Pakistan Customs
Federal Board of Revenue, Ministry of Finance

Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

March 2015
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

March 2015
Acknowledgements

This study, "Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs" has been conducted by the Customs Research Unit (CRU) at Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), Karachi. Pakistan Customs would like to thank and acknowledge the technical and financial support extended by Afghan Opiate Trade Project (AOTP) of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for successful completion of this study.

The study was carried out under the technical supervision of:

**Ghulam Ahmed**, Director General, Directorate General of Training and Research, Karachi
**Rubina Wasti**, Director, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
**Abdul Basit Ch.**, Principal/Project Coordinator Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
**Saeed Akram**, Additional Director, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
**Amer Rashid**, Deputy Director/Coordinator, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi

**Research Team:**
**Zehra Tahir Naqvi**, Team Member, Customs Research Unit
**Asif Khan**, Team Member, Customs Research Unit
**Syed Samsam Qadir Shah**, Team Member, Customs Research Unit

**IT and Technical Assistance:**
**Noor Muhammad**, Instructor, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
**Nabi Bakhsh Sahito**, IT Professional, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi

**Disclaimer:**
This report is based on data collected directly from 57 Pakistan Customs field offices through a customised questionnaire. While all necessary precautions have been taken in the compilation of this report to ensure accuracy. However, some inadvertent errors cannot be ruled out. Hence, it would be appreciated if any errors could be brought to the attention of the research team.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. I
Customs Research Unit (CRU) ................................................................................................................ V
Executive summary .................................................................................................................................. VI
Preface ....................................................................................................................................................... VIII

CHAPTER I: Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1
  1.1 The structure of Pakistan Customs ............................................................................................... 3
  1.2 Why a gap analysis and need assessment .................................................................................. 4
  1.3 Study parameters ....................................................................................................................... 4
  1.4 Research methodology ............................................................................................................... 5
  1.5 Report structure ......................................................................................................................... 7
  1.6 Limitations .................................................................................................................................. 7

CHAPTER II: Identifying deficiencies in the interdiction capacity of Pakistan Customs ......................... 9
  2.1 Human resource .......................................................................................................................... 10
    2.1.1 Staff strength ...................................................................................................................... 11
    2.1.2 Training ............................................................................................................................ 14
  2.2 Equipment and infrastructure ...................................................................................................... 17
    2.2.1 Scanning devices ............................................................................................................... 17
    2.2.2 CCTV Cameras .................................................................................................................. 24
    2.2.3 Canine units ...................................................................................................................... 24
    2.2.4 Drugs and precursors testing kits ..................................................................................... 25
    2.2.5 Laboratories and testing facilities ..................................................................................... 26
    2.2.6 Arms and ammunition ....................................................................................................... 31
    2.2.7 Check posts ....................................................................................................................... 32
    2.2.8 Unofficial crossing points ................................................................................................. 33
  2.3 Operational, technical and IT related capabilities ......................................................................... 41
    2.3.1 Database ........................................................................................................................... 41
    2.3.2 Risk profiling .................................................................................................................... 41
    2.3.3 Automation of procedures ............................................................................................... 43
    2.3.4 Information sharing and coordination with law enforcement agencies ......................... 43

CHAPTER III: Need assessment and recommendations ......................................................................... 45
  3.1 Human resource .......................................................................................................................... 46
  3.2 Infrastructure and equipment ....................................................................................................... 47
  3.3 Operational, technical and IT-related issues ............................................................................... 48

CHAPTER IV: Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 51
Annex A: questionnaire used for data collection and Lists of Pics/Maps/Fig .......................................... 55
Annex B: pictures of the study .............................................................................................................. 67

About Research Team ........................................................................................................................... 74
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Assistant Collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Assistant Chemical Examiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANF</td>
<td>Anti Narcotics Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Appraising Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOTP</td>
<td>Afghan Opiate Trade Project, UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Airport Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASO</td>
<td>Anti Smuggling Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Computer-based Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Commission on Narcotics and Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRU</td>
<td>Customs Research Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Deputy Collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGTTR</td>
<td>Directorate General of Training and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DII</td>
<td>Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTT</td>
<td>Directorate of Transit and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>Electronic Data Interchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Examining Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBR</td>
<td>Federal Board of Revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Frontier Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPO</td>
<td>General Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEJ (Lab)</td>
<td>Hussein Ebrahim Jamal (Laboratory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Inspector Preventive Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCB</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KICT</td>
<td>Karachi International Container Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Model Customs Collectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC(A) East</td>
<td>Model Customs Collectorate (Appraisement East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC(A) West</td>
<td>Model Customs Collectorate (Appraisement West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC(Exp)</td>
<td>Model Customs Collectorate (Exports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC(P)</td>
<td>Model Customs Collectorate (Preventive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIH</td>
<td>National Institute of Health Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Logistics Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODRP</td>
<td>Office of Defence Representative in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Principal Appraiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaCCS</td>
<td>Pakistan Customs Computerized System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSIR</td>
<td>Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCU</td>
<td>Port Control Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICT</td>
<td>Pakistan International Container Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSA</td>
<td>Pakistan Maritime Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAL</td>
<td>Pakistan Revenue Automation (Pvt)Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Preventive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QICT</td>
<td>Qasim International Container Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>Risk Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Senior Preventive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Superintendent Preventive Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WeBOC</td>
<td>Web Based One Customs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

Customs Research Unit (CRU):

Terms of Reference between UNODC and FBR were signed on May 16, 2013 which resulted in the formation of CRU at DGTR (Customs), Karachi, with the following main objectives:

• To build the capacity of a team at Pakistan Customs so that it can carry out research on key drug-related issues in Pakistan.
• To explore Pakistan Customs current capability to identify emerging and evolving risks in the areas of drug trafficking and crime control.
• To highlight deficiencies with regard to procedures, rules and laws relevant to functions of Pakistan Customs.
• To evaluate existing resources at Pakistan Customs and its ability to address needs relating to equipment, infrastructure and human resources.

DGTR provided the space and nominated a team comprising three Customs officers supervised by a Customs Coordinator for the project while, UNODC provided all necessary financial and technical support. In order to streamline operations and foster a better working relationship between these stakeholders, a National Research Consultant (NRC), based in the CRU, was also appointed by UNODC.

To have a better understanding of the current situation of Pakistan Customs, the study was formally initiated in August 2013. During the course of this study, the research team learnt and put into action skills relating to data collection, analysis and presentation. This report is the first document of its kind produced by CRU. The experience and expertise gained by the research team during its compilation has generated a great deal of confidence at the Unit with regard to the production of future research studies.

Picture 1: Research Team with Mr. Ghulam Ahmed, DG, DGTR, 2014

Picture 2: Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi

Picture 3: Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi
Executive summary:

Pakistan Customs is one of the premier border controlling agency of Pakistan with its presence at all international entry and exit points. In addition to that, it has its operational units all around the country for maintaining vigilance and check on inland movement of smuggled or contraband goods. Pakistan Customs has a brilliant history of carrying out tasks related to control of illicit drug and precursors trafficking in line with international standards. This study was carried out in order to assess, evaluate and further optimize this operational capacity, with a particular focus on identifying deficiencies in existing procedures, infrastructure, equipment and human resources along with suggesting the measures required to address the same. The study is based on data collected from visits by the research team to 57 field units of Pakistan Customs all around the country. Following are the main findings.

- There is a shortage of staff at Pakistan Customs field units, particularly with regard to illicit drugs control. There is a noticeable dearth of examination and assessment officers at sea ports and dry ports, which needs to be addressed immediately in light of the rising level of international trade. At the same time there is a shortage of inspectors, preventive officers, sepoys and havaldars at airports, border stations and check posts as well as ASOs. These officials form the backbone of all operational units. In addition, existing sepoys and havaldars lack training in arms and ammunition.
- There is an acute need for staff training related to control of illicit drugs and precursor trafficking, particularly in areas of identification of drugs and precursors, concealment methods, search and investigation techniques, and the handling of imported, exported and transit cargo. Although, DGTR has done a remarkable job in imparting training to customs officers and staff in different fields of professional expertise, yet the proportion of trainings related to drugs & precursors in last three years is quite low being 15.2% in 2011-12, 16.9% in 2012-13 and 10.5% in 2013-14 of the total number of participants in other trainings. Short term training courses as well as Computer Based Training (CBT) modules have been conducted from time to time but there is a need to enhance the number of local and foreign trainings related to drugs and precursors for field staff.
- Pakistan Customs requires greater drug testing laboratory capacity. The organization has only four laboratories – two main units at Karachi and Lahore and two comparatively smaller facilities at Faisalabad and Port Muhammad bin Qasim – and all suffer not only from a shortage of staff and equipment but also from proper training facilities for existing staff. As a result, seized illicit drugs and precursors are sent to the National Institute of Health laboratory (NIHL) in Islamabad.
- Modern scanners for detecting illicit goods in passengers’ baggage or body, containerized cargo and vehicles as well as surveillance cameras though available at ports and check posts, do not meet the actual requirement. Therefore, the majority of field units require modern scanners and CCTV cameras to ensure effective vigilance and check.
- Canine units with trained dogs and dog-handlers constitute another area of prime consideration as these are one of the most effective tools in illicit drugs detection. At present, there are only three canine units with Pakistan Customs at Karachi. New units need to be established at Peshawar, Lahore, Quetta and Gawadar.
- Illicit drugs and precursors testing kits, mainly provided by UNODC, are available at 70% of the customs units visited by the research team. These kits should be available at all units and training should be carried out in the use of these kits.
- There has been no procurement of weapons for Pakistan Customs units since 1989, therefore available weapons are not only outdated but also unreliable and non-operational. Hence, latest weapons and training in arms handling is required for customs staff.
- In order to carry out effective vigilance on the movement of smuggled and contraband goods including drugs and precursors, there is a dire need to reinforce Anti Smuggling Organisations (ASOs) and Directorates of Intelligence and Investigation (I&I) through provision of resources for building a strong information network, procurement of

Footnote: 1 Sepoy is the lowest tier of operational staff at Pakistan Customs. A Sepoy is promoted to a Havaldar.
operational equipment, tracking and communication devices, fully armed vehicles as well as development of a central control room.

• On the basis of subject research study and feedback from different customs field formations, located in four provinces of Pakistan, Customs Research Unit (CRU) proposes creation of 32 new check posts at unofficial crossing points along the border. In addition, existing check posts and border customs stations need reinforcement in terms of staff, equipment and modern infrastructure.

• Currently, there is only one operational marine customs unit (in Karachi). With a 1,064 km coast line, Pakistan Customs needs more marine units and the specialized speed boats, night vision glasses and binoculars, safety equipment and other accessories that are required for sea patrolling and the surveillance of coastal areas.

• There is no centralized database for maintaining an up-to-date record of information on illicit drugs and precursors at Pakistan Customs. Although FBR maintains a consolidated data, there is no software available to link all the MCCs and update this information on real time basis. In the wake of transition of Pakistan Customs towards automated clearance system that deals with imports, exports and transit cargo, there is an emergent need to further strengthen risk profiling mechanism relating to narcotics control. As such, most illicit drug and precursor seizures reported by Pakistan Customs to date have been made as a result of manual examination, snap checking, random selection and by using information-based interdiction techniques.

• Coordination with local and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) of neighbouring countries needs to be further strengthened through more frequent interactions for better operational synchronization and information sharing.
Preface

The role of research and development cannot be over-emphasized with regard to the professional and technical advancement and uplift of an organisation. On one hand, these activities enable the organisation to analyze its internal and external challenges vis-à-vis its future role and responsibilities, and on the other hand, they enhance its capacity to use its resources efficiently and effectively in facing these challenges. It is within this context that the Federal Board of Revenue, in collaboration with UNODC, has established the Customs Research Unit (CRU) at Directorate General of Training and Research, Karachi.

The unit’s primary aim is the development of research capacity at Pakistan Customs relating to the topics of professional interest in order to generate reports, newsletters and analytical material for the benefit of the organisation. The instant study on “Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs” is the first step in this regard.

This study is commendable in the sense that it, not only addresses the present and future needs of Pakistan Customs, relating specifically to its role as an effective border controlling agency, but also gives a general picture of major deficiencies in the areas of human resource, equipment and infrastructure. The members of the Customs Research Unit, representing varied operational backgrounds, have made a meaningful effort in collecting data from 57 field units of Pakistan Customs, analyzing the same and compiling it in the form of this Report. This study is a milestone for the Directorate General of Training and Research and will prove to be a precedent for similar future endeavors.

Needless to say that the relevance of this study increases manifold in the context of the geo-strategic position of Pakistan on the world map characterized by its porous borders with Afghanistan and Iran, its long unmanned coastline and a complex tribal belt which makes the country highly vulnerable to illicit drug trafficking. This reality is a source of growing concern to the global community as well.

As a result, the role of Pakistan Customs which is one of the premier border controlling agency performing its drugs-controlling functions at Pakistan’s international borders, has also become more complex and challenging. There is a need to probe all such factors which can improve the performance and effectiveness of the organization. This can only be done through an enhanced focus on research and analysis. Hence, initiatives like CRU will prove to be a substantive measure to strengthen Pakistan Customs in general and improving the control of illicit drugs and precursors in the region, in particular.

I would like to thank AOTP and the Country Office of UNODC Pakistan for their interest in working with and supporting Pakistan Customs in the areas of capacity building and operational issues. Now, that we are working together towards a common goal, I feel that this study sets a good example of mutual cooperation. I look forward more collaborative efforts between DGTR and UNODC in future.

Ghulam Ahmed
Director General
Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter I: Introduction

Pakistan is one of those countries of Asia which remain in world focus as far as trafficking of illicit drugs is concerned. This is mainly due to a 2,538 km long and porous border in west with Afghanistan, which is the world’s largest producer of opium, opiates and cannabis resin. Certain other factors related to Pakistan’s geo-strategic location especially its 909 km rugged terrain with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the south-west, a 1,600 km border with the Republic of India in the east and 1,062 km of unmanned coastline in the south also make the country highly vulnerable for trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors. Opium cultivation in Afghan provinces that border Pakistan is on the rise. According to recent reports, cultivation has risen markedly in recent years, from 74,000 hectares in 2002 to 224,000 hectares in 2014.

Drug traffickers are increasingly looking for alternative routes to supplement old ones, and southern and southwestern areas of Pakistan are part of major drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan to global markets. According to the 2013 World Drug Report, a new maritime route that travels southwards from Afghanistan via ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Makran coast in Pakistan is being increasingly used by drug traffickers to supply illicit drugs to global markets through ports in East and West Africa. In addition, heroin is being trafficked southward from Afghanistan via the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, from where it reaches the Middle East via Iraq (Map 1). Also, drug seizure data shows that the opiates produced in Afghanistan are fast replacing and competing the opiates produced and consumed in East and South-East Asia.

Another area of concern for Pakistan in this regard is the local consumption of these narcotic drugs. A recent report shows an increase in domestic illicit drug consumption in Pakistan: an estimated 5.9 to 6.45 million people aged between 15 and 64 are drug consumers.

Therefore, Pakistan appears to remain as focus of global attention in terms of trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors, and measures to combat this illicit trade.

Map 1: Opiates trafficking through Pakistan, 2013

---

5 Drugs Monitoring Site(DMS), UNODC, 2013
7 UNODC World Drug Report, 2013
1.1 The structure of Pakistan Customs

Pakistan Customs, being one of the premier revenue collection and border controlling agencies of Pakistan, has its presence all around the country with its functional units at all sea, dry and airports of Pakistan. These units are officially called Model Customs Collectorate (MCCs) and are assigned with monitoring and clearance of import and export cargo, baggages, couriers and passenger traffic. In addition, there are specialized Anti Smuggling Units (ASOs) and a number of inland and border check posts working under the MCCs to prevent transportation of smuggled/contraband goods, illicit drugs and narcotics.

There is also a specialized Directorate General of Transit Trade, which handles the clearance of the transit cargo moving through Pakistan's territory. In addition, there is a Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation which maintains internal checks on irregularities found in import and export cargo and prevents attempts for evasion of duty/taxes and performs anti-smuggling functions.

In addition to that there are other Directorates General assigned with specialised tasks related to Valuation, Post Clearance Audit, Internal Audit, Input-output Co-efficient determination, Training & Research and Automation & Reforms.

Pakistan Customs enjoys a competitive edge over most of the public sector organisations in Pakistan due to its focus on automation, system reforms, trade facilitation and business processes re-engineering. These features have been a hallmark of this organisation in all areas of its professional activity due to which it has been successful in meeting the challenges related to revenue generation, tariff optimization, tax reforms and protection of local industry, in a progressive and pro-active manner. In addition to that border management has also been a major area of excellence for Pakistan Customs, receiving unprecedented global acclaim in areas of drugs and precursors' control, anti-money laundering measures and protection of intellectual property rights.

Fig 1: Operational structure of Pakistan Customs, 2013

---

Source: Federal Board of Revenue, Pakistan

---

1.2 Why a gap analysis and need assessment

There is an increasing global and regional concern regarding control of illicit drugs and precursors produced, trafficked and consumed in and through Pakistan. FBR is not only fully aware of the sensitivity of this issue but also acknowledges its role in the prevention and control of all such activities.

A 2013 UNODC report\(^9\) suggests that there has been an increase in heroin trafficking from dry ports and seaports in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran to Western and Central Europe. Another study conducted during the same year\(^10\) estimates that 150 tons of opiates enter Pakistan annually. In addition, Pakistan is reportedly a major transit point for the trafficking of large quantities of precursors like acetic anhydride which are required to produce heroin in Afghanistan\(^11\). These figures highlight the need for and importance of studying Pakistan Customs, which is the premier border control agency of Pakistan, in perspective of its organizational strength, professional capacity and operational capabilities vis-à-vis control of illicit drugs and precursors. Hence this gap analysis and needs assessment was proposed to be the title of maiden research study to be conducted by CRU.

This study provides an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan Customs for the benefit of all internal and external stakeholders, and raises awareness of the challenges the organization faces. It also aims at making recommendations based purely on the feedback and data collected from operational field units of the organisation, for the improvement of systems and procedures as well as suggesting the measures that need to be taken in order to optimize its operating capacity.

Accounting for the past performance and achievements in controlling the menace of illicit drugs and precursors, this study deals with acquiring first hand knowledge about the deficiencies, gaps and barriers hindering Pakistan Customs from becoming the most effective drugs and narcotics control agency of the country. It also focuses on existing and required levels of financial, technical and intellectual resources meant for achieving this goal through investment in the areas of infrastructure, human resource development, laboratories and equipment. The role of international community and donor agencies in providing support to Pakistan Customs for combating this global challenge has also been discussed.

1.3 Study parameters

This gap analysis and needs assessment focuses on three key areas of Pakistan Customs:

- **I.** Human resource: The report analyzes the overall issues related to human resource of Pakistan Customs. This includes the study of gaps in the existing and required levels of staff strength, training and capacity building, motivation and leadership. It also covers the administrative issues related to the recruitment, transfers/postings, promotions and grant of rewards and incentives. Thus an overview of current situation of human resource in the organisation has been presented alongwith a need assessment in this field to meet the future challenges.

- **II.** Equipment and infrastructure: The report estimates the availability and requirement of essential equipment for the detection and seizure of illicit drug and precursors. A focus has been made on scanners, X-ray machines, CCTV cameras and canine units at airports, dry ports, sea ports and check posts. It also examines the need for new check posts, marine posts and customs stations and highlights the need of some major infrastructural requirements like chemical testing laboratories, drugs and precursors testing kits, networking/tracking/communication devices as well as arms and ammunition vehicles, speed boats, hovercrafts and other accessories required for improving enforcement capacity of Pakistan Customs.

- **III.** Operational, technical and IT issues: The report also focuses on operational, technical and IT-related issues at Pakistan Customs. Operational issues broadly include illicit drugs and precursors’ detection methodology, mobilization

---

\(^9\) Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia (2013), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.

\(^10\) In-depth Evaluation of Container Control Programme (2013), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.

capacity and logistics with regard to patrolling and conducting searches and raids and information gathering networking. Technical issues include system automation, equipment handling, reporting and coordination. While IT-related issues include the availability of a central database, risk profiling system, and the capacity for record keeping and information sharing.

1.4 Research methodology

The research methodology for this report is qualitative involving collection of data from primary and secondary sources. For this purpose, a questionnaire (Annex-A) was devised keeping in view all the study parameters discussed above. Questions included in this questionnaire were cohesive and exhaustive covering all the aspects related to professional capability of the organisation with particular reference to drugs and precursors. Several brainstorming sessions with experts and test runs were conducted before finalization of questionnaire so that it is easily comprehensible for all tiers of organisation and fetches practical and realistic information from the most relevant staff. The members of research team were imparted with basic training for conducting interviews and collection of data through this questionnaire.

The questionnaire was then distributed through Assistant/Deputy Collectors (Headquarters) of MCCs and Directorates to customs staff posted there for duties relating to examination, assessment, anti-smuggling, transit clearance, or any other assignments relevant to drugs and precursors’ control.

However, in order to ensure safety and accuracy of data, the research team personally visited 57 Pakistan Customs units (Map 2) at sea, dry and airports and check posts in the four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan) and Islamabad Capital Territory. At each unit, the team carried out structured interviews with customs staff in order to get the questionnaire filled up. In addition to that, customs staff posted at canine units, Port Control Units (PCUs) and General Post Offices (GPOs) was also interviewed to get the questionnaire filled up.

Officials of customs laboratories in Karachi, Lahore, Port Qasim and Faisalabad were also interviewed. Laboratory facility at Karachi was exhaustively studied to understand the role of forensic laboratories, equipment and training in effective control of illicit drugs and precursors. The officials of Pakistan Revenue Automation Ltd (PRAL) responsible for designing and managing Pakistan Customs database were also interviewed.

Other data sources included reports, journals, articles and newsletters published by UNODC, INCB, WCO and customs organisations of Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics were studies. Records available with FBR and Ministry of Narcotics Control, Pakistan were also consulted. Mainly, the data used for this study is primary, secondary data was only used to support research in cases where first-hand information was not available.

The data collected from 57 customs field units was subsequently fed into MS Access database and then converted into Microsoft Excel format for analysis and preparation of this report.
1.4.1 Literature review

In order to familiarize the members of research team with the concept of the research topic as well as knowledge about different research techniques and methodologies; primary, secondary and tertiary data sources; data collection and presentation techniques; report format and structure, a review of available literature was carried out encompassing library and on-line sources. In this connection, along with the reference books and journals on research techniques, Annual Reports published by World Customs Organization (WCO), UNODC, INCB, Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), Ministry of Narcotics Control, Pakistan and other relevant national and international agencies were consulted. Articles, research papers and reports focusing on the concept of ‘gap analysis’ and ‘need assessment’ were also reviewed.

1.4.2 Sources of data collection

Members of the research team made field visits to

- Sea ports at Karachi, Port Muhammad bin Qasim and Gawadar.
- Dry ports at Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Sambrial, Multan, Faisalabad, Hyderabad and Quetta.
- International airports at Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Faisalabad, Sambrial, Multan, Peshawar and Quetta.
- Directorates of Transit trade at Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar.
- Directorates of Intelligence and Investigation at Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad.
- Customs stations and Check posts in Baluchistan (Baleli, Awaran, Galangur, Nokandi, Shelabagh, Pasni, Jeewani, Hab, Gadani, Chaman and Taftan).
- Customs stations at Kohat and Torkham.
- Port Control Units (PCUs) at Karachi and Faisalabad.
At all these field units, experienced staff in service cadres of Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents, Principal Appraisers, Appraisers, Examination Officers and Inspectors, (according to the nature of the assignment) were called in for interview and the questionnaire was filled in after thorough discussion. At most of the field units a panel of officials jointly filled in the questionnaire and it was later endorsed by the Assistant/Deputy Collector in charge of the concerned section too.

1.4.3 Data management and analysis

The data was entered into Microsoft Access database and organized according to standard practices. Subsequently, it was converted into MS Excel format for interpretation and analysis by the members of research team. On the basis of this data, charts, graphs, Tables and Maps were developed using SPSS and ArcGIS softwares. The report was drafted by the research team with the technical support of UNODC. The main findings of this report were presented to the donor community in Vienna on 19 March 2014 during the 57th session of the Commission of Narcotic Drugs.

1.5 Report structure

The report comprises four chapters as follows:

Chapter I: Introduction provides an overview of the research topic and its relevance to the professional development of Pakistan Customs. It also describes the research methodology, sources of data collection, data management and analyses and report structure.

Chapter II: Identifying Deficiencies in the Interdiction Capacity of Pakistan Customs outlines the existing facilities and infrastructure of Pakistan Customs related to drugs and precursors’ control and provides the findings in relation to the deficiencies in the areas the operational and enforcement capacity of the organisation which are broadly categorized under three headings i.e. (i) human resource (ii) equipment and infrastructure and (iii) operational, technical and IT-related capabilities.

Chapter III: Needs Assessment and Recommendations highlights the future requirements of the organization to address the operational deficiencies related to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking.

Chapter IV: Conclusion gives the crux of whole study, highlighting all the areas covered in preceding chapters. It enlists all the gaps in the operational capacity of the organisation and suggest remedies to address the gaps in a progressive and pro-active manner.

1.6 Limitations

As this study is the first of its kind conducted by the CRU, there were a number of limitations identified by the research team during its visits to 57 Pakistan Customs field units. The members of research team coming from varied professional backgrounds

---

12 Special training sessions were organized for the members of research team to develop their expertise in use of these softwares.
had no expertise in Research methods, therefore, informal and formal training sessions were arranged with the support of UNODC to overcome this deficiency.\(^\text{13}\)

The team had to travel across Pakistan in a limited time and gaining access to customs stations and check posts in KP, Baluchistan and Gawadar was difficult due to critical law and order situation, poor road network and security issues. While the mobility of the team from one customs station to another in these provinces was negatively impacted, access was still made possible with the cooperation of ASOs, which provided the research team with security services.

In addition, the research team encountered a number of problems relating to the collection of quantitative data from some check posts and customs stations located in remote areas because of the absence of computerized records regarding staff strength, training and seizures. At these customs stations and check posts, record keeping is carried out manually and in order to fulfill the requirements of the questionnaire, the data were compiled manually. This process took a great deal of time.

**Picture 7:** Orientation session for research team, Vienna, December 2013

**Picture 8:** ArcGIS and SPSS training session for research team, Islamabad, May 2014

\(^{13}\) Three such sessions were arranged: In November 2013, the members of research team were provided with training in research methodology, MS Excel, SPSS and ArcGIS by the Afghan Opiate Trade Project, Regional Programme of UNODC, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Later on an orientation session was arranged at Vienna in December, 2014. Another formal training on MS Excel and ArcGIS was conducted by UNODC at Islamabad in May, 2014.
Chapter II: Identifying deficiencies in the interdiction capacity of Pakistan Customs
Chapter II: Identifying deficiencies in the interdiction capacity of Pakistan Customs

Pakistan Customs has always been forthcoming in taking initiatives with regard to controlling of illicit drug and precursors’ trafficking, in line with international standards and there has been a series of tremendous achievements in the past. This study has, however, been carried out to probe into the gaps and deficiencies in the operational, technical and infrastructural capacity of the organisation in order to further optimize and enhance the existing performance. Following are the findings of the study in some key areas of organisational functioning:

2.1 Human resource

Pakistan Customs performs multiple tasks which, inter alia, include import and export cargo clearance, passenger and baggage handling, transit trade to Afghanistan, anti-smuggling and anti-narcotics activities, intellectual property rights protection and anti-money laundering activities. Therefore, the organization has a diverse workforce stationed across the country especially at all official international border points. Table 1 provides an outline of the key staff positions (basic pay scale 16 and below) performing jobs in prevention of illicit drugs and precursors in the organisation and the duties required by these posts.

Table 1: Job description of different staff positions at Pakistan Customs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Duty</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Job description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import &amp; Export processing/</td>
<td>Principal Appraiser (PA)</td>
<td>Assessment of duty / taxes, determine value of Consignment (Import/Export) and allowing out of charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clearance staff</td>
<td>Appraising Officer (AO)</td>
<td>Assessment of cargo and baggage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examination Officer (EO)</td>
<td>Examination of container cargo and baggage at sea and dry ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive staff</td>
<td>Superintendent Preventive Service (SPS)</td>
<td>Supervision of field operations at airports and anti-smuggling organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspector Preventive Service (IPS)</td>
<td>Supervision, monitoring of subordinate staff, anti-smuggling operations, passenger handling at airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Preventive Officer (SPO)</td>
<td>Examination of cargo and baggage, and anti-smuggling and field operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventive Officer (PO)</td>
<td>Examination of cargo and baggage, and anti-smuggling and field operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-smuggling Staff</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Supervision of anti-smuggling and field operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Anti-smuggling operations, Examination of cargo and baggage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>Anti-smuggling operations and examination of cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Investigation (I &amp; I)</td>
<td>Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)</td>
<td>Supervision of Intelligence and information collection, seizures and contraventions, preventing leakage of revenue and smuggling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Intelligence Officers/Inspectors (I&amp;I)</td>
<td>Intelligence and information collection, affect seizures and contraventions, preventing leakage of revenue and smuggling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office /Support Staff</td>
<td>Clerks (Lower Division and Upper Division)</td>
<td>Office support, file work, records maintenance and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sepoys/ Havaladars</td>
<td>Field support staff – part of patrol and raid units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘Generic Job Description Manual’ FBR, Pakistan

While studying the deficiencies in the capacity of Pakistan Customs with regard to the control of illicit drugs and precursor trafficking, it was necessary to study the level of human resources in terms of staffing levels, staff capabilities, capacity building and training, motivation and resilience levels and discipline. The findings are as follows:

14 The descriptions given here show a set of generalized tasks assigned to each post out of which staff can perform any one or more tasks depending upon nature and place of their posting.
2.1.1 Staff strength

The Federal Board of Revenue, the governing body of Pakistan Customs, allocates specific officers (basic scale\textsuperscript{15} 17 to 20) and staff (basic scale 1 to 16) to each customs unit proportionate to the amount of work, territorial jurisdiction and functional requirements. With gradual expansion in size and diversification of the functions assigned to Pakistan Customs, there is a general feeling at the organization that staffing levels have become insufficient. Therefore, the questionnaire was designed to include questions related to the availability of staff at customs units.

Data collected from the 57 Pakistan Customs unit visits revealed that staffing levels at almost all of the units was less than the sanctioned strength. Although, this sanctioned strength was calculated in 1998 considering the realities of that time but despite exponential increase in work load no revision has been made in it. At the same time, a number of new MCCs, Directorates and borders check points have been created after 1998 but no new recruitments have been made to meet the staffing requirements of these entities. Their requirements have been met through existing workforce resulting in over burdening of staff. It means that the gap in this area is twofold: (i) gap between the currently working and the sanctioned strength (ii) gap between the sanctioned and actually required strength. Most of the units reported that even if the gap between the existing strength and the sanctioned strength is bridged, there would still be a requirement of 20-30 \% more staff to meet the demands of their current workload. The findings relating to staff availability are displayed in Table 2.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Position & Sanctioned Staff Strength\textsuperscript{16} & Working Strength & Difference (total) & Difference (\%) \\
\hline
Senior Preventive Officer & 434 & 298 & (-) 136 & (-) 31 \\
Inspector Preventive Service & 86 & 61 & (-) 25 & (-) 29 \\
Superintendent Preventive Service & 42 & 36 & (-) 6 & (-) 14 \\
Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent & 431 & 431 & 0 & 0 \\
Inspectors & 1,143 & 1,090 & (-) 53 & (-) 5 \\
Appraising Officers & 350 & 218 & (-) 132 & (-) 38 \\
Principal Appraiser & 67 & 87 & (+) 20 & (+) 30 \\
Examining Officers & 296 & 145 & (-) 151 & (-) 51 \\
Sepoys/Havaladars & 1,327 & 1,189 & (-) 138 & (-) 10 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs, 2013}
\end{table}

Source: Admin Wing, FBR, Islamabad

It is evident from the above Table that, in contrast of the quantum of trade handled by Pakistan Customs at sea-, dry- and air ports, there is a visible shortage of staff at all level of organisation. This shortfall is quite noticeable in cadres of appraising and examining officers which show a deficiency of 38\% and 51\% of the available working strength respectively. A similar trend has been noticed in strength of preventive staff where in the cadres of SPO, IPS, SPS and Inspectors there exists a shortfall of 31\%, 29\%, 14\% and 5\% of the available working strength, respectively. Moreover, for sepoys and havaladars, which constitute the backbone of all field operations, patrolling and searches, this deficiency reaches upto 10\% (Fig 2).

\textsuperscript{15} Pakistan Government has specified system of grades/scales for salary of staff and officers according to their job description and seniority where a higher the rank refer the superior the authority.

\textsuperscript{16} The number of staff by position allocated by FBR to different units.
With regard to staffing levels at laboratories, the shortfall is considerable (Table 3). It is reported that 50% of Assistant Chemical Examiner posts and 37.5% of Deputy Chemical Examiner posts are vacant because of a Government of Pakistan ban on new recruitment.

### Table 3: Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs laboratories, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Sanctioned</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Shortfall (number)</th>
<th>Shortfall (% of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chemical Examiner</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chemical Examiner</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we analyse the situation by clubbing the staff into broader categories of enforcement staff (performing field duties at airports, check posts, anti-smuggling organisations and customs intelligence), cargo clearance staff (performing duties related to cargo examination, assessment and clearance), laboratory staff and lower operational staff (Sepoys and constables), picture becomes a little more unambiguous. (Fig 3).

### Fig 3: Shortfall of staff, 2013

This gap can be observed more clearly if reflected in terms of percentage of the available human resource in different categories (Fig 4).
The gap analysis conducted at ASOs (Fig 5 and Fig 6), being the most effective units of Pakistan Customs for controlling and monitoring illicit drug and precursor trafficking, indicates that in cadres of inspectors and sepoys/havaldars there is a deficiency of staff around 30 to 50% of required strength. Moreover the trend at border check posts is not much different as well (Fig 7).

Fig 4: Overall staff shortfall at Pakistan Customs (% of total), 2013

The gap analysis conducted at ASOs (Fig 5 and Fig 6), being the most effective units of Pakistan Customs for controlling and monitoring illicit drug and precursor trafficking, indicates that in cadres of inspectors and sepoys/havaldars there is a deficiency of staff around 30 to 50% of required strength. Moreover the trend at border check posts is not much different as well (Fig 7).
A similar deficiency of staff was observed and reported at almost all field units visited by the members of CRU and few common factors have been identified which have aggravated the situation. Firstly, staff requirements for newly created units within the organisation such as Directorates General of Transit Trade, IOCO, Automation & Reforms and Model Collectorate Adjudication etc. have been fulfilled temporarily by posting existing staff from different Collectorates, due to which majority of the field units are facing the deficiency of appropriate staff. Secondly, due to the superannuation of staff and no fresh recruitments in the organisation since 1998, the gap in available human resource is getting wider. Therefore, there is an immediate need to address this gap by calculating the requirement of staff in each and every unit of the organisation on real time basis.

2.1.2 Training

Pakistan Customs is a frontline government agency for revenue collection, trade facilitation and border control. Its functions are, therefore, wide and varied demanding an equally diverse workforce. Prevention of trafficking of contraband goods and illicit drugs and precursors is one of the most important functions of Pakistan Customs. In order to upgrade and maintain the performance level of workforce in all fields of professional activity and keeping them abreast with the ongoing developments in their respective fields of activity, training and capacity building initiatives are very important. It was under this consideration that the research team included questions relating to training and capacity building in the questionnaire so that current levels and the effectiveness of available training could be studied and requirement for future training modules could be assessed.

Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) has established the Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), for planning, execution and monitoring of training related activities for the officers and staff of Pakistan Customs. It is performing an excellent role in the capacity building of organisation by imparting training to all cadres of officers and staff in wide range of subjects related to their professional development. It also includes trainings related to control of drugs and precursors. As evident from Table 4, quite a large number of staff and officers participated in the training programmes offered by DGTR. These trainings were conducted in diverse fields keeping in view the professional requirements of different operational units of the organisation (Table 5). In addition to that, DGTR, in collaboration with UNODC, arranged a 5-days international training course on Data Analysis in GIS and SPSS for research units of Pakistan Customs, Afghan Customs, ANF and UNODC’s Country office.

DGTR has its Directorates at Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad in order to cater the training requirements of the staff of different Collectorates closest to their location. Although, all these Directorates are well equipped with the facilities required for training,
yet there is still a significant need for expansion and improvement in the available facilities for short term and long term training programs to meet future challenges.

Table 4: Training received by customs staff at DGTR, 2011-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of Training Modules/Courses</th>
<th>No. of participants in Drug &amp; Precursors Trainings (A)</th>
<th>Number of Participants in Trainings other than Drugs &amp; Precursors (B)</th>
<th>Total No. of participants (A+B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>4359</td>
<td>5143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>3264</td>
<td>3926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2732</td>
<td>3052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DGTR, Pakistan Customs

Table 5: Courses/Modules offered by DGTR, 2011-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drugs &amp; Precursors related courses/modules</th>
<th>Broad Categories of Courses/ modules other than Drugs &amp; Precursors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Identification &amp; Search Techniques</td>
<td>WeBOC System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction Techniques</td>
<td>Counterfeiting, International Law and IPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Techniques</td>
<td>Customs Law and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>Anti-smuggling Techniques and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis intelligence &amp; Analysis</td>
<td>WTO Agreements and implications for Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Deliveries</td>
<td>General Financial Rules (GFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Intelligence &amp; Analysis</td>
<td>Post Clearance Audit (PCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction Techniques at Seaport</td>
<td>Rules of Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction Techniques at Land Control</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigating Drug Organized Crime</td>
<td>Customs and Border Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container Control Program</td>
<td>Business Processes &amp; Re-Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous Material</td>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Training on Drugs and Precursor Identification</td>
<td>Communication Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs Identification &amp; Use of UNODC Drug Test Kit</td>
<td>Staff Motivation/Leadership Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioural Indicators at Airports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dynamic International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Management &amp; Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispute Settlement Procedure under WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forms of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective People Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision Making Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernization of International Borders &amp; Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention of Illegal importation of counterfeit medicines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Express Clearing Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time Management Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skills required for Good Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revised Kyoto Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MS Excel/MS Word/Power Point 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal Research Topics and tax policy formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train-the-Trainer Course on Radiation deduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Money Laundering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretariat Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economical Growth and Taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovation in Public Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Customs Valuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti Smuggling Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Facilitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DGTR, Pakistan Customs
During the study, it has been observed that the proportion of participants receiving trainings related to drugs and precursors is much lower as compared to the total number of participants included in other courses offered by DGTR during last three years. At the same time number of participants in drugs related courses is on decline during the last three years (Fig 8). This position was also endorsed by the staff at field units especially those posted at border check posts and ASO.

**Fig 8:** Staff training at Pakistan Customs 2011-2014

A steady decline in the percentage number of participants in the courses related to drugs and precursors has also been noticed during the last three years (fig 9).

**Fig 9:** Participating staff in drugs & precursors trainings, 2011-2014

During the course of data collection from field units it has been observed that the staff posted at border check posts and ASOs is lacking in appropriate levels of trainings related to drugs and precursors as well as arms handling. At many units, for instance, although drug testing kits were available but due to lack of proper training, staff was unable to use them. Moreover, as part of organisation's job rotation policy, the staff receiving such specialized trainings are often transferred to other sections resulting in such deficiency.

It was furthered studied by the research team that the trainings imparted were not based on any training need analysis or the specific requirements of staff. For example, at most of the units, field and supervisory staff responsible for the examination of cargo and baggage had not received training relating to examination techniques and other relevant skills. Similarly, support staff such as Sepoys and Havaladars responsible for field duties at ASOs, Directorates of I & I or check posts, had not received
any physical training including that of handling of arms and ammunition. The Directorate General of Transit Trade was created in 2013, but employees at the Directorates at Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta have not received specialized training related to illicit drugs and precursors identification, detection and seizure. Another important area of training which has reportedly been neglected relates to the skill development in reading/interpretation of scanned images of cargo. This would reduce the dependence of examining and appraising staff over private staff deputed by terminal operators at scanners. The same situation exists with regard to training in the use of scanning and X-ray machines at airports.

Generally, there is a dire need to ascertain the needs of staff posted in different sections of the organisation so that specific modules are designed by DGTR for their professional uplift.

2.2 Equipment and infrastructure

In the wake of rising volume of import, export and transit cargo and the transition of Pakistan Customs to a fully automated clearance system, there is a clear need to improve the overall infrastructure related to cargo screening and inspection so that effective vigilance of illicit drugs and precursors can be ensured without compromising the flow and facilitation of legitimate trade.

As a matter of fact, use of conventional means and procedures relying on manual inspection and physical examination of passengers, baggage or containerized cargo are not compatible with such quantum of trade. Therefore, there is an emergent need to link the customs clearance system with latest equipment for detection of illicit drugs and precursors.

Furthermore, the highly organized nature of international drug trade and the use of modern technology, diversified techniques and hi-tech equipment by traffickers to produce, transport and distribute illicit drugs and precursors, underlines the importance of equipping Pakistan Customs with modern equipment such as scanners with high resolution imaging system, X-ray machines, CCTV cameras, canine units, testing kits and laboratories in line with international standards. Therefore, questions related to this area were included in questionnaire to identify the deficiencies. Following is a consolidated account of findings:

2.2.1 Scanning devices

Scanning devices are a quick and convenient security solution for inspecting cargo, vehicles, baggage and parcels and any other items at airports, seaports, dry ports, railways, land freight units and other border crossings. Modern scanners fitted with sub-millimeter image resolution and sophisticated image processing software enable customs and security personnel to detect illicit items and contraband, including ammunition, weapons, IEDs, drugs, cigarettes and alcohol.

As a result of significant rise in Pakistan’s foreign trade in the last five years\(^\text{17}\), it has become imperative for Pakistan Customs to find cargo handling solutions that ensure proper examination and inspection of goods without compromising smooth flow. One solution is the installation of modern scanners at all border crossing points as physical searches of vehicles and cargo is time consuming and involves manual labour. In contrast, scanning devices allow customs personnel to see quickly and easily inside the most inaccessible parts of a vehicle, container or parcel without examining it physically.

The greater availability of scanners (along with other systems and equipment, such as the image readers, profiling of importers and exporters, canine units and information-based checks) would not only improve illicit drugs and precursors control but also accelerate the clearance process of bonafide goods. Hence, questions relating to availability of scanners at border points, dry ports, airports and sea ports were included in the study.

\(^{17}\) Pakistan’s total exports jumped from around 1.38 trillion rupees in 2008-09 to around 2.38 trillion rupees in 2012-13 while imports during this period enhanced from 2.72 trillion rupees to 4.35 trillion rupees. Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.
This study found a shortage of scanning devices (including large scanners for cargo scanning, conventional X-ray machines for passenger scanning, and smaller or mobile scanners for parcel and baggage searches) at all customs ports handling cargo, baggage and passengers despite a substantial increase in the number of containers, baggage, loose cargo, passengers and transit consignments passing through these units (Fig 10).

**Fig 10:** Availability of scanning devices at ports in Pakistan, 2013

Looking at the individual requirements of dry ports, sea ports and airports, the following picture emerges:

**Sea ports:** There are four major sea ports in Pakistan that actively deal with the clearance of imports, exports and transit cargo. These are located in Karachi East, Karachi West, Port Muhammad bin Qasim and Gawadar. Approximately 5,000 containers are processed through these ports per day.

**Karachi Port** is the largest port in Pakistan and handles about 75% of import/export cargo. It is a naturally occurring deep sea port with 11 km long approach channel to provide safe navigation and anchorage to tankers, container vessels, bulk carriers and general cargo ships. The port has 30 dry cargo berths, including two main container terminals and three liquid cargo-handling berths. The total port area is 100 hectares and an additional 60 hectares is close by for the storage of goods. The port handles about 14 million tons of liquid cargo and 12 million tons of general cargo, including 738,000 TEUs containers, every year.
Port Muhammad bin Qasim is the first industrial and multi-purpose deep sea port. Located in the Indus delta region, 50 km south east of Karachi, the port is well connected to the rest of country by various modern modes of transportation and plays an important role in the economic development of the country. Port Muhammad bin Qasim offers conventional cargo handling functions and land for the creation of import and export based businesses. The port includes a 45 km navigational channel that can accommodate large vessels and container ships. An overview of the flow of cargo at these ports between 2011 and 2013 is summarized in Table 6.

### Table 6: Cargo clearance at Karachi and Port Muhammad bin Qasim, 2011-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Port</th>
<th>No. of TEUs (Imports)</th>
<th>No. of TEUs (Exports)</th>
<th>No. of TEUs (Transit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Wharf Karachi</td>
<td>187,598</td>
<td>154,028</td>
<td>166,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Wharf Karachi</td>
<td>251,694</td>
<td>269,384</td>
<td>226,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Qasim</td>
<td>209,121</td>
<td>198,056</td>
<td>167,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Port Control Unit (PCU), Karachi

With regard to Gawadar, the port has recently been constructed. Situated on the Baluchistan coast, it is 533 km from Karachi and 120 km from the Iranian border. Gawadar is a deep water port located at the tip of the Straits of Hormuz and the mouth of the Persian Gulf. It has the potential to become a regional hub, an alternative to Gulf ports and a vital link to the People’s Republic of China and Central Asian Republics, and as a result it is expected to attract significant volume of import, export and transit trade in future18.

In recent years, drug traffickers have become increasingly reliant on maritime transportation to smuggle opiates through sea ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan to global markets. These traffickers use a number of vessels to ship opiates from these sea ports to Africa19. They abuse trade routes from Afghanistan and smuggle opiates to the Iranian seaports at Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, and to Pakistani sea ports at Gawadar, Karachi and Port Muhammad bin Qasim. Traffickers have also found ways to use Gawadar seaport as an exit point for small-scale heroin smuggling. Seizure reports of the last three years show that all major sea ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan are being misused for smuggling of opiates20.

Presently there are three scanners in operation at sea ports, one each at KICT, PICT and QICT (Fig 11), while no scanner at Gawadar Port has so far been installed.

### Fig 11: Pakistan Customs controlled scanners at sea ports, 2013

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

18 Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Ports and Shipping


20 Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia: a threat assessment (2013), UNODC, Vienna.
In addition to these scanners, a special facility under US-funded Integrated Cargo Container Control (IC3) program has also been developed at QICT since 2007 which enables joint screening of US-bound containerised cargo from Pakistan via live video link by customs authorities of Pakistan and USA. Resultantly, US Customs do not need to screen the cargo for re-examination on arrival at their ports. The said unit, besides hosting operational synchronization and information-sharing between the two countries, has also contributed in reducing the scanning cost of cargo destined for US. It has also helped in curbing the illegal transportation of arms, radioactive materials and narcotics. It has also resulted in reduction of operational delays and clearance time at both ends and comparatively smooth procedure for just in time shipments.

Similarly, another Stationary Scanner has been installed at East Wharf Karachi since 2009 in collaboration with the Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP). But it is not in operation since September 2013 due to maintenance related issues.

The scanning of containers is conducted by the technical staff of the terminal operators. The examination and assessment staff of Pakistan Customs generates their examination/assessment reports on the basis of these scanned images.

Given the volume of trade activity at these ports in general and that relating to cargo transiting to and from Afghanistan in particular, there is a clear need to install two additional latest scanners one each at QICT and KICT for scanning of Afghan transit cargo according to risk-profiling criteria.

**Picture 11: Non-functional scanner at East Wharf, Karachi, 2013**

Dry ports: Dry ports provide conveniently located customs clearance facilities for importers and exporters, and are designed to reduce congestion at sea ports and provide economic activity at smaller cities and towns away from the coast. Dry ports are an essential requirement for the facilitation of import and export trade, and are integral to global supply chain management.\(^{21}\)

At present, there are 12 dry ports in the country providing services including quick clearance, warehousing and bonded transportation.\(^{22}\) They also offer employment opportunities. The government intends to further expand this network of dry ports to cities such as Sargodha, Sukkur, Larkana and Noshera.

The research team assessed the infrastructure of these dry ports, including the availability of equipment (Fig 12).

\(^{21}\) Emergence and Significance of Dry Ports’ (2008), Violeta Roso, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.

\(^{22}\) The consignments meant for export are inspected and sealed at dry ports and then transported to sea ports under supervision of dry port management.
According to the data collected with regard to the availability of modern scanners, all dry ports in Pakistan do not possess enough scanning devices to adequately inspect the goods that pass through them.

As a large amount of the cargo that passes through these dry ports is destined for export, it is important that these goods are inspected for illicit drugs and contraband. Therefore, in the absence of scan device inspection of cargo is conducted in close liaison with ANF using sniffer dogs to avoid clearance of any illicit drugs and contraband goods.

Given the shortage of scanners, customs units’ drug seizures are largely made as a result of intelligence sharing and the physical examination of baggage, people and vehicles. For example, Sambrial is the busiest dry port in Pakistan and is located at the junction of four cities whose significant manufacturing output is export-focused (Gujranwala, Gujrat, Daska and Wazirabad). Cargo worth billions of rupees, including sports goods, surgical instruments, utensils, household goods, and electrical fittings and instruments, passes through this port every year. According to the data collected, this dry port does not have any scanning devices. The drug seizures made at this port between 2011 and 2013 were mostly reported by ANF.

A similar situation with regard to scanners exists at dry ports in Multan, Hyderabad, Quetta and Prem Nagar. Furthermore, while dry ports in Faisalabad, Peshawar and Lahore (NLC and Mughalpura) have scanners, there is still an urgent need for extra equipment and training.

Airports: There are 11 international airports in Pakistan. Jinnah International Airport in Karachi is the largest airport in the country and handles six million passengers annually.

Other major airports for international and domestic traffic are at Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, Multan, Faisalabad, Sialkot and Quetta. In addition, there are smaller airports in Rahim Yar Khan, Zhob and Gawadar.

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

23 Source: Civil Aviation Authority(CAA) of Pakistan, 2009
Scanners at the airports are used for the following functions:

- Clearance of passenger baggage.
- Screening of unaccompanied baggage that is booked and processed at Air Freight Units located at international airports.

According to the 2013 World Drug Report, a significant number of drug seizures made in Pakistan, including the majority of heroin seizures, involve drugs trafficked by air\textsuperscript{24}.
**Table 7: Passengers, cargo and mail handling capacity of international airports in Pakistan, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>Number of flights</th>
<th>Passenger volume</th>
<th>Cargo volume (million tons)</th>
<th>Mail volume (million tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jinnah International Airport, Karachi</td>
<td>52,990</td>
<td>6,081,448</td>
<td>169,124</td>
<td>2,953.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benazir Bhutto International Airport, Islamabad</td>
<td>48,110</td>
<td>3,035,966</td>
<td>53,950</td>
<td>579.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore</td>
<td>39,634</td>
<td>3,091,590</td>
<td>74,664</td>
<td>1,683.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacha Khan International Airport, Peshawar</td>
<td>13,234</td>
<td>890,942</td>
<td>10,537</td>
<td>47.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quetta International Airport, Quetta</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>284,829</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>32.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan International Airport, Multan</td>
<td>19,379</td>
<td>240,573</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>49.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gawadar International Airport, Gawadar</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>29,379</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisalabad International Airport, Faisalabad</td>
<td>2,832</td>
<td>189,339</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>30.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While assessing the availability of scanners at international airports, the research team found that similar deficiencies existed as seen at sea ports and dry ports (Fig 13).

**Fig 13: Availability of scanners at airports in Pakistan, 2013**

At airports, Pakistan Customs works closely with the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Airport Security Force (ASF) and ANF. With regard to scanners operated by Pakistan Customs, there are none at the airports in Multan and Faisalabad and as a result, the organization uses scanners operated by ASF or CAA. A similar situation exists at other international airports. Lack of proper maintenance also makes Pakistan Customs reliant on scanners belonging to ASF or CAA. Although small mobile scanners are available at all international airports, for scanning the parcels and baggage for more effective control of illicit drugs and precursors, more of these scanners are required and those that are in use require updating with state-of-the-art models.

---


25 Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan, official web page, www.caapakistan.com.pk
Trafficking of drugs inside passengers’ bodies is a common phenomenon at airports. In order to carry out body scanning of passengers, conventional X-ray machines are required. With regard to X-ray machines, they are only available at international airports in Islamabad, Karachi and Quetta (Fig 14). At Lahore airport, one X-ray machine is provided by CAA. Hence, this deficiency also needs to be addressed.

**Fig 14:** X-ray machines for passenger scanning at airports, 2013

![Available and Required X-ray machines at airports](image)

*Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs*

### 2.2.2 CCTV Cameras

CCTV cameras play a significant role in monitoring the movement of suspect cargo. These cameras are an effective tool for surveillance and identification. However, the data collected showed an acute shortage of CCTV cameras at almost every customs unit. The shortage was most acute at sea ports, dry ports, check posts and border customs stations. The number of CCTV cameras at airports was found to be satisfactory (Fig 15).

**Fig 15: Availability of CCTV at ports in Pakistan, 2013**

![Available, Functional, and Required CCTV cameras](image)

*Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs*

### 2.2.3 Canine units

The effectiveness of canine units in the interception of drugs is undisputed. They are used for searching for drugs, explosives and decomposed bodies. Pakistan Customs is fully aware of the effectiveness of canine units with regard to tracking illicit drugs concealed in goods and containers and, therefore, has two such units in operation: one at Karachi airport and the other at East Wharf sea port in Karachi. Another canine unit is planned for Port Muhammad Bin Qasim. Details of these units are as follows:
2.2.4 Drugs and precursors testing kits

Drugs and precursors testing kits are essential for field officers responsible for specialized tasks related to the control of illicit drug and precursor trafficking. According to the data collected (Fig 16), the majority of customs units require these kits and basic training with regard to their use.
2.2.5 Laboratories and testing facilities

Laboratories play a critical role in drug control efforts. They are vital for identification and verification of drugs and precursors. In majority of cases, identification of illicit drugs and precursors is not possible without proper laboratory testing facilities. Furthermore, prosecution is more difficult without authentic laboratory results. Substantial resources are required to establish and maintain properly equipped laboratories staffed by qualified professionals. This requires continuous investment in equipment, testing materials, staff development and training.

The importance of testing laboratories is widely acknowledged. During the 54th session of Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), a Resolution was passed recognizing the important role of drug analysis laboratories as part of drug control systems. It further stressed that access to reference samples of controlled substances is an essential requirement with regard to quality assurance and credibility. The resolution also endorsed the significance of credible test results for the justice system and law enforcement, preventive health care, as well as for the international harmonization, exchange and coordination of drug information.

With regard to laboratories in Pakistan, of the 57 customs units included in the study, only four had functional laboratories (Map 4). Out of these, two are full-fledged Pakistan Customs laboratories and provide services to all the field units. These laboratories are located in Custom House, Karachi and at Mughalpura dry port, Lahore. The laboratory in Karachi provides services to 11 main MCCs and Directorates (including their field units, custom stations and check posts) in the southern parts of the country. Despite this heavy workload, a staff of only 18 officials are employed at this laboratory.

A similar situation exists in the laboratory at Mughalpura dry port. This laboratory has only two staff members and provides services to central region of Pakistan. There are smaller laboratory facilities at Port Muhammad bin Qasim and Faisalabad but they only fulfill the needs of the local MCCs and their capabilities are limited to the routine examination of imported chemicals and other materials.

---

26 Resolution 54/3 of 54th session of Commission on Narcotics & Drugs, 2011
Map 4: Pakistan Customs laboratory facilities, 2013

Furthermore, the four laboratories under Pakistan Customs face an acute shortage of skilled staff, equipment and testing materials for the purposes of identifying illicit drugs and precursors. As a result, illicit drugs and precursors samples are forwarded to National Institute of Health Laboratory (NIHL) in Islamabad. It was reported that this has been the practice for last 20 years.

During the study, it was also observed that the condition of the main Pakistan Customs laboratories in Karachi and at Mughalpura dry port, Lahore is not in accordance with international standards. There are no proper arrangements for storage, handling etc. of chemicals and equipment, and delays upto 10 days have been reported for routine test results. Funds are also not available for procurement of new apparatus. In addition, the general condition of hygiene in these laboratories was also found to be very poor.

Picture 14: Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013

Picture 15: Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013
It is largely because of lack of resources that the deficiencies in laboratory and testing facilities are quite noticeable. Significant finances are required to build and operate modern laboratories and testing facilities at all field units, such as those in Gawadar, Quetta, Peshawar and Gilgit Baltistan.

These customs units are not only located in far flung areas away from Collectorates that have any kind of laboratory, but are also located in instable areas particularly vulnerable to illicit drugs and precursors trafficking. Fully equipped laboratories in these Collectorates would enhance the capacity of Pakistan Customs to deal quickly and effectively with illicit drugs and precursors that are seized.

The Resolution\(^\text{27}\) passed in the 54th session of Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) showed considerable concern over the costs and complex administrative procedures for obtaining required materials and equipment for such facilities and recommended that UNODC should continue to support Member States in enhancing the analytical capacity of laboratories and the training of experts. With regard to the training of laboratory staff, during the visits by the research team, it was observed that no formal or structured training has been offered to any staff members. This is another deficiency that needs to be addressed.

\(^{27}\) Resolution 54/3 of 54th session of Commission on Narcotics & Drugs, 2011
Case study: Pakistan Customs Laboratory, Karachi

In order to have a better understanding of the existing problems, the research team carried out a comprehensive case study involving Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi.

At present, Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi provides lab facilities to 11 main MCCs and Directorates (including their field units, custom stations and check posts) in the southern parts of the country. Its role in supporting the functions of Pakistan Customs has increased manifold over the years. It helps custom units to determine the composition of different chemicals, textiles, leather and other materials, and to identify contraband goods.

However, there are a number of items for which testing facilities are not available at this laboratory (Table 8). As a result, samples of these items are referred to other laboratories that are not under Customs Control.

Table 8: List of items not tested at Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Names of laboratories</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs and precursors</td>
<td>National Institute of Health Laboratory, Islamabad</td>
<td>7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal and ores</td>
<td>- Pakistan Steel Mills Karachi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peoples Steel Mills Ltd. Karachi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgy</td>
<td>Dr. A.Q Khan Laboratory</td>
<td>15-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical, chemical &amp; micro-biological, trace metals, physico-chemical analysis of diesel, Bio diesel &amp; engine oils, lubricating oils, wax oil, etc</td>
<td>HEJ and PCSIR</td>
<td>10-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

Despite being the largest laboratory of its type under Pakistan Customs, the facility has not provided services for testing illicit drugs and precursors since 1995. All samples are referred to National Institute of Health Laboratory for testing.

Workforce:
The workforce comprises a Chemical Examiner as the supervisory head and 11 Deputy Chemical Examiners and 3 Assistant Chemical Examiners (ACEs). While a further five ACEs are due to be added shortly. However, more operational staff is required to cater to growing magnitude of work.

Infrastructure:
The laboratory is housed in two floors of Customs House Karachi. This is the main Pakistan Customs building. This allocation of space was made with further extensions to laboratory facilities in mind. However, there is an acute shortage of equipment, apparatus and supplies. Therefore, if these shortages are addressed, the services of the laboratory could be improved as follows:

- A fully equipped and fully functional laboratory would help expand Pakistan Customs' controls.
- The laboratory would be able to share its analytical expertise, thereby ensuring goods are released quicker as a result of more efficient laboratory testing.
- Quick clearance times would result in more trade and reduce costs relating to the testing referred to other laboratories.

Impact of automation
As a result of transition of Pakistan Customs to automated systems and its implementation of the WeBOC online clearances system, its workload has risen significantly. The new system has an inbuilt risk profiling mechanism that is able to automatically refer consignments that are considered suspect for examination. On an average 110 samples are received at Customs Lab Karachi per day. But with existing work force and resources, it is difficult to handle this workload. No procurement of new
equipment or upgradation in existing facility has been made since 1997. Furthermore, the laboratory faces financial and technical issues like equipment repair, availability of testing chemicals/materials etc.

Rewards and incentives
The research team found that laboratory employees receive little or no acknowledgment for their efforts and hard work. The absence of incentives and rewards and the slow pace of promotions are the issues that need consideration.

Training
The laboratory employees have never been considered for any local or international technical training with regard to enhancement of their skills. There is a need for tailored training modules linked to new scientific concepts in laboratory techniques should be provided to staff regularly to enhance their analytical abilities.

In addition, given the level of risk involved in chemical testing, it is also important that safety training is provided to laboratory staff. This training would ensure that they are adequately informed about physical and health hazards and with regard to procedures for reducing risks relating to exposure to chemicals and other hazardous substances.

Hazardous waste management
Safeguarding staff health, ensuring appropriate levels of hygiene and ensuring the ability to deal with post-test laboratory waste, spills and accidental releases, chemical and biological hazards, protective equipment leaks, and fires and explosions are vitally important. The research team found that there is much more to do in these areas at Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi.

The absence of safety and precautionary measures
The research team found that there were no precautionary measures displayed in the laboratory and that safety rules were not practically enforced. Material Safety Data Sheets contain essential information about substances used in laboratories, including safety information, and are of paramount importance. No such sheets were found. This matter requires immediate attention.

An autonomous laboratories body
Based on the data collected, there is a clear need for a separate directorate responsible for the laboratories under Pakistan Customs. Such a body would help Pakistan Customs tackle existing problems involving human resource, capacity building and training, infrastructure and equipment, and rewards and incentives. If the deficiencies in laboratory and testing facilities are
properly addressed and fully equipped laboratories staffed with qualified and well-trained staff are made available, Pakistan Customs laboratories can become a source of significant revenue for the organization.

### 2.2.6 Arms and ammunition

The requirement of arms and ammunition for field operations of Pakistan Customs cannot be over emphasized. Prevailing law and order situation especially in far-flung areas of the country and the prevalence of drug trafficking further underline the necessity of these resources.

The research team found that the existing supply of arms and ammunition does not meet the basic requirements of customs units (Table 9).

#### Table 9: Arms supply, existing and required, at customs units visited by CRU, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs unit</th>
<th>Existing arms</th>
<th>Required arms and equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airports and air freight units</td>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>AK47 rifles and 9mm pistols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOs</td>
<td>Semi-automatic machine guns and MP5 Kalashnikovs, old AK47 rifles and 9mm pistols</td>
<td>Latest light machine guns (LMGs), and automatic and side-arm pistols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea ports/marine check posts</td>
<td>Obsolete arms, including old rifles, guns and Kalashnikovs</td>
<td>LMGs, guns mounted on boats and the latest automatic weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border customs units/check posts</td>
<td>Kalashnikovs, rifles and pistols</td>
<td>LMGs and guns mounted on vehicles, latest automatic guns and pistols, bullet proof jackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorates of I&amp;I</td>
<td>Old weapons, Kalashnikovs, semi-automatic Chinese rifles, AK-47 rifles and G-3 rifles</td>
<td>Latest Kalashnikovs, communication equipment, AK-47 rifles, 9mm pistols and bullet proof jackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Control Units</td>
<td>9mm MP5s and submachine guns</td>
<td>The latest models of existing weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry ports</td>
<td>Rifles and old Kalashnikovs</td>
<td>Latest weapons and bullet proof jackets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs*

The research team discovered that no procurement of modern arms had been made by Pakistan Customs since 1998, resultantly, the available arms & ammunition are insufficient and outdated.

Given the nature of anti-smuggling activities, Pakistan Customs is seriously deficient in arms and ammunition.

Furthermore, the research team found that while the operational staff had basic knowledge of weapon handling, they had not been given training in the use and maintenance of modern weapons. They had not received any refresher courses or field training, or taken part in any simulation exercises. In the past, Pakistan Customs staff received this training from coast guards and marines, but this practice has long been discontinued, largely because of lack of focus on such training, a lack of cooperation and coordination between customs and other agencies, and the absence of any formal procedures and framework relating to such training.

Although the customs units are aware of the need for training in arms handling and other related areas and the role this training plays in improving the capacity for carrying out raids, patrols and combat but the existing situation and the lack of action to address the deficiency of modern arms, ammunition and safety equipment such as bulletproof jackets are potential factors for demoralizing and demotivating staff and affect results with regard to the prevention of illicit drugs and precursor trafficking.

A similar situation was found to exist at units responsible for operations at sea. These units had only conventional resources, such as pistols and rifles, and a limited amount of ammunition. Furthermore, they did not have any safety equipment such as bulletproof jackets. A few Kalashnikovs and two submachine guns are available to these units but these arms are old and outdated. In addition, these units do not have speed boats to carry out high-speed pursuits. Therefore, assistance is sought from Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA).
2.2.7 Check posts

Pakistan Customs operates a large number of check posts located throughout the country. These check posts are responsible for preventing the flow of smuggled goods and carrying out surveillance at borders and smuggling routes.

Table 10: Check posts by location, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Locations of Customs Check Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>Lahore: Gujranwala (Customs Intelligence) Sialkot: Gujranwala (MCC, Sialkot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>1. Sadiqabad 2. D.G.khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>Attock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs
There are reportedly 52 check posts and field information units located throughout Pakistan. The addition of further 32 check posts was suggested by the customs units. Also, the Directorates of Transit Trade pointed out that check posts required greater capacity for tracking and checking transit cargo.

The Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation in Islamabad is in process of developing a network of 25 new check posts that will be responsible for enhancing patrol capacity and information sharing.

### 2.2.8 Unofficial crossing points

Another key area covered by the study was the identification of unofficial crossing points used for the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors.

There are a number of unofficial crossing points (Table 11) that are reportedly used for this purpose. Therefore, check posts need to be established to develop effective control measures, including more frequent patrols, in these areas.
### Table 11: Unofficial crossing points noted by custom units, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Customs unit and city</th>
<th>Unofficial crossing point(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>MCC Lahore (Lahore)</td>
<td>Sheikupura, Kala Shah Kaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Multan (Rahim Yar Khan)</td>
<td>Sadiqabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multan (Rajan pur)</td>
<td>Kashmore More</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Multan (Dera Ghazi Khan)</td>
<td>Wahoa, Sakhi Sarwar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Multan (Bhakar)</td>
<td>Bhakkar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Faisalabad (Mianwali)</td>
<td>Bakakhail, Chashma, Musa Khail, Eisa Khail, Dusa Tang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Islamabad (Attock)</td>
<td>Attok Khurd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Islamabad (Chakwal)</td>
<td>Balksor,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Islamabad (Haripur)</td>
<td>Sirkot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhaw</td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Warsak)</td>
<td>Charsada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Abbotabad)</td>
<td>Bariab, Jhari Khas Kohistan, Bhisham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Noshera)</td>
<td>Noshera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Chitralt)</td>
<td>Boroghal, Dorah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Khyber Agency)</td>
<td>Barsa (Kaka sahib Road), Shilmen Tinha, Bara, Tira valley, Malagaur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Kurram Agency)</td>
<td>Piewar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Hangu)</td>
<td>Hangu Tall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (South Waziristan Agency)</td>
<td>Angor Adda, Gomal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Chaghi)</td>
<td>Kachao, Maskhail, Taalab, Ghani Laudi, Yekmach, Koh-i-Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Quetta)</td>
<td>Kanale Muriband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Noshki)</td>
<td>Shehkwasil Noshki Gaon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Turbat)/(Kech)</td>
<td>Mand, Buleda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Ziarat)</td>
<td>Katchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Gawadar (Pasni)</td>
<td>Shadikur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Gawadar (Gawadar)</td>
<td>Liari Coastal High Way, Kalmat, Bella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Gawadar (Hub)</td>
<td>Sakaran, Bundawari, Bandmurad, Somani Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>MCC Preventive (Karachi)</td>
<td>Northern By Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Preventive (Gharro)</td>
<td>Laith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Preventive (Sukkar)</td>
<td>Sakkar By pass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs*
Uncontrolled open areas and unchecked routes, where there are few or no check posts or patrols, are a breeding ground for illegal activity, including the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors. Therefore, CRU focused strongly on these areas and routes.

There are a number of unofficial crossing points that are regularly used for the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors. All the major customs units highlighted the vulnerability of these routes and the urgent need for the strengthening of surveillance and enforcement capacity at existing check posts or creation of new check posts.

During the visit to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, CRU found that conditions at many existing check posts and customs units were inadequate. Many of these check posts, such as those at Terri Mangal, Burki, Dera Darya Khan, Chasma, Rahim Khan Kharlachi and Taank, do not have their own building and operate from privately rented buildings. Furthermore, many check posts have no boundary walls, electricity supply or proper ancillary buildings. Therefore, fully functional and well-equipped check posts need to be established with enhanced capacity.
Case study: Check posts and customs stations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)

The province of KP in the northwest of Pakistan faces numerous challenges as a result of a rise in militancy and suicide bombing, and the deterioration of law and order.

Check posts and customs units have been targeted by terrorists and these attacks have claimed lives and destroyed property. As a result, the operations of these units are periodically suspended.

Picture 20: Snapshot of a news item regarding blast at Torkham

The lack of basic infrastructure and standard facilities at these customs stations and check posts are obstacles faced by customs staff at these units. However, despite these challenges and meager resources, the efforts of Pakistan Customs to combat illicit drugs trafficking are noteworthy.

CRU found that there are six customs units in Kohat Division (Shaheedano Dand, Terri Mangal and Kharlachi since February 2005; Burki and Ghulam Khan since January 2004; and Taank since February 1983).

The customs unit in Ghulam Khan (NWA) and Taank are fully functional, while those in Kharlachi and Burki were reactivated in June 2012. However, those in Terimangal and Kurram Agency are non-functional. The units in Terri Mangal, Kharlachi and Taank operate from privately rented buildings, and the unit in Ghulam Khan operates from a tehsil building. Only the unit in Shaheedano Dand operates from a government building.

Picture 22: Check post in Rahim Khan Khushalgarh (Kohat)
This check post in Rahim Khan Khushalgarh was built in 1966-67. No tangible improvement to the building has been made since this date. Hence, the unit is located in a rented building whose conditions are quite poor.

**Picture 23:** Custom unit in Burki (Kurram Agency/FATA)

Customs operations at Burki were resumed in June 2012. However, the condition of this unit is very poor. The building is a basic brick structure with no boundary wall or paved area, and the ceiling is in poor condition. It has no electricity or sanitary facilities. To perform their duties, employees have to work in temporary tents.

**Picture 24:** Check post in Ramak [D.I. Khan]  
**Picture 25:** Check post in Ramak [D.I. Khan]
Located in a government building, the check post in Ramak has been in operation since 1977. However, staff performance is affected by poor working conditions and absence of basic facilities, such as water, sanitation and electricity.

**Picture 26**: Customs unit in Tank (South Waziristan Agency/FATA)

![](image1)

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

This customs unit in Tank has been in operation since 1983. However, because of an absence of proper infrastructure and security issues, this check post has been closed intermittently in the past.

**Picture 27**: Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/FATA)

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

**Picture 28**: Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/FATA)

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

The check post in Ghulam Khan has been in operation since 2004. Situated in a tehsil building, its location in North Waziristan, an area highly vulnerable to the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors, makes it a very important resource.
The check post in Dera Darya Khan was built in a private building in 1986. The condition of this building is quite poor as a result of a lack of maintenance.

**Picture 31: Check post in Tunnel (Kohat)**

The check post in Tunnel has operated since 2011 and is located in a government building. However, the building lacks basic facilities.

**Picture 32: Customs unit in Kharlachi (Kurram Agency)**
The condition of this building, which was reactivated in June 2002, is poor. There is plenty of space and if the deficiencies are addressed, effectiveness can be increased.

**Picture 33: Check post in Darra Tang (Lakki Marwat)**

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

The check post in Darra Tang has been in operation and is based in a government building since 1984-85. However, poor infrastructure and the absence of basic facilities hinder effectiveness.

**Picture 34: Customs unit in Shaheedano Dand (Kurram Agency/FATA)**

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

The customs unit in Shaheedano Dand was initially opened in March 2005. However, due to security issues, it remained largely non-operational until 2009. As a result, basic import and export operations were conducted at the customs unit in Thall. The building lacks basic facilities and has no boundary wall or paved area.
2.3 Operational, technical and IT related capabilities

Pakistan Customs has a distinguished place among the public sector organisations of the country for its initiatives towards automation, system re-engineering, customer facilitation and procedural simplification. In this section these initiatives are reviewed in the context of control of illicit drugs and precursors.

2.3.1 Database

Pakistan Customs has its central database managed by Pakistan Revenue Automation Ltd. (PRAL) which has developed an indigenous web-based customs clearance system (WeBOC- Web Based One Customs) replacing the previous system of PACCS that provides real time integration of 25333 importers and exporters, 1782 agents, 237 shipping lines and 711 internal users. The system also has the capacity to link terminal operators, cargo handlers and other allied agencies and departments. This system covers all stages of goods clearance, from good declaration to final out-of-charge. Every stage is linked. The system has an in-built capacity of maintaining and updating all clearance data along with generation of reports and analyses. There are different modules in the system for Goods Declaration (GD) filing, examination and assessment reports feeding, import and export clearance, transit trade handling, warehousing and risk management. All the reports and historical data related to clearance of all types of goods through Pakistan Customs is available through this database, however, there is no specialized database for drugs or precursors seizures. Such data is either individually available at MCCs or manually compiled at FBR through periodical reports and feedback from field formations. Another important feature of WeBOC is its possible connectivity with neighboring countries. In order to streamline transit trade clearance, EDI with Afghan Customs− Soft launching (pilot run) initiated on Nov 01, 2013

2.3.2 Risk profiling

The value of risk profiling as a tool to aid in the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking has been proven all over the world. With around 5,000 TEUs processed every day at customs units throughout the country, it is impossible for customs staff to manually inspect each consignment. Therefore, a strong risk management system has been incorporated in WeBOC. Importers and exporters are divided into three categories: red, yellow and green depending on their business profile.

- Green: containers of reputed importers and exporters are cleared in few hours after passing through a computerized scanning process.
- Yellow: this channel is for the computerized checking of declarations and works on first-in first-out basis.
- Red: this channel is for physical examination in cases where risk parameters fed into system refer the goods for examination.

Following are the results of risk management system in 2013:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RMS Results</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GD's Processed through Green Channel</td>
<td>GD's Processed through Yellow Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GD's Processed through Green Channel</td>
<td>GD's Processed through Yellow Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Directorate of Reforms and Automation, FBR
29 Directorate of Reforms and Automation, FBR
Broad categorization is based on the following risk parameters:

- Type of goods
- Destination of goods
- Profile of exporter/importer
- History/record of exporter/importer

With regard to the focus on the study, it was important to know as to how this risk profiling system is operated in relation to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking. In addition, it was important to know as to how the tool was functioning as part of the new automated system used at Pakistan Customs.

Fig 17 shows the degree of use of these risk parameters. The data collected shows that 'destination of goods' is the most frequently used parameter, followed by 'history/record' and 'profile of importer/exporter'. With regard to the interception of illicit drugs and precursors, 'information-based checks' and 'random selection' are most commonly used techniques. Hence, despite the presence of sophisticated WeBOC system and risk profiling awareness, the most reliable and effective tool in the control of illicit drugs and precursors is information network.

**Fig 17:** Risk profiling parameters and techniques, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random selection</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History record</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile of exporter</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination of goods</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of goods</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

Post Clearance Audit is also an integral part of this risk profiling strategy. For this purpose, Directorate General of Post Clearance Audit (PCA) has been established with its Directorates in all the provinces with following functions:

(i) To establish, update and operate records, databases pertaining to goods exported from or imported into Pakistan and profiles of importers and exporters covering all aspects of their trade and business;
(ii) To evolve a pro-active monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with national trade laws, rules, procedures, controls, restrictions, prohibitions etc;
(iii) To set up a mechanism to detect and investigate commercial and trade related frauds and propose measures and controls at the operational level to prevent its occurrence;
(iv) To set up mechanism and machinery along with ancillary and auxiliary sub systems for audit, intelligence, investigation, prosecution, dispute resolution and initiate contravention reports/recovery proceedings for adjudication.
(v) To analyze data, risk assessment and selection of sectors/cases for generating the work orders for field formations to conduct audit, and monitoring of the follow up action.

The main focus of risk profiling and post clearance audit is to safeguard revenue leakages, but system based checks related to illicit drugs and precursors have also been made a part of this strategy particularly for those chemicals which have been legally imported by local industry but can be diverted for the use of drug manufacturing. However, during the study it has been noticed that this area needs a little more emphasis by the field units.

Following other deficiencies in this area have been observed:

i. Information sharing related to illicit drugs and precursors between the MCCs and field units is not on real time basis but through FBR headquarters. The effectiveness of risk profiling techniques can be enhanced if they are based on
systematic information sharing, whether in real time or from a centralized database. However, with regard to illicit drugs and precursors trafficking, no such centralised database is available.

ii. Effective interception and identification of illicit drugs and precursors needs knowledge of their description, harmonized codes and other relevant specifications. It is essential that customs staff remain up to date with the harmonized system so that they can properly identify precursor chemicals. Data collected with regard to this area shows that 28 customs units (49% of the total) have staffs that are aware of the harmonized system.

iii. Data collected shows that all record keeping related to illicit drugs and precursors at most customs units is carried out manually and that there is no online data sharing or data update system in place. (Fig 18)

**Fig 18: Type of reporting mechanism at CRU-visited customs units, 2013**

![Pie chart showing 15% hard copy and 85% online]

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

However, Port Control Units (PCUs), established with the support of UNODC, are effectively availing the information available in database and on-line clearance data to check the flow of illicit drugs and precursors.

2.3.3 Automation of procedures

Pakistan Customs has gradually evolved its processes from manual to automated ones. PaCCS and WeBOC are two examples of Pakistan Customs transition towards greater procedural automation. However, in context of better and effective drugs and precursors’ control, only 31 customs units (54% of those visited by CRU) responded in favor of automation, while 5 units took a neutral position. Staff based at 14 units responded that it would negatively impact efficiency (Table 12) perceiving that chances of clearance of illicit goods are higher in automated clearance under WeBOC system as compared to physical checks and manual examination. But it is a reality that in order to facilitate the trade and reduce the dwell time of cargo at ports, automated clearance with risk profiling strategy and post clearance checks in the only recourse.

**Table 12: Customs units’ position on the impact of automation, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of impact</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive impact</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative impact</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

2.3.4 Information sharing and coordination with Law Enforcement Agencies

There are a number of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) that register their presence or coordinate during customs operations, in particular to the activities related to control of illicit drug trafficking (Table 13). Officers of these agencies are posted all around the country in their designated offices to work in close collaboration with Pakistan Customs for the purposes...
of sharing information and resources for detection and investigation of drugs and precursor trafficking cases. All these agencies work within their jurisdiction and coordinate with each other effectively to constitute a better deterrence and check on all such illegal activities.

**Table 13: LEA coordinating with Customs units, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of customs unit</th>
<th>Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airports</td>
<td>ANF, ASF, IB, FIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wharfs</td>
<td>ANF, Provincial Excise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check posts</td>
<td>FC, Police, Levies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry ports</td>
<td>ANF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal area units</td>
<td>ANF, Coast Guards, PMSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border customs units</td>
<td>ANF, FC, Political Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

Pakistan Customs also receives and issues alerts regarding different techniques used by the traffickers. For this purpose, FBR has an anti-smuggling wing at headquarters which compiles information on any such alerts from its field formations and disseminates to the headquarters of all LEAs and vice versa.

To sum up, these deficiencies and gaps, if not accounted for on priority, may turn into possible stumbling blocks hampering the organisation to explore its maximum potential in all the areas of its professional performance in general and control of illicit drugs and precursors in particular. Although, some major seizures of drugs and precursors have been reported by Pakistan Customs in recent years, there is a reported decline in the quantity of drugs seized by Pakistan Customs (Fig 19) during last three years.

**Fig 19: Drug seizures made by Pakistan Customs, 2011-13**

![Graph showing drug seizures](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010-2011</th>
<th>2011-2012</th>
<th>2012-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charas</td>
<td>25,204.10</td>
<td>7,527.45</td>
<td>4,241.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>2,617.65</td>
<td>185.00</td>
<td>108.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>763.06</td>
<td>346.55</td>
<td>198.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish Oil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy Straw</td>
<td>7,792.00</td>
<td>75,727.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>626.00</td>
<td>1,189.55</td>
<td>3,727.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official data obtained from Anti-Smuggling Wing, FBR, Islamabad
Chapter III: Need assessment and recommendations
Chapter III: Need assessment and recommendations

The key objective of this study is to identify gaps in the operational capacity of Pakistan Customs, however, it is, equally important to assess the existing and future needs of the organisation with regard to these gaps. Special emphasis was, therefore, given to such needs during the study, with particular reference to controlling measures for illicit drugs and precursors. A summary of these recommendations based on the feedback of the field units is provided below:

3.1 Human resource

Following recommendations are made in the area of human resource development for the organisation:

3.1.1 New recruitment

Shortage of staff is a severe challenge and may impact the performance of the organisation negatively. Analysis of the data collected suggests that there is a 30-40% shortage in the strength of assessment, cargo clearance and enforcement staff, while with regard to laboratory staff, the shortage is over 80% of existing strength. As far as general staff (i.e. Sepoys and Havaladars) is concerned, the shortage is reported to be around 12% and this gap is expected to increase as a result of superannuation of a large number of these employees in the next few years. As there has been no recruitment in the organization since 1998, it is recommended that feedback from every unit should be collected and consolidated. Recruitment in different cadres of staff should, subsequently, be made keeping in view the current and future workload and any possible expansion of the organisation.

3.1.2 Training and capacity building

Another area requiring immediate attention is training and staff capacity building. Despite some regular training programs, including those relating to illicit drugs and precursors control measures, there are still significant deficiencies in this area. Most of the customs units visited by CRU reported an acute need for training in areas like the examination of goods; the identification of drugs, precursors and explosives, and concealment methods; investigation techniques; the searching of passengers, baggage and vehicles; the use of drug testing kits; and the handling of arms and ammunition. There is also a need for specialized training for laboratory staff.

It is recommended that the training needs of staff in every area may be fully assessed and on the basis of this training need analysis, organized training programs, including short-term and long-term courses, workshops and on-job training, should be launched.

The role of DGTR is crucial to achieve this goal. A program or study in the area of training need analysis, organized training programs, including short-term and long-term courses, workshops and on-job training, should be launched.

The role of DGTR is crucial to achieve this goal. A program or study in the area of training need analysis, organized training programs, including short-term and long-term courses, workshops and on-job training, should be launched.

Fig 20: Training need analysis
A review of training modules and their content should be conducted based on the results of the training need analysis. New training material and courses need to be designed, if required, and may be introduced alongside existing training material according to the needs of specific positions and cadres. Furthermore, it is recommended that international donor agencies, such as UNODC, WCO and WTO may be approached to provide a 'train-the-trainers' program in order to optimize and accelerate the staff training process. Additionally, the staff who have received specialized training should be utilized as resource persons for future trainings. The staff getting training for some specialized area should not be transferred to other positions for which they have not been trained for.

3.1.3 Rewards and incentives

Rewards and incentives are effective means for staff motivation, therefore, Pakistan Customs should put in place a well-designed incentive package to acknowledge staff performance with particular reference to detection and seizure of illicit drugs and precursors.

3.2 Infrastructure and equipment

Infrastructural and equipment needs may be summarized as follows:

3.2.1 Scanners, X-ray machines and CCTV cameras

Currently, there are three Customs Collectorates at Karachi sea port dealing with the clearance of import cargo i.e. MCC Appraisement (East), MCC(Appraisement (West) and MCC (Poert Qasims). In addition to this, there are MCC (Exports) and MCC (Exports Port Qasim) dealing with the exports cargo and Directorate of Transit Trade dealing with Afghan transit cargo. In order to cater the needs of all these Customs formations, only three cargo scanners are available at East Wharf, West Wharf and Port Muhammad Bin Qasim. This is a big gap in view of transition of Customs procedures from manual examination to an automated clearance system (Weboc).

Reportedly, around 5,000 containers are handled by Pakistan Customs every day at Karachi port (import, export, transit and transshipment cargo) and the volume of the same is increasing, the organization is in dire need of more scanners: it needs at least two additional scanners with high-resolution imaging systems at East Wharf and West Wharf. In addition, two such scanners are also required at Port Muhammad Bin Qasim. The provision of these scanners would not only reduce dwell time30 but also provide an effective mechanism of check and balance required for the automated clearance system. Moreover, modern image readers for interpreting the images of scanned cargo are also required.

A similar situation exists at dry ports where it has been noticed that there are no scanners available at Sambrial, Multan, Prem Nagar (Lahore) and Hyderabad. These dryports mainly handle export-oriented cargo, therefore, need at least one scanner each. At rest of the dryports, some futuristic assessment is required to ascertain the need of more scanners in proportion to the increasing magnitude of trade.

Mobile scanners are needed at international airports for the quick scanning of baggage, courier shipments and parcels. Currently, such scanners are in use at Karachi and Lahore airports only, but these, too, need to be replaced with upgraded versions with high-resolution capability in order to carry out effective control of illicit drugs and precursors. Other international airports at Peshawar, Islamabad, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Multan, Quetta and Gwadar also need such scanners.

There is also an acute need for X-ray machines to scan passengers for body packing and internal concealment of drugs inside the body. International airports in Pakistan at Faisalabad, Sialkot, Multan, Gwadar and Quetta are lacking in this facility. At least one such machine may be provided at these airports to maintain a deterrence against drug trafficking. In addition to above, CCTV cameras and metal detectors are needed at all customs units, including those at sea ports, dry ports, airports, border customs

30 The dwell time can be defined as the measure of the time elapsed from the time the cargo arrives in the port to the time the goods leave the port premises after all permits and clearances have been obtained
stations and check posts. In view of deteriorating law and order conditions in the country, it is strongly recommended to provide these equipments alongwith training of the staff in its handling and maintenance.

Pakistan Customs is fully aware of the need and importance of all these equipments but bridging these gaps within available resources is a big challenge.

3.2.2 Laboratories and testing facilities

The needs of Pakistan Customs with regard to laboratories and testing facilities are as follows:

i) The construction of new laboratories at remote Collectorate in Gawadar, Quetta, Peshawar and Gilgit Baltistan.

ii) To upgrade existing laboratories in Karachi, Port Muhammad bin Qasim, Lahore and Faisalabad to meet international standards, including the provision of modern testing equipment, testing chemicals and specialized training for staff.

The condition of customs laboratories has significantly deteriorated over the years, particularly with regard to the capacity to test illicit drugs and precursors. This decline, has resulted into a situation where no drug samples are tested at customs laboratories, some prompt actions are required to be taken in this area by improving the supply of provisions and stores to the existing laboratories and addressing their financial as well as human resource related issues. The existing equipment at these laboratories also need upgradation and/or replacement with modern equipment and tools in order to make these facilities in line with international standards. There is also a need to establish new laboratories at Peshawar, Quetta, Gawadar and Gilgit Baltistan. It is also proposed that, in order to resolve the administrative issues faced by the staff at customs laboratories a specialised set-up or Directorate General may be established within FBR.

At the same time, it has been noticed that the drug testing kits provided by UNODC to most custom units are not being used properly because of a lack of training of staff in its usage techniques. Trainings, in this area, should therefore, be organized through train-the-trainer programmes at each Collectorate in collaboration with UNODC.

3.2.3 Canine units

Sniffer dogs play an important role in the detection of drugs and canine units are an integral resource for preventing illicit drug and precursor trafficking. Pakistan Customs has only two canine units in Karachi, and one more unit is likely to become operational shortly. Due to the absence of such units at custom units located in remote areas, sniffer dogs are transported from Karachi whenever the need arises resulting into time lapses as well as handling problems for dogs. Therefore, there is an urgent need to establish new canine units in Quetta, Gawadar, Peshawar and Lahore.

According to some rough estimates, monthly expenditure for maintainence of such units comprising two dogs and their handlers ranges from Rs. 400,000 to 500,000. Thus lack of financial resources for maintaining such units in an appropriate manner may also be a big challenge for Pakistan Customs.

3.2.4 Arms and ammunition

To carry out snap checks, patrols and raids, and personal safety of staff of Pakistan Customs, modern arms and ammunition are quite essential. Modern and easy-to-use semi-automatic weapons are required for inland units, while border and sea check posts need fully automatic weapons. There is a need to analyse the requirement of each unit realistically.

3.3 Operational, technical and IT-related issues

3.3.1 Sea operations

There is currently only one sea check post in operation, CP Guardian which is a floating check post near Karachi port established
in 1961. However, this post has received no renovation or upgradation ever since it was established as a result, it appears in dilapidated condition.

Due to the peculiar nature of the country’s coastline comprising of the creeks and the mangrove swamps, marshy and rocky patches and clayey ridges as well as shallow lagoons, Pakistan Customs needs special speed boats with the capacity to operate in tropical waters in all conditions. In addition, the navigational and surveillance equipment, such as compasses and GPS with track plotting capability, radar systems and communication equipment (e.g. HF/VHF radio systems, satellite telephone systems), and lifesaving equipment (e.g. inflatable life rafts, buoys and life jackets) are also required.

New deep-water check posts need to be established near Jewani, Gawadar, Pasni, Ormara, Damm and Karachi.

3.3.2 Inland operations

For effective patrols, raids and snap checks in all terrains, including hilly and desert areas, Pakistan Customs needs appropriate vehicles. Therefore, anti-smuggling units need to be equipped with 4x4 double-cabin vehicles and jeeps. Moreover bullet-proof vehicles are also required for specialized operations in more volatile areas.

At the same time, to maintain effective surveillance of coastal and mountainous areas, at least two helicopters may be procured and included in the ASOs of border Collectorates. This resource would significantly enhance the capability of Pakistan Customs to cover large areas of Baluchistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), besides coastal areas.

In addition, customs units need communication devices, such as satellite phones, and a central reporting room for surveillance, monitoring as well as controlling activities.

3.3.3 New check posts

Based on the data collected, a number of border points have been identified where there is a need to establish new check points. These border points were identified in view of their critical and sensitive location and vulnerability to illicit drugs and precursors trafficking.

The poor condition of existing Pakistan Customs check posts is also an area of operational deficiency resulting in a gradual decline in the quantity of drugs seized in recent years. In order to effectively combat the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors re-inforcement and mobilisation of existing check posts on modern lines is essential.

3.3.4 Improving existing check posts

During the visit of CRU to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the following recommendations were made by the staff posted at check posts and border customs units:

- All check posts and units should be located in government buildings and be equipped with government vehicles.
- The lack of staff, in all cadres, requires immediate attention.
- Warehouse facilities, boundary walls and an uninterrupted supply of electricity should be ensured.
- High-speed broadband facilities are required for real-time accessing and sharing of data. Wherever possible, these devices should be provided.
- A wireless communication network is required especially for check posts in remote areas.
- Safety measures need to be strengthened to ensure the safety of customs unit staff.
3.3.4 Technical and IT-related capabilities

3.3.4.1 Database

There is an urgent need for the development of an effective database containing consolidated information about illicit drug and precursor seizures, the data related to arrests and criminals involved records of criminal proceedings and detailed case histories. The database should be available to all units so that the investigating staff can access information and update the system with fresh entries. Such a resource would help in proper data collection and management, and encourage data sharing and relevant policy formulation.

3.3.4.2 Risk profiling

Risk management is the key to modern automated customs management\(^{31}\). There are five main steps in the standard customs risk management process as defined by the World Customs Organization\(^{32}\):

1. Establish context: import of goods, export, passenger traffic, etc.
2. Identify risks: revenue protection (e.g. under valuation, origin, classification), prohibitions and restrictions (e.g. drug trafficking, IPR, fire arms, etc.)
3. Analyse risks: likelihood of a risk occurring (less likely, likely, most likely)
4. Assess and prioritize risks: assess impact and the consequence of risks occurring (e.g. high, medium, low)
5. Address risks: define countermeasures and assign risk levels (e.g. tolerate, treat, transfer or terminate).

In addition to these five steps, risk management requires constant monitoring and review in order to eliminate false negative and false positive risk assessments. Throughout the process, proper documentation, communication and consultation with all relevant stakeholders is crucial, as risk management is a corporate task involving the entire organization and not one dedicated unit only.

Risk-based systems operate more effectively in automated environment. As Pakistan Customs has already introduced WeBOC system for import/export/transit cargo clearance, a risk management system developed on the guidelines above would help establish a more effective, more dynamic and more accurate means for detecting and seizing illicit drugs and precursors. However, it is essential that such a system is properly maintained and updated through a periodical review of risk parameters.

In practice, risk management methodology should be flexible, adaptable and take into account changes in operating environment, including processes and legislation. It requires a constant monitoring, communication and evaluation mechanism. For this purpose, separate and independent Directorate(s)/Unit(s) or Risk Management Committee(s) within Pakistan Customs need to be established for monitoring local, regional and international situations and for working on system optimization. This would not only improve illicit drugs and precursors trafficking control measures throughout Pakistan, but also strengthen the overall enforcement strategy of Pakistan Customs. In addition, it is recommended that training on new procedures should be provided for all staff and that specialized courses should be provided for staff directly involved in the implementation and operation of the new risk management system.

It is clear that Pakistan Customs can excel in the areas covered in this study if the deficiencies are properly addressed and its needs are fully met. The organization is aware of what is required to further improve its capacity and is working hard to find solutions. However, the shortage of funds is a major obstacle in achieving these goals.

---

\(^{31}\) Customs Risk Management (CRiM): A survey of 24 WCO Member Administrations (2011) by Cross-border Research Association, EPFL & HEC UNIL Lausanne, Switzerland published by World Customs Organisation (WCO)

\(^{32}\) World Customs Organisation (WCO), ‘Trade Facilitation and Implementation Guide’ Case Study for New Zealand (2011)
Chapter IV: Conclusion
Chapter IV: Conclusion

Pakistan Customs is one of the most resilient and responsive public sector organisations in Pakistan. It works in coordination with local, regional and international organizations to fulfill its responsibilities in most professional way particularly with reference to control of illicit drugs and precursors. The success of Container Control Programme is one example of the progressive steps taken by the organisation33. The foundation of the CRU in collaboration with UNODC, with the goal of building the research capacity of its staff and studying and analyzing its operations is yet another indicator of the vision of this organisation for achieving professional excellence through research, reforms and business-processes re-engineering.

With regard to combating illicit drugs and precursors trafficking, initiatives taken by Pakistan Customs are significant, as reflected in a number of large seizures made at sea ports, airports and dry ports in recent years. However, due to a marked increase in the volume of trade flowing through the country and changes in the enforcement environment relating to illicit drugs and precursors control, there is a need to re-assess and analyze the interception capacity of the organization. Therefore, CRU chose for its first report, a gap analysis and needs assessment relating to illicit drugs and precursor control capacity of Pakistan Customs.

The study focused on three key areas relating to illicit drugs and precursors control measures:

i) Human Resource;

ii) Infrastructure and equipment; and

iii) Operational, technical and IT-related issues.

The findings revealed a number of deficiencies in these areas that are adversely affecting the organization's performance in relation to control of drugs and precursors' trafficking:

Human Resource:

Pakistan Customs is facing a severe shortage of staff, including those employed in tasks relating to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking. This shortage is estimated at between 30 to 40% in overall operational strength of the organisation, while with regard to laboratory staff, the shortage is around 40-50%. This gap is likely to increase in coming years as a result of superannuation of a large number of lower enforcement staff.

With regard to training, firstly, there is no system of conducting training need analysis in the organisation to ascertain the general and specific professional needs of staff. Consequently, there is no organized effort to provide training in areas such as examination of goods and passengers, assessment and investigation, data management and risk profiling. Secondly, there is no policy guidelines for improving and updating the existing training modules and curriculum in line with the emerging needs.

Infrastructure and equipment

There are considerable deficiencies with regard to infrastructure and equipment which include the chemical testing laboratories, canine units and inland and sea check points. In addition to this, the gaps related to availability of scanners, X-ray machines, CCTV cameras, laboratory equipment, drug testing kits, communication equipment, arms and ammunition and vehicles are also visible.

The study shows that seaports, dry ports and airports do not have enough scanners proportionate to their existing and anticipated increase in the magnitude of trade. While only two scanners are working at Karachi sea port, no such facilities are available at major dry ports like Faisalabad, Sambrial, Multan, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Hyderabad. The situation is similar with regard to CCTV cameras and X-ray machines: only two of the eight international airports visited by CRU had X-ray machines for scanning passengers, and there is an acute shortage of CCTV cameras at all ports.

Another area of concern is lack of arms and ammunition, bulletproof jackets and vehicles, modern communication systems, tracking devices and jammers. These resources are required by ASOs and Directorates of Intelligence and Investigation in order to effectively carry out field operations. No procurement of new arms has been made since 1998. There is neither any central control room nor any wireless system available to customs units and the mobility of staff in the field is affected by lack of appropriate vehicles.

New check points are required to improve illicit drug and precursor control measures in areas alongside the country's coast and in areas sharing borders with Afghanistan, Iran, India and China. According to the data collected, five new check points in coastal areas and 32 new check points in areas with vulnerable borders need to be established. In addition, existing check points need to be properly maintained and re-enforced on modern lines.

Pakistan Customs has no laboratory facility for conducting forensic tests of samples of seized drugs. Currently, the organization has only four testing laboratories and these facilities can only fulfill routine testing requirements. Furthermore, they suffer from an acute shortage of staff, trainings, equipment and lab testing chemicals. Illicit drug samples are referred to NIHL in Islamabad and this process is time consuming and expensive.

A similar situation exists with regard to canine units at Pakistan Customs. The organization has only three canine units and as a result, at most of the Collectorates it has to rely on the resources of ANF.

**Operational, technical and IT-related issues**

Reporting of seizures of illicit drugs and precursors at Pakistan Customs is still made manually. There is no online resource or database related to illicit drugs and precursors that could form a strong base for evolving a risk-profiling or automatic alert system.

Although the organization has introduced a system of automated cargo clearance, and all procedures are being redesigned accordingly, this system has no in-built checks or mechanism for identifying and blocking suspicious consignments likely to contain illicit drugs and precursors. As a result, reliance is made on information-based networks and conventional interception techniques.

While Pakistan Customs has carried out significant illicit drugs and precursors control activity in past, in order to enhance its capabilities in this area and transform it into a modern enforcement agency, the deficiencies and needs presented in this study need to be addressed, and the recommendations need to be considered on priority.

The initiatives like CRU need to be strengthened so that research activities may be continued on other topics of professional excellence of the organisation alongwith drugs and precursors control. Suggested areas for future research in relation to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking are as follows:

- Controlling Drug Precursors in Pakistan: A gap analysis.
- Illicit pharmaceutical trade in Pakistan
- Illicit drugs and precursors trafficking by small boats and dhows along the Makran coast in the Arabian Sea
- Analysis of Afghan transit trade through Pakistan
- Pakistani prosecution system in relation to illicit drugs control: a gap analysis and needs assessment
- Impact of Automation: A comparative study
- Trends in Imports
Annex A: Questionnaire used for data collection

Drugs & Precursors Controlling Techniques:
Gap Analysis & Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

Interviewee Information:
Designation:____________________ Name of Custom Station:______________________________ Province:________________________
Type of Port:_________________________ Interview Number:____________________________ Date:______________
Name of Interviewer:_________________________ Signature:____________________________
UNODC Research Consultant:_________________________ Signature:____________________________

Part I: Human Resource:
A. Staff Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cadre</th>
<th>Sanctioned Strength</th>
<th>Working strength</th>
<th>Required Strength</th>
<th>Nature of job e.g. Examination, Assessment, Support etc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent/SPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Appraiser(PA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO/AO/IPO/SPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks (UDC/LDC/S.Typist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepoys/Havaldars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Capacity Building:

1. Did your staff receive trainings related to drugs and precursors control in last two years?  Yes: ☐  No: ☐

2. Please provide the below information on provided trainings in last two years?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Number of staff participated</th>
<th>Duration of Training</th>
<th>Training Provider</th>
<th>Location of Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. In which age bracket does your operational staff fall? Are they capable of performing the drugs control activities properly or age factor is a limitation? ________________

4. Will training be effective for the staff in their activities related to drugs and precursors control? ________________

5. Do you suggest some specific Training Modules for training needs of your staff? ________________

Part II: Equipments and Infrastructure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Equipments</th>
<th>Available number</th>
<th>In Working Condition</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scanners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Ray Machines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV Cameras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any Other: ____________________________________________________________

1. How many containers/trucks are scanned by scanners/X-Ray machines daily? ________________ containers/trucks

2. Do you have canine unit with appropriate facilities? Yes: ☐ No: ☐

3. Does the department have sniffer dogs for detecting drugs? Yes: ☐ No: ☐

4(a). How many sniffer dogs does your department have? ________________ sniffer dogs.

4(b) Are the dogs in proportion to work load?

4(c) How many trained dog handlers do you have?

5. Does your department have precursors testing kits? Yes: ☐ No: ☐

6. For which chemical and precursors do you have testing kits? 1. ________________ 2. ________________ 3. ________________ 4. ________________ 5. ________________

7. Does your department have drugs testing kits? Yes: ☐ No: ☐

8. For which drugs do you have testing kits? 1. ________________ 2. ________________ 3. ________________ 4. ________________ 5. ________________

9. Is there any video camera installed at custom/official crossing point? Yes: ☐ No: ☐

10. How many Check-posts are working at this Custom Station?

11. How many Check posts/Points are required to be established for effective control of Drugs trafficking?
Part III: Control Mechanism and Procedures:

A. General Measures:
1. What kind of procedures and measures do you exercise/follow to prevent drugs from entering into/transiting through Pakistan?
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 
   iv. 

2. What kind of procedures and measures do you exercise/follow to prevent precursors, from entering into/transiting through Pakistan?
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 
   iv. 

3. What agencies of law enforcement are present during inspection of import and export goods?
   1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ Other, please specify ____________________________

4. (a) Weak points of procedure from which precursors’ traffickers get, advantage in your opinion:
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 

4(b) Weak points related to Enforcement staff / support Staff.
   i. 
   ii. 

5. Weak points of procedure from which drugs’ traffickers get advantage in your opinion:
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 

6(a) What is the procedure of incoming and outgoing transit goods declaration of Afghanistan through Pakistan?
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 

6 (b) Weak points from which traffickers get advantage in your opinion:

7. What would be the impacts of automation on precursors and drug trafficking in Pakistan
1. Increase □ 2. Decrease □ 3. No effect □ 4. Other, please specify: ________________________
B. Field Operations/Raids:

8. Are there any mechanism for routine checking/patrolling in your jurisdiction? [ ] Yes [ ] No

9. How many raids are conducted per month by your Field units? [ ]

10. Are these raids information based? [ ]

11. What sort of Arms/Ammunition your patrolling/raiding Units have? [ ]

12. Do the staff have proper training in Arms handling and operating? [ ]

13. What kind of Arms/Equipments you need for making patrolling/raiding effective? [ ]

14. Are there unofficial crossing points used for smuggling goods, drugs and precursors in your jurisdiction? [ ] Yes [ ] No

14(a) Unofficial crossing points names and location on district level:

i. _______________ Route _______________ District

ii. _______________ Route _______________ District

iii. _______________ Route _______________ District

iv. _______________ Route _______________ District

14(b) How many containers/trucks are being imported through this official crossing point? ___/day ___/month ___/year

C. Lab Testing:

15. Do you have the laboratory unit? [ ] Yes [ ] No

16. How many staff member you have for laboratory department? _______________ Personals.

17. Is there staff of laboratory qualified and trained? [ ] Yes [ ] No

18. What trainings are needed for laboratory staff? [ ] 1. Chemical analysis [ ] 2. Drugs testing kit usage [ ]

3. other, please specify __________________________________________________________

19. Does the lab staff identify some chemicals with their physical appearance and specifications? [ ] Yes [ ] No

20. Does the laboratory have adequate facilities (building, energy source, lighting, ventilation)? [ ] Yes [ ] No

21. Does the custom lab is sufficiently equipped with all testing and auxiliary equipment and test kits? [ ] Yes [ ] No

What equipment and testing kits are needed? 1. _______________ 2. _______________ 3. _______________ 4. _______________ 5. _______________ 6. _______________

23. Where do you send your chemicals and drugs sample?

24. How much time Lab takes to provide the results? _________ days

25. Do you have the list of controlled and banned chemicals? [ ] Yes [ ] No

26. Have any banned and controlled chemicals been imported through this custom? [ ] Yes [ ] No

27. Which banned and controlled chemicals were imported with the permission of Drugs Regulation Committee? please provide below information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of chemicals</th>
<th>Amount kg/lit</th>
<th>Origin Country</th>
<th>Importer Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28(a) What is the procedure of drawing and sending a sample for lab testing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________

28 (b) Weak points of procedure from which drugs' traffickers get advantage in your opinion:
   i.  __________________________________________________________
   ii. __________________________________________________________
   iii. __________________________________________________________

28(c) Identify any hurdles / limitation in this regard? ______________________________________________

29. Is there any statistical sampling technique used in your department for getting the sample of a product or chemical?
   Yes: [ ] No: [ ]

30. Is the laboratory test result is obligatory for further procedure? Yes: [ ] No: [ ]

D. Risk Profiling:

31. Is there any other Risk profiling mechanism/MIS/R&D System in use by your office? ________________________________

32. Is there any data base for profiling of importers / Exporters? _______________________________________________

33. What parameters are used by your department for Risk Profiling? Type of Goods [ ] Destination of Goods [ ]
   Profile of Exporter [ ] Random selection [ ] History/Record [ ] Information [ ]

34. Is there any Systematic information collection system?

35. Is the staff aware of the Harmonized System Codes for precursors and chemicals? Yes: [ ] No: [ ]

36. Are these codes fed into your risk profile System? Yes: [ ] No: [ ]

Part IV: Seizures of Drugs and Precursors:

1. Has your department seized any banned or under control chemical or precursors during last three years? Yes: [ ] No: [ ]

2. How much banned and under control chemicals/precursors have been seized by your department during last three years? Please provide information below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date of Seizure</th>
<th>Type of chemical</th>
<th>Seizing unit</th>
<th>Amount kg/lit</th>
<th>Origin Country</th>
<th>Importer company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. How your department did?
   i.  __________________________________________________________
   ii. __________________________________________________________
   iii. __________________________________________________________

4. Which methods and techniques were used by precursors’ traffickers for precursors trafficking?
   i.  __________________________________________________________
   ii. __________________________________________________________
   iii. __________________________________________________________
4 (a) What kind of goods are used for trafficking drugs and precursors? For Example, Food, Baggage, sports goods, furniture, etc.

5. Have your department seized any illicit drugs since last three years? Yes: ☐ No: ☐

6. How much illicit drugs have been seized by your department during last three years? Please provide information below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date of Seizure</th>
<th>Type of drugs</th>
<th>Seizing unit</th>
<th>Amount kg/lit</th>
<th>Destination Country</th>
<th>Exporter company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. How your department found it?
   i.  
   ii.  
   iii.  
   iv.  

8. Which methods and techniques were used by drugs' traffickers for drugs trafficking?
   i.  
   ii.  
   iii.  
   iv.  
Part V: Seizures of Drugs and Precursors:

1. How do you maintain the data on drugs and precursors? Classic hard copy  ☐  Ms. Excel  ☐
2. Ms. Access  ☐  4. Online Database  ☐  5. Other  ☐
2. Does your department keep the drugs and precursors seizures data separately? Yes:  ☐  No:  ☐
3. How often does your agency report to headquarter on drugs and precursors seizure?
   Online database  ☐  Other  ☐, please specify  ☐
5. Do you have information sharing system with other law enforcement agencies? Yes:  ☐  No:  ☐
6. With whom do you share the information/data?

7. Do you have information sharing system with neighboring countries on provincial level? Yes:  ☐  No:  ☐
8. Do you have a central data base system for updating, record keeping and integrated information?

Part VI: Challenges, Problems, Requirements and Recommendations:

1. Challenges and Problems in detection and seizure of precursors and drugs:
   i. ____________________________
   ii. ____________________________
   iii. ____________________________
   iv. ____________________________
2. Trainings needed for better control of drugs and precursors smuggling inside Pakistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Department to be participated</th>
<th>Number of staff participating in training</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Equipments needed for better control of drugs and precursors smuggling inside Pakistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>#of Equipment</th>
<th>Department needed the equipment</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. What are your recommendations for better control of precursors and drugs smuggling inside Pakistan?
   A. 
   B. 
   C. 
   D. 
## Table of Pictures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Picture 1:</td>
<td>Research Team with Mr. Ghulam Ahmed, DG, DGTR, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 2:</td>
<td>Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 3:</td>
<td>Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 4:</td>
<td>Data Collection at ASO, Islamabad, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 5:</td>
<td>Customs Research Unit (CRU) at DGTR, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 6:</td>
<td>Research Methodology, SPSS &amp; ArcGIS Training at OSCE, Dushanbe, November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 7:</td>
<td>Orientation session for research team, Vienna, December 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 8:</td>
<td>ArcGIS and SPSS training session for research team, Islamabad, May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 9:</td>
<td>Scanner at East Wharf, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 10:</td>
<td>Scanner at West Wharf, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 12:</td>
<td>Customs canine unit, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 13:</td>
<td>Customs canine unit, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 14:</td>
<td>Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 15:</td>
<td>Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 16:</td>
<td>Hygiene and equipment at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 17:</td>
<td>Hygiene and equipment at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 18:</td>
<td>Sample storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 19:</td>
<td>Chemical-testing section, Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 20:</td>
<td>Snapshot of a news item regarding blast at Torkham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 21:</td>
<td>Snapshot of a news item regarding blast at Torkham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 22:</td>
<td>Check post in Rahim Khan Khushalgarh (Kohat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 23:</td>
<td>Custom unit in Burki (Kurram Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 24:</td>
<td>Check post in Ramak (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 25:</td>
<td>Check post in Ramak (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 26:</td>
<td>Customs unit in Tank (South Waziristan Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 27:</td>
<td>Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 28:</td>
<td>Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 29:</td>
<td>Check post in Dera Darya Khan (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 30:</td>
<td>Check post in Dera Darya Khan (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 31:</td>
<td>Check post in Tunnel (Kohat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 32:</td>
<td>Customs unit in Kharlachi (Kurram Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 33:</td>
<td>Check post in Darra Tang (Lakki Marwat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 34:</td>
<td>Customs unit in Shaheedano Dand (Kurram Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex B: pictures of the study

- CRU Team with Ms. Rubina Wasti, Director, DGTR, 2013
- Customs Research Team at CRU, DGTR Islamabad, 2013
- Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013
- Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013
- Customs Research Team at Custom House Peshwar
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

Customs Research Team at ANF, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, ASO, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Peshawar, 2013

Data collection, Lahore, 2013

Customs Research Team at the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the "Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis" training course, 11-22 November 2013

Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and BMSC officials in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on the conclusion of the "Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis" training course

Pakistan Customs Research Team, Afghan Team and UNODC officials at "Afghanistan and Pakistan Customs' Research Capacity Building Meeting", 13-18 December 2013, held at Vienna International Center (VIC) Vienna, Austria

57th Session of The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014

Pakistan Customs Team and UNODC officials at The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014

Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials at the "Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS" training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014

Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials on the conclusion of the "Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS" training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014

Customs Day: 26th January, 2015
Table of Maps

Map 1: Opiates trafficking through Pakistan, 2010 .................................................................................................................. 2
Map 2: Pakistan Customs units visited by CRU ......................................................................................................................... 6
Map 3: International and domestic airports in Pakistan, 2013 .................................................................................................. 22
Map 4: Pakistan Customs laboratory facilities, 2013 ................................................................................................................. 27
Map 5: Check posts and field information units under Pakistan Customs .................................................................................. 33
Map 6: Unofficial crossing points noted by custom units, 2013 ............................................................................................... 35

Table of Figures/Graphs

Fig 1: Operational structure of Pakistan Customs, 2013 ...................................................................................................... 3
Fig 2: Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs, 2013 ....................................................................................................................... 12
Fig 3: Shortfall of staff, 2013 ..................................................................................................................................................... 12
Fig 4: Overall staff shortfall at Pakistan Customs (% of total), 2013 ....................................................................................... 13
Fig 5: Position of Inspectors at ASOs, Pakistan Customs, 2013 ................................................................................................. 13
Fig 6: Positions of sepoys at ASOs, Pakistan Customs, 2013 .................................................................................................... 13
Fig 7: Position of inspectors at border check posts of Pakistan Customs, 2013 ................................................................. 14
Fig 8: Staff training at Pakistan Customs 2011-2014 ...................................................................................................................... 16
Fig 9: Percentage of participating staff in drugs & precursors trainings, 2011-2014 .................................................................. 16
Fig 10: Availability of scanning devices at ports in Pakistan, 2013 ...................................................................................... 18
Fig 11: Pakistan Customs controlled scanners at sea ports, 2013 .......................................................................................... 19
Fig 12: Scanners at dry ports visited by CRU, 2013 .................................................................................................................. 21
Fig 13: Availability of scanners at airports in Pakistan, 2013 ................................................................................................. 23
Fig 14: X-ray machines for passenger scanning at airports, 2013 .......................................................................................... 24
Fig 15: Availability of CCTV at ports in Pakistan, 2013 ............................................................................................................ 24
Fig 16: Available drug and precursors testing kits, 2013 .......................................................................................................... 26
Fig 17: Risk profiling parameters and techniques, 2013 .......................................................................................................... 42
Fig 18: Type of reporting mechanism at CRU-visited customs units, 2013 ................................................................. 43
Fig 19: Drug seizures made by Pakistan Customs, 2011-13 ...................................................................................................... 44
Fig 20: Training need analysis .............................................................................................................................................. 46
Table of Tables

Table 1: Job description of different staff positions at Pakistan Customs................................................................. 10
Table 2: Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs, 2013 .................................................................................................. 11
Table 3: Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs laboratories, 2013 ............................................................................ 12
Table 4: Training received by customs staff at DGTR, 2011-2014.......................................................................... 15
Table 5: Courses/Modules offered by DGTR, 2011-2014 ..................................................................................... 15
Table 6: Cargo clearance at Karachi and Port Muhammad bin Qasim, 2011-2013..................................................... 19
Table 7: Passengers, cargo and mail handling capacity of international airports in Pakistan, 2013.................. 23
Table 8: List of items not tested at Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi......................................................... 29
Table 9: Arms supply, existing and required, at customs units visited by CRU, 2013 ............................................. 31
Table 10: Check posts by location, 2013................................................................................................................ 32
Table 11: Unofficial crossing points noted by custom units, 2013........................................................................ 34
Table 12: Customs units’ position on the impact of automation, 2013................................................................. 43
Table 13: LEA coordinating with Customs units, 2013......................................................................................... 44
Annex B: Pictures of the study

CRU Team with Ms. Rubina Wasti, Director, DGTR, 2013

Customs Research Team at CRU, DGTR Islamabad, 2013

Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013

Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013

Customs Research Team at Custom House Peshwar
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

Customs Research Team at ANF, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, ASO, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Peshawar, 2013

Data collection, Lahore, 2013
Customs Research Team at the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the “Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis” training course, 11-22 November 2013

Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and BMSC officials in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on the conclusion of the “Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis” training course
Pakistan Customs Research Team, Afghan Team and UNODC officials at “Afghanistan and Pakistan Customs’ Research Capacity Building Meeting”, 13-18 December 2013, held at Vienna International Center (VIC) Vienna, Austria

57th Session of The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014

Pakistan Customs Team and UNODC officials at The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014
Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials at the “Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS” training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014

Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials on the conclusion of the “Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS” training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014
Final day of 5-Day Training on “Specialized Software for Criminal Intelligence Analysis-i2 Analyst Notebook & i2 Ibase”
Dushanbe, 2014
Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Director General, Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), Karachi with the officers and staff of DGTR on Customs Day, 26th January, 2015

Research Team Members at DGTR, 2015

At United Nations office at Vienna International Centre (VIC), 2014

Research Team at work at Customs Research Unit (CRU), 2015
About Research Team

Muhammad Rashid Munir Siddiqui, is currently working on deputation with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as Senior National Research Consultant for the Research Capacity Building Project in Pakistan Customs. Born on 1st September, 1972 in Multan, he received his elementary education in his hometown. Later, he did M.Sc.(Hons.) in Agricultural Entomology (1995-97) from University of Agriculture, Faisalabad. He has, on his credit, degrees in MBA General Management (2004-05) from Preston University, Karachi and Executive MBA (2008-10) from Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). He is also a member of Project Management Institute (PMI) a not-for-profit association for the project, program and portfolio management profession. As part of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), Pakistan since 2002, he held diverse middle management positions related to trade regulation and facilitation, cargo examination and assessment, counter narcotics and border management in different field Collectorates. He has also served as Executive Magistrate for four years (1998-2002) in Punjab provincial government. He is part of visiting faculty of different educational institutions including Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), Karachi. He has attended a number of international and national short-term courses, conferences, seminars and workshops on capacity building, human resource management and System re-engineering including annual Convention on Narcotic Drugs-NCD (Vienna, 2014), Trainings at Border Management Staff College (BMSC) of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), (Dushanbe 2013 and 2014), Basic and Intermediate Training Courses in ArcGIS, UNODC, (Islamabad, 2014), Basic Course in IBM Analyst Notebook i2 (Dushanbe, 2014).

Zehra Tahir Naqvi is an officer of Pakistan Customs Service since 2008. She has a varied experience of working at Regional Tax Office (RTO), Karachi, MCC PaCCS, Directorate General of Transit Trade, Karachi and the Directorate General of Training & Research, (Customs), Karachi, as Deputy Director. She is Masters in English Literature from University of Karachi. She has attended a lot of short term & long term Training Courses/Seminars/Workshops related to Border Management, Customs Procedures, Organizational Behavior, Project Management and Capacity Building. She has been the part of Intermediate & Advanced Level Trainings in SPSS & ArcGIS held at OSCE Border Management College, Dushanbe, Tajikistan (2013) and in Islamabad (2014). She has successfully completed various UNODC online courses on Drug Identification, Human Trafficking, Money Laundering & Risk Management. She enjoys reading, movies, music and writing poetry. She is also fond of sports specially Tennis and swimming. Her passions include travelling and learning languages.
Asif Khan has been serving Pakistan Customs since 1996. He holds Masters degree in Public Administration (MPA) from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad with majors in Management and Marketing. During his professional career he has worked in diverse positions related to assessment and examination of cargo, audit and automation of Customs Procedures. He has been awarded with a number of meritorious certificates and letters of appreciation for his distinguished performance. He is currently working for Capacity Building Project with UNODC.

He has attended a number of training courses and seminars on Effective People Management, Project Management, Leadership Skills, Conflict Management, Basic Computer Concepts & Operations, Information Technology, Change Management, UNODC online courses on Drug Identification & Interdiction Techniques, Container Control Programme, Risk Management and other computer based trainings in ArcGIS, SPSS, IBM i2 Analyst Notebook etc. He has also attended a number of international trainings held at Border Management Staff College (BMSC) of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and trainings organised by United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC) held in Tajikistan, Dushanbe (2013-14).

He possesses exceptional skills in professional writing and regularly contributes in Pakistan’s leading English News Papers & Magazines viz Dawn, The News International, Daily Nation, Social Pages, Mag Weekly. He has, on his credit, coverage of many international events including “Water Calligraphy” by Dr. Kanta Kochhar Lindgren, an Associate Professor at the University of Washington on the issue of global water shortage and an international workshop organized by US Consulate featuring Sarah Long Holland, Development Manager of New England Foundation for the Arts at Boston, USA. He regularly covers the events organized by Pakistan American Cultural Centre (PACC) and German Goethe-Institut in Pakistan.

Syed Samsam Qadir Shah, joined Pakistan Customs in 1983 as Preventive Officer in Collectorate of Preventive, Karachi. He has done his Bachelors of Arts (B.A.) from Government College Lahore (1982) with a Roll of Honor Award for his performance in sports. He has so far served in diverse positions related to Investigation & Prosecution, Drug Enforcement and Anti-Smuggling. He received letter of appreciation from Nordic Police in the field of Investigation and Prosecution in 1997. He had a chance to serve as a volunteer for Disaster Assistance Camp (DAC), carried out by American Forces and other countries at Chaklala Base (2005-2006).

He is an International Hockey Player, and has the honour to represent Pakistan in various International Hockey events within and outside Pakistan during 1980 to 1982. Later he also served as the national coach of hockey team for PHF’s Goal Keeper’s Academy, Karachi (2011-12). He is also a National Golfer having a distinguished ranking of Single HCP (4).

He has attended a number of training courses related to his professional responsibilities including computer based trainings in MS office, MS Excel, MS Access, Data entry Analysis and Interpretation and MS PowerPoint. He has also attended local and international trainings related to Border Control & Interdiction Techniques, Karachi conducted by US Customs(2011), Trainings in SPSS and ArcGIS at OSCE Border Management College, Dushanbe, Tajikistan (2013) and Islamabad (2014) and Intermediate Training course in IBM i2 Notebook in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (2014).
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

March 2015
Acknowledgements

This study, “Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs” has been conducted by the Customs Research Unit (CRU) at Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), Karachi. Pakistan Customs would like to thank and acknowledge the technical and financial support extended by Afghan Opiate Trade Project (AOTP) of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for successful completion of this study.

The study was carried out under the technical supervision of:

Ghulam Ahmed, Director General, Directorate General of Training and Research, Karachi
Rubina Wasti, Director, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
Abdul Basit Ch., Principal/Project Coordinator Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
Saeed Akram, Additional Director, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
Amer Rashid, Deputy Director/Coordinator, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi

Research Team:
Rashid Munir Siddiqui, National Research Consultant.
Zehra Tahir Naqvi, Team Member, Customs Research Unit
Asif Khan, Team Member, Customs Research Unit
Syed Samsam Qadir Shah, Team Member, Customs Research Unit

IT and Technical Assistance:
Noor Muhammad, Instructor, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi
Nabi Bakhsh Sahito, IT Professional, Directorate of Training and Research, Karachi

Disclaimer:
This report is based on data collected directly from 57 Pakistan Customs field offices through a customised questionnaire. While all necessary precautions have been taken in the compilation of this report to ensure accuracy. However, some inadvertent errors cannot be ruled out. Hence, it would be appreciated errors, if any, could be brought to the attention of the research team.
# Table of Contents

**Acknowledgements** .................................................................................................................................................................................. I  
**Customs Research Unit (CRU)** ................................................................................................................................................................. V  
**Executive summary** .................................................................................................................................................................................... VI  
**Preface** ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... VIII

## CHAPTER I: Introduction........................................................................................................................................................................ 1  
1.1 The structure of Pakistan Customs ..................................................................................................................................................... 3  
1.2 Why a gap analysis and need assessment ........................................................................................................................................... 4  
1.3 Study parameters .................................................................................................................................................................................... 4  
1.4 Research methodology ........... 5  
1.5 Report structure .................................................................................................................................................................................. 7  
1.6 Limitations .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7

## CHAPTER II: Identifying deficiencies in the interdiction capacity of Pakistan Customs ................................................................. 9  
2.1 Human resource ................................................................................................................................................................................... 10  
2.1.1 Staff strength ............................................................................................................................................................................. 11  
2.1.2 Training ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 14  
2.2 Equipment and infrastructure .............................................................................................................................................................. 17  
2.2.1 Scanning devices ....................................................................................................................................................................... 17  
2.2.2 CCTV Cameras ............................................................................................................................................................................ 24  
2.2.3 Canine units .............................................................................................................................................................................. 24  
2.2.4 Drugs and precursors testing kits ........................................................................................................................................... 25  
2.2.5 Laboratories and testing facilities ......................................................................................................................................... 26  
2.2.6 Arms and ammunition ........................................................................................................................................................... 31  
2.2.7 Check posts ............................................................................................................................................................................... 32  
2.2.8 Unofficial crossing points ...................................................................................................................................................... 33  
2.3 Operational, technical and IT-related issues ..................................................................................................................................... 41  
2.3.1 Database .................................................................................................................................................................................. 41  
2.3.2 Risk profiling ........................................................................................................................................................................ 41  
2.3.3 Automation of procedures ................................................................................................................................................... 43  
2.3.4 Information sharing and coordination with law enforcement agencies ................................................................................... 43

## CHAPTER III: Need assessment and recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 45  
3.1 Human resource .................................................................................................................................................................................. 46  
3.2 Infrastructure and equipment .......................................................................................................................................................... 47  
3.3 Operational, technical and IT-related issues ................................................................................................................................... 48

## CHAPTER IV: Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................................ 51  
Annex A: questionnaire used for data collection and Lists of Pics/Maps/Fig ............................................................................................ 55  
Annex B: pictures of the study ................................................................................................................................................................. 67

About Research Team .................................................................................................................................................................................. 74
ACRONYMS

AC Assistant Collector
ACE Assistant Chemical Examiner
ANF Anti Narcotics Force
AO Appraising Officer
AOTP Afghan Opiate Trade Project, UNODC
ASF Airport Security Force
ASO Anti Smuggling Organization
CBT Computer-based Training
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CND Commission on Narcotics and Drugs
CRU Customs Research Unit
DC Deputy Collector
DEC Drug Enforcement Cell
DGTR Directorate General of Training and Research
DII Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation
DTT Directorate of Transit and Trade
EDI Electronic Data Interchange
EO Examining Officer
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBR Federal Board of Revenue
FC Frontier Constabulary
GPO General Post Office
HEJ (Lab) Hussein Ebrahim Jamal (Laboratory)
IPS Inspector Preventive Service
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
KICT Karachi International Container Terminal
KP Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa
LEA Law Enforcement Agencies
MCC Model Customs Collectorate
MCC(A) East Model Customs Collectorate (Appraisement East)
MCC(A) West Model Customs Collectorate (Appraisement West)
MCC(Exp) Model Customs Collectorate (Exports)
MCC(P) Model Customs Collectorate (Preventive)
NIHL National Institute of Health Laboratory
NLC National Logistics Cell
ODRP Office of Defence Representative in Pakistan
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA Principal Appraiser
PaCCS Pakistan Customs Computerized System
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCSIR</td>
<td>Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCU</td>
<td>Port Control Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICT</td>
<td>Pakistan International Container Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSA</td>
<td>Pakistan Maritime Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAL</td>
<td>Pakistan Revenue Automation (Pvt)Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Preventive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QICT</td>
<td>Qasim International Container Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>Risk Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Senior Preventive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Superintendent Preventive Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WeBOC</td>
<td>Web Based One Customs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Customs Research Unit (CRU):

**Picture 1:** Research Team with Mr. Ghulam Ahmed, DG, DGTR, 2014

Terms of Reference between UNODC and FBR were signed on May 16, 2013 which resulted in the formation of CRU at DGTR (Customs), Karachi, with the following main objectives:

- To build the capacity of a team at Pakistan Customs so that it can carry out research on key drug-related issues in Pakistan.
- To explore Pakistan Customs current capability to identify emerging and evolving risks in the areas of drug trafficking and crime control.
- To highlight deficiencies with regard to procedures, rules and laws relevant to functions of Pakistan Customs.
- To evaluate existing resources at Pakistan Customs and its ability to address needs relating to equipment, infrastructure and human resources.

DGTR provided the space and nominated a team comprising three Customs officers supervised by a Customs Coordinator for the project while, UNODC provided all necessary financial and technical support. In order to streamline operations and foster a better working relationship between these stakeholders, a National Research Consultant (NRC), based in the CRU, was also appointed by UNODC.

To have a better understanding of the current situation of Pakistan Customs, the study was formally initiated in August 2013. During the course of this study, the research team learnt and put into action skills relating to data collection, analysis and presentation. This report is the first document of its kind produced by CRU. The experience and expertise gained by the research team during its compilation has generated a great deal of confidence at the Unit with regard to the production of future research studies.

**Picture 2:** Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi

**Picture 3:** Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi
Executive summary:

Pakistan Customs is one of the premier border controlling agency of Pakistan with its presence at all international entry and exit points. In addition to that, it has its operational units all around the country for maintaining vigilance and check on inland movement of smuggled or contraband goods. Pakistan Customs has a brilliant history of carrying out tasks related to control of illicit drug and precursors trafficking in line with international standards. This study was carried out in order to assess, evaluate and further optimize this operational capacity, with a particular focus on identifying deficiencies in existing procedures, infrastructure, equipment and human resources along with suggesting the measures required to address the same. The study is based on data collected from visits by the research team to 57 field units of Pakistan Customs all around the country. Following are the main findings.

• There is a shortage of staff at Pakistan Customs field units, particularly with regard to illicit drugs control. There is a noticeable dearth of examination and assessment officers at sea ports and dry ports, which needs to be addressed immediately in light of the rising level of international trade. At the same time there is a shortage of inspectors, preventive officers, sepoys and havaldars\(^1\) at airports, border stations and check posts as well as ASOs. These officials form the backbone of all operational units. In addition, existing sepoys and havaldars lack training in arms and ammunition.
• There is an acute need for staff training related to control of illicit drugs and precursor trafficking, particularly in areas of identification of drugs and precursors, concealment methods, search and investigation techniques, and the handling of imported, exported and transit cargo. Although, DGTR has done a remarkable job in imparting training to customs officers and staff in different fields of professional expertise, yet the proportion of trainings related to drugs & precursors in last three years is quite low being 15.2% in 2011-12, 16.9% in 2012-13 and 10.5% in 2013-14 of the total number of participants in other trainings. Short term training courses as well as Computer Based Training (CBT) modules have been conducted from time to time but there is a need to enhance the number of local and foreign trainings related to drugs and precursors for field staff.
• Pakistan Customs requires greater drug testing laboratory capacity. The organization has only four laboratories – two main units at Karachi and Lahore and two comparatively smaller facilities at Faisalabad and Port Muhammad bin Qasim – and all suffer not only from a shortage of staff and equipment but also from proper training facilities for existing staff. As a result, seized illicit drugs and precursors are sent to the National Institute of Health laboratory (NIHL) in Islamabad.
• Modern scanners for detecting illicit goods in passengers’ baggage or body, containerized cargo and vehicles as well as surveillance cameras though available at ports and check posts, do not meet the actual requirement. Therefore, the majority of field units require modern scanners and CCTV cameras to ensure effective vigilance and check.
• Canine units with trained dogs and dog-handlers constitute another area of prime consideration as these are one of the most effective tools in illicit drugs detection. At present, there are only three canine units with Pakistan Customs at Karachi. New units need to be established at Peshawar, Lahore, Quetta and Gawadar.
• Illicit drugs and precursors testing kits, mainly provided by UNODC, are available at 70% of the customs units visited by the research team. These kits should be available at all units and training should be carried out in the use of these kits.
• There has been no procurement of weapons for Pakistan Customs units since 1989, therefore available weapons are not only outdated but also unreliable and non-operational. Hence, latest weapons and training in arms handling is required for customs staff.
• In order to carry out effective vigilance on the movement of smuggled and contraband goods including drugs and precursors, there is a dire need to reinforce Anti Smuggling Organisations (ASOs) and Directorates of Intelligence and Investigation (I&I) through provision of resources for building a strong information network, procurement of

\(^1\) Sepoy is the lowest tier of operational staff at Pakistan Customs. A Sepoy is promoted to a Havaldar.
operational equipment, tracking and communication devices, fully armed vehicles as well as development of a central control room.

- On the basis of subject research study and feedback from different customs field formations, located in four provinces of Pakistan, Customs Research Unit (CRU) proposes creation of 32 new check posts at unofficial crossing points along the border. In addition, existing check posts and border customs stations need reinforcement in terms of staff, equipment and modern infrastructure.
- Currently, there is only one operational marine customs unit (in Karachi). With a 1,064 km coast line, Pakistan Customs needs more marine units and the specialized speed boats, night vision glasses and binoculars, safety equipment and other accessories that are required for sea patrolling and the surveillance of coastal areas.
- There is no centralized database for maintaining an up-to-date record of information on illicit drugs and precursors at Pakistan Customs. Although FBR maintains a consolidated data, there is no software available to link all the MCCs and update this information on real time basis. In the wake of transition of Pakistan Customs towards automated clearance system that deals with imports, exports and transit cargo, there is an emergent need to further strengthen risk profiling mechanism relating to narcotics control. As such, most illicit drug and precursor seizures reported by Pakistan Customs to date have been made as a result of manual examination, snap checking, random selection and by using information-based interdiction techniques.
- Coordination with local and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) of neighbouring countries needs to be further strengthened through more frequent interactions for better operational synchronization and information sharing.
Preface

The role of research and development cannot be over-emphasized with regard to the professional and technical advancement and uplift of an organisation. On one hand, these activities enable the organisation to analyze its internal and external challenges vis-à-vis its future role and responsibilities, and on the other hand, they enhance its capacity to use its resources efficiently and effectively in facing these challenges. It is within this context that the Federal Board of Revenue, in collaboration with UNODC, has established the Customs Research Unit (CRU) at Directorate General of Training and Research, Karachi.

The unit’s primary aim is the development of research capacity at Pakistan Customs relating to the topics of professional interest in order to generate reports, newsletters and analytical material for the benefit of the organisation. The instant study on “Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs” is the first step in this regard.

This study is commendable in the sense that it, not only addresses the present and future needs of Pakistan Customs, relating specifically to its role as an effective border controlling agency, but also gives a general picture of major deficiencies in the areas of human resource, equipment and infrastructure. The members of the Customs Research Unit, representing varied operational backgrounds, have made a meaningful effort in collecting data from 57 field units of Pakistan Customs, analyzing the same and compiling it in the form of this Report. This study is a milestone for the Directorate General of Training and Research and will prove to be a precedent for similar future endeavors.

Needless to say that the relevance of this study increases manifold in the context of the geo-strategic position of Pakistan on the world map characterized by its porous borders with Afghanistan and Iran, its long unmanned coastline and a complex tribal belt which makes the country highly vulnerable to illicit drug trafficking. This reality is a source of growing concern to the global community as well.

As a result, the role of Pakistan Customs which is one of the premier border controlling agency performing its drugs-controlling functions at Pakistan’s international borders, has also become more complex and challenging. There is a need to probe all such factors which can improve the performance and effectiveness of the organization. This can only be done through an enhanced focus on research and analysis. Hence, initiatives like CRU will prove to be a substantive measure to strengthen Pakistan Customs in general and improving the control of illicit drugs and precursors in the region, in particular.

I would like to thank AOTP and the Country Office of UNODC Pakistan for their interest in working with and supporting Pakistan Customs in the areas of capacity building and operational issues. Now, that we are working together towards a common goal, I feel that this study sets a good example of mutual cooperation. I look forward more collaborative efforts between DGTR and UNODC in future.

Ghulam Ahmed

Director General
Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter I: Introduction

Pakistan is one of those countries of Asia which remain in world focus as far as trafficking of illicit drugs is concerned. This is mainly due to a 2,538 km long and porous border in west with Afghanistan, which is the world’s largest producer of opium, opiates and cannabis resin. Certain other factors related to Pakistan’s geo-strategic location especially its 909 km rugged terrain with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the south-west, a 1,600 km border with the Republic of India in the east and 1,062 km of unmanned coastline in the south also make the country highly vulnerable for trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors. Opium cultivation in Afghan provinces that border Pakistan is on the rise. According to recent reports, cultivation has risen markedly in recent years, from 74,000 hectares in 2002 to 224,000 hectares in 2014.

Drug traffickers are increasingly looking for alternative routes to supplement old ones, and southern and southwestern areas of Pakistan are part of major drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan to global markets. According to the 2013 World Drug Report, a new maritime route that travels southwards from Afghanistan via ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Makran coast in Pakistan is being increasingly used by drug traffickers to supply illicit drugs to global markets through ports in East and West Africa. In addition, heroin is being trafficked southward from Afghanistan via the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, from where it reaches the Middle East via Iraq (Map 1). Also, drug seizure data shows that the opiates produced in Afghanistan are fast replacing and competing the opiates produced and consumed in East and South-East Asia.

Another area of concern for Pakistan in this regard is the local consumption of these narcotic drugs. A recent report shows an increase in domestic illicit drug consumption in Pakistan: an estimated 5.9 to 6.45 million people aged between 15 and 64 are drug consumers.

Therefore, Pakistan appears to remain as focus of global attention in terms of trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors, and measures to combat this illicit trade.

Map 1: Opiates trafficking through Pakistan, 2013


---

5 Drugs Monitoring Site(DMS), UNODC, 2013
7 UNODC World Drug Report, 2013
1.1 The structure of Pakistan Customs

Pakistan Customs, being one of the premier revenue collection and border controlling agencies of Pakistan, has its presence all around the country with its functional units at all sea, dry and airports of Pakistan. These units are officially called Model Customs Collectorates (MCCs) and are assigned with monitoring and clearance of import and export cargo, baggage, couriers and passenger traffic. In addition, there are specialized Anti Smuggling Units (ASOs) and a number of inland and border check posts working under the MCCs to prevent transportation of smuggled/contraband goods, illicit drugs and narcotics.

There is also a specialized Directorate General of Transit Trade, which handles the clearance of the transit cargo moving through Pakistan’s territory. In addition, there is a Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation which maintains internal checks on irregularities found in import and export cargo and prevents attempts for evasion of duty/taxes and performs anti-smuggling functions.

In addition to that there are other Directorates General assigned with specialised tasks related to Valuation, Post Clearance Audit, Internal Audit, Input-output Co-efficient determination, Training & Research and Automation & Reforms.

Pakistan Customs enjoys a competitive edge over most of the public sector organisations in Pakistan due to its focus on automation, system reforms, trade facilitation and business processes re-engineering. These features have been a hallmark of this organisation in all areas of its professional activity due to which it has been successful in meeting the challenges related to revenue generation, tariff optimization, tax reforms and protection of local industry, in a progressive and pro-active manner. In addition to that border management has also been a major area of excellence for Pakistan Customs, receiving unprecedented global acclaim in areas of drugs and precursors’ control, anti-money laundering measures and protection of intellectual property rights.

Fig 1: Operational structure of Pakistan Customs, 2013

Source: Federal Board of Revenue, Pakistan

1.2 Why a gap analysis and need assessment

There is an increasing global and regional concern regarding control of illicit drugs and precursors produced, trafficked and consumed in and through Pakistan. FBR is not only fully aware of the sensitivity of this issue but also acknowledges its role in the prevention and control of all such activities.

A 2013 UNODC report\(^9\) suggests that there has been an increase in heroin trafficking from dry ports and seaports in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran to Western and Central Europe. Another study conducted during the same year\(^10\) estimates that 150 tons of opiates enter Pakistan annually. In addition, Pakistan is reportedly a major transit point for the trafficking of large quantities of precursors like acetic anhydride which are required to produce heroin in Afghanistan\(^11\). These figures highlight the need for and importance of studying Pakistan Customs, which is the premier border control agency of Pakistan, in perspective of its organizational strength, professional capacity and operational capabilities vis-à-vis control of illicit drugs and precursors. Hence this gap analysis and needs assessment was proposed to be the title of maiden research study to be conducted by CRU.

This study provides an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan Customs for the benefit of all internal and external stakeholders, and raises awareness of the challenges the organization faces. It also aims at making recommendations based purely on the feedback and data collected from operational field units of the organisation, for the improvement of systems and procedures as well as suggesting the measures that need to be taken in order to optimize its operating capacity.

Accounting for the past performance and achievements in controlling the menace of illicit drugs and precursors, this study deals with acquiring first hand knowledge about the deficiencies, gaps and barriers hindering Pakistan Customs from becoming the most effective drugs and narcotics control agency of the country. It also focuses on existing and required levels of financial, technical and intellectual resources meant for achieving this goal through investment in the areas of infrastructure, human resource development, laboratories and equipment. The role of international community and donor agencies in providing support to Pakistan Customs for combating this global challenge has also been discussed.

1.3 Study parameters

This gap analysis and needs assessment focuses on three key areas of Pakistan Customs:

I. Human resource: The report analyzes the overall issues related to human resource of Pakistan Customs. This includes the study of gaps in the existing and required levels of staff strength, training and capacity building, motivation and leadership. It also covers the administrative issues related to the recruitment, transfers/postings, promotions and grant of rewards and incentives. Thus an overview of current situation of human resource in the organisation has been presented alongwith a need assessment in this field to meet the future challenges.

II. Equipment and infrastructure: The report estimates the availability and requirement of essential equipment for the detection and seizure of illicit drug and precursors. A focus has been made on scanners, X-ray machines, CCTV cameras and canine units at airports, dry ports, sea ports and check posts. It also examines the need for new check posts, marine posts and customs stations and highlights the need of some major infrastructural requirements like chemical testing laboratories, drugs and precursors testing kits, networking/tracking/communication devices as well as arms and ammunition vehicles, speed boats, hovercrafts and other accessories required for improving enforcement capacity of Pakistan Customs.

III. Operational, technical and IT issues: The report also focuses on operational, technical and IT-related issues at Pakistan Customs. Operational issues broadly include illicit drugs and precursors’ detection methodology, mobilization

\(^9\) Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia (2013), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.

\(^10\) In-depth Evaluation of Container Control Programme (2013), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.

capacity and logistics with regard to patrolling and conducting searches and raids and information gathering networking. Technical issues include system automation, equipment handling, reporting and coordination. While IT-related issues include the availability of a central database, risk profiling system, and the capacity for record keeping and information sharing.

1.4 Research methodology

The research methodology for this report is qualitative involving collection of data from primary and secondary sources. For this purpose, a questionnaire (Annex-A) was devised keeping in view all the study parameters discussed above. Questions included in this questionnaire were cohesive and exhaustive covering all the aspects related to professional capability of the organisation with particular reference to drugs and precursors. Several brain storming sessions with experts and test runs were conducted before finalization of questionnaire so that it is easily comprehensible for all tiers of organisation and fetches practical and realistic information from the most relevant staff. The members of research team were imparted with basic training for conducting interviews and collection of data through this questionnaire.

The questionnaire was then distributed through Assistant/Deputy Collectors (Headquarters) of MCCs and Directorates to customs staff posted there for duties relating to examination, assessment, anti-smuggling, transit clearance, or any other assignments relevant to drugs and precursors’ control.

However, in order to ensure safety and accuracy of data, the research team personally visited 57 Pakistan Customs units (Map 2) at sea, dry and airports and check posts in the four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan) and Islamabad Capital Territory. At each unit, the team carried out structured interviews with customs staff in order to get the questionnaire filled up. In addition to that, customs staff posted at canine units, Port Control Units (PCUs) and General Post Offices (GPOs) was also interviewed to get the questionnaire filled up.

Officials of customs laboratories in Karachi, Lahore, Port Qasim and Faisalabad were also interviewed. Laboratory facility at Karachi was exhaustively studied to understand the role of forensic laboratories, equipment and training in effective control of illicit drugs and precursors. The officials of Pakistan Revenue Automation Ltd (PRAL) responsible for designing and managing Pakistan Customs database were also interviewed.

Other data sources included reports, journals, articles and newsletters published by UNODC, INCB, WCO and customs organisations of Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics were studies. Records available with FBR and Ministry of Narcotics Control, Pakistan were also consulted. Mainly, the data used for this study is primary, secondary data was only used to support research in cases where first-hand information was not available.

The data collected from 57 customs field units was subsequently fed into MS Access database and then converted into Microsoft Excel format for analysis and preparation of this report.
1.4.1 Literature review

In order to familiarize the members of research team with the concept of the research topic as well as knowledge about different research techniques and methodologies; primary, secondary and tertiary data sources; data collection and presentation techniques; report format and structure, a review of available literature was carried out encompassing library and on-line sources. In this connection, along with the reference books and journals on research techniques, Annual Reports published by World Customs Organization (WCO), UNODC, INCB, Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), Ministry of Narcotics Control, Pakistan and other relevant national and international agencies were consulted. Articles, research papers and reports focusing on the concept of ‘gap analysis’ and ‘need assessment’ were also reviewed.

1.4.2 Sources of data collection

Members of the research team made field visits to

- Sea ports at Karachi, Port Muhammad bin Qasim and Gawadar.
- Dry ports at Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Sambrial, Multan, Faisalabad, Hyderabad and Quetta.
- International airports at Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Faisalabad, Sambrial, Multan, Peshawar and Quetta.
- Directorates of Transit trade at Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar.
- Directorates of Intelligence and Investigation at Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad.
- Customs stations and Check posts in Baluchistan (Baleli, Awaran, Galangur, Nokandi, Shelabagh, Pasni, Jeewani, Hab, Gadani, Chaman and Taftan).
- Customs stations at Kohat and Torkham.
- Port Control Units (PCUs) at Karachi and Faisalabad.
At all these field units, experienced staff in service cadres of Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents, Principal Appraisers, Appraisers, Examination Officers and Inspectors, (according to the nature of the assignment) were called in for interview and the questionnaire was filled in after thorough discussion. At most of the field units a panel of officials jointly filled in the questionnaire and it was later endorsed by the Assistant/Deputy Collector in charge of the concerned section too.

1.4.3 Data management and analysis

The data was entered into Microsoft Access database and organized according to standard practices. Subsequently, it was converted into MS Excel format for interpretation and analysis by the members of research team. On the basis of this data, charts, graphs, Tables and Maps were developed using SPSS and ArcGIS softwares. The report was drafted by the research team with the technical support of UNODC. The main findings of this report were presented to the donor community in Vienna on 19 March 2014 during the 57th session of the Commission of Narcotic Drugs.

1.5 Report structure

The report comprises four chapters as follows:

**Chapter I: Introduction** provides an overview of the research topic and its relevance to the professional development of Pakistan Customs. It also describes the research methodology, sources of data collection, data management and analyses and report structure.

**Chapter II: Identifying Deficiencies in the Interdiction Capacity of Pakistan Customs** outlines the existing facilities and infrastructure of Pakistan Customs related to drugs and precursors’ control and provides the findings in relation to the deficiencies in the areas the operational and enforcement capacity of the organisation which are broadly categorized under three headings i.e. (i) human resource (ii) equipment and infrastructure and (iii) operational, technical and IT-related capabilities.

**Chapter III: Needs Assessment and Recommendations** highlights the future requirements of the organization to address the operational deficiencies related to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking.

**Chapter IV: Conclusion** gives the crux of whole study, highlighting all the areas covered in preceding chapters. It enlists all the gaps in the operational capacity of the organisation and suggest remedies to address the gaps in a progressive and pro-active manner.

1.6 Limitations

As this study is the first of its kind conducted by the CRU, there were a number of limitations identified by the research team during its visits to 57 Pakistan Customs field units. The members of research team coming from varied professional backgrounds

---

12 Special training sessions were organized for the members of research team to develop their expertise in use of these softwares.
had no expertise in Research methods, therefore, informal and formal training sessions were arranged with the support of UNODC to overcome this deficiency\textsuperscript{13}.

The team had to travel across Pakistan in a limited time and gaining access to customs stations and check posts in KP, Baluchistan and Gawadar was difficult due to critical law and order situation, poor road network and security issues. While the mobility of the team from one customs station to another in these provinces was negatively impacted, access was still made possible with the cooperation of ASOs, which provided the research team with security services.

In addition, the research team encountered a number of problems relating to the collection of quantitative data from some check posts and customs stations located in remote areas because of the absence of computerized records regarding staff strength, training and seizures. At these customs stations and check posts, record keeping is carried out manually and in order to fulfill the requirements of the questionnaire, the data were compiled manually. This process took a great deal of time.

\textbf{Picture 7:} Orientation session for research team, Vienna, December 2013

\textbf{Picture 8:} ArcGIS and SPSS training session for research team, Islamabad, May 2014

\textsuperscript{13} Three such sessions were arranged: In November 2013, the members of research team were provided with training in research methodology, MS Excel, SPSS and ArcGIS by the Afghan Opiate Trade Project, Regional Programme of UNODC, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Later on an orientation session was arranged at Vienna in December, 2014. Another formal training on MS Excel and ArcGIS was conducted by UNODC at Islamabad in May, 2014.
Chapter II: Identifying deficiencies in the interdiction capacity of Pakistan Customs
Chapter II: Identifying deficiencies in the interdiction capacity of Pakistan Customs

Pakistan Customs has always been forthcoming in taking initiatives with regard to controlling of illicit drug and precursors' trafficking, in line with international standards and there has been a series of tremendous achievements in the past. This study has, however, been carried out to probe into the gaps and deficiencies in the operational, technical and infrastructural capacity of the organisation in order to further optimize and enhance the existing performance. Following are the findings of the study in some key areas of organisational functioning:

2.1 Human resource

Pakistan Customs performs multiple tasks which, inter alia, include import and export cargo clearance, passenger and baggage handling, transit trade to Afghanistan, anti-smuggling and anti-narcotics activities, intellectual property rights protection and anti-money laundering activities. Therefore, the organization has a diverse workforce stationed across the country especially at all official international border points. Table 1 provides an outline of the key staff positions (basic pay scale 16 and below) performing jobs in prevention of illicit drugs and precursors in the organisation and the duties required by these posts.

Table 1: Job description of different staff positions at Pakistan Customs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Duty</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Job description¹⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import &amp; Export processing/clearance staff</td>
<td>Principal Appraiser (PA)</td>
<td>Assessment of duty/taxes, determine value of Consignment (Import/Export) and allowing out of charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appraising Officer (AO)</td>
<td>Assessment of cargo and baggage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examination Officer (EO)</td>
<td>Examination of container cargo and baggage at sea and dry ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive staff</td>
<td>Superintendent Preventive Service (SPS)</td>
<td>Supervision of field operations at airports and anti-smuggling organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspector Preventive Service (IPS)</td>
<td>Supervision, monitoring of subordinate staff, anti-smuggling operations, passenger handling at airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Preventive Officer (SPO)</td>
<td>Examination of cargo and baggage, and anti-smuggling and field operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventive Officer (PO)</td>
<td>Examination of cargo and baggage, and anti-smuggling and field operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-smuggling Staff</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Supervision of anti-smuggling and field operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Anti-smuggling operations, Examination of cargo and baggage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>Anti-smuggling operations and examination of cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Investigation (I &amp; I) Staff</td>
<td>Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)</td>
<td>Supervision of Intelligence and information collection, seizures and contraventions, preventing leakage of revenue and smuggling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Officers/Inspectors (I&amp;I)</td>
<td>Intelligence and information collection, affect seizures and contraventions, preventing leakage of revenue and smuggling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office /Support Staff</td>
<td>Clerks (Lower Division and Upper Division)</td>
<td>Office support, file work, records maintenance and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sepoys/ Havaladars</td>
<td>Field support staff – part of patrol and raid units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁴ The descriptions given here show a set of generalized tasks assigned to each post out of which staff can perform any one or more tasks depending upon nature and place of their posting.
2.1.1 Staff strength

The Federal Board of Revenue, the governing body of Pakistan Customs, allocates specific officers (basic scale\(^{15}\) 17 to 20) and staff (basic scale 1 to 16) to each customs unit proportionate to the amount of work, territorial jurisdiction and functional requirements. With gradual expansion in size and diversification of the functions assigned to Pakistan Customs, there is a general feeling at the organization that staffing levels have become insufficient. Therefore, the questionnaire was designed to include questions related to the availability of staff at customs units.

Data collected from the 57 Pakistan Customs unit visits revealed that staffing levels at almost all of the units was less than the sanctioned strength. Although, this sanctioned strength was calculated in 1998 considering the realities of that time but despite exponential increase in work load no revision has been made in it. At the same time, a number of new MCCs, Directorates and borders check points have been created after 1998 but no new recruitments have been made to meet the staffing requirements of these entities. Their requirements have been met through existing workforce resulting in over burdening of staff. It means that the gap in this area is twofold: (i) gap between the currently working and the sanctioned strength (ii) gap between the sanctioned and actually required strength. Most of the units reported that even if the gap between the existing strength and the sanctioned strength is bridged, there would still be a requirement of 20-30 % more staff to meet the demands of their current workload. The findings relating to staff availability are displayed in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Sanctioned Staff Strength(^{16})</th>
<th>Working Strength</th>
<th>Difference (total)</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Preventive Officer</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>(-136)</td>
<td>(-31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector Preventive Service</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>(-25)</td>
<td>(-29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Preventive Service</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(-6)</td>
<td>(-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>(-53)</td>
<td>(-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraising Officers</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>(-132)</td>
<td>(-38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Appraiser</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>(+20)</td>
<td>(+30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining Officers</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>(-151)</td>
<td>(-51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepoys/Havaladars</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>(-138)</td>
<td>(-10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Admin Wing, FBR, Islamabad*

It is evident from the above Table that, in contrast of the quantum of trade handled by Pakistan Customs at sea- dry- and air ports, there is a visible shortage of staff at all level of organisation. This shortfall is quite noticeable in cadres of appraising and examining officers which show a deficiency of 38% and 51% of the available working strength respectively. A similar trend has been noticed in strength of preventive staff where in the cadres of SPO, IPS, SPS and Inspectors there exists a shortfall of 31%, 29%, 14% and 5% of the available working strength, respectively. Moreover, for sepoys and havaladars, which constitute the backbone of all field operations, patrolling and searches, this deficiency reaches upto 10% (Fig 2).

\(^{15}\) Pakistan Government has specified system of grades/scales for salary of staff and officers according to their job description and seniority where a higher the rank refer the superior the authority.

\(^{16}\) The number of staff by position allocated by FBR to different units.
With regard to staffing levels at laboratories, the shortfall is considerable (Table 3). It is reported that 50% of Assistant Chemical Examiner posts and 37.5% of Deputy Chemical Examiner posts are vacant because of a Government of Pakistan ban on new recruitment.

Table 3: Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs laboratories, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Sanctioned</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Shortfall (number)</th>
<th>Shortfall (% of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chemical Examiner</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chemical Examiner</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we analyse the situation by clubbing the staff into broader categories of enforcement staff (performing field duties at airports, check posts, anti-smuggling organisations and customs intelligence), cargo clearance staff (performing duties related to cargo examination, assessment and clearance), laboratory staff and lower operational staff (Sepoys and constables), picture becomes a little more unambiguous. (Fig 3).

Fig 3: Shortfall of staff, 2013

This gap can be observed more clearly if reflected in terms of percentage of the available human resource in different categories (Fig 4).
The gap analysis conducted at ASOs (Fig 5 and Fig 6), being the most effective units of Pakistan Customs for controlling and monitoring illicit drug and precursor trafficking, indicates that in cadres of inspectors and sepoys/havaldars there is a deficiency of staff around 30 to 50% of required strength. Moreover the trend at border check posts is not much different as well (Fig 7).

**Fig 4:** Overall staff shortfall at Pakistan Customs (% of total), 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Type</th>
<th>Shortfall (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Operational Staff</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory Staff</td>
<td>-83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Clearance</td>
<td>-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement Staff</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig 5:** Position of Inspectors at ASOs, Pakistan Customs, 2013

**Fig 6:** Positions of sepoys at ASOs, Pakistan Customs, 2013
A similar deficiency of staff was observed and reported at almost all field units visited by the members of CRU and few common factors have been identified which have aggravated the situation. Firstly, staff requirements for newly created units within the organisation such as Directorates General of Transit Trade, IOCO, Automation & Reforms and Model Collectorate Adjudication etc. have been fulfilled temporarily by posting existing staff from different Collectorates, due to which majority of the field units are facing the deficiency of appropriate staff. Secondly, due to the superannuation of staff and no fresh recruitments in the organisation since 1998, the gap in available human resource is getting wider. Therefore, there is an immediate need to address this gap by calculating the requirement of staff in each and every unit of the organisation on real time basis.

2.1.2 Training

Pakistan Customs is a frontline government agency for revenue collection, trade facilitation and border control. Its functions are, therefore, wide and varied demanding an equally diverse workforce. Prevention of trafficking of contraband goods and illicit drugs and precursors is one of the most important functions of Pakistan Customs. In order to upgrade and maintain the performance level of workforce in all fields of professional activity and keeping them abreast with the ongoing developments in their respective fields of activity, training and capacity building initiatives are very important. It was under this consideration that the research team included questions relating to training and capacity building in the questionnaire so that current levels and the effectiveness of available training could be studied and requirement for future training modules could be assessed.

Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) has established the Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), for planning, execution and monitoring of training related activities for the officers and staff of Pakistan Customs. It is performing an excellent role in the capacity building of organisation by imparting training to all cadres of officers and staff in wide range of subjects related to their professional development. It also includes trainings related to control of drugs and precursors. As evident from Table 4, quite a large number of staff and officers participated in the training programmes offered by DGTR. These trainings were conducted in diverse fields keeping in view the professional requirements of different operational units of the organisation (Table 5). In addition to that, DGTR, in collaboration with UNODC, arranged a 5-days international training course on Data Analysis in GIS and SPSS for research units of Pakistan Customs, Afghan Customs, ANF and UNODC’s Country office.

DGTR has its Directorates at Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad in order to cater the training requirements of the staff of different Collectorates closest to their location. Although, all these Directorates are well equipped with the facilities required for training,
yet there is still a significant need for expansion and improvement in the available facilities for short term and long term training programs to meet future challenges.

Table 4: Training received by customs staff at DGTR, 2011-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of Training Modules/Courses</th>
<th>No. of participants in Drug &amp; Precursors Trainings (A)</th>
<th>Number of Participants in Trainings other than Drugs &amp; Precursors (B)</th>
<th>Total No. of participants (A+B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>4359</td>
<td>5143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>3264</td>
<td>3926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2732</td>
<td>3052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DGTR, Pakistan Customs

Table 5: Courses/Modules offered by DGTR, 2011-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drugs &amp; Precursors related courses/modules</th>
<th>Broad Categories of Courses/ modules other than Drugs &amp; Precursors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Identification &amp; Search Techniques</td>
<td>WeBOC System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction Techniques</td>
<td>Counterfeiting, International Law and IPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Techniques</td>
<td>Customs Law and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>Anti-smuggling Techniques and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis intelligence &amp; Analysis</td>
<td>WTO Agreements and implications for Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Deliveries</td>
<td>General Financial Rules (GFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Intelligence &amp; Analysis</td>
<td>Post Clearance Audit (PCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction Techniques at Seaport</td>
<td>Rules of Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction Techniques at Land Control</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigating Drug Organized Crime</td>
<td>Customs and Border Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container Control Program</td>
<td>Business Processes &amp; Re-Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous Material</td>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Training on Drugs and Precursor Identification</td>
<td>Communication Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs Identification &amp; Use of UNODC Drug Test Kit</td>
<td>Staff Motivation/Leadership Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioural Indicators at Airports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dynamic International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Management &amp; Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispute Settlement Procedure under WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forms of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective People Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision Making Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernization of International Borders &amp; Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention of Illegal importation of counterfeit medicines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Express Clearing Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time Management Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skills required for Good Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revised Kyoto Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MS Excel/MS Word/Power Point 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal Research Topics and tax policy formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train-the-Trainer Course on Radiation deduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Money Laundering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretariat Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economical Growth and Taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovation in Public Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Customs Valuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti Smuggling Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Facilitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DGTR, Pakistan Customs
During the study, it has been observed that the proportion of participants receiving trainings related to drugs and precursors is much lower as compared to the total number of participants included in other courses offered by DGTR during last three years. At the same time number of participants in drugs related courses is on decline during the last three years (Fig 8). This position was also endorsed by the staff at field units especially those posted at border check posts and ASO.

**Fig 8:** Staff training at Pakistan Customs 2011-2014

A steady decline in the percentage number of participants in the courses related to drugs and precursors has also been noticed during the last three years (fig 9).

**Fig 9:** Participating staff in drugs & precursors trainings, 2011-2014

During the course of data collection from field units it has been observed that the staff posted at border check posts and ASOs is lacking in appropriate levels of trainings related to drugs and precursors as well as arms handling. At many units, for instance, although drug testing kits were available but due to lack of proper training, staff was unable to use them. Moreover, as part of organisation’s job rotation policy, the staff receiving such specialized trainings are often transferred to other sections resulting in such deficiency.

It was furthered studied by the research team that the trainings imparted were not based on any training need analysis or the specific requirements of staff. For example, at most of the units, field and supervisory staff responsible for the examination of cargo and baggage had not received training relating to examination techniques and other relevant skills. Similarly, support staff such as Sepoys and Havaladars responsible for field duties at ASOs, Directorates of I & I or check posts, had not received
any physical training including that of handling of arms and ammunition. The Directorate General of Transit Trade was created in 2013, but employees at the Directorates at Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta have not received specialized training related to illicit drugs and precursors identification, detection and seizure. Another important area of training which has reportedly been neglected relates to the skill development in reading/interpretation of scanned images of cargo. This would reduce the dependence of examining and appraising staff over private staff deputed by terminal operators at scanners. The same situation exists with regard to training in the use of scanning and X-ray machines at airports.

Generally, there is a dire need to ascertain the needs of staff posted in different sections of the organisation so that specific modules are designed by DGTR for their professional uplift.

2.2 Equipment and infrastructure

In the wake of rising volume of import, export and transit cargo and the transition of Pakistan Customs to a fully automated clearance system, there is a clear need to improve the overall infrastructure related to cargo screening and inspection so that effective vigilance of illicit drugs and precursors can be ensured without compromising the flow and facilitation of legitimate trade.

As a matter of fact, use of conventional means and procedures relying on manual inspection and physical examination of passengers, baggage or containerized cargo are not compatible with such quantum of trade. Therefore, there is an emergent need to link the customs clearance system with latest equipment for detection of illicit drugs and precursors.

Furthermore, the highly organized nature of international drug trade and the use of modern technology, diversified techniques and hi-tech equipment by traffickers to produce, transport and distribute illicit drugs and precursors, underlines the importance of equipping Pakistan Customs with modern equipment such as scanners with high resolution imaging system, X-ray machines, CCTV cameras, canine units, testing kits and laboratories in line with international standards. Therefore, questions related to this area were included in questionnaire to identify the deficiencies. Following is a consolidated account of findings:

2.2.1 Scanning devices

Scanning devices are a quick and convenient security solution for inspecting cargo, vehicles, baggage and parcels and any other items at airports, seaports, dry ports, railways, land freight units and other border crossings. Modern scanners fitted with sub-millimeter image resolution and sophisticated image processing software enable customs and security personnel to detect illicit items and contraband, including ammunition, weapons, IEDs, drugs, cigarettes and alcohol.

As a result of significant rise in Pakistan's foreign trade in the last five years, it has become imperative for Pakistan Customs to find cargo handling solutions that ensure proper examination and inspection of goods without compromising smooth flow. One solution is the installation of modern scanners at all border crossing points as physical searches of vehicles and cargo is time consuming and involves manual labour. In contrast, scanning devices allow customs personnel to see quickly and easily inside the most inaccessible parts of a vehicle, container or parcel without examining it physically.

The greater availability of scanners (along with other systems and equipment, such as the image readers, profiling of importers and exporters, canine units and information-based checks) would not only improve illicit drugs and precursors control but also accelerate the clearance process of bonafide goods. Hence, questions relating to availability of scanners at border points, dry ports, airports and sea ports were included in the study.

---

17 Pakistan’s total exports jumped from around 1.38 trillion rupees in 2008-09 to around 2.38 trillion rupees in 2012-13 while imports during this period enhanced from 2.72 trillion rupees to 4.35 trillion rupees. Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.
This study found a shortage of scanning devices (including large scanners for cargo scanning, conventional X-ray machines for passenger scanning, and smaller or mobile scanners for parcel and baggage searches) at all customs ports handling cargo, baggage and passengers despite a substantial increase in the number of containers, baggage, loose cargo, passengers and transit consignments passing through these units (Fig 10).

**Fig 10:** Availability of scanning devices at ports in Pakistan, 2013

Looking at the individual requirements of dry ports, sea ports and airports, the following picture emerges:

**Sea ports:** There are four major sea ports in Pakistan that actively deal with the clearance of imports, exports and transit cargo. These are located in Karachi East, Karachi West, Port Muhammad bin Qasim and Gawadar. Approximately 5,000 containers are processed through these ports per day.

**Karachi Port** is the largest port in Pakistan and handles about 75% of import/export cargo. It is a naturally occurring deep sea port with 11 km long approach channel to provide safe navigation and anchorage to tankers, container vessels, bulk carriers and general cargo ships. The port has 30 dry cargo berths, including two main container terminals and three liquid cargo-handling berths. The total port area is 100 hectares and an additional 60 hectares is close by for the storage of goods. The port handles about 14 million tons of liquid cargo and 12 million tons of general cargo, including 738,000 TEUs containers, every year.
Port Muhammad bin Qasim is the first industrial and multi-purpose deep sea port. Located in the Indus delta region, 50 km south east of Karachi, the port is well connected to the rest of the country by various modern modes of transportation and plays an important role in the economic development of the country. Port Muhammad bin Qasim offers conventional cargo handling functions and land for the creation of import and export based businesses. The port includes a 45 km navigational channel that can accommodate large vessels and container ships. An overview of the flow of cargo at these ports between 2011 and 2013 is summarized in Table 6.

Table 6: Cargo clearance at Karachi and Port Muhammad bin Qasim, 2011-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Port</th>
<th>No. of TEUs (Imports)</th>
<th>No. of TEUs (Exports)</th>
<th>No. of TEUs (Transit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Wharf Karachi</td>
<td>187,598</td>
<td>154,028</td>
<td>166,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Wharf Karachi</td>
<td>251,694</td>
<td>269,384</td>
<td>226,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Qasim</td>
<td>209,121</td>
<td>198,056</td>
<td>167,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Port Control Unit (PCU), Karachi

With regard to Gawadar, the port has recently been constructed. Situated on the Baluchistan coast, it is 533 km from Karachi and 120 km from the Iranian border. Gawadar is a deep water port located at the tip of the Straits of Hormuz and the mouth of the Persian Gulf. It has the potential to become a regional hub, an alternative to Gulf ports and a vital link to the People’s Republic of China and Central Asian Republics, and as a result it is expected to attract significant volume of import, export and transit trade in future18.

In recent years, drug traffickers have become increasingly reliant on maritime transportation to smuggle opiates through sea ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan to global markets. These traffickers use a number of vessels to ship opiates from these sea ports to Africa19. They abuse trade routes from Afghanistan and smuggle opiates to the Iranian seaports at Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, and to Pakistani sea ports at Gawadar, Karachi and Port Muhammad bin Qasim. Traffickers have also found ways to use Gawadar seaport as an exit point for small-scale heroin smuggling. Seizure reports of the last three years show that all major sea ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan are being misused for smuggling of opiates20.

Presently there are three scanners in operation at sea ports, one each at KICT, PICT and QICT (Fig 11), while no scanner at Gawadar Port has so far been installed.

Fig 11: Pakistan Customs controlled scanners at sea ports, 2013

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

---

18 Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Ports and Shipping
19 World Drug Report [2013], UNODC, Vienna.
20 Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia: a threat assessment [2013], UNODC, Vienna.
In addition to these scanners, a special facility under US-funded Integrated Cargo Container Control (IC3) program has also been developed at QICT since 2007 which enables joint screening of US-bound containerised cargo from Pakistan via live video link by customs authorities of Pakistan and USA. Resultantly, US Customs do not need to screen the cargo for re-examination on arrival at their ports. The said unit, besides hosting operational synchronization and information-sharing between the two countries, has also contributed in reducing the scanning cost of cargo destined for US. It has also helped in curbing the illegal transportation of arms, radioactive materials and narcotics. It has also resulted in reduction of operational delays and clearance time at both ends and comparatively smooth procedure for just in time shipments.

Similarly, another Stationary Scanner has been installed at East Wharf Karachi since 2009 in collaboration with the Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP). But it is not in operation since September 2013 due to maintenance related issues.

The scanning of containers is conducted by the technical staff of the terminal operators. The examination and assessment staff of Pakistan Customs generates their examination/assessment reports on the basis of these scanned images.

Given the volume of trade activity at these ports in general and that relating to cargo transiting to and from Afghanistan in particular, there is a clear need to install two additional latest scanners one each at QICT and KICT for scanning of Afghan transit cargo according to risk-profiling criteria.

**Picture 11: Non-functional scanner at East Wharf, Karachi, 2013**

**Dry ports:** Dry ports provide conveniently located customs clearance facilities for importers and exporters, and are designed to reduce congestion at sea ports and provide economic activity at smaller cities and towns away from the coast. Dry ports are an essential requirement for the facilitation of import and export trade, and are integral to global supply chain management. 21

At present, there are 12 dry ports in the country providing services including quick clearance, warehousing and bonded transportation. 22 They also offer employment opportunities. The government intends to further expand this network of dry ports to cities such as Sargodha, Sukkur, Larkana and Noshera.

The research team assessed the infrastructure of these dry ports, including the availability of equipment (Fig 12).

21 Emergence and Significance of Dry Ports’ [2008], Violeta Roso, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
22 The consignments meant for export are inspected and sealed at dry ports and then transported to sea ports under supervision of dry port management.
According to the data collected with regard to the availability of modern scanners, all dry ports in Pakistan do not possess enough scanning devices to adequately inspect the goods that pass through them.

As a large amount of the cargo that passes through these dry ports is destined for export, it is important that these goods are inspected for illicit drugs and contraband. Therefore, in the absence of scan device inspection of cargo is conducted in close liaison with ANF using sniffer dogs to avoid clearance of any illicit drugs and contraband goods.

Given the shortage of scanners, customs units’ drug seizures are largely made as a result of intelligence sharing and the physical examination of baggage, people and vehicles. For example, Sambrial is the busiest dry port in Pakistan and is located at the junction of four cities whose significant manufacturing output is export-focused (Gujranwala, Gujrat, Daska and Wazirabad). Cargo worth billions of rupees, including sports goods, surgical instruments, utensils, household goods, and electrical fittings and instruments, passes through this port every year. According to the data collected, this dry port does not have any scanning devices. The drug seizures made at this port between 2011 and 2013 were mostly reported by ANF.

A similar situation with regard to scanners exists at dry ports in Multan, Hyderabad, Quetta and Prem Nagar. Furthermore, while dry ports in Faisalabad, Peshawar and Lahore (NLC and Mughalpura) have scanners, there is still an urgent need for extra equipment and training.

**Airports:** There are 11 international airports in Pakistan. Jinnah International Airport in Karachi is the largest airport in the country and handles six million passengers annually.

Other major airports for international and domestic traffic are at Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, Multan, Faisalabad, Sialkot and Quetta. In addition, there are smaller airports in Rahim Yar Khan, Zhob and Gawadar.

---

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

---

23 Source: Civil Aviation Authority(CAA) of Pakistan, 2009
Map 3: International and domestic airports in Pakistan, 2013

Scanners at the airports are used for the following functions:

- Clearance of passenger baggage.
- Screening of unaccompanied baggage that is booked and processed at Air Freight Units located at international airports.

According to the 2013 World Drug Report, a significant number of drug seizures made in Pakistan, including the majority of heroin seizures, involve drugs trafficked by air\textsuperscript{24}.

\textsuperscript{24} World Drug Report [2013], United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.
### Table 7: Passengers, cargo and mail handling capacity of international airports in Pakistan, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>Number of flights</th>
<th>Passenger volume</th>
<th>Cargo volume (million tons)</th>
<th>Mail volume (million tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jinnah International Airport, Karachi</td>
<td>52,990</td>
<td>6,081,448</td>
<td>169,124</td>
<td>2,953.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benazir Bhutto International Airport, Islamabad</td>
<td>48,110</td>
<td>3,035,966</td>
<td>53,950</td>
<td>579.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore</td>
<td>39,634</td>
<td>3,091,590</td>
<td>74,664</td>
<td>1,683.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacha Khan International Airport, Peshawar</td>
<td>13,234</td>
<td>890,942</td>
<td>10,537</td>
<td>47.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quetta International Airport, Quetta</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>284,829</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>32.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan International Airport, Multan</td>
<td>19,379</td>
<td>240,573</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>49.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gawadar International Airport, Gawadar</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>29,379</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisalabad International Airport, Faisalabad</td>
<td>2,832</td>
<td>189,339</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>30.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While assessing the availability of scanners at international airports, the research team found that similar deficiencies existed as seen at sea ports and dry ports (Fig 13).

**Fig 13: Availability of scanners at airports in Pakistan, 2013**

![Graph showing availability of scanners at airports in Pakistan, 2013](source: CRU, Pakistan Customs)

At airports, Pakistan Customs works closely with the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Airport Security Force (ASF) and ANF. With regard to scanners operated by Pakistan Customs, there are none at the airports in Multan and Faisalabad and as a result, the organization uses scanners operated by ASF or CAA. A similar situation exists at other international airports. Lack of proper maintenance also makes Pakistan Customs reliant on scanners belonging to ASF or CAA. Although small mobile scanners are available at all international airports, for scanning the parcels and baggage for more effective control of illicit drugs and precursors, more of these scanners are required and those that are in use require updating with state-of-the-art models.

---

25 Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan, official web page, www.caapakistan.com.pk
Trafficking of drugs inside passengers’ bodies is a common phenomenon at airports. In order to carry out body scanning of passengers, conventional X-ray machines are required. With regard to X-ray machines, they are only available at international airports in Islamabad, Karachi and Quetta (Fig 14). At Lahore airport, one X-ray machine is provided by CAA. Hence, this deficiency also needs to be addressed.

**Fig 14:** X-ray machines for passenger scanning at airports, 2013

![Figure 14: X-ray machines for passenger scanning at airports, 2013](image)

2.2.2 CCTV Cameras

CCTV cameras play a significant role in monitoring the movement of suspect cargo. These cameras are an effective tool for surveillance and identification. However, the data collected showed an acute shortage of CCTV cameras at almost every customs unit. The shortage was most acute at sea ports, dry ports, check posts and border customs stations. The number of CCTV cameras at airports was found to be satisfactory (Fig 15).

**Fig 15:** Availability of CCTV at ports in Pakistan, 2013

![Figure 15: Availability of CCTV at ports in Pakistan, 2013](image)

2.2.3 Canine units

The effectiveness of canine units in the interception of drugs is undisputed. They are used for searching for drugs, explosives and decomposed bodies. Pakistan Customs is fully aware of the effectiveness of canine units with regard to tracking illicit drugs concealed in goods and containers and, therefore, has two such units in operation: one at Karachi airport and the other at East Wharf sea port in Karachi. Another canine unit is planned for Port Muhammad Bin Qasim. Details of these units are as follows:
2.2.4 Drugs and precursors testing kits

Drugs and precursors testing kits are essential for field officers responsible for specialized tasks related to the control of illicit drug and precursor trafficking. According to the data collected (Fig 16), the majority of customs units require these kits and basic training with regard to their use.
2.2.5 Laboratories and testing facilities

Laboratories play a critical role in drug control efforts. They are vital for identification and verification of drugs and precursors. In majority of cases, identification of illicit drugs and precursors is not possible without proper laboratory testing facilities. Furthermore, prosecution is more difficult without authentic laboratory results. Substantial resources are required to establish and maintain properly equipped laboratories staffed by qualified professionals. This requires continuous investment in equipment, testing materials, staff development and training.

The importance of testing laboratories is widely acknowledged. During the 54th session of Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), a Resolution was passed recognizing the important role of drug analysis laboratories as part of drug control systems. It further stressed that access to reference samples of controlled substances is an essential requirement with regard to quality assurance and credibility. The resolution also endorsed the significance of credible test results for the justice system and law enforcement, preventive health care, as well as for the international harmonization, exchange and coordination of drug information.

With regard to laboratories in Pakistan, of the 57 customs units included in the study, only four had functional laboratories (Map 4). Out of these, two are full-fledged Pakistan Customs laboratories and provide services to all the field units. These laboratories are located in Custom House, Karachi and at Mughalpura dry port, Lahore. The laboratory in Karachi provides services to 11 main MCCs and Directorates (including their field units, custom stations and check posts) in the southern parts of the country. Despite this heavy workload, a staff of only 18 officials are employed at this laboratory.

A similar situation exists in the laboratory at Mughalpura dry port. This laboratory has only two staff members and provides services to central region of Pakistan. There are smaller laboratory facilities at Port Muhammad bin Qasim and Faisalabad but they only fulfill the needs of the local MCCs and their capabilities are limited to the routine examination of imported chemicals and other materials.

26 Resolution 54/3 of 54th session of Commission on Narcotics & Drugs, 2011
Furthermore, the four laboratories under Pakistan Customs face an acute shortage of skilled staff, equipment and testing materials for the purposes of identifying illicit drugs and precursors. As a result, illicit drugs and precursors samples are forwarded to National Institute of Health Laboratory (NIHL) in Islamabad. It was reported that this has been the practice for last 20 years.

During the study, it was also observed that the condition of the main Pakistan Customs laboratories in Karachi and at Mughalpura dry port, Lahore is not in accordance with international standards. There are no proper arrangements for storage, handling etc. of chemicals and equipment, and delays up to 10 days have been reported for routine test results. Funds are also not available for procurement of new apparatus. In addition, the general condition of hygiene in these laboratories was also found to be very poor.

**Picture 14:** Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013

**Picture 15:** Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013
It is largely because of lack of resources that the deficiencies in laboratory and testing facilities are quite noticeable. Significant finances are required to build and operate modern laboratories and testing facilities at all field units, such as those in Gawadar, Quetta, Peshawar and Gilgit Baltistan.

These customs units are not only located in far flung areas away from Collectorates that have any kind of laboratory, but are also located in instable areas particularly vulnerable to illicit drugs and precursors trafficking. Fully equipped laboratories in these Collectorates would enhance the capacity of Pakistan Customs to deal quickly and effectively with illicit drugs and precursors that are seized.

The Resolution passed in the 54th session of Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) showed considerable concern over the costs and complex administrative procedures for obtaining required materials and equipment for such facilities and recommended that UNODC should continue to support Member States in enhancing the analytical capacity of laboratories and the training of experts. With regard to the training of laboratory staff, during the visits by the research team, it was observed that no formal or structured training has been offered to any staff members. This is another deficiency that needs to be addressed.

Resolution 54/3 of 54th session of Commission on Narcotics & Drugs, 2011
Case study: Pakistan Customs Laboratory, Karachi

In order to have a better understanding of the existing problems, the research team carried out a comprehensive case study involving Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi.

At present, Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi provides lab facilities to 11 main MCCs and Directorates (including their field units, custom stations and check posts) in the southern parts of the country. Its role in supporting the functions of Pakistan Customs has increased manifold over the years. It helps custom units to determine the composition of different chemicals, textiles, leather and other materials, and to identify contraband goods.

However, there are a number of items for which testing facilities are not available at this laboratory (Table 8). As a result, samples of these items are referred to other laboratories that are not under Customs Control.

Table 8: List of items not tested at Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Names of laboratories</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs and precursors</td>
<td>National Institute of Health Laboratory, Islamabad</td>
<td>7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal and ores</td>
<td>- Pakistan Steel Mills Karachi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgy</td>
<td>- Peoples Steel Mills Ltd. Karachi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical, chemical &amp; micro-biological, trace</td>
<td>Dr. A.Q Khan Laboratory</td>
<td>15-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metals, physico-chemical analysis of diesel,</td>
<td>HEJ and PCSIR</td>
<td>10-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bio diesel &amp; engine oils, lubricating oils,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wax oil, etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

Despite being the largest laboratory of its type under Pakistan Customs, the facility has not provided services for testing illicit drugs and precursors since 1995. All samples are referred to National Institute of Health Laboratory for testing.

Workforce:
The workforce comprises a Chemical Examiner as the supervisory head and 11 Deputy Chemical Examiners and 3 Assistant Chemical Examiners (ACEs). While a further five ACEs are due to be added shortly. However more operational staff is required to cater to growing magnitude of work.

Infrastructure:
The laboratory is housed in two floors of Customs House Karachi. This the main Pakistan Customs building. This allocation of space was made with further extensions to laboratory facilities in mind. However, there is an acute shortage of equipment, apparatus and supplies. Therefore, if these shortages are addressed, the services of the laboratory could be improved as follows:

- A fully equipped and fully functional laboratory would help expand Pakistan Customs' controls.
- The laboratory would be able to share its analytical expertise, thereby ensuring goods are released quicker as a result of more efficient laboratory testing.
- Quick clearance times would result in more trade and reduce costs relating to the testing referred to other laboratories.

Impact of automation
As a result of transition of Pakistan Customs to automated systems and its implementation of the WeBOC online clearances system, its workload has risen significantly. The new system has an inbuilt risk profiling mechanism that is able to automatically refer consignments that are considered suspect for examination. On an average 110 samples are received at Customs Lab Karachi per day. But with existing work force and resources, it is difficult to handle this workload. No procurement of new
equipment or upgradation in existing facility has been made since 1997. Furthermore, the laboratory faces financial and technical issues like equipment repair, availability of testing chemicals/materials etc.

Rewards and incentives
The research team found that laboratory employees receive little or no acknowledgment for their efforts and hard work. The absence of incentives and rewards and the slow pace of promotions are the issues that need consideration.

Training
The laboratory employees have never been considered for any local or international technical training with regard to enhancement of their skills. There is a need for tailored training modules linked to new scientific concepts in laboratory techniques should be provided to staff regularly to enhance their analytical abilities.

In addition, given the level of risk involved in chemical testing, it is also important that safety training is provided to laboratory staff. This training would ensure that they are adequately informed about physical and health hazards and with regard to procedures for reducing risks relating to exposure to chemicals and other hazardous substances.

Hazardous waste management
Safeguarding staff health, ensuring appropriate levels of hygiene and ensuring the ability to deal with post-test laboratory waste, spills and accidental releases, chemical and biological hazards, protective equipment leaks, and fires and explosions are vitally important. The research team found that there is much more to do in these areas at Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi.

Picture 18: Sample storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013
Picture 19: Chemical-testing section, Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

The absence of safety and precautionary measures
The research team found that there were no precautionary measures displayed in the laboratory and that safety rules were not practically enforced. Material Safety Data Sheets contain essential information about substances used in laboratories, including safety information, and are of paramount importance. No such sheets were found. This matter requires immediate attention.

An autonomous laboratories body
Based on the data collected, there is a clear need for a separate directorate responsible for the laboratories under Pakistan Customs. Such a body would help Pakistan Customs tackle existing problems involving human resource, capacity building and training, infrastructure and equipment, and rewards and incentives. If the deficiencies in laboratory and testing facilities are
properly addressed and fully equipped laboratories staffed with qualified and well trained staff are made available, Pakistan Customs laboratories can become a source of significant revenue for the organization.

### 2.2.6 Arms and ammunition

The requirement of arms and ammunition for field operations of Pakistan Customs cannot be over emphasized. Prevailing law and order situation especially in far flung areas of the country and the prevalence of drug trafficking further underline the necessity of these resources.

The research team found that the existing supply of arms and ammunition does not meet the basic requirements of customs units (Table 9).

**Table 9: Arms supply, existing and required, at customs units visited by CRU, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs unit</th>
<th>Existing arms</th>
<th>Required arms and equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airports and air freight units</td>
<td>Rifles, AK47 rifles and 9mm pistols</td>
<td>AK47 rifles and 9mm pistols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOs</td>
<td>Semi-automatic machine guns and MP5 Kalashnikovs, old AK47 rifles and 9mm pistols</td>
<td>Latest light machine guns (LMGs), and automatic and side-arm pistols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea ports/marine check posts</td>
<td>Obsolete arms, including old rifles, guns and Kalashnikovs</td>
<td>LMGs, guns mounted on boats and the latest automatic weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border customs units/check posts</td>
<td>Kalashnikovs, rifles and pistols</td>
<td>LMGs and guns mounted on vehicles, latest automatic guns and pistols, bullet proof jackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorates of I&amp;I</td>
<td>Old weapons, Kalashnikovs, semi-automatic Chinese rifles, AK-47 rifles and G-3 rifles</td>
<td>Latest Kalashnikovs, communication equipment, AK-47 rifles, 9mm pistols and bullet proof jackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Control Units</td>
<td>9mm MP5s and submachine guns</td>
<td>The latest models of existing weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry ports</td>
<td>Rifles and old Kalashnikovs</td>
<td>Latest weapons and bullet proof jackets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs*

The research team discovered that no procurement of modern arms had been made by Pakistan Customs since 1998, resultantly, the available arms & ammunition are insufficient and outdated.

Given the nature of anti-smuggling activities, Pakistan Customs is seriously deficient in arms and ammunition.

Furthermore, the research team found that while the operational staff had basic knowledge of weapon handling, they had not been given training in the use and maintenance of modern weapons. They had not received any refresher courses or field training, or taken part in any simulation exercises. In the past, Pakistan Customs staff received this training from coast guards and marines, but this practice has long been discontinued, largely because of lack of focus on such training, a lack of cooperation and coordination between customs and other agencies, and the absence of any formal procedures and framework relating to such training.

Although the customs units are aware of the need for training in arms handling and other related areas and the role this training plays in improving the capacity for carrying out raids, patrols and combat but the existing situation and the lack of action to address the deficiency of modern arms, ammunition and safety equipment such as bulletproof jackets are potential factors for demoralizing and demotivating staff and affect results with regard to the prevention of illicit drugs and precursor trafficking.

A similar situation was found to exist at units responsible for operations at sea. These units had only conventional resources, such as pistols and rifles, and a limited amount of ammunition. Furthermore, they did not have any safety equipment such as bulletproof jackets. A few Kalashnikovs and two submachine guns are available to these units but these arms are old and outdated. In addition, these units do not have speed boats to carry out high-speed pursuits. Therefore, assistance is sought from Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA).
2.2.7 Check posts

Pakistan Customs operates a large number of check posts located throughout the country. These check posts are responsible for preventing the flow of smuggled goods and carrying out surveillance at borders and smuggling routes.

Table 10: Check posts by location, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Locations of Customs Check Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs
There are reportedly 52 check posts and field information units located throughout Pakistan. The addition of further 32 check posts was suggested by the customs units. Also, the Directorates of Transit Trade pointed out that check posts required greater capacity for tracking and checking transit cargo.

The Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation in Islamabad is in process of developing a network of 25 new check posts that will be responsible for enhancing patrol capacity and information sharing.

### 2.2.8 Unofficial crossing points

Another key area covered by the study was the identification of unofficial crossing points used for the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors.

There are a number of unofficial crossing points (Table 11) that are reportedly used for this purpose. Therefore, check posts need to be established to develop effective control measures, including more frequent patrols, in these areas.
Table 11: Unofficial crossing points noted by custom units, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Customs unit and city</th>
<th>Unofficial crossing point(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Punjab</strong></td>
<td>MCC Lahore (Lahore)</td>
<td>Sheikupura, Kala Shah Kaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Multan (Rahim Yar Khan)</td>
<td>Sadiqabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multan(Rajan pur)</td>
<td>Kashmore More</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Multan (Dera Ghazi Khan)</td>
<td>Wahoo, Sakhi Sarwar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Multan (Bhakar)</td>
<td>Bhakkar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Faisalabad (Mianwali)</td>
<td>Bakakhail, Chashma, Musa Khail Eisa Khail, Dusa Tang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Islamabad (Attock)</td>
<td>Attok Khurd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Islamabad (Chakwal)</td>
<td>Balksor,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Islamabad (Haripur)</td>
<td>Sirkot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khyber Pakhtunkhaw</strong></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Warsak)</td>
<td>Charsada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Abbottabad)</td>
<td>Bariyan, Jhari Khas Kohistan/ Bhisham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Noshera)</td>
<td>Noshera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Chitral)</td>
<td>Boroghal, Dorah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Khyber Agency)</td>
<td>Barsa (Kaka sahib Road), Shilmen, Tinha, Bara, Tira valley, Mala Gauri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Kurram Agency)</td>
<td>Piewar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (Hangu)</td>
<td>Hangu Tali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Peshawar (South Waziristan Agency)</td>
<td>Angor Adda, Gomai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balochistan</strong></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Chaghai)</td>
<td>Kachao, Maskhail, Taalab, Ghani Laudi, Yekmach, Koh-i-Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Quetta)</td>
<td>Kanale Muriband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Noshki)</td>
<td>Shekhwasil Noshki Gaon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Turbat)/(Kech)</td>
<td>Mand, Buleda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Quetta (Ziarat)</td>
<td>Katchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Gawadar (Pasni)</td>
<td>Shadikur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Gawadar (Gawadar)</td>
<td>Liari Coastal High Way, Kalmat, Bella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Gawadar (Hub)</td>
<td>Sakaran, Bundawari, Bandmurad, Somani Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sind</strong></td>
<td>MCC Preventive (Karachi)</td>
<td>Northern By Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Preventive (Gharro)</td>
<td>Laith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC Preventive (Sukkar)</td>
<td>Sakkar By pass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs*
Uncontrolled open areas and unchecked routes, where there are few or no check posts or patrols, are a breeding ground for illegal activity, including the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors. Therefore, CRU focused strongly on these areas and routes.

There are a number of unofficial crossing points that are regularly used for the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors. All the major customs units highlighted the vulnerability of these routes and the urgent need for the strengthening of surveillance and enforcement capacity at existing check posts or creation of new check posts.

During the visit to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, CRU found that conditions at many existing check posts and customs units were inadequate. Many of these check posts, such as those at Terri Mangal, Burki, Dera Darya Khan, Chasma, Rahim Khan Kharlachi and Taank, do not have their own building and operate from privately rented buildings. Furthermore, many check posts have no boundary walls, electricity supply or proper ancillary buildings. Therefore, fully functional and well-equipped check posts need to be established with enhanced capacity.
Case study: Check posts and customs stations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)

The province of KP in the northwest of Pakistan faces numerous challenges as a result of a rise in militancy and suicide bombing, and the deterioration of law and order.

Check posts and customs units have been targeted by terrorists and these attacks have claimed lives and destroyed property. As a result, the operations of these units are periodically suspended.

**Picture 20:** Snapshot of a news item regarding blast at Torkham

**Picture 21:** Snapshot of a news item regarding blast at Torkham

The lack of basic infrastructure and standard facilities at these customs stations and check posts are obstacles faced by customs staff at these units. However, despite these challenges and meager resources, the efforts of Pakistan Customs to combat illicit drugs trafficking are noteworthy.

CRU found that there are six customs units in Kohat Division (Shaheedano Dand, Terri Mangal and Kharlachi since February 2005; Burki and Ghulam Khan since January 2004; and Taank since February 1983).

The customs unit in Ghulam Khan (NWA) and Taank are fully functional, while those in Kharlachi and Burki were reactivated in June 2012. However, those in Terimangal and Kurram Agency are non-functional. The units in Terri Mangal, Kharlachi and Taank operate from privately rented buildings, and the unit in Ghulam Khan operates from a tehsil building. Only the unit in Shaheedano Dand operates from a government building.

**Picture 22:** Check post in Rahim Khan Khusalgarh (Kohat)
This check post in Rahim Khan Khushalgarh was built in 1966-67. No tangible improvement to the building has been made since this date. Hence, the unit is located in a rented building whose conditions are quite poor.

**Picture 23:** Custom unit in Burki (Kurram Agency/FATA)

Customs operations at Burki were resumed in June 2012. However, the condition of this unit is very poor. The building is a basic brick structure with no boundary wall or paved area, and the ceiling is in poor condition. It has no electricity or sanitary facilities. To perform their duties, employees have to work in temporary tents.

**Picture 24:** Check post in Ramak (D.I. Khan)

**Picture 25:** Check post in Ramak (D.I. Khan)
Located in a government building, the check post in Ramak has been in operation since 1977. However, staff performance is affected by poor working conditions and absence of basic facilities, such as water, sanitation and electricity.

**Picture 26:** Customs unit in Tank (South Waziristan Agency/FATA)

This customs unit in Tank has been in operation since 1983. However, because of an absence of proper infrastructure and security issues, this check post has been closed intermittently in the past.

**Picture 27:** Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/FATA)

**Picture 28:** Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/FATA)

The check post in Ghulam Khan has been in operation since 2004. Situated in a tehsil building, its location in North Waziristan, an area highly vulnerable to the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors, makes it a very important resource.
The check post in Dera Darya Khan was built in a private building in 1986. The condition of this building is quite poor as a result of a lack of maintenance.

The check post in Tunnel has operated since 2011 and is located in a government building. However, the building lacks basic facilities.
The condition of this building, which was reactivated in June 2002, is poor. There is plenty of space and if the deficiencies are addressed, effectiveness can be increased.

**Picture 33: Check post in Darra Tang (Lakki Marwat)**

The check post in Darra Tang has been in operation and is based in a government building since 1984-85. However, poor infrastructure and the absence of basic facilities hinder effectiveness.

**Picture 34: Customs unit in Shaheedano Dand (Kurram Agency/FATA)**

The customs unit in Saheedano Dand was initially opened in March 2005. However, due to security issues, it remained largely non-operational until 2009. As a result, basic import and export operations were conducted at the customs unit in Thall. The building lacks basic facilities and has no boundary wall or paved area.
2.3 Operational, technical and IT related capabilities

Pakistan Customs has a distinguished place among the public sector organisations of the country for its initiatives towards automation, system re-engineering, customer facilitation and procedural simplification. In this section these initiatives are reviewed in the context of control of illicit drugs and precursors.

2.3.1 Database

Pakistan Customs has its central database managed by Pakistan Revenue Automation Ltd. (PRAL) which has developed an indigenous web-based customs clearance system (WeBOC- Web Based One Customs) replacing the previous system of PACCS that provides real time integration of 25333 importers and exporters, 1782 agents, 237 shipping lines and 711 internal users\(^\text{28}\). The system also has the capacity to link terminal operators, cargo handlers and other allied agencies and departments. This system covers all stages of goods clearance, from good declaration to final out-of-charge. Every stage is linked. The system has an in-built capacity of maintaining and updating all clearance data along with generation of reports and analyses. There are different modules in the system for Goods Declaration (GD) filing, examination and assessment reports feeding, import and export clearance, transit trade handling, warehousing and risk management. All the reports and historical data related to clearance of all types of goods through Pakistan Customs is available through this database, however, there is no specialized database for drugs or precursors seizures. Such data is either individually available at MCCs or manually compiled at FBR through periodical reports and feedback from field formations.

Another important feature of WeBOC is its possible connectivity with neighboring countries. In order to streamline transit trade clearance, EDI with Afghan Customs – Soft launching (pilot run) initiated on Nov 01, 2013

2.3.2 Risk profiling

The value of risk profiling as a tool to aid in the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking has been proven all over the world. With around 5,000 TEUs processed every day at customs units throughout the country, it is impossible for customs staff to manually inspect each consignment. Therefore, a strong risk management system has been incorporated in WeBOC. Importers and exporters are divided into three categories: red, yellow and green depending on their business profile.

- **Green**: containers of reputed importers and exporters are cleared in few hours after passing through a computerized scanning process.
- **Yellow**: this channel is for the computerized checking of declarations and works on first in first out basis.
- **Red**: this channel is for physical examination in cases where risk parameters fed into system refer the goods for examination.

Following are the results of risk management system in 2013\(^\text{29}\):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RMS Results</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GD's Processed through Green Channel</td>
<td>GD's Processed through Yellow Channel</td>
<td>GD's Processed Through Red Channel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GD's Processed through Green Channel</td>
<td>GD's Processed through Yellow Channel</td>
<td>GD's Processed Through Red Channel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{28}\) Directorate of Reforms and Automation, FBR  
\(^{29}\) Directorate of Reforms and Automation, FBR
Broad categorization is based on the following risk parameters:

- Type of goods
- Destination of goods
- Profile of exporter/importer
- History/record of exporter/importer

With regard to the focus on the study, it was important to know as to how this risk profiling system is operated in relation to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking. In addition, it was important to know as to how the tool was functioning as part of the new automated system used at Pakistan Customs.

Fig 17 shows the degree of use of these risk parameters. The data collected shows that ‘destination of goods’ is the most frequently used parameter, followed by ‘history/record’ and ‘profile of importer/exporter’. With regard to the interception of illicit drugs and precursors, ‘information-based checks’ and ‘random selection’ are most commonly used techniques. Hence, despite the presence of sophisticated WeBOC system and risk profiling awareness, the most reliable and effective tool in the control of illicit drugs and precursors is information network.

**Fig 17: Risk profiling parameters and techniques, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random selection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History/record</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile of exporter</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination of goods</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of goods</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

Post Clearance Audit is also an integral part of this risk profiling strategy. For this purpose, Directorate General of Post Clearance Audit (PCA) has been established with its Directorates in all the provinces with following functions:

(i) To establish, update and operate records, databases pertaining to goods exported from or imported into Pakistan and profiles of importers and exporters covering all aspects of their trade and business;
(ii) To evolve a pro-active monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with national trade laws, rules, procedures, controls, restrictions, prohibitions etc;
(iii) To set up a mechanism to detect and investigate commercial and trade related frauds and propose measures and controls at the operational level to prevent its occurrence;
(iv) To set up mechanism and machinery along with ancillary and auxiliary sub systems for audit, intelligence, investigation, prosecution, dispute resolution and initiate contravention reports/recovery proceedings for adjudication.
(v) To analyze data, risk assessment and selection of sectors/cases for generating the work orders for field formations to conduct audit, and monitoring of the follow up action.

The main focus of risk profiling and post clearance audit is to safeguard revenue leakages, but system based checks related to illicit drugs and precursors have also been made a part of this strategy particularly for those chemicals which have been legally imported by local industry but can be diverted for the use of drug manufacturing. However, during the study it has been noticed that this area needs a little more emphasis by the field units.

Following other deficiencies in this area have been observed:

i. Information sharing related to illicit drugs and precursors between the MCCs and field units is not on real time basis but through FBR headquarters. The effectiveness of risk profiling techniques can be enhanced if they are based on
systematic information sharing, whether in real time or from a centralized database. However, with regard to illicit drugs and precursors trafficking, no such centralised database is available.

ii. Effective interception and identification of illicit drugs and precursors needs knowledge of their description, harmonized codes and other relevant specifications. It is essential that customs staff remain up to date with the harmonized system so that they can properly identify precursor chemicals. Data collected with regard to this area shows that 28 customs units (49% of the total) have staffs that are aware of the harmonized system.

iii. Data collected shows that all record keeping related to illicit drugs and precursors at most customs units is carried out manually and that there is no online data sharing or data update system in place. (Fig 18)

Fig 18: Type of reporting mechanism at CRU-visited customs units, 2013

However, Port Control Units (PCUs), established with the support of UNODC, are effectively availing the information available in database and on-line clearance data to check the flow of illicit drugs and precursors.

2.3.3 Automation of procedures

Pakistan Customs has gradually evolved its processes from manual to automated ones. PaCCS and WeBOC are two examples of Pakistan Customs transition towards greater procedural automation. However, in context of better and effective drugs and precursors’ control, only 31 customs units (54% of those visited by CRU) responded in favor of automation, while 5 units took a neutral position. Staff based at 14 units responded that it would negatively impact efficiency (Table 12) perceiving that chances of clearance of illicit goods are higher in automated clearance under WeBOC system as compared to physical checks and manual examination. But it is a reality that in order to facilitate the trade and reduce the dwell time of cargo at ports, automated clearance with risk profiling strategy and post clearance checks in the only recourse.

Table 12: Customs units’ position on the impact of automation, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of impact</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive impact</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative impact</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

2.3.4 Information sharing and coordination with Law Enforcement Agencies

There are a number of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) that register their presence or coordinate during customs operations, in particular to the activities related to control of illicit drug trafficking (Table 13). Officers of these agencies are posted all around the country in their designated offices to work in close collaboration with Pakistan Customs for the purposes
of sharing information and resources for detection and investigation of drugs and precursor trafficking cases. All these agencies work within their jurisdiction and coordinate with each other effectively to constitute a better deterrence and check on all such illegal activities.

Table 13: LEA coordinating with Customs units, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of customs unit</th>
<th>Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airports</td>
<td>ANF, ASF, IB, FIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wharfs</td>
<td>ANF, Provincial Excise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check posts</td>
<td>FC, Police, Levies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry ports</td>
<td>ANF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal area units</td>
<td>ANF, Coast Guards, PMSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border customs units</td>
<td>ANF, FC, Political Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRU, Pakistan Customs

Pakistan Customs also receives and issues alerts regarding different techniques used by the traffickers. For this purpose, FBR has an anti-smuggling wing at headquarters which compiles information on any such alerts from its field formations and disseminates to the headquarters of all LEAs and vice versa.

To sum up, these deficiencies and gaps, if not accounted for on priority, may turn into possible stumbling blocks hampering the organisation to explore its maximum potential in all the areas of its professional performance in general and control of illicit drugs and precursors in particular. Although, some major seizures of drugs and precursors have been reported by Pakistan Customs in recent years, there is a reported decline in the quantity of drugs seized by Pakistan Customs (Fig 19) during last three years.

Fig 19: Drug seizures made by Pakistan Customs, 2011-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010-2011</th>
<th>2011-2012</th>
<th>2012-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charas</td>
<td>25,204.10</td>
<td>7,527.45</td>
<td>4,241.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>2,617.65</td>
<td>185.00</td>
<td>108.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>763.06</td>
<td>346.55</td>
<td>198.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish Oil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy Straw</td>
<td>7,792.00</td>
<td>75,727.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>626.00</td>
<td>1,189.55</td>
<td>3,727.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official data obtained from Anti-Smuggling Wing, FBR, Islamabad
Chapter III: Need assessment and recommendations
Chapter III: Need assessment and recommendations

The key objective of this study is to identify gaps in the operational capacity of Pakistan Customs, however, it is equally important to assess the existing and future needs of the organisation with regard to these gaps. Special emphasis was, therefore, given to such needs during the study, with particular reference to controlling measures for illicit drugs and precursors. A summary of these recommendations based on the feedback of the field units is provided below:

3.1 Human resource

Following recommendations are made in the area of human resource development for the organisation:

3.1.1 New recruitment

Shortage of staff is a severe challenge and may impact the performance of the organisation negatively. Analysis of the data collected suggests that there is a 30-40% shortage in the strength of assessment, cargo clearance and enforcement staff, while with regard to laboratory staff, the shortage is over 80% of existing strength. As far as general staff (i.e. Sepoys and Havaladars) is concerned, the shortage is reported to be around 12% and this gap is expected to increase as a result of superannuation of a large number of these employees in the next few years. As there has been no recruitment in the organization since 1998, it is recommended that feedback from every unit should be collected and consolidated. Recruitment in different cadres of staff should, subsequently, be made keeping in view the current and future workload and any possible expansion of the organisation.

3.1.2 Training and capacity building

Another area requiring immediate attention is training and staff capacity building. Despite some regular training programs, including those relating to illicit drugs and precursors control measures, there are still significant deficiencies in this area. Most of the customs units visited by CRU reported an acute need for training in areas like the examination of goods; the identification of drugs, precursors and explosives, and concealment methods; investigation techniques; the searching of passengers, baggage and vehicles; the use of drug testing kits; and the handling of arms and ammunition. There is also a need for specialized training for laboratory staff.

It is recommended that the training needs of staff in every area may be fully assessed and on the basis of this training need analysis, organized training programs, including short-term and long-term courses, workshops and on-job training, should be launched.

The role of DGTR is crucial to achieve this goal. A program or study in the area of training need analysis, organized training programs, including short-term and long-term courses, workshops and on-job training, should be launched.

Fig 20: Training need analysis

![Diagram of Training Need Analysis](image-url)
A review of training modules and their content should be conducted based on the results of the training need analysis. New training material and courses need to be designed, if required, and may be introduced alongside existing training material according to the needs of specific positions and cadres. Furthermore, it is recommended that international donor agencies, such as UNODC, WCO and WTO may be approached to provide a ‘train-the-trainers’ program in order to optimize and accelerate the staff training process. Additionally, the staff who have received specialized training should be utilized as resource persons for future trainings. The staff getting training for some specialized area should not be transferred to other positions for which they have not been trained for.

3.1.3 Rewards and incentives

Rewards and incentives are effective means for staff motivation; therefore, Pakistan Customs should put in place a well-designed incentive package to acknowledge staff performance with particular reference to detection and seizure of illicit drugs and precursors.

3.2 Infrastructure and equipment

Infrastructural and equipment needs may be summarized as follows:

3.2.1 Scanners, X-ray machines and CCTV cameras

Currently, there are three Customs Collectorates at Karachi sea port dealing with the clearance of import cargo i.e. MCC Appraisement (East), MCC(Appraisement (West) and MCC (Port Qasims). In addition to this, there are MCC (Exports) and MCC (Exports Port Qasim) dealing with the exports cargo and Directorate of Transit Trade dealing with Afghan transit cargo. In order to cater the needs of all these Customs formations, only three cargo scanners are available at East Wharf, West Wharf and Port Muhammad Bin Qasim. This is a big gap in view of transition of Customs procedures from manual examination to an automated clearance system (Weboc).

Reportedly, around 5,000 containers are handled by Pakistan Customs every day at Karachi port (import, export, transit and transshipment cargo) and the volume of the same is increasing, the organization is in dire need of more scanners: it needs at least two additional scanners with high-resolution imaging systems at East Wharf and West Wharf. In addition, two such scanners are also required at Port Muhammad Bin Qasim. The provision of these scanners would not only reduce dwell time but also provide an effective mechanism of check and balance required for the automated clearance system. Moreover, modern image readers for interpreting the images of scanned cargo are also required.

A similar situation exists at dry ports where it has been noticed that there are no scanners available at Sambrial, Multan, Prem Nagar (Lahore) and Hyderabad. These dryports mainly handle export-oriented cargo, therefore, need at least one scanner each. At rest of the dryports, some futuristic assessment is required to ascertain the need of more scanners in proportion to the increasing magnitude of trade.

Mobile scanners are needed at international airports for the quick scanning of baggage, courier shipments and parcels. Currently, such scanners are in use at Karachi and Lahore airports only, but these, too, need to be replaced with upgraded versions with high-resolution capability in order to carry out effective control of illicit drugs and precursors. Other international airports at Peshawar, Islamabad, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Multan, Quetta and Gwadar also need such scanners.

There is also an acute need for X-ray machines to scan passengers for body packing and internal concealment of drugs inside the body. International airports in Pakistan at Faisalabad, Sialkot, Multan, Gwadar and Quetta are lacking in this facility. At least one such machine may be provided at these airports to maintain a deterrence against drug trafficking. In addition to above, CCTV cameras and metal detectors are needed at all customs units, including those at sea ports, dry ports, airports, border customs

---

[30] The dwell time can be defined as the measure of the time elapsed from the time the cargo arrives in the port to the time the goods leave the port premises after all permits and clearances have been obtained.
stations and check posts. In view of deteriorating law and order conditions in the country, it is strongly recommended to provide these equipments alongwith training of the staff in its handling and maintenance.

Pakistan Customs is fully aware of the need and importance of all these equipments but bridging these gaps within available resources is a big challenge.

3.2.2 Laboratories and testing facilities

The needs of Pakistan Customs with regard to laboratories and testing facilities are as follows:

i) The construction of new laboratories at remote Collectories in Gawadar, Quetta, Peshawar and Gilgit Baltistan.
ii) To upgrade existing laboratories in Karachi, Port Muhammad bin Qasim, Lahore and Faisalabad to meet international standards, including the provision of modern testing equipment, testing chemicals and specialized training for staff.

The condition of customs laboratories has significantly deteriorated over the years, particularly with regard to the capacity to test illicit drugs and precursors. This decline, has resulted into a situation where no drug samples are tested at customs laboratories, some prompt actions are required to be taken in this area by improving the supply of provisions and stores to the existing laboratories and addressing their financial as well as human resource related issues. The existing equipment at these laboratories also need upgradation and/or replacement with modern equipment and tools in order to make these facilities in line with international standards. There is also a need to establish new laboratories at Peshawar, Quetta, Gawadar and Gilgit Baltistan. It is also proposed that, in order to resolve the administrative issues faced by the staff at customs laboratories a specialised set-up or Directorate General may be established within FBR.

At the same time, it has been noticed that the drug testing kits provided by UNODC to most custom units are not being used properly because of a lack of training of staff in its usage techniques. Trainings, in this area, should therefore, be organized through train-the-trainer programmes at each Collectorate in collaboration with UNODC.

3.2.3 Canine units

Sniffer dogs play an important role in the detection of drugs and canine units are an integral resource for preventing illicit drug and precursor trafficking. Pakistan Customs has only two canine units in Karachi, and one more unit is likely to become operational shortly. Due to the absence of such units at custom units located in remote areas, sniffer dogs are transported from Karachi whenever the need arises resulting into time lapses as well as handling problems for dogs. Therefore, there is an urgent need to establish new canine units in Quetta, Gawadar, Peshawar and Lahore.

According to some rough estimates, monthly expenditure for maintainence of such units comprising two dogs and their handlers ranges from Rs. 400,000 to 500,000. Thus lack of financial resources, for maintaining such units in an appropriate manner may also be a big challenge for Pakistan Customs.

3.2.4 Arms and ammunition

To carry out snap checks, patrols and raids, and personal safety of staff of Pakistan Customs, modern arms and ammunition are quite essential. Modern and easy-to-use semi-automatic weapons are required for inland units, while border and sea check posts need fully automatic weapons. There is a need to analyse the requirement of each unit realistically.

3.3 Operational, technical and IT-related issues

3.3.1 Sea operations

There is currently only one sea check post in operation, CP Guardian which is a floating check post near Karachi port established
in 1961. However, this post has received no renovation or upgradation ever since it was established as a result, it appears in dilapidated condition.

Due to the peculiar nature of the country's coastline comprising of the creeks and the mangrove swamps, marshy and rocky patches and clayey ridges as well as shallow lagoons, Pakistan Customs needs special speed boats with the capacity to operate in tropical waters in all conditions. In addition, the navigational and surveillance equipment, such as compasses and GPS with track plotting capability, radar systems and communication equipment (e.g. HF/VHF radio systems, satellite telephone systems), and lifesaving equipment (e.g. inflatable life rafts, buoys and life jackets) are also required.

New deep-water check posts need to be established near Jewani, Gawadar, Pasni, Ormara, Damm and Karachi.

3.3.2 Inland operations

For effective patrols, raids and snap checks in all terrains, including hilly and desert areas, Pakistan Customs needs appropriate vehicles. Therefore, anti-smuggling units need to be equipped with 4x4 double-cabin vehicles and jeeps. Moreover bullet-proof vehicles are also required for specialized operations in more volatile areas.

At the same time, to maintain effective surveillance of coastal and mountainous areas, at least two helicopters may be procured and included in the ASOs of border Collectorates. This resource would significantly enhance the capability of Pakistan Customs to cover large areas of Baluchistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), besides coastal areas.

In addition, customs units need communication devices, such as satellite phones, and a central reporting room for surveillance, monitoring as well as controlling activities.

3.3.3 New check posts

Based on the data collected, a number of border points have been identified where there is a need to establish new check points. These border points were identified in view of their critical and sensitive location and vulnerability to illicit drugs and precursors trafficking.

The poor condition of existing Pakistan Customs check posts is also an area of operational deficiency resulting in a gradual decline in the quantity of drugs seized in recent years. In order to effectively combat the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors re-inforcement and mobilisation of existing check posts on modern lines is essential.

3.3.4 Improving existing check posts

During the visit of CRU to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the following recommendations were made by the staff posted at check posts and border customs units:

• All check posts and units should be located in government buildings and be equipped with government vehicles.
• The lack of staff, in all cadres, requires immediate attention.
• Warehouse facilities, boundary walls and an uninterrupted supply of electricity should be ensured.
• High-speed broadband facilities are required for real-time accessing and sharing of data. Wherever possible, these devices should be provided.
• A wireless communication network is required especially for check posts in remote areas.
• Safety measures need to be strengthened to ensure the safety of customs unit staff.
3.3.4 Technical and IT-related capabilities

3.3.4.1 Database

There is an urgent need for the development of an effective database containing consolidated information about illicit drug and precursor seizures, the data related to arrests and criminals involved records of criminal proceedings and detailed case histories. The database should be available to all units so that the investigating staff can access information and update the system with fresh entries. Such a resource would help in proper data collection and management, and encourage data sharing and relevant policy formulation.

3.3.4.2 Risk profiling

Risk management is the key to modern automated customs management. There are five main steps in the standard customs risk management process as defined by the World Customs Organization:

1. Establish context: import of goods, export, passenger traffic, etc.
2. Identify risks: revenue protection (e.g. under valuation, origin, classification), prohibitions and restrictions (e.g. drug trafficking, IPR, fire arms, etc.)
3. Analyse risks: likelihood of a risk occurring (less likely, likely, most likely)
4. Assess and prioritize risks: assess impact and the consequence of risks occurring (e.g. high, medium, low)
5. Address risks: define countermeasures and assign risk levels (e.g. tolerate, treat, transfer or terminate).

In addition to these five steps, risk management requires constant monitoring and review in order to eliminate false negative and false positive risk assessments. Throughout the process, proper documentation, communication and consultation with all relevant stakeholders is crucial, as risk management is a corporate task involving the entire organization and not one dedicated unit only.

Risk-based systems operate more effectively in automated environment. As Pakistan Customs has already introduced WeBOC system for import/export/transit cargo clearance, a risk management system developed on the guidelines above would help establish a more effective, more dynamic and more accurate means for detecting and seizing illicit drugs and precursors. However, it is essential that such a system is properly maintained and updated through a periodical review of risk parameters.

In practice, risk management methodology should be flexible, adaptable and take into account changes in operating environment, including processes and legislation. It requires a constant monitoring, communication and evaluation mechanism. For this purpose, separate and independent Directorate(s)/Unit(s) or Risk Management Committee(s) within Pakistan Customs need to be established for monitoring local, regional and international situations and for working on system optimization. This would not only improve illicit drugs and precursors trafficking control measures throughout Pakistan, but also strengthen the overall enforcement strategy of Pakistan Customs. In addition, it is recommended that training on new procedures should be provided for all staff and that specialized courses should be provided for staff directly involved in the implementation and operation of the new risk management system.

It is clear that Pakistan Customs can excel in the areas covered in this study if the deficiencies are properly addressed and its needs are fully met. The organization is aware of what is required to further improve its capacity and is working hard to find solutions. However, the shortage of funds is a major obstacle in achieving these goals.

---

31 Customs Risk Management (CRiM): A survey of 24 WCO Member Administrations (2011) by Cross-border Research Association, EPFL & HEC UNIL Lausanne, Switzerland published by World Customs Organisation (WCO)

Chapter IV: Conclusion
Chapter IV: Conclusion

Pakistan Customs is one of the most resilient and responsive public sector organisations in Pakistan. It works in coordination with local, regional and international organizations to fulfill its responsibilities in most professional way particularly with reference to control of illicit drugs and precursors. The success of Container Control Programme is one example of the progressive steps taken by the organisation. The foundation of the CRU in collaboration with UNODC, with the goal of building the research capacity of its staff and studying and analyzing its operations is yet another indicator of the vision of this organisation for achieving professional excellence through research, reforms and business-processes re-engineering.

With regard to combating illicit drugs and precursors trafficking, initiatives taken by Pakistan Customs are significant, as reflected in a number of large seizures made at sea ports, airports and dry ports in recent years. However, due to a marked increase in the volume of trade flowing through the country and changes in the enforcement environment relating to illicit drugs and precursors control, there is a need to re-assess and analyze the interception capacity of the organization. Therefore, CRU chose for its first report, a gap analysis and needs assessment relating to illicit drugs and precursor control capacity of Pakistan Customs.

The study focused on three key areas relating to illicit drugs and precursors control measures:

i) Human Resource;
ii) Infrastructure and equipment; and
iii) Operational, technical and IT-related issues.

The findings revealed a number of deficiencies in these areas that are adversely affecting the organization's performance in relation to control of drugs and precursors' trafficking:

Human Resource:
Pakistan Customs is facing a severe shortage of staff, including those employed in tasks relating to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking. This shortage is estimated at between 30 to 40% in overall operational strength of the organisation, while with regard to laboratory staff, the shortage is around 40-50%. This gap is likely to increase in coming years as a result of superannuation of a large number of lower enforcement staff.

With regard to training, firstly, there is no system of conducting training need analysis in the organisation to ascertain the general and specific professional needs of staff. Consequently, there is no organized effort to provide training in areas such as examination of goods and passengers, assessment and investigation, data management and risk profiling. Secondly, there is no policy guidelines for improving and updating the existing training modules and curriculum in line with the emerging needs.

Infrastructure and equipment
There are considerable deficiencies with regard to infrastructure and equipment which include the chemical testing laboratories, canine units and inland and sea check points. In addition to this, the gaps related to availability of scanners, X-ray machines, CCTV cameras, laboratory equipment, drug testing kits, communication equipment, arms and ammunition and vehicles are also visible.

The study shows that seaports, dry ports and airports do not have enough scanners proportionate to their existing and anticipated increase in the magnitude of trade. While only two scanners are working at Karachi sea port, no such facilities are available at major dry ports like Faisalabad, Sambrial, Multan, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Hyderabad. The situation is similar with regard to CCTV cameras and X-ray machines: only two of the eight international airports visited by CRU had X-ray machines for scanning passengers, and there is an acute shortage of CCTV cameras at all ports.

Another area of concern is lack of arms and ammunition, bulletproof jackets and vehicles, modern communication systems, tracking devices and jammers. These resources are required by ASOs and Directorates of Intelligence and Investigation in order to effectively carry out field operations. No procurement of new arms has been made since 1998. There is neither any central control room nor any wireless system available to customs units and the mobility of staff in the field is affected by lack of appropriate vehicles.

New check points are required to improve illicit drug and precursor control measures in areas alongside the country’s coast and in areas sharing borders with Afghanistan, Iran, India and China. According to the data collected, five new check points in coastal areas and 32 new check points in areas with vulnerable borders need to be established. In addition, existing check points need to be properly maintained and re-enforced on modern lines.

Pakistan Customs has no laboratory facility for conducting forensic tests of samples of seized drugs. Currently, the organization has only four testing laboratories and these facilities can only fulfill routine testing requirements. Furthermore, they suffer from an acute shortage of staff, trainings, equipment and lab testing chemicals. Illicit drug samples are referred to NIHL in Islamabad and this process is time consuming and expensive.

A similar situation exists with regard to canine units at Pakistan Customs. The organization has only three canine units and as a result, at most of the Collectorates it has to rely on the resources of ANF.

**Operational, technical and IT-related issues**

Reporting of seizures of illicit drugs and precursors at Pakistan Customs is still made manually. There is no online resource or database related to illicit drugs and precursors that could form a strong base for evolving a risk-profiling or automatic alert system.

Although the organization has introduced a system of automated cargo clearance, and all procedures are being redesigned accordingly, this system has no in-built checks or mechanism for identifying and blocking suspicious consignments likely to contain illicit drugs and precursors. As a result, reliance is made on information-based networks and conventional interception techniques.

While Pakistan Customs has carried out significant illicit drugs and precursors control activity in past, in order to enhance its capabilities in this area and transform it into a modern enforcement agency, the deficiencies and needs presented in this study need to be addressed, and the recommendations need to be considered on priority.

The initiatives like CRU need to be strengthened so that research activities may be continued on other topics of professional excellence of the organisation alongwith drugs and precursors control. Suggested areas for future research in relation to the control of illicit drugs and precursors trafficking are as follows:

- Controlling Drug Precursors in Pakistan: A gap analysis.
- Illicit pharmaceutical trade in Pakistan
- Illicit drugs and precursors trafficking by small boats and dhows along the Makran coast in the Arabian Sea
- Analysis of Afghan transit trade through Pakistan
- Pakistani prosecution system in relation to illicit drugs control: a gap analysis and needs assessment
- Impact of Automation: A comparative study
- Trends in Imports
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs
Annex A: Questionnaire used for data collection

Drugs & Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis & Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

Interviewee Information:
Designation:____________________ Name of Custom Station:____________________________________ Province:__________
Type of Port:______________________________ Interview Number:______________________________ Date:________________
Name of Interviewer:____________________ Signature:____________________
UNODC Research Consultant:____________________ Signature:____________________

Part I: Human Resource:

A. Staff Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cadre</th>
<th>Sanctioned Strength</th>
<th>Working strength</th>
<th>Required Strength</th>
<th>Nature of job e.g. Examination, Assessment, Support etc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent/SPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Appraiser(PA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO/AO/IPO/SPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks (UDC/LDC/S.Typist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepoys/Havaldars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Capacity Building:

1. Did your staff receive trainings related to drugs and precursors control in last two years? Yes: [ ] No: [ ]

2. Please provide the below information on provided trainings in last two years?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Number of staff participated</th>
<th>Duration of Training</th>
<th>Training Provider</th>
<th>Location of Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
3. In which age bracket does your operational staff fall? Are they capable of performing the drugs control activities properly or age factor is a limitation? ________________________________

4. Will training be effective for the staff in their activities related to drugs and precursors control? ________________________________

5. Do you suggest some specific Training Modules for training needs of your staff? ________________________________

---

**Part II: Equipments and Infrastructure:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Equipments</th>
<th>Available number</th>
<th>In Working Condition</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scanners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Ray Machines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV Cameras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any Other: __________________________________________________________________________________________

1. How many containers/trucks are scanned by scanners/X-Ray machines daily? ____________________________ containers/trucks

2. Do you have canine unit with appropriate facilities? Yes: □ No: □

3. Does the department have sniffer dogs for detecting drugs? Yes: □ No: □

4(a). How many sniffer dogs your department has? ______________________ sniffer dogs.

4 (b) Are the dogs in proportion to work load?

4 (c) How many trained dog handlers do you have?

5 Does your department have precursors testing kits? Yes: □ No: □

6 For which chemical and precursors do you have testing kits? 1. __________________________ 2. __________________________

3. __________________________ 4. __________________________ 5. __________________________

7 Does your department have drugs testing kits? Yes: □ No: □

8 For which drugs do you have testing kits? 1. __________________________ 2. __________________________

3. __________________________ 4. __________________________ 5. __________________________

9 Is there any video camera installed at custom/official crossing point? Yes: □ No: □

10 How many Check-posts are working at this Custom Station?

11 How many Check posts/Points are required to be established for effective control of Drugs trafficking?
Part III: Control Mechanism and Procedures:

A. General Measures:
1. What kind of procedures and measures do you exercise/follow to prevent drugs from entering into/transiting through Pakistan?
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 
   iv. 

2. What kind of procedures and measures do you exercise/follow to prevent precursors, from entering into/transiting through Pakistan?
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 
   iv. 

3. What agencies of law enforcement are present during inspection of import and export goods?
   1  2  3  4  Other, please specify 

4. 4 (a) Weak points of procedure from which precursors’ traffickers get, advantage in your opinion:
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 

4(b) Weak points related to Enforcement staff / support Staff.
   i. 
   ii. 

5. Weak points of procedure from which drugs’ traffickers get advantage in your opinion:
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 

6(a) What is the procedure of incoming and outgoing transit goods declaration of Afghanistan through Pakistan?
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 

6 (b) Weak points from which traffickers get advantage in your opinion:

7. What would be the impacts of automation on precursors and drug trafficking in Pakistan
   1. Increase  2. Decrease  3. No effect  4. Other, please specify: 

B. Field Operations/Raids:

8. Are there any mechanism for routine checking/patrolling in your jurisdiction? ________________________________

9. How many raids are conducted per month by your Field units? ________________________________

10. Are these raids information based? ________________________________

11. What sort of Arms/Ammunition your patrolling/raiding Units have? ________________________________

12. Do the staff have proper training in Arms handling and operating? ________________________________

13. What kind of Arms/Equipments you need for making patrolling/raiding effective? ________________________________

14. Are there unofficial crossing points used for smuggling goods, drugs and precursors in your jurisdiction? Yes:  No:  

14(a) Unofficial crossing points names and location on district level:  
  i. ________________________________ Route ________________________________ District  
  ii. ________________________________ Route ________________________________ District  
  iii. ________________________________ Route ________________________________ District  
  iv. ________________________________ Route ________________________________ District  

14(b) How many containers/trucks are being imported through this official crossing point? _____/day _____/month_____/year  

C. Lab Testing:  

15. Do you have the laboratory unit? Yes:  No:  

16. How many staff member you have for laboratory department? ________________ Personals.  

17. Is there staff of laboratory qualified and trained? Yes:  No:  

18. What trainings are needed for laboratory staff? 1. Chemical analysis  2. Drugs testing kit usage  3. other, please specify ________________________________  

19. Does the lab staff identify some chemicals with their physical appearance and specifications? Yes:  No:  

20. Does the laboratory have adequate facilities (building, energy source, lighting, ventilation)? Yes:  No:  

21. Does the custom lab is sufficiently equipped with all testing and auxiliary equipment and test kits? Yes:  No:  

What equipment and testing kits are needed? 1. ________________________________ 2. ________________________________ 3. ________________________________ 4. ________________________________ 5. ________________________________ 6. ________________________________  

22. Where do you send your chemicals and drugs sample?  

23. How much time Lab takes to provide the results? _________ days  

24. Do you have the list of controlled and banned chemicals? Yes:  No:  

25. Have any banned and controlled chemicals been imported through this custom? Yes:  No:  

26. Which banned and controlled chemicals were imported with the permission of Drugs Regulation Committee? please provide below information:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of chemicals</th>
<th>Amount kg/lit</th>
<th>Origin Country</th>
<th>Importer Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28(a) What is the procedure of drawing and sending a sample for lab testing?

28(b) Weak points of procedure from which drugs’ traffickers get advantage in your opinion:
   i. 
   ii. 
   iii. 

28(c) Identify any hurdles / limitation in this regard?

29. Is there any statistical sampling technique used in your department for getting the sample of a product or chemical?
   Yes:  No:  

30. Is the laboratory test result is obligatory for further procedure? Yes:  No:  

D. Risk Profiling:
31. Is there any other Risk profiling mechanism/MIS/R&D System in use by your office?  

32. Is there any data base for profiling of importers / Exporters? 

33. What parameters are used by your department for Risk Profiling? Type of Goods  Destination of Goods  
   Profile of Exporter  Random selection  History/Record  Information  

34. Is there any Systematic information collection system? 

35. Is the staff aware of the Harmonized System Codes for precursors and chemicals? Yes:  No:  

36. Are these codes fed into your risk profile System? Yes:  No:  

Part IV: Seizures of Drugs and Precursors:
1. Has your department seized any banned or under control chemical or precursors during last three years? Yes:  No:  

2. How much banned and under control chemicals/precursors have been seized by your department during last three years? Please provide information below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date of Seizure</th>
<th>Type of chemical</th>
<th>Seizing unit</th>
<th>Amount kg/lit</th>
<th>Origin Country</th>
<th>Importer company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. How your department did?
   i.  
   ii.  
   iii.  

4. Which methods and techniques were used by precursors’ traffickers for precursors trafficking?
   i.  
   ii.  
   iii.  
4 (a) What kind of goods are used for trafficking drugs and precursors? For Example, Food, Baggage, sports goods, furniture, etc.

5. Have your department seized any illicit drugs since last three years? Yes: ☐  No: ☐

6. How much illicit drugs have been seized by your department during last three years? Please provide information below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date of Seizure</th>
<th>Type of drugs</th>
<th>Seizing unit</th>
<th>Amount kg/lit</th>
<th>Destination Country</th>
<th>Exporter company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. How your department found it?
   i. ________________________________________________________________
   ii. ______________________________________________________________
   iii. ______________________________________________________________
   iv. ______________________________________________________________

8. Which methods and techniques were used by drugs' traffickers for drugs trafficking?
   i. ________________________________________________________________
   ii. ______________________________________________________________
   iii. ______________________________________________________________
   iv. ______________________________________________________________
Part V: Seizures of Drugs and Precursors:

1. How do you maintain the data on drugs and precursors? 
   - Classic hard copy  
   - Ms. Excel  
   - Ms. Access  
   - Online Database  
   - Other  

2. Does your department keep the drugs and precursors seizures data separately? 
   - Yes:  
   - No:  

3. How often does your agency report to headquarter on drugs and precursors seizure? 
   - Weekly  
   - Monthly  
   - Quarterly  
   - Yearly  
   - Other, please specify  

4. In what form do you send the report? 
   - Classic hard copy  
   - Ms. Excel  
   - Ms. access  
   - Online database  
   - Other, please specify  

5. Do you have information sharing system with other law enforcement agencies? 
   - Yes:  
   - No:  

6. With whom do you share the information/data?  

7. Do you have information sharing system with neighboring countries on provincial level? 
   - Yes:  
   - No:  

8. Do you have a central data base system for updating, record keeping and integrated information?  

Part VI: Challenges, Problems, Requirements and Recommendations:

1. Challenges and Problems in detection and seizure of precursors and drugs:
   i.  
   ii.  
   iii.  
   iv.  

2. Trainings needed for better control of drugs and precursors smuggling inside Pakistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Department to be participated</th>
<th>Number of staff participating in training</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Equipments needed for better control of drugs and precursors smuggling inside Pakistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>#of Equipment</th>
<th>Department needed the equipment</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. What are your recommendations for better control of precursors and drugs smuggling inside Pakistan?
   A. ____________________________________________
   B. ____________________________________________
   C. ____________________________________________
   D. ____________________________________________
## Table of Pictures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Picture Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Research Team with Mr. Ghulam Ahmed, DG, DGTR, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Research team at CRU, DGTR, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Data Collection at ASO, Islamabad, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Customs Research Unit (CRU) at DGTR, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Research Methodology, SPSS &amp; ArcGIS Training at OSCE, Dushanbe, November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Orientation session for research team, Vienna, December 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ArcGIS and SPSS training session for research team, Islamabad, May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Scanner at East Wharf, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Scanner at West Wharf, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Non-functional scanner at East Wharf, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Customs canine unit, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Customs canine unit, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chemical storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hygiene and equipment at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hygiene and equipment at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Sample storage at Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Chemical-testing section, Pakistan Customs laboratory, Karachi, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Snapshot of a news item regarding blast at Torkham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Snapshot of a news item regarding blast at Torkham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Check post in Rahim Khan Khushalgarh (Kohat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Custom unit in Burki (Kurram Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Check post in Ramak (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Check post in Ramak (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Customs unit in Tank (South Waziristan Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Customs unit in Ghulam Khan (North Waziristan Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Check post Darya Khan (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Check post Darya Khan (D.I. Khan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Check post in Tunnel (Kohat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Customs unit in Kharlachi (Kurram Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Check post in Darra Tang (Lakki Marwat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Custom unit in Shaheedano Dand (Kurram Agency/Fata)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Annex B: pictures of the study

- CRU Team with Ms. Rubina Wasti, Director, DGTR, 2013
- Customs Research Team at CRU, DGTR Islamabad, 2013
- Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013
- Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013
- Customs Research Team at Custom House Peshwar
Customs Research Team at ANF, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, ASO, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Peshawar, 2013

Data collection, Lahore, 2013

Customs Research Team at the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the "Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis" training course, 11-22 November 2013

Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and BMSC officials in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on the conclusion of the "Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis" training course

Pakistan Customs Research Team, Afghan Team and UNODC officials at "Afghanistan and Pakistan Customs' Research Capacity Building Meeting", 13-18 December 2013, held at Vienna International Center (VIC) Vienna, Austria

57th Session of The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014

Pakistan Customs Team and UNODC officials at The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014

Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials at the "Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS" training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014

Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials on the conclusion of the "Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS" training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014

Customs Day: 26th January, 2015
### Table of Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Opiates trafficking through Pakistan, 2010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pakistan Customs units visited by CRU</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>International and domestic airports in Pakistan, 2013</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pakistan Customs laboratory facilities, 2013</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Check posts and field information units under Pakistan Customs</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Unofficial crossing points noted by custom units, 2013</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table of Figures/Graphs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operational structure of Pakistan Customs, 2013</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs, 2013</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shortfall of staff, 2013</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Overall staff shortfall at Pakistan Customs (% of total), 2013</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Position of Inspectors at ASOs, Pakistan Customs, 2013</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Positions of sepoys at ASOs, Pakistan Customs, 2013</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Position of inspectors at border check posts of Pakistan Customs, 2013</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Staff training at Pakistan Customs 2011-2014</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Percentage of participating staff in drugs &amp; precursors trainings, 2011-2014</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Availability of scanning devices at ports in Pakistan, 2013</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Pakistan Customs controlled scanners at sea ports, 2013</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Scanners at dry ports visited by CRU, 2013</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Availability of scanners at airports in Pakistan, 2013</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>X-ray machines for passenger scanning at airports, 2013</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Availability of CCTV at ports in Pakistan, 2013</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Available drug and precursors testing kits, 2013</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Risk profiling parameters and techniques, 2013</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Type of reporting mechanism at CRU-visited customs units, 2013</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Drug seizures made by Pakistan Customs, 2011-13</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Training need analysis</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Tables

Table 1: Job description of different staff positions at Pakistan Customs................................................................................................ 10
Table 2: Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs, 2013 ........................................................................................................................................... 11
Table 3: Staffing levels at Pakistan Customs laboratories, 2013 ................................................................................................................. 12
Table 4: Training received by customs staff at DGTR, 2011-2014............................................................................................................... 15
Table 5: Courses/Modules offered by DGTR, 2011-2014 ................................................................................................................................ 15
Table 6: Cargo clearance at Karachi and Port Muhammad bin Qasim, 2011-2013.............................................................................................. 19
Table 7: Passengers, cargo and mail handling capacity of international airports in Pakistan, 2013 ................................................................. 23
Table 8: List of items not tested at Pakistan Customs laboratory in Karachi..................................................................................................... 29
Table 9: Arms supply, existing and required, at customs units visited by CRU, 2013 ......................................................................................... 31
Table 10: Check posts by location, 2013............................................................................................................................................................... 32
Table 11: Unofficial crossing points noted by custom units, 2013...................................................................................................................... 34
Table 12: Customs units' position on the impact of automation, 2013 .............................................................................................................. 43
Table 13: LEA coordinating with Customs units, 2013.................................................................................................................................... 44
Annex B: Pictures of the study

CRU Team with Ms. Rubina Wasti, Director, DGTR, 2013

Customs Research Team at CRU, DGTR Islamabad, 2013

Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013

Procurement meeting at DGTR, Karachi, 2013

Customs Research Team at Custom House Peshwar
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

Customs Research Team at ANF, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, ASO, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, Karachi, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Islamabad, 2013

Data collection, dry port, Peshawar, 2013

Data collection, Lahore, 2013
Customs Research Team at the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the “Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis” training course, 11-22 November 2013

Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and BMSC officials in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on the conclusion of the “Integration of Research Activities and Data Analysis” training course
Pakistan Customs Research Team, Afghan Team and UNODC officials at “Afghanistan and Pakistan Customs’ Research Capacity Building Meeting”, 13-18 December 2013, held at Vienna International Center (VIC) Vienna, Austria

57th Session of The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014

Pakistan Customs Team and UNODC officials at The Commission on Narcotics and Drugs (CND), March 2014
Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials at the “Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS” training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014

Pakistan Customs Research Team with other participants and UNODC and DGTR officials on the conclusion of the “Intermediate Data Analysis in GIS & SPSS” training course in Islamabad, Pakistan, 19-23 May 2014
Final day of 5-Day Training on "Specialized Software for Criminal Intelligence Analysis-i2 Analyst Notebook & i2 Ibase"
Dushanbe, 2014
Drugs and Precursors Controlling Techniques: Gap Analysis and Need Assessment for Pakistan Customs

Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Director General, Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), Karachi with the officers and staff of DGTR on Customs Day, 26th January, 2015

Research Team Members at DGTR, 2015

At United Nations office at Vienna International Centre (VIC), 2014

Research Team at work at Customs Research Unit (CRU), 2015
About Research Team

Muhammad Rashid Munir Siddiqui, is currently working on deputation with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as Senior National Research Consultant for the Research Capacity Building Project in Pakistan Customs. Born on 1st September, 1972 in Multan, he received his elementary education in his hometown. Later, he did M.Sc.(Hons.) in Agricultural Entomology (1995-97) from University of Agriculture, Faisalabad. He has, on his credit, degrees in MBA General Management (2004-05) from Preston University, Karachi and Executive MBA (2008-10) from Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). He is also a member of Project Management Institute (PMI) a not-for-profit association for the project, program and portfolio management profession. As part of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), Pakistan since 2002, he held diverse middle management positions related to trade regulation and facilitation, cargo examination and assessment, counter narcotics and border management in different field Collectorates. He has also served as Executive Magistrate for four years (1998-2002) in Punjab provincial government. He is part of visiting faculty of different educational institutions including Directorate General of Training and Research (Customs), Karachi. He has attended a number of international and national short-term courses, conferences, seminars and workshops on capacity building, human resource management and System re-engineering including annual Convention on Narcotic Drugs-NCD (Vienna, 2014), Trainings at Border Management Staff College (BMSC) of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), (Dushanbe 2013 and 2014), Basic and Intermediate Training Courses in ArcGIS, UNODC, (Islamabad, 2014), Basic Course in IBM Analyst Notebook i2 (Dushanbe, 2014).

Zehra Tahir Naqvi is an officer of Pakistan Customs Service since 2008. She has a varied experience of working at Regional Tax Office (RTO), Karachi, MCC PaCCS, Directorate General of Transit Trade, Karachi and the Directorate General of Training & Research, (Customs), Karachi, as Deputy Director. She is Masters in English Literature from University of Karachi. She has attended a lot of short term & long term Training Courses/ Seminars/ Workshops related to Border Management, Customs Procedures, Organizational Behavior, Project Management and Capacity Building. She has been the part of Intermediate & Advanced Level Trainings in SPSS & ArcGIS held at OSCE Border Management College, Dushanbe, Tajikistan (2013) and in Islamabad (2014). She has successfully completed various UNODC online courses on Drug Identification, Human Trafficking, Money Laundering & Risk Management. She enjoys reading, movies, music and writing poetry. She is also fond of sports specially Tennis and swimming. Her passions include travelling and learning languages.
Syed Samsam Qadir Shah, joined Pakistan Customs in 1983 as Preventive Officer in Collectorate of Preventive, Karachi. He has done his Bachelors of Arts (B.A.) from Government College Lahore (1982) with a Roll of Honor Award for his performance in sports. He has so far served in diverse positions related to Investigation & Prosecution, Drug Enforcement and Anti-Smuggling. He received letter of appreciation from Nordic Police in the field of Investigation and Prosecution in 1997. He had a chance to serve as a volunteer for Disaster Assistance Camp (DAC), carried out by American Forces and other countries at Chaklala Base (2005-2006). He is an International Hockey Player, and has the honour to represent Pakistan in various International Hockey events within and outside Pakistan during 1980 to 1982. Later he also served as the national coach of hockey team for PHF’s Goal Keeper’s Academy, Karachi (2011-12). He is also a National Golfer having a distinguished ranking of Single HCP (4).

He has attended a number of training courses related to his professional responsibilities including computer based trainings in MS office, MS Excel, MS Access, Data entry Analysis and Interpretation and MS PowerPoint. He has also attended local and international trainings related to Border Control & Interdiction Techniques, Karachi conducted by US Customs(2011), Trainings in SPSS and ArcGIS at OSCE Border Management College, Dushanbe, Tajikistan (2013) and Islamabad (2014) and Intermediate Training course in IBM i2 Notebook in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (2014).

Asif Khan has been serving Pakistan Customs since 1996. He holds Masters degree in Public Administration (MPA) from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad with majors in Management and Marketing. During his professional career he has worked in diverse positions related to assessment and examination of cargo, audit and automation of Customs Procedures. He has been awarded with a number of meritorious certificates and letters of appreciation for his distinguished performance. He is currently working for Capacity Building Project with UNODC.

He has attended a number of training courses and seminars on Effective People Management, Project Management, Leadership Skills, Conflict Management, Basic Computer Concepts & Operations, Information Technology, Change Management, UNODC online courses on Drug Identification & Interdiction Techniques, Container Control Programme, Risk Management and other computer based trainings in ArcGIS, SPSS, IBM i2 Analyst Notebook etc. He has also attended a number of international trainings held at Border Management Staff College (BMSC) of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and trainings organised by United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC) held in Tajikistan, Dushanbe (2013-14).

He possesses exceptional skills in professional writing and regularly contributes in Pakistan’s leading English News Papers & Magazines viz Dawn, The News International, Daily Nation, Social Pages, Mag Weekly. He has, on his credit, coverage of many international events including “Water Calligraphy” by Dr. Kanta Kochhar Lindgren, an Associate Professor at the University of Washington on the issue of global water shortage and an international workshop organized by US Consulate featuring Sarah Long Holland, Development Manager of New England Foundation for the Arts at Boston, USA. He regularly covers the events organized by Pakistan American Cultural Centre (PACC) and German Goethe-Institut in Pakistan.