Resolution 49/3
Strengthening systems for the control of precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic drugs

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs,

Alarmed by the physical and psychological damage caused by synthetic drugs, especially methylenedioxyamphetamine (commonly known as Ecstasy), methamphetamine and amphetamine, and the highly addictive nature of methamphetamine and amphetamine,

Alarmed also by the widespread abuse of those drugs,

Recognizing that those drugs can be manufactured from chemicals anywhere, even in crude laboratories,

Acknowledging the challenges that this presents to law enforcement and regulatory authorities,

Noting that denying clandestine drug manufacturers the required precursor chemicals is one of the effective strategies to prevent the illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs,

Reaffirming the Political Declaration adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session,1 in which Member States decided to establish 2008 as a target date for States to eliminate or significantly reduce the diversion of precursors,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 59/162 of 20 December 2004, on strengthening the systems of control over chemical precursors and preventing their diversion and trafficking, in which the Assembly emphasized the need to ensure that adequate mechanisms were in place, where necessary and to the extent possible, to prevent the diversion of preparations containing substances listed in tables I and II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,2 pertaining to illicit drug manufacture, in particular those containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine,

Recalling also Economic and Social Council resolution 2004/41 of 21 July 2004 on the control of the manufacture of, trafficking in and abuse of synthetic drugs,

Recalling further its resolution 45/12, in which it called on Governments to put in place systems and procedures to ensure that the details of any interdiction, seizure, diversion or suspected diversion of precursors within their territories were communicated without delay to the competent authorities of all the Governments concerned and to the International Narcotics Control Board,

Recalling its resolution 48/11, in which it noted that the International Narcotics Control Board had been given the additional functions of receiving and disseminating precursor information on a real-time basis and also of identifying trends involving the diversion or misuse of precursors and following up all reported

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1 General Assembly resolution S-20/2, annex.
seizures and cases involving diversion with the competent authorities of the countries concerned,

Stressing that control of precursor chemicals is a strategy to prevent diversion by ensuring that precursor chemicals are only sold to legitimate businesses for legitimate commercial, medical and scientific uses,

Recognizing that determining national legitimate requirements for precursor chemicals can greatly assist competent national authorities in importing and exporting countries to determine the legitimacy of proposed transactions in those substances in order to prevent imports greater than legitimate requirements that would be liable to diversion,

Recalling that article 19 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and of that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol requires States parties to provide to the International Narcotics Control Board estimates of requirements for narcotic drugs,

Recalling also that, in its resolutions 1981/7 of 6 May 1981 and 1991/44 of 21 June 1991, the Economic and Social Council invited Governments to provide to the International Narcotics Control Board assessments of annual requirements for psychotropic substances listed in schedules II, III and IV of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971,

Noting with satisfaction that the system of estimates and assessments has contributed effectively to the prevention of diversion of those substances from licit international trade into illicit channels,

Noting that the precursor chemicals 3,4-methylenedioxymethyl-2-propanone, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and phenyl-2-propanone are important for the illicit manufacture of Ecstasy, methamphetamine and amphetamine,

Noting also that 3,4-methylenedioxymethyl-2-propanone, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and phenyl-2-propanone are substances included in Table I of the 1988 Convention,

Acknowledging that pseudoephedrine and ephedrine can be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means from preparations containing them, thus making them attractive to traffickers and to manufacturers of illicit methamphetamine and amphetamine,

Noting that some such preparations are widely used to treat common diseases,

Concerned that the International Narcotics Control Board has reported the recovery of large amounts of preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine from illicit amphetamine and methamphetamine manufacturing sites,

Noting that preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine can be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means to obtain those precursor chemicals, otherwise regulated under the 1988 Convention,

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3 Ibid., vol. 520, No. 7515.
4 Ibid., vol. 976, No. 14152.
5 Ibid., vol. 1019, No. 14956.
1. **Requests** Member States to provide to the International Narcotics Control Board annual estimates of their legitimate requirements for 3,4 methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and phenyl-2-propanone and, to the extent possible, estimated requirements for imports of preparations containing those substances that can be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means;

2. **Requests** the International Narcotics Control Board to provide those estimates to Member States in such a manner as to ensure that such information is used only for drug control purposes;

3. **Invites** Member States to report to the International Narcotics Control Board on the feasibility and usefulness of preparing, reporting and using estimates of legitimate requirements for the precursor chemicals and preparations referred to in paragraph 1 above in preventing diversion;

4. **Requests** exporting States to exercise continuing vigilance to verify the legitimacy of each export authorization for those substances and, to the extent possible, also for preparations containing those substances that can be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means, using where appropriate the estimates referred to in paragraph 1 above to assist them in that process;

5. **Urges** exporting States to continue, under Project Prism, to provide to the International Narcotics Control Board information on all shipments of 3,4 methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and phenyl-2-propanone and, subject to national legislation and regulations, as in Project Prism, to provide information to the International Narcotics Control Board on preparations containing those substances that can be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means;

6. **Requests** Member States to permit, subject to their national legislation and regulations, the International Narcotics Control Board to share with concerned national law enforcement and regulatory authorities, taking care not to impede legitimate international commerce, shipment information on preparations containing those substances that can be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means, following the standard operating procedures as established under Project Prism on a current basis and using the online system of pre-export notifications or other effective mechanisms, so that appropriate measures can be taken to prevent or interdict those shipments which are of concern;

7. **Calls upon** importing States to exercise continuing vigilance to ensure that the quantities of those substances and preparations containing those substances that can be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means authorized in their import certificates are commensurate with their legitimate requirements for manufacture or domestic consumption, using the estimates of the International Narcotics Control Board to assist in that process;

8. **Urges** importing States to carry out backtracking investigations providing relevant information, such as types of chemical and samples of the seized material, to the International Narcotics Control Board and exporting States;

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to continue to ensure that the precursor programmes of the International Narcotics Control Board are adequately funded, and invites Member States to consider providing additional support to the precursor
programmes in the form of provision of cost-free expertise and extrabudgetary funds.