Mr. Chair,

In its resolution 76/187, the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon Member States to strengthen cooperation at all levels to counter the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including through enhanced operational and timely information-sharing, logistical support, as appropriate, and capacity-building activities, such as those provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The resolution also called to share and adopt best practices to identify foreign terrorist fighters, to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters from, into or through Member States, to prevent the financing, mobilization, recruitment and organization of foreign terrorist fighters.

This is especially important, as in many instances when we are dealing with the sophisticated phenomena of organization of foreign terrorist fighters with all pertinent layers of criminal activities such as illegal border crossings, provision of financial resources through illicit flows, engagement of transport carriers and diversion of arms and ammunition, the national capacities alone might not be sufficient to counter this sophisticated crime and further improvement of international understanding of such complex crime and response mechanisms become a matter of paramount importance.

In this sense the relevant provision of the Kyoto Declaration inviting member states to strengthen cooperation at all levels to prevent and combat all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including by strengthening the rule of law and by ensuring the implementation of the relevant international conventions and protocols related to counter-terrorism, puts our national commitments in this regard under a bright spotlight. In Kyoto Declaration the member states further endeavored to address the growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including through the implementation of applicable international obligations,
and underlined the importance of United Nations capacity-building in accordance with existing mandates.

Thus, Mr. Chair, there is a quite robust framework of international legally binding obligations, such as the counter-terrorism conventions and non-legally binding obligations such as the Kyoto Declaration, which imply national and international efforts to counter the threat of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We also have a dedicated work of the relevant international bodies such as the UNOCT, CTED, the UNODC and other relevant bodies to help member states in capacity building and navigating the global efforts against terrorism.

With such a solid normative and institutional background in place, in our view, what we need is a more focused approach to the modern challenges and developments in the field of terrorism, especially bearing in mind the fact that the terrorist and their supporters are keen to rapidly change tactics, make use of modern and evolving technology and take the advantage of the volatile regions.

For instance, in case of recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters from conflict affected areas, we need to understand which vulnerable groups of population are more susceptible to the process of recruitment, especially when financial gains are involved. If the recruitment has been taking place from the refugee camps from amongst the population living in extreme poverty and deprivation, then a coordinated action is required at national and international levels to improve the lives and livelihoods of people in such situations and mitigate the risk of recruitment. If the recruitment has been occurring from amongst the groups affiliated with terrorist organizations, then there is a need to understand what makes the existence of such groups possible in a particular area and to take appropriate response actions in that regard.

It is also important to prosecute the recruiters, as key enablers for organization of foreign terrorist fighters. Against background of sufficient facts and evidence about particular entities and organizations, which have been engaged in the recruitment of FTFs from vulnerable groups and terrorist organizations, we believe that it is not hard to institute stringent sanctions against such organizations, especially bearing in mind the requirements of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.
In this sense, indeed the follow-the-money principle becomes crucial, as such recruiting organizations are heavily reliant on illicit financial flows and proceeds of corruption. Thus, identifying and disrupting illicit financial flows derived from corruption, which feed the whole process of recruitment, could have a crucial role in counter-terrorism efforts.

When it comes to the organized transfer of FTFs from one region to another, here it becomes important to identify the carriers, which were engaged in such illegal transfers, to institute the most stringent sanctions against them.

Last but not least, against the background of facts and evidence of diversion of arms and ammunition to foreign terrorist fighters, including from the government stockpiles, the arms manufacturers and exporters should institute more stringent license authorization mechanisms for those end-users who are implicated in being engaged in such illegal practices. We believe that the relevant recommendations of the UNTOC Working Group on Firearms provide necessary guidance for the institution of such measures.

Mr. Chair, we would like to emphasize that a more focused approach to the instances of providing financial and logistical support to terrorism, including to foreign terrorist fighters, through analyzing all modalities of such crimes as well as the modus operandi of criminals, could play a crucial role in international counter terrorism efforts.

Needless to mention that the political will and the understanding that in our modern world the developments do not occur in vacuum and if not countered properly in one place they tend to replicate themselves in other corners of the world, remain of paramount importance.

Thank you Mr. Chair