needs to have access to and the capacity to process information, the capacity to coordinate wider partnerships both in Kabul and the provinces,
the skills to mainstream topics of concern within the interventions of others, the faculty to allot aid and support in timely fashion, and, most importantly, the clout to define policy with authority. Therefore, we will continue our support to Government institutions in general and the MCN in particular.
List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>AREU</td>
<td>Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit</td>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Alternative Development</td>
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<td>ANF</td>
<td>Anti Narcotics Force (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>ATS</td>
<td>Amphetamine-type Stimulants</td>
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<td>BLO</td>
<td>Border Liaison Office</td>
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<td>BMTF</td>
<td>Border Management Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agricultural Rural Development</td>
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<td>CARICCC</td>
<td>Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (UNODC Program – Rainbow Strategy)</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre</td>
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<td>CN</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CNTA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Training Academy</td>
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<td>CNTF</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Trust Fund</td>
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<td>COAFG</td>
<td>Country Office Afghanistan (UNODC)</td>
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<td>COIRA</td>
<td>Country Office Iran (UNODC)</td>
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<td>COPAK</td>
<td>Country Office Pakistan (UNODC)</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Caspian Sea Initiative (UNODC – Rainbow Strategy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transit Command - Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLO</td>
<td>Drug Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>DCHQ</td>
<td>Drug Control Headquarters (Iran)</td>
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<td>DR</td>
<td>Demand reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>GCCI</td>
<td>Gulf Centre for Criminal Intelligence (UNODC Program)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>Good Performance Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICMP</td>
<td>Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (UNODC program)</td>
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<td>IDLG</td>
<td>Independent Directorate for Local Governance</td>
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<td>IDU</td>
<td>Injecting Drug Use(r)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCB</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Board</td>
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<td>JPC</td>
<td>Joint Planning Cell (UNODC – Triangular Initiative)</td>
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<td>JPCU</td>
<td>Joint Port Coordination Units (UNODC – Container Program)</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Justice Support Centers (UNODC program)</td>
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<td>MCN</td>
<td>Ministry of Counter Narcotics</td>
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<td>ML</td>
<td>Money Laundering</td>
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<td>MLA</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MoJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>MoPh</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRRD</td>
<td>Ministry Reconstruction and Rural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Office of the Attorney-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMUNA</td>
<td>Provincial mapping of UN Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
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<td>RAS</td>
<td>Rapid Assessment Survey</td>
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<td>ROCA</td>
<td>Regional Office for Central Asia (UNODC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SCT</td>
<td>Supreme Court of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TARGETET</td>
<td>Targeted Anti-trafficking regional operation enhancing Communication, Expertise and Training (UNODC – Rainbow Strategy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>T/R</td>
<td>Treatment and rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>United Nations AIDS Programme</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCF</td>
<td>United Nations Common Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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The mission of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is to contribute to the achievement of security and justice for all by making the world safer from crime, drugs and terrorism. The UNODC global strategy (2008-2011) is therefore built on five premises:

(a) Crime, drugs and terrorism are universal challenges. Effective responses to these threats include national, regional and international responses, based on the principle of shared responsibility;

(b) The United Nations helps define these international responses; becomes custodian of the relevant international legal instruments when adopted; facilitates international cooperation; keeps the world informed about how the problem in question is evolving; and assists Member States, when requested, in building domestic capacity and in translating the multilateral standards into national practice;

(c) An important part of the established mandates of UNODC is to facilitate the ratification and implementation of the relevant international conventions on crime, drugs and terrorism;

(d) UNODC has a comparative advantage to contribute, in compliance with its mandates, to this multilateral response, in particular, in offering:

   • Normative services: facilitating the effective implementation of existing international legal instruments and their transformation into global norms and, where appropriate, facilitating negotiation of international legal instruments
   • Research and analysis
   • Technical assistance: assisting Member States, upon request, in signing and ratifying relevant international legal instruments and facilitating implementation of these instruments; and providing member States, upon request, with legislative assistance and facilitating national capacity building, inter alia, in the area of multilateral standards and norms

(e) These services must be consistent with, and indeed contribute to, the wider efforts of the United Nations towards peace, security and development.

This document translates the global strategy of UNODC into a country vision for Afghanistan. The country strategy covers the period 2009–2011, two years that will be pivotal in setting Afghanistan’s course for at least a decade thereafter.

Afghanistan faces tremendous drug and crime challenges. The insurgency that affects significant parts of the country hampers effective counter-narcotics and criminal justice responses from the Government. More sinisterly, it feeds off failures in these areas, through funding derived from the drug trade and through the erosion of popular support for the Government. Engaged in a counter-insurgency war against an opponent most fondly remembered for straightforward law and order, the Government cannot afford to be seen as ineffective or corrupt in enforcing the law. In battling for territorial control with an enemy that has presided over simple but functional cash-crop farming, the Government must provide alternative livelihoods to rural communities dependent on opium.

UNODC aims to assist stability and development in Afghanistan by supporting the government to deliver effective counter-narcotics and criminal justice services and by providing an evidence base for international action on drug and crime issues. We implement the UN’s humanitarian mandate through our alternative livelihoods work, which includes attention to emergency poverty alleviation. We further the mandate for strengthening Afghanistan politically by
improving state effectiveness and raising public trust in the government. And we contribute to national development by helping to transform an illicit economy and increasing the power of rules over the power of rulers.

UNODC is a relatively small agency and some areas of our mandate – such as law enforcement and alternative livelihoods – are shared by other organizations with sizeable programs. This strategy therefore aims for action based on UNODC’s comparative advantages, notably our status as a UN body, our specialist expertise in drugs and crime and our capacity to facilitate Afghanistan’s participation in international responses.

In terms of geographical focus, UNODC applies the principle of comparative advantage to select priority areas. Elements of consideration are the political neutrality inherent to a UN agency, relevance to a mandate covering drugs and crime, priorities set out by the Government, UNAMA and the UN Country Team, the potential for partnerships and the availability of resources. The resulting emphasis on Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Ghor and Kandahar provinces reflects our strengths.

Even so, we will actively pursue partnerships in order to amplify the effect of our interventions and achieve maximum impact. Example preferred partners are UNAMA through its provincial offices, other UN agencies, bilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations. Finally, experiences in other parts of the world indicate that peace-building efforts are by definition long-term and require national ownership. UNODC therefore places great emphasis on capacity-building and partnerships with Afghan Government counterparts.

This strategy is divided into three levels geographically: regional, national and provincial. An ambition for practical impact generates a preference for designing interventions locally. Nevertheless, the interdependence of local development with wider trends and frameworks is clear. Twenty (20) out of the thirty-four (34) Afghan provinces are border provinces, with a population of fifteen (15) million out of the estimated total twenty-four (24) million for Afghanistan, and ethnic lines stretch well beyond the formal boundaries. Progress at the local/provincial level can be furthered, consolidated or diluted by events at the national level or in a neighboring country. Conversely, where insecurity inhibits local action, national or cross-border interventions can positively influence provincial trends. We will therefore strive at the national and regional levels to shape the conditions for grassroots success.

At the local or provincial level, we will support the roll-out of effective counter-narcotics and criminal justice services in selected provinces. Governors’ offices are to be engaged to develop locally-owned plans and design evidence-based policy. We will provide assistance and create wider partnerships to translate plans into implemented programs and embed these into the wider national and regional context. To that end, we will also support the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, the Counter Narcotics Police, the Border Police and the justice system at the provincial level, while helping to coordinate between the national and local levels.

At the national level, we will strengthen the evidence base for action on drug and crime issues and will advise on integrating narcotics issues and anti-corruption policies into other organizations’ programs. Provincial or local action is to be harmonized with the capital and we will provide specialist expertise, training and equipment to the development of specific national law enforcement and criminal justice institutions. Finally, we will partner with the government in its efforts to strengthen Afghanistan’s legal and regulatory regimes against drugs and crime in accordance with regional and international legal standards.

At the regional level, with the Rainbow Strategy as our core, we will work to ensure that Afghanistan has the institutional, legal
and human capacity to cooperate effectively with its neighbors, both operationally and in sharing intelligence. We will exploit our neutrality within a complex political arena and seek convergence of interests among regional partners. Lastly, we will use our research and analytical expertise to influence international approaches to drug and crime issues in Afghanistan.
Regional Level

A- COUNTER-NARCOTICS

The Afghan drug trade is a transnational phenomenon that links many otherwise disparate countries. Working with the Paris Pact, UNODC has developed the Rainbow Strategy, a comprehensive approach to the Afghan drug trade. Comprising seven initiatives, an important principle in the development of the Rainbow Strategy was to design inter-related but distinct components, in order to facilitate local alliances and encourage convergence around shared interests. The impact-oriented Rainbow Strategy was endorsed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2009.

COAFG will help to implement the Rainbow Strategy by facilitating Afghanistan’s international counter-narcotics cooperation and by building its capacity to participate effectively. This means incorporating the regional perspective into our domestic activities, as well as prioritizing high-value cross-border cooperation. In these efforts COAFG enjoys the advantage of a network of surrounding UNODC offices, which work to coordinate neighboring governments’ actions and provide crucial information to us on trends in Afghan opiate trafficking and consumption.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is of intense concern to the international community and has attracted significant efforts to develop bilateral cooperation. For example, Canada has sponsored the Dubai Process, focusing on law enforcement, counter-narcotics, the movement of people and Customs. Simultaneously, the Government of Turkey has been facilitating bilateral discussions that include counter-narcotics issues, while the ongoing Regional Economic Conferences on Afghanistan overlap with UNODC interests in some areas related to trade facilitation. Our strategy is to assist Afghanistan with utilizing these opportunities effectively, while also acting as an independent provider of advice and facilitator of cross-border action. UNODC has fewer financial resources available to encourage active cooperation, but we have good access to key operational partners and experience of generating practical law enforcement outcomes.

Our ongoing and planned interventions at the Afghanistan-Iran border reflect perhaps our best comparative advantage, making ultimate use of our political neutrality and facilitating cooperation between international and regional stakeholders in fields of common interest, such as narcotics control and measures against human trafficking.

International Conference on Afghanistan, The Hague, 31 March 2009

Strengthen Afghanistan’s border security by intensifying cooperation among Afghan National Security Forces, NATO/ISAF and regional partners, and thereby countering illegal trafficking in arms and drugs. (…)

Improve the security and integrity of national borders by working with governments in the region to strengthen cooperation on law enforcement, counter-narcotics efforts and customs policies. (…)

Welcome the increased attention given to Afghanistan and the regional context as exemplified by conferences in Tehran, Moscow, The Hague, Islamabad and Trieste as important steps in enhancing development and in fighting terrorism, drug trafficking and transboundary organised crime.

(Chairmen’s Statement of the International Conference on Afghanistan, The Hague, 31 March 2009)
Closing the Opiate Trading Highway – The Triangular Initiative

Launched by policy-makers from the three countries in Vienna in June 2007 and facilitated through us, the Triangular Initiative sets in motion a series of trust-building measures and joint operations, with the ultimate goal of ongoing for information/intelligence sharing. The potential benefits of triangular cooperation became obvious in early 2009 when the first joint operation occurred. Earlier, in October 2008, Iran opened the Joint Planning Cell (JPC) in Tehran, an incubator for intelligence-sharing in preparation for joint triangular operations.

- Support to the Afghan Border Police, especially at the Afghan/Iranian and Afghan/Pakistan borders.
- Facilitate trust and confidence between Iran and other key players including NATO/ISAF, especially at the Afghanistan/Iran border in Herat, Farah and Nimroz.
- Establish Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) at Islam Qala, Spin Boldak and Torkham and establish joint units to this end.
- Promote integrated border management, including economic incentives for border communities.
- Promote the concept of Drug Liaison Officers (DLOs) and place law enforcement/intelligence specialists at the JPC in Tehran.
- Support Operation Tarcet (regional precursor control) through the JPC.
- Cooperate with the One UN joint program led by UNCTAD on Border Management (focused on anti-corruption and transparency) and Trade Facilitation.
- Coordinate with Afghanistan-Pakistan bilateral arrangements and initiatives.
- For related and supporting activities, see National Level.

*Rainbow Strategy ‘Green Paper’*

“Afghanistan’s border regions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan are under attack from criminal groups that are smuggling precursor chemicals into Afghanistan and trafficking drugs out of the country... senior representatives of the three countries agreed on the need for action, particularly in the most vulnerable border regions...” (Triilateral Ministerial Meeting, Joint Statement, Vienna 2007)

“Calls upon all Member States and UNODC to provide the technical assistance and support needed for strengthening the initiatives and efforts of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan to fight drug trafficking.” (ECOSOC Resolution 2008/27)

“Commending the support provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to the Triangular Initiative within the framework of the Paris Pact initiative and the Rainbow Strategy in an effort to promote enhanced and operational drug control coordination at the subregional, regional and international levels, (...)

Welcoming the decision taken at the second ministerial meeting of the Triangular Initiative, held in Tehran on 7 May 2008, by Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan, inter alia, to establish in Tehran a joint planning cell and to conduct joint operations within national borders against drug traffickers, and looking forward to the continued implementation of the Triangular Initiative, (...)

Urges all Member States and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to provide or facilitate the provision of the technical assistance and support needed for implementing the initiatives of Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan, including the Triangular Initiative within the framework of the Paris Pact initiative and the Rainbow Strategy;..” (CND Resolution E/CN.7/2009/L.8/Rev.1)
Interdicting Routes to/from Turkmenistan up to the Caspian Sea

The Caspian Sea Initiative (CSI) is a joint endeavor of UNODC, the European Commission (EC) and the World Customs Organization (WCO). It engages the countries sharing borders with the Caspian Sea in regional and international efforts to combat illicit trade and trafficking. Specific emphasis is placed on strengthening analytical capacities, intelligence sharing and cross-border cooperation, largely in the framework of container profiling at dry- and sea-ports.

The CSI is complemented by the Turkmen Border Initiative (TBI). The TBI is three-phased: the establishment of a State Commission for Drug Control in Turkmenistan, which was finalized during 2008; building capacity along the Turkmen borders; and information/intelligence sharing through cross-border cooperation with Afghanistan and Iran.

- Establish a Border Liaison Office at Torghundi/Akina and establish joint units to this end.
- Promote integrated border management, including economic incentives for border communities.
- Promote the concept of DLOs.
- Integrate Turkmen-Afghan border management with Iranian border management efforts, initiating a new sub-regional platform for cooperation with the three countries’ involvement.
- Cooperate with the One UN joint program led by UNCTAD on Border Management (focused on anti-corruption and transparency) and Trade Facilitation.
- For related and supported activities, see National Level.

Rainbow Strategy ‘Violet Paper’

“Border issues should be looked at in a comprehensive way, including at sea ports, airports and land border crossings…and promoted from a sub-regional perspective.” (Paris Pact Expert Round Table/ERT, Turkmenbashi 2007)

“Need for a prioritised integrated approach to combat narcotics in the region…and for coordination at regional, sub-regional and national levels” (ERT, Turkmenbashi 2007)

“The Caspian Sea Initiative, in order to enhance data-analytical capacities in the region, strengthen container control and share strategic and operational intelligence…” (ERT, Turkmenbashi 2007)

The Northern Route: An Issue of Stability – Cooperation with Central Asia

We aim to promote intelligence-sharing and strengthen interdiction capabilities by developing cross-border liaison mechanisms between Central Asia and Afghanistan. This will also involve agreeing operating standards for the long stretches of unguarded or “green borders” in this sensitive region. Three operational measures will achieve this: mobile interdiction teams (MOBITs), BLOs and information and intelligence exchange. MOBITs run drug and precursor operations in the border area, guided by intelligence. Analytical capabilities of border control agencies, both national centers and decentralized field offices, are strengthened through the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC). Finally, BLOs in high-risk areas and on key Afghan and Central Asian border crossings, will lead cross-border communication, operational cooperation and coordination.

- Establish BLOs at Nizhnjy-Panj (Tajik border), Hayraton (Uzbek border) and Akina (Afghan border – see also Turkmen Border Initiative).
- Strengthening official border crossing points (BCPs).
- Promote the concept of DLOs.
- Facilitate Afghanistan’s observer status at CARICC.
• For related and supporting activities, see National Level.

Rainbow Strategy ‘Yellow Paper’

“Informational and operational interaction among law enforcement agencies ... should be improved....CARICC - a centre for combating drug trafficking and related crimes with its headquarters in Almaty, Kazakhstan - is to become an important element in setting up internationally accepted standard in the region for the exchange of strategic and tactical information between the participants in the Central Asian Memorandum of Understanding...” (Moscow Ministerial Declaration 2006)

“The establishment of Border Liaison Offices (BLO) was considered to be practical and viable in building trust and dialogue between border control agencies on shared borders, leading to their empowerment to act and respond quickly and in concert to requests for mutual assistance or information exchange without having to refer all decisions back to Headquarters” (Observations and Recommendations, Moscow Ministerial Meeting 2006)

Preventing Heroin Production through Precursor Control – Operation Tarcet

In 2008 UNODC facilitated Operation Tarcet, which resulted in significant seizures of precursor chemicals in Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan – and ended a spell of inaction cast by the lack of acetic anhydride seizures since 2001. However, Afghanistan was not in a position to participate due to a lack of national capacity. As the major destination country for regional precursor flows and with the planning of Operation Tarcet 2009 well advanced, it is crucial that Afghanistan becomes an effective partner in intelligence gathering, precursor seizures and cooperation in backtracking investigations. We therefore intend to use regional operations as focal exercises in supporting cross-border cooperation against precursor smuggling, as well as centerpieces around which to organize the development of Afghanistan’s domestic capabilities.

• Facilitate and support Afghanistan’s participation in regional precursor control operations through national measures and coordination with other UNODC offices.
• Reverse the ‘chain of evidence’ and focus on backtracking investigations that start in Afghanistan.
• For related activities, see National Level.

Rainbow Strategy ‘Red Paper’

“The Security Council... expressing utmost concern at the increase of illegal smuggling, for illicit use, to and within Afghanistan of chemical precursors needed to produce heroin... Stressing the central role played by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in assisting Member States,...Welcomes the launch, under the guidance of UNODC and the Project Cohesion Task Force, of the Targeted Anti-Trafficking Regional Communication, Expertise and Training (TARCET) initiative, targeting precursors used in the manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan...” (UN Security Council Resolution 1817, June 08)

Avoiding Unwelcome Complications: Demand Reduction and HIV/AIDS

We have been running demand reduction activities in Peshawar targeting Afghan refugees in Pakistan. We designed and recently approved a regional project covering Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan that gave urgent attention to the high number of returnees with addiction problems. A case in point is the crisis in the defunct and ruined Russian Cultural Center in Kabul, where approximately 50% of the drug user population finding refuge in the center had returned or been deported from Iran. The President of Afghanistan took personal note of this situation and invited parliament to devise a solution. The cabinet requested the UN through UNODC to help the Afghan government. In close consultation with MCN, the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), UNAMA and other concerned UN
agencies, UNODC developed three strategies, short-, medium- and long-term, to provide assistance to the inhabitants.

- Facilitate Afghanistan’s participation in regional knowledge-sharing on opiate abuse and HIV/AIDS epidemiology.
- Support dissemination of forensic findings on Afghan drug trends to reduce harm in neighboring countries.
- For related activities, see National Level.

**Rainbow Strategy ‘Indigo Paper’**

“Demand reduction policies should be put in place, generally comprising medical care, risk reduction measures and possibly substitution treatment……” (Paris Ministerial Declaration 2003)

“...The illicit trafficking in opiates has resulted in increased drug abuse in transit countries of Central, South and West Asia... the health aspects of drug use, and heroin use in particular, should be a priority in policies implemented by States...in particular prevention and treatment of drug addiction and diseases transmitted through intravenous drug injection, such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis...” (Moscow Ministerial Declaration 2006)

**Hitting the Pressure Points: Controlling Illicit Financial Flows to/from Afghanistan**

As late as 2005 Afghanistan had no formal banking institutions, but its financial services industry has been developing quickly from this low base. Nevertheless, its informal service providers remain the dominant force in its financial sector. As well as the crucial services they supply for Afghanistan’s domestic and foreign trade, they also facilitate money laundering and terrorist financing. Hawaladars in Kabul have reported single transactions as large as $15 million and monitoring is in its early stages. The sector will remain open for many years yet and Afghanistan would therefore benefit from close intelligence cooperation with law enforcement authorities in major financial destinations such as the United Arab Emirates.

- Support Afghanistan’s international sharing of law enforcement intelligence on crime-related financial transactions.
- Contribute to the informal working group facilitated by UNODC between the Eurasia Group on combating money-laundering and financing of terrorism (EAG), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Interpol and the World Bank (WB).
- For related activities, see National Level.

**Rainbow Strategy ‘Orange Paper’**

“The fight against the laundering of money from criminal activities, including precursors and drugs trafficking and corruption should be strengthened” (Moscow Ministerial Declaration 2006)

“Encourages States to submit to the Committee for inclusion on the Consolidated List names of individuals and entities participating in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaeda, […] including but not limited to using proceeds derived from illicit cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotic drugs originating in Afghanistan, and their precursors” (UN Security Council resolution 1735)

**Dismantling Regional Networks – Platforms for Intelligence-Sharing**

As well as establishing CARICC under the Yellow Paper of the Rainbow Strategy (Securing Central Asian Borders) and the JPC under the Green Paper (Triangular Initiative), we also support the planned Gulf Centre for Criminal Intelligence (GCC). Through these three initiatives, combined with existing
networks, geographical areas become inter-connected and cross-border operations are better targeted.

- Harmonize Afghanistan’s intelligence collection and management processes with CARICC, the JPC and the GCCI.
- Link Afghanistan with the EC-funded Economic Cooperation Organization project (ECO), which enables the placement of Interpol’s I24/7 system in the wider region.
- Support CNPA’s forensic laboratory in generating and disseminating analyses relevant to surrounding countries.
- For related activities, see National Level.

**Facilitating Trade – Profiling of Containers**

The Global Container Program has been expanding rapidly and has enjoyed successes in developing risk-based targeting of container trade, as well as cross-border information exchanges. In Afghanistan, the dominance of informal trade and the unofficial Customs revenues levied on this trade require an approach that contextualizes container targeting by reference to serious crimes such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling.

- Facilitate activities of UNODC’s Global Container Program in Afghan dry ports, including its focus on integrated border management to exchange information and develop risk- and intelligence-based profiling.
- For related activities, see National Level.

**Regional Harmonization of Afghan Capabilities in Training and Equipment**

The proliferation of law enforcement assistance activities in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan has created challenges in the cross-border compatibility of training approaches and equipment. COAFG will coordinate with surrounding offices to ensure that our domestic programs put Afghanistan in the best position possible to operate effectively in cooperation with its neighbors.

- Apply UNODC’s computer-based training (CBT) method in Afghanistan.
- Coordinate intelligence analysis training with UNODC’s Regional Office for Central Asia.
- Cross-training in precursor control with Pakistan and Central Asia.
- Coordinate Afghan procurement with surrounding UNODC offices.
- For related activities, see National Level.
B- CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Afghanistan’s communities and provincial economies are heavily integrated with those of its neighbors. The drug trade is an excellent example of the way in which this integration facilitates cross-border criminality. UNODC COAFG aims to assist the Government to develop legislative and regulatory regimes that support effective international cooperation against crime, with a focus on our specialist expertise in drugs, money laundering, human trafficking and intelligence-sharing. As a necessary complement to this work, we will enhance human capacity in the justice sector to ensure that officials can take advantage of the legal tools at their disposal in pursuit of cross-border crime.

Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Afghanistan has anti-money laundering (AML) and counter financing of terrorism (CFT) laws in place, although there have been no prosecutions under either. It has signed MoUs with 20 jurisdictions and has shared basic statistical information. FINTRACA, the financial intelligence unit, is an administrative agency under the central bank. Effective criminal justice in this area will therefore require the regulatory and human capacity for Afghan law enforcement and judicial authorities to use FINTRACA information in support of cross-border investigations.

- Facilitate and support legislative, regulatory and operational cooperation between Afghanistan and countries that are major venues for laundering money derived from the drug trade.
- For related activities, see National Level.

Rainbow Strategy ‘Orange Paper’

“The Government of Pakistan and the donor community should undertake research/es on drug-related financial flows and assets recovery in Pakistan, in order to clearly understand the volume of such flows and their importance for the national economy, as well as to explore possible linkages between countries and their respective trafficking groups profiting from the illegal trade.” (ERT, Islamabad 2005)

“Paris Pact partners and the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council should fully implement all relevant UN Conventions and other international standards against money laundering; support the work of the MENAFATF; and pay special attention to the need for effective law enforcement and regulatory capacity to deal with alternative remittance dealers and cross-border cash smuggling.” (ERT, Doha 2006)

“Need to strengthen control over trans-national movement of monetary funds received from illicit drug trafficking from Afghanistan, and to develop measures aiming at countering their laundering with the purpose of further usage for bribing corrupt officials and financing terrorist activity.” (ERT, Kabul 2007)

Laying the Legal Foundations for Cross-Border Operations

UNODC assists requesting member states to expand their legal capacity to prevent illicit traffic of narcotics, trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants by establishing appropriate legislative and administrative measures, becoming party to and fully implementing international drug control and crime prevention conventions, including protocols to the Transnational Organized Crime Convention on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants.

- Provide technical advice to Afghanistan on legal regimes against drugs and crime that are effective in supporting its cooperation with neighboring countries.
- Support the establishment and functioning of an Afghan Central Authority responsible for dealing with mutual legal assistance in accordance with drug and crime conventions and protocols to which Afghanistan is a party.
- Facilitate cross-border operations by advising on the construction of legal foundations, with particular focus on intelligence exchange, controlled deliveries, anti-money laundering, mutual legal assistance, extradition, human trafficking and smuggling of migrants.
• Advocate and support Afghanistan’s implementation of international drug and crime conventions and protocols, where appropriate to national bodies.
• For related activities, see National Level.

Afghanistan Compact (Benchmark 1.5.2)
“By end-2010, the Government and neighbouring and regional governments will work together to increase coordination and mutual sharing of intelligence, with the goal of an increase in the seizure and destruction of drugs being smuggled across Afghanistan’s borders and effective action against drug traffickers.”

C- RESEARCH, ADVOCACY AND INFORMATION
As part of the global organization mandated to assist states against drugs and crime, UNODC COAFG is in an excellent position to contribute to the discovery and dissemination of authoritative information on trends in Afghanistan. At the regional level, we will work with our network of UNODC offices and headquarters to develop comprehensive analyses of transnational issues rooted in or affecting Afghanistan, with a focus on the drug trade. Strengthening the evidence base in this way will support our regional advocacy, both through passive dissemination of accurate ‘facts on the ground’ and active encouragement of international partners to adopt effective responses.

Insights into Regional Drug and Crime Trends
• Work with Vienna and surrounding UNODC offices to support international understanding of drug and crime trends, including corruption related to Afghanistan.
• Use external information to guide national program responses and advocacy.
• Strengthen and utilize UNODC’s regional network for information collection, especially to support targeting, training and backtracking.
• Conduct situation analyses in advance of regional precursor control operations.

Policy Advice on Regional Measures through Advocacy
• Influence external approaches to drug and crime issues in the wider region surrounding Afghanistan through evidence-based policy recommendations.
• For related activities, see National Level.
A- COUNTER-NARCOTICS

Over the course of 2006, 2007 and 2008, Afghanistan’s opium production exceeded global demand. In 2008 and during preparations for the 2009 harvest, there have been indications of a market correction in the form of lower opium prices and declining opium production. Government programs such as pre-planting advocacy and awareness-raising, combined with eradication efforts, have contributed to an increase of the number of opium poppy-free provinces, emphasizing the concentration of production in a handful of provinces. Another positive has been a decline over recent years in the size of the narco-economy relative to GDP.

However, the fact that this is largely a market-based correction highlights that the opium economy generally remains unthreatened by Government intervention and alternative rural economic opportunities. In order to consolidate reductions in area under cultivation and contain opium poppy cultivation in its remaining zones, prevent the adoption of cannabis as an alternative to opium poppy and to increase pressure at the higher levels of the drug trade, UNODC aims to support the Government in developing its law enforcement capacity and in coordinating/implementing effective alternative livelihoods assistance in areas prone to opium cultivation.

Afghanistan Compact (Benchmark 1.5.1)

“By end-2010, the Government will strengthen its law enforcement capacity at both central and provincial levels, resulting in a substantial annual increase in the amount of drugs seized or destroyed and processing facilities dismantled, and in effective measures, including targeted eradication as appropriate, that contribute to the elimination of poppy cultivation.”

Afghanization of Policy, Planning and Coordination in Counter-Narcotics

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is almost purely a coordinating ministry, with very little role in implementation. In the Afghan political context, where major international stakeholders heavily influence policy, this is a challenging position. MCN is thus the primary capacity-building target for UNODC in enhancing the Government’s awareness, planning and coordination of counter-narcotics policies and programs. Niche infrastructure support will provide good returns at low cost, while UNODC also aims to improve the professional capacity of MCN staff with broad-based and specialized training.

- Strengthen MCN’s provincial outreach, including through infrastructure and training.
- Partner with MCN in surveying, i.e. the opium survey, verifying eradication, winter assessments, price data collection and drug demand.
- Assist in creating a small training academy in MCN, to provide tailored courses relevant to counter-narcotics for government and non-government staff.
- Advise MCN on processes for collecting, managing and dissemination information, including with initiatives such as the alternative livelihoods database.
- Support MCN’s advocacy, monitoring and advice to government on demand reduction and addict treatment/rehabilitation.
- Advise the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN SRSG) and his Office on policy related to counter-narcotics and related issues.
Upgrading the Capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies – an Incremental Approach

There are several large donor programs assisting Afghan law enforcement agencies. UNODC’s comparative advantage is in counter-narcotics and in areas that support Afghanistan’s capacity for international cooperation, such as border management. While the latter might start on themes such as counter-narcotics, there is the advantage that, once in place, it can easily and incrementally expand into other areas of concern, such as human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. As demonstrated by the addiction problem in Afghanistan and highlighted in the defunct Russian Cultural Centre – most of whom have returned from neighboring countries – the inter-relationships of cross-border phenomena create high returns to relatively simple improvements in border management.

We will pay close attention to integrating and coordinating with other donors as appropriate, for example through our excellent relationship with trainers funded by the US Department of Defense at the Counter Narcotics Training Academy (CNTA). In terms of Government agencies, two stand out as primary partners – CNPA and ABP. For counter-narcotics and cross-border law enforcement, the statutory responsibilities of these two agencies make them central to our national law enforcement development strategy. Human, technical and institutional capacity in the CNPA and ABP remain low, with predictable results in terms of operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, UNODC has observed encouraging indications of these organizations’ potential for development. Our assistance is necessarily broad-based, but in contrast to many actors we are focused on sustainable interventions, which require fewer resources but greater patience.

The Afghan Border Police, an equal and effective partner in cross-border initiatives

- Intensive training and mentoring of a core cadre of commanders and staff.
- Provision of equipment for protection, interdiction and detection.
- Infrastructure and equipment to support effective field operations.
- Integrate community policing methods to assist in generating intelligence and facilitating operations, including through small-scale humanitarian assistance delivered by ABP.
- Coordinating with the Border Management Task Force (BMTF) and other mechanisms.

The Counter Narcotics Police, mobile and exposed to international standards

- Support the CNPA assessment and its coordination of donor activities.
- Support the forensic laboratory. Mentor and demonstrate the utility of disseminating analyses to guide operations and intelligence-collection. Connect the laboratory with the EC-funded ECO.
- Intelligence analysis training and the provision of analytical software.
- Support for infrastructure development and its effective utilization, including seizure storage sites.
- Provision of and training in drug detection equipment.
- Enhance CNPA mobile detection units with basic infrastructure and equipment support.
- Support institutional and administrative effectiveness, for example in salary management. Include CNPA in the Electronic Payroll System for Police.
The Counter Narcotics Training Academy, a national centre of excellence

CNPA has recently allocated 6 staff to be full-time trainers at the CNTA. In line with our emphasis on capacity-building, we will devote significant attention to this cadre’s skills. This will include on-the-job mentoring through incorporation into UNODC-led training sessions, with a view to CNTA staff taking increasing responsibility for curriculum design and delivery.

- Provide an international train-the-trainer mentor for CNTA’s trainer cadre.
- Provide an international, in-house trainer/mentor in intelligence analysis.
- Expand CNTA infrastructure as appropriate.
- Update CNTA’s legislative and regulatory training handbooks.

Computer-Based Training for Law Enforcement (CBT), a proven and efficient method of capacity-building

UNODC’s extensive library of CBT modules has proven effective in the delivery and retention of foundational law enforcement knowledge in many countries. To the extent that these can cover the basic training currently delivered by numerous providers to Afghan law enforcement officials, they will free up resources within UNODC and other organizations to concentrate on higher-level skills and mentoring.

- Adapt UNODC’s CBT library for use in Afghanistan.
- Support all-agency access to CBT centers, prioritizing access by relevant officers and with a focus on integrating CBT with other UNODC training/mentoring programs.

Synchronizing training with other agencies

- Link the ABP Training Academy with the CNTA.
- Develop Customs’ awareness of its law enforcement role through inclusion in inter-agency training, with a focus on counter-narcotics.
- Facilitate information-sharing, both directly and through encouragement/advocacy.
- Support all-agency involvement in BLOs.
- Where appropriate, standardize equipment, particularly in drug and precursor detection.
- Make CBT available to all agencies, initially facilitated by its application at the CNTA.

Reversing the focus of precursor control – starting from Afghanistan and moving out

Precursor chemical prices in Afghanistan are high, particularly the crucial ingredient of acetic anhydride. Seizures in 2008 rose over 2007, but they are still a fraction of the volumes estimated to enter the country. Price rises therefore appear to result from better source country control. Nevertheless, this indicates the pressure that could be applied to processing within Afghanistan from improved precursor law enforcement. With support from UNODC, CNPA recently allocated 7 staff to a Precursor Control Unit (PCU), which will become the focus of our assistance to Afghanistan in countering precursor smuggling. Lesser support will also be extended to Customs, the officers of which are regularly in contact with chemical shipments but who do not currently perceive precursor interdiction as their responsibility.

- Support CNPA’s PCU with basic through advanced training, including intelligence analysis and the use of relevant software.
- Mentor the PCU in intelligence and data analysis.
- Support PCU mobility, including provincial deployments.
• Provide detection equipment and training to Customs Mobile Verification Units.
• Incorporate precursor control training into our ABP project.
• Prepare, facilitate and support Afghanistan’s participation in regional precursor control operations.
• Support the Drug Regulation Committee through training, basic equipment and facilitating its connections to national stakeholders.

**Consolidating Success – Providing Farmers with an Alternative**

**Afghanistan Compact (Benchmark 6.3)**

“By end-2010, the Government will design and implement programmes to achieve a sustained annual reduction in the amount of land under poppy and other drug cultivation by the strengthening and diversification of licit livelihoods and other counter-narcotics measures, as part of the overall goal of a decrease in the absolute and relative size of the drug economy in line with the Government’s MDG target.”

Long-term conflict has eroded physical infrastructure and inhibited human/cultural dynamism in Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Rural economic development is a wide field in which UNODC is dwarfed by other donors. Our comparative advantage is in understanding the relationship between the opium economy and rural development. We will advise the Government, other UN agencies and bilateral donors in targeting, developing and implementing comprehensive approaches to alternative livelihoods, working with a three-phased concept that: 1) offsets economic losses experienced by communities abandoning opium cultivation by providing immediate ameliorative responses; 2) delivers non-monetary welfare benefits such as education and healthcare to improve overall quality of life; and 3) programs longer-term development projects to prevent a return to cultivation.

This work will mostly occur at the provincial and district levels (discussed in the next Pillar). At the national level, we will use analysis, advice, publicity and advocacy to integrate counter-narcotics perspectives into development planning and assist the Government with directing resources to consolidate the contraction of area under opium cultivation.

• Analyze the opium economy’s effects at the local level. Present recommendations to stakeholders and develop interventions to fill gaps.
• Assist the Government, other UN agencies and bilateral donors in developing and coordinating well-targeted interventions. Advise the Government on integrating national strategies with provincial activities, including on resource mobilization, community development and the effective application of funding mechanisms relevant to alternative livelihoods.

**A Curse to be Avoided: Drug Addiction and HIV/AIDS**

**Afghanistan Compact (Benchmark 7.7)**

“By end-2010, the Government will implement programmes to reduce the demand for narcotics and provide improved treatment for drug users.”

The demand side of the Afghan drug trade receives significantly less attention than the supply side, despite its wide impacts on the health and socio-economic situation from the addiction of law enforcement officers to the debilitation of social support networks. Assistance in this area has focused heavily on service delivery, with little capacity-building impact. While the development of the evidence base remains important, the basic knowledge and government plans do exist to initiate sustainable projects in this area if only funding was made available.
**Closing a running tap – prevention and demand reduction**

Afghanistan’s drug demand patterns are broad and varied. As demonstrated by the concentration of users in places such as the defunct Russian Cultural Center in Kabul, the country would benefit from immediate, ameliorative assistance. In order to ensure sustainability, UNODC aims to assist the Government in mainstreaming drug treatment and rehabilitation services into its healthcare system, providing broad coverage and access, including outside of major cities. At the primary level, this means providing simple drug treatment/rehabilitation equipment for integration into Government healthcare facilities and training outreach health workers in identifying and referring drug abuse and related problems. At the secondary level, it means integrating drug treatment facilities into comprehensive and provincial healthcare centers. Institutionally, it requires mentoring and advice to government at central and provincial levels on coordinating, monitoring and supporting drug treatment services.

- Support the government to deal with immediate problems, such as the Russian Cultural Centre, while integrating short-term responses with longer-term solutions.
- Develop a drug dependence treatment and rehabilitation system in the provinces selected by Government, mainstreamed through integration with the health system (part of the Basic Package of Health Services).
- Provide advice and support to the Government in drug abuse prevention campaigns, with a focus on youth and outreach to rural areas.
- Seek funding for the above projects. If donors are not forthcoming by mid-2009, suspend the international expert position as a signal of ineffective attention to demand reduction.

**Dealing with the running tap – injecting drug use, the main transmitter of HIV/AIDS**

- Provide effective input and guidance to the UN Thematic Group on HIV/AIDS.
- Support the Afghan government in HIV/AIDS epidemiology and in linking demand reduction to HIV/AIDS prevention.
B-CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Afghanistan Compact (Benchmarks 2.7.2 and 2.7.4)

“By end-2010, functioning institutions of justice will be fully operational in each province of Afghanistan, [...] [...] By end-2010, reforms will strengthen the professionalism, credibility and integrity of key institutions of the justice system (the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the Attorney-General’s office, the Ministry of Interior and the National Directorate of Security). [...] By end-2010, justice infrastructure will be rehabilitated; and prisons will have separate facilities for women and juveniles.”

For most Afghans, the formal criminal justice system remains distant, dimly understood and unpredictable. Informally regulated violence continues to be a common method of intra- and inter-communal dispute settlement, while corruption is widespread. The formal system is constantly at risk of subversion by money, threats and violence. High-profile incidents of corruption and intimidation of judicial actors reduce confidence in the system and discourage Afghans from engaging it. At the other end of the justice system, Afghanistan’s correctional facilities and methods have been improving but more activities and efforts need to be put in place in order to bring Afghanistan in line with international human rights and standards.

Nationally, we will focus on enhancing the legislative framework, institutional mechanisms and human capacities to prosecute serious crimes, with a particular interest in drug-related criminality and corruption. Afghanistan is entering a challenging phase of reforming its anti-corruption framework and related legislation, efforts that we can assist based on extensive experience. In this respect, we will continue to provide technical assistance and advisory services to enhance the institutional and human capacity of the Afghan criminal justice organs.

Legislative Reform in Line with Regional and International Standards on Drug and Criminal Conventions and Protocols

- Promote and support the implementation of international and regional drug and criminal conventions and protocols through a comprehensive and prioritized revision of the existing legislative framework.
- Provide on-the-job assistance to members of the Lower and Upper Houses of the National Assembly, legislative drafters of Ministry of Justice, as well as to national ministries and the permanent justice institutions originating criminal justice legislation.
- Continue to provide leadership and technical assistance to the activities of the Criminal Law Committee of the Law Reform Working Group to ensure a coordinated and uniform international-national approach to the legislative process.

Criminal Justice Capacity Building: Counter-narcotics, Counter-terrorism, Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Justice

Afghanistan Compact (Benchmark 2.7.1)

“By end-2010, the legal framework required under the constitution, including [...] criminal [...] law will be put in place, [...]”

- Strengthen the capacity of criminal justice officials, in particular judges and prosecutors.
- Provide training programs and mentoring assistance to legal aid providers and criminal defense attorneys to increase access to justice, in particular for vulnerable groups.
• Support the establishment of specialized units.

**Penitentiary Reform in Line with International Human Rights and Standards**

• Provide comprehensive training programs to strengthen operational performance of the correction officers and to improve knowledge of human rights issues.

• Provide assistance to rehabilitate existing prisons and detention facilities in accordance with standard minimum rules for the treatment of inmates.

• Advocate for the development of sustainable mechanisms to ensure a sound implementation of alternatives to imprisonment.

• Provide comprehensive educational and vocational training programs to increase post release opportunities for male and female prisoners and detainees.

• Support the development of models, contingency plans, training manuals and guides for crisis managers and team members for a high profile/high security prison, in accordance with applicable international standards.

**Measures Against Corruption**

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Afghanistan Compact (Benchmark 2.2)

“The UN Convention against Corruption will be ratified by end-2006, national legislation adapted accordingly by end-2007 and a monitoring mechanism to oversee implementation will be in place by end-2008.”
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• Support to establishment of specialized prosecutors and court divisions (“diwans”) to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate corruption cases.

• Assisting national authorities through technical advice on the establishment and implementation of ethics codes and accountability regimes, including development of professional standards and enforcement mechanisms to strengthen integrity and effective service delivery.

• Provide advisory services for the implementation of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy and policies to the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, the Attorney General’s Office, Supreme Court, and other institutions.

• Facilitate the drafting and revision processes of specific legislation in accordance with UNCAC.

• Support the establishment and functioning of national monitoring mechanisms of the implementation of the UNCAC and anti-corruption policies.
C - RESEARCH, ADVOCACY AND INFORMATION

Five principles determine RAI’s priorities and methods:

1. Evidence based action
   UNODC is a service delivery agency and we are not engaged in academic observation. Research activities will add to the credibility of COAFG’s program, providing an evidence base for other actors’ policies and UNODC’s project development. It serves and influences COAFG’s counter-narcotics and criminal justice priorities.

2. Balancing advocacy with support for government reform
   Public advocacy is one method of pursuing remedial action by the Afghan government and international donors (‘name and shame’). Quiet diplomacy and the restricted presentation of research findings is another method. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, which UNODC will balance when defining the purpose of each RAI activity and product.

3. Synergy with others
   Many agencies outside of Afghanistan are interested in and conduct research on domestic drug and crime issues. COAFG research should complement and not compete, taking advantage of our access to information and exploiting synergies with wider activities by UNODC and other agencies.

4. Alignment with mandates and source protection
   We will tap efficiently into local data providers, including UNODC provincial offices, unprocessed data from our Survey section, Afghan agencies and international representatives. We therefore need to balance rigorous information collection with our specific RAI responsibilities, which demands adherence to confidentiality and caution towards information sources.

5. Capacity-building and transfer know-how to Government
   Ultimately, UNODC aims for the government to produce comprehensive information and analysis itself. RAI activities will exploit links to the capacity-building components of our program, for example by supporting the Ministry of Counter Narcotics alternative livelihoods database, by conducting surveys jointly with the government where possible and by sharing our findings and analytical approaches with government agencies.

Developing the Evidence Base for Specific Target Groups

Research, Advocacy and Information has a wide range of tools and media available for engagement, with due regard to the widening circles of audience – e.g. confidential law enforcement information, through to restricted project reporting and on to press releases and website dissemination.

- We will promote networking and information exchange among technical experts, for example through the opium survey and forensics assistance. Exchanges follow the need-to-know principle.
- The Joint Analysis Group between UNODC, UNAMA and UNDSS will continue its work and, as per discussion with these partners, will generate high-level analyses on particular topics of shared interest for the executive audience. Reports follow the need-to-know principle.
- We will make available UNODC expertise for briefing sessions on specific topics for target groups at the technical and policy levels. Classification of these sessions will be as appropriate to the content and audience.
- Project Steering Committees are essential to keep donors abreast of progress and challenges. We will report regularly on impact, not process. Information follows the need-to-know principle.
- Analytical briefs, such as the Paris Pact briefs, reach out to a wider group of partners. They set recent programmatic impacts in the context of developing counter-narcotics trends. While the distribution list will be controlled, it is broad and content will essentially be considered public information.
National Level

- Cooperation with other research entities or policy-influencing bodies will be promoted, for example the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, ICG and the NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre. Information can be exchanged even when it is deemed useful not to refer to the UNODC source of origin.
- Opium Surveys, Winter Assessments, Opium Price Reports and Eradication Verification surveys, considered as public information.
- Media liaison and official public appearances are important but should be handled with prudence and be impact-oriented.
- A website is an important but difficult tool, especially in relation to public information updates. Specific attention is to be given to the Rainbow Strategy website, given that most of our counter-narcotics program will link to the overarching regional strategy.
Provincial Level

International Conference on Afghanistan, The Hague, 31 March 2009

Integrate existing counter-narcotics programmes more closely into broader strategies for improved governance, economic development and stability. They will further strengthen support aimed at increasing poppy free provinces.

(Chairmen’s Statement of the International Conference on Afghanistan, The Hague, 31 March 2009)

Afghan provinces are slowly regaining their control of the drug situation. In 2006, only 6 out of 34 provinces were opium poppy-free. In 2007 and 2008 the number of opium poppy-free provinces increased to 13 and 18, respectively. Today only 5 provinces in the south account for over 90% of Afghan’s opium cultivation. As Afghan provinces reduced their production drastically and quickly, relapses or increase in cannabis cultivation might occur. Targeted support towards the farmers, their families and communities is required to consolidate the gains made in the opium poppy-free provinces and to roll these reductions out to other locations.

Criteria for Selection

We will focus our provincial and district interventions on Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Ghor and Kandahar. We selected the first four provinces following consideration of the criteria below.

1. Securing the buffer zones

The contraction of areas under opium cultivation in Afghanistan leaves Herat, Farah, Nimroz and Ghor as significant buffer provinces. There is potential to make all four opium poppy-free but also a risk that intense interventions elsewhere will displace cultivation westwards. A parallel displacement of insurgent activity appears to be underway already.

2. The comparative advantage of the neutral Blue Flag

The western border engages our comparative advantage in addressing concerns of neighboring countries (Iran, Pakistan and Turkmenistan) and strengthening cross-border cooperation, thereby facilitating a constructive relationship with other international stakeholders active in Afghanistan, starting with areas of mutual concern such as narcotics and human trafficking control.

3. Interconnectivity of issues enabling partnerships and maximizing impact

The humanitarian crisis in the defunct Russian Cultural Centre illustrated the interconnection between smuggling of migrants at the Western borders, human trafficking, addiction and drug trade, injecting drug use and HIV/AIDS, food insecurity and poverty, border management and other related issues. This inter-connectivity allows partnerships among a wide range of concerned players who, if their respective interventions were to be coordinated, could ensure greater impact.

4. Relatively little attention to these provinces

There are fewer and smaller actors in these five provinces, partly as a result of proximity to Iran and the focus on Hilmand and Kandahar as Afghanistan’s central opium producers. In particular Farah, Nimroz and Ghor receive relatively little bilateral attention from major donors and implementers. As pilots for our comprehensive approach to counter-narcotics and criminal justice, these provinces are attractive to UNODC offering the potential to demonstrate positive impact of its interventions.
5. Accessibility to UNODC

We have provincial offices in Kandahar and Heart and ongoing interventions in the remaining provinces. Our border control project, based in Herat, has been active in Farah and Nimroz. In Ghor we have implemented significant criminal justice project activities and have been welcomed by provincial authorities. With the exception of Kandahar, these provinces are relatively accessible at present (bearing in mind that they are buffer areas, so there is a risk of a rapid deterioration in security). With flexibility, UNODC anticipates that the timing and location of interventions can be managed effectively.

6. Funding prospects to further activities

Initial consultations with counterparts indicate a high level of agreement on UNODC’s comparative advantage in these provinces. The Government of Canada, which has been a major supporter of UNODC COAFG, has expressed its particular interest in further work in Kandahar. In the other four provinces, there is greater recognition of Iran’s significance to Afghanistan’s development and also its sensitivity to bilateral donor activities in western Afghanistan. This recognition has widened the niche for neutral actors such as UNODC.

**Rainbow Strategy 'Blue Paper'**

“... the elimination of opium poppy cultivation must be effectively sequenced with the broader stabilization effort and eradication targeted where rural livelihoods exist...no sustainable reduction in cultivation, either through self-restraint or eradication, will be possible until farmers have access to sufficient legal livelihoods ...” (National Drug Control Strategy, 2006)

**Providing a Menu of Services, Designed to Local Needs**

Activities at the provincial level aim to bring the widest range of services closest to beneficiaries. Streamlining ‘cops, courts and corrections’ to deliver with integrity law and justice needs at public-access points will contribute directly to political stabilization and development goals. At this level, the integration and cross-pollination of UNODC programs will be obvious, for example we aim to guide alternative livelihoods activities in such a way that communities are more supportive of law enforcement intelligence collection. Convergence also allows us to bring partners together thereby augmenting the delivery of services, not necessarily directly mandated to UNODC, and maximizing impact through synergy.

Also our research, advocacy and information activities will give focused attention to priority provinces. Sharing analytical products with provincial authorities will augment the government’s own systems for disseminating information between provinces and from Kabul downwards. We will advise provincial authorities on information collection, dissemination and advocacy, primary targets being MCN provincial representatives and Governors’ offices.
**Planning Combined with a Sense of Urgency**

As reflected in the diagram on the next page, activities at the provincial level will follow from the Rainbow Strategy Blue Paper and will be tailored by engaging Governors’ offices in a provincial counter-narcotics planning exercise. The full process will take 8-12 months, including the development of a provincial UNODC menu of services and coordination with other organizations to consider synergies.

During this time and not awaiting the outcome of the planning activities, we will implement initiatives that have been proven elsewhere, such as our Justice Support Centers. We will also respond to urgent law enforcement and alternative livelihoods needs, re-programming resources currently allocated to other provinces where feasible. Nevertheless, in criminal justice in particular, we will take into account the priorities of the permanent justice institutions in light of internationally-coordinated needs assessments.
**Comprehensive Provincial Counter-Narcotics Plans**

Rainbow Strategy Blue Paper – Provincial Profiles

- Alternative Livelihoods Rapid Assessments
- Counter-Narcotics Assessments (IDLG)
- Preparations with Governors’ offices

Devising a Provincial Counter-Narcotics Plan (MCN, IDLG, UNODC, JSC, UNAMA)

**IMPLEMENTATION**

- **Demand Reduction**
  - Treatment
  - Rehabilitation
  - HIV/AIDS prevention

- **Law Enforcement**
  - CNPA
  - ABP/Customs
  - Border Liaison Offices

- **Criminal Justice**
  - Corrections infrastructure/training
  - Justice Support Centers
  - Judicial sector training

- **Alternative Livelihoods**
  - Coordination, advocacy, advice
  - Implementation to fill gaps
  - Grassroots monitoring

**Partnerships**
- ALOS secretariat and working groups, UNAMA coordination, ISAF/PRTs, NGO and donor programs.

**Menu of Services**

- Re-programming existing resources
- Securing additional funding
### ANNEX A – Resource Requirements

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<td>$51.2 million</td>
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## ANNEX B – Provincial Presence (Actual and Planned by different actors)

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X = existing; X = planned; PX = provincial centre; RX = regional centre