

Asset recovery
Abuse of functions
Corruption
Law enforcement
Domestic law
International cooperation

Measures
Prevention

Bribery
Criminalization
Legal assistance
Offenders

Statistical framework to measure corruption

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication was produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

UNODC would like to extend its appreciation to the authorities who provided valuable feedback to this publication:

Anticorruption Office of the Republic of **Argentina**; Ministry of Justice and Statistics Committee of the Republic of **Armenia**; Attorney-General's Department of the Commonwealth of **Australia**; Federal Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Republic of **Austria**; Anti-Corruption Commission of Republic of **Azerbaijan**; General Prosecutor Office and National Statistical Office of Republic of **Belarus**; Office of Administrative Ethics and Professional Conduct of Kingdom of **Belgium**; National Institute of Statistics and Demography of Republic of **Benin**; Anticorruption Commission of Kingdom of **Bhutan**; Ministry of Justice and Institutional Transparency of the Plurinational State of **Bolivia**, Department of Assets Recovery and International Legal Cooperation and Office of the Comptroller General of the Federative Republic of **Brazil**; Commission for Combating Corruption of the Republic of **Bulgaria**; National Statistical Institute, Prosecutor's Office, National Revenue Agency and National Audit Office of the Republic of **Bulgaria**; Anti-corruption Research and Training Center of **Burkina Faso**; National Police and Special Brigade Anti-corruption of the Republic of **Burundi**; Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics of **Canada**; National Commission of Supervision, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Commission of Supervision of the People's Republic of **China**; National Administrative Department of Statistics, National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences and Ministry of Justice and Law and General Attorney Office of the Republic of **Colombia**; National Institute of Statistics and Censos of the Republic of **Costa Rica**; Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and High Authority for Good Governance of the Republic of **Côte d'Ivoire**; Ministry of Justice and Public Administration and Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of **Croatia**; Comptroller General of the Republic of the Republic of **Cuba**; General Directorate of Ethics and Government Integrity of the **Dominican Republic**; Secretary of Anti-Corruption Public Policy, State Attorney General's Office, President's Office and National Institute for Statistics and Census of the Republic of **Ecuador**; Administrative Control Authority of the Arab Republic of **Egypt**; National Civil Police of the Republic of **El Salvador**; Statistics **Finland**; Statistical Service of the Republic of **Ghana**; National Transparency Authority of the Hellenic Republic of **Greece**; National Protective Service of **Hungary**; Central Vigilance Commission of the Republic of **India**; Ministry of Justice of the Islamic Republic of **Iran**; Ministry of Justice and Central Bureau of Statistics of the State of **Israel**; National Institute of Statistics, Anticorruption Authority and National School of Administration of the Republic of **Italy**; Integrity Commission of **Jamaica**; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of **Japan**; Integrity and Anti-corruption Commission of the Hashemite Kingdom of **Jordan**; Anti-Corruption Agency and National Statistics Bureau of the Republic of **Kazakhstan**; Public Prosecution, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of **Kenya**; Anticorruption Authority of State of **Kuwait**; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Principality of **Liechtenstein**; Special Investigation Service of the Republic of **Lithuania**; Committee to Safeguard Integrity of the Republic of **Madagascar**; Police Force and National Statistical Office of the Republic of **Malta**; Independent Commission Against Corruption of the Republic of **Mauritius**; National Institute of Statistics and Geography and Ministry of Public Administration of **Mexico**; Anticorruption Prosecutor and National Anti-Corruption Centre of **Moldova**; Independent Authority Against Corruption of **Mongolia**; National Authority for Probity, Prevention and Fight against Corruption of the Kingdom of **Morocco**; Anti-Corruption Commission Office of the Republic of the Union of **Myanmar**; Ministry of Justice of the Republic of **Namibia**; National Accountability Bureau of the Islamic Republic of **Pakistan**; Central Bureau of Statistics of **Palestine**; Senior Anti-Corruption Prosecutor of the Republic of **Panama**; National Anticorruption Secretariat of the Republic of **Paraguay**; Undersecretary of Strategic Management of Public Integrity of the Republic of

Peru; Department of Justice of the Republic of **Philippines**; National Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of **Poland**; Statistics **Portugal**; Anticorruption Agency of State of **Qatar**; Ministry of Justice and National Anticorruption Directorate of **Romania**; General Prosecutor Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the **Russian Federation**; Oversight and Anti-Corruption Authority of the Kingdom of **Saudi Arabia**; Agency for Prevention of Corruption, Ministry of Interior and Prosecutors Office of the Republic of **Serbia**; Anti-Corruption Commission of the Republic of **Seychelles**; Ministry of Justice and Corruption Prevention Department and Statistical Office of the **Slovak Republic**; Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of **South Korea**; Department of Statistical System of Criminality and Victims of the Kingdom of **Spain**; Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery of Corruption and Department of Census and Statistics of Democratic Socialist Republic of **Sri Lanka**; Federal Statistical Office of the **Swiss Confederation**; Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption of the Republic of **Tajikistan**; National Anti-Corruption Commission of Kingdom of **Thailand**; Ministry of Justice, Statistical Institute and Personal Data Protection Authority of **Türkiye**; Joint Anticorruption Unit, **United Kingdom**; National Agency on Corruption Prevention and Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office of **Ukraine**; **United States** Department of State and U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics; Anti-Corruption Commission of the Republic of **Zimbabwe**.

UNODC also acknowledges with gratitude the contribution of the following experts who provided valuable input concerning the content of the publication: Mihaly Fazekas (Government Transparency Institute); Jesper Johnson, Rusudan Mikhelidze and Sara Sultan Balbuena (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development); Irina Sokolova and Janithrika Jayasundara (Transparency International); Rajen Bablee (Transparency Mauritius); Sofia Selkämäa (University of Helsinki); Isam Haj Hussein (Coalition for Accountability and Integrity); Sofie Arjon Schütte (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre); Jerg Gutmann (University of Hamburg), Samantha Feinstein (Government Accountability Project), Joy D'Angelo and Richard E. Messick. UNODC wishes to acknowledge Alina Mungiu Pippidi (Hertie School of Government) and Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka (Transparency International) as the leading authors of the conceptual framework of this document.

The publication was prepared under the supervision of Angela Me, Chief of the UNODC Research and Analysis Branch and benefited from the valuable input of Salome Flores Sierra Franzoni, UNODC Information Centre, Stefanie Holling and Zorana Markovic from UNODC's Corruption and Economic Branch, Mayra Carolina Lemus Way, and Roberto Murguia Huerta, UNODC INEGI Center of Excellence.

This document has not been formally edited.

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What is this framework?

The framework is an ambitious set of indicators that requires a holistic national system of statistical and non-statistical sources that probably does not exist in its entirety in any country, but similarly to the SDG indicators framework, the objective is to offer countries a reference frame to guide national efforts to develop national information systems on corruption.

How was this framework developed?

It is the result of two global consultations hosted by UNODC in December 2022 and November 2023. During these consultations, experts appointed by Member States exchanged their national experiences on corruption measurement, discussed the dimensions to measure corruption, and finally provided the last review of the framework. These consultations also included other stakeholders from international organizations, think tanks, academia and civil society. More than 200 national experts participated.

In total, 149 entities from 81 Member States provided written feedback, including 25 national statistical offices, 56 anti-corruption authorities, 25 criminal justice authorities, ministries, think tanks, academia, and civil society organizations.

How is this framework useful?

Given that measuring corruption is a complex and gradual task that cannot rely on a single indicator, the framework comprises 145 indicators. Throughout consultations, Member States and other stakeholders deliberated on the relevance and feasibility of each indicator.

This extensive set of indicators enables countries to gain a profound understanding of the extent of corruption and to monitor the effectiveness of preventive policies. Although indicators within the framework are not exhaustive, collecting and analyzing them can help countries in establishing comprehensive

baselines to grasp corruption and monitor their ongoing efforts to address it over time.

How can Member States use this framework?

Countries are not anticipated to report data based on this framework; instead, they are encouraged to utilize it as a tool to gradually collect, analyze and use relevant data on corruption at the national and subnational levels to inform and monitor their policies.

Which authorities can use this framework?

Collecting relevant data to measure corruption is a shared responsibility involving various stakeholders including:

1. National statistical offices.
They are responsible for collecting, compiling, and disseminating official statistics on various topics including corruption. Some conduct population and business surveys to measure the perceptions of corruption and the prevalence of bribery. They are responsible for reporting progress on Sustainable Development Goals indicators 16.5.1 and 16.5.2.
2. National Anti-Corruption Agencies:
Many countries have dedicated anti-corruption commissions or agencies responsible for implementing and monitoring National Anticorruption policies and preventing corruption.
3. Ethics Commissions:
These commissions or similar bodies are responsible for promoting ethical conduct in public service. These entities may collect data on ethical violations, including corruption-related misconduct.
4. Public Procurement Units:
Agencies or administrative units responsible for overseeing public

procurement processes may collect data on corrupt practices related to government contracts, bidding processes, and procurement transactions.

5. **Financial Regulatory Authorities:**
Agencies overseeing financial institutions and transactions, such as central banks, financial regulatory bodies and financial intelligence units may collect data on suspicious financial activities and transactions related to corruption.
6. **Customs and Border Control Agencies:**
Agencies responsible for customs and border control may collect data on corruption related to smuggling, bribery at border crossings, and other illicit activities.
7. **Tax Authorities:**
Tax agencies may gather data on tax evasion, fraudulent financial activities, and corrupt practices related to tax collection.
8. **Law Enforcement Agencies:**
Police and other law enforcement agencies are often involved in investigating and prosecuting corruption cases. They collect data related to corruption allegations, investigations, arrests, and legal proceedings.
9. **Auditing Agencies**
Government auditing bodies, such as the national audit office or inspector general, may collect data related to financial irregularities, misuse of public funds, and other corrupt practices through their audit processes.
10. **Judicial Bodies:**
Courts and judicial bodies may collect data on corruption cases, convictions, and legal outcomes related to corruption charges.

By systematically collecting and analyzing administrative records from all these agencies, Member States can identify

patterns, trends, and indicators of corruption, assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures, and formulate evidence-based policies and strategies to combat corruption effectively.

How to collect data to measure corruption?

Integrating different data sources can provide valuable insights. A general approach to integration can follow these steps:

1 **Coordination.** It's important for all relevant agencies to coordinate their data collection efforts and share information to build a more comprehensive and accurate picture of corruption, its associated risks and the government's response within a country, according to the indicators in this statistical framework. Ideally, countries could establish a mechanism to ensure maximum coordination, discuss measurement priorities and indicators, agree on definitions and methodologies, and establish sharing arrangements. A custodian of a unified database or platform should also be defined. National Statistical Offices are impartial and have the technical capacity and infrastructure to fulfil this role. However, if there are constraints on the implementation of the data collection and follow-up analysis, other arrangements and partnerships should be explored.

2. **Data collection.** The sources from which data will be collected should be identified in advance and data should be gathered in accordance with the indicators that have been agreed upon in advance. These sources can include administrative records from different institutions, national survey data or any other secondary sources. It is important to ensure the use of common definitions and units of measurement to ensure consistency and accuracy in data collection procedures. The data collection process should be documented comprehensively as documentation enhances transparency.

3. Data validation. Data should be checked for errors, missing data, anomalies, and inconsistencies to maintain data quality. In this phase, government agencies should verify that data is complete, that there are no missing values or gaps, and that data is consistent and does not contain contradictory information. Identifying and eliminating duplicate records or entries is also part of this phase. Data validation ensures that the dataset is accurate and reliable before analysis.

4. Data integration. Data from multiple sources should be combined into a single database or platform. There are different techniques for integrating data; some involve extracting data from existing source systems, while others involve loading data into a target system. The choice of the most appropriate technique should consider existing capacities and resources. Data can only be integrated when similar rules are used when recording it. This involves using identification codes, definitions and variables that standardize data collection and enable data integration.

5. Analysis and interpretation. Once the data is ready for analysis, an expert inter-institutional group should analyze the key indicators and decide how best to organize and visualize the key findings. This group should also provide explanations of the patterns, trends, and relationships between the different indicators in each dimension, as well as their implications for decision making or policy development.

6. Confidentiality and security. Sensitive data should be handled responsibly, ensuring the privacy and security of individuals and organizations involved. Compliance with relevant data protection regulations is essential.

7. Use of technology. Technologies such as data mining, machine learning, and natural language processing should be leveraged to efficiently analyze large data sets. These tools can help identify patterns, anomalies, and

trends that may indicate corruption. Due caution must be exercised, however, as the use of technology is only possible if the datasets are standardized, clean, and contain enough data points to apply robust analytical techniques.

8. Dissemination. In this phase, data should be made available to users in a usable and accessible format. The easiest way to disseminate data is through a centralized online platform that allows access to datasets and metadata. Platforms should also offer at least some basic visualization functionalities and analytical tools.

9. Continuous monitoring. Corruption is dynamic and may evolve over time. Data collection and monitoring should be an ongoing activity to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and to identify emerging trends.

By systematically following these steps, national authorities can collect high-quality data that is reliable, valid, and conducive to generating valuable insights to fight corruption, promote accountability, promote fairness, and ultimately improve the well-being of societies.

Why did UNODC develop this framework?

Since 2013, UNODC has promoted a road map to improve the quality and availability of crime and criminal justice statistics (E/CN.3/2013/11). The 2013 roadmap acknowledged corruption among those emerging and difficult-to-measure crimes that demanded additional methodological development since its measurement presented major weaknesses often based on indirect or perception-based methodology without a consolidated approach to produce reliable and standardized measurements, and a lack of commonly agreed statistical concepts, methods, tools, and indicators.

UNODC is also the custodian agency of SDG indicators 16.5.1 and 16.5.2 which measure the prevalence of briberyⁱ in households and businesses. UNODC and UNDP produced the *Manual on Corruption Surveys: Methodological Guidelines on the Measurement of Bribery and Other Forms of Corruption through Sample Surveys* which provides technical guidance to measure types of corruption.

Furthermore, the Conference of the States Parties (CoSP) to the United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted resolution 8/10 entitled “Measurement of Corruption” and requested UNODC “to continue expert-level consultations on identifying and refining methodologies on the issue of the measurement of corruption in order to develop proposals on a comprehensive, scientifically sound and objective framework for the purpose of assisting States Parties, upon their request, in measuring corruption, consistent with the Convention”.

The special session of the General Assembly against corruption (UNGASS), in 2021, adopted the political declaration “Our common commitment to effectively addressing challenges and implementing measures to prevent and combat corruption and strengthen international cooperation”. It encouraged UNODC, in coordination with the UN Statistical Commission and in broad cooperation across the United Nations system, to develop and share a comprehensive, scientifically sound and objective statistical framework, grounded in methodological work and reliable data sources, to support States in their efforts to measure corruption, its impact and all relevant aspects of preventing and combating it, in order to inform and strengthen evidence-based anti-corruption policies and strategies, consistent with the Convention against Corruption.

What is the relationship between this framework and the Implementation Review Mechanism?

This Statistical Framework does not intend to replace or substitute the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of UNCAC. On the contrary, the indicators of the Statistical Framework may contribute to add a statistical perspective to the findings of the Mechanism.

If a Member State collects data and measures different aspects of corruption or has developed a national statistical system for its measurement based on this statistical framework, the indicators produced may be used to inform the Implementation Review Mechanism and contribute to the assessment of the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts.

Is this framework going to be used to rank countries?

The Statistical Framework is intended purely for domestic use by Member States as a tool to support their adoption of knowledge-based anti-corruption measures. It does not aim to create any sort of ranking or compare levels of corruption among States, and it will not be used as a tool by the United Nations to assess the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

How will UNODC support countries in using this framework?

UNODC can facilitate knowledge sharing and coordination among relevant stakeholders in the adoption of this framework, including by sharing relevant metadata for each indicator describing the key definitions and concepts associated with each indicator, units of measurement, data sources, data collection methods, calculation methods and proposed disaggregation.

Corruption is not a static phenomenon and there may be other, new forms of corruption, so the framework may be reviewed and adapted in the future if deemed necessary.

Conceptual framework

The 146 indicators that form the Statistical Framework to measure corruption consider the complexity of corruption by looking at the different dimensions of corruption together with elements that can describe it.

The Framework is constructed through a table with different dimensions:

- types of corruption (based on the United Nations Convention against Corruption) and type of measurement:
- perception, output/direct measures (experience of corruption), and
- indirect measures (risks and responses).

The types of corruption considered in the framework are based on the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and include the following aspects, which were included for their potential to generate data:

a) Criminal offences under UNCAC.

- a.1 Bribery of national public officials
- a.2 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or other diversion of property by a public official
- a.3 Money-laundering
- a.4 Illicit enrichment
- a.5 Abuse of functions

b) Preventive measures

- b.1 Public hiring based on merit
- b.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary
- b.3 Conflict of interest
- b.4 Management of public finances
- b.5 Public procurement
- b.6 Candidature for and election to public office
- b.7 Preventive measures for the private sector
- b.8 Preventive measures for the state-owned enterprises
- b.9 Training programs

c) Enabling environment to report and address corruption

- c.1 Resources allocated to fight corruption
- c.2 Public reporting and access to information
- c.3 Protection of reporting persons

The statistical framework to measure corruption is presented in a table that contains a list of indicators that relate to different forms of corruption and to distinguish between direct or indirect measures.

Direct measures assess the prevalence of specific types of corruption, particularly bribery or in other words, the percentage of the population or businesses that have experienced bribery when dealing with public officials. Estimating the prevalence of bribery by type of public official and sector provides guidance on where to focus preventive measures. These indicators can typically be produced through population and business surveys, and they are robust, accurate and representative if statistical designs of the surveys are representative of the whole population. The challenge in the implementation of these surveys is that they are usually expensive and not always easy and sustainable to conduct repeatedly. Measuring corruption directly is often not possible due to the context and the nature of the sector. For example, if a sector is by its nature hidden from the public (e.g. due to the subject matter, such as defense or national security, or because it involved personal data) direct measurement through a survey would not help to reveal the true scale of corruption because the public would have no direct experience to report.

Indirect measures: Due to the elusive nature of corruption and the challenge to collect data to measure it directly, indirect measures are included in the framework: while not measuring corruption per se, they can measure elements that may enable or deter corruption. The following indirect measures are considered:

- **Perception indicators.** The measurement of the perception of corruption may include a broad range of attitudes and beliefs (for example regarding conflict of interest, abuse of

power, embezzlement of public funds, etc.). Perception indicators may be influenced by a variety of subjective factors that may not be directly linked to the prevalence of corruption, such as culture, mass communication, and values. Therefore, perception-based measures are not suitable to monitor corruption levels and trends but can help to examine the trends and scope of the relationship between direct experience of corruption, general perception, trust in public agencies. Measuring perception of corruption together with indicators on direct experience of corruption can provide an understanding of the gap between the perception and the corruption experienced by the surveyed populations.

- **Risk indicators.** These measures provide information on possible existing or non-existing infrastructures and procedures that increase or decrease the risk of corruption, rather than the occurrence of corruption itself. Risk indicators measure the context that can enable corruption. They are useful to map the different types of corruption and to understand the context in which these occur. The risk depends on the capacity of a State to prevent public officials, private sector entities and individuals from committing corruption. Where this capacity is low, corruption risk is high. Measuring opportunities or risks (circumstances that enable corruption) and constraints (circumstances that deter corruption) is important for policy makers to identify existing risks as well as possible measures for addressing them. A State with moderate to low constraints may still manage to control corruption if opportunities remain low. For example, measuring the proportion of persons who interact with government through digital platforms rather than directly contact with public officials can be useful in assessing the extent to which e-government constrain discretionary decision-making.

Another example of a constraint indicator is the proportion of persons or business that report bribery to the competent authorities, as this shows their willingness to take a stand against corruption and contribute to the fight against this corrosive phenomenon.

- **Response indicators.** As risk varies across societies so does the State response. For instance, some countries have resources concentrated in few institutions or lower oversight in certain sectors, which provide higher opportunities for corruption. The response indicators are indirect measures because they do not measure the occurrence of corruption, but how the State responds to it through:
 - legislative initiatives (classified in the framework as **de jure**), and
 - criminal justice actions or other actions that target corruption perpetrators (classified in the framework as **de facto** response).

Response indicators measure a mix of trends in the capacity and concrete response to combat corruption. They are labelled as indirect rather than direct measures because they do not clearly inform on the level of corruption.

The *de jure* category can be further quantified using a benchmark (For example, comprehensiveness of bribery regulation, for instance) and the measurement of each country against it.

The *de jure* and the *de facto* measures are separated because the evidence shows that important implementation gaps exist, and countries with the most comprehensive regulation are not necessarily the least corrupt or the ones that improve the most.

How to explain indicators?

The indicators included in the framework are not to be used in isolation.

The framework is designed to measure different criminal offenses, such as bribery, money laundering or illicit enrichment, among others and to combine them with other indicators as alone, each indicator may give partial or biased information.

For example, a high level of convictions for corruption may mean a high level of corruption or a high level of state response to corruption. Considering this indicator in combination with indicators on the level of bribery experience by citizens gives a more complete picture: high bribery levels with low conviction rates suggest a high level of corruption with a low state response while low a level of bribery with a high level of convictions indicates a low incidence of corruption with a high level of state response.

How to read these indicators?

The framework can be used by combining the different categories.

- **Types of measures as analytical categories.** Reading the framework by type of measure (direct or indirect) captures the analytic building blocks that describe corruption, the factors that enable it and the capacity to deter it. These building blocks provide the space to integrate different types of measurement (direct, indirect), while also monitoring the relevant risks based on enabling and mitigating circumstances for corruption, i.e., the opportunities and constraints, as well as the official legal and law enforcement responses. The rows related to Risks and Responses describe some specific elements of the preventive anti-corruption policies and practices mentioned in chapter II of UNCAC. After global consultations with international and

national experts, the indicators were chosen for their potential to produce concrete data and therefore be measured. The qualitative analysis of preventive measures remains subject to review under the Implementation Review Mechanism.

- **Indicators as analytical categories.** Indicators use selected offences of corruption under the United Nations Convention against Corruption, thus allowing for the assessment of different manifestations of corruption . Bribery, embezzlement and money-laundering as mandatory offences that potentially generate the most data were chosen as the three primary offences. In addition, illicit enrichment and abuse of functions can be measured whether the underlying behaviour has been criminalized, by including indicators for administrative rather than criminal justice action.

Each type of corruption, say, bribery, is thus monitored by perception, direct measurements and indirect indicators, the latter including also measures for enabling and mitigating context, for the legal response and the de facto response. Implementation gaps can be calculated between the de jure response and the de facto one. When duly filled in, the framework will provide, in one glance, a better picture of the prevalence of a specific type of corruption (through measurements), as well as an overview of the disabling and enabling circumstances.

The ensemble of the framework indicators and enabling and disabling factors for corruption can be measured at national, subnational and sector level, as each sector adds its own specificity and risks. This allows for a highly adaptable framework that can be replicated at the sub-national or sectoral level depending on the context of each user and country.

However, the national context and legal framework remains present in each and every sector, as it is the national level which shapes the primary legal and policy formulation

against corruption. Differences may be found at geographical level, e.g., types of corruption or corruption risks may vary between cities, and sectors.

The gender dimension in measuring corruption


The relationship between corruption and gender has increasingly been explored since the early days of the millennium. Initial research looked into the impact of women's political participation on the prevalence of corruption and found that countries with higher representation of women in public administration and in the labour market show lower levels of corruption.

However, since then, findings indicate that women are not necessarily less prone to corruption but have less agency and access to

positions of decision-making and power where opportunities of corruption are generally more present.

A quarter of a century later, anti-corruption and gender equality measures are considered to be mutually reinforcing, as diversity tends to act as a corruption prevention measure as it can break up collusive networks. Bringing a gender perspective into corruption measurement is important to fully understand how corruption could affect different groups within society due to existing social norms, power dynamics and unequal access to resources. The starting point is the collection of disaggregated data to capture gender-specific perceptions, experiences, disparities and barriers between groups.

Dimensions of the statistical framework to measure corruption.



Statistical Framework to measure corruption²

Components of the statistical framework to measure corruption³

a) Criminal offenses under UNCAC⁴

Dimension		a.1 Bribery of national public officials⁵ (Art. 15 UNCAC)		
Direct measure	a.1.1 Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials⁶ among the population Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe (gave a public official money, a gift or counter favour) to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months ⁷ Disaggregated by function of public official, sex of the person and the public official			
	a.1.2 Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials among businesses Proportion of businesses who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe (gave a public official money, a gift or counter favour) to a public official or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months			
	a.1.3 Total monetary value (in US Dollars) of bribes paid by all people during the previous 12 months. Disaggregated by function of the public official and sex			
Indirect Measures	Perception	a.1.4 Perception of corruption in the public sector⁸ Proportion of persons who perceive that the public sector is corrupt ⁹ Disaggregated by age, sex and by government branches (e.g., executive, legislative and judiciary) and by government level (e.g., national, local) and sector		
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A	
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	a.1.5 E-Government¹⁰ coverage Proportion of persons who engaged in at least one public service delivery and who did so using a digital platform Disaggregated by sex, age, and type of procedure	
			a.1.6 Reporting bribery in dealings with public officials among the population/business. Proportion of people/businesses who reported a case to competent authorities in the last 12 months	
Response	DE JURE	a.1.7 Criminalization of bribery		

		(Regulation)	Comprehensive criminalization of bribery under national legislation, in line with Article 15 of UNCAC a.1.8 Comprehensive definition of public official. All public officials should be covered by national legislation, in line with Article 2 of UNCAC
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	a.1.9 Bribery detection Total number of actual or suspected bribes brought to the attention of relevant authorities in the last 12 months
			a.1.10 Bribery investigation¹¹ Total number of persons under criminal investigation for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.1.11 Bribery prosecution¹² Total number of persons prosecuted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.1.12 Bribery conviction¹³ Total number of persons convicted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.1.13 Assets recovered from bribery Total amount of assets recovered ¹⁴ from bribery convictions
			a.1.14 Total number of administrative sanctions (such as disciplinary measures for public officials or debarment of companies from public procurement) recorded in a given year Disaggregated by sex

Dimension	a.2 Embezzlement¹⁵, misappropriation, or diversion¹⁶ of property or public funds (Art. 17 UNCAC)		
Direct measure	N/A		
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	a.2.1 Discretionary allocation Proportion of total government budget that can be allocated outside the formal budget approval process
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	a.2.2 Misused public funds identified Monetary value of irregularities ruled by the Supreme Audit Institution as a share of the total audited ¹⁷ public budget
			a.2.3 Frequency of audits Number of planned and ad hoc audits conducted in the last 12 months
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	a.2.4 Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds in the national legislation, in line with article 17 of UNCAC
			a.2.5 Regulations on management of resources Regulatory framework with a clear separation of duties and responsibilities of public officials in charge of managing resources
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	a.2.6 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion investigation Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.2.7 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.2.8 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion conviction Rate of persons convicted engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.2.9 Assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion

			Total amount of assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion convictions or proceedings
			a.2.10 Total number of administrative sanctions for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year

Dimension	a.3 Money laundering (UNCAC art.14)			
Direct measure	N/A			
Indirect Measures	Perception	a.3.1 Perception of corruption in the financial system Proportion of persons who perceive that the financial system is corrupt Disaggregated by sector (e.g. banking system, real estate, customs)		
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A	
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	a.3.2 Addressing risk gaps Number of gaps that have been addressed since the last evaluation by an international peer review body or since national risk assessment	
			a.3.3 Supervision on AML regulatory framework Number of supervisory activities conducted regarding institutions obliged under AML framework	
			a.3.4 Freezing transactions Number of transactions frozen	
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	a.3.5 Criminalization of money laundering and predicate offenses in the national legislation as per Article 14 of UNCAC	
			a.3.6 Beneficial ownership transparency Access by financial institutions and relevant authorities to accurate and up-to-date information on the ultimate beneficial owner	
			a.3.7 Regulation on anonymous cash transactions	
			a.3.8 Regulation on virtual assets Virtual asset service providers are licensed, registered and subject to supervision	
			a.3.9 Information sharing mechanisms Existing information sharing mechanisms to exchange information across relevant institutions	
	DE FACTO (Implementation)	a.3.10 Suspicious transactions Number of suspicious transactions registered by the financial intelligence unit in a calendar year		
		a.3.11 Money laundering investigation		

			Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in money laundering recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.3.12 Money laundering prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for money laundering recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.3.13 Money laundering conviction Rate of persons convicted engaging in money laundering recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. Disaggregated by sex
			a.3.14 Money laundering administrative sanctions Number of legal entities sanctioned for engaging in money laundering recorded in a given year Disaggregated by sex
			a.3.15 Assets recovered from money laundering Total amount of assets recovered from money laundering convictions or proceedings

Dimension	a.4 Illicit enrichment ¹⁸ (Art. 20 UNCAC)			
Direct measure	a.4.1 Income declaration Proportion of public officials whose assets cannot be explained ¹⁹			
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A		
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A	
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	a.4.2 Asset and interest disclosure of public officials Existence of accessible and up-to-date registries or databases on bank accounts, and luxury assets (e.g. real estate, vehicles).	
			a.4.3 Existence of a control body to monitor, validate and enforce asset and interest disclosures of public officials	
	Response	DE FACTO (Implementation)	DE JURE (Regulation)	a.4.4 Financial disclosure regime Existence of regulation on wealth disclosure for public officials (including real state and vehicles)
			a.4.5 Illicit enrichment inquiries Total number of inquiries by control bodies regarding public officials potentially engaging in illicit enrichment	
			a.4.6 Illicit enrichment investigation Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in illicit enrichment recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex	
			a.4.7 Illicit enrichment prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for illicit enrichment recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000. Disaggregated by sex	
			a.4.8 Illicit enrichment conviction Total number of public officials convicted for engaging in illicit enrichment divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex	
			a.4.9 Assets recovered from illicit enrichment Total amount of assets recovered from illicit enrichment convictions or proceedings	
a.4.10 Total number of administrative sanctions for illicit enrichment recorded in a given year Disaggregated by sex				

Dimension	a.5 Abuse of functions²⁰ (Art. 19 UNCAC)		
Direct measure	N/A		
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	a.5.1 Mechanisms to assess risk of corruption in vulnerable positions. Existence of a mechanism to assess risks of corruption in vulnerable positions
	a.5.2 Mandatory training. Percentage of public officials that have received mandatory training on integrity and ethics in relation of the total numbers of public officials in the last 12 months Disaggregated by sex		
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	a.5.3 Effective sanctions Existence of effective criminal or administrative sanctions for abuse of functions
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	a.5.4 Abuse of functions investigation Total number of persons under investigation for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.5.5 Abuse of functions prosecution Total number of persons prosecuted for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.5.6 Abuse of functions conviction Total number of persons convicted for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000 Disaggregated by sex
			a.5.7 Assets recovered from abuse of functions Total amount of assets recovered from abuse of functions convictions or proceedings
			a.5.8. Total number of administrative sanctions for abuse of functions recorded in a given year Disaggregated by sex

b) Preventive measures

Dimension	b.1 Public hiring based on merit (Art. 7(1)(2) UNCAC)		
Direct measure	b.1.1 Open recruitment Proportion of public sector employees appointed without an open and competitive recruitment process in the past 12 months Disaggregated by sex		
Indirect Measures	Perception	b.1.2. Use of personal connections to obtain public employment Percentage of public officials that perceive that public officials influence the hiring of friends or relatives in the public sector Disaggregated by sex	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	b.1.3 Non-competitive recruitment Proportion of open recruitments for public sector positions with just one candidate
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.1.4 Existence of a complaint mechanism for rejected candidates
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.1.5 Positions vulnerable to corruption Number of recruitments of positions vulnerable to corruption that followed a risk assessment criterion in the last 12 months
			b.1.6 Public service²¹ regime Existence of laws and guidelines for merit-based recruitment in the public sector based on pre-set criteria
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	b.1.7 Transparency in recruitment procedures Publicly available procedures around hiring, promotion, retirement, and dismissal, as well as salary scales
			b.1.8 Irregular hiring processes Number of public sector appointments reverted due to irregularities in the hiring process per 1,000 recruitments in the last 12 months
		b.1.9 Number of complaints to appeal mechanisms regarding recruitment in the last 12 months	

Dimension	b.2. Independence and integrity²² of the judiciary (Art. 11 UNCAC)		
Direct measure	b.2.1 Judicial ethics²³ Number of admonishments for magistrates on ethical grounds in the past 12 months		
	b.2.2 Number of successful motions against a judge's refusal to recuse from a case in the last 12 months		
Indirect Measures	Perception	b.2.3 Perception of corruption in the judiciary Proportion of persons who perceive that the judiciary is corrupt Disaggregated by sex	
	Perception	b.2.4 Perception of corruption in public prosecution offices Proportion of persons who perceive that prosecutors are corrupt Disaggregated by sex	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.2.5 Transparency Proportion of court proceedings that were public in the past 12 months
			b.2.6 Randomization Proportion of case files that were randomly assigned in the past 12 months
			b.2.7 Mandatory training Percentage of judges and prosecutors that have received training on ethics and integrity in relation to the total number of public officials in the last 12 months Disaggregated by sex
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.2.8 Institutional reporting Existence of annual public reporting on integrity problems in the judiciary
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	b.2.9 Ethical and integrity-related dismissal Proportion of judges or prosecutors dismissed on the grounds of ethics and integrity breaches Disaggregated by sex
			b.2.10 Number of investigations of judges and prosecutors for corruption offences in the last 12 months Disaggregated by sex
			b.2.11 Number of prosecutions of judges and prosecutors for corruption offences in the last 12 months Disaggregated by sex
b.2.12. Number of convictions of judges and prosecutors for corruption offences in the last 12 months Disaggregated by sex			

Dimension	b.3 Conflict of interest (Art. 7 UNCAC)		
Direct measure	b.3.1 Numbers of detected conflicts of interests that were not declared by public officials		
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.3.2 Asset and conflict of interest disclosure regimes in place
			b.3.3 Control body/bodies to monitor and manage conflict of interest disclosures
	b.3.4 Employment cooling off periods for public officials in place		
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.3.5 Existence of conflict of interest regulation including clear guidance on what and how to report conflicts, and the consequences
			b.3.6 Existence of lobbying regulation including clear guidance on what and how to report lobbying activities
DE FACTO (Implementation)		b.3.7 Percentage of public officials sanctioned for not disclosing conflicts of interest in the previous year	

Dimension	b.4 Management of public finances (Art. 9 UNCAC)		
Direct measure	N/A		
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.4.1 Accessibility of budgetary information Percentage of total government budget not subject to public disclosure (e.g. due to confidentiality)
			b.4.2 Frequency of audits Number of planned and ad hoc audits conducted on public expenditures in the last 12 months
		b.4.3 Public participation in budgeting process Existence of mechanisms to foster participation of citizens in budgetary processes	
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.4.4 Comprehensiveness of budget disclosure requirements The extent to which national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances
b.4.5 Bottom-up approach in budgeting process Existence of mechanisms to foster participation of authorities and their administrative units in the budgetary processes			
DE FACTO (Implementation)		b.4.6 Sanctions²⁴ against public officials for financial misconduct²⁵ Number of public officials and civil servants sanctioned (e.g. disciplined, fined or imprisoned) for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds per 1,000,000 population Disaggregated by sex	

Dimension	b.5 Public Procurement (UNCAC art. 9)		
Direct measure	b.5.1 Percentage of public contracts awarded without competition (without another bidder)		
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.5.2 Transparency in procurement Percentage of public tenders for which information was published (open call/invitation, selection criteria, selection process, award information, appeal process).
			b.5.3 Existence of an effective remedy for competitors in bidding processes
			b.5.4 Blacklist and/or whitelist of suppliers in place Systems in place to pre-vet suppliers that participate in tenders and/or to keep track of suppliers barred from tendering
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.5.5 Compliance of public procurement regulation and procedures with article 9 UNCAC
			b.5.6 Rules on public procurement in times of crisis/emergencies Exceptions from usual procedures in place for emergency situations
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	b.5.7 Ratio of criminal convictions ²⁶ related to irregularities in procurement processes
b.5.8 Number of administrative sanctions against companies for participating in irregular procurement, e.g., debarment			

Dimension	b.6 Candidature for and election to public office (Art. 7(2)(3) UNCAC)		
Direct measure	b.6.1 Total campaign spending per candidate vs. total campaign funds allocated per candidate		
	b.6.2 Total campaign spending per political party vs. total campaign funds allocated per political party		
	b.6.3 Percentage of population who experienced vote buying during the past election Disaggregated by sex		
Indirect Measures	Perception	b.6.4 Percentage of citizens who perceived corruption in the processes of election to public office	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	b.6.5 Anonymous donations Percentage of anonymous donations to political campaigns in relation to the total campaign funds
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.6.6 Existence of an autonomous electoral body
	b.6.7 Existence of regulatory body to monitor financing of political campaigns and electoral processes		
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.6.8 Regulatory measures on the prevention and sanctioning of acts of corruption in elections
			b.6.9 Regulatory measures on political party financing
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	b.6.10 Percentage of public officials who were sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing or otherwise violating regulations on elections Disaggregated by sex
			b.6.11 Percentage of candidates who were sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing or otherwise violating regulations on elections Disaggregated by sex

Dimension	b.7 Preventive measures for the private sector		
Direct measure	N/A		
Indirect Measures	Perception	b.7.1 Perception of corruption in the private sector Proportion of persons who perceive that the private sector is corrupt ²⁷ Disaggregated by sector and by sex	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.7.2 Proportion of medium and large private enterprises with a compliance/integrity unit or regime²⁸ b.7.3 Existence of checks and balances such as policies and processes aimed at detecting and preventing corruption and irregularities
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.7.4 Existence of compliance legislation/regulation or guidance regarding corporate compliance
			b.7.5 Regulatory framework regarding the involvement of intermediaries in money laundering
			b.7.6 Restrictions on professional activities of former public officials
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	b.7.7 Number of sanctions or measures imposed²⁹ following the identification of irregularities during investigations or audits
			b.7.8 Number of dismissals following the identification of irregularities during investigations or audits
			b.7.9 Number of reports of irregularities found to law enforcement authorities

Dimension	b.8 Preventive measures for state-owned enterprises		
Direct measure	N/A		
Indirect Measures	Perception	b.8.1 Perception of corruption in state-owned enterprises Proportion of persons who perceive that state-owned enterprises (public companies such as electricity, oil, telecommunications) are corrupt Disaggregated by sector and by sex	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	b.8.2 Audits Number of internal and external audits performed in processes vulnerable to corruption
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.8.3 Existence of a comprehensive regulatory framework on finance, funding, operations, and oversight of state-owned enterprises
			b.8.4 Disclosure and transparency requirements , e.g. as per the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises
	DE FACTO (Implementation)	N/A	

Dimension	b.9 Training programs (UNCAC art. 7)			
Direct measure	b.9.1 Proportion of public officials that completed anti-corruption training programs			
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A		
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A	
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	N/A	
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	b.9.2 Existence of compulsory anti-corruption/training education for public officials	
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	N/A	

c) Enabling environment to report and address corruption

Dimension	c.1 Resources allocated to fighting corruption			
Direct measure	c.1.1 Percentage of funds in the annual budget allocated for specialized body/bodies to fight corruption			
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A		
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A	
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	N/A	
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	c.1.2 Existence of an adequate legal framework ensuring regular funding for specialized bodies to fight corruption	
			c.1.3 Existence of a body/bodies focused on the fight against corruption with the necessary independence	
DE FACTO (Implementation)		c.1.4 Percentage of filled positions divided by envisaged positions in specialized bodies to fight corruption x 100		

Dimension	c.2 Public reporting and access to information (Articles 10, 13 UNCAC)		
Direct measure	c.2.1 Access to Information Requests Proportion of requests for access to information that were denied		
Indirect Measures	Perception	N/A	
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	c.2.2 Existence of summary proceedings Percentage of laws that were adopted through summary proceedings in relation to the total number of laws adopted in the last 12 months
			c.2.3 Exemptions Number of exemptions allowing the withholding of certain pieces or categories of information
			c.2.4 Existence of a regulatory body responsible for addressing complaints regarding access to information
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	c.2.5 Civil Society Activities Number of activities by civil society organizations regarding preventing and tackling corruption
			c.2.6 Media Number of media reports regarding potential corruption cases
			c.2.7 Regulatory framework in place on access to information to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms
	Response	DE JURE (Regulation)	c.2.8. Appeal mechanism Existence of an appeal mechanism for requests not granted
c.2.9 Proactive publication of information, including on risks of corruption			
DE FACTO (Implementation)			

Dimension	c.3 Reporting and protection of reporting persons (Arts. 8(4) and 33 UNCAC)			
Direct measure	c.3.1 Whistleblower³⁰ reporting Number of proceedings opened due to whistle-blower reporting Disaggregated by sex of the reporting person, sex of the alleged perpetrator and type of alleged crime/conduct			
Indirect Measures	Perception	c.3.2 Proportion of public officials who would not report for fear of retaliation Disaggregated by sector and by sex		
	Risk	OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	N/A	
		CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	c.3.3 Existence of internal and external reporting channels to facilitate the reporting of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities	
		DE JURE (Regulation)	c.3.4 Mechanisms for protecting whistleblowers Mechanisms in place against potential retaliation or intimidation for whistleblowers who report corruption	
		DE FACTO (Implementation)	c.3.5 Number of reports received by appropriate units or authorities	
			c.3.6 Number of reports addressed by appropriate units or authorities	
c.3.7 Number of whistleblowers that have received protection from appropriate units or authorities				

End notes

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- ¹ Indicator 16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months and indicator 16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months. See Global SDG Indicator Framework adopted by the General Assembly in A/RES/71/313 available at: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/>
- ² All definitions presented in the framework are definitions for statistical purposes, they are not legal definitions.
- ⁴ Criminalization: an act or determination of a ruler about certain acts which by the society or members of the society are considered as acts which can be penalized as a criminal act or making an act to become a criminal act and therefore can be penalized by the government by and on behalf of the government.
- ⁵ Bribery: the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Or the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. It can include public or foreign public officials.
- ⁶ Public official: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person's seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a "public official" in the domestic law of a State Party
- ⁷ International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the experience of bribery by public officials can be found at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf.
- ⁸ Public Sector: Set of administrative bodies through which the State fulfills or enforces the policy and will be expressed in the fundamental laws of the country. It includes all administrative bodies of the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and autonomous public agencies. It therefore includes the Central Sector and the State-owned enterprises, and all local levels
- ⁹ This indicator is a better measure than the perception recorded among public officials because it overcomes the reporting bias of those who may be corrupted themselves or those who fear retaliation if they report corruption. International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the perception of bribery can be found at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf.
- ¹⁰ E-government can be defined as the use of ICT by government agencies for the purpose of increasing and improving accessibility, effectiveness, and accountability. The principal goals of e-government should be efficient and improved service to customers, increased transparency, empowerment through access to information, efficient government purchasing and efficient administration
- ¹¹ Investigation: investigation is understood as the gathering of evidence about the detected case of potential corruption, including information about its extent, nature, effects, and the parties involved, to decide whether and which measures need to be taken. Investigations may be carried out internally within the organization concerned or through law enforcement agencies or other external actors, such as anti-corruption agencies
- ¹² Prosecution: to bring legal action against a suspect for redress or punishment of a crime or violation of law
- ¹³ Sentencing: The punishment the competent court or authority decides should be given to someone who has been convicted of a crime
- ¹⁴ Asset recovery: the seizure, freezing, confiscation and return of illicitly obtained assets for the purpose of redressing the impact of corruption
- ¹⁵ Embezzlement. misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any

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- other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position
- ¹⁶ Diversion of public resources: The authorization, request, or performance of acts for the allocation or diversion of public resources, whether material, human or financial, without legal basis or contrary to the applicable rules
- ¹⁷ Audit: A formal investigation of the accounts or financial situation of an organization or individual and a methodical examination and review. Audits can be internal, meaning they are performed by the organization itself; or external, meaning they are performed by an independent outside entity
- ¹⁸ Statistical measure of illicit enrichment: The significant increase in the assets of a public official with respect to his or her legitimate income that cannot be reasonably justified, nor is of legitimate origin; based on the indicators, illicit enrichment can be assessed by States whether or not they have criminalized the underlying behaviour
- ¹⁹ This can be applied only in jurisdictions where there is a system for public officials to declare their income
- ²⁰ Abuse of functions: the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity
- ²¹ Public service: Comprises persons employed by public authorities at central, regional, and local levels and include both civil servants and public employees
- ²² Integrity: behaviors and actions consistent with a series of moral or ethical standards and principles, adopted by individuals as well as institutions, which operate as a barrier against corruption and in favor of the rule of law. Strict adherence to a moral code, reflected in honesty, transparency, and complete harmony in what one thinks, says and does
- ²³ Ethics: the attempt to understand the nature of human values, of how we ought to live and of what constitutes the right conduct
- ²⁴ Sanction: In addition to the provisions regarding the liability of legal persons. disciplinary measures for public officials and asset recovery, article 30 para. 1 UNCAC provides that “each State Party shall make the commission of [corruption] offences [...] liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that offence.” According to the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption “it is also necessary to ensure that the prosecution, treatment and sanctioning of offenders around the world is [...] consistent with the harm they have caused and with the benefits they have derived from their criminal activities. [...] The penalties provided for similar crimes in various jurisdictions diverge significantly, reflecting different national traditions, priorities and policies. It is essential, however, to ensure that at least a minimum level of deterrence is applied by the international community to avoid the perception that certain types of crime “pay”, even if the offenders are convicted. In other words, the sanctions must clearly outweigh the benefits of the crime.” ”
- ²⁵ Misconduct: Contravention of the provisions of the law, which might be classified at least as: serious, non-serious
- ²⁶ Conviction: Adjudication of a criminal defendant's guilt
- ²⁷ Current survey tools measure perception of bribery in the private sector
- ²⁸ Compliance: Procedures, systems or departments within public agencies or companies that ensure that all legal, operational, and financial activities comply with applicable laws, rules, norms, regulations, and standards
- ²⁹ Sanctions are intended to be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. These aim to improve performance and are financial or non-financial. Non-financial sanctions may encompass private notices requiring abstaining from repetition of the observed conduct; a public notice for the same effect; order to take action; temporary ban to perform its functions; permanent ban from functions.
- ³⁰ Whistle-blower: Person who reports on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with the UNCAC