INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Module 1

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
This Module is a resource for lecturers.

Developed under the Education for Justice (E4J) initiative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a component of the Global Programme for the Implementation of the Doha Declaration, this Module forms part of the E4J University Module Series on Counter-Terrorism and is accompanied by a Teaching Guide. The full range of E4J materials includes university modules on Anti-Corruption, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Cybercrime, Firearms, Organized Crime, Trafficking in Persons/Smuggling of Migrants, and Integrity and Ethics, as well as Counter-Terrorism.

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Introduction

Although the term is not subject to a universally agreed definition, terrorism can be broadly understood as a method of coercion that utilizes or threatens to utilize violence in order to spread fear and thereby attain political or ideological goals. Contemporary terrorist violence is thus distinguished in law from “ordinary” violence by the classic terrorist “triangle”: A attacks B, to convince or coerce C to change its position regarding some action or policy desired by A. The attack spreads fear as the violence is directed, unexpectedly, against innocent victims, which in turn puts pressure on third parties such as governments to change their policy or position. Contemporary terrorists utilize many forms of violence, and indiscriminately target civilians, military facilities and State officials among others.

The challenges of countering terrorism are not new, and indeed have a long history. The term “terrorism” was initially coined to describe the Reign of Terror, the period of the French Revolution from 5 September 1793 to 27 July 1794, during which the Revolutionary Government directed violence and harsh measures against citizens suspected of being enemies of the Revolution. In turn, popular resistance to Napoleon’s invasion of the Spanish Peninsula led to a new form of fighter—the “guerrilla”, which derives from the Spanish word guerra, meaning “little war” (Friedlander, 1976, p. 52). As a weapon of politics and warfare, however, the use of terrorism by groups can be traced back to ancient times, and as noted by Falk, “in various forms, terrorism is as old as government and armed struggle, and as pervasive” (Falk, 1990, pp. 39, 41). The focus of this module, and of the University Module Series as a whole, is on terrorist violence and the threats carried out by non-State groups and the response of the international community, especially States, regional organizations and the United Nations system.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

• Understand the semantic and historical development of the word “terrorism”.
• Analyse the concept and underpinning legal principles of international crimes of terrorism, whether at the national or international level.
• Explain treaty-based crimes relevant for prosecuting acts of terrorism, whether at the national or international level.
• Identify and discuss some of the reasons for, and implications of, the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism at the global level.
• Familiarize students with interdisciplinary perspectives (e.g., victimology).
Key issues

The purpose of this Module is to introduce students to the key concepts and principles that underpin international instruments and institutions concerned with the complex topics of terrorism and how to counter terrorism, as well as any hard, security-based, responses adopted by States when confronted with acts of terrorism. When considering the concept of terrorism, it is important to note that as yet, there is no global consensus regarding an agreed definition of the term “terrorism” for legal purposes (see further Module 4). This Module will also provide a brief overview of modern terrorism and its implications for the international community. Regarding the prosecution of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism, it is vital to understand how, why and to what extent, the impact of a lack of a universally agreed global legal definition of the term may have had on the effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences. Principally, prosecuting chargeable crimes must rely on the judicial forums available. A decision to prosecute a “terrorist” offence will depend, among other factors, on legal and non-legal considerations. Furthermore, the State of custody must decide either to prosecute (as a “terrorist” or an ordinary crime) or to extradite elsewhere for prosecution persons accused of serious, transboundary terrorist crimes. Choosing between prosecuting on the grounds of “terrorist” or of ordinary crimes also involves wider issues such as the distinction between armed and non-armed conflict, the State use of counter-terrorist force and the return of “terrorists” who have been fighting abroad.

Notwithstanding the absence of a globally agreed, legal definition of terrorism, an effective and prevention-focused international response to terrorism is highly desirable, particularly one guided by a normative legal framework and embedded in the core principles of the rule of law, due process and respect for human rights. Many international and regional legal instruments already exist which are dedicated to countering and deterring terrorism (see further Modules 4 and 5), primarily through the investigation and prosecution of those suspected of committing related crimes by means of State criminal justice processes. While such international and regional instruments provide for effective prevention mechanisms, including interventions targeting specific types of criminal acts (e.g., hostage-taking, the hijacking of planes or ships, terrorist bombings and the funding of terrorism), States implement their treaty obligations differently. As a result, criminal justice responses and outcomes in investigating and prosecuting terrorism-related crimes may vary between States.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, international support for more effective counter-terrorism measures and responses has led to greater international cooperation in counter-terrorist matters, and there is certainly evidence of a widespread hardening of approaches to the prosecution of “terrorists”. This is important in a context that is witnessing the increased export and globalization of terrorism by groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL, or Da’esh), a trend that shows no sign of abating. In response, States are utilizing a range of counter-terrorism measures, from criminal justice
mechanisms—which should represent the usual response, including as a means of terrorism prevention—to "harder" security-based measures accompanied by increased military spending. Although, as discussed in Module 6, military responses may be entirely appropriate where the requisite legal criteria are met, such as the threshold of violence necessary to constitute an armed conflict, these are also accompanied by increased complexities. For example, in most situations "terrorist" groups do not cross the requisite threshold for the application of international humanitarian law (International Law Association, 2010). Yet when States utilize armed force, it can be argued that international humanitarian law should apply (an approach adopted as "policy" by a number of States) to the treatment and prosecution of captured non-State violent actors, not least because international humanitarian law mandates strong due process rights and humanitarian treatment of all those placed hors de combat (see further Module 6).

The landscape of terrorism and counter-terrorism is complex and sensitive due to these and other factors examined throughout the University Module Series. When considering the future of terrorism therefore, it can be helpful first to look backwards, albeit briefly, to the modern origins of the criminal phenomenon referred to today as international or transboundary terrorism.

Together with a brief overview of the history of terrorism, this Module will also consider the evolution of terrorism in the twentieth century. In doing so, where examples are informative, these are drawn from terrorist organizations which have been formally designated as such within the United Nations system, namely Al-Qaida and ISIL (Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and subsequent resolutions). That is not to say that other "terrorist" groups are any less important or that the impact of their criminal activities is any less significant in their areas of operation; rather it is reflective of some of the legal and political complexities underlying many of the issues examined in this University Module Series, a number of which circle back to the inability of the international community to agree on a universal definition of terrorism. Without this, it is often not possible to reach universal agreement, for instance, regarding the designation of "terrorist" groups. For similar reasons, since matters of "terrorist" motivations can be politically sensitive, the discussion of terrorism throughout the University Module Series is largely framed around related criminal acts and not any underlying ideologies or other motivating factors (e.g., self-determination), consistent with the approach of the international community, as reflected within the universal anti-terrorism conventions examined in Module 4.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM

In terms of targeting, many of the tactical means and methods of modern terrorism have, until relatively recently, followed those utilized between States in their armed conflicts inter se. It has been argued specifically that, a century ago, terrorist codes on targeting victims closely resembled professional military codes, in that they respected the distinction between soldiers and officials on the one hand, and innocent civilians on the other (e.g., the targeted
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on 28 June 1914) (Walzer, 1977, pp. 197-234). This was the case from approximately the mid-nineteenth century onwards, when increasingly industrialized weaponry facilitated a lack of targeting, in the sense that killing the enemy became more indiscriminate and deadly. The industrialized and indiscriminate means and methods of warfare utilized during the two “total wars” of the twentieth century (e.g., in widespread disregard of the principle of distinction) effectively taught those who would become post-war revolutionary terrorists, and who also would adopt more irregular weapons and forms of fighting, such as urban guerrilla warfare. In the contemporary world, indiscriminate weaponry (e.g., high-level bombing capacities, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and so on) is a recurring feature.

In terms of terrorist strategy, a useful way to conceptualize the evolution of modern terrorism as a resort to revolutionary violence is provided by David Rapoport’s influential concept of the “waves” of terrorism (The Four Waves of Terrorism). For example, one wave is the late nineteenth century/early twentieth century “anarchist wave”. Another is the “anti-colonial wave” (starting with the post-World War I political principle of self-determination, e.g., the Aaland Islands arbitration in 1921, and its violent evolution into a legal right after World War II, examples being the Algerian Civil War and the Vietnam War).

In turn, the tactics employed in each of these waves often mirrored those utilized between States during armed conflict, not least because demobilized soldiers throughout the ages have returned to their homes at the end of a war fully trained tactically to utilize force, while the name of each terrorist wave reflects its dominant strategic goals. The wave theory further reflects that terrorist groups rise and fall, that they can dissolve when no longer capable of inspiring others to continue with violent resistance to authority, to violently redress one or other grievance, or to protest violently against a lack of political concessions. This point also suggests that terrorism and its motivations are clearly impacted by the conditions of and changes in social and political cultures.

In contrast, Parker and Sitter (2016) posit that violent terrorist situations occur around the world not so much in waves, but because terrorist actors are motivated differentially through four goal-oriented strains: socialism, nationalism, religious extremism or exclusionism. These underlying motivators are not chronologically sequential, i.e., one strain dies and a new one arises. Instead, they can work in parallel, and can occasionally overlap, to motivate different terrorist movements according to their needs.

Such academic discourse offers a flavour of some of the discussions and debates that occur when seeking to better comprehend or categorize “terrorist” groups. This University Module Series, however, does not take a view regarding what the motivational factors of various non-State actors may or may not be. These are issues that those teaching this or any other parts of this University Module Series may wish to explore further within different contexts.

**TERRORISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY**

Modern terrorism can be traced back to nineteenth century revolutionary radicalism, and, in particular, the emergence of “anarchist”, “collectivist anarchist” and “anarcho-communist”
groups. For example, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, groups led or influenced by the Frenchman Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, author of *What is Property?* (1840), the German Karl Marx, and the Russian Mikhail Bakunin, were promoting one or another anti-establishment model. Within a decade, similar groups had appeared throughout Western Europe, the Balkans and Asia. The German revolutionary Karl Heinzen was the first to articulate the use of violence, even mass murder, by individuals to effect political change in his influential 1853 pamphlet, *Mord und Freiheit*, coining the term *Freiheitskämpfer* or “freedom fighter” in the process. However, as these early radicals became disillusioned by their failure to provoke widespread social revolution among the peasantry through traditional means such as distributing political pamphlets and leaflets urging uprisings and riots to put government under pressure, they turned instead to violence in the hope of forcing political reform and of undermining the State. In this way, “propaganda by the deed”, as a strategy for political action, became central to the politics of European anarchism (see, for example, Fleming, 1980).

The principal violent method of spreading terror utilized by virtually all such groups at the time was targeted assassination, which not only carried with it serious personal risk but also the potential for political martyrdom. The assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881 by the Russian revolutionary group *Narodnaya Volja* is emblematic of this period of terrorism. Targeted assassination could be differentiated from ordinary criminal acts, because targeting persons acting in an official State capacity signified a deep, personal commitment to a “cause that could inspire others, and epitomised the revolutionary ‘code of honour’ by sparing innocent citizens”. This arguably made terrorist assassination a more humane form of violence than civil war, since the terrorist’s targeted attack would strike only against State “oppressors”, and would help maintain the low casualty rate of terrorism that was also an advantage of the “propaganda by the deed” strategy (Morozov, 1880, p. 106).

Technological developments in the mid and late nineteenth century also played a pivotal role in the rise of terrorism. The ready availability of dynamite allowed terrorists to perpetrate and disseminate their deadly acts more widely as propaganda by the deed. The development of mass communication technologies allowed news, learning, ideas and events to be rapidly communicated across long distances, opening up an era of mass communication and of migration that was crucial to inspiring groups elsewhere. The invention of the telegraph and the steam-powered rotary press meant that newspapers could receive messages almost instantly after transmission from around the world and gave millions of people access to information about events virtually as soon as they occurred. New technologies, together with greater access to educational opportunities, facilitated the migration of agricultural labourers and artisans to urban centres. The development of commercial railways and trans-Atlantic passage steamers aided groups to travel long distances, and to carry their political sympathies further afield.

Although the successful assassination of Czar Alexander II would initially inspire a wave of anarchist violence that shook Europe and the Americas over the following decades (Zimmer, 2009), Russian rebels encouraged and trained a variety of rebel groups who were emerging elsewhere, even when their political aims were vastly different. While anarchists carried out bombings in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and elsewhere, which at times turned into cycles of retribution between anarchists and the authorities (Zimmer, 2009), Western States
attempted to stem the tide through such legal mechanisms as immigration controls and extradition treaties targeted against "undesirable aliens". These included a protocol concerning measures to be taken against the anarchist movement, signed on behalf of nine States in March 1904, and an administrative convention for the exchange of information concerning individuals considered dangerous to society, signed in October 1905 (Hudson, 1941, p. 862). By the mid-nineteenth century, many extradition treaties exempted fugitives accused of "political offences" or "crimes of a political character" from extradition (Hannay, 1988, p. 116). Only the conservative regimes of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Naples persisted in advocating that ideologically similar nations should use their extradition laws to help suppress each other's revolutionaries (Pyle, 1988, pp. 181-182).

On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Serbian nationalist and supporter of the clandestine Black Hand group, which wished to bring about a Greater Serbia, assassinated the Archduke of Austria and heir presumptive, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, in Sarajevo. This event unleashed a "domino effect" of defensive alliances developed in the pre-war years, leading to the "total war" of World War I, which irrevocably changed the face of terrorism for the eras to come. By the end of the war, with the return of fully-trained soldiers to their homes and families, the tactics and methods learned in "total war" between 1914 and 1918 would continue to haunt States. As revolutionary politics at the local level continued to simmer throughout the nineteenth century, the continued availability and use of "political offence" exceptions as grounds upon which States might refuse requests by other States for the extradition of persons suspected of having perpetrated violent offences for various ideological, religious or political motives highlighted the difficulties associated with distinguishing criminal acts of terrorism from criminal acts generally. These definitional issues have continued to the present day.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND TERRORISM

The 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty between Germany and the Allied Powers that concluded World War I precipitated the next phase in the development of modern terrorism. The Covenant of the League of Nations (the League Covenant) redistributed former German and Turkish colonies and other dependencies through the League mandate system, which was designed to ensure a "mild form of international accountability for [their] administration" (Thullen, 1964, p. 9). Otherwise, standards to help integrate minority peoples in the new States created after 1919, such as Yugoslavia, were also provided for, and were intended to serve a peace-making function, while deterring transboundary alliances (Veatch, 1983/2010, p. 369). Nonetheless, protected common rights, such as the right to a nationality, the free exercise of belief, employment and identity, and rights enshrined in the ideals of the mandate system and policies on minorities did not apply to the peoples and minorities in the victorious States, which later were instead the guarantors of peace and security as a whole, while the victors also presumably rejected the notion of new colonial acquisitions when declining to annex former colonies and non-governing territories. Overall, the Covenant system of mutual defence appeared to be designed to favour international security concerns rather than those of the rule of law and international law, in the event of a conflict.
The twentieth century link between modern terrorism and the ideal of self-determination arose within the competing ideologies of communist/socialist theory (Lenin, 1914/1972), and those reflected in a League of Nations Covenant in which there is no express reference to the principle of self-determination. In contrast to the rejection of all prior Czarist debts and obligations by the post-war revolutionary Government of the Soviet Union, the United States, under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, was a strong proponent of the “peoplehood” principle of self-determination (Morgan, 1980, pp. 355-359). However, Wilson did not hold sway on this concept of self-determination at the Versailles conference at which the final version of the Covenant was agreed. In addressing the issue of self-determination, article VI of the Wilson-Miller draft of the proposed League Covenant provided that:

The League of Nations shall require all new states to bind themselves, as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous states, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their jurisdiction exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded to the racial or national majority of their people (Fawcett, 1979, p. 7).

Even so, such issues in the era of the League of Nations represented only a number of the factors to be considered during the formation of new States, whether within the operational context of mechanisms to attain statehood, or as a matter of self-help. When issues relating to self-determination arose early on in the League’s existence during the Aaland Islands dispute in 1920 between Sweden and Finland, the League Council appointed the International Commission of Jurists to determine the matter. The Commission concluded that the mere recognition of the principle of self-determination, as made out in a number of treaties, did not create a positive rule of the law of nations (Wilson, 1988, p. 57). In part, this was due to the Committee’s apprehension about creating a precedent for secession, thereby encouraging anarchy. However, a subsequent Committee of Inquiry refined this result by concluding that if Finland failed to provide the islanders with certain specified guarantees, they would indeed have a right under international law to a plebiscite, which could have resulted in separation from Finland. Nowadays, the Aaland Islands solution is regarded as a precedent for successful international dispute settlement (O’Brien, 2012).

In the meantime, the spate of terrorist assassinations continued. By the 1930s, several bilateral agreements referred to the suppression of terrorism, and many extradition treaties contained clauses excluding assassination attempts against Heads of State from the exempted list of political offences (e.g., Convention on Extradition 1933, article 3(e)). The assassinations of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs together in Marseilles on 9 October 1934 brought matters to a head, when the requested extradition of the persons accused was refused by Italy on the grounds that the offences were political (Chadwick, 1996). In response, a Committee of Experts was established by the League Council to draft a Convention on Terrorism for the establishment of an International Criminal Court, which would have jurisdiction over certain acts specified as acts of terrorism in the Convention, and which States Parties were obliged to criminalize within their national laws. Article 1(2) of the Terrorism Convention defines “acts of terrorism” as “criminal acts directed against a state” (1937). Such acts must be “intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public”. The Convention is silent on the purpose of the fear generated (Chadwick, 1996).

Nonetheless, State and regional traditions of asylum, coupled with strong national sympathies, made any differentiation between “terrorist” and “political” offences problematic, and the granting of asylum remained possible then, as now. Moreover, the 1937 Terrorism Convention, as a creature of its time, had no “international” criminal law to be grounded in, as reflected in article 19, which provides that:

The present Convention does not affect the principle that, provided the offender is not allowed to escape punishment owing to an omission in the criminal law, the characterisation of the various offences dealt with in the present Convention, the imposition of sentences, the methods of prosecution and trial, and the rules as to mitigating circumstances, pardon and amnesty are determined in each country by the provisions of domestic law.

Therefore, the law applicable to any criminal prosecution for acts established as offences under the Convention was to be that of the referring, and thus, prosecuting, State. Unfortunately, World War II erupted soon after, and neither convention entered into force.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND TERRORISM

A recurring feature of discussions, debates and political sensitivities regarding terrorism during the post-1945 United Nations era have related to issues of terror-violence by so-called “liberation fighters” claiming to be utilizing “direct action” to pursue their right to the self-determination of peoples, as they argued is provided for in the United Nations Charter (Treaty Series, vol. 1, no. XVI), articles 1(2) and 55 (see also 1941 Atlantic Charter). The Charter contextualizes the Organization’s obligation to “develop friendly relations” among nations (not “States”) based on the principles of equal rights and the self-determination of “peoples”. Difficulties with and controversies regarding the practical operation of equal rights and self-determination soon arose, including where national liberation agendas stretched far beyond the narrow confines of the League of Nations mandate system and the protection of minorities. As a consequence, conflicting interpretations of relevant Charter principles and provisions surrounding self-determination quickly arose and have remained ever since.

This Module, as well as the University Module Series as a whole, does not attempt to comment on the accuracy or otherwise of particular legal or political positions. Rather it seeks to provide an impartial commentary on legal and interdisciplinary approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism, by identifying the existence of ongoing debates, where appropriate, in order to assist students in better comprehending current approaches to the phenomenon of terrorism and current responses to it by States and intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations system. On issues such as self-determination, including the ongoing “freedom fighter versus terrorist” conundrum, what is important to understand is that these issues have been, continue and are likely to remain contentious and have implications for issues such as the continuing inability of the international community to agree on a universal definition of terrorism with law-making consequences.
In any event, many terrorist activities that have occurred during the post-1945 era have not been associated with self-determination debates at all. Identified causes of terrorism have instead ranged through the entire spectrum of human discontent, including the economic, political, social, psychological, ideological, etc., with short or long-term goals, both objective and subjective, becoming the object of violence (Whittaker, 2001, p. 33). In response, some in the international community, especially academics, have sought to label terrorist groups according to their motivational goals or ideologies rather than in terms of criminal acts, as is the approach within the United Nations system. Consequently, students may come across the categorization of such groups within scholarship as "revolutionary", "separatist", "ethnocentric", "nationalist" or "religious".

In terms of the use of violence and force by terrorists, this also ranges across a wide spectrum, from individuals with military training and experience, to what Whittaker has termed "throw away" operatives, who are effectively sent untrained on suicide missions. Their use of violence also illustrates the slow evolution of terrorist tactics and strategies, including traditional assassination, bombings, arson, hostage-taking, hijacking, kidnapping, sabotage, the perpetration of hoaxes and suicide bombings, to name but a few (see, for example, Global Terrorism Index 2017). More recent tactics can include unconventional forms of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism (for example, fabricating a dirty bomb, attacking a nuclear reactor, etc.), high-tech terrorism involving cyberattacks, ecological terrorism (for instance, the threat of destruction to the environment) and terrorist attacks aiming at destroying cultural heritage, as perpetrated by ISIL (see, for example, the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1999, article 1).

Of particular interest is the fact that such issues and debates have shaped the approach of the international community to its universal anti-terrorism conventions so that are framed around terrorist acts as serious international crimes regardless of any underlying motivation. Broadly speaking, anti-terrorism instruments were adopted roughly in three phases (see further Module 4). Beginning with legislation covering the safety of aviation and shipping, the early instruments were developed from the 1960s through to the early 1990s, and addressed specific types of terrorist offences. Notably, acts perpetrated during "liberation conflicts" were expressly made exceptions to terrorist crimes, for example, the 1979 Hostages Convention (Treaty Series, vol. 1316, p. 205, adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983), as such acts were to be dealt with under other areas of international law, such as international humanitarian law. The most recent phase reflects the broadening, post-categorization of terrorist groups and "causes", to include groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaida and ISIL, and thus reflect the contemporary terrorist threat to the international community. Within this latter phase, anti-terrorism instruments have been developed that deal with new crimes associated with terrorist bombings (1997, Treaty Series, vol. 2149, p. 256), the financing of terrorism (1999, Treaty Series, vol. 2178, p. 197) and nuclear terrorism (2005, Treaty Series, vol. 2445, p. 89).

In Modules 4 and 5, the evolution and substantive content of United Nations anti-terrorism instruments in the Charter era will be considered in more detail.
UNITED NATIONS DESIGNATED TERRORIST GROUPS AND TARGETED SANCTIONS

This section introduces students to the United Nations designation and targeted sanctions regimes against the Taliban, Al-Qaida, ISIL and affiliated individuals and groups under Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and is aimed at promoting discussion on the strengths, weaknesses and challenges associated with the counter-terrorism approach of the United Nations under that resolution and its successive resolutions (see also Module 3).

There are two primary non-State groups, namely the Taliban and Al-Qaida, which have been designated “terrorist” organizations by the Security Council. In 1999, following the refusal of the Taliban to surrender Osama Bin Laden and his associates for their roles in the August 1988 attacks on United States Embassies in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, under its resolution 1267 (1999) the Security Council designated as terrorist groups the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, through targeted travel and arms embargos, and financial/assets sanctions. In 2011, under Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), the Council divided the so-called “Consolidated List” of individuals and entities associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida into two separate lists: the “Al-Qaida, or 1988 List”, and the Taliban List, which contains those individuals and entities associated with the Taliban who are deemed to present an ongoing threat to the peace and security of Afghanistan. Finally, under Security Council resolution 2253 (2015), the Al-Qaida List was further extended to include ISIL and Al Nusrah Front (ANF).

See the reading list for further information on the groups and organizations designated by the Security Council, and their evolution, objectives, ideologies and tactical approaches. Moreover, in periodic reports to the Secretary-General, the Security Council has reported on the threat posed by ISIL, (Da’esh) to international peace and security. In its report to the Council on 29 January 2018 (S/2018/14), the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which supports the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 (1999), states:

In Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) lost control over all remaining urban areas. The group continues to transform into a terror organization with a flat hierarchy, with cells and affiliates increasingly acting autonomously. The global fight against ISIL will have to focus on the threat posed by less visible international networks. The combination of “frustrated travellers”, ISIL sympathizers, returnees and relocators poses an increased security risk for Member States. Attempts by ISIL to infuse money into the licit economy in combination with a greater inflow of funds for reconstruction of recaptured areas will necessitate adjusted counter measures.

The global Al-Qaida network has remained resilient and in several regions poses a greater threat than ISIL. Despite being under military pressure, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) increasingly serves as the communications hub for Al-Qaida as a whole. In North and West Africa, Al-Qaida affiliates and groups loyal to ISIL increased their activities; while in East Africa, Al-Shabaab has sustained its dominance over ISIL groups. In South Asia, Al-Qaida affiliates and ISIL are taking advantage of the volatile security situation in Afghanistan. Although the recapture of Marawi City by the Philippine authorities was a military success,
the ability of ISIL affiliates to maintain a temporary stronghold within the city was a propaganda victory with potential long-term consequences for the region.

The global flow of foreign terrorist fighters has continued to slow, with only individual cases being reported. However, the marked reduction of territorial control by ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic will force many foreign terrorist fighters to make a choice between joining other groups or leaving the region. With the adoption of its resolution 2396 (2017), the Security Council has taken a significant step towards meeting the challenges posed by returnees and relocators.

In implementing their obligations under the sanctions regimes established against Al-Qaida, ISIL and other affiliated groups designated by the Security Council under resolution 1267 (1999), many States have established a range of domestic mechanisms for giving effect to the United Nations lists of designated individuals, groups or entities. Often, this will involve the adoption of the lists, at a national level, or the use of nationally-based designations of individuals or entities appearing on them.

In addition, in countering the financing of terrorism, States are obliged under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), operative para. 1(c), to freeze, without delay, funds, other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; or of entities they own, control or direct, as well as of persons and entities acting on their behalf or direction, and to prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts (operative para. 1(d)). As a result, many States have in place, at a national level, legal and institutional frameworks for the designation of individuals or groups their governments consider to be terrorists, that are on the United Nations list, or are designated for national or multilateral (e.g., European Union) purposes. The use of such designation mechanisms potentially raises a number of implementation challenges for States, and rights-based concerns. An example of these can be found in the landmark case of C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351.

**TERRORIST VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS OF TERRORISM**

Victimization can be understood as the action of singling someone out for cruel or unjust treatment. This section explores terrorist victimization, for example, the factors that come into play when targeting the future victims of a planned terrorist attack.

Terrorist attacks can be broadly categorized into two categories: focused and indiscriminate. Historically, terrorism has largely fallen under the former category. As noted earlier, terrorist attacks were used as an instrument for politically motivated action, which targeted specific members of governments or political actors for the purposes of attaining a particular political aim (Schmid, 2006, p. 3; Turković, 2006, p. 55). Such attacks involved some element of participation in the conflict, albeit indirectly, between the terrorist group and the adversary.
However, contemporary terrorism is characterized by an increasing frequency and magnitude of indiscriminate violence. Victims of terrorist attacks are not usually specifically selected on the basis of their individual characteristics, but are “chance” victims who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. These victims serve as an instrument designed to influence third party actors (Šeparović, 2006, p. 20). It is partly this element of unpredictability and randomness of victim selection that gives terrorism its modern power—“a power enhanced manifold by the media’s display and replay of acts of victimization” (Schmid, 2006, p. 9). This evolution of the focus of terrorism reflects a shift from individual terror to a dimension of mass murder and psychological warfare (Schmid, 2006, p. 9). In this sense, terrorism attempts to coerce a population and/or its leadership by inciting fear of being hurt (Šeparović, 2006, p. 21).

PRIMARY (DIRECT) VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR CAMPAIGNS*

- Those who are killed by terrorist kidnappers, hostage-takers, gunmen or bombers.
- Those who are injured, mutilated or mentally tortured by terrorists but ultimately released or liberated.
- Those who are wounded or die in a counter-terrorist rescue operation at the hands of terrorists or armed first responders.
- Those who become mentally or physically handicapped or die (commit suicide) in a causal sequel to one or several terrorist events in which they were involved or of which they were direct witnesses.


Although terrorist attacks are indeed serious crimes, it is important to remember that terrorist victimization differs from criminal victimization in that the former has an inherent political dimension. This political dimension may also encapsulate ideological or religious aims. For instance, the direct victim of a terrorist attack is rarely the ultimate target of the violence. Rather, the act of singling out a target serves as an amplifier to convey a broader message and to influence a wider audience, such as an adversary State of the terrorist organization (Schmid, 2006, p. 4). An important goal of terrorism is for mass audiences to pay attention to the messages being conveyed, and to undergo a sense of terror and panic as a result of the terrorist attack. The terror invoked in individuals is further amplified by a process of identification with the victim, a fear that “it could have been me” (Schmid, 2006, p. 7). The victims of terrorist attacks therefore serve as symbols of shared group or class characteristics, which in turn form one basis for their selection as victims (Šeparović, 2006, p. 21). In this sense, victims of terrorism serve as instrumental targets.

By using violence, or the threat of violence, wider audiences are put in a state of chronic fear or terror which takes a physical, psychological, social, political and economic toll on society as a whole (Šeparović, 2006, p. 21; Schmid, 2006, p. 5). This indirect method of combat can have several aims: to produce disorientation and/or force their targets to comply with their demands (e.g., government); to mobilize third party actors to act; or, to stir society and public
opinion in order to change attitudes or behaviours that benefit the interests of the perpetrators. Successful victimization of sectors of society signals to the public at home and abroad that the State cannot protect them effectively, and this sense of insecurity may be further exploited by violent extremist organizations (see further Module 2) (Schmid, 2006, p. 4). The ability of terrorist organizations to manipulate wider audiences by the public victimization of a few indirect victims in an environment that is media-rich has transformed terrorism from a marginal mode of protest, blackmail and intimidation into a major form of psychological warfare.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEN TERRORIST AUDIENCES*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The adversary/-ies of the terrorist organization (usually one or several governments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The constituency/society of the adversary/-ies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The targeted direct victims and their families and friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Others who have reason to fear that they might be the next targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. “Neutral” distant audiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The supporting constituency of the terrorist organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Potential sympathetic sectors of domestic and foreign audiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other terrorist groups rivalling for prominence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The terrorist and his or her organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exercises and case studies

This section contains suggestions for in-class or pre-class educational exercises, while a post-class assignment for assessing student understanding of the Module is suggested in a separate section.

The exercises in this section are most appropriate for classes of up to 50 students, where students can be easily organized into small groups in which they discuss cases or conduct activities before group representatives provide feedback to the entire class. Although it is possible to have the same small group structure in large classes comprising a few hundred students, it is more challenging and the lecturer might wish to adapt the facilitation techniques to ensure sufficient time for group discussions as well as providing feedback to the entire class. The easiest way to deal with the requirement for small group discussion in a large class is to ask students to discuss the issues with the four or five students sitting close to them. Give time limitations; not all groups will be able to provide feedback in each exercise. It is recommended that the lecturer makes random selections and tries to ensure that all groups get the opportunity to provide feedback at least once during the session. If time permits, the lecturer could facilitate a discussion in plenary after each group has provided feedback.

All exercises in this section are appropriate for both graduate and undergraduate students. However, as students’ prior knowledge and exposure to these issues varies widely, decisions about the appropriateness of exercises should be based on their educational and social context.

Exercise 1: Kahoot quiz (see Teaching Guide)

A great way of engaging students in an interactive manner is by means of a quiz. This could either be by using an online tool such as Kahoot or orally in a classroom setting if such technology is not available. There are different ways in which a quiz could be used, such as testing general knowledge about terrorism at the start of the University Module Series and/or at the end as a means of consolidating module learning. The examples detailed here are illustrative of the types of general knowledge questions that could be asked, and be readily adapted to your own, for example, national or regional perspectives. The correct answers are in bold.

1. When was the first time the word “terrorism” was used?
   a. French Revolution 1794
   b. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 1937
   c. Convention on Offices and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963
   d. Iranian Revolution 1979
2. Which of the following is a form of terrorism?
   a. Hostage taking
   b. Organized crime
   c. Extremism
   d. Trafficking

3. How many terrorist attacks worldwide were recorded during 2016?*
   a. 6,771
   b. 9,351
   c. 11,072
   d. 13,463

4. What was the value of insurance property losses attributable to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks?*
   a. US$13 billion
   b. US$19 billion
   c. US$25 billion
   d. US$32 billion

* Terrorism statistics are available from websites such as www.statista.com, which was the source of the statistics drawn upon here.

Case Study 1: Designation of terrorist groups

An exercise that could be used to facilitate group discussions in class or as a possible assessment exercise (e.g., along similar lines as was done for the case studies) would be to ask students to discuss or develop case studies of groups that might be regarded as terrorist groups operating within your own country or region. Groups could assume the role of members of the Security Council 1267 Committee, tasked with assessing the possible adoption or designation of such groups as terrorist groups under Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and related resolutions. In doing so, they could consider the factors relevant to such assessments, the evidential sufficiency required for designations, and the applicable legal and procedural safeguards that should be available to individuals or groups under consideration for designation.
Possible class structure

This section contains recommendations for a teaching sequence and timing intended to achieve learning outcomes through a three-hour class. The lecturer may wish to disregard or shorten some of the segments below in order to dedicate more time to other elements, including introduction, icebreakers, conclusions or short breaks. The structure could also be adapted for shorter or longer classes, given that the class durations vary across countries.

0–10 mins  Briefly introduce topic, session learning outcomes and outline structure.
10–30 mins  Undertake exercise 1: Kahoot quiz.
30–50 mins  Discuss the introduction to the global terrorism landscape/brief history of terrorism/terrorism in the nineteenth century.
50–55 mins  Short break.
100–105 mins Short break.
105–145 mins Discuss case study 1: United Nations designated terrorist groups and targeted sanctions.
145–170 mins Discuss terrorist victimization.
170–180 mins If appropriate, introduce the assessment questions with relevant marking criteria.
Core reading

This section provides a list of open access materials that the lecturer could ask the students to read before taking a class based on this Module.

**TERRORISM**


**TERRORIST VICTIMIZATION**

Advanced reading

This section recommends advanced reading for students interested in exploring the topic(s) of this module in more detail, and for lecturers teaching the Module.

**TERRORISM**


TERRORIST VICTIMIZATION


Student assessment

This section provides a suggestion(s) for a post-class assignment(s) for the purpose of assessing student understanding of the Module. Suggestions for pre-class or in-class assignments are provided in the exercises section.

ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

• Critically compare past and present forms of terrorism in order to identify and evaluate areas of similarity and difference between them.

• Do any real distinctions exist between “old” and “new” forms of terrorism? Discuss, with examples.

• “There is no real difference between the criminal acts or motivations of Al Qaida and ISIL.” Discuss with examples.

• Critically explain some of the reasons why no universal definition of terrorism currently exists. In light of your findings, do you consider it possible that agreement on a definition might be reached any time soon? Critically examine the United Nations approach to countering terrorism, and threats presented by particular terrorist groups designated by the United Nations Security Council under resolution 1267 (1999). Identify some of the key strengths and weaknesses of this approach, and suggest how, if at all, this approach might be improved.

• Critically explain the effect, if any, that the absence of a universal definition of terrorism might have on the robustness of procedures for the designation of individuals and groups as terrorists, within the United Nations system under Security resolution 1267 (1999), or at a national or multilateral level (e.g., the European Union). How might any rights-based concerns associated with such procedures be addressed or mitigated?

• Critically evaluate the different types of terrorist victim. Consider whether and, if so, what type of victims have been the most prevalent within your own region and why.
Additional teaching tools

This section includes links to relevant teaching aides such as PowerPoint slides, video material, case studies, and other resources that could help the lecturer teach the issues covered by the Module. The slides and other resources can be adapted by lecturers.

PowerPoint presentation on Module 1:

Additional online resources provide various details on a wide range of terrorism-related themes, including current trends/threats, details on different non-State terrorist groups, which organizations have been "blacklisted" by States as prohibited terrorist groups, and so forth. Some examples of such resources are given here:

- Terrorism Research, “Categories of Terrorist Groups”.
- United States Department of State (2003). U.S. Executive Order 13224. Appendix C: Background Information on Terrorist Groups. For a current list, updated regularly, of terrorists and groups identified under E.O. 13224, see Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department Under E.O. 13224.
References

BOOKS/E-BOOKS


BOOK CHAPTERS


• Schmid, Alex (2006). “Magnitudes and Focus of Terrorist Victimization.” In Uwe Ewald and Ksenija Turković eds. Large-Scale Victimisation as a Potential Source of Terrorist Activities. IOS Press.


CASES


CONVENTIONS, ChARTERS AND TREATIES

• Atlantic Charter. 14 August 1941.


JOURNAL/ONLINE ARTICLES AND PRESENTATIONS


UNITED NATIONS MATERIALS

- Security Council resolution 1267 (1999).

REPORTS AND REMARKS
