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SOCIAL FORCES AND
THE PREVENTION OF CRIMINALITY
(with particular reference to the public,
the family, educational facilities and
occupational opportunities)

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

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Contents

I. CRIME AND SOCIAL FORCES

1.   Crime remains a phenomenon for which there is still no consensus as to its causes and its cures.   By some, it is seen as a malady springing from the fabric of society itself and thus preventive measures would properly be directed broadly toward strengthening the social fibres and controlling factors presumed to be contaminating.   By others, crime is viewed as a matter of personal maladjustment or mental aberration arising from a complex combination of unfortunate experiences and/or natural endowment;   under such a conception, the preventive or remedial approach is directed toward the individual to attain his conformity to society as it exists. Some conceptions have a distinctly economic or political character, or a combination of both.   One general theory, for instance, holds that crime is a manifestation of class conflict in society and that it is the consequence of the economic exploitation of the masses by the class which owns and controls the means of production;   thus in a truly classless society the conditions necessary to permit the elimination of crime would prevail.

2.   There are those who rely upon statistics to show that the incidence of crime (and by this is meant invariably the types of crime which are brought dramatically to public notice;   namely, rape, murder, assault, robbery and the like) is greater among the poor.   Others argue that many social and cultural forces combine to produce the relatively high rates of crime and delinquency found among low income groups;   a reason given is that their socio-economic status makes the poor particularly vulnerable in situations which can result in their being classified as criminals. Again, they argue that it often happens that the socio-economic status of a person determines whether his deviation is "safe" or "unsafe", because the response of law-enforcement agencies differs according to the class of persons and the type of crime: if the rates of crime are higher among the poor, it is perhaps because the poor are restricted to those criminal acts which are most likely to result in prosecution, or because the authorities concerned with law enforcement are more likely to be lenient with the wealthier classes.   Others, however, observe that in some societies with a highly socialistic orientation, the converse is more likely to be true;   wealth is suspect and those who possess it are more open to police investigation.

3.   This multiplicity of views cautions against basing a social defence programme on the asserted validity of any single view however convincing the supporting evidence seems to be at the time.   It is entirely possible that there is an element of truth in each view.   But it would be an oversimplification to argue that it is the whole truth, for crime is too complex a phenomenon to be explained by a single formula.

4.   Thus for instance, an active programme of slum clearance, carried out on the presumption that the slum was inherently a breeding place of crime, will not necessarily of itself have a crime preventive effect.   While slum clearance stands on its own merits, it is not an unmixed blessing in that, very often, it divests the community of some of the stability and cohesiveness which may exist even in slums 1/. It has been observed, for example, that the replacement of slums in certain parts of

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1/   Charles Abrams, "City planning and housing policy in relation to crime and delinquency", International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 16, pages 23-28.

New York City by large housing projects has not helped to reduce the delinquency rates in those areas, but rather created a more impersonal environment apparently more conducive to delinquency. In contrast it has been asserted that among Palestinian refugees who live in groups on the outskirts of the cities and under extremely poor conditions, the rate of delinquency is relatively low, though some of the juveniles who migrate to the city with their families and who enjoy relatively better accommodation contribute appreciably to the delinquency rate of the city.

5. The manifestation of criminal behaviour is the cumulative effect of a variety of interesting factors whose duration and intensity vary both in time and place. There is a social element in criminal behaviour; the individual commits the crime but his behaviour is influenced by a long process of social conditioning. There is also an individual element in the sense that, given the same social conditioning, no two individuals will necessarily react in an identical fashion to any given stimulus.

6. Thus continuous research into the etiology of crime is needed because it would seem that there can never be a conclusive explanation for every form of criminal behaviour which will hold true for all time. Such research, however limited, will always be helpful because it will enable the formulation of a social defence policy which is flexible enough to respond to apparent needs. Also, the complexity of criminal behaviour and the need for continuous research is the most persuasive reason for a society not to remain idle in the hope that final answers will be forthcoming, but to take action as is necessary and appropriate.

7. There is no divergence of views concerning the disastrous nature of the consequences of crime. In both affluent and developing countries the economic burden and the loss of gain are greatly felt. Its cost, whether measured in terms of actual damage or loss in human resources is too heavy, particularly for those societies which must urgently strive towards higher levels of living and greater economic development.

8. On this account, the technical social defence groups and policy making bodies of the United Nations have advocated that the prevention of juvenile delinquency and adult criminality should form part of comprehensive economic and social development plans. Likewise, a number of national governments seem to be alert to the necessity of including crime preventive action in their social development programmes. Some governments, for instance, the Government of India, have incorporated such action in their national planning. In the United States, the President's message to Congress on 8 March 1965 recognized crime as a national problem and set out a plan for checking its growth. In the United Kingdom a Royal Commission was appointed in 1964 to make a comprehensive and fundamental review of penal philosophy and practice. In the Soviet Union crime prevention, in its many aspects, has been linked with the basic premises of penal law 2/.

9. Although there is general recognition of the need for urgent action to prevent crime, this has not always been translated into terms of budgetary appropriations. There are many reasons for this. In certain countries, emphasis is so heavily on

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2/ "Theoretical basis of the study and prevention of crime in the USSR and some practical solutions," prepared by the All-Union Institute for the Study of the Causes of Crime and Measures for its Prevention.

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economic development projects that investment in the social sector is kept to the barest minimum; social defence programmes inevitably suffer. In other countries, particularly some strongly socialistic developing countries, first rank is given not to social defence but to social welfare programmes, education, health, social services and the like; it is a governmental response to what is believed to be the most urgent needs of the people.

10. One reason for the relatively low priority assigned to social defence programmes in many countries is that these programmes are usually regarded as highly specialized with only a marginal relationship to social development. Further, social defence experts and administrators can rarely support their allegations of the high cost of crime to any country, for accurate statistical information is scarce in most countries. Also it is difficult to show the results of investment in social defence programmes, particularly because the incidence of crime often increases despite such investment; rarely is it recalled that the investment might have prevented an even greater incidence because the factors producing criminality never remain constant.

11. It is time, therefore, to give crime preventive programmes their proper priority among national projects 3/. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that crime is so deeply rooted in the fabric of society itself that special budgetary allocations, however extensive they may be, cannot by themselves effect a solution.

12. Budgetary resources, however, are not unlimited and for that reason should be used to the utmost. This would seem to require a new approach to crime prevention whereby the social forces in every society will be utilized to propel social action against criminality.

13. These social forces such as nationalism, religion, public opinion, custom, urbanization, indus ialization, education and the like cannot be regarded by themselves as either crime preventive or crime conducive. At different times and in different places, the same social force has had contrary results. Urbanization, for instance, generates crime in many places, but not everywhere. What, therefore, can be done to use a social force for the benefit of the preventive programme?

14. Each force gives rise to a number of movements, some of which have a salutary effect on crime while others might be conducive to crime. Efforts should be made to neutralize the latter so that the former can exert their untrammelled effect on crime prevention. A small investment in this direction could thus bring disproportionally beneficial returns.

15. Experience indicates that preventive action which is opposed to the social forces is rarely successful. For instance, measures which are actively opposed by current public opinion and attitudes are usually rendered ineffective by a withdrawal of support, co-operation, and even through disobedience. On the other hand, when such measures are in accord with the direction of social forces, they enjoy relative

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3/ For an analysis of techniques of social planning and assignment of appropriations see Methods of determining social allocations (U.N. document E/CN.5/389 of 31 March 1965), particularly chapters III and IV.

success.   For instance, rehabilitative programmes in prisons will not succeed in their purpose if public attitudes toward accepting the discharged prisoner are negative.   If the media of mass communication are used to influence public attitudes in favour of the prisoner, rehabilitation programmes will have more chance of obtaining the active support of the whole community.

16.   These social forces are realities which should neither be viewed nor evaluated exclusively in terms of their effect on crime prevention.   In the first place, these forces exist apart and irrespective of any crime prevention and, secondly, it is for the over-all social planner to decide whether attempts are to be made to halt, reverse or re-route social forces not solely because of their implications for crime but also because of their larger implications for society.

17.   Hence, social defence preventive programmes must recognize the social forces as they are;   it would be futile to base a programme on what the social defence specialists would like the social forces to be.   If, for instance, urbanization and migration affect the cohesiveness of the family, efforts should be made to accept realistically the consequences of these forces, and focus attention on measures to ensure that the less cohesive family does not contribute to crime and delinquency.

18.   It would not be practical to discuss each of these social forces as a means of preventing crime.   This paper will therefore be limited to a discussion of their use for this purpose from the point of view of the public, the family, education and occupational opportunities.

II. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CRIME PREVENTION

19. The potential of the public for appropriate and effective participation in crime prevention may be greater than is generally realized, but so far it has remained largely unexplored.   Perhaps one reason is the essential single-mindedness of those who see social defence exclusively in terms of law enforcement agencies, courts and correctional institutions.   Another reason may be the vague fear that the public, having been encouraged to take an active part in crime prevention, would act too vigorously and without sufficient restraint and prudence.

20. On the other hand, even those whose avowed intention it is to use this potential have not always done so with success.   In many countries, appeals for public participation have often been sectarian, rarely sustained for any length of time, and seldom explicit enough to excite more than cursory interest. It may be that those who wished to use the public for crime prevention did not always know either what they wanted, or how to achieve the desired results.

21. The participation of the public in crime prevention is not new.   In societies which existed in the past, and may still exist today, the public assumed the right to prevent crime and dispense justice in accordance with what it considered to be correct norms of conduct.   This often implied the substitution of vengeance for justice, of taboo, superstition and fear for reason, and of intolerance for impartiality.   It must be made clear that in referring to, and discussing the possible use of, this potential for the prevention of crime, such a role is completely ruled out.   Nor is it intended to assign to the public a role which would allow it to act according to its whims, irrespective of government policies.   What is called for is the participation of the public in crime prevention, but within the framework of enunciated social defence policy.

22. There seems to be some tendency, particularly in some developed countries, toward a much greater reliance on the participation and support of the public in the prevention of crime.   For instance, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR resolved that the attention of all judicial authorities should be drawn to the inadmissability of the tendency among certain members of the judiciary to base the prevention of crime not on methods of public suasion, but mainly on the imposition of criminal penalties entailing the deprivation of liberty.4/   Again, the President of the United States, in his message to Congress on 8 March 1965, emphasized the necessity for public participation in checking criminality.

23. One might also anticipate finding in the newly emerging countries a place for the public in the prevention of crime as part of the wider views which now identify law enforcement and the administration of justice as processes of the

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4/ "Theoretical basis of the study and prevention of crime in the USSR and some practical solutions", op.cit.

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people.   This, in turn, has probably been influenced by the conception, officially established in many of the developing countries, that criminality is not properly to be viewed as a matter of exclusively individual guilt but that, in large measure, society itself shares the responsibility.5/

24.   The question thus poses itself how the public could best be engaged or re-engaged in crime prevention.   Indeed, it is now time to answer this question lest a stimulated or demanding public move to a participation which would be unwelcome if not dangerous.

25.   This calls for a critical examination of contemporary social defence programmes, particularly since the application of many of them has had very limited success in most countries.   It may be reasonable to argue that these programmes have failed because they were based upon a theoretical division of responsibility between the State and the public, in circumstances in which the public was not prepared to carry out its expected functions.   Many recommendations have emphasized the role and responsibility of the public in crime prevention, and programmes have been launched on the assumption that the public would play its part.   The results invalidated that assumption.

26.   In any event, the notion of "public responsibility" in crime prevention is difficult to establish and maintain.   Even if the role of the public were defined by statute and the public made legally accountable, experience has proved this approach to be less than reliable.   For example, in many countries the law requires the individual citizen to give all possible assistance to a policeman requesting it, to report a crime when he saw one being committed, or to go to the assistance of a victim of a crime.   The law notwithstanding, individuals often prefer to pretend that they did not see, or to hurry away from the scene of a crime, for fear of being involuntarily involved in consequent legal proceedings and thereby being inconvenienced.

27.   It will be natural to despair of relying upon the idea of public responsibility if the public has no sense of common purpose nor any sympathy for the goals to be attained.   In certain areas, for example, where public attitudes are manifest in racial, religious or linguistic intolerance, the public itself promotes criminality by supporting this intolerance.

28.   A cautious approach does not mean, however, a rejection of the idea that crime is a social phenomenon and that each society is responsible for its crime figures.   Every effort should be made to impress upon society its ultimate responsibility for crime and to enlist the social force of the public on behalf of a social defence policy.

5/   It is not uncommon, moreover, for countries to include in recently drafted constitutions statements declaring that the objectives and methods with respect to the treatment of offenders are to be social in nature.   Argentina and Nicaragua, among others, have in the past made such provisions in their constitutions.

29. Public opinion is powerful and is the result of such varied social forces as traditions, customs, religion and the like. The object then is to establish social defence programmes which might reasonably expect public acceptance or, if public attitudes do not favour the establishment of certain programmes, to attempt to obtain general public acceptance. The former implies the establishment of priorities in programming; the latter, an investment in whatever media are available for that purpose.

30. Although the question of timing and priorities is becoming commonplace to economists and social planners, it does not appear that social defence policy makers have yet taken vigorously to formulating practical policies wherein timing and a scale of priorities are laid down and adhered to. Perhaps the reason is that the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders have been regarded as one of the "housekeeping chores" of government rather than a matter of long-range planning.

31. In certain countries, for example, the probation system was initiated on the ground that it was a progressive measure, although the public was not yet receptive to it and the judiciary not yet prepared to use it.6/ Consequently, the programme had to be withdrawn. An untimely introduction such as this jeopardizes the reintroduction of the system since the public will not easily forget the previous experience. Again, it has been observed that some open institutions failed in certain areas precisely because they were prematurely introduced to the public.

32. On the other hand, programmes which enjoyed public support and confidence from the outset expanded far beyond expectation. Boys Town, for example, has so captured the interest and support of the public in the United States that individuals and organizations are more than willing to contribute financially to the programme. The idea of Boys Town has caught on in certain Asian and African countries and such institutions have been set up, for instance, in the Philippines, in Thailand and in Tunisia.

33. A major difficulty in social defence programming is, of course, to find out in advance what the attitude of the public is likely to be to any programme. Although no method is infallible, there are many ways by which a government can get a reasonably accurate idea of the public attitude. Firstly, there are the sophisticated techniques of the public opinion poll-takers and measures of the intensity of opinions; there are also the content analysts and the questionnaire senders. These ways of assessing and evaluating public opinion, however, can be employed only in areas where the public is aware of the issues and gives its opinion. Again, public attitudes can be determined through secondary sources such as organizations and associations whose main functions are to influence public attitudes, and to advise the government on what the public seems to want

6/ One reason for the inclusion of the item of probation on the agenda of many United Nations social defence meetings is that of winning acceptance for it through regular forum discussions which are participated in by social defence specialists and judicial personnel, and reported to the public. The merits of probation are not disputed.

in the way of social defence programmes.   Organizations such as the Howard League
for Penal Reform in the United Kingdom, the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency in the United States, and the All India Crime Prevention Society seem
to fulfil this purpose.   Some of these organizations, it must be noted, are
particularly concerned with advancing social defence practices, and may thus be
regarded as the vanguard of public opinion.   Where such specialized social defence
organizations do not exist - as may be the case in some of the developing
countries - recourse may be had to organizations and associations which have
contact with the public in some other capacity, social service groups, rural
development organizations, charity associations, religious groups, educational
associations and the like.

34.   Public attitudes, although helpful when sympathetic to new policies, should
not be regarded as the ultimate determinant of policy matters;   when basic
principles are at stake, the policies have to be enforced.   In fact, many reforms
have emanated from an enlightened minority and have had to be enforced in the
teeth of majority opposition.

35.   The ultimate purpose of the government must logically, however, be to win the
public over to a full acceptance of its social defence policies so as to ensure
that the public will readily participate and cooperate in crime prevention.   One
way of doing this would be to demonstrate the successful results which could be
obtained by carrying out a specified programme, and for this purpose it would
seem appropriate for the programme to begin with a pilot project.   If the pilot
project is successful, the whole programme could be launched.

36.   In recent years, however, many governments appear to have invested heavily in
ambitious social defence programmes without having experimented with small-scale
pilot projects.   But the inconclusiveness of many of these programmes have
apparently not prevented even further investment in their prototypes.   This is
conspicuous waste without any compensating advantage.

37.   Another way of influencing the public is through the mass media of
communication, the radio, cinema, television and the press.   Of these, it appears
that television is by far the most potent because of its great popularity as
indicated by the number of viewing hours per week so many persons devote to it.
Moreover, the visual image seems to be more persuasive than the spoken or written
word.   Also, it may be observed that television is no longer confined to the
technologically developed countries;   it has now been installed in several of the
developing countries, and it may be foreseen that it will be established in many
more even at considerable expense, as being a powerful instrument for influencing
the public.

38.   The question then arises whether these systems can be induced to give of their
facilities and their time.   In certain countries where they are virtually
government agencies, there would be no difficulty since they would serve according
to government requirements.   In other countries, however, they are not government
controlled;   they possess a certain freedom of expression and may be at variance
with government policies.

39. The mass media, in many instances, exert a salutary influence on the public and, what is more important, have clearly expressed the public demand for criminal reform. At other times, however, the mass media have been accused of being criminogenic since crime was capitalized for commercial purpose. The constructive use of the mass media without curbing their initiative is not an easy matter since it involves such issues as limiting freedom of expression and the right to dissent, the legitimacy of free enterprise and the like. Government censorship has been one response, but censorship is violently opposed in many countries. Another solution has been the adoption by the mass media of a voluntary code of ethics. In Lebanon, for instance, the Association of Newspaper Publishers entered into a gentleman's agreement with the Government under which the Association took upon itself the onus of disciplining errant members; the possibility of censorship was thus obviated. Leaving aside the merits of such controls, perhaps the most that can be said is that the sense of responsibility of the mass media to the public should be sharpened.

40. In some of the developing countries, the use of radio, television and the press might not be practical except in limited areas. Local institutional practices may, however, be an effective substitute. In many of these countries, for instance, periodic traditional social and religious occasions (purification ceremonies, enthronement of new tribal chiefs or kings, harvest festivals, religious days) do provide opportunities for people to assemble together. On such occasions, it might well be that local dignitaries (tribal elders, village chieftains, teachers, clergy and monks) could be prevailed upon to speak on matters of social and moral responsibility. In Buddhist countries, for instance, poya (full-moon) days are occasions on which the monks speak to assemblages in the temples on matters of righteousness, responsibility and moral obligation.

41. The mass media and local institutional practices apart, there are other ways of winning the support of the public. One is to make citizens feel that the maintenance of law and order and the dispensation of justice is very much a part of their lives. In many societies today, the administration of justice is an abstract and impersonal process removed in time and place from the site in which the offence was committed, and conducted by persons who are not known in the vicinity, and very often in a manner which is somewhat alien to community practices. This development appears to have been inevitable in industrialized or urbanized societies but this does not make it less abstract or less impersonal.

42. The immediacy and intimacy of the administration of justice is preserved in some countries through certain indigenous judicial institutions. In nearly all African countries the native or traditional courts are still responsible for trying about 80 or 90 per cent of the criminal cases; the courts are regulated by statute and their powers defined and, as a rule, the sentences imposed are subject to confirmation by an administrative officer or professional magistrate.[7] In India, the panchayats, and in Ceylon, the gansabhavas, which are elected village councils, have jurisdiction in certain minor offences. The basic idea of providing easy, remedial justice which carries the added weight of community participation and approval is thus preserved.

7/   J.S. Read, "Criminal law in Africa of today and tomorrow", Journal of African Law, volume 7, No. 1, 1963, pages 15-16.

43.   It needs to be emphasized, however, that if such courts are to be set up and particularly if they are to be given a somewhat wider jurisdiction than that over very minor offences, adequate legal safeguards would have to be established lest justice be perverted.   One might, of course, argue that a degree of fallibility should be acceptable within the framework of community participation and approval. But even so, the limits of independent and final judgement might have to be set either by law or through the provision of legally qualified court advisers, or through judicial review of decisions, or through a combination of these.

44.   Still another way in which the public might be influenced and its support elicited for social defence purposes is by incorporating certain elements of a crime preventive programme into rural or urban community development projects.   In view of the rapid social and economic changes affecting the patterns of life in both rural and urban communities, perhaps the need to use community development projects as a vehicle for making the public conscious of its stake in crime prevention is all the more urgent.   There are many who believe in the value of community development as an agent in crime prevention;   in this the Second United Nations Congress (London, 1960) concurred and urged greater use of it.8/

45.   In most countries today there is some kind of public participation in, and support of, social defence programmes.   Thus, in the Netherlands and Japan the probation programme is directed by professionals but the supervision and counselling of the probationers is done by voluntary probation officers who are citizens of some standing in their communities and each one of whom accepts a few probationers in his charge.   In the United Kingdom and in many of the Commonwealth countries, there are boards of prison visitors who oversee correctional institutions;   the visitors are usually persons of importance in the community.   In India, a large number of after-care hostels have been established and are conducted by the public.

46.   Such instances of public support are not, however, instances of mass support in the sense that a large proportion of the members of a community busy themselves with social defence programmes, and it is this kind of mass support which must be won because it opens the way to extensive and effective use of the public.   For instance, through the organization of effective after-care services - placement in suitable employment, provision of assistance to ex-prisoners and their families, etc. - and through a change in attitudes, the public could virtually ensure the reintegration of the discharged offender in society.

47.   Again, a supportive and crime conscious public could be induced to take elementary and common-sense measures to prevent crime which now it fails to take because of apathy or indifference or carelessness.   For instance, spectacular burglaries often take place simply because tenants have their houses with valuables in them unguarded and unlocked;   cars are stolen because owners invited or facilitated theft by leaving the ignition keys in the locks;   pickpockets are virtually presented with open handbags or conspicuous billfolds.   The public gets alarmed when atrocities occur and are publicized, but this soon gives way to apathy and interest in other matters.9/

8/   United Nations Publication, Sales No. 61.IV.3, page 28 et seq.

9/   See in this respect the paper "The role and future of the police in the field of crime prevention", prepared by Interpol for the Congress (A/CONF.26/NGO.1).

48. In certain countries, public participation in the prevention of crime seems to have assumed a different and more direct turn. In several of the socialist countries, for instance, the participation of the public has been organized through its trade unions and collectives and this has led to the creation of quasi-judicial institutions. Thus, in the Soviet Union, comradeship courts have been set up. These are public bodies elected by general meetings of workers, farmers, office employees, students and neighbours at their place of work. One of their tasks, according to an ukas of 3 July 1961 of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, is, inter alia, to investigate and punish certain types of offences. The comradeship courts may apply any one or all of the following measures to a person who has been found guilty: ask the accused to apologize publicly to the collective or the victim; reprimand the comrade; impose a fine up to ten roubles; ask the manager of the collective to consider the accused's demotion; ask the accused to pay damages up to 50 roubles. The court acts not only in offences committed by members of the groups but also in matters of behaviour which, although they do not constitute a breach of the law, are nevertheless clearly contrary to socialist morality and likely to develop into crime. Again, in some countries, the public has organized people's militia units to maintain law and order, while in other countries rural volunteer groups have been formed to combat crime in villages. In the Soviet Union, the militia units have been reported as being highly successful.

49. Although the public is apathetic in some countries and relatively active in others, there appear to be signs of a gradual stirring of public consciousness in the face of what seems to be an alarming increase in crime. It would seem particularly appropriate, therefore, for governments to stimulate this consciousness - but in a constructive and not an alarmist manner - to channel the energy released in the awakening process in accordance with national cultural patterns. The alternative might be a public initiative in crime prevention that would be unwelcome.

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III. THE FAMILY AS A FOCUS OF CRIME PREVENTION

50. The statistics compiled and the special studies carried out in various regions generally lead to the conclusion that juveniles are more prone to embroil themselves with the law when their connexions with their families have been disrupted because of parental disharmony, divorce and separation, or when for other reasons these connexions become tenuous or remote. Such conclusions are not surprising because the family is patently the most important and most intimate of the groups to which a person belongs and disruption in the family is likely to be reflected in the behaviour of the children.

51. United Nations concern with juvenile delinquency has also caused it to concentrate attention on the family. As far back as 1949, the Secretariat embarked on a series of comparative studies on juvenile delinquency in various parts of the world 10/. The matter was subsequently discussed at several regional meetings, and finally included as an item on the agenda of the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. The Congress discussions confirmed that there was general agreement on a causal relationship between juvenile delinquency and the family, and that therefore action had to be taken to maintain and strengthen family ties and to re-establish them when broken. The Congress therefore agreed on recommendations to this effect 11/.

52. In the years following, it appeared that not only did old forms of delinquency refuse to die out but new forms kept emerging - presumably despite application in some countries of provisions to strengthen the family. Studies carried out between 1955 and 1960, and reports prepared specially for the Second United Nations Congress (London, 1960) showed that both developed and developing countries were becoming more anxious about juvenile delinquency. The role of the family was again discussed and suggestions made as to how family cohesiveness could be promoted as a way of discouraging delinquency.

53. Since 1960, there has been a series of regional meetings, in Latin America (Caracas, Venezuela, 1963), in Asia (Tokyo, Japan, 1964), in Africa (Monrovia, Liberia, 1964), and in the Middle East (Damascus, 1964), in addition to a United Nations Consultative Group Meeting (Geneva, 1961), and recommendations on measures to strengthen the family were adopted.

54. The measures suggested covered social welfare or social service benefits such as family or children's allowances, counselling services, homemaker services, family vacation programmes and the like; community services such as provision of recreational services, facilities for leisure time activities, low-cost housing, etc.; health and medical services; more rigid legislation governing separation and divorce, compulsory registration of marriages, etc.; economic measures such as investment in rural areas to make them more viable, re-location of industries, control over migration to cities, etc.

55. These measures can stand on their own merits, but their effectiveness in the prevention of crime and delinquency has not yet been clearly shown. It is admittedly as difficult to prove such effectiveness as it is to disprove it, because it is virtually impossible to carry out controlled social experiments using each

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10/ ST/SOA/SD/1 and addenda 1 to 4.

11/ The recommendations need not be repeated here. Interested participants are referred to the Report of the Congress (UN Sales Publication No. 1956.IV.4), pages 79-80.

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measure as a variable factor, and it may be argued that had not these measures been taken in some countries the rate of delinquency would have been higher. But, considering the criminal statistics together with the measures taken or the absence thereof, in the countries submitting such statistics, it would seem that juvenile delinquency has a life and movement which is not directly related to those measures.

56. It appears reasonable to argue therefore that juvenile delinquency is one consequence of the interplay of social forces - the social forces of urbanization, industrialization, nationalism, political movements, religion, racial consciousness and the like - which affect the individual and his response in given situations.

57. These social forces also affect social institutions such as the family, and change them. The change is sometimes rapid and noticeable, and sometimes imperceptible. In all cases, however, the social institutions have to change or become effete.

58. Measures to strengthen the family must, therefore, take cognizance of the changes which the social forces have wrought in the family. For instance, measures which are aimed at preserving the family intact with its strong parental controls would seem foredoomed to failure simply because they seek to preserve untouched an institution which is being constantly changed by more powerful forces. Further, the pace of social institutional change must be expected to grow faster in response to the accelerated speed of technological change and the social environment this creates. Hence social measures for the family must look even more to the future instead of, as seems to be done now, to the immediate past.

59. The influence of the interacting social forces has changed the institution of the family radically, particularly in the industrialized countries. Education and instruction, entertainment, care and protection, and vocational training, for instance, have been taken over either by the State and its agencies or by voluntary associations or by commercial or industrial organizations. In most of the developing countries, the extended family appears to be passing, in some places more rapidly than in others; its passage is being deliberately hastened by the leaders in certain countries because they consider the extended family a cultural shackle on social development. The nuclear family in these countries is also changing, relatively faster, so it seems, than in industrialized societies.

60. What, therefore, is the function of social defence planners as regards their preoccupation with delinquency and its relationship with the family? Should they attempt to change the direction of social forces so as to keep the family intact and cohesive, or should they try to organize their preventive programmes in such a fashion as to deal with the products of these interacting social forces?

61. The control of the direction and rate of expansion of the social forces in a country is the legitimate preoccupation of the social planners; within certain limits and in line with the national objectives, it is they who lay down the lines of social policy and adapt programmes to the needs of that social policy. This is not to say that social defence planners should not participate in the formulation of such a policy; on the contrary, they have a legitimate right - one might even argue an

obligation - to point out the implications for social defence of the policy in preparation. This means that they must draw up their programmes so as to counter whatever criminogenic effects the application of a social policy might have.

62. Thus, for instance, community solidarity deriving from ethnic consciousness can be a stabilizing force which is crime preventive. But ethnic neighbourhoods in cities are now considered somewhat out-of-date if not politically undesirable, and national governments strive to transmute ethnic consciousness into national consciousness. Again, and this applies particularly to African countries, tribal allegiances and loyalties are sometimes found to be disruptive of a country's vanity. The fusing of the tribes so as to constitute a nation has been regarded as dictated by the national interest, irrespective of any effect on crime. Social defence planners cannot act contrary to social policy decisions which seek to achieve national goals even though it is realized that they might lead to a higher incidence of delinquency.

63. A social defence programme should therefore be based on the realities of social existence and in accordance with a social policy to control the movement of social forces. The immediate results would be better and the future success of the programme would be more realizable. The importance of development planning has been emphasized by the United Nations, particularly since the launching of the Development Decade on 19 December 1961, and it would seem that the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency and adult criminality has to be a part of this development planning. In a recent note to the Social Commission, the Secretary-General of the United Nations observed that social defence technical groups and policy making bodies of the United Nations advocate such planning 12/.

64. The advantage of such an approach may be seen, for instance, when discussing the impact of the social force of urbanization on the family. Urban centres have existed for hundreds of years in most countries, but with industrialization and technical development, urbanization has been enormously accelerated; a pace that will continue and is in fact welcomed in some countries.

65. The effects of urbanization may be either good or bad. Urban environment affords increased intellectual stimulation, relatively more employment opportunities, the advantages of better medical, sanitary, health and educational services, more varied possibilities for entertainment and recreation, better housing units, and accelerated social mobility. On the other hand, the greater opportunities of employment may attract a disproportionate percentage of unattached males who having abandoned their families in the rural areas come to live in unfamiliar urban surroundings without the primary social controls to which they had been accustomed; similar employment opportunities may also entice mothers to go out to work even if this means neglecting their children. Again, the many forms of commercialized entertainment available in the city draw children and parents out of their homes and may thus weaken the stability of domestic life. Also, the attractiveness and excitement of city life pulls many children from rural areas, who often become vagrants and thus prone either to delinquency or exploitation by adults.

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12/ E/CN.5/383/Add.1, para. 14.

66.   Urbanization does not necessarily weaken the family and therefore contribute to juvenile delinquency.   It may even strengthen the family which may be able to profit by the easier urban life.   But unplanned and uncontrolled urbanization may be criminogenic, for it may disrupt families moving into the city or upset their former pattern of life, so much so that individual members, or even the whole family become more susceptible to criminal behaviour.   The criminogenic possibilities of uncontrolled and unplanned urbanization must be considered in view of the increasing pace or urbanization in many of the developing countries.   For example, the progress of the Lower Mekong River Basin development project will inevitably enlarge a number of towns and villages in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, and create others, while at the same time displacing existing villages.   Again, in Venezuela, for instance, a scheme for the creation of a great industrial city is at present being carried out in the sparsely populated Guyana region at the confluence of the Orinoco and Caroni rivers.   The industrial complex (part of which is already in production) round the future city of San Tomé de Guayana, which will have a population of half a million, is intended by Venezuela's National Development Programme to furnish, by 1975, about 28 per cent of the country's total exports.   Such schemes will contribute to national economic development;   whether they, additionally, contribute or not to national delinquency depends upon the adequacy of social planning.

67.   It is the function of the social defence specialists to point out to the social planners the criminogenic dangers of an insufficiently planned urbanization and to suggest the proper measures.   For instance, measures may be taken to prepare migrant persons of rural origin for life in the city;   if necessary, some preparation could be made obligatory for aspirant migrants.   Perhaps steps might even be taken, in conjunction with housing planners, to see that migrants moved in familial units. Again, it might be possible to establish reception and relocation centres, employment agencies, temporary hostels for individuals and families, youth hostels for the younger migrants, and the like.

68.   No measures can be expected, however, to achieve this control fully.   Social defence specialists must therefore draw up adequate programmes for the care and protection of those children whose family has become disrupted either because various members have abandoned it and gone into the city, or because they have moved to the city and are unable to cope with the newness of urban life.   For instance, at the Arab States Seminar in Damascus in 1964, it was urged that governments should take steps to provide care and protection for the thousands of migrant Arab children who had become vagrant and whose petty delinquencies were due almost exclusively to their homelessness.

69.   Urbanization is not, however, the only force affecting the family.   Economic, political, social, religious and ideological forces are also factors of change.   For instance, a political force under which men and women are equal changes their expectations of each other;   an economic force providing similar job opportunities for each partner may achieve a like result.

70.   Under the impact of these interacting forces, it appears unlikely that the family can be expected to play its previous crime preventive role.   In contemporary society the family no longer possesses many of the functions for the control and conduct of its members, and these functions cannot be restored by so-called family-strengthening

measures such as marriage guidance, psychological counselling, homemaker services and the like. These measures can certainly help to keep families together, but they cannot restore the functions which in previous generations the nuclear family exercised. The social defence programme must assist those children who are in danger of becoming delinquent because their families are unable to discharge even the limited functions incumbent on them.

71. Also, social defence specialists have to consider contemporary trends in the institution of the family, lest they place members of the family in positions which might make them prone to delinquency. For instance, the frequency of divorce in many countries must not be allowed to imperil the rights of children born of the union. Under the statutory, customary or religious laws in certain countries divorce is easy and, pending a reform, the rights of the children must be protected. Under recent legislative reform in Tunisia, for example, a husband can no longer divorce his wife by simple declaration. Divorce can take place only when certain pre-conditions are met to the satisfaction of a court having relevant jurisdiction. Divorce, it is reported, is granted only when, _inter alia_, the care and protection of the children are assured.

72. In accepting to provide these services, the family is expected to fulfil its inherent obligations to society. In particular, parents must see that their children are instructed in the nature of the obligations which they will one day be called upon to assume. The instruction would seem to be of special importance in the developing countries because the youth of these countries is expected to carry out the responsibility for the future rapid national development. The State can do a great deal through its educational system and through the mass media to influence youth. Yet this does not relieve the family of its duty to inculcate values in youth, and direct the young toward the successful assumption of adult responsibilities.

73. In simple societies, the puberty rites marked the end of childhood and the beginning of shared responsibility with the adult members. In modern society, the prolonged educational preparation for competitive living seems to have overemphasized the privileges and prerogatives of the adolescent whereas his obligations to the larger society in which he will one day take his place seem to be under-emphasized.

74. There is a gulf between the values of youth and the values of adults, and this gulf, particularly in the developing countries, seems to be widening. For instance, the social defence expert group meeting in Monrovia in 1964 urged "recognition of the fact that the social distance between youth and their elders in the rapidly changing African urban life, in many instances, is considerable, and the extent to which youth will look to their elders for their social goals and code of behaviour is, therefore, limited" 13/. But though this is a subject of concern in many countries, particularly because of its implications for delinquency and delinquency control, there is hardly any research study on which realistic policies and programmes for youth may be based.

13/ E/CN.14/328, para. 36.

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75.   Assuming, however, that there is a gulf and conceding even that the widening of this gulf is inevitable because of the more intensive education given to youth, their wider knowledge, and the strong influence of their peer-groups, the gulf must not allow the adolescent to lose contact with the adult world so that he no longer recognizes its goals and values, and believes that his own conduct is fully justi- fied because it is endorsed and supported by his peer-groups.   Repression, when it comes, would not be understood by the adolescent, and repression is enforced by the adult world through its police and its correctional agencies.

76.   In discussing the family as a centre of attention for crime prevention, one other matter might be raised as far as family responsibilities for the children are concerned, namely the extent of the legal responsibility of the family for the delinquent acts of its juveniles or adolescents 14/.   This is patently not a simple question of implying parental responsibility as regards the delinquent acts of juveniles and punishing them with reprimands, fines or restitution for damage. In many societies, some parents are admittedly helpless to control their children because they lack the possibility at home of keeping their children in, or because (and this would seem to apply to transitional cultures) control was an involuntarily accepted function which a disappearing extended family forced on them and which they are ill-equipped to handle.   In such circumstances, parental responsibility might be more apparent than real.

77.   Here again, much more study is required to find out how the right balance can be struck, and how may legal responsibility be fixed when deliberate parental irresponsibility or gross negligence is proven.   The balance and the extent of parental liability will obviously vary with the culture and the extent to which the State has assumed a parens parentis role.   But it is a balance which has to be struck soon in view of the rapidity with which social forces are remoulding concepts and institutions, or making them obsolete.

14/   In many legal systems there are provisions permitting a court to accept parents or legal guardians as sureties for the future good behaviour of juvenile offenders.   In other countries, the law seems to go further.   Thus V. S. Pronina in her book Role of local soviets in the prevention of juvenile delinquency listed a series of measures which might be taken to enforce parental responsibility.   It was observed, for instance, that comradeship courts may discuss the improper behaviour of parents, and that parents may be fined and may have to pay for damage caused by their children.   Role of local soviets in the prevention of juvenile delinquency, 1961, Moscow, pages 60-64.

IV.   THE SOCIAL FORCE OF EDUCATION IN THE
PREVENTION OF DELINQUENCY

78.   Statistics seem to indicate that juvenile delinquency has reached alarming
proportions in some affluent countries, where there is compulsory school
attendance and a low rate of illiteracy.   On the other hand in many developing
countries where the illiteracy rate is high, the problem of juvenile delinquency
is not regarded as acute.   Paradoxically, however, a close examination of the
delinquency figures shows that in these countries the illiteracy rate among the
delinquents is higher than in the general population.[15]

79.   It would seem, therefore, that it must not be inferred that there is a
direct causal relationship between the inadequacy of school education and the low
rate of delinquency, nor between the inadequacy of school education and the high
rate of delinquency, nor indeed between the adequacy of school education and the
high rate of delinquency.   The comparison merely shows that no generalization
on causal relationship can be drawn.   Some school systems operating within
certain social settings seem to contribute to the prevention of juvenile
delinquency;   other systems operating within other social settings appear to
promote juvenile delinquency.   School education may thus be seen as only a part
of another social force which could have either preventive or stimulative effects,
or both, depending on the manner, circumstances, conditions and social setting in
which it exerts its influence on juveniles.

80.   Education and school attendance as agents for the prevention of delinquency
have been discussed many times and on five occasions by United Nations groups
since the holding of the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (London, 1960).[16]   There was in every case
general agreement on the potential of education in the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and the part the school could take.

15/   See, for instance, the United Nations comparative surveys of juvenile
delinquency for Asia and the Far East, Latin America, the Middle East,
North America and Europe.

16/   Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
(Geneva, December 1961), ST/SOA/SD/CG.1, particularly paras. 77-80;   European
Seminar on the Evaluation of Methods used in the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency (Frascati, October 1962), SOA/ESWP/1962/3, particularly
pages 29-36;   Asian Seminar (UNAFEI, Fuchu, Tokyo, February-March 1964),
UNAFEI/5, page 46;   Expert Group Meeting on Social Defence (Monrovia,
August 1964), E/CN.14/328, particularly paras. 39-40;   Third Seminar for
the Arab States on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
(Damascus, Sept.-Oct. 1964).

81.   One may argue therefore that the importance attached to school education as a delinquency preventive force stems from a belief, which is often more implicit than explicit, that schools, because of their functions of training of the mind through formal courses of study, of imparting to the student a sense of discipline, and of building character, are best equipped to prepare the future adults to play a constructive role in society and to live law-abiding lives. This belief in the effectiveness of the school is perhaps stronger in contemporary societies because of a feeling of uneasiness that the family of today is not able to discharge its control and disciplinary functions as effectively as before, and that therefore the school must not fail in this respect.

82.   The school, however, is another social institution just as the family is, and like the family it has been exposed to social forces within society.   In some countries, the school has changed its attitudes toward discipline and control as well as its methods of instruction so as to keep in step with social changes.   This may be seen in the relaxation of strict school discipline, the greater tolerance shown toward variegated student activities, the more permissive methods of teaching, the greater choice of subjects offered in the curriculum, the greater use of counsellors and educational guidance personnel, and the like. In other countries, the school has resisted or been indifferent to social changes and the new needs they have generated.   In these countries, the school system entails serious consequences for society.

83.   The classical conception of a school is that of an institution which imparts a certain type of book-knowledge and builds the pupil's character through a system of discipline and indoctrination in traditions.   Both objectives were perhaps realizable in a time when classes were small and students were selected on the basis of aptitude and/or family antecedents.   Students learned or they left - and even when they left they were not considered drop-outs or potential failures in life because the family generally received and placed them successfully in safe, respectable positions.   With the increase in population, compulsory education and the growth of technical knowledge, the school is, however, no longer able to discharge these functions;   it has to cope with swollen numbers of students many of whom are not interested in the kind of education which the school offers.   In many places, the school system responded to the new demands.   Schools expanded or were diversified;   the curricula were changed;   new methods were adopted.   In other places, the school made only a limited response: it expanded to accommodate greater numbers, but did little else.   In both cases, however, some functions had to be given up, namely, controlling and indoctrinating the students through the intimate student-teacher relationships, the observance of school traditions, a system of inflexible discipline and the like.

84.   But the consequences have not been beneficial in places where the school has limited its response to expanding its accommodation for the increased numbers. In many African and Asian countries, the classical or scholastically oriented school, whose curriculum was designed to produce thinkers, scholars and white-collar workers, is the only channel through which all youths must pass irrespective of

whether they have the aptitude and capability for academic learning, and irrespective of whether they are emotionally or socially adjusted to accept the school's orientation. One of the consequences of this kind of processing is maladjustment in the school, leading to drop-outs, truancy, misbehaviour, poor grades and the like. Another consequence is the school graduate who is destined to remain unemployed because he is virtually unemployable; there are few office positions for which his school training made him ideally suitable.

85. Unfortunately, the solution to the difficulty raised by the academic school is not simply to provide a diversified school system with vocational, industrial and commercial schools to complement the traditional school. The tragedy remains that in most countries the highest rewards, posts conferring social prestige, whether managerial, executive or even clerical, and the privileges of power and position go to the graduates of the scholastically oriented school. This situation is on the way to becoming acute in the technologically advanced countries where automation is slowly reducing the demand for low-level technicians and operators while the more sophisticated technology is at the same time demanding university-trained personnel; university entrants seldom come from other than the academic schools.

86. In most of the developing countries, the tragedy persists in its more elementary form. These countries need the low-level technicians, the lathe operators, the fitters, the skilled mechanics, the artisans, the draughtsmen and others that the vocational, industrial and commercial schools can produce. Yet the highest rewards of society go to those who can boast of office jobs, and the academic school is ideally equipped to produce aspirants for them in large numbers.

87. In many parts of the world, and at many United Nations regional social defence meetings, this particular defect has been recognized, and it has invariably been agreed that certain school systems, by concentrating on stereotyped formal education, are not adequately preparing youth for modern life and employment and thus, in a sense, might even be considered as contributing to delinquency.[17] Changes of syllabus have been called for. But such changes will mean little if social attitudes are not also changed.

88. This failure to carry out school functions and the lack of response may partly explain why some school systems do so little to prevent delinquency; they may even stimulate it. For this the family blames the school and the school blames the family. Both the school and the family have changed and neither can now be depended upon as the principal delinquency preventive. The school, as a recent UNESCO publication observed, cannot solve the problem of juvenile delinquency or even attempt to prevent it single-handed. It can only complement the work of other social institutions and agencies.[18]

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[17] See for instance the Report of the Monrovia Group, E/CN.14/328, para. 39.

[18] Kvaraceus, William C., Juvenile delinquency: a problem for the modern world, UNESCO, 1964, page 54.

89. The limitations of the school have been acknowledged by the 1961 United Nations Consultative Group; it was agreed that although schools had access to all children for many years, they could not be considered the repository for unruly children and could not take over all the functions relinquished by other agencies. The influence of the school could be salutary for some and useless for others, and deeply disturbed children could not be helped by the school atmosphere.19/

90. It would appear therefore that the very rapid expansion of school education in recent years has not only not served to increase the effectiveness of the school's preventive role but, on the contrary, has served in a sense to overburden and limit it further. In certain instances, also, educational programmes were insufficiently planned with the result that the expansion of education led to an increased number of school drop-outs, truancy, and the like.

91. Considering the increased amounts which all countries will probably spend on education, it would be advisable to ensure that the effects on juvenile delinquency will be salutary. A balanced educational programme will be necessary, one allowing for the different needs and aptitudes of children, flexible grading systems, changes in media of instruction (if required), the needs of over-age students, and the like.

92. The planning of such school programmes is, of course, the task of the educationalist. But in recent years there has been a tendency to recognize that investment in education is also a "human investment" which contributes to the economic and social development of a country. This seems to have assumed cardinal significance in many of the affluent and the developing countries, so much so that in certain African and Asian countries a large part of national revenue is being devoted to school education even at the expense of urgently needed schemes of economic development.

93. Though due account was often taken of economic aims in educational planning, it would seem that in many countries social defence considerations were frequently overlooked as if it were taken for granted that an increase in educational opportunities would enable juveniles to be more law-abiding citizens. This is not always true. Firstly, school curricula are in many countries drawn up to impart knowledge, whereas teaching a sense of civic or moral responsibility to students seems to have been overlooked in many countries. Secondly, the emphasis has often been on producing a quantitative increase in the number of "educated" persons, without paying due regard to the quality of the education; deadlines for stamping out illiteracy or raising the average level of education in a country have been detrimental to quality. Thirdly, educational programmes in many places seem to have benefited only those children who receive academic training; those who are not thus oriented are exposed to frustration which expresses itself in school drop-outs, etc.

19/ ST/SOA/SD/CG.1, para. 77.

94.   The advice and collaboration of social defence specialists should therefore
be sought in the planning of educational programmes; this is in the interest of
the educationalist and the economist lest the investment in education be offset
by an increase in the costs of delinquency.

95.   Even with harmonious and balanced planning the maladjustment of some
children in some schools is inevitable.   Therefore, specialized services have to
be provided to ensure that such maladjustment (truancy, poor grades, behaviour
problems, etc.) is detected early enough and remedied.   The school, having the
custody of all children for at least some part of the day during their early
lives, is in the best position to detect delinquency – although the same school
might not, of course, be in a position to remedy it.

96.   What specialized services are required for this purpose, and whether such
services can be provided, depends of course on the particular needs of the country
and its ability to provide them.   For instance, at the United Nations European
Social Defence Seminar (Frascati) there seemed to be general agreement that every
European school should have access to specialized services for diagnosis, remedial
treatment and guidance for pupils with serious maladjustment problems, as well as
for the training of teaching staff in the detection of cases and the proper
handling of juvenile delinquents.[20/]   Such advice might, however, not find
response in many of the developing countries where financial resources are limited
and where medico–psychological personnel are few.

97.   Such specialized services, even when available, cannot be depended upon to
solve the problem of juvenile delinquency and concomitant measures are also
required.   In fact, children today are much more exposed to various kinds of
stimuli from outside the school; the school is not the only institution that
educates the children, who are open to the influence of the mass media of
information, the peer–group, and the like.   In view of the decline in family
control, out-of-school programmes and activities assume major crime preventive
importance.

98.   These programmes imply the organization of activities to combat or channel
educative influences from outside the school.   It is thus complementary to
school education and, as commonly used, covers two types: activities for
children and young persons in their after–school hours and during weekends and
vacations, and education for those who continue their studies beyond compulsory
school–leaving age and also for those who have already started to earn a living.
The first includes special clubs for gifted children (language, folkcraft, music,
chess, etc.), youth clubs for sports, recreation and leisure, holiday clubs for
mountaineering, hiking, swimming, etc., choral clubs, and the like.   The latter
activities are designed to prepare the younger generation for employment, and to
improve the qualifications of young workers so that they will not be misfits in a
rapidly developing technological environment.

20/   SOA/ESWP/1962/3, page 34.

99. At a UNESCO sponsored international conference on youth (Grenoble, 1964) it was observed that in the more advanced countries it was essential for young people to acquire a very high standard of technical education in order to meet the requirements of a highly specialized industry or agriculture, and also to satisfy the needs of constantly developing industrial and agricultural techniques. Furthermore, the regular transfer of part of the manpower from rural to industrial employment meant that young people had to bring their professional qualifications constantly up to date. In contrast, in the under-equipped or developing countries, it was observed that education was often of short duration, incomplete and sometimes ineffective, because children and adolescents left school without receiving an adequate preparation for life. Further, it was essential to counterbalance the rapid changes involved in development by adapting educational systems to its needs.21/

100. The following might be considered as part of out-of-school education: evening classes; practical training at the place of work; holidays with pay granted by business firms to enable employees to pursue studies; allocation of free time during working hours, without loss of pay; correspondence courses including radio and television courses; pre-employment classes and supplementary classes during employment for those with an interrupted or unfinished primary schooling to enable them to continue their studies with a view to entering a vocational training establishment; specialized training centres for young persons to assist those who have not completed their general education; organized vocational training in the enterprises themselves during the working day to permit workers and other employees to acquire further qualifications.22/

101. A concerted programme of action which covers school instruction as well as out-of-school education and activities thus appears necessary if the social force of education is to be used effectively for the prevention of delinquency; exclusive and isolated attention to one or the other might not have any beneficial results. Such a concerted programme does not, of course, necessarily mean state control: it can mean direction and guidance from the State, and the voluntary assumption of functions on the part of the appropriate non-state institutions and agencies.

21/ Final Report of the International Conference on Youth (Grenoble, 23 August to 1 September 1964) UNESCO, 10 Nov. 1964 (UNESCO/ED/211), pages 14-15.

22/ For more details see the Final Report of the International Conference on Youth (Grenoble, 1964) UNESCO/ED/211, 10 November 1964.

V. OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CRIME PREVENTION

102. Both in the developed and in the developing countries there are many who state that depressed economic conditions and limited opportunities for employment are two of the main reasons for criminality. Thus, in the United States, the high percentage of delinquents among young people who have left school but not yet found a job is regarded by the authorities as strong evidence of the relationship between enforced idleness and crime.23/ In the Republic of Cameroon, a recent investigation indicated that the general shortage of jobs, the lack of training facilities for urban employment and the exploitation of young workers had to be included among the contributory factors of juvenile delinquency.24/ It has also been reported that in the Republic of Viet-Nam 28.7 per cent of juvenile delinquents had no proper employment and were living by their wits, and 87 per cent were unable to earn their living and did not have enough to eat.25/ Similar indications of the relationship between poverty and delinquency were given at the meeting of the Latin American Group of Experts (La Guaira, Venezuela, September 1963) and at the Third United Nations Seminar for the Arab States (Damascus, September-October 1964). It was observed that in these countries poverty contributed to crime by creating a feeling of want or deprivation which engendered revolt and antagonism and led to delinquency.26/

103. On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest also that even where opportunities for work are available, the incidence of delinquency is not inconsiderable and, further, many delinquents are themselves employed. A recent French survey on delinquency among gangs, for instance, showed that fewer than 10 per cent of the members of these gangs were out of work.27/ Further, in

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23/ Cited in the working paper prepared by the International Labour Organisation for the Third United Nations Congress (Stockholm), No. D.2, 1965, "The role of vocational guidance, training, employment opportunity and work in youth adjustment and the prevention of delinquency", p. 35.

24/ S.P. Tschourgui et Pierre Zumbach, "Diagnostic de la délinquance juvénile au Cameroun", International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 20, pages 35-44.

25/ "La délinquance juvénile au Viet-Nam", L'Enfance dans le monde, November-December 1959.

26/ Report of the Latin American Working Group of Experts (La Guaira, Venezuela, 9-18 September 1963) and Report of the Third United Nations Seminar for the Arab States (Damascus, September-October 1964).

27/ "La délinquance des jeunes en groupes", Centre de formation et de recherche de l'éducation surveillée, Vaucresson, 1963, L'Enfant, No. 1, 1964, pages 53-59.

Zambia it has been noted that in the towns where young people predominated, and where many of them were unemployed, the unemployment was not always because the jobs were not available, but often because the available jobs were menial and did not carry the status which the young people having attained a certain level of education expected.28/

104. Conflicting evidence as illustrated above seems to suggest that the mere creation of job opportunities for youth may not have the strong crime preventive effects often attributed to it. This is not to suggest, however, that crime preventive programmes based essentially on a provision of employment opportunities should be discarded. Where there is a large reservoir of discontented and unemployed youth (who often are undereducated as well), it would be patently in the best interest of crime prevention, and of society in general, to absorb this youth into work-schemes.

105. Thus, in Mali, in Congo (Brazzaville), in the Malagasy Republic, and in Ghana, <u>Civic Youth Brigades</u> have been established to absorb the very large numbers of unemployed youth and to provide the channels through which surplus labour, particularly young labour, can be directed to a variety of public works and rural settlement schemes. Other countries such as Chad, the Ivory Coast and Gabon, have made military service compulsory and use the conscripts for work of national importance.29/ Some of these schemes are believed to have been inaugurated in the name of crime prevention in part by involving youth in socially constructive tasks which, in turn, provide a sense of achievement and strengthen their concept of civic responsibility. It must be borne in mind, however, that they do not provide permanent employment. If, in the time between recruitment for national service and discharge from it, it has been possible to develop the economy which will provide the job opportunities, and to train accordingly the young men who were recruited, then the period of national service would have been well spent. If, on the other hand, these young people are demobilized from such service without occupation or hope of employment, then they may become more discontented and troublesome than before having, now, new aspirations which cannot be achieved.

106. In some countries, employment opportunities present themselves as a consequence of the relatively free play of economic forces; in others, the economic forces are subject to a certain measure of control through exchange restrictions, import quotas and the like, while in still other countries, the

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28/ Clifford, A., <u>Juvenile delinquency in Zambia.</u> To be published shortly by the United Nations.

29/ Clifford, A. "The evaluation of methods used for the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency in Africa south of the Sahara", <u>International Review of Criminal Policy</u>, No. 21, page 22.

employment opportunities are deliberately created on the basis of strict
planning.   It may be observed also that the creation of employment opportunities,
whether as a consequence of the interplay of free economic forces or as a
consequence of deliberate planning, does not necessarily imply an increase in
jobs;   it might mean simply the abolition of jobs made obsolete by technological
change or moribund industries, and the creation of alternate jobs.

107. What is especially important to the social defence specialist is the degree
of satisfaction (or frustration) felt by the occupants of such jobs in the
performance of their work.   There would seem to be good reason to expect that
some of those who are frustrated will eventually turn to delinquency as an
expression of their feelings.   Further, this sense of frustration will in all
probability be sharpened in those countries where privileged groups enjoying
the fruits of abundance exist in the view of all, or where the levels of
expectation of the people for material comfort and the abundant life have been
raised.   Sometimes, the expectations of a people are raised by the hopes and
promises of national leaders: sometimes, by various economic development plans;
or, they may be due to the images and symbols of extranational affluence which
have been disseminated by the mass media.   But whatever the reason, the result
of a person's failure to reach the levels of his expectations might turn him away
from an unrewarding job to other ways of obtaining the pleasures and trappings of
an affluent life.

108. In this sense, the role of the social defence specialist is to give advice
concerning the preparation of youth in general for future employment, and in
particular to try to ensure that those youths who have shown that they are more
likely to turn to delinquency will be adequately prepared for jobs for which they
are temperamentally and otherwise suitable.   The measures which may be suggested
for this purpose would seem to comprise information and occupational counselling
services, training systems (including apprenticeships) and placement services.

109. In certain countries, some social defence specialists have advocated the
creation of specialized vocational guidance and job-finding services for
delinquent youth, contending that solutions to unemployment and unemployability
in their cases are essential elements in a rehabilitation programme.   It is
sometimes further contended that the unemployment and unemployability of this
group are of a special and separate character requiring a specialized approach.
Programmes along these lines have been implemented in some countries, particularly
in the United States.   There are, however, other social defence experts who do
not find favour with this approach, arguing that such separate services tend to
mark the delinquent as belonging to a group apart, and to stigmatize him in the
eyes of others and even in his own eyes.   These experts advocate the use, only,
of common services open to all youth, due regard being paid to individual
differences and problems of the delinquent just as due regard should be paid to
the individual differences and problems of any youth.

110. Occupational information and counselling services play a vital role in
assuring that young people do not become occupational misfits.   It has been
found that in most countries, despite the rapid development of means of

communication and information, and the extensive use of the mass media, young people have increasing difficulty in obtaining an accurate picture of the job opportunities open to them. These difficulties would seem to be more prevalent in the more developed and industrialized countries than in the less developed countries. In the former, not only is there at any point of time a complex and often bewildering variety of occupations to choose from, but the accelerated pace of technological change tends to create new occupations, while rendering others obsolete with disconcerting speed.30/ Hence, there tends to be a gulf between the available jobs and the number of youths who cannot take the jobs, because either they have had no training or not the training required, and hence have to remain unemployed. In the developing countries, there is often very little to choose from, and young people tend to go into whatever is immediately available whether or not appropriate to their talents.

111. In recent years there has been a marked improvement in the methods of informing and advising the young and their parents of the types of employment open to them and the qualifications required. These services will need to be extended so as to meet the demands of the increasing numbers of the young who will be looking for employment in the near future. When organising these services there may be some difficulty, by no means insuperable, in setting up the channels of communication and co-operation between the school system (including vocational schools) and the industries or other enterprises which will provide the employment.

112. A vocational training system 31/ is generally intended to include all facilities for children and adults desirous of acquiring the theoretical and practical knowledge necessary for a trade or occupation, irrespective of the nature of these facilities – technical training in a school for either a short or long period, apprenticeship or accelerated training. The system employed depends on the country and its economic and social conditions, and the degree of centralization of control. But whatever the type, it must comply with two fundamental requirements: it must enable all who wish to do so, to equip themselves for a particular career, and it must adapt itself to the economy and provide the managerial, clerical and technical personnel it needs.

113. In a paper prepared for the United Nations Seminar on the Prevention of Delinquency, at Frascati (October 1962), the International Labour Organisation observed that two trends in vocational training seemed to be distinguishable. One was towards accelerated training, using intensive methods to produce urgently

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30/ The latest edition of the United States *Dictionary of occupational titles* contained 6,000 new titles which have come into existence, since 1949. (Quoted in the ILO working paper for the Third Congress (No. D.2. 1965), page 8.)

31/ For development of this subject see the ILO working paper for the Third Congress (No. D.2. 1965), Chapter IV.

required skills.   This trend seemed to be prevalent in the developing countries.
The other was towards a more general occupational preparation to facilitate
mobility and the later retraining made necessary by economic and technological
change.32/   This trend seemed to prevail in the developed countries in particular.
In many of the developed countries occupational change is recognized as almost an
inevitable concomitant of modern industry; hence, the need for a more general
occupational preparation.

114.   The third service which is essential in order to take full advantage of
the employment opportunities is an effective placement system.   The placement
service is also complementary to the vocational training system because, as
pointed out by the ILO, a service which does not provide some constructive help
in finding work at the end of the vocational process stands very little chance
of acceptance as either useful or necessary.33/

115.   Effective placement services are a vital part of delinquency preventive
programmes because guidance and training which do not lead to employment may have
harmful effects.   As the report of the Frascati Seminar observed, "Failure to
find an opening is serious for all young people;   it becomes catastrophic in the
case of delinquents and pre-delinquents because they react more violently to
frustration".34/

116. Many countries, whatever their state of economic development, have taken
steps to provide and extend such services.   The establishment of these services
and their extension work to the benefit of the social defence specialist.   In
the United States, it has been reported that, in 1962 alone, 4,000 new youth
employment offices were opened to assist in youth placement.35/   Many of the
developing countries have also begun to provide such services.   In Tanzania
(Tanganyika) a youth employment service has been in operation since 1959, while
in several Asian countries, for example, Ceylon, India and Singapore, some sort
of special assistance is given to young people in search of work.36/

117.   One other aspect of employment that is of interest to the social defence
specialist is the availability of jobs which might be socially dangerous.   With
the growth of urbanization and industrialization and of city populations,
particularly in the developing countries, jobs potentially dangerous for the

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32/   International Labour Organisation, "The function of vocational guidance,
       training and placement programmes in the prevention of juvenile delinquency",
       UN/SOA/SEM/8/WP.5.

33/   Id.

34/   SOA/ESWP/1962/3, page 42.

35/   ILO Working paper for the Third Congress (No. D.2. 1965), page 40.

36/   Id.

young will inevitably increase.   These conditions will create a demand for commercial entertainment, and the response might well be a proliferation of bars, night-clubs, dance halls, pinball parlours, and the like.   Also, particularly in the Asian and African cities, the growth of urbanization could lead to an increase in street-trades and itinerant hawking.   Such jobs, although they do provide employment, could also provide the work environment most conducive to delinquency.   Unfortunately, it might not be feasible in many countries to prevent the young from taking such jobs.   In stagnant economies, such jobs are often the only alternatives to destitution.   But at least it might be found possible, in the interests of crime prevention and in the interests of the young themselves, to provide some sort of controls and supervision, so that they will neither be exploited by employers nor led into delinquency by others.